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 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
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 PREFACE
The COVERED CASES AND J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES was
crafted as an apt response for the need to provide a comprehensive compilation of
jurisprudence, promulgated by the Supreme Court, covered for this year’s Bar
Examinations. This complement significantly the other bar review materials in the
repository of the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations.

On this year’s edition, the COVERED CASES is in two forms: a printed copy of
the Covered Cases: Case Doctrines, and a digital copy of the Covered Cases: Case
Digests which include the Supreme Court decisions released from July 1, 2017 to June
30, 2018; while the J. PERLAS-BERNABE CASE DOCTRINES includes the
summary of the rulings pronounced by the 2019 Bar Examination Chairperson, the
Honorable Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, from September 16, 2011 to December
31, 2018.

In addition to that, the cases herein are categorized and arranged based on the
2019 Supreme Court Bar Exam Syllabus in order to guide its readers in their
appreciation and understanding of the court decisions.

With this material, the San Beda Centralized Bar Operations seeks to uphold
its legacy of service and excellence in helping the examinees achieve their goal of
becoming worthy members of the legal profession.

UT IN OMNIBUS GLORIFICETUR DEUS!

THIS IS THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE

SAN BEDA UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW
CENTRALIZED BAR OPERATIONS.

THE UNAUTHORIZED COPYING, REPRODUCTION,

MODIFICATION OR DISTRIBUTION
OF ANY OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS BOOK IS
STRICTLY PROHIBITED.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
REMEDIAL LAW
Page
Number

Hon. Michael Rama, in his capacity as Mayor of Cebu City, et.al. vs. ……………..…. 1
Hon. Gilbert Moises, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 18, Cebu
City et. al.
G.R. No. 197146; August 08, 2017

Joshua Casanas y Cabantac vs. People of the Philippines …………………………….. 2

G.R. No. 223833; December 11, 2017
Glynna Foronda-Crystal vs. Aniana Lawas Son ………………………………………….. 3
G.R. No. 221815; November 29, 2017
Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Co. ……………. 4
G.R. No. 196795; March 07, 2018
North Greenhills Association, Inc. vs. Atty. Narciso Morales ………………………….. 5
G.R. No. 222821; August 09, 2017
Heirs of Ernesto Morales vs. Astrid Morales Agustin, ………………………………….. 6
represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Edgardo Torres
G.R. No. 224849; June 6, 2018
First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. ………………………………………………. 7
Philippine Bank of Communications
G.R. No. 202836; June 19, 2018
Alona G. Roldan vs. Spouses Clarence I. Barrios ………………………………………. 8
and Anna Lee T. Barrios, Rommel Matorres, and Hon. Jemena Abellar Arbis, in her
Capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Aldan
G.R. No. 214803; April 23, 2018

Stephen A. Antig, as representative of AMS BANANA EXPORTER, INC. …………… 9

(formerly AMS Farming Corporation) vs. Anastacio Antipuesto, in his own
capacity and as representative of AMS Kapalong Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
Multipurpose Cooperative (AMSKARBEMCO) and its members
G.R. No. 192396; January 17, 2018
Heirs of Tunged vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. …………………………. 10
G.R. No. 231737; March 6, 2018

Jose Audie Abagatnan, et. al. vs. Spouses Jonathan and Elsa Clarito ………………. 11
G.R. No. 211966; August 7, 2017

Alfonso Singson Cortal vs. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises ……………………………. 12

G.R. No. 199107; August 30, 2017
Floro Mercene vs. Government Service Insurance System …………………………….. 13
G.R. No. 192971; January 10, 2018
Donald Gaffney vs. Gina Butler ………………………………………………………………. 14
G.R. No. 219408; November 8, 2017
Teodulfo Lao et.al vs. LGU of Cagayan De Oro City et. al. ……………………………… 15
G.R. No. 187869; September 13, 2017
Luis Juan L. Virata vs. Alejandro Ng Wee ……………………………………………….… 16
G.R. No. 221058; March 21, 2018
Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Spouses Sabado ………………………………………….. 17
G.R. No. 224204; August 30, 2017
Conchita Uy, et. al vs. Crispulo Del Castillo ………………………………………………. 18
G.R. No. 223610; July 24, 2017

Rudy L. Racpan vs. Sharon Barroga Haigh ……………………………………………….. 19

G.R. No. 234499; June 6, 2018
Ley Construction and Development Corp. vs. Marvin Sedano ………………………… 20
G.R. No. 222711; August 23, 2017
Planters Development Bank vs. Spouses Victoriano and Melanie Ramos …………... 21
G.R. No. 228617; September 20, 2017

Yolanda Villanueva-Ong vs. Juan Ponce Enrile ...............................................……….. 22

G.R. No. 212904; November 22, 2017
Senator Leila M. De Lima vs. Hon. Juanita Guerrero …………………………………….. 23
G.R. No. 229781; October 10, 2017
Ben Line Agencies Philippines, Inc. vs. Charles M.C. Madson ………………………… 24
G.R. No. 195887; January 10, 2018
Ramon K. Ilusorio et al. vs. Sylvia K. Ilusorio …………………………………………….. 25
G.R. No. 210475; April 11, 2018
Charlie Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co. ………………………………………………. 26
G.R. No. 207354; January 10, 2018
Brgy. Tongonan, Ormoc City vs. Hon. Apolinario M. Buaya …………………………… 27
G.R. No. 204183; June 20, 2018
Societe Des Produits, Nestle, S.A. vs. Puregold Price Club, Inc. ……………………… 28
G.R. No. 217194; September 6, 2018
Heirs of Fermin Arania vs. Intestate Estate of Magdalena R. Sangalang …………….. 29
G.R. No. 193208; December 13, 2017
Ma. Victoria M. Galang vs. Peakhold Finance Corporation …………………………….. 30
G.R. No. 233922; January 24, 2018
Bernardo S. Zamora vs. Emmanuel Z. Quinan, Jr. et al. ………………………………… 31
G.R. No. 216139; Nov. 29, 2017
GSIS vs. Albert Velasco ………………………………………………………………………. 32
G.R. No. 196564; August 07, 2017

Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. CIR …………………………………. 33

G.R. No. 205925; June 20, 2018
Philippine Savings Bank vs. Josephine L. Papa …………………………………………. 34
G.R. No. 200469; January 15, 2018
Magsaysay Maritime Corp./Air-Sea Holiday GMBH Stable …………………………….. 35
Organization Italia/Marlon R. Rono vs. Elmer V. Enanor
G.R. No. 224115; June 20, 2018

Express Padala S.P.A. vs. Helen M. Ocampo ……………………………………………… 36

G.R. No. 202505; Sept. 06, 2017
G. V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Tiara Commercial Corporation ……………………….. 37
G.R. No. 201378; October 18, 2017
Carolina Que Villongco, et al. vs. Cecilia Que Yabut, et al. …………………………….. 38
G.R. Nos. 225022 & 225024; February 5, 2018
Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals ……………………………………….. 39
G.R. No. 203298; January 17, 2018
Bobie Rose D. V. Frias vs. Rolando F. Alcayde …………………………………………… 40
G.R. No. 194262; February 28, 2018

Steel Corporation of the Philippines vs. Bureau of Customs …………………………. 41

G.R. No. 220502; February 12, 2018
Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Peter Sy, et. al. ………………………………………………… 42
G.R. No. 185647; July 26, 2017
Bernice Joan Ti vs. Manuel S. Dino ………………………………………………………… 43
G.R. No. 219260; November 06, 2017
Lily S. Villamil vs. Spouses Juanito Erguiza ……………………………………………… 44
G.R. No. 195999; June 20, 2018

Alex Raul Blay vs. Cynthia B. Baña ………………………………………………………… 45

G.R. No. 232189; March 7, 2018
Emmanuel Lu vs. Marissa Lu Chiong, et al. ……………………………………………….. 46
G.R. No. 220070; April 16, 2018

Angeline Chua and Heirs of Jose Ma. Cheng Sing Phuan vs. …………………………. 47
Spouses Santiago Cheng and Avelina Sihiyon
G.R. No. 219309; November 22, 2017
Sultan Cawal P. Mangondaya vs. Naga Ampaso ………………………….………………. 48
G.R. No. 201763; March 21, 2018

Lilia S. Duque, et. al. vs. Spouses Bartolome D. Yu and ……………………………….. 49

Juliet O. Yu, et. al.
G.R. No. 226130; February 19, 2018

Spouses Loreto and Milagros Sibay, et. al. vs. Spouses Bienvenido ………………… 50
and Juanita Bermudez
G.R. No. 198196; July 17, 2017

Armando Lagon vs. Dennis A. Velasco ……………………………………………………. 51

G.R. No. 208424; February 14, 2018

Cathay Land, Inc. vs. Ayala Land, Inc. ……………………………………………………… 52

G.R. No. 210209; August 9, 2017
Amando Go. vs. East Ocean Leasing and Finance Corporation ………………………. 53
G.R. No. 206841-42; January 19, 2018

Jesus Dujali Buot vs. Roque Dasay Dujali ………………………………………………… 54

G.R. No. 199885; October 2, 2017
Angelito L. Cristobal vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. …………………………………………. 55
G.R. No. 201622; October 4, 2017
Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines vs. …………………. 56
Philippine Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 178083; March 13, 2018
Velia J. Cruz vs. Spouses Christensen …………………………..................................... 57
G.R. No. 205539; October 4, 2017
Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. vs. Multi-Realty Development Corp. …………. 58
G.R. No. 185530; April 18, 2018
Fernando Melendres vs. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez ………………….. 59
and Jose Pepito M. Amores, M.D.
G.R. No. 194346; June 18, 2018
Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Spouses Huang …………………………………………………… 60
G.R. No. 197654; August 9, 2017
Rogelio Antone vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………………………. 61
G.R. No. 225146; November 20, 2017
Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. vs. VTL Realty, Inc. …………………………………………. 62
G.R. No. 193499; April 23, 2018
Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARMPC) …………….. 63
vs. Carmencita Diaz
G.R. No. 206331; June 4, 2018
Roberto A. Torres vs. Antonia F. Aruego ………………………………………………….. 64
G.R. No. 201271; September 20, 2017
Ophelia Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan …………………………………………………………. 65
G.R. No. 217874. Dec. 5, 2017
Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the DPWH) vs. ………………………. 66
Heirs of Cirilo Gotengco
G.R. No. 226355, January 24, 2018
Samson Lim Bio Hian vs. Joaquin Lim Eng Tian ………………………………………… 67
G.R. No. 195472; January 08, 2018
Edward Thomas Joson vs. Office of Ombudsman ………………………………………. 68
G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435; August 9, 2017
Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited vs. …………………. 69
Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
G.R. No. 196072; September 20, 2017
Lourdes Padayhag vs. Director of Lands and Southern Mindanao Colleges ……….. 70
G.R. No, 202872 & 206062; November 22, 2017
Philcontrust Resources Inc. vs. Carlos Santiago, et. al. ……………………………….. 71
G.R. No. 174670; July 26, 2017
Mario Magat, Sr. et. al., vs. Tantrade Corp. ………………………………………………… 72
G.R. No. 205483; August 23, 2017
Editha B. Albor vs. Court of Appeals ………………………………………………………. 73
G.R. No. 196598; January 17, 2018
Henry E. Yu vs. SR Metals, Inc. ……………………………………………………………… 74
G.R. No. 214249; September 25, 2017
United Interior Manggahan Homeowner’s Association vs. …………………………….. 75
Hon Ambrosio De Luna G.R. No. 216788; November 20, 2017
Mark Montelibano vs. Linda Yap …………………………………………………………….. 76
G.R. No. 197475; December 6, 2017
Swire Realty Development Corp. vs. Specialty Contracts ……………………………… 77
General and Construction Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 188027; August 9, 2017
CE Construction Corp. vs. Araneta Center, Inc. …………………………………………... 78
G.R. No. 192725; August 9, 2017
Ariel A. Ebuenga vs. Southfield Agencies, Inc. …………………………………………… 79
G.R. No. 208396; March 14, 2018
Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center vs. Asiamed Supplies …………………… 80
and Equipment Corp.
G.R. No. 205638; August 23, 2018
Belina Cancio and Jeremy Pampolina vs. Performance Foreign ……………………… 81
Exchange Corporation
G.R. No. 182307; June 6, 2018
Francisco Chavez vs. Imelda Marcos ………………………………………………………. 82
G.R. No. 185484; June 27, 2018
Lourdes Estrellado vs. Presiding Judge of the MTC in cities, …………………………. 83
11th Judicial Region, Branch 3, Davao City
G.R. No. 164482 & 211320; November 8, 2017
Angel Fuellas Dizon vs. People of the Philippines ………………………………………. 84
G.R. No. 227577; January 24, 2018
Analyn De Los Santos et. al. vs. Joel Lucenio ……………………………………………. 85
G.R. No. 215659, March 19, 2018
Republic of the Philippines vs. Banal na Pag-aaral, Inc. ……………………………….. 86
G.R. No. 193305; February 5, 2018
Dr. Gil J. Rich vs. Guillermo Paloma III, et al. ……………………………………………… 87
G.R. No. 210538; March 7, 2018
Teodorico Castillo, Alice Castillo, and St. Ezekiel School, Inc. vs. ……………………. 88
Bank of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. 214053; June 6, 2018

Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Franklin Cual, et. Al ………………………….. 89

G.R. No. 207684; July 17, 2017
Heirs of Peñaflor vs. Heirs of Dela Cruz ……………………………………………………. 90
G.R. No. 197797; August 9, 2017
Rolando Soliva vs. Reynaldo Taleon ……………………………………………………….. 91
A.M. No. P-16-3511; September 06, 2017
Spouses Rosalino and Sylia Reyes vs. Spouses Herbery and Wienna Chung ……... 92
G.R. No. 228112; September 13, 2017
Cecilia Rivac vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………………………….. 93
G.R. No. 224673; January 22, 2018
Saturnino C. Ocampo et. al., vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez ………………….. 94
(in his capacity as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs,
Armed Forces of The Philippines
G.R. No. 225973; August 8, 2017
Daniel A. Villareal, Jr. vs. MWSS …………………………………………………………….. 95
G.R. No. 232202; February 28, 2018
Heirs of Piedad vs. Candelaria and Mariano Bobilles ……………………………………. 96
G.R. No. 208614; November 27, 2017
Douglas F. Anama vs. Citibank ……………………………………………………………… 97
G.R. No. 192048; December 13, 2017
Tee Ling Kiat vs. Ayala Corp. ………………………………………………………………… 98
G.R. No. 192530; March 07, 2018
Felicitas L. Salazar vs. Remedios Felias …………………………………………………… 99
G.R. No. 213972; February 5, 2018
Heirs of Yusingco vs. Busilak ……………………………………………………………….. 100
G.R. No. 210504; January 24, 2018
Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Elmer T. Vallecer …………………………………………… 101
G.R. No. 227124; December 06, 2017
Teresa R. Ignacio vs. Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City ……………………. 102
G.R. No. 221620; September 11, 2017
Jose Diaz, Jr. vs. Salvador Valenciano, Jr. ………………………………………………… 103
G.R. No. 209376; December 6, 2017
Angelica Cruz vs. Marylou Tolentino ……………………………………………………….. 104
G.R. No. 210446; April 18, 2018
Spouses Firmo and Agnes Rosario vs. Priscilla P. Alvar ………………………………. 105
G.R. No. 212731; September 6, 2017

Tsuneishi Heavy Industries (Cebu), Inc. vs. Mis Maritime Corporation ……………… 106
G.R. No. 193572; April 4, 2018
Bicol Medical Center vs. NoeBotor …………………………………………………………. 107
G.R. No. 214073; October 4, 2017
Hon. Mylyn Cayabyab vs. Jaime Dimson …………………………………………………... 108
G.R. No. 223862; July 10, 2017
SM Investments Corporation vs. MAC Graphics Carranz International Corp. ………. 109
G.R. Nos. 224131-32; June 25, 2018
Power Generation Employees Association-NPC vs. National Power Corp. …………. 110
G.R. No. 187420; August 8, 2017
Evy Construction and Development Corporation vs. Valiant Roll Forming …………. 111
Sales Corporation
G.R. No. 207938; October 11, 2017
Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation vs. Spouses Danilo Cereño ……………………….. 112
and Cerina Cereño, G.R. No. 218236; February 07, 2018
Excellent Essentials International Corporation vs. ………………………………………. 113
Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 192797; April 18, 2018

Demosthenes Arbilon vs. Sofronio Manlangit …………………………………………….. 114

G.R. No. 197920; January 22, 2018

Bureau of Internal Revenue vs. Hon. Ernesto Acosta, et. al. …………………………… 115
G.R. No. 195320; April 23, 2018
Career Executive Service Board vs. Civil Service Commission ………………………. 116
G.R. No. 196890; January 11, 2018
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals ………………………………………. 117
G.R. No. 206167; March 19, 2018
Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. National Development Co. ……………. 118
G.R. No. 213039; November 27, 2017
Agnes Coeli Bugaoisan vs. Owi Group Manila …………………………………………… 119
G.R. No. 226208; February 7, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan …………………………………………….. 120
G.R. Nos. 228494-96; March 21, 2018
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas ………. 121
G.R. No. 200678; June 04, 2018
National Electrification Administration (NEA) vs. ……………………………………….. 122
Maguindanao Electric Cooperative, Inc.
G.R. Nos. 192595-96; April 11, 2018
Ma. Sugar M. Mercado vs. Hon. Joel Socrates S. Lopena ………………………………. 123
G.R. No. 230170; June 6, 2018
Republic of the Philippines vs. Florie Grace Cote ………………………………………... 124
G.R. No. 212860; March 14, 2018
Government Service Insurance System Board of Trustees and Cristina vs. ……….. 125
Astudillo vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals – Cebu City and Former Judge Ma. Lorna
P. Demonteverde
G.R. No. 230953; June 20, 2018
Gov. Aurora E. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission ………………………………….. 126
G.R. No. 180845; November 22, 2017
Adtel, Inc. vs. Marijoy Valdez …………………………………………………………………. 127
G.R. No. 189942; August 9, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Juan Roberto L. Abling …………. 128
G.R. No. 198119; September 27, 2017
Saturnino C. Ocampo et. al., vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez ………………….. 129
(in his capacity as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs,
Armed Forces of The Philippines
G.R. No. 225973; August 8, 2017
Privatization and Management Office (PMO) vs. Edgardo vs. Quesada ……………… 130
G.R. No. 224507; September 20, 2017
Marvin Cruz and Francisco Cruz, in his capacity as Bondsman vs. ………………….. 131
People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 224974; July 3, 2017
Bureau of Customs vs. Hon. Paulino Q. Gallegos ………………………………………... 132
G.R. No. 220832; February 28, 2018
Genpact Services, Inc, and Danilo Sebastian Reyes, vs. ………………………………. 133
Maria Katrina Santosfalceso
G.R. No. 227695; July 31, 2017
Republic of the Philippines vs. O.G. Holdings Corporation ………………………….… 134
G.R. No. 189290; November 29, 2017
Republic of the Philippines vs. Alvin C. Dimarucot and ………………………………… 135
Nailyn Tanedo- Dimarucot, G.R. No. 202069; March 07, 2018
Spouses Larry and Flora Davis vs. Spouses Florencio and Lucresia Davis ……….. 136
G.R. No. 233489; March 07, 2018
Evelyn L. Miranda et. al. vs. Sandiganbayan ……………………………………………… 137
G.R. No. 144760-61; August 2, 2017
Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion vs. People of the Philippines ………………………. 138
and Carmelita Punongbayan
G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018

Republic of the Philippines, represented by ………………………………………………. 139

Solicitor General Jose C. Calida vs. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428; May 11, 2018
Republic of the Philippines, represented by ……………………………………………… 140
Solicitor General Jose C. Calida vs. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428; May 11, 2018

National Power Corporation vs. Apolonio Marasigan et. al. …………………………… 141
G.R. No. 220367; November 20, 2017
Lucila Yared vs. Land Bank of the Philippines …………………………………………… 142
G.R. No. 213945; January 24, 2018
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raul T. Manzano ……………………………………… 143
G.R. No. 188243; January 24, 2018
Paz E. Rebadulla vs. Republic ……………………………………………………………….. 144
G.R. Nos. 222159 & 222171; January 31, 2018
Republic of The Philippines vs. Leonor Macabagdal ……………………………………. 145
G.R. No. 227215; January 10, 2018
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Herederos De Ciriaco ………………………………… 146
Chunaco Distileria, Inc., G.R. No. 206992; June 11, 2018
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) vs. Eugenio Dalauta ………………………………. 147
G.R. No. 190004; August 8, 2017
Republic of the Philippines vs. Belly H. Ng ……………………………………………….. 148
G.R. No. 229335; November 29, 2017
The Manila Banking Corporation vs. ………………………………………………………... 149
Bases Conversion and Development Authority
G.R. No. 230144; January 22, 2018

Ma. Rosario Agarrado, et. al. vs. Cristita Librando-Agarrado ………………………….. 150
and Ana Lou Agarrado-King
G.R. No. 212413; June 6, 2018

Teresita Bugayong-Santiago vs. Teofilo Bugayong ……………………………………… 151

G.R. No. 220389; December 6, 2017
Queen Errika Saddi vs. Maricris Renomeron ……………………………………………… 152
G.R. No. 211004; August 23, 2017
Rene Michael French vs. Court of Appeals ……………………………………………….. 153
G.R. No. 220057; July 12, 2017
Eversley Childs Sanitarium vs. Spouses Barbarona ……………………………………. 154
G.R. No. 195814; April 4, 2018).
Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte vs. Spouses Silvino S. Estomo ………………………… 155
G.R. No. 223399; April 23, 2018
Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. ………………….. 156
vs. Dela Cruz G.R. No. 208284; April 23, 2018
Pablo C. Hidalgo vs. Sonia Velasco …………………………………………………………. 157
G.R. No. 202217; April 25, 2018

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) vs. Federico A. Serra ………………. 158
G.R. No. 216124; July 19, 2017
Bro. Bernard Oca et.al. vs. Laurita Custodio ………………………………………………. 159
G.R. No. 199825; July 26, 2017
Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Commission on Audit …………………………….. 160
G.R. No. 213525; November 21, 2017
L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. vs. Mcdonald's Corporation ………………………………….. 161
G.R. No. 233073; February 14, 2018

Teresa R. Ignacio vs. Ramon Reyes et. al. …………………………………………………. 162

G.R. No. 213192; July 12, 2017
In The Matter of the Intestate Estate of Reynaldo Guzman Rodriguez; ………………. 163
Anita Ong Tan vs. Rolando C. Rodriguez, et. al.
G.R. No. 230404; January 21, 2018
Amparo S. Cruz vs. Angelito S. Cruz ……………………………………………………….. 164
G.R. No. 211153; February 28, 2018
In The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas Corpus, Ssgt. Edgardo L. Osorio ……….. 165
vs. Assistant State Prosecutor Juan Pedro C. Navera et al.
G.R. No. 223272; February 26, 2018

The Republic of the Philippines vs. Virgie (Virgel) L. Tipay ……………………………. 166
G.R. No. 209527; February 14, 2018
The Republic of the Philippines vs. Michelle Soriano Gallo ……………………………. 167
G.R. No. 207074; January 17, 2018

Priscilla Z. Orbe vs. Leonora O. Miaral ………………………………………………….…. 168

G.R. No. 217777; August 16, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Jerson Dasmarinas y Gonzalez ………………………… 169
G.R. No. 203986; October 4, 2017
AAA vs. BBB …………………………………………………………………………………….. 170
G.R. No. 212448; January 11, 2018

Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna Inc. vs. Melanie M. Canicon …………………………… 171
G.R. No. 196015; June 27, 2018
Securities and Exchange Commission vs. ………………………………………………… 172
Price Richardson Corporation, Consuelo Velarde-Albert, and Gordon Resnik
G.R. No. 197032; July 26, 2017
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Manu Gidwani …………………………. 173
G.R. No. 234616; June 20, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Delos Santos …………………………………….. 174
G.R. No. 220685; November 29, 2017
Robertson S. Chiang vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. ………………….. 175
G.R. No. 196679; December 13, 2017
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Pangasinan Legal Aid ……………………………….. 176
and Jay-Ar R. Senin vs. Department of Justice, Provincial Prosecutor's Office,
Burau of Jail Management and Penology, and Philippine National Police
G.R. No. 232413; July 15, 2017
Public Attorney’s Office vs. Office of the Ombudsman …………………………………. 177
and Atty. Terencia Erni Rivera
G.R. No. 197613 November 22, 2017
Carmencita O. Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan …………………………………………………. 178
G.R. Nos. 203797-98; June 27, 2018

Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………….. 179

G.R. No. 227038; July 31, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Joselito Bringcula y Fernandez ………………………… 180
G.R. No. 226400; January 24, 2018
Leniza Reyes y Capistrano vs. People of the Philippines …………….………………… 181
G.R. No. 229380; June 6, 2018

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Escobar ……………………………………………. 182

G.R. No. 214300; July 26, 2017
Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan …………………………………………………..… 183
G.R. No. 224162; November 07, 2017
Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan …………………………………………………….. 184
G.R. No. 224162; February 6, 2018
Teodora Altobano-Ruiz vs. Hon. Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay ………………………… 185
A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893; February 19, 2018

Estipona, Jr. y Asuela vs. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo ………………………………………… 186

G.R. No. 226679; August 15, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Garin y Osorio …………………………………… 187
G.R. No. 222654; February 21, 2018

People of the Philippines vs. Roger Dominguez y Santos, et al. ……………………… 188
G.R. No. 229420; February 19, 2018
Angelito Magno vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………………………. 189
G.R. No. 230657; March 14, 2018

Dr. Francisco M. Malabanan vs. Sandiganbayan ……………….………………………… 190

G.R. Nos. 186584-86 & 198598; August 2, 2017
Miguel D. Escobar et. al. vs. People of the Philippines ………………………………… 191
G.R. No. 205576; November 20, 2017

Farouk B. Abubakar vs. People ………………………………………………………………. 192

G.R. No. 202408, 202409, 202412; June 27, 2018

Allan S. Cu vs. Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation ……………….. 193
G.R. No. 211222; August 07, 2017
Napoleon O. Cedeno vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………………… 194
G.R. Nos. 193020 & 193040-193042; November 8, 2017
Personal Collection Direct Selling Inc., vs. Teresita Carandang ………………………. 195
G.R. No. 106958; November 8, 2017
John Dennis G. Chua vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………………… 196
G.R. No. 195248; November 22, 2017

Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit ……………………………….. 197
in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170, Malabon City
A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC; September 5, 2017
Jorge Dabon a.k.a. George Debone vs. People of the Philippines……………………... 198
G.R. No. 208775, January 22, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad ……………………. 199
G.R. No. 196045; February 21, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Renante Comprado y Bronola …………………………… 200
G.R. No. 213225; April 4, 2018
Jaylord Dimal and Allan Castillo vs. People of the Philippines ……………………….. 201
G.R. No. 216922; April 18, 2018

Norlina G. Sibayan vs. Elizabeth O. Alda ………………………………………………….. 202

G.R. No. 233395; January 17, 2018
Raffy Brodeth and Rolan Onal vs. People of the Philippines ………………………….. 203
and Abraham Villegas
G.R. No. 197849; November 29, 2017

People of the Philippines vs. Romaldo Lumayag y Dela Cruz, et al. …………………. 204
G.R. No. 181474; July 26, 2017
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan ………………………………………………………………… 205
G.R. No. 189590; April 23, 2018
Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation vs. Gammon Philippines, Inc. ……….. 206
G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Dela Rosa Y Lumanog “Manny" ………………. 207
G.R. No. 230228; December 13, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Benedicto Veedor, Jr. y Molod ………………………….. 215
G.R. No. 223525; June 25, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Jovencito Miranda y Tigas ………………………………. 220
G.R. No. 229671; January 31, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Vicente Sipin ……………………………………………….. 227
G.R. No. 224290; June 11, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Narciso Supat y Radoc ……………………………………. 228
G.R. No. 217027; June 6, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Glenn De Guzman y Delos Reyes ……………………… 233
G.R. No. 219955; February 5, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Dumagay y Suacito ………………………………. 234
G.R. No. 216753; February 7, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Abdulwahid Pundugar ……………………………………. 235
G.R. No. 214779; February 7, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Raul Manansala y Maninang ……………………………. 236
G.R. No. 229092; February 21, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Geronimo y Agustine ………………………… 237
G.R. No. 180447; August 23, 2017
PO2 Jessie Flores y De Leon vs. People of the Philippines …………………………… 239
G.R. No. 222861; April 23, 2018
Hilario Lamsen vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………………………… 240
G.R. No. 227069; November 22, 2017
Philippine National Bank vs. James Cua …………………………………………………… 241
G.R. No. 199161; April 18, 2018

People of the Philippines vs. Crisente Pepano Nuñez …………………………………… 242

G.R. No. 209342; October 4, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli ………………………. 243
G.R. No 203121; November 29, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores …………………………….. 244
G.R. No. 208013; July 3, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Golidan ………………………………………..…. 245
G.R. No. 205307; January 11, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Rupal ………………………………………………… 246
G.R. No. 222497; June 27, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Tanglao y Egana ………………………………… 247
G.R. No. 219613; June 13, 2018).
Spouses Cipriano Pamplona and Bibiana Intac, vs. Spouses Lilia I. Cueto …………. 248
and Vedasto Cueto
G.R. No. 204735; February 19, 2018
Fernando Mancol, Jr. vs. Development Bank of the Philippines ……………………… 249
G.R. No. 204289; November 22, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Badillos ……………………………………… 250
G.R. No. 215732, June 6, 2018
(People of the Philippines vs. Geraldo Santillan y Villanueva ………………………… 251
and Eugene Borromeo y Natividad
G.R. No. 227878; August 9, 2017
Heirs of Peter Donton through their legal representative, Felipe G. Capulong ……... 252
vs. Stier and Maggay
G.R. No. 216491; August 23, 2017
Teodora C. Tortona vs. Julian C. Gregorio ………………………………………………… 253
G.R. No. 202612; January 17, 2018
People vs. Andrada y Caampued ……………………………………………………………. 254
G.R. No. 232299; June 20, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Rommel Diputado …………………………………………. 255
G.R. No. 213922; July 5, 2017

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph San Jose y Gregorio ……………………………. 256
and Jonathan San Jose y Gregorio
G.R. No. 206916; July 3, 2017
Marlon Bacerra y Tabones vs. People of the Philippines ………………………………. 257
G.R. No. 204544; July 3, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Gunsay y Tolentino ……………………………… 258
G.R. No. 223678; July 5, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Ernie Carillo y Pabello …………………………………… 259
and Ronald Espique y Legaspi
G.R. No. 212814; July 12, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Marcial D. Pulgo …………………………………………… 260
G.R. No. 218205; July 5, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Federico Gerola y Amar ………………………………….. 261
G.R. No. 217973; July 19, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Rene Boy Dimapilit y Abellado …………………………. 262
G.R. No. 210802; August 9, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio N. Polangcus …………………………………….. 263
G.R. No. 216940; December 13, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Moises Dejolde, Jr. y Salino …………………………….. 264
G.R. No. 219238; January 31, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Junrel R. Villalobos ……………………………………….. 265
G.R. No. 228960; June 11, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Ardin Cuesta Cadampog ………………………………… 266
G.R. No. 218244; June 13, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Romulo Bandoquillo ……………………………………… 267
G.R. No. 218913; February 7, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Ronnie Dela Cruz a.k.a. “Barok” ………………………… 268
G.R. No. 219088; June 13, 2018
Petronilo Napone, Jr. and Edgar Napone vs. People of the Philippines ……………… 269
G.R. No. 193085; November 29, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Llamera y Atienza ………………………………. 270
G.R. No. 218703; April 23, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Herminio Vidal, Jr. y Uayan ………………………………. 271
G.R. No. 229678; June 20, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Michael Delima …………………………………………….. 272
G.R. No. 222645; June 27, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Carlos Bauit y Delos Santos ……………………………. 273
G.R. No. 223102; February 14, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Empuesto y Socrate ………………………………. 274
G.R. No. 218245; January 17, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Balao y Lopez ………………………………………. 275
G.R. No. 207805; November 22, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Grabador, Jr., ……………………………………. 276
Roger Abierra, Dante Abierra and Alex Abierra
G.R. No. 227504; June 13, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Ruperto Rubillar, Jr. y Gaberon ………………………… 277
G.R. No. 224631; August 23, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Armando Labraque a.k.a. “Arman” ……………………. 278
G.R. No. 225075; September 13, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho …….………….. 279
G.R. No. 225642-43; January 17, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Cristanto Cirbeto y Giray ………………………………… 280
G.R. No. 231359; February 7, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Benedict Gomez y Ragundiaz …………………………… 281
G.R. No. 220892; February 21, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Emiliano De Chavez ………………………………………. 282
G.R. No. 218427; January 31, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Gloria Nangcas …………………………………………….. 283
G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018
Carlose Jay Adlawan vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………………… 284
G.R. No. 197645, April 4, 2018
Republic of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo M. Cuenca, et al. ………………………………. 285
G.R. No. 198393; April 4, 2018
Suprema T. Dumo vs. Republic of the Philippines ……………………………………….. 286
G.R. No. 218269; June 6, 2018
Redante Sarto y Misalucha vs. People of the Philippines ………………………………. 287
G.R. No. 206284; February 28, 2018
Esperanza Berboso vs. Victoria Cabral …………………………………………………….. 288
G.R. No. 204617; July 10, 2017
Spouses Edgardo M. Aguinaldo and Nelia Torres-Aguinaldo vs. …………………….. 289
Artemio T. Torres, Jr.
G.R. No. 225808; September 11, 2017

Lara’s Gift and Decors, Inc., vs. PNB General Insurers Co., Inc ….…………………… 290
and UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 230429; January 24, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Willington Rodriguez y Hermosa ………………………. 291
G.R. No. 211721; September 20, 2017
Republic of the Philippines vs. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico ………………………….. 292
G.R. No. 218630; January 11, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Benito Lababo, et al. ………………………………………. 293
G.R. No. 234651; June 8, 2018
Celerino Chua Alias Suntay vs. People of the Philippines ……………………………… 294
G.R. No. 172193; September 13, 2017
People of the Philippines vs. Gil Ramirez y Suyu ………………………………………… 295
G.R. No. 218701; February 14, 2018
People of the Philippines vs. Eleuterio Bragat ……………………………………………. 296
G.R. No. 222180; November 22, 2017

Lorie Marie Tomas Callo vs. Commissioner Jaime H. Morente ………………………… 297
G.R. No. 230324; September 19, 2017
Arthur Balao vs. Eduardo Ermita ……………………………………………………………. 298
G.R. Nos. 186050 & 186059 (Resolution); August 1, 2017
Gen. Emmanuel Bautista vs. Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon ………………… 299
G.R. No. 221862; January 23, 2018

Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña vs. Joel Capili Garganera ……………………………………. 300

G.R. No. 231164; March 20, 2018

Department of Foreign Affairs vs. BCA Corporation International …………………… 301

& Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal
G.R. No. 225051; July 19, 2017
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

STRICT APPLICATION OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS, NOT ABSOLUTE

Hon. Michael Rama, in his capacity as Mayor of Cebu City, et.al. vs. Hon. Gilbert Moises, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City et. al.
G.R. No. 197146, August 08, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is a resolution for the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Gwendolyn
Garcia, successor of Pablo Garcia, against petitioners Michael Rama and other Cebu city officials
vis-à-vis the decision promulgated by the SC annulling and setting aside the decision rendered by
the RTC and declaring Sec. 3(b), PD No. 198 unconstitutional.

Section 3 (b) of PD No. 198 which states that: “in the event that more than 75% of the total
active water service connections of a local water district are within the boundary of any city or
municipality, the appointing authority shall be the; otherwise, the appointing authority shall be the
governor of the province within which the district is located.” Cebu Provincial Governor Pablo
Garcia wrote to the MCWD to assert his authority in appointing the members of the BOD, alleging
that the active water service connections in Cebu City was below 75%.

MCWD filed an action for declaratory relief with the RTC seeking to declare Section 3 (b)
of PD No. 198 unconstitutional, or if valid, let the appointing authority be solely the Cebu City
Mayor. RTC dismissed the action. Petitioner directly went to the SC to seek such relief. The SC
ruled that Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198 should be partially struck down for being repugnant to the
local autonomy granted by the 1987 Constitution to LGUs, and related laws on local governments.

The respondents claim in this MR that the petitioners have disregarded the principle of
hierarchy of courts, and have resorted to the wrong remedy in assailing the decision of the RTC
by failing to file the petition first with the CA.

ISSUE:
Is the strict application of the principle of hierarchy of courts absolute?

RULING:
No, the strict application of the principle of hierarchy of courts is not absolute.

The policy on the hierarchy of courts is not to be regarded as an iron-clad rule. In the
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections and Querubin v. Commission on Elections, the
Court has enumerated the various specific instances when direct resort to the Court may be
allowed, to wit: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at
the most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance.

In this case, the two aforestated exceptions are present considering that the validity or
constitutionality of P.D. No. 198 a statute or decree, or a provision thereof is being challenged.
Moreover, the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of and assume jurisdiction
over the special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally
compelling reasons or when warranted by the nature of the issues that are clearly and specifically
raised in the petition.

Therefore, direct resort to the SC, disregarding the hierarchy of courts, is proper.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A COURT CANNOT EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER A PERSON CHARGED WITH AN

OFFENSE COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORY

Joshua Casanas y Cabantac vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 223833; December 11, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution which
affirmed the Decision of RTC-Valenzuela finding petitioner Joshua Casanas (Casanas) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Carnapping, as define and penalized under R.A. No.
6539.
Casanas allegedly never returned the tricycle owned by private complainant Calderon
when it was lent to him in Marilao, Bulacan because a passenger wanted to ride the tricycle. The
Valenzuela Police Station received a report a few days later that a suspected stolen motorcycle
was being sold in Valenzuela City. When the police responded to the report, they saw Casanas
standing beside the subject motorcycle. Casanas failed to provide any proof of ownership of the
motorcycle when the police asked him. He was then frisked and a knife was found in his
possession. They were brought to the police station for further investigation.

In his defense, Casanas denied the stealing and averred that he only borrowed the
motorcycle but was unable to return it the next day. The RTC of Valenzuela found him guilty of
Carnapping, ruling that his possession of the motorcycle, while lawful in the beginning, became
unlawful when he failed to return the same to Calderon in accordance with their agreement. The
CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling, upholding the trial court’s findings and pointing out that removal
of the sidecar from the subject motorcycle bolsters the conclusion that Casanas intended to
appropriate the motorcycle for himself.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC of Valenzuela have jurisdiction over the crime where the accused carnapped
the vehicle in Marilao, but was seen driving the same in Valenzuela?

RULING:
No, the RTC of Valenzuela does not have jurisdiction over petitioner’s case since the
alleged carnapping happened in Marilao, Bulacan, and not in Valenzuela City, Metro Manila where
he was arrested, charged, and tried.

Jurisprudence establishes that in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot

exercise jurisdiction over the person charges with an offense committed outside its limited territory.
As such, when it becomes apparent that the crime was committed outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the court, the case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

In this case, the crime of Carnapping, including all the elements did not occur in Valenzuela
City, but in Marilao, Bulacan. While Casanas indeed arrested in Valenzuela City while in the
possession of the subject motorcycle, the same is of no moment, not only because such is not an
element of the crime, but more importantly, at that point in time, the crime had long been
consummated. The RTC of Valenzuela had no authority to take cognizance of the instant case.

Therefore, the RTC of Valenzuela does not have jurisdiction over the crime where the
accused carnapped the vehicle in Marilao but was seen driving the same in Valenzuela.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY,

WHETHER ALLEGED OR DISCERNABLE FROM ATTACHED DOCUMENTS, NOT
MARKET VALUE

Glynna Foronda-Crystal vs. Aniana Lawas Son

G.R. No. 221815; November 29, 2017
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 by petitioner Glynna Foronda-
Crystal appealing the decision of the CA that affirmed the RTC, conveying title to the property to
respondent Aniana Lawas Son.

Petitioner is a daughter of an owner of a parcel of land through a Free Patent. Respondent

then instituted an action for reconveyance and damages with the RTC against the former, alleging
that she has been the lawful owner and possessor for 12 years, that she purchased the same and
that she has been paying real property taxes for such, and the issuance of the free patent was due
to gross error.

Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss, among others, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
It was initially granted as the value of the subject property as can be seen in the Tax Declaration
was only Php 2,826.00. However, the trial court reversed itself in an Order, stating that the
complaint alleged that the respondent purchased the property for Php 200,000.00 The RTC thus
proceeded with the case and rendered a decision ordering the Register of Deeds to issue a new
OCT under the respondent. The CA affirmed the RTC on appeal, albeit on other grounds.

ISSUE:
Is the determination of jurisdiction based on the assessed value of the property and not its
market value?

RULING:
Yes, the determination of jurisdiction is based on the assessed value of the property and
not its market value.

Under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, jurisdiction is determined by the “assessed value” of the
property which must be differentiated from the “market value” of the property. However, the rule
would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the property, while not alleged in the complaint,
could still be identified through a facial examination of the documents already attached to the
complaint.

In this case, the allegation in the complaint that the property is “worth P200,000.00”
pertains to its sale or “market value” rather than its assessed value. In fact, the complaint does not
allege the assessed value of the property at all, which should have resulted to the dismissal of the
action. However, a liberal interpretation of the law, necessitates an examination of the documents
annexed in the complaint. The complaint referred to the Tax Declaration covering the property
which stated that the assessed value of the property is P2,826.00.

Therefore, it is clear that the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction.

|3
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

EXISTENCE OF OTHER ACTIONS BASED ON THE SAME CONTRACT DOES NOT OUST
THE MeTC OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE

Intramuros Administration vs. Offshore Construction Development Co.

G.R. No. 196795; March 07, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, appealing
the Decision of the RTC, which dismissed petitioner Intramuros Administration's (Intramuros)
Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Offshore Construction and Development Company
(Offshore) on the grounds of forum shopping and lack of jurisdiction.

In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of the national government which it
administered to Offshore Construction. During the lease period, Offshore failed to pay its utility bills
and rental fees, despite several demand letters. Intramuros thus filed a Complaint for Ejectment
before the Manila Metropolitan Trial Court. Offshore filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
violation of the rule on non-forum shopping, lack of jurisdiction over the case, and litis pendentia.
OffShore alleged that while there were lease contracts between the parties, the existence of the
other contracts between them made Intramuros and Offshore’s relationship as one of concession.
In fact, the parties have several cases pending on aspects of the same concession contract. The
trial court ruled in favor of Offshort, holding that the determination of the ejectment case required
passing on matters beyond mere possession and rentals only. Thus MeTC granted the said motion
and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. This was affirmed by the RTC. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the existence of other actions based on the same contract oust the MeTC of its
jurisdiction over an ejectment case?

RULING:
No, the MeTC retains its jurisdiction even with the the existence of other actions based on
the same contract.

It is well-settled that as long as the requsites for unlawful detainer are present and alleged
in the complaint, the MeTC acquires jurisdiction over the ejectment case regardless of the claims
or defenses raised by the defendant. What is crucial is that the MeTC limits its jurisdiction on the
sole issue of physical possession. The defenses of the defendant therefore cannot oust the court
of its jurisdiction. To emphasize, physical possession, or de facto possession, is the sole issue to
be resolved in ejectment proceedings.

In this case, the MeTC has jurisdiction over the ejectment complaint since it has been
shown that the requisite jurisdictional facts have been alleged regardless of the claims or defenses
raised by a defendant.

Therefore, although there may be other cases between the same parties involving the
same contract but are within the jurisdiction of other courts, such cases will not bar the invocation
of the MeTC’s limited jurisiction on the issue of possession.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS DETERMINED FROM ALLEGATIONS

CONTAINED IN THE COMPLAINT

North Greenhills Association, Inc. vs. Atty. Narciso Morales

G.R. No. 222821; August 09, 2017
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner North Greenhills
Association, Inc. (NGA) seeking the review of the decision of CA affirming the decision of the Office
of the President (OP) favoring respondent Atty. Narciso Morales in a complaint before HLURB for
allegedly blocking his side access to the community park.

Petitioner started constructing a pavilion occupying the side of the park adjacent to the
residence of respondent. Respondent filed a complaint before the HLURB that the construction of
the pavilion was illegal because it violated his right to immediate access to the park. Petitioners
contended that as the absolute owner of the park, it had the absolute right to fence the property
and impose reasonable conditions for the use thereof by both its members and third parties.
Petitioner also sought the payment from respondent of an amount corresponding to the annual
membership dues which respondent had not been paying.

Petitioner claims that the HLURB never had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
respondent considering that there was no allegation that he was member of the association,
entitling him to claim the use of the latter's facilities including the right of access to McKinley Park.

ISSUE:
Does HLURB have jurisdiction over a complaint which does not alleged that respondent
therein is a member of the association?

RULING:
Yes, HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint even if it failed to allege membership.

Basic is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint. The nature of an action, as well as which court or
body has jurisdiction over it, is determined from the allegations contained in the complaint,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims
asserted therein. Relative thereto is the rule that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of
the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.

In this case, it appears that Atty. Morales, by filing his complaint as a member whose rights
have been allegedly violated, has satisfied such requirement. His status as a member has not
been questioned. It is worthy to note that NGA, in its counterclaim, demanded the payment of
association dues from Atty. Morales as he has been refusing to pay his dues for more than three
decades.

Therefore, jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case was properly vested in the
HLURB.

|5
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JURISDICTION OVER THE THING CAN BE ACQUIRED BY ACTUALLY OR

CONSTRUCTIVELY SEIZING OR PLACING IT UNDER THE COURT'S CUSTODY EVEN
IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF PROPER SERVICE OF SUMMONS TO SOME OF THE
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST

Heirs of Ernesto Morales vs. Astrid Morales Agustin, represented by her

Attorney-in-fact, Edgardo Torres
G.R. No. 224849, June 6, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 challenges the Decision of the CA,
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC.

The respondent, Astrid Morales Agustin, is a grandchild of Jayme Morales, who was the
registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements located in Laoag City. The respondent
initiated the instant complaint, originally together with Lydia Morales, another one of Jayme's
grandchildren for the partition of Jayme's property alleging that they, together with the petitioners
and their other cousins, were co-owners of the subject property by virtue of their successional
rights as heirs of Jayme. In response to the complaint, the heirs of Jose Morales admitted the
allegations in the complaint and interposed no objection to the partition. Ernesto Morales, as one
of the heirs of Vicente Morales, filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-
claims alleging that respondent has no cause of action because the proper remedy should not be
a complaint for partition but an action for the settlement of the estate and respondent has no more
right of participation over the subject property.

Summons to the heirs of Martina Morales-Enriquez, who were at that time residing abroad,
were allowed to be served personally. In response, one of Martina Morales-Enriquez's heirs filed
a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because
he was not furnished with a copy of the Amended Complaint.

ISSUE:
May the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the thing even in the absence of proof of proper
service of summons to some of the real parties in interest?

RULING:
Yes, the RTC may acquire jurisdiction even in the absence of proof of proper service of
summons.

Jurisdiction can be acquired by instituting legal proceeding. The court may acquire
jurisdiction over the thing by actually or constructively seizing or placing it under the court's
custody. Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from
a seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the
law, or it may result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of
law, the power of the court over the property is recognized and made effective.

In this case, the filing of the complaint before the RTC, which sought to partition the subject
property, effectively placed the latter under the power of the court. On this front, none of the parties
challenged the RTC's jurisdiction. Also, it was found that: (1) the heirs of Vicente Morales received
summons, filed an Answer, and actively participated in the trial; (2) the heirs of Jose Morales filed
their Answer and admitted to the allegations; and (3) the heirs of Martina Morales were duly served
with summons, copies of the complaint, and actively participated in the trial.

Therefore, jurisdiction over the property was properly acquired.

6|
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, INCAPABLE OF

PECUNIARY ESTIMATION; RTC HAS JURISDICTION

First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc. vs. Philippine Bank of Communications

G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review under Rule 45, petitioner First Sarmiento Property Holdings, Inc.
assails the April 3, 2012 Decision of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City, Bulacan in Civil
Case No. 04-M-2012 in favor of respondent Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM).

On June 19, 2002, First Sarmiento obtained from PBCOM a P40,000,000.00 loan, which
was secured by a real estate mortgage. Later on, the loan agreement was further amended, and
the loan amount was increased to P100,000,000.00.

On January 2, 2006, PBCOM filed a Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage. It claimed in its Petition that First Sarmiento failed to pay the principal amount and
accrued interest on the loan, despite PBCOM having sent several demand letters.

On January 2, 2012, First Sarmiento filed a Complaint for annulment of real estate
mortgage and its amendments. First Sarmiento claimed in its Complaint that it never received the
loan proceeds of P100,000,000.00 from PBCOM, yet the latter still sought the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

In its Opposition, PBCOM asserted that the Regional Trial Court failed to acquire
jurisdiction over First Sarmiento's Complaint because the action for annulment of mortgage was a
real action; thus, the filing fees filed should have been based on the fair market value of the
mortgaged properties.

ISSUE:
Is the complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage an action capable of pecuniary
estimation?

RULING:
No, a complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

To determine the nature of an action, whether or not its subject matter is capable or
incapable of pecuniary estimation, the nature of the principal action or relief sought must be
ascertained. If the principal relief is for the recovery of a sum of money or real property, then the
action is capable of pecuniary estimation. However, if the principal relief sought is not for the
recovery of sum of money or real property, even if a claim over a sum of money or real property
results as a consequence of the principal relief, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

In this case, the Court finds that the principal relief sought is not for the recovery of sum of
money or real property. The petitioner never prayed for the reconveyance of the properties
foreclosed during the auction sale, or that it ever asserted its ownership or possession over them.
Rather, it assailed only the validity of the loan contract with real estate mortgage that it entered
into with respondent because it supposedly never received the proceeds of the P100,000,000.00
loan agreement. Such subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction and is incorrect in dismissing the Complaint.

|7
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE, A REAL ACTION; JURISDICTION

DETERMINED BY ASSESSED VALUE

Alona G. Roldan vs. Spouses Clarence I. Barrios and Anna Lee T. Barrios,
Rommel Matorres, And Hon. Jemena Abellar Arbis, In Her Capacity as
Presiding Judge, Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, Aldan,
G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Alona Roldan against
respondents Spouses Barrios et. al. assailing the dismissal of the complaint by the RTC as well as
the Order denying reconsideration thereof.

Petitioner filed an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage against respondents. She
alleged that defendants borrowed from plaintiff the sum of ₱250,000.00, payable within the period
of one year, with an interest 5% per month; and to secure the prompt and full payment of the same,
defendants made and executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of plaintiff upon a parcel
of land and improvements thereon and at the time for payment of said loan is overdue and
defendants failed and refused to pay, despite repeated demands. Respondents spouses Barrios,
however, contended that the computation of their alleged loan obligation was not accurate. On the
other hand, respondent Matorres admitted that the subject land was mortgaged to him; that he had
also filed a judicial foreclosure case against respondents spouses Barrios pending with the RTC
of Kalibo Aldan.

The RTC however, dismissed the action as it found from the complaint that the assessed
value of the property mortgaged is only ₱13,380.00 and the case being a real action, the assessed
value of the property, which determines the jurisdiction, involving amount below ₱20,000.00 should
be under first level court’s jurisdiction. Hence, this petition. Petitioner argues that foreclosure of
mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation which is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Is foreclosure of a real estate mortgage an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and
therefore within the jurisdiction of the RTC?

RULING:
No, the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage is a real action and jurisdiction over which is
determined by the assessed value of the property.

Actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the
law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the
assessed value of the real property involved does exceed ₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila, or
₱20,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds ₱20,000.00 or ₱50,000.00 as the case may
be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).

In this case, the allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for foreclosure of
mortgage showed that foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of the
mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when
due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the property seized and
sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation. Therefore, the
foreclosure suit is a real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of
a property debt, and an order for the sale of the res.

Therefore, as foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the

property which determines the court's jurisdiction.

8|
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RTC, ACTING AS A SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT, EXERCISES LIMITED AND SPECIAL

JURISDICTION; NO AUTHORITY TO ISSUE INJUNCTIVE ORDERS

Stephen A. Antig, as representative of AMS BANANA EXPORTER, INC. [formerly AMS

Farming Corporation] vs. ANASTACIO ANTIPUESTO, in his own capacity and as
representative of AMS KAPALONG AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES MULTIPURPOSE
COOPERATIVE (AMSKARBEMCO) and its members
G.R. No. 192396, January 17, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner AMS Banana Exporter, represented by Stephen Antig, assail, by way of a
Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Decision of the CA which set aside the Orders of the RTC,
which was designated as Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

Respondents (collectively, the landowners) were registered owners of four agricultural lots.
Pursuant to separate lease contracts, petitioner had been leasing portions of the lots as banana
plantations. During the effectivity of the lease contracts, the landowners offered their respective
lots for agrarian reform, and availed of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) under the CARP. As the
duly designated financial intermediary of the CARP, the Land Bank of the Philippines arrived at its
own valuation. Respondents disagreed with the LBP valuation as it allegedly did not include the
value of the standing crops and the improvements. Thus, they protested before the DARAB.
Thereafter, petitioner was notified of the impending "physical takeover" of the lots.

On the day of the "takeover," respondents filed before the RTC, designated as SAC, a
Petition for Injunction with an Application for the Issuance of a TRO. The SAC took cognizance of
the petition and granted its prayer for a TRO. Then, SAC issued the injunction orders. Hence, the
DAR elevated their case to the CA, impleading the Presiding Judge of the SAC and respondents.
CA ruled that SAC acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of the petition for injunction and set aside the orders of SAC.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC, acting as a SAC, have jurisdiction to issue injunctive orders?

RULING:
No, the RTC acting as a SAC, has no jurisdiction to issue injunctive orders.

The jurisdiction of the RTC as a SAC is in the nature of a limited and special jurisdiction,
that is, the RTC's authority to hear and determine a class of cases is confined to particular causes
or can only be exercised under the limitations and circumstances prescribed by statute. Thus, the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a SAC as delineated by law is to cover only
the following controversies: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657.

In this case, a perusal of the petition for injunction filed by private respondents shows that
it does not raise either of the foregoing issues. The principal averments of the petition and the relief
prayed for therein actually assert a cause of action to enjoin the "installation/ physical takeover" of
the subject landholdings by the ARBs affiliated with the Cooperative, and therefore not within the
purview of the limited or special jurisdiction of the public respondent as a Special Agrarian Court.

Therefore, public respondent is bereft of any authority to issue injunctive orders and, thus,
acted with grave abuse of discretion.

|9
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RTC, NOT THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, HAS

JURISDICTION OVER DISPUTES AMONG MEMBERS BELONGING TO DIFFERENT
ICC/IP

Heirs of Tunged vs. Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.

G.R. No. 231737, March 6, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Heirs of Tunged
(petitioner) against Sta. Lucia Realty and Development (respondent) assailing the Order of RTC,
which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in Environmental Case No. 8548-R.

Petitioners are recognized Indigenous People (IP), being members of the Ibaloi tribe. They
claim that the subject property is an ancestral land and that they have been occupying in the
concept of an owner since time immemorial through their ancestors. Further, the respondents' acts
of demolishing and bulldozing the subject land, causing the destruction of small and full-grown
trees and sayote plants and other resources, violated their rights pursuant to The Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) and violated environmental laws, as respondents' project poses grave
and/or irreparable danger to environment, life, and property.

Baguio Properties, Inc. invoked ownership over the subject land and as such, they argued
that petitioners' complaint is a collateral attack to its Torrens Titles.

The RTC dismissed the case because the case falls within the coverage of Administrative
Matter the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases ((AM No. 09-6-8-SC) and the prayer by
the petitioners is the recognition of their right of ownership over the subject property. The RTC held
that such claim is in effect an admission that their asserted right over the same, if any, is yet to be
established. Without the confirmation of their rights as IP to the property, the filing of this case is
premature.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the case where the parties do not belong to the same
ICC/IP?

RULING:
Yes, RTC has jurisdiction over a case where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.

Pursuant to Section 66 of the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA), the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes
involving rights of indigenous cultural communities (ICCs)/IPs only when they arise between or
among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims and disputes arise between or
among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different ICC/IPs
or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/ IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper
Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP.

In this case, the cause of action is based upon the alleged earthmoving activities and
operations of the respondents within petitioners' ancestral land, which violated and continue to
violate petitioners' environmental rights under the IPRA and PD 1586 as the said activities were
averred to have grave and or irreparable danger to the environment, life, and property. Such cause
of action is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as a special environmental court, pursuant to
AO No. 23-2008 in relation to BP 129 and A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.

Therefore, the case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC and is reinstated for proper
disposition.

10 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PRIOR BARANGAY CONCILIATION NOT MANDATORY WHEN NOT ALL REAL PARTIES
IN INTEREST RESIDE IN THE SAME CITY OR MUNICIPALITY, EVEN IF THERE IS SPA IN
FAVOR OF CO-PETITIONER WHO IS A RESIDENT

Jose Audie Abagatnan, et. al. vs. Spouses Jonathan and Elsa Clarito
G.R. No. 211966, August 7, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision and
Resolution of CA in dismissing, albeit without prejudice, the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and
Damages filed by petitioners Jose Audie Abagatnan, et. al against respondent spouses Jonathan
Clarito and Elsa Clarito, for failure to comply with the mandatory requirement of resorting to prior
barangay conciliation, as required under Section 412 of the LGC.
Respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao Abagatnan and asked for permission to
construct a residential house. Because Jonathan is a distant relative, Wenceslao allowed them to
do so. Petitioners decided to sell portions of the land, offered to sell to respondents, but the latter
declined. Petitioners send demand letter but respondents refused to vacate.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against respondents
before the MTCC and alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as a
pre-condition for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of Roxas
City, specifically Jimmy, resident of Laguna, and Jenalyn, resident of Pasig. Respondents argued
that prior barangay conciliation is a mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with,
considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had already executed a SPA in favor of their co-petitioner and
sister, Josephine, who is a resident of Roxas City.
ISSUE:

Should prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC be complied
with, despite the fact that not all real parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality?
RULING:
No, a party holding legal title to the property is not an indispensable party to the suit; thus,
it need not be impleaded.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be joined in
a suit. An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy
which is inseparable from the interest of the other parties, and that a final adjudication cannot be
made without affecting such interest. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

In this case, the only issue in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who between the litigating parties
has the better right to possess de facto the subject property. Thus, HTPMI's interest in the subject
property, as one holding legal title thereto, is completely separable from petitioner's rights under
the Contract which include the cancellation or rescission of such contract and resultantly, the
recovery of actual possession of the subject property by virtue of this case.

Therefore, HTPMI need not be impleaded in the ejectment suit.

| 11
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROCEDURAL RULES SHALL BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED

Alfonso Singson Cortal et. al., vs. Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises

G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 praying that the assailed
Resolutions of the CA which dismissed petitioners' appeal under Rule 43 on account of several
technical defects be reversed and set aside, and that the CA be directed to give due course to the
dismissed appeal of petitioners Alfonso Singson Cortal et. al.

An Action for Recovery of parcels of land was filed by private respondent Inaki Larrazabal
Enterprises before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator (RA) at the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) alleging the cancellation of its titles and subsequent issuance
of new titles to farmer-beneficiaries including the petitioners and that just compensation
requirement was violated for no price had been fixed, much less paid for the expropriation of said
lands. Petitioner denied nonpayment and presented certifications issued by Land Bank of the
Philippines that deposits were made in Larrazabal Enterprises’ name.

The case reached the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 filed by petitioners. The
CA dismissed the same for the following formal errors: (1) an inconsistency between the listing of
petitioners' names in the accompanying verification and certification of non-forum shopping; (2)
the non-inclusion of the original Complaint filed by the adverse party, now private respondent,
before the RA; and (3) petitioners' counsel's failure to indicate the place of issue of the official
receipt of his payment of annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal justified by the technical errors noted by the CA?

RULING:
No, the dismissal of petitioners’ appeal was not justified by the technical errors.

Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of Court expressly stipulates the rules’ liberal construction
to the extent that justice is better served. Procedural rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive
of reasons so as to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. A strict application of the rules
should not amount to straight-jacketing the administration of justice and that the principles of justice
and equity must not be sacrificed for a stern application of the rules of procedure.

In this case, contrary to the CA’s conclusion, the Court does not consider these defects to
have been so fatal as to peremptorily deny petitioners the opportunity to fully ventilate their case
on appeal. Rather than dwelling on procedural minutiae, the CA should have been impelled by the
greater interest of justice. It should have enabled a better consideration of the intricate issues of
the application of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, social justice, expropriation, and just
compensation. The reversals of rulings at the level of the DARAB could have been taken as an
indication that the matters at stake were far from being so plain that they should be ignored on
mere technicalities. The better part of its discretion dictated a solicitous stance towards petitioners.

Therefore, the CA should have given due course to the appeal of petitioners.

12 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD FOR REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES

MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF A CAUSE OF ACTION

Floro Mercene vs. Government Service Insurance System

G.R. No. 192971, January 10, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Floro Mercene (Mercene) seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision of the CA which had reversed the RTC judgement declaring a mortgage
made in favor of GSIS as void.

On 14 May 1968, Mercene obtained a loan from respondent Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS). As security, a real estate mortgage was executed over Mercene's
property in Quezon City. The mortgage was registered and annotated on the title.

On 11 June 2004, Mercene filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against GSIS before the
RTC. He alleged that since 1968 until the time the complaint was filed, GSIS never exercised its
rights as a mortgagee. GSIS raised the affirmative defense, among others, that the complaint failed
to state a cause of action. The RTC ruled in favor of Mercene so GSIS appealed. The CA agreed
with GSIS ruling that Mercene's complaint did not state a cause of action because the maturity
date of the loans, or the demand for the satisfaction of the obligation, was never alleged.

ISSUE:
Is the allegation of the date of commencement of the prescriptive period for real estate
mortgages material in determining the existence of a cause of action?

RULING:
Yes, the date of commencement of the prescriptive period for real estate mortgages is
material in determining the existence cause of action.

In order for cause of action to arise, the following elements must be present: (1) a right in
favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act
or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. In University of Mindanao, Inc. v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, et al., the Court clarified that prescription runs in mortgage contract from the
time the cause of action arose and not from the time of its execution, to wit: the prescriptive period
neither runs from the date of the execution of a contract nor does the prescriptive period
necessarily run on the date when the loan becomes due and demandable. Prescriptive period runs
from the date of demand, subject to certain exceptions.

In this case, Mercene's complaint failed to state a cause of action because it merely stated
the dates when the loan was contracted and when the mortgages were annotated on the title of
the lot used as a security. Conspicuously lacking were allegations concerning: the maturity date of
the loan contracted and whether demand was necessary under the terms and conditions of the
loan. Thus, it is unclear when the mortgage may have prescribed.

Therefore, the CA is correct in holding that an allegation of the date when the prescriptive
period for realizing real estate mortgages prescribes is material in determining cause of action.

| 13
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A DECEASED PERSON DOES NOT HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BE SUED AND MAY NO
LONGER BE MADE A DEFENDANT IN A CASE

Donald Gaffney vs. Gina Butler

G.R. No. 219408, November 8, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 filed by petitioner Donald
Gaffney against respondent Gina Butler.

Gaffney alleged that sometime, Gina and her husband Anthony Butler, approached and
invited Gaffney to invest in Activefun, an entity engaged in construction of children’s play, to which
petitioner is a president. Gaffney advanced an amount of P12.5 Million representing his initial
investment. Petitioner’s husband passed away, consequently the project did not materialize.
Private respondent demanded return of his investments from petitioner who personally undertook
to repay the amount. However, petitioner was able to repay only P1 million. Gaffney then filed an
action to recover a sum of money. Because no full relief can be had against the estate/heirs of
Anthony Butler, under the original complaint, Gaffney filed a motion for leave to admit amended
complaint for the purpose of impleading the estate or the heirs of the late Anthony.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Ad-Cautelam, arguing that the death of her husband
did not ipso facto make her a representative and that in an ordinary civil action only natural or
juridical persons may be parties. Consequently, service of summons to the estate of late Anthony
was improperly served.

ISSUE:
Can the estate of the deceased defendant be named as additional defendant in the present
case?

RULING:
No, a deceased person does not have the capacity to be sued and may not be made a
defendant in a case.

Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that "only natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." A deceased person or his
estate may not be impleaded as defendant in a civil action as they lack legal personality.

In this case, when Anthony died, his legal personality ceased, and he could no longer be
impleaded as respondent in the present ordinary civil suit for collection. As such, the complaint
against him should be dismissed on the ground that the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action or for failure to state a cause of action pursuant to Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court, because a complaint cannot possibly state a cause of action against one who
cannot be a party to a civil action. Moreover, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person
or estate of Anthony. No valid service of summons upon the deceased Anthony was or could have
been made, precisely because he was already dead even before the complaint against him and
his wife was filed in court.

Therefore, impleading the deceased Anthony or his estate in the present petition was
improper and the action against him must be dismissed and the same may just be filed as a claim
against his estate in a proper proceeding.

14 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CITY COUNCIL IS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST TO QUESTION THE VALIDITY OF A

CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY THE CITY MAYOR ALLEGEDLY WITHOUT
AUTHORITY

Teodulfo Lao et.al vs. LGU of Cagayan De Oro City et. al.
G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 questioning the resolution of the
RTC denying petitioner’s prayer of TRO.

MEGA Farm’s President, Erwin See proposed to redevelop the Agora Complex into a
Modern Intergrated Terminal, Public Market and Vegetable Landing Area. Mega Farm and the
newly-elected Mayor Constantino Jaraula executed a Build-to-Operate contract for the
redevelopment of Agora Complex. Petitioners filed their complaint for declaration of nullity of the
contract with prayer for TRO.

Petitioners contended that the contract is void because the city council did not issue an
ordinance authorizing the mayor to sign for it. The RTC dismissed their complaint and held that
the Agora Complex BOT contract was a national government project in which a trial court is
prohibited from issuing TRO over said projects. Petitioner’s MR was denied by the RTC.

Petitioner’s filed their petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 directly with this court.
Mega Farm argued that it was improper for petitioners to directly file this petition, as it involves
both questions of fact and law and petitioners have no locus standi, as they are not business, fruit
or vegetable vendors or jeepney vendors who will be directly affected by the alleged
unconstitutional part of the contract. It is also asserted that neither can they can sue as taxpayers,
as there is no appropriation of public funds.

ISSUES:
Is the city council the real party in interest in cases of suits filed to question the validity of
contracts entered by the Mayor without authority?

RULING:
Yes, the city council is the real party in interest in cases of suits filed to question the validity
of contracts entered by the Mayor without authority.

Section 2 of the Rules of Court defines real party in interest as the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

In this case, the real party in interest which may file a case, questioning the validity of a
contract entered into by the city mayor, who is alleged to have no authority to do so, is the city
itself. It is the LGU which stands to be injured or benefited by any judgment that may be made in
this case. City councilors may file a suit for the declaration of nullity of a contract on the basis that
the city mayor had no authority to do so because the city mayor's authority to bind the city to
obligations must emanate from the City Council.

Therefore, the city council has personality to file the action.

| 15
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A REAL PARTY IN INTEREST IS THE PARTY WHO STANDS TO BE BENEFITED OR

INJURED BY THE JUDGMENT IN THE SUIT

Luis Juan L. Virata et. al. vs. Alejandro Ng Wee

G.R. No. 221058, March 21, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
In an appeal under Rule 45 before the SC, petitioner Luis Virata assails the Decision of the
CA which affirmed the judgment of the trial court declaring them solidarily liable to respondent
Alejandro Wee.

Respondent was a valued client of Westmont Bank. He was enticed by the bank manager
to make money placements with Wincorp, an investment house. Offered to him were "sans
recourse" transactions. Respondent then placed investments thereon under accounts in his own
name, or in those of his trustees. Respondent's initial investments were matched with Hottick.
Hottick was extended a credit facility. However, Hottick defaulted in paying its outstanding
obligations. As a result, Wincorp filed a collection suit against Hottick.

Alarmed by the news of Hottick's default, respondent inquired about the status of his
investments. Wincorp assured him that the losses from the Hottick account will be absorbed by
the company and that his investments would be transferred to a new borrower account.
Respondent then continued making money placements, rolling over his previous investments in
Hottick and even increased his stakes in the new borrower account - Power Merge. Thereafter, in
a meeting of Wincorp's board of directors, it resolved to approve Power Merge's application for a
credit line. Unknown to respondent, however, was that on the very same dates the Credit Line
Agreement and its subsequent Amendment were entered into by Wincorp and Power Merge,
additional contracts were likewise executed by the two corporations absolving Power Merge of
liability as regards the Promissory Notes it issued.

Despite repeated demands, respondent was not able to collect Power Merge's outstanding
obligation. This prompted respondent to institute a Complaint for Sum of Money. The petitioners
moved for the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action, among other reasons,
moored on the fact that the investments were not recorded in the name of respondent.

ISSUE:
Is a party considered real party in interest in an investment contract even if the investments
were not recorded his name?

RULING:
Yes, a party a real party in interest in an investment contract even if the investments were
not recorded his name.

As a general rule, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a real party in interest as "the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit."

In this case, respondent has clearly averred that he placed some of his money placements
in the names of other persons and that said persons held the said money placements in trust for
him. With such allegation of ownership of the funds, respondent is clearly the real party in interest
as he stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the instant case.

Therefore, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioners was properly dismissed.

16 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE PARTY HAVING A COMPLETELY SEPARABLE INTEREST FROM THE OTHER

PARTIES IS NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY; HE NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED IN THE
SUIT

Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Spouses Ramon and Annabelle Sabado

G.R. No. 224204, August 30, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Philippine Veterans Banks
assailing the CA’s Decision and Resolution ordering that Haus Talk Project Managers, Inc.
(HTPMI) be impleaded as an indispensable party to the unlawful detainer case against respondent-
spouses Ramon and Annabelle Sabado.

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioner against respondents before the
MTCC. The complaint stemmed from respondents’ failure to pay and vacate the property. The
basis of the obligation is the Contract entered into by respondents and HTMPI, the original seller
where it was agreed that respondents’ failure to pay any amount within the stipulated period shall
mean forfeiture of their payments and cancellation of the Contract. A Deed of Assignment (Deed)
was then executed by HTPMI in favor of petitioner assigning its rights and interests in the Contract
to Sell with respondents including the right to collect payments and execute any act or deed
necessary to enforce compliance. Thus, the ejectment case.

In their defense, respondents argued that petitioner is not the real party-in-interest to
institute such complaint since ownership over the property remained with HTPMI. They argued
that under the Deed, only the rights and interests pertaining to the receivables under the Contract
were assigned to petitioner and not the ownership. The MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner. The RTC
affirmed the MTCC. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s ruling and ordered that
the case be remanded to the MTCC for HTPMI to be impleaded not only as a real party-in-interest
but also as an indispensable party since it retained ownership over the property and directed the
MTCC to proceed with the trial of the case. Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration which
was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is a party who holds legal title over a property, an indispensable party to the ejectment suit
and thus needs to be impleaded?

RULING:
No, a party holding legal title to the property is not an indispensable party to the suit; thus,
it need not be impleaded.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court mandates that all indispensable parties should be
joined in a suit. An indispensable party is one who has an interest in the subject matter of the
controversy which is inseparable from the interest of the other parties, and that a final adjudication
cannot be made without affecting such interest. The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.

In this case, the only issue in the instant unlawful detainer suit is who between the litigating
parties has the better right to possess de facto the subject property. Thus, HTPMI's interest in the
subject property, as one holding legal title thereto, is completely separable from petitioner's rights
under the Contract which include the cancellation or rescission of such contract and resultantly,
the recovery of actual possession of the subject property by virtue of this case.

Therefore, HTPMI need not be impleaded in the ejectment suit.

| 17
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RULE ON SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES IS INAPPLICABLE WHEN THE COMPLAINT IS

AMENDED TO IMPLEAD NEW PARTIES IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES

Conchita Uy, et. al vs. Crispulo Del Castillo

G.R. No. 223610, July 24, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Conchita S. Uy
and her children assailing the Decision of CA affirming the orders of the RTC denying their
Omnibus Motion, motion to quash the writ of execution, and their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.

Respondent Crispulo Del Castillo filed an action for quieting of title, reconveyance involving
a parcel of land against Jaime and his wife, herein petitioner. Jaime died 6 years before
respondents filed the case. Respondent amended his complaint and impleaded Jaime's children,
i.e., the Uy siblings, as defendants. RTC ruled in favor of respondents. Respondents filed a Motion
for Issuance of Writ of Execution which was granted. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion praying
that the writ of execution be quashed and set aside.

Petitioners' argument is that they cannot be held solidarily liable for the satisfaction of any
monetary judgment or award since they are only representatives of the deceased. They maintain
that the estate of Jaime should instead be held liable for the adjudged amount and that
respondents should have brought their claim against the estate, in accordance with Section 20,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Do the rules on substitution of parties apply when the complaint is amended to implead
new parties in their personal capacities?

RULING:
No, the rules on substitution of parties do not apply when the complaint is amended to
implead new parties in their personal capacities.

Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides in part that whenever a party to a pending
action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and
address of his legal representative or representatives. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed
to be substituted for the deceased.

In this case, the Uy siblings were not merely substituted in Jaime's place as defendant;
rather, they were impleaded in their personal capacities. After Conchita filed an Answer informing
the RTC of Jaime's death, the complaint was amended to implead the Uy siblings. Accordingly,
the Rules of Court provisions on substitution upon the death of a party do not apply and the Uy
siblings were not merely substituted in place of Jaime in the Quieting of Title case. Instead, they
were impleaded in their personal capacities.

Therefore, petitioners' argument that they cannot be held solidarily liable for the satisfaction
of any monetary judgment or award must necessarily fail.

18 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROPER VENUE FOR PERSONAL ACTION; RESIDENCE OF PLAINTIFF OR PRINCIPAL

PLAINTIFF, IF THERE BE SEVERAL

Rudy L. Racpan vs. Sharon Barroga-Haigh

G.R. No. 234499, June 6, 2018
Velasco Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing CA’s Decision and
Resolution which affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint for improper venue and failure
to comply with a condition precedent to its filing.

Petitioner Rudy Racpan filed a Complaint "For Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale with
Right to Repurchase & Attorney's Fees" before the RTC of Davao City (RTC-Davao). In his
Complaint, petitioner alleged that after his wife's death, their daughter discovered a Deed of Sale
with Right to Purchase dated March 29, 2011, which was purportedly signed by him and his late
wife and appeared to convey to respondent Sharon Barroga-Haigh a real property registered in
his name and located in Bo. Tuganay, Municipality of Carmen, Province of Davao del Norte.
Petitioner maintained that the Deed of Sale was fictitious as he never signed any contract or any
special power of attorney. Thus, he prayed for the declaration of the Deed of Sale's nullity.

Respondent, in her Answer, contended that the venue of the Complaint was improperly
laid and that the filing of the case lacks the mandatory requirement of Barangay Clearance. RTC-
Davao, accordingly, dismissed the said compliant, and affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. It
being petitioner’s contention that the Complaint is a personal action as this does not concerned
with title to or possession of real property, as in fact, no transfer of possession or title of the real
property to the respondent has occurred. Hence, case was proper laid in RTC-Davao.

ISSUE:
Is the venue improperly laid as the complaint for the nullification of the Deed of Sale was
a personal action?

RULING:
No, venue is not improperly laid.

By weight of jurisprudence, the nature of an action is determined by the allegations in the

complaint. In turn, the nature of the action determines its proper venue. Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court provides that “all other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.”

In this case, petitioner sought the nullification of the Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase on the strength of this claim: he did not sign the same nor did he execute any special
power of attorney in favor of his late wife to do so in his behalf. But, as there was no allegation that
the possession and title to the property have been transferred to respondent, nowhere in the
Complaint did petitioner allege or pray for the recovery or reconveyance of the real property.
Evidently, from the foregoing the (alleged) subject deed of sale with right to repurchase is null and
void as the same contains the falsified signature of the herein plaintiff. The Complaint was not
concerned with the title to or recovery of the real property, it was a personal action.

Therefore, Davao City, where both the petitioner and the respondent reside is the proper
venue for the complaint.

| 19
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PARTIES MAY, THROUGH A WRITTEN INSTRUMENT, RESTRICT THE FILING OF

ACTIONS IN A CERTAIN EXCLUSIVE VENUE

Ley Construction and Development Corp. vs. Marvin Sedano

G.R. No. 222711, August 23, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the orders issued by the RTC dismissing
petitioner Ley Construction and Development Corporation’s (Ley Construction) complaint for
collection of sum of money and damages against respondent Marvin Sedano (Sedano), without
prejudice, on the ground of improper venue.

Ley Construction and Sedano entered into a 10-year sublease agreement for a portion of
land in Pasay City. Due to Sedano’s failure to pay the rent due for four (4) months and refusal to
settle obligations, Ley Construction filed a complaint before the Valenzuela-RTC.

Sedano in his answer, contends the complaint should be dismissed for improper venue
since Section 21 of the lease contract provides that “all actions or cases filed in connection with
the case shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, exclusive of all others.” On the other hand, Ley
Construction, argued that the Section 21 of the lease contract is not a stipulation as to venue, but
a stipulation on jurisdiction which is void. It deprives other courts of jurisdiction over cases which,
under the law, are within said courts’ jurisdiction. The RTC granted the motion and dismissed the
complaint on the ground of improper venue.

ISSUE:
Is the venue improperly laid when it was filed elsewhere notwithstanding a stipulation that
the action shall be filed only with a specific court, exclusive of all others?

RULING:
Yes, the venue was improperly laid.

Based on the provisions of Rule 4, Rules of Court, the venue for personal actions shall, as
a general rule, lie with the court which has jurisdiction where the plaintiff or the defendant resides,
at the election of the plaintiff. As an exception, parties may, through a written instrument, restrict
the filing of said actions in a certain exclusive venue. The Court held that an exclusive venue
stipulation is valid and binding, provided that: (a) the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive
in nature or in intent; (b) it is expressed in writing by the parties thereto; and (c) it is entered into
before the filing of the suit. In this case, all these elements are present in Section 21 of the lease
contract.

In this case, the parties' intention to limit the place where actions or cases arising from a
violation of the terms and conditions of the contract of lease may be instituted are clear and evident
from the use of the phrase "exclusive of all others" and the specification of the locality of Pasay
City as the place where such cases may be filed. Notably, the fact that this stipulation generalizes
that all actions or cases shall be filed with the RTC of Pasay City, to the exclusion of all other
courts, does not mean that the same is a stipulation which attempts to curtail the jurisdiction of all
other courts. It is fundamental that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not subject to stipulation of
the parties.

Therefore, the case is clearly dismissible on the ground of improper venue, without
prejudice, however, to its refiling in the proper court.

20 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

STIPULATIONS ON VENUE CAN EITHER BE PERMISSIVE OR RESTRICTIVE

Planters Development Bank vs. Spouses Ramos

G.R. No. 228617, September 20, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA filed by petitioner Planters Development Bank against respondents Spouses
Ramos.

Respondents applied for several credit lines with petitioner for the construction of a
warehouse. The said application was approved and was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over
the properties owned by the spouses. Respondents were not able to pay their obligations as they
fell due. Subsequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate
Mortgage before the RTC. Afterwards, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate
Mortgages and Promissory Notes, Accounting and Application of Payments, Injunction with
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against petitioner and its officers also
before the RTC. Instead of filing an Answer, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss, which
was denied. Aggrieved, it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the RTC for denying its motion to dismiss but the same was also denied.

Petitioner alleges that the venue of the action was improperly laid considering that the real
estate mortgages signed by the parties contained a stipulation that any suit arising therefrom shall
be filed in Makati City only.

ISSUE:
Is the venue improperly laid when the suit was filed elsewhere despite the stipulation that
it shall be filed in Makati City only?

RULING:
Yes, the venue is improperly laid when the suit was filed elsewhere despite the stipulation
that it shall be filed in Makati City only.

Stipulations on venue may either be permissive or restrictive. Written stipulations as to

venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or
merely permissive in that the parties may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also
in the places fixed by law. Mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough to preclude
parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation
is exclusive.

In this case, the Real Estate Mortgages involved provide that “In the event of suit arising
from out of or in connection with this mortgage and/or the promissory note/s secured by this
mortgage, the parties hereto agree to bring their causes of action exclusively in the proper court/s
of Makati, Metro Manila, the MORTGAGOR waiving for this purpose any other venue.” Thus, it
was agreed that any suit or action that may arise from the mortgage contracts or the promissory
notes must be filed and tried in Makati only. Not being contrary to law or public policy, the stipulation
on venue, which the parties freely and willingly agreed upon, has the force of law between them,
and thus, should be complied with in good faith.

Therefore, the venue is improper in this case.

| 21
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

COUNTERCLAIMS SEEKING MORAL, ACTUAL, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND

ATTORNEYS FEES AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR
MALICIOUS AND UNFOUNDED COMPLAINT ARE COMPULSORY

Yolanda Villanueva-Ong vs. Juan Ponce Enrile

G.R. No. 212904, November 22, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
filed by petitioner Yolanda Villanueva-Ong against respondent Juan Ponce Enrile.

Respondent filed a civil complaint for damages against petitioner for libel before the RTC.
Petitioner filed a Compulsory Counterclaim. The pertinent portion of which states that “respondent
acted with malice, evident bad faith” and has caused petitioner damages due to filing of unfounded
case. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss which argued that petitioner’s counterclaims are
actually permissive and hence should have complied with the requirements of an initiatory
pleading, specifically the payment of docket fees and certification against forum shopping. RTC
gave petitioner 15 days from the receipt of the order to pay the appropriate docket fees.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA denied the petition.
Hence, this petition for review was filed.

ISSUE:
Is a counterclaim seeking moral, actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
against a respondent permissive in nature that requires the payment of docket fees and filing of
certification against forum-shopping?

RULING:
No, a counterclaim seeking moral, actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
against a respondent is not permissive in nature that requires the payment of docket fees and filing
of certification against forum-shopping.

A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected with
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim that may be
filed separately in another case." A counterclaim purely for damages and attorney’s fees by reason
of the unfounded suit filed by the respondent, has long been settled as falling under the
classification of compulsory counterclaim and it must be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, it
is barred. The SC ruled that counterclaims seeking moral, actual and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees against the respondent on account of their malicious and unfounded complaint are
compulsory.

In this case, the counterclaim set up by petitioner arises from the filing of respondent's
complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it is incapable of proceeding
independently." The Court finds that the evidence supporting respondent's cause that malice
attended in the publication of the article would necessarily negate petitioner's counterclaim for
damages premised on the malicious and baseless suit filed by respondent. The Court also finds
that petitioners’ claims are compulsory, and hence should be resolved along with the civil complaint
filed by respondent, without the necessity of complying with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings.

Therefore, payment of docket fees and filing of certification against forum shopping are not
necessary since it is not a permissive counterclaim.

22 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A PLEADING WHICH LACKS A PROPER VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING SHALL BE TREATED AS AN UNSIGNED PLEADING

Senator Leila M. De Lima vs. Hon. Juanita Guerrero

G.R. No, 229781, October 10, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
For consideration is the Petition for Certiorari and prohibition with application for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Urgent Prayer for TRO and Status Quo Ante Order under Rule 65 filed
by Petitioner Leila De Lima assailing the order and warrant of arrest issued by RTC Judge Juanita
Guerrero against petitioner.

The Congress conducted several legislative inquiries on the proliferation of dangerous

drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison which led to the filing of 4 complaints charging Senator
De Lima. The four cases were consolidated. DOJ panel proceeded with the conduct of preliminary
investigation and recommended the filing of Information against Petitioner De Lima. Petitioner filed
the motion to quash mainly raising that DOJ panel lacks authority to file the information.
Respondent Judge issued the presently assailed order finding probable cause for the issuance of
warrant of arrest against De Lima. Petitioner filed to this court a petition for certiorari.

The OSG argued that the petition should be dismissed as De Lima falsified the jurats as
petitioner did not actually appear and swear before the notary public on such date in Quezon City,
contrary to the allegations in the jurats.

ISSUE:
Should the petition be dismissed for falsification committed by petitioner in the jurats of her
verification and certification against Forum Shopping and Affidavit of Merit?

RULING:
Yes, the petition must be dismissed for the falsification committed.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that a pleading is verified by an
affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. A pleading required to be verified which
lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. Meanwhile, Section 5, Rule
7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
that he did not commit forum shopping.

In this case, when petitioner failed to sign the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping in the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to properly swear under oath the
contents thereof, thereby rendering false and null the jurat and invalidating the Verification and
Certification against Forum Shopping. Similarly, the absence of the notary public when petitioner
allegedly affixed her signature also negates a proper attestation that forum shopping has not been
committed by the filing of the petition.

Therefore, the petition is, for all intents and purposes, an unsigned pleading that does not
deserve the cognizance of this Court.

| 23
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE TO ATTACH LEGIBLE COPIES ESSENTIAL PLEADINGS AND OTHER

ATTACHMENTS DOES NOT IPSO FACTO WARRANT THE DISMISSAL OF A
COMPLAINT OR PETITION

Ben Line Agencies Philippines, Inc. vs. Charles M.C. Madson

G.R. No. 195887; January 10, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Ben Line Agencies Philippines, Inc. (Ben
Line) seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the CA affirming the Resolution
of the DOJ, dismissing the complaint for estafa against respondent Charles M.C. Madson
(Madson).

Ben Line, a domestic corporation engaged in maritime business, entered into a crane rental
contract with AAL TAFIL Inc., through its president, Madson wherein the latter will supply the crane
capable of lifting heavy shipment. Ben Line paid Madson in consonance with the agreement.
However, due to problems with the crane operator and crane itself, Ben Line was forced to look
for a substitute.

Ben filed a complaint-affidavit against Madson before the NBI. It asserted that it was
deceived into renting a less worthy crane. The NBI issued a resolution recommending the
prosecution of Madson for estafa under Article 315(2), RPC. The Office of the Prosecutor issued
a resolution recommending the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Then, the
DOJ denied Ben Line's petition for review because it failed to attach clear copies of the assailed
resolution.

ISSUE:
Can the failure to attach legible copies of essential pleadings and other attachments to the
complaint or petition ipso facto be excused?

RULING:
Yes, the mere failure to attach legible copies does not ipso facto warrant the dismissal of
a complaint or petition.

In Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora (Air Philippines), the SC ruled that generally, a
petition lacking copies of essential pleadings and portions of the case record may be dismissed.
However there are guideposts to be followed: 1) only those which are relevant and pertinent must
accompany the petition; 2) if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a
questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached; and
3) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice, that case may be decided on the merits.

In this case, in accordance with the pronouncements of the court in Air Philippines and in
order that the substantial issues of the case be fully ventilated, the DOJ should have reinstated
Ben Line's petition for review. It is noteworthy that in its motion, Ben Line had already attached
clear and legible copies of the resolutions appealed from. Further, it pointed out that the copies it
initially attached in its petition for review before the DOJ were provided by the OCP.

Therefore, DOJ inordinately dismissed Ben Line’s petition for review.

24 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

GENERAL PRAYER JUSTIFIES GRANT OF RELIEF NOT SPECIFICALLY PRAYED FOR

Ramon K. Ilusorio et al. vs. Sylvia K. Ilusorio

G.R. No. 210475, April 11, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with prayer for temporary restraining
order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) seeks to annul and set aside the CA Resolutions
which affirmed the RTC.

Respondent Sylvia filed a complaint for libel against petitioners Ramon Ilusorio et al. It
stemmed from the alleged libelous book entitled “On the Edge of Heaven” authored by Erlinda
Ilusorio. The defendants filed a Motion for Determination of Probable Cause (With Prayer to Defer
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest) with the RTC. The DOJ Investigating Panel however dismissed
the charges against defendants. Sylvia filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), causing the
reversal of the resolution.

Herein petitioners filed before the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for TRO and/or
WPI. It was then dismissed by the CA. According to the CA, petitioners prayed only for injunctive
relief and failed to pray for the relief relevant to the principal action which is the nullification of any
issuances rendered by the RTC. Thus, the petition is defective for failure to seek any reliefs in its
principal action.

ISSUE:
Did the CA properly deny the Petition for Certiorari for failure of the petitioner to state in
their prayer the declaration of nullity of the RTC Order?

RULING:
No, the failure of petitioners to state in their prayer the declaration of nullity of the RTC
Order is a mere formal defect.

Certainly, a general prayer for “other reliefs just and equitable” appearing on a complaint
or pleading (a petition in this case) normally enables the court to award reliefs supported by the
complaint or other pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by
the parties, even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the complaint. Moreover,
procedural imperfection should not serve as basis of decisions. To prevent injustice, it is a better
policy to dispose of a case on the merits rather than on a technicality, affording every party-litigant
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his or her cause.

In this case, while the petition did not categorically state the reversal and setting aside of
the Order as one of the specific reliefs desired, causing the CA to hastily conclude that there was
no principal action sought by petitioners, it did contain a general prayer “for other legal and
equitable reliefs.” This general prayer should be interpreted to include the plea for the nullity of the
Order because it is already evident from the allegations contained in the body of the petition.

Therefore, the case is hereby remanded to the CA to resolve the same based on merits as
the failure to state was the declaration of nullity is a mere formal defect.

| 25
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

VERIFICATION SIGNED BY COUNSEL AND NOT BY HIS CLIENT, INEFFECTIVE FOR

LACK OF AMPLE KNOWLEDGE TO SWEAR TO THE TRUTH OF THE ALLEGATIONS IN
THE COMPLAINT

Charlie Hubilla vs. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co.

G.R. No. 207354, January 10, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing Decision and Resolution
of the CA which upheld the LA’s finding that the petitioners Hubilla et. al. voluntarily terminated
their employment with respondent HSY Marketing Ltd., Co.

Petitioners filed a complaint before the LA for alleged labor violations done by respondents.
However, such complaint was dismissed by the LA. This prompted petitioners to appeal to the
NLRC. The NLRC rendered a Decision reversing that of the LA and finding that the employees
were illegally dismissed. Respondents moved for partial reconsideration but was denied by the
NLRC. Subsequently respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The appellate court
rendered a Decision reversing the Decision of the NLRC and reinstating the LA Decision. The
employees filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA.

Petitioners argue that respondents were unable to substantially comply with the verification
requirement before the CA. They submit that respondents' counsel would have been privy to the
antecedents of the case so as to have personal knowledge and not merely knowledge as relayed
by his clients. On the other hand, respondents argue that a defect in the verification will not
necessarily cause the dismissal of the pleading and that they had sufficiently complied with the
requirement when the affiant attested that the petition was based on facts relayed by his clients
and on authentic records.

ISSUE:
Is a verification signed by counsel a substantial compliance with the rules?

RULING:
No, a verification signed by counsel is not a substantial compliance with the rules.

For verification to be valid, the affiant must have ample knowledge to swear to the truth of
the allegations in the complaint or petition. Facts relayed to the counsel by the client would be
insufficient for counsel to swear to the truth of the allegations in a pleading. Otherwise, counsel
would be able to disclaim liability for any misrepresentation by the simple expediency of stating
that he or she was merely relaying facts with which he or she had no competency to attest to. For
this reason, the Rules of Court require no less than personal knowledge of the facts to sufficiently
verify a pleading.

In this case, respondents' counsel, not having sufficient personal knowledge to attest to
the allegations of the pleading, was not able to validly verify the facts as stated. Respondents'
Petition for Certiorari before the CA should have been considered as an unsigned pleading.

Therefore, the petition of respondents before the CA should have been dismissed.

26 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHEN PETITIONER IS A JURIDICAL PERSON, THE PETITION MUST BE

ACCOMPANIED BY PROOF OF SIGNATORY’S AUTHORITY

Brgy. Tongonan, Ormoc City vs. Hon. Apolinario M. Buaya

G.R. No. 204183, June 20, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 are the Resolution dated
November 24, 2011 and Resolution dated September 27, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu
City in CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 02691 which dismissed petitioner's Amended Petition for Declaration
of Nullity and/or Annulment of Court Order and Amicable Settlement due to a defective Verification
and Certification Against Non-forum Shopping.

The instant petition has as its factual background a boundary dispute between respondents
Ormoc City and the Municipality of Kananga. To settle the controversy, Ormoc City and the
Municipality of Kananga entered into an Amicable Settlement, which compromise agreement was
subsequently approved by respondent court a quo.

Claiming that the Amicable Settlement constitutes an illegal relinquishment of the

patrimony of Ormoc City in general and of petitioner in particular which greatly altered its
boundaries, petitioner lodged a petition before the CA Cebu City seeking to annul the Amicable
Settlement as well as the court a quo's Order approving the same.

Because of the defective Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping, the petition
for annulment was initially dismissed by the CA Cebu City.

ISSUE:
In cases filed by a juridical person, is the absence of proof of the signatory’s authority
warrants the dismissal of the case?

RULING:
Yes, in cases filed by a juridical person, the absence of proof of the signatory’s authority
warrants the dismissal of the case.

The SC underscored the necessity of submitting a petition for annulment of judgment that
is verified and of submitting a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as required under Rule
47, Section 4. When the petitioner is a juridical person, the certification is to be executed by a
natural person to whom the power to execute such certification has been validly conferred by the
corporate board of directors and/or duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, generally, a petition
is dismissible if the certification submitted was unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority.

In this case, petitioner cured the defect by submitting the original of the Barangay Council
Resolution authorizing the succeeding Punong Barangay Periander R. Bañez to file the amended
petition and to sign the certification as an attachment to its motion for reconsideration. In line with
existing jurisprudence, the Court finds that this act constitutes substantial compliance.

Therefore, the CA Cebu City is incorrect in dismissing the case.

| 27
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE TO SHOW AN AUTHORIZATION BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF A

CORPORATION TO FILE A CERTIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING IS FATAL TO
A PETITION

Societe Des Produits, Nestle, S.A. vs. Puregold Price Club, Inc.
G.R. No. 217194, September 6, 2018
Carpio, Acting C.J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 asailing the CA Resolution
dismissing petitioner Societe Des Produits, Nestle, S.A.’s (Nestle) petition for review before the
CA.

Respondent Puregold Price Club, Inc. (Puregold) filed an application for the registration of
the trademark “COFFEE MATCH” with the Intellectual Property Office (IPO). Petitioner Nestle
opposed the application. The Bureau of Legal Affairs-IPO (BLA-IPO) dismissed Nestle’s opposition
due to its defective verification and certification against forum shopping which did not include a
board resolution or secretary certificate stating Dennis Barot’s (Barot) authority to act on behalf of
Nestle. It likewise ruled that the trademarks are easily distinguishable. On appeal, the Office of the
Director General-IPO, (ODG-IPO) dismissed Nestle’s appeal for the same reason.

The CA dismissed the petition for review on certiorari for failure to file it within the 15-day
reglementary period. It noted that the reglementary period started to run from the time petitioner’s
counsel of record received a copy of the decision on February 19, 2014. This is because when
Bengzon Law Office entered into appearance there was no evidence submitted that it properly
substituted petitioner’s counsel of record. Thus, it had until March 7 to appeal. Clearly, when
petitioner filed the Motion for Extension on March 27, 2014, and the petition on April 14, 2014, the
period had already lapsed.

ISSUE:
Is the certification against forum shopping properly executed when it is not accompanied
by a board resolution or secretary’s certificate authorizing a person to sign on behalf of the officer?

RULING:
No, the certificate against forum shopping was not executed properly since it is not
accompanied by a board resolution or secretary’s certificate authorizing a person to sign on behalf
of the officer.

Juridical persons, including corporations, that cannot personally sign the certification
against forum shopping, must act through an authorized representative. For corporations, the
authorized representative to sign the certification against forum shopping must be selected or
authorized collectively by the board of directors.

In this case, Nestle itself, acknowledged the absence of a board resolution or secretary’s
certificate to prove the authority of Barot to sign the certification against forum shopping on its
behalf. The failure to attach said copy is fatal to its petition and is a sufficient ground to dismiss
since the courts are not expected to take judicial notice of board resolutions or secretary’s
certificate. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules Court provides: x x x…” Failure to comply with the
foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x”.

Therefore, the CA is correct in dismissing the case.

28 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE CAUSES OF ACTION ARE IDENTICAL IS

TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE SAME EVIDENCE WILL SUSTAIN BOTH ACTIONS, OR
WHETHER THERE IS AN IDENTITY IN THE FACTS ESSENTIAL TO THE
MAINTENANCE OF THE TWO ACTIONS

Heirs of Fermin Arania vs. Intestate Estate of Magdalena R. Sangalang

G.R. No. 193208, December 13, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for annulment of judgment assailing the CA’s decision which nullified the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)’s decision in an action for recovery
of possession.

Petitioners filed an action for recovery of possession of subject landholdings before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD). The landholdings form part of the estate
of Magdalena Sangalang (Magdalena). They alleged that they are the lawful tenant-tillers since
time immemorial. As proof of their claim, they presented Certificates of Land Transfer. The
petitioners averred that they were harassed by Magdalena and were forced to leave their
respective landholdings. They further contended that they were paying lease rentals as evidenced
by receipts issued to them. The respondents countered that the petitioners are not the lawful
tenants, the same having been under the administration of their mother, Magdalena, during her
lifetime.

The PARAD, and later the DARAB on appeal, found for the petitioners. Thus, Respondents
challenged the DARAB decision before the CA 7th Division. In the meantime, a writ of execution
pending appeal was issued by the DARAB. This prompted respondent to file a petition
for certiorari before the CA Special 15th Division to assail the issuance of the said writ. The two
divisions of the CA rendered conflicting rulings, with the Special 15 th Division finding for
respondents, hence, this petition to annul said judgement.

ISSUE:
Is there forum shopping when a party filed a petition for certiorari with knowledge that a
petition for review involving the same case is pending in a different division?

RULING:
Yes, forum shopping exists when a party filed a petition for certiorari with knowledge that
a petition for review involving the same case is pending in a different division.

Identity of causes of action does not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily
escape the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or the relief sought. The
test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts essential to the
maintenance of the two actions.

In this case, the same evidence will be necessary to sustain the causes of action in the
two cases which are unequivocally based on the same set of facts. While it may be true that the
respondents raised as an additional assignment of error in the petition for certiorari the DARAB’s
issuance of the writ of execution pending appeal, they nevertheless sought the nullification of the
DARAB decision.

Therefore, in truth and in fact, the two petitions are based on the same cause of action.
Ergo, there being an identity of parties, reliefs, and causes of action, there is forum shopping.

| 29
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TO DETERMINE IF THERE IS FORUM SHOPPING, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ASK WHETHER

A FINAL JUDGMENT IN ONE CASE WILL AMOUNT TO RES JUDICATA IN ANOTHER
OR WHETHER THE ELEMENTS OF LITIS PENDENTIA ARE PRESENT

Ma. Victoria M. Galang vs. Peakhold Finance Corporation

G.R. No. 233922, January 24, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision and the Resolution of the
CA which affirmed the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner Ma. Victoria
M. Galang (Galang) for annulment of deed of real estate mortgage and foreclosure proceedings
on the ground of forum shopping.

This case stemmed from a complaint against respondent Peakhold Finance Corporation
(Peakhold) (Annulment Case). While the Annulment Case was pending, Peakhold filed an Ex-
Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession (Ex-Parte Petition) over the subject lot. Aggrieved,
Galang filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment (Petition for Relief Case). With the subsequent
dismissal of the Petition for Relief Case, Galang elevated the matter to the CA via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus (Certiorari Case). In the meantime, the Annulment Case was re-raffled
to the RTC Branch 126.

Peakhold moved to dismiss the Annulment Case on the ground of, inter alia, forum
shopping, since the Amended Complaint failed to disclose that Galang has a pending Certiorari
Case before the CA, as well as a complaint for qualified theft (Criminal Complaint) against the
President of Peakhold and a certain Jocelyn "Gigi" Cortina-Donasco (Donasco) before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City (OCP Caloocan).

ISSUE:
Is forum shopping present when any judgment rendered in one case will necessarily
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration?

RULING:
Yes, forum shopping is present when any judgment rendered in one case will necessarily
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies
in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues, either pending in or already resolved by some other court, to increase the chances
of obtaining a favourable decision if not in one court, then in another.

In this case, there is no identity of causes of actions and reliefs prayed for among the said
cases. The Annulment Case seeks to nullify the mortgage document executed in Peakhold's favour
whereas in the Petition for Relief Case, Galang sought to set aside the ex parte writ of possession.
The Certiorari Case sought to revive the Petition for Relief Case which was dismissed on the
ground of forum shopping, while the Criminal Complaint involves the determination of whether or
not there is probable cause to indict the President of Peakhold and Donasco for Qualified Theft.

Therefore, there is no forum shopping and any judgment rendered in one will not
necessarily amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

30 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FILING A PETITION TO ANNUL A JUDGEMENT OF THE RTC AFFECTING TITLE TO A

PROPERTY AS WELL AS A COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF TITLE OF SAID PROPERTY
CONSTITUTES FORUM SHOPPING

Bernardo S. Zamora vs. Emmanuel Z. Quinan Jr., Emmanuel J. Quinan Sr.,

Efrem Z. Quinan And Emma Rose Q. Quimbo
G.R. No. 216139, Nov. 29, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Bernardo S.
Zamora seeking to reverse the CA’s ruling granting respondents Emmanuel Z. Quinan, Jr.,
Emmanuel J. Quinan, Sr., Efrem Z. Quinan and Emma Rose Q. Quimbo's motion to dismiss on
the ground of forum shopping.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for Reconveyance of Title of Real Properties before the RTC
of Cebu City, Branch 19 to recover properties which were alleged to be fraudulently obtained.
Pending the resolution of such, he filed before the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment of the
RTC of Cebu City, Branch 9. The petition however was dismissed on procedural technicalities.

Undeterred, he refiled the same petition. Respondents thus filed with the CA a motion to
dismiss claiming that the petitioner resorted to forum shopping, citing the pendency of the
proceedings in the RTC, resulting in the dismissal of the second petition. Petitioner contends
however that the CA should have relaxed the procedural rules to give him the opportunity to be
heard.

ISSUE:
Is a party guilty of Forum Shopping when, after filing a case with the RTC and pending
RTC’s decision over the same, it filed an action with the CA, and refiled the same when dismissed?

RULING:
Yes, petitioner is liable of forum shopping for filing a premature petition and further refiling
the same petition.

Under Rule 7, Sec 5(a) of the ROC, the plaintiff shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto
and simultaneously filed therewith, that he has not theretofore commence any action or filed any
claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of
his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein.

In this case, there is identity of causes of action, parties and reliefs sought in the action he
filed for the reconveyance of properties before the RTC and the petition for annulment of judgment
filed before the CA. Petitioner should have waited first the decision for reconveyance as it was the
first case he filed before seeking other remedies.

Therefore, a summary dismissal of the case is in order.

| 31
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THERE IS NO FORUM SHOPPING WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION AND RELIEF

PRAYED FOR IN THE CASES ARE DIFFERENT

GSIS vs. Albert Velasco

G.R. No. 196564, August 07, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner GSIS assails the CA Decision on Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by respondent Velasco against the officers of petitioner.

Garcia, President and General Manager of GSIS, filed an administrative case against
respondent for misconduct. A committee was constituted to investigate. Respondent filed to CSC
a Petition to Transfer Investigation. CSC failed to resolve. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA (CA-G.R. SP No. 73170) to set aside the order of Garcia to submit to the jurisdiction
of the committee. CSC then denied the petition to transfer investigation due to lack of merit.
Respondent assailed the CSC Resolution in a Petition for Review with the CA (CA-G.R. SP No.
75973), which reversed such decision. CA, deciding on CA-G.R. SP No. 73170, perpetually
restrained Garcia and petitioner from hearing and investigating the administrative cases, but before
said restraining order was affirmed by this Court, petitioner issued 2 conflicting Memoranda to
respondent: 1) He is being withdrawn as GSIS attorney; 2) He is reassigned to field offices. In
connection with this, respondent filed with RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which was
denied. Respondent filed an MR, which later on have been withdrawn. Thereafter, respondent filed
a Petition for Certiorari, TRO, Preliminary Injunction with the CA regarding his reassignment,
charges of insubordination and gross discourtesy, dropping him from GSIS roll of employees. CA
granted the TRO.

Petitioner alleged that Velasco is guilty of forum shopping for filing a Petition for Certiorari
with CA during the pendency of another case with another division of the appellate court.

ISSUE:
Is the respondent guilty of forum shopping for filing a Petition for Certiorari with CA during
the pendency of another case with another division of the appellate court?

RULING:
No, the respondent is not guilty of forum shopping.

Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum other
than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two (2) or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court might
look with favor upon the party. Where the elements of litis pendentia are not present or where a
final judgment in one case will not amount to res judicata in the other, there is no forum shopping.

In this case, the cause of action and relief prayed for by herein petitioner in the cases were
not the same. It was held that what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum
shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks
different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by different fora upon the same issues.

Therefore, petitioner could not be said to have resorted to two different courts for the
purpose of obtaining the same relief.

32 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

GOVERNMENT INSTRUMENTALITY VESTED WITH CORPORATE POWERS IS EXEMPT

FROM THE PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES

Bases Conversion and Development Authority vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 205925; June 20, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Bases Conversion and
Development Authority (BCDA) seeks to reverse and set aside the decision of the CTA En Banc
dismissing its case filed on the ground that BCDA failed to pay docket fees as required under Rule
141 of the Rules of Court.

BCDA filed a petition for review with the CTA in order to preserve its right to pursue its
claim for refund of the Creditable Withholding Tax (CWT) paid under protest in connection with its
sale of the allocated units in the Serendra Project pursuant to the Joint Development Agreement
with Ayala Land, Inc. The petition was filed with a Request for Exemption from the Payment of
Filing Fees on the ground that it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
is therefore, exempt from paying filing fees under Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

The CTA First Division denied BCDA’s Request for Exemption and ordered it to pay the
filing fees within five (5) days from notice. BCDA moved for reconsideration but was denied and
was once again ordered to pay the filing fees. BCDA then filed a petition for review with the CTA
En Banc but was returned and not deemed filed without payment of the correct legal fees. BCDA
once again emphasized its position as to its exemption from the payment of such fees.

ISSUE:
Is BCDA a government instrumentality exempt from payment of docket fees under Section
21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
Yes. BCDA is a government instrumentality exempt from the payment of docket fees.

Section 21 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court states that the Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities, are exempt from paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Section
2 (10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines an
instrumentality as any agency of the National Government, not integrated with the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter. Such grant of corporate powers is likewise stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 7227,
also known as The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992.

In this case, it is clear that a government instrumentality may be endowed with corporate
powers and at the same time retain its classification as a government instrumentality for all other
purposes. Further, although BCDA has an authorized capital of P100 billion, it is not divided into
shares of stock and has no voting shares. There is likewise no provision which authorized the
distribution of dividends and allotments of surplus and profits to BCDA’s stockholders. Hence, it is
not a stock corporation. BCDA also does not qualify as a non-stock corporation because it is not
organized for any of the purposes mentioned under the Corporation Code.

Therefore, BCDA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and is

exempt from payment of docket fees under Section 21, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.

| 33
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SERVICE OF PLEADING BY ORDINARY MAIL IS ALLOWED ONLY ON SUFFICIENT

EXPLANATION THAT NO REGISTRY SERVICE IS AVAILABLE AT THE PLACE WHERE
THE SERVICE IS TO BE MADE

Philippine Savings Bank vs. Josephine L. Papa

G.R. No. 200469, January 15, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision and
the Resolution of the CA, which affirmed the Order of the RTC, which in turn reversed and set
aside the Decision of the MeTC filed by petitioner PSB against respondent Josephine L. Papa.

PSB filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Papa before the MeTC,
alleging that Papa obtained a flexi-loan of P207,600.00, and executed a promissory note for it,
wherein such note provides additional charges in case of default. Papa defaulted in her payment,
and that despite repeated demands, Papa failed to meet her obligation. The MeTC ruled in favor
of PSB and against Papa. Aggrieved, Papa elevated an appeal before the RTC. RTC reversed
and set aside the MeTC decision.

On 10 November 2009, PSB filed a timely motion for reconsideration. It however appears
that the service of the said motion was made two days late, as PSB availed a private courier service
instead of the modes of service prescribed under the Rules of Court. As such, PSB's motion for
reconsideration is deemed not to have been made on the date it was deposited to the private
courier for mailing but rather on 11 November 2009, the date it was actually received by Papa.
RTC denied PSB's motion for reconsideration ratiocinating that its 14 October 2009 decision had
already attained finality, among others. Aggrieved, PSB filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of
the Revised Rules of Court before the CA. CA sustained the RTC Decision. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Is the service made by a private courier allowed even without sufficient explanation that no
registry service is available at the place where the service is to be made?

RULING:
No, the service made by a private courier is not allowed without sufficient explanation that
no registry service is available at the place where the service is to be made.

Precisely, the Rules require every motion set for hearing to be accompanied by proof of
service thereof to the other parties concerned; otherwise, the court shall not be allowed to act on
it, effectively making such motion as not filed. Service by ordinary mail is allowed only in instances
where no registry service exists either in the locality of the sender or the addressee – this is the
only credible justification why resort to service by ordinary mail or private courier may be allowed.
Rule 13, Section 13 of the Rules of Court requires that if the service is by ordinary mail, proof
thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with section
7 of Rule 13.

In this case, PSB failed to comply with the requirements under Rule 13, Section 7 for an
effective service by ordinary mail. While PSB explained that personal service was not effected due
to lack of time and personnel constraints, it did not offer an acceptable reason why it resorted to
"private registered mail" instead of by registered mail. PSB failed to indicate that no registry service
was available in San Mateo, Rizal, or in Makati City, where the office of PSB's counsel is located.

Therefore, no valid service is made.

34 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ALTHOUGH THE COURT HAS DISCRETION TO DISMISS A COMPLAINT DUE TO

ABSENCE OF EXPLANATION AS TO WHY PERSONAL SERVICE WAS NOT EFFECTED,
SUCH DISCRETION MUST BE A SOUND ONE

Magsaysay Maritime Corp./Air-Sea Holiday GMBH Stable Organization Italia/Marlon R. Rono

vs. Elmer vs. Enanor
G. R. No. 224115, June 20, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners assail the twin
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. The Resolutions dismissed outright the petitioners' petition
for certiorari that assailed the Decision of the NLRC.

The instant petition arose from an action filed by Elmer V. Enanor against Magsaysay
Maritime Corp., Air-Sea Holiday GMBH Stable Organization Italia, and Marlon R. Roño for the
recovery of disability benefits, medical expenses, and attorney's fees.

The LA ruled in favor of Magsaysay Maritime Corp et al. When the case was elevated to
the NLRC, the LA Decision was reversed and set aside in favor of Enanor.

This time, herein petitioners disagreed with the NLRC Decision, and filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. Unfortunately for the petitioners, the CA dismissed the
petition outright due to substantial defects in the pleading. The CA pointed out that: (1) the name
of the respondent in the caption of the pleading is different from the name of the respondent in the
body thereof; and (2) the petitioners failed to attach an explanation as to why the service of the
petition was not made personally, which was a violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:
Is it proper for the CA to dismiss a petition for certiorari outright based on the petitioner’s
failure to attach an explanation as to why service of the petition was not personally made?

RULING:
No, the CA should not have dismissed the petition outright and should have considered
the substantial issues raised by the petitioners.

Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court mandates that pleadings and papers be served
and filed personally; in the instances that personal service and filing are not practicable, resort to
other modes could be had, but only if the party concerned attaches a written explanation as to why
personal service and filing is deemed impracticable. Even then, should the party concerned fail to
attach a written explanation in his/her pleadings and papers, the Court, in its discretion, may
consider the same as not filed. Such discretionary power of the court must be exercised properly
and reasonably, taking into account the following factors: (1) the practicability of personal service;
(2) the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein; and (3) the
prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11.

In this case, the substantial issues raised by the petitioners should have been considered
by the appellate court. The petitioners raised questions of facts, which, if left unresolved, would
deny the petitioners a true administration of justice.

Therefore, the CA committed an error in dismissing outright petitioner’s Petition for

Certiorari.

| 35
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION MAY ONLY BE RESORTED TO WHEN THE

WHEREABOUTS OF THE DEFENDANT ARE NOT ONLY UNKNOWN, BUT CANNOT BE
ASCERTAINED BY DILIGENT INQUIRY

Express Padala S.P.A. vs. Helen M. Ocampo

G.R. No. 202505, September 06, 2017
Jardaleza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari challenging the Decision and Resolution of the CA.
The CA granted the petition for certiorari filed by respondent Helen M. Ocampo and set aside the
Decision of the RTC which granted Express Padala (Italia), S.P.A., now BDO Remittance (Italia)
S.P.A.'s (BDO Remittance) petition for recognition of foreign judgment.

Respondent was convicted of a crime for misappropriating money by falsifying invoices of

money payments relating to customers' money transfer by a court in Italy. However, it has been
granted that there will be a suspension of the enforcement of sentence on account of her guilty
plea. BDO Remittance then filed a petition for recognition of foreign judgment with the RTC where
it prayed for the recognition of the foreign court Decision, among other things. Subsequently, the
sheriff attempted to personally serve the summons on respondent in her local address alleged in
the petition. However, the present occupant of the address, informed the sheriff that respondent
and her family were already in Italy. The sheriff then proceeded to serve the summons upon such
person. After respondent failed to file an answer, BDO Remittance filed a motion to declare
respondent in default which was granted. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of BDO
Remittance. After some time, respondent received a copy of the RTC decision. Not having been
represented by counsel a quo, the period of appeal lapsed. Respondent then filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.

In its assailed decision, the CA set aside the RTC decision. It ruled that since Ocampo's
whereabouts were unknown, summons should have been served in accordance with Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The sheriff however, erroneously effected the substituted
service of summons under Section 7 of Rule 14. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over Ocampo, and the RTC Decision against her is null and void. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Was the service of summons validly effected upon respondent, who lives in Italy, through
substituted service?

RULING:
No, the service of summons was not validly effected upon respondent.

When the defendant's whereabouts are unknown, the rules allow service of summons by
publication. Service of summons by publication may only be resorted to when the whereabouts of
the defendant are not only unknown but cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. The diligence
requirement means that there must be prior resort to personal service and substituted service, and
proof that these modes were ineffective before summons by publication may be allowed.

In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service upon respondent through the
caretaker of respondent’s old family residence. The CA correctly held that substituted service was
improperly resorted to. It found that since Ocampo's whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may be effected only by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation.

Therefore, the service of summons was not validly effected.

36 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JURISDICTION IS ACQUIRED NOT ONLY THROUGH SERVICE OF SUMMONS BUT

ALSO THROUGH VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE

G. V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Tiara Commercial Corporation

G.R. No. 201378, October 18, 2017
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 filed by petitioner G.V. Florida
Transport Inc. to challenge the decision of the CA.

Victory Liner filed an action for damages against GV Florida and its bus driver Arnold
Vizquera before the RTC due to the vehicle collision that occurred between the buses of VLI and
GV Florida. VLI claimed that Vizqueras’ negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
Florida alleged that the Michelin tires of its bus that it purchased from Tiara Commercial
Corporation (TCC) had factory and mechanical defects which caused a tire-blowout. This is
claimed was the proximate cause of the collision. RTC ordered the service of summons on TCC.
TCC filed a Special entry of Appearance with an ex-parte motion for extension to file responsive
pleading and/or motion to dismiss. TCC filed a motion to dismiss GV Florida’s Third-party
complaint.

TCC argued that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over it due to improper service of
summons since the sheriff served the summons to a certain Gino-gino who is its financial
supervisor. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. TCC filed its Answer Ad Cautelum which it repeated
its arguments of lack of jurisdiction. RTC set the case for pre-trial. TCC filed its pre-trial brief without
any reservation as to the issue of jurisdiction. CA reversed the order of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Is a defective service of summons to a person not falling under those enumerated under
Sec. 11 of Rule 14 cured by the voluntary appearance of the party concerned?

RULING:
Yes, a defective service of summons to a person not falling under the enumeration under
Sec. 11 of Rule 14 is cured by the voluntary appearance of the party concerned.

Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court enumerates the list to whom service of summons
to a domestic private juridical entity should be served and the list is exclusive. Service of summons,
however is not the only mode through which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. Still
improper service of summons and lack of voluntary appearance do not automatically warrant the
dismissal of the complaint. The proper and speedy remedy is for the court to issue alias summons.

In this case, the summons was served to Gino-gino, a financial supervisor of TCC. While
she is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 11 of Rule 14, we find that TCC has voluntarily
appeared before and submitted itself to the RTC when it filed its pre-trial brief without any
reservation as to the court's jurisdiction over it. At no point in its pre-trial brief did TCC raise the
issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over it. In fact, it even asked the RTC that it be allowed to reserve
the presentation of additional evidence through documents and witnesses.

Therefore, TCC waived any objection raised therein as to the jurisdiction of the court when
it subsequently filed its pre-trial brief without any reservation and even prayed to be allowed to
present additional evidence.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

AN INVALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS CURED BY THE VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE

OF THE DEFENDANT IN COURT AND HIS SUBMISSION TO THE COURT'S AUTHORITY

Carolina Que Villongco et. al. vs. Cecilia Que Yabut, et. al.
G.R. Nos. 225022 & 225024, February 5, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
These are two separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari appealing the decisions of the
CA in favor of petitioners Villongco et. al., annulling the annual stockholder's meeting held by the
respondents Yabut, et. al. for lack of proper quorum and declaring the subsequent acts performed
by respondents as ultra vires acts.

Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of Phil-Ville, held an

emergency meeting and made a decision to postpone the annual stockholders' meeting of Phil-
Ville until the a controversy regarding the distribution of 3,140 shares of stocks in the name of
certain stockholders is settled. The SEC and all the stockholders were apprised of the decision to
postpone the meeting. Despite the postponement, respondents proceeded with the scheduled
annual stockholder's meeting participated only by a few stockholders.

Petitioners thus filed the instant election case praying that the election of the resppondents
as directors be declared void as the meeting had a lack of quorum. The lower courts found in favor
of petitioners; hence, this appeal. Respondents assert that they were properly elected as the basis
for determining quorum is the total number of undisputed shares of stock.

Among other claims, respondents, question the jurisdiction of the trial court as summons
were not properly served on them. The CA however ruled that jurisdiction over their persons was
obtained when they filed a Motion for Additional Time to file Answer on March 7, 2014.

ISSUE:
Should the filing of the Motion for Additional Time to File Answer be considered as
voluntary appearance which cures an invalid service of summons?

RULING:
Yes, the filing of the Motion for Additional Time to File Answer is considered as voluntary
appearance which cures an invalid service of summons.

It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in a civil case is obtained
through a valid service of summons. When there is no service of summons upon the defendant,
the court acquires no jurisdiction over his person, and a judgment rendered against him is null and
void. However, the invalidity of the service of summons is cured by the voluntary appearance of
the defendant in court and their submission to the court's authority.

As held in the case of Carson Realty & Management Corporation v. Red Robin Security
Agency, et al., this Court has repeatedly ruled that the filing of a motion of time to file answer is
considered voluntary appearance on the part of the defendant, such that the trial court
nevertheless acquired jurisdiction over his person despite the defectiveness of the service of
summons.

In this case, even though the service of summons was defective, respondents filed a
Motion for Additional Time to File Answer.

Therefore, the defect in the service of summons is deemed cured and the court acquired
jurisdiction over the respondents.

38 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JURISDICTION OVER A JURIDICAL PERSON IS ACQUIRED ONLY THROUGH

PERSONAL SERVICE TO THE CORPORATE OFFICERS ENUMERATED IN SECTION 11
OF RULE 14; RESORT TO SUBSTITUTED SERVICE TO THE STAFF OF THESE OFFICERS
IS ALLOWED ONLY WHEN IT IS SHOWN CLEARLY WHY THE SAID OFFICERS COULD
NOT BE PERSONALLY SERVED

Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 203298, January 17, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of
the CA, which ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents due to the defective service of summons.

Petitioner Interlink Movie Houses, Inc. (Interlink) filed before the RTC a complaint for sum
of money and damages against respondents Expressions Stationery Shop, Inc. (Expressions) and
Joseph Lim Bon Huan (Bon Huan) for the recovery of unpaid rentals and damages. The sheriff
certified that he served the summons at the office of the defendant company's president through
a Jonalyn Liwanan. Respondents’ counsel made a special appearance to question the service, the
Court ordered that service be done again. This time, the sheriff tendered it to a different secretary
named Amee Ochotorina.

Despite a second special appearance to question jurisdiction over the person of the
respondents, the court declared respondents in default. The RTC took judicial notice that corporate
officers are usually busy, thus, there was sufficient compliance with the rules on service of
summons to a juridical entity when received by the assistant/secretary of the president.

The RTC then heard the case ex parte and rendered a decision. On appeal, the CA
annulled the RTC’s order and ruled that jurisdiction had not been acquired. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Does a court acquire jurisdiction over a party when service of summons is defective and
appearance was limited to challenging jurisdiction?

RULING:
No, the court does not acquire jurisdiction when service of summons was defective and
appearance was made merely to challenge the court’s jurisdiction.

If the defendant is a domestic private juridical entity, service may be made only on its
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house
counsel. It has been consistently held that this enumeration is exclusive. Resort to substituted
service is allowed only if, for justifiable causes, said officers cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time. On the other hand, while it is true that one who seeks an
affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, the Court has always
applied the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance
to challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have
submitted to its authority.

In this case, it is clear that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the respondents
when summons were served on the wrong persons and the respondent only appeared by special
appearance.

Therefore, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendants.

| 39
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A DETAILED RETURN OF THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUBSTITUTED

FILING OF SUMMONS IS ESSENTIAL TO PROPER SERVICE; MERE GENERAL
STATEMENTS THAT EFFORTS WERE MADE WILL NOT SUFFICE

Bobie Rose D.V. Frias vs. Rolando F. Alcayde

G.R. No. 194262, February 28, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Challenged in this appeal by petitioner Bobie Rosie Frias is the CA’s decision in favor of
respondent Rolando Alcayde’s petition for annulment of judgment due to lack of jurisdiction against
the former.

Petitioner obtained a favorable decision from the MeTC in a case involving the parties
under a Contract of Lease. As a result, respondent filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with
Prayer for Issuance of TRO and/or Injunction. A copy of the petition for annulment of judgment
was allegedly served to the petitioner based on the Officer’s Return, through Sally Gonzales, the
secretary of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Daniel S. Frias. However, petitioner did not file any pleading
or appear in court despite allegedly receiving summons resulting in the Court declaring petitioner
in default. 2 months later, petitioner made a special appearance questioning the jurisdiction of the
Court on her person as she did not receive any summons. On August 22, 2008, the RTC issued
an Order, granting petitioner's “Preliminary Submission to Dismiss,” which was reversed.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.

Petitioner contends that the CA erred in not dismissing respondent's petition for annulment
of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over her person. She maintains that since an
annulment of judgment is a personal action, it is necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over
her person. The CA however denied the petition holding that her filing of her “Preliminary
Submission” amounted to voluntary appearance.

ISSUE:
Does a trial court obtain jurisdiction over a party when summons is made through
substituted service without an attempt to serve it personally?

RULING:
No, the court does not acquire jurisdiction over a party through substituted service of
summons without showing any attempt to serve it personally. There was neither a valid service of
summons in person nor a valid substituted service of summons over the person of the petitioner.

To warrant the substituted service of the summons, the serving officer must first attempt to
effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has
become impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service.

In this case, a perusal, of the Officer's Return discloses that the following circumstances
were not clearly-established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable time was
impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a
person of sufficient age and discretion residing at the party's residence or upon a competent
person in charge of the party's office or place of business. Indeed, without specifying the details of
the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement
that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted
service of summons.

Therefore, the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner since there
was no valid service of summons.

40 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A DEFECTIVE MOTION IS CURED BY THE ACT OF THE COURT IN TAKING

COGNIZANCE OF THE SAME AND BY NOTICE TO THE ADVERSE PARTY OF ITS
EXISTENCE

Steel Corporation of the Philippines vs. Bureau of Customs

G.R. No. 220502, February 12, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the petitioner Steel
Corporation of the Philippines seeking to reverse the CA’s decision of dismissing the complaint
due to lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner was placed under rehabilitation for which a Stay Order was issued effectively
until the final court approval of the rehabilitation plan. In a letter to the BOC, petitioner manifested
its intent to avail the privilege granted under Section 19 of FRIA for waiver of customs duties and
fees due for the period covered by the amnesty. The DOF Undersecretary, however, disapproved
the same holding that the privilege does not include customs duties and fees. Petitioner thus filed
a petition for injunction against the respondents before the RTC to enjoin the assessment of
customs duties and fees against it.

The OSG, acting for and in behalf of the BIR, BOC, DOF, and OP, filed a Motion to Dismiss
(MTD), arguing that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the complaint, which was
dismissed. Several other motions were filed and ruled upon. Ultimately, the case was decided
against petitioner.

On appeal, petitioner heavily relied on the fact that the trial court gave due course to OSG
motions that were set for hearing on days that were declared as national holiday and/or beyond
the period prescribed by the Rules of Court. Petitioner claimed to have been denied procedural
due process. The CA denied the appeal. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Is a motion, otherwise defective, cured by the act of the court in taking cognizance of the
same and by notice to the adverse party of its existence?

RULING:
Yes, a motion, otherwise defective, is cured by the act of the court in taking cognizance of
the same and by notice to the adverse party of its existence.

Motions are defective for failing to comply with the procedural rules on notice and hearing.
Be that as it may, even if the motions may be defective, the defects were cured by the court's
taking cognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified of the
existence of said pleading. The test of procedural due process is the presence of the opportunity
to be heard, as well as to have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the
grounds upon which it is based. A liberal construction is proper where the lapse in the literal
observance of a procedural rule has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the
court of its authority.

In the present case, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the
respective counsels of the petitioners and they were duly furnished with copies of the same as
shown by the receipts signed by their staff or agents. The petitioner therefore cannot claim to have
been denied procedural due process.

Therefore, the defects were cured when the court took cognizance of such.

| 41
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

GRANT OF MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT IS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT AND IS

ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT

Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Peter Sy, et. al.

G.R. No. 185647, July 26, 2017
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where petitioner Dy Teban Trading,
Inc. seeks the reversal of the CA’s decision which nullified the Orders of the RTC.

Due to certain disagreements relating to its management, petitioner instituted an action for
injunction against respondents. Respondent filed an action for dissolution of the corporation.
During the trial, petitioner presented witness Lorencio Dy, but his cross-examination did not push
through on the scheduled date. The rescheduled hearing did not proceed as one of respondents'
counsels could not make it due to certain health problems. Respondents' other counsel, moved for
the postponement of the hearing, which the RTC granted. As the parties needed to clarify with this
Court whether the transfer of cases to the sala of Judge Calas included intra-corporate disputes,
the hearing was twice rescheduled. Neither of the respondents’ counsels attended the hearing.
No motion for postponement was also filed. Petitioner’s counsel moved that respondents be
declared to have waived their right to cross-examine Lorencio, which was granted.

Thereafter, the scheduled hearing proceeded but neither respondents nor their counsels
appeared. Instead, they filed an urgent motion for continuance. Petitioner contends that
respondents were not entitled, as a matter of right, to the grant of their motion for continuance.

ISSUE:
Are parties to a case entitled to the grant of motion for continuance or postponement, as a
matter of right?

RULING:
No, the grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right and must
be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.

Courts possess the duty and authority to control the proceedings before it. This includes
the setting of trial dates and allowing postponement of hearings. Even when a motion for
postponement is filed before the court, there is never an obligation for the court to grant it. Far from
being a right, the grant of a motion for postponement is a privilege addressed to the court's sound
discretion. Hence, a party filing such motion must not assume that it will be granted.

In this case, the facts of this case and the relevant jurisprudence warrant an affirmation of
the trial court's order that respondents have waived their right to cross-examine petitioner’s witness
Lorencio. The counsel’s explanation for his failure to attend the hearing, after years of persistent
resetting of the cross-examination, merits no consideration.

Therefore, RTC was correct in declaring that respondents had already waived their right to
cross-examination.

42 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF RULES APPLY ONLY IN

PROPER CASES OF DEMONSTRABLE MERIT AND UNDER JUSTIFIABLE CAUSES AND
CIRCUMSTANCES

Bernice Joan Ti vs. Manuel S. Dino

G.R. No. 219260, November 06, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Bernice Joan Ti
seeking to reverse the decision of the CA.

The city prosecutor issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information against
Petitioner and Julieta Fernandez for falsification of public documents. MeTC set aside the
recommendation. Private prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the MeTC order. MeTC
issued an order granting the same, finding probable cause to indict petitioner. RTC ruled that MeTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the criminal case on the basis of the MR filed
by the private prosecutor without the concurrence of the public prosecutor. Respondent received
RTC’s decision denying the MR on February 11, 2011. Thereafter it filed a notice of appeal on
February 24, 2011. RTC disapproved the notice of appeal. CA reversed the decision of the RTC.

Petitioner contends that respondent's filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with
the CA was premature. According to petitioner, the respondent should have first filed an MR of the
RTC's denial of respondent's notice of appeal and motion for the transmittal of records to the CA
before he filed the petition for certiorari before the CA. Petitioner further insists that respondent
violated the 3-day notice rule requiring every movant of a motion required to be heard to ensure
the receipt of the said motion with notice of hearing to the other party at least 3 days before the
date of the hearing. Petitioner argues that respondent should have resorted to personal service of
the motion because such is not impossible considering that the counsel of petitioner's office is
located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City, while that of the respondent's counsel is located in Malate,
Manila.

ISSUE:
May the provision of the Rules be interpreted liberally as to dispense with the requirement
of receipt of the other party of notice of hearing at least 3 days before the same?

RULING:
No, liberal interpretation of the provisions of the Rule, requiring receipt of the other party
of the notice of hearing at least 3 days before such hearing on a written motion, cannot be made.

The Rules of Court mandates that every written motion is required to be heard and the
notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing.

In this case, respondent failed to ensure the receipt by the petitioner of the notice of hearing
at least three days before the date of such hearing. Under the circumstances of the case,
respondent should have personally served the notice of hearing since the offices of the respondent
and petitioner's counsels are both located in the NCR. Personal service, therefore, is the most
practicable considering the close proximity of the places. Nevertheless, respondent was not able
to satisfactorily explain why he made use of registered mail instead of personally serving the notice
of hearing. It must be remembered that "only when personal service or filing is not practicable may
the resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to
why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with." Concomitant to a liberal
application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality
to explain his failure to abide by the rules

Hence, there can be no liberal interpretation of the law in this case.

| 43
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHEN ADVERSE PARTY HAD BEEN AFFORDED OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD,

PURPOSE OF NOTICE OF HEARING IS DEEMED SERVED

Lily S. Villamil vs. Spouses Juanito Erguiza

G.R. No. 195999, June 20, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the Decision of
CA which nullified the Decision for an action for recovery of possession filed by petitioner Lily
Villamil against respondents Juanito and Mila Erguiza.

Petitioner is the owner of a parcel of land. The parties entered into a sale subject to a
condition. Defendants allege that they did not violate any of the terms and conditions contained in
the agreement to which petitioner is trying to base her cause of action. MTCC dismissed the
complaint saying that it was one for interpretation of contracts and incapable of pecuniary
estimation. RTC reversed, that the cause of action was one for recovery of possession of real
property and its assessed value. MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner. RTC affirmed the ruling.
Unconvinced, respondents moved for reconsideration.

Petitioner argues that RTC decision has actually become final and executory after
respondents filed a defective MR which did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal
the decision before the CA. Respondents contend that they complied with the provision of the
Rules of Court as regards notice of hearing such that on the day the motion for reconsideration
was to be heard, petitioner was present and she even filed her opposition to the motion.

ISSUE:
Will the decision of a trial court become final and executory if the party filed a defective
Motion for Reconsideration, which in effect did not toll the running of the reglementary period to
file an appeal?

RULING:
No, the decision of the trial court will not become final and executory despite the defective
MR filed.

The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and
5 of the ROC is mandatory. Nevertheless, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast
rule. When the adverse party had been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed
heard through the pleadings filed in opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day
notice requirement is deemed served. In such case, the requirements of procedural due process
are substantially complied with. The test is the presence of opportunity to be heard, as well as to
have time to study the motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is
based.

In this case, the RTC gave petitioner ten days within which to comment on respondents’
MR. Petitioner filed its Opposition in the Motion, and filed a Motion for Entry of Judgment. Thus, it
cannot be gainsaid that petitioner was not given her day in court. While it is true that the name of
petitioner's counsel was not indicated in the notice of hearing, nonetheless, she was furnished a
copy thereof which she received before the date of the scheduled hearing.

Therefore, under the circumstance of the present case, the purpose of a notice of hearing
was served.

44 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SHOULD THE DEFENDANT DESIRE TO PROSECUTE HIS COUNTERCLAIM, HE

SHOULD MANIFEST HIS PREFERENCE WITHIN FIFTEEN (15) DAYS FROM NOTICE OF
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Alex Raul Blay vs. Cythia B. Baña

G.R. No. 232189, March 7, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, filed by petitioner Alex Raul Blay, assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the CA, which affirmed the Orders of the RTC that granted the petitioner
Alex Raul Blay’s Motion to Withdraw and declared respondent Cynthia Baña’s Counterclaim for
independent adjudication. The CA held that if a counterclaim has been filed by the defendant
before the service upon him of the petitioner's motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited
to the complaint.

Petitioner later filed a Motion to Withdraw his previous petition seeking to declare null and
void his marriage with respondent Cynthia Baña on account of psychological incapacity.
Respondent, in her comment/opposition, invoked Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court and
prayed that her counterclaims be declared as remaining for the court’s independent adjudication.

In his reply, petitioner claimed that the counterclaims are barred from being prosecuted in
same action due to her failure to file a manifestation within fifteen days from notice of the Motion
to Withdraw, which is required under the same Rules.

ISSUE:
Will a counterclaim be barred from being prosecuted for failure to file manifestation within
fifteen days from notice of motion to dismiss?

RULING:
Yes, the counterclaim will be barred from being prosecuted due to failure to file
manifestation within fifteen days, as required by the Rules.

Section 2, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court provides that “if a counterclaim has been pleaded
by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion for dismissal, the dismissal
shall be limited to the complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the motion he manifests his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same
action. Should he choose to have his counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the
complaint had been dismissed, he must manifest within 15 days from notice to him of plaintiff's
motion to dismiss. The rationale behind this rule is not difficult to discern: the passing of the fifteen
(15)-day period triggers the finality of the court's dismissal of the complaint and hence, bars the
conduct of further proceedings, i.e., the prosecution of respondent's counterclaim, in the same
action.

In this case, respondent failed to file his counterclaims within 15 days.

Therefore, his counterclaim is barred from being prosecuted in the same action. The
aforesaid dismissal is without prejudice to the prosecution of respondent’s counterclaim in a
separate action.

| 45
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOOTNESS IS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION, RENDERING IT

UNNECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO RULE ON THE MERITS OF THE OTHER
GROUNDS

Emmanuel Lu et al. vs. Marissa Lu Chiong et al.

G.R. No. 220070, April 16, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 appealing the Decision
of the CA against petitioners which nullified the inhibition of Judge Maria Florencia Formes-Baculo
(Judge Formes-Baculo) from the original case in the RTC.

Two complaints for Nullification of Stockholder's Meeting, Election of the Members of the
Board of Directors, Officers, General Information Sheet and Minutes of Meeting, were filed by
Marissa Lu Chiong and Cristina Lu Ng (respondents) against petitioners with the RTC Calamba.

Respondents filed a Motion for Inhibition, asking Judge Formes-Baculo to recuse herself
from the cases on ground that the Judge had granted the petitioners' applications for preliminary
injunction on the basis of erroneous findings of fact, unfounded evidence and misapplication of law
and jurisprudence, leading the respondents to believe that her order was made with bias to
petitioners. Although Judge Formes-Baculo inhibited herself, she denied the allegations of bias.

Respondents filed with the CA a Consolidated Petition for certiorari and prohibition, which
the CA granted. It held that the inhibition was contrary to Sec 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. It
explained that a judge's voluntary inhibition from a case must be based on just or valid reasons.
Mere imputations of bias or partiality are not enough grounds for inhibition.

During the pendency of the case however, the RTC issued a decision on the merits of the
original action between the parties. It was rendered by the judge who replaced Judge Formes-
Baculo. Thus, petitioners argued before the CA that this petition questioning the inhibition of Judge
Former-Baculo has been mooted and should be dismissed. The CA did dismiss the petition. Hence
this appeal.

ISSUE:
Should a petition for inhibition of a trial judge be dismissed for being moot and academic
when the case for which the inhibition is sought is already decided on the merits by another judge?

RULING:
Yes, the petition for inhibition of the trial judge must be dismissed for being moot and
academic.

An issue is said to have become moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value." Courts decline
jurisdiction over such actions or dismiss them on the ground of mootness.

In this case, the jurisdiction over the main actions between the parties attached to the RTC
of Calamba City, not in its branches or judges, to the exclusion of others. Thus, the dismissal of
the respondent’s complaints by Judge Formes-Baculo’s replacement was a valid disposition on
the merits.

Therefore, any proceedings collateral to the main actions are mooted, such as the petition
before the CA.

46 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ONLY THE EVIDENCE IDENTIFIED AND PRE-MARKED DURING PRE-TRIAL MAY BE

ALLOWED TO BE PRESENTED DURING TRIAL

Angeline Chua and Heirs of Jose Ma. Cheng Sing Phuan vs. Spouses
Santiago Cheng and Avelina Sihiyon
G.R. No. 219309, November 22, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by Angeline Chua and heirs of Jose which imputed grave
abuse of discretion to Judge Maniba, the RTC judge who issued the decision denying the oral
motion of petitioners to present additional witness and denying petitioner’s MR of the resolution.

Jose Ma. Cheng Sing Phuan, Santiago Cheng, and Petra Cheng Sing are siblings and
registered owners of two parcels of land situated in Iloilo City. On these land stands a rice mill
housing pieces of milling equipment. Santiago sent Jose written and verbal demands for the
physical partition of the Iloilo lands, rice mill, and equipment. As the demands left unheeded,
Santiago filed a complaint for partition and damages before the RTC.

After submission of their pre-trial briefs and the conduct of pre-trial conference, Judge Ruiz,
then presiding judge, issued a pre-trial order stating “all evidence to be adduced and presented by
both parties shall be limited to those identified.” None of the parties manifested any intent to revise
the pre-trial order. During the hearing, petitioners orally manifested in open court that they would
be presenting 6 additional witnesses. These additional witnesses were not among those listed in
the pre-trial order nor were identified in Jose’s pre-trial brief. Respondent’s opposed. Judge Maniba
assumed the position as presiding judge and issued the RTC resolution denying the petitioner’s
oral motion.

ISSUE:
Is a judge correct in denying an oral motion to present witnesses who are not listed in the
pre-trial order?

RULING:
Yes, judge is correct in denying the motion to present witnesses who are not listed in the
pre-trial order.

No evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of a
party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during
the pre-trial, except if allowed by the court for good cause shown. The importance of pre-trial in
civil cases cannot be overemphasized. Time and again, this Court has recognized "the importance
of pre-trial procedure as a means of facilitating the disposal of cases by simplifying or limiting the
issues and avoiding unnecessary proof of facts at the trial, and to do whatever may reasonably be
necessary to facilitate and shorten the formal trial." The need for strict adherence to the rules on
pre-trial thus proceeds from its significant role in the litigation process. This is not to say, however,
that the rules governing pre-trial should be, at all times, applied in absolute terms. While faithful
compliance with these rules is undoubtedly desirable, they may be relaxed in cases where their
application would frustrate, rather than facilitate, the ends of justice. The relaxation of these rules,
however, is contingent upon a showing of compelling and persuasive reasons to justify the same.

In this case, it is the Court's considered view that petitioners have failed to sufficiently show
that such compelling and persuasive reasons exist in this case.

Therefore, the judge correctly denied the motion.

| 47
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PRE-TRIAL AND TRIAL ARE NEEDED TO GIVE OPPORTUNITY TO DEFINE AND

CLARIFY ISSUES, MATTERS TO BE RESOLVED, AND PRESENT EVIDENCE

Sultan Cawal P. Mangondaya vs. Naga Ampaso,

G.R. No. 201763, March 21, 2018
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 questioning the order of the Shari'a
District Court (SDC), dismissing petitioner Sultan Cawal P. Mangondaya's complaint for recovery
of possession and ownership of a parcel of land against respondent Naga Ampaso.

Petitioner claimed that he is the owner of the land while respondent cultivated it under a
customary law, which provides that a person can utilize the land without the owner’s consent but
he cannot buy or sell it. Respondent then informed petitioner that he will sell the land to which he
objected but petitioner still sold it. Petitioner brought the matter to the Sultanate Community Civic
Leader, Inc. (SCCLI) but respondent still refused to return his land.

Respondent alleged that the SDC had no jurisdiction as no customary act was involved.
He also argued that he bought the land evidenced by a deed of sale, and even if petitioner has a
claim, it is already barred by laches. He also claimed that SCCLI did not rule on the controversy
and the attached document was a forgery. Petitioner then argued that the Orders of the SDC
violated procedural due process, which requires that every litigant is entitled to his day in court,
when it issued the said Orders without trial.

ISSUE:
Is a party deprived of procedural due process when orders were issued without the benefit
of a trial?

RULING:
Yes, a party is deprived of procedural due process when the court issues orders without a
trial. Petitioner was deprived of procedural due process when instead of conducting a pre-trial in
order to clarify and define the issues and proceeding with the trial, the SDC dismissed the case.

Under Section 6 of the Special Rules on Procedure in Shari’a Courts, not later than 30
days after the answer is filed, the case shall be calendared for pre-trial.

In this case, the SDC could not just conclude on the basis of pleadings and attachments
that petitioner failed to prove his claim over the land, that prescription and laches have set in, and
that the 'äda, assuming it exists, is contrary to the Constitution, laws and public policy. It should
have proceeded with the pre-trial where the parties would have had the opportunity to define and
clarify the issues and matters to be resolved, present all their available evidence. The SDC would
then have the opportunity to carefully weigh, evaluate, and scrutinize such.

Therefore, the case is remanded to the SDC to conduct pre-trial and further proceedings
to examine the claims and defenses of the parties.

48 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHEN MATTERS SUBJECT OF REQUEST FOR ADMISSION ARE ALREADY

CONTROVERTED IN EARLIER PLEADING, OTHER PARTY NEED NOT REPLY
THERETO

Lilia S. Duque, et. al. vs. Spouses Bartolome D. Yu and Juliet O. Yu, et. al.
G.R. No. 226130, February 19, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioners assail the CA decision,
affirming in toto the grant of demurrer to evidence by the trial court.

Petitioner Lilia Duque (Duque) and her late husband owned a parcel of land, and over
which they allegedly executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their daughter, respondent Delia
Capacio (Capacio), who, in turn, sold a portion thereof to co-respondents Spouses Yu (Sps. Yu).
Thereafter, claiming that the Deed of Donation was forged, Duque filed a “Verified Complaint for
Declaration of Non-Existence and Nullity of a Deed of Donation and Deed of Absolute Sale and
Cancellation of TD” (Complaint) against Sps. Yu. In her Answer, Capacio admitted that the
signature in the Deed of Donation was, indeed, falsified, but she did not know the author thereof.

Subsequently, Sps. Yu filed a Motion for Admission by Adverse Party under Rule 26 of the
Rules of Court, requesting, among others, the admission of the Deed of Donation. Duque was
directed to comment thereon but failed to do so. Thus, the trial court pronounced that they were
deemed to have admitted the same. As a result, Sps. Yu, during trial, moved for demurrer of
evidence in view of the aforesaid pronouncement.

ISSUE:
Is the failure to comply with the Request for Admission under Rule 26 tantamount to an
admission of the genuineness and authenticity of a deed?

RULING:
No, failure to comply with the Request for Admission is not tantamount to an admission of
the genuineness and authenticity of the deed in questions. The petitioners need not reply to the
request for admission.

Once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material and relevant
matter of fact, the party to whom such request is served has 15 days within which to file a sworn
statement answering it. In case of failure to do so, each of the matters of which admission is
requested shall be deemed admitted. An exception is when the party to whom such request for
admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier
pleading. In turn, the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to the request and,
thereafter, assume or even demand the application of the implied admission rule in Sec. 2, Rule
26 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, the circumstances fall under the exception since the matters and documents
being requested to be admitted have already been denied and controverted in the Complaint. In
fact, the forgery committed in the Deed of Donation was the very essence of that Complaint, where
it was alleged that being a forged document, the same is invalid and without force and legal effect.

Therefore, petitioners need not reply to the request for admission, and as a consequence,
they cannot be deemed to have admitted the Deed of Donation’s genuineness and authenticity for
their failure to respond thereto.

| 49
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

GRANT OR DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT;

ADDRESSED TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF COURT

Spouses Loreto and Milagros Sibay, et. al. vs. Spouses Bienvenido and Juanita Bermudez
G.R. No. 198196, July 17, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision
and Resolution of the CA which fined the petitioner spouses Sibay and their counsel for being
absent due to illness and conflict of scheduled hearings, respectively.

Petitioners obtained a loan from LBP and mortgaged the subject lot as a security. LBP
foreclosed the property and sold it to Nemesia Bermudez, through respondent spouses Bermudez.
Petitioners filed before the RTC a complaint for the annulment of the loan contract. When the case
was called for the presentation of petitioners' evidence, Loreto Sibay failed to attend due to arthritis.
The court reset the hearing and directed Loreto, through counsel, to submit his medical certificate,
otherwise, they will have to reimburse the defendants of the expenses incurred for unjustified
postponement of the hearing.

Before the rescheduled hearing, petitioners filed a motion for postponement due to a
conflict in the hearing schedule of its counsel before another court. The court denied the motion
and ordered the petitioners to pay respondents in the total amount of P10,000. In a motion for
reconsideration, it was reduced to P5,000. Petitioners allege that the court grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court a quo. CA denied the petition.

ISSUE:
Is the grant or denial of a motion for postponement a matter of right?

RULING:
No, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is not a matter of right.

As a rule, the grant or denial of a motion for postponement is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, which should always be predicated on the consideration that more than the
mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness should
be served thereby. Thus, in considering motions for postponements, two things must be borne in
mind: (1) the reason for the postponement, and (2) the merits of the case of the movant. Unless
grave abuse of discretion is shown, such discretion will not be interfered with either by mandamus
or appeal. Because it is a matter of privilege, not a right, a movant for postponement should not
assume beforehand that his motion will be granted.

In this case, Loreto Sibay grounded his motion on an unsubstantiated claim of illness, while
his counsel's excuse is conflict of schedule. Even if these were true, there is still no reason why
both Loreto Sibay and his counsel could not have submitted his medical certificate or fix the
schedule and file the motion for postponement, seasonably.

Therefore, denying the motion for postponement and imposing of fine is justified.

50 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

BOTH THE JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE AND DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE CAN CO-
EXIST HARMONIOUSLY AS TOOLS FOR A MORE EFFICIENT AND SPEEDY TRIAL

Armando Lagon vs. Dennis A. Velasco

G.R. No. 208424, February 14, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking the annulment of the Order issued
by public respondent Hon. Dennis A. Velasco (Judge Velasco), directing petitioner Armando Lagon
(Lagon) to file the judicial affidavits of his witnesses within five (5) days prior to the commencement
of the trial dates.

Petitioner Lagon issued a check for the payment of his debt from Gabriel Dizon (Dizon).
However, when it was presented for payment, it was dishonored. Eleven years later, Dizon sent a
letter demanding payment from Lagon but the latter refused to pay. A complaint for sum of money
was filed against Lagon. Lagon then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of prescription.

During the preliminary conference, the parties were directed to file their pre-trial briefs.
Judge Velasco issued the order requiring the parties to submit their judicial affidavits of those of
their witnesses. Lagon filed a motion that he be allowed to submit the judicial affidavit after the
plaintiff has adduced his evidence and claimed that Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule (JAR)
violates his rights to due process because it deprives him of his right not to present evidence and
to demur to the evidence. Judge Velasco denied the motion, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is Section 2 of the JAR, which requires a defendant to offer testimonial evidence by judicial
affidavits before the pre-trial or preliminary conference, inconsistent with the rule on demurrer to
evidence?

RULING:
No, Section 2 of the JAR is not inconsistent with the rule on demurrer to evidence.

There is nothing in the provisions of the JAR, which prohibits a defendant from filing a
demurrer to evidence, even after submitting judicial affidavits before pre-trial or preliminary
conference. If he truly believes that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is insufficient, nothing in
both rules prevent him demurring to the evidence of the plaintiff. Besides, in the resolution of the
demurrer to evidence, only the evidence presented by the plaintiff shall be considered and weighed
by the Court.

Clearly, both the Judicial Affidavit Rule and Demurrer to Evidence can co-exist
harmoniously as tools for a more efficient and speedy trial. On the one hand, the Judicial Affidavit
Rule simply dispenses with the direct testimony, thereby reducing the time at which a case stands
for trial, in the same way that the Demurrer to Evidence abbreviates proceedings by allowing the
defendant to seek for an early resolution of the case should the plaintiff be unable to sufficiently
prove his complaint.

Therefore, these rules do not conflict, and when used hand in hand will lead to an efficient
administration of the trial.

| 51
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JUDGMENT BASED ON COMPROMISE SHOULD BE EXECUTED BASED STRICTLY ON

THE TERMS AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES

Cathay Land, Inc. vs. Ayala Land, Inc.

G.R. No. 210209, August 9, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the resolution of CA that
it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in ordering the execution of the
Compromise Agreement between petitioner Cathay Group and respondent Ayala Group.

Petitioner filed a Complaint alleging that respondent unjustifiably denied passage to

petitioner's personnel, vehicles, and heavy equipment through its properties. Then, the parties
executed a Compromise Agreement. Petitioner undertakes that it will not develop and will not allow
the development of, among others, high-rise buildings. RTC approved the Agreement.

Respondent filed a Motion for Execution alleging that the petitioner disregarded its
undertaking not to construct high-rise buildings or structures which are at least 15 meters high or
beyond the building height limit of three storeys. Petitioner contended that the Compromise
Agreement does not contain a provision limiting building height at three storeys and the
proscription therein only pertains to the construction of high-rise buildings without any specific
qualifications.

ISSUE:
Should a compromised agreement approved by a court be strictly interpreted and executed
based on the terms agreed upon?

RULING:
Yes, a compromise agreement duly approved by the court should be executed based
strictly on the terms agreed upon. The term “high-rise” building should not be interpreted as to
imply a “height limit of three storeys” as it was not contemplated by the parties.

It is settled that once a compromise agreement is approved by a final order of the court, it
transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, as it becomes a
judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules of Court. Judges, therefore,
have the ministerial and mandatory duty to implement and enforce it. Nevertheless, in
implementing a compromise agreement, the courts cannot modify, impose terms different from the
terms of the agreement, or set aside the compromises and reciprocal concessions made in good
faith by the parties without gravely abusing their discretion.

In this case, the RTC granted the respondent’s Motion for Execution of the Compromise
Agreement on account of the petitioner’s construction of "high-rise structures" on its properties.
Under the Compromise Agreement, the remedies available to the respondent should the petitioner
fail to abide by the terms are, first: to notify the Cathay Group of such breach; and second, either
to withdraw or suspend the grant of easement of right-of way to the petitioner.

Therefore, the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it granted a remedy that is not
available to the respondent, thereby imposing terms different from what was agreed upon by the
parties.

52 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JUDGMENTS RENDERED WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS ARE

VOID

Amando Go. vs. East Ocean Leasing and Finance Corporation

G.R. No. 206841-42, January 19, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial Court.

Petitioner Armando Go (Go) obtained a loan from respondent East Oceanic Leasing and
Finance Corporation (East Oceanic) in the amount of ₱4,062,888.00 evidenced by a Promissory
Note that Go executed on the same day. Go subsequently issued six post-dated checks in favor
of East Oceanic, all drawn from his account. Unfortunately, the checks were all dishonored by the
DBP upon presentment. By reason of the dishonored checks, Go's loan became due and
demandable with an outstanding balance of ₱2,814,054.84. East Oceanic filed a
Complaint against Go before the RTC for collection of a sum of money with prayer for preliminary
attachment. Go requested for a proper accounting of his loan in order to determine the amount
that he actually owed from East Oceanic. Thereafter, RTC rendered a judgment Ordering
defendant Armando Go to pay plaintiff the sum of ₱2,814,054.84 plus 6% interest to be computed
from the time of the filing of the complaint.

Petitoner Go now asserts that the RTC Decision is contrary to law because it failed to cite
any factual and/or legal basis as to his civil liability to East Oceanic.

ISSUE:
Is the absence of factual or legal basis in rendering a judgment contrary to law?

RULING:
Yes, the absence of a factual and legal basis in rendering a judgment is contrary to law.

The Constitution expressly provides that "'no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.” This
constitutional mandate is reflected in Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court which states that:
Sec l. Rendition of judgements and final orders. – A judgment or final order determining the merits
of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating dearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of court.
The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that
judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action.

In this case, a review of the records shows that the RTC had failed to clearly and
distinctly state the facts and the law on which it based its ruling insofar as Go's civil liability to East
Oceanic is concerned. There is absolutely no discussion at all in the assailed Decision as to the
RTC's ruling in the collection case, particularly, on how it arrived at its conclusion finding Go liable
to pay East Oceanic "'the sum of ₱2,814,054.86 plus 6% interest to be computed from the time of
the filing of the complaint.''

Therefore, the assailed judgment was rendered void for not having sufficient factual/legal
basis.

| 53
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS ONLY PROHIBITED BY THE RULES

IF FILED BY THE SAME PARTY INVOLVING THE SAME JUDGMENT OR FINAL
RESOLUTION

Jesusa Dujali Buot vs. Gregorio Dujali

G.R. No. 199885, October 2, 2017
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Jesusa Dujali Buot (Buot) challenged the Orders of the RTC dismissing her petition and denying
her subsequent motion for reconsideration, respectively which favored respondent Dujali.

Petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for letters of administration of the estate of
deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio). It was alleged that Respondent purportedly continued to
manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other heirs. Furthermore, for no
justifiable reason, respondent denied her request to settle the estate. Respondent subsequently
filed an opposition with motion to dismiss, arguing that petitioner had no legal capacity to institute
the proceedings but the same was denied by the RTC. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and it was granted. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed subsequently a motion for
reconsideration which the RTC denied.

According to the RTC, not only was petitioner’s motion a second motion for reconsideration
prohibited under the Rules, there was also no sufficient reason to reverse its earlier dismissal of
the petition.

ISSUE:
Is the second motion for reconsideration prohibited by the Rules?

RULING:
No, a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited by the rules only if it is filed by the
same party involving the same judgment or resolution. The second motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioner in this case is not a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.

Section 2 of Rule 52 of the Rules of Court states “No second motion for reconsideration of
a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained”. Section 2 of Rule 52 is clear
and leaves no room for interpretation. What it prohibits is a second motion for reconsideration filed
by the same party involving the same judgment or final resolution.

In this case, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was only her first motion challenging
the Order dismissing her petition for administration of Gregorio's estate.

Therefore, the motion of reconsideration filed by petitioner is not a prohibited second

motion for reconsideration.

54 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A DECISION SUBSTANTIALLY REVERSING A DETERMINATION IN A PRIOR DECISION

IS A DISCRETE DECISION FROM THE EARLIER ONE

Angelito L. Cristobal vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.

G.R. No. 201622, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA Resolutions
dismissing petitioner Angelito L. Cristobal's (Cristobal) from respondent Philippine Airlines’
employment.

Petitioner became a pilot for respondent. After many years of working as a pilot for
respondent, petitioner applied for leave without pay from respondent to enter into a four-year
contract with EVA Air. The application was approved and he was advised that he would continue
to accrue seniority during his leave and that he could opt to retire from PAL during this period.
However, when petitioner advised respondent of his intent to retire, the latter advised him that he
was deemed to have lost his employment status. This prompted petitioner to file a complaint
against respondent.

The Labor Arbiter ruled partially in favor of petitioner which was later on affirmed by the
NLRC. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration as he alleged that the award granted to
him is not sufficient. Respondent, on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration asking that
the award to be granted to petitioner be reduced further. The NLRC resolved both motions by
granting respondent’s prayer. It further reduced the award granted to petitioner which prompted
the latter to file another motion for reconsideration. However, such motion for reconsideration was
dismissed by the NLRC on the ground that it is a prohibited second motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner went to the CA but the latter just affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

Petitioner points out that his Partial Motion for Reconsideration only assailed the NLRC
Decision, which reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages. On the other hand, his
Motion for Reconsideration assailed the reduction of his retirement benefits.

ISSUE:
Is an MR assailing the reduction of retirement benefits a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration considering that there was already a previous MR filed assailing the reduction of
award of moral and exemplary damages?

RULING:
No, the MR assailing the reduction of retirement benefits is not a prohibited second motion
for reconsideration even if there was already a previous MR assailing the reduction of damages.

The NLRC Rules of Procedure prohibits a party from questioning a decision, resolution, or
order, twice. In other words, the rule prohibits the same party from assailing the same judgment.
However, a decision substantially reversing a determination in a prior decision is a discrete
decision from the earlier one.

In this case, the NLRC Decision substantially modified its previous Decision. Thus,
petitioner was not precluded from seeking reconsideration of the new decision of the NLRC.

Therefore, the motion for reconsideration of petitioner is not a prohibited second motion for
reconsideration.

| 55
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAY BE ALLOWED TO PROSPER UPON

A SHOWING BY THE MOVANT THAT A RECONSIDERATION OF THE PREVIOUS
RULING IS NECESSARY IN THE HIGHER INTEREST OF JUSTICE

Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
G.R. No. 178083, March 13, 2018
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
This is a case resolving two motions for reconsideration filed by respondent PAL and
another motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Flight Attendants and Stewards Association
of the Philippines.

Resolving the appeal of petitioner, the Third Division of the Court promulgated its decision
(July 22, 2008 Decision) reversing the decision promulgated by the CA and entering a new one
finding respondent guilty of unlawful retrenchment. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
which prompted, upon motion, an oral argument between the parties. Afterwards, the Court
directed the parties to explore a possible settlement but no settlement was made. The Court
resolved the issue by denying respondent’s motion of reconsideration through a resolution (Oct.
2, 2009 Resolution). Not satisfied, respondent filed the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of Oct. 2, 2009 and Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008.

Respondent manifests that the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of Oct. 2,
2009 and Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of July 22, 2008 is its first motion for
reconsideration vis-a-vis the Oct. 2, 2009 resolution, and its second as to the July 22, 2008
decision. It states therein that because the Court did not address the issues raised in its previous
motion for reconsideration, it is re-submitting the same. Petitioner counters that a second motion
for reconsideration was a prohibited pleading.

ISSUE:
Is a second motion for reconsideration a prohibited pleading at all times?

RULING:
No, the second motion for reconsideration is not a prohibited pleading at all times.

The rule prohibiting the filing of a second motion for reconsideration is by no means
absolute. Under the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, a second motion for reconsideration may
be allowed to prosper upon a showing by the movant that a reconsideration of the previous ruling
is necessary in the higher interest of justice. There is higher interest of justice when the assailed
decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially capable of
causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties.

The arguments of respondent regarding the retrenchment sufficed to show that the
assailed decision contravened settled jurisprudence on respondent’s precarious financial
condition. It cannot be gainsaid that there were other businesses undergoing rehabilitation that
would also be bound or negatively affected by the July 22, 2008 decision. This was the higher
interest of justice that the Court sought to address.

Therefore, respondent’s second motion for reconsideration should be allowed.

56 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROCEDURAL RULES OF EVEN THE MOST MANDATORY CHARACTER MAY BE

SUSPENDED UPON A SHOWING OF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING THE EXERCISE
OF LIBERALITY IN ITS STRICT APPLICATION

Velia J. Cruz vs. Spouses Maximo and Susan Christensen

G.R. No. 205539, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA. The assailed Decision reversed the RTC Decision which ordered
respondents Maximo and Susan Christensen to pay unpaid rentals and to vacate petitioner Velia
J. Cruz's property. The CA instead reinstated the MTC Decision, dismissing the complaint for
unlawful detainer for petitioner’s failure to prove that a demand letter was validly served on the
respondents.

Petitioner alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land and that due to respondent’s
failure and refusal to pay rentals, she was constrained to demand the latter to vacate the property
and pay all unpaid rentals. Petitioner alleged that despite demand, respondent refused to vacate
and pay the accrued rentals. Thus, petitioner was constrained to file a Complaint for unlawful
detainer which was dismissed by the MTC. Petitioner appealed to the RTC which rendered a
Decision reversing the MTC Decision. Respondents subsequently appealed to the CA. The CA
afterwards reversed the RTC Decision and reinstated the MTC Decision. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration but the same was denied.

According to the CA, the filing of a memorandum of appeal within 15 days from the receipt
of order is mandatory under Rule 40, Section 7(b) of the Rules of Court and the failure to comply
will result in the dismissal of the appeal. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that the issues and
arguments raised in the appeal outweigh its procedural defect and, hence, should be given
consideration.

ISSUE:
Does the failure to comply with the 15-day period from receipt of Order under Rule 40,
Section 7(b) of the ROC result into an automatic dismissal of the appeal?

RULING:
No, the failure to comply with the 15-day period from receipt of an order under Rule 40
should not result to an automatic dismissal of the appeal.

Procedural rules of even the most mandatory character may be suspended upon a showing
of circumstances warranting the exercise of liberality in its strict application. The rule regarding the
procedure of appeals in the RTC is jurisdictional since such court can only resolve errors that are
specifically assigned and properly argued in the memorandum. Thus, dismissals based on this rule
are premised on the non-filing of the memorandum. A trial court does not acquire jurisdiction over
an appeal where the errors have not been specifically assigned.

In this case, a Memorandum of Appeal was filed late but was nonetheless given due course
by the RTC. Thus, the jurisdictional defect was cured since petitioner was able to specifically
assign the MTC’s errors, which the RTC was able to address and resolve.

Therefore, the failure to comply with the period provided in the Rules of Court will not at all times
dismiss an appeal.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

NO RES JUDICATA WHEN THE PREVIOUS CASE DID NOT TAKE ON THE MERITS OF
THE CASE

Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp. vs. Multi-Realty Development Corp.

G.R. No. 185530, April 18, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Makati Tuscany Condominium
Corporation against respondent Multi-Realty Development Corp. assailing the Amended Decision
of the CA.

Pursuant to RA No. 4726, respondent created and incorporated petitioner corporation.

Respondent executed a Deed of Transfer of ownership of the common areas to petitioner.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages and/or reformation of instrument and alleged in its
complaint that out of the 106 parking slots designated in the Master Deed as part of the common
areas, only 8 slots were actually intended to be guest parking slots. RTC dismissed the complaint.
CA dismissed the appeal on the ground of prescription. Respondent filed a petition for review
before this Court.

The Supreme Court, in Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. The Makati Tuscany

Condominium Corporation, granted respondent’s petition and directed the CA to resolve
respondent’s appeal. CA upheld the RTC finding that respondent was guilty of estoppel by deed.
Respondent maintains that the Petition raises factual findings and prays that this Court take a
second look at the evidence presented and come up with its own factual findings.

ISSUE:
Is a Court bound by the factual findings on the issue of prescription in another case
involving the same parties on the ground of conclusiveness of judgment?

RULING:
No, the Court is not bound by the factual findings of the other case.

There is res judicata when the following concur: a) the former judgment must be final; b)
the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; d) and there must be between the first and second actions
identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

In this case, Multi-Realty Development Corporation did not take on the merits of the case
but only tackled the issue of prescription raised to this Court on appeal. After finding that the action
had not yet prescribed and was mistakenly dismissed by the CA because of a supposedly stale
claim, this Court directed that it be remanded to the CA for a resolution of the appeal.

Therefore, res judicata had not yet set in and this Court was not precluded from evaluating
all of the evidence vis-a-vis the issues raised by both parties.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

APPEAL IS NOT A NATURAL RIGHT OR A PART OF DUE PROCESS BUT IS MERELY A

STATUTORY PRIVILEGE

Fernando Melendres vs. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez and Jose Pepito M. Amores,
M.D.
G. R. No. 194346, June 18, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Fernando A. Melendres'
(Melendres) assails the Resolutions dated June 15, 2010 and November 9, 2010 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 113143.

Said Resolutions dismissed his appeal for failure to comply with the CA Resolution dated
April 6, 2010 directing him to submit various documents material to his petition.

A complaint for Grave Misconduct against Melendres and the other officials of Lung Center
of the Philippines was filed, for having allegedly misappropriated the funds for LCP's renovation
by utilizing the same for private investment purposes to the detrimental to government medical
service.

The Ombudsman found Melendres guilty. Melendres then appealed the decision of the
Ombudsman to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. He claimed that the money was not
placed under an IMA investment but was merely a special savings account with an interest yield
of 7.25% for thirty days. On April 6, 2010, the CA issued a Resolution requiring Melendres to
submit, within three (3) days from receipt, clearly legible copies of material portions of the record
and other supporting documents, with warning that failure to comply will result to the dismissal of
the petition.

ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in dismissing the appeal on the ground of petitioner’s failure to comply
with the submission of the documents required by the appellate court?

RULING:
Yes. The CA correctly dismissed the appeal for petitioner’s failure to comply with the
submission of the documents required by the appellate court.

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. As
such, the party seeking relief from the appellate court must strictly comply with the requirements
set forth by the rules. Compliance with the procedural rules is essential for the speedy disposition
of justice.

In this case, the appellate court required submission of certain documents and expressly
warned Melendres that dismissal is forthcoming in case of failure to comply. Melendres, despite
the extension given him, still failed to comply with the documents required by the appellate court.
Clearly, dismissal is justified under the Rules of Court. Melendres' failure to abide by the procedural
requirements, under the aforesaid circumstances, results in the forfeiture of his right to appeal.
"The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional."

Therefore, CA validly dismissed the appeal upon failure of petitioner to comply with the
submission of the required documents.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A JUDGMENT THAT LAPSES INTO FINALITY BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND

UNALTERABLE

Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Spouses Huang and Stephen Huang

G.R. No. 197654, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari arising from the execution of a final and executory
judgment for damages which assails the Decision and Resolution of the CA which sustained the
denial of the Motion to Quash Writ of Execution, Motion for Inhibition, and Urgent Motion to Defer
the Implementation of Writ of Execution filed by petitioners Mercury Drug Corporation and Rolando
Del Rosario in a complaint for damages filed by respondents Stephen Huang and his parents.

Huang who became paraplegic due to the tragic incident and his parents filed a complaint
for damages based on quasi-delict against petitioners Mercury, the owner of the truck, and Del
Rosario, the driver. As the case reached its finality, an Entry of Judgment was made. Huang moved
for the execution of the judgment before RTC and the same was granted.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA due to RTC’s grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the execution of judgment despite clerical errors in the computation of life
care cost and loss of earning capacity that were awarded by the court to the parties. The CA denied
the petition holding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. It found that the
perceived error in the computation of the award and its correction entailed a substantial
amendment of the judgment sought to be enforced. Under the doctrine on immutability of
judgments, courts are precluded from altering or modifying a final and executory judgment. Hence,
this petition.

Petitioners point out, in particular, that the amounts of life care cost and loss of earning
capacity reflected in the dispositive portion and the writ of execution do not correspond to those
stated in the body of the decision. On the other hand, respondents assert that petitioners are
prohibited from questioning the propriety of the monetary awards under the doctrine of immutability
of final judgments.

ISSUE:
Is the exception on the doctrine of immutability of final judgment on the ground of clerical
errors applicable in a case where it was alleged that the dispositive portion of a decision was varied
by a subsequent writ of execution?

RULING:
No, the exception on the doctrine of immutability of final judgment on the ground of clerical
errors is not applicable in such case.

It is a fundamental principle that a judgment that lapses into finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. The primary consequence of this principle is that the judgment may no longer be
modified or amended by any court in any manner even if the purpose of the modification or
amendment is to correct perceived errors of law or fact. This principle known as the doctrine of
immutability of judgment is a matter of sound public policy, which rests upon the practical
consideration that every litigation must come to an end.

In this case, the amounts indicated in the dispositive portion of the judgment faithfully
correspond to the findings of fact and conclusions of the trial court. There being no clerical errors
or ambiguities in the dispositive portion or body of the judgment, the amounts awarded as life care
cost and loss of earning capacity stand.

Therefore, no exceptions to the doctrine of immutability of judgments are present in this

case.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A DECISION THAT HAS ACQUIRED FINALITY BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND

UNALTERABLE, AND MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE
MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO CORRECT ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND
LAW

Rogelio Antone vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 225146, November 20, 2017
Perlas- Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Rogelio Antone for two counts of the crime of Statutory
rape.

The instant case stemmed for two separate information filed before the RTC charging
Antone of raping his then eleven-year-old niece-in-law. The RTC found Antone guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of simple Statutory Rape, and accordingly sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. In a decision dated July 31, 2015, CA
affirmed the RTC ruling with modification as to the award of damages. Dissatisfied, Antone moved
for a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a resolution dated April 22, 2016.

ISSUE:
Does a procedural lapse exist when the case of Rape punishable by reclusion perpetua is
elevated before the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court?

RULING:
Yes, there is a procedural lapse when the case of Rape punishable by reclusion perpetua
is elevated before the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules states “In cases where the Court of Appeals
imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter
judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice
of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.” Time and again, the Court has repeatedly held that "a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land.
This principle, known as the doctrine of immutability of judgment, has a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly
the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the judicious perception that
the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of
time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but rather, a
matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied."

In this case, the CA affirmed the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to Antone
for each count of Statutory Rape committed against AAA. As such, he should have filed a notice
of appeal before the CA instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari before the Court.

Therefore, Antone's failure to timely file a notice of appeal before the CA resulted in the
latter court's Decision dated July 31, 2015 and the Resolution dated April 22, 2016 lapsing into
finality.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENTS CANNOT BE ATTACKED OR MODIFIED

Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. vs. VTL Realty, Inc.

G.R. No. 193499, April 23, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Motion to Order Defendant to Correct Statement of Account, praying that BDO be
ordered to compute interests and penalties due only up to April 28, 1995.

Bollozos sold the property to VTL Realty Corporation (VTL) and A Deed of Definite Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage was executed between the parties. This led VTL to institute an action
for specific performance with damages against BDO with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City. In the course of the proceedings, the obligation remained unpaid, prompting BDO to foreclose
the real estate mortgage on March 29, 1995.

RTC rendered a Decision directing BDO to furnish VTL with Bollozos and/or World's Arts
and Crafts Inc.'s new Statement of Account based on the Statement of Account plus the
corresponding interests and penalty charges that have accrued thereafter. By the same token, VTL
was directed to assume and pay Bollozos' obligation to BDO upon receipt of such Statement of
Account. VTL appealed the RTC judgment to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the same
in a Decision dated May 26, 2004. Thereafter, an Entry of Judgment was issued.

Later, separate motions for execution were filed by BDO and VTL. However, on an appeal
with the CA, it concluded that the reckoning of the applicable interests and penalty charges should
be computed only up to the date of registration of the Certificate of Sale making VTL liable to pay
only P6,631,840.95 versus BDO's calculation of P41,769,596.94. Hence, this petition was made.
BDO argues that the CA violated the principle of immutability of judgments when it rendered the
assailed Decision despite the finality of its Decision dated May 26, 2004.

ISSUE:
Can the judgment rendered by the CA, which became final and executory due to the
respondent’s failure to appeal, be attacked or modified?

RULING:
No, the judgment rendered by the CA which became final and executory due to the
respondent’s failure to appeal cannot be attacked or modified.

It is axiomatic that final and executory judgments can no longer be attacked by any of the
parties or be modified, directly or indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

In this case, VTL did not appeal from the CA Decision dated May 26, 2004, which affirmed
the RTC's disposition that the amount to be paid by VTL shall be based on the Statement of
Account dated August 12, 1994, plus the corresponding interests and penalty charges that have
accrued thereafter. Due the respondent failure to appeal within the reglementary period, it made
the said judgement final and executory. Curiously, the CA did not stand by its final and executory
decision, the incidents of which may no longer be questioned.

Therefore, due to the finality of the May 26, 2004 CA Decision, therefore, the CA’s decision
cannot be anymore attacked or modified.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FINAL AND IMMUTABLE JUDGEMENT CANNOT BE MODIFIED OR ALTERED

Department of Agrarian Reform Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DARMPC) vs. Carmencita Diaz,

Represented by Mary Catherine M. Diaz; Emma Cabigting; and Nina T. Samaniego
G.R. No. 206331, June 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing CA’s decision which
reversed and set aside the NLRC’s decision.

Diaz, Cabigting, and Samaniego worked for the Cooperative as Accounting Clerk, Loan
Officer and Verifier, and Lending Supervisor, respectively. The Cooperative's accountant
discovered that duplicate original receipts showing the members' cash payments of share capital
contributions were missing and unrecovered. It was allegedly claimed that Diaz, Cabigting, and
Samaniego were all in a conspiracy in the anomalous transactions. Thus, they were placed under
a 30-day preventive suspension. After the period lapsed, they tried to return to work but were told
that their employment had already been. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed their complaint. NLRC affirmed the dismissal. On appeal, CA found
that there’s illegal dismissal.

Hence, this petition. However, respondents claimed that this petition must not be given due
course as it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Respondents alleged, in support of their
claim, that the actual receipt by the Cooperative of a copy of the CA’s September 12, 2012
Resolution was on September 20, 2012, as shown by the Registry Return Receipt. Thus, when
the Cooperative filed this Petition on April 5, 2013, more than six (6) months from the end of the
15-day reglementary period had already elapsed. The counsel for the Cooperative, in his motion,
explained the lapse by stating that a copy of the CA’s Resolution was misplaced at his office during
the holiday season. Further, he claimed that he was staying in his province during that period and
was busy preparing for elections in Carigara, Leyte. He likewise admitted that due to his secretary's
resignation, he failed to know that the Court of Appeals May 11, 2012 Decision had become final
and that the period to appeal had already lapsed.

ISSUE:
Can the judgment rendered by the CA be attacked or modified even if the petition was filed
beyond the 15-day reglementary period?

RULING:
No, CA’s judgment here cannot be attacked or modified even by filing of a petition beyond
the 15-day reglementary period.

No court, not even this Court, may thereafter modify, alter, or let alone reverse a final and
immutable judgment. The only exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, nunc pro tunc entries
that cause no prejudice to the parties, and void judgments. Even when there are facts or
circumstances that would render the execution of a final judgment unjust and inequitable, it must
be shown that they arose after the finality as to warrant a court's modification or alteration.

It is considered final and executory. Evidently, no reasonable attempt has been made by
petitioner to comply with the mandatory requirement of filing within the reglementary period. The
Cooperative’s Counsel's excuses of failing to monitor the date of the receipt of the Court of Appeals
September 12, 2012 Resolution and his electoral activities do not deserve any consideration from
this Court. Moreover, petitioner's counsel's negligence is binding upon it.

Therefore, the petitioner cannot file a petition for review on certiorari beyond the
reglementary period since the judgement reached its finality.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DECISIONS THAT HAS LONG ATTAINED FINALITY MAY NOT BE SUBJECT TO

REVIEW OR MODIFICATION BY COURTS

Roberto A. Torres, Immaculada Torres-Alanon, Agustin Torres and Justo Torres, Jr. vs.
Antonia F. Aruego
G.R. No. 201271, September 20, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners Roberto Torres, Immaculada Torres-Alanon, Agustin Torres and Justo Torres,
Jr. filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under rule 45 against Respondent Antonia Aruego. They
seek to challenge the decisions of the CA for dismissing their petition for certiorari and for denying
their motion for reconsideration.

Respondent’s mother filed a complaint with the RTC for Compulsory Recognition and
Enforcement of Successional Rights against Jose Aruego, Jr. and the five minor children of Gloria
Torres. The RTC declared respondent as the illegitimate child of Jose. She then filed a Motion for
Partition alleging that the decision became final and executory in view of the denial of the notice
of appeal by petitioners, the dismissal of their petition for prohibition and certiorari by the CA, and
the denial of their appeal to the SC. However, petitioners filed a verified complaint seeking to nullify
the deed of absolute sale and corresponding titles executed by respondent. Respondent filed a
petition for Certiorari in the CA after the RTC deferred the motion for partition. The CA granted the
petition and the decision became final and executory for failure of petitioners to appeal.

Petitioners contend that the decision has not become final and executory for the Court
erred in applying the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and the exceptions thereto, as
when the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation.
Respondent contends that the said decision attained finality more than 20 years ago for failure of
petitioners to timely appeal and that there is no ambiguity in the terms of the Decision. Its
dispositive portion clearly identified the properties of the estate and the share of respondent.

ISSUE:
May the Decision of the court which attained finality more than 20 years ago still be subject
to review and modification by the Court?

RULING:
No, the decision which has attained finality may not be subject to review and modification
by the court.

Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification
is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only recognized exceptions to the general rule
are the correction of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tunct entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

In this case, petitioners seek an order from the court to allow them to present evidence
with regard to the properties comprising the estate of Aruego and the heirs who are to share in the
inheritance. This is, in effect an appeal from the decision which has long become final and
executory, and not from an order of execution which is yet to be carried out, thru a Project of
Partition still to be submitted to and approved by the court.

Therefore, the Court cannot issue a writ so as to allow the parties to present evidence in a
case that long attained finality.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT MAY REOPEN A CRIMINAL

CASE DUE TO AN AMENDATORY STATUTE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED FOR THE
LIMITED PURPOSE OF AMENDING THE PENALTY IMPOSED

Ophelia Hernan vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to reverse the
Sandiganbayan’s decision, affirming the RTC’s decision, convicting Ophelia Hernan, petitioner, of
the crime of malversation of public funds.

Petitioner was charged and found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds for converting
P11,300.00. After the Sandiganbayan rendered final judgement affirming her conviction, Hernan
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 21, 2009. The Sandiganbayan denied the same
in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010. Entry of Judgement was made in June 26, 2013.

However, on July 12, 2013, Hernan, through a new counsel filed “Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution” which was denied. Undeterred,
she filed a “Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgement in lieu of
Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgement” which was likewise denied with Finality. Thus, Hernan
filed this present petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

The crux of petitioner’s insistent plea for new trial is her claim that she was deprived due
process as she was not allowed to offer an allegedly exculpatory evidence.

ISSUE:
May the judgement of conviction be modified in view of an amendatory law reducing the
penalty imposed?

RULING:
Yes, the judgement of conviction may be modified in view of an amendatory law reducing
the penalty imposed.

Although the doctrine of immutability of judgement precludes the court from re-opening the
instant case and recall the entry of judgement, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the
passage of an amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the
Court should not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective
of which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed.

In this case, it is necessary to reopen the case not for reception of further evidence, but to
modify the penalty imposed because of the passage of R.A. No. 10951, where the penalty of the
crime charged was reduced. Petitioner’s sentence must be modified respecting the settled rule on
the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the accused. She may
even apply for probation, as long as she does not possess any ground for disqualification. Hence,
it is proper for the court to reopen the instant case since the amount involved is Php11,300.00 (not
exceeding Php40,000.00), the new penalty should be prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods.

Therefore, the judgement of conviction, although final and immutable, may be modified in
view of an amendatory law reducing the penalty imposed.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MODIFICATION OF A JUDGEMENT TO IMPOSE LEGAL INTEREST ON A MONEY

JUDGEMENT, A VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGEMENT

Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the DPWH) vs. Heirs of Cirilo Gotengco
G.R. No. 226355, January 24, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), filed this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the decision promulgated by the CA which granted the payment
of legal interest in favor of respondents.

The Republic expropriated the property of respondents for the purpose of constructing the
South Luzon Expressway. An expropriation complaint was then filed before the RTC. The RTC
rendered a Modified Partial Decision representing the adjusted amount of just compensation for
the land are covered for expropriation. This decision did not prescribe the payment of legal interest.
After the Modified Partial Decision had lapsed into finality, respondents, jointly moved for its
execution, which the RTC approved on March 30, 2001. Accordingly, Republic and Gotengco
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale.

Nine years after the promulgation of the Modified Partial Decision, Gotengco filed an
Omnibus Motion pleading for the payment of accrued interest on the just compensation, computed
from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid. The RTC granted the omnibus motion and
ordered Republic to pay Gotengco the balance of the just compensation with legal interest.
Aggrieved, Republic filed before the CA a petition for certiorari through Rule 65 imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for modifying a judgment, which has become final
and executory. The CA denied Republic’s petition concluding that while the judgment has become
final and executory, the court may modify the judgment and impose legal interest.

ISSUE:
Is the modification of a judgment to impose legal interest on a money judgment a violation
of the doctrine of immutability of judgment?

RULING:
Yes, the modification to impose legal interest violated the doctrine of immutability of
judgment.

It is a well-established rule that a judgment, once it has attained finality, can never be
altered, amended, or modified, even if the alteration, amendment or modification is to correct an
erroneous of judgment. This is the principle of immutability of judgments — to put an end to what
would be an endless litigation. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium. In the interest of society as a
whole, litigation must come to an end. But this tenet admits several exceptions, these are: (1) the
correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to
any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

In this case, it does not fall within any of the aforesaid exceptions. The RTC never
adjudicated the payment of such legal interest. Yet, despite the apparent adverse decision to
impose no legal interest, Gotengco chose to acquiesce. It was only after nine (9) long years from
finality of the assailed. His belated action in asserting his right within a reasonable time to dispute
the assailed judgment in the guise of this Court's protection from miscarriage of justice cannot be
disregarded. Indeed, Gotengco is guilty of laches.

Therefore, the modification of a judgment to impose legal interest on a money judgment is

a violation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHEN DECISION ON THE MERITS IN THE PRINCIPAL CASE BECOMES FINAL AND
EXECUTORY, PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS STEMMING FROM SUCH CASE ARE MOOT
AND ACADEMIC

Samson Lim Bio Hian vs. Joaquin Lim Eng Tian

G.R. No. 195472, January 08, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Johnson Tiong seek to reverse and set
aside the Decision of the CA in which nullified the Orders of the RTC, granting the partition of the
subject land.

Petitioners Samson Tian and Johnson Tiong and respondent Joaquin Tian are co-owners
of a parcel of land. Respondent Tian filed a complaint for partition when the petitioners refused to
heed his demand to end the co-ownership. During partition proceedings, the petitioners move to
be allowed to cross-examine the respondent and to file a pre-trial brief out of time. Thus,
respondent Tian filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the orders of the RTC granting
the motion as the same are not allowed in the Rules.

The CA concluded that the RTC indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. Moreover,
petitioners had clearly failed to show that their failure to attend the pre-trial conference and to file
a pre-trial brief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. Thus, the petitioners filed
this petition for review under Rule 65 from the CA’s decision.

Meanwhile, the RTC issued the final order for partition, ruling that respondent, as co-owner
of the parcel of land, was entitled to demand its partition. Thus, it was raised as to whether the
present petition has become moot and academic.

ISSUE:
Did the issuance of a final order of partition render the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
moot and academic?

RULING:
Yes, the issuance of a final order of partition renders the petition for certiorari under Rule
65 moot and academic.

The existence of an actual case or controversy is a necessary condition precedent to the

court's exercise of its power of adjudication. An actual case or controversy exists when there is a
conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims between the parties that is
susceptible or ripe for judicial resolution. In the negative, a justiciable controversy must neither be
conjectural nor moot and academic. There must be a definite and concrete dispute touching on
the legal relations of the parties who have adverse legal interests. The reason is that the issue
ceases to be justiciable when a controversy becomes moot and academic; otherwise, the court
would engage in rendering an advisory opinion on what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts. A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, the conflicting
issue that may be resolved by the court ceases to exist.

In this case, the issue raised in this petition was rendered moot and academic by the final
and executory decision in the main action for partition.

Therefore, the RTC’s issuance of a final order of partition renders moot and academic the
appeal made by petitioner.

| 67
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

REMEDY OF AN AGGRIEVED PARTY FROM DECISIONS OF OMBUDSMAN IN

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IS TO APPEAL THE CASE TO THE CA UNDER RULE 43

Edward Thomas Joson vs. Office of Ombudsman

G.R. Nos. 197433 and 197435, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the order of the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissing petitioner Edward Thomas Joson's, (Vice Governor) administrative and
criminal complaints against Aurelio Umali (Governor), et. al. for graft and corruption, malversation,
fraud, and grave misconduct, among others.

This case arose from the alleged payment to a caterer that did not provide meals for an
event and the consequent misappropriation of the amount paid. Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer dismissed the criminal charges for lack of probable cause and dismissed the
administrative charge for lack of merit.

Respondents argue, among others, that petitioner should have appealed the Decision of
the Office of the Ombudsman, regarding the administrative case, to the Court of Appeals under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court instead of filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioner
argues that the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper since the remedy under Rule 43 can
only be availed of in all other cases except in the case when the respondent is absolved of the
charge, among others.

ISSUE:
Is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, instead of Rule 43, a correct remedy in assailing
the decision of the Ombudsman in an Administrative Case?

RULING:
No, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an incorrect remedy in assailing the decision
of the Ombudsman in an Administrative Case. The petitioner should have appealed by filing a Rule
43 petition.

In administrative complaints, the Office of the Ombudsman's decision may be appealed to

the Court of Appeals via Rule 43.

In this case, the assailed ruling of the Ombudsman absolving the private respondents of
the administrative charge possesses the character of finality and, thus, not subject to appeal.
Though final and unappealable in the administrative level, the decisions of administrative agencies
are still subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of grave abuse
of discretion, fraud or error of law, or when such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion. Specifically, the correct
procedure is to file a petition for certiorari before the CA to question the Ombudsman's decision of
dismissal of the administrative charge.

In this case, Joson failed to do the same. Hence, the decision of the Ombudsman
exonerating the private respondents from the charge of grave misconduct had already become
final. In any event, the subject petition failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or any
reversible error on the part of the Ombudsman to compel this Court to overturn its assailed
administrative ruling.

Therefore, petitioner's failure to avail of the correct procedure with respect to the
administrative case renders the Office of the Ombudsman's decision final.

68 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ALLEGATIONS IN THE PETITION OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART

OF THE CA DO NOT IPSO FACTO RENDER THE INTENDED REMEDY THAT OF
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65

Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Limited vs. Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
G.R. No. 196072, September 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
The case involves a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the Decision and Resolution
of the CA, which favored Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (Sulpicio), filed by Steamship Mutual Underwriting
Association (Bermuda) Limited (Steamship).

Steamship was a Protection and Indemnity Club which insures its members-shipowners
against "third party risks and liabilities" for various claims. Sulpicio insured its fleet of inter-island
vessels with Steamship through its local insurance agents. One day, one of the vessels owned by
Sulpicio, was gutted by fire while on voyage, resulting in total loss of its cargoes. The fire incident
prompted Sulpicio to claim indemnity from Steamship under the insurance policy. However,
Steamship denied the same and subsequently rescinded the insurance coverage of Sulpicio's
other vessels on the ground that "Sulpicio was grossly negligent in conducting its business
regarding safety, maintaining the seaworthiness of its vessels as well as proper training of its crew."
Sulpicio filed a Complaint with the RTC against Steamship. Steamship filed its Motion to Dismiss
and/or to Refer Case to Arbitration pursuant to the ADR Law, and to Rule 4716 of the 2005/2006
Club Rules, which supposedly provided for arbitration in London of disputes between Steamship
and its members. RTC denied the motions to dismiss. Steamship assailed the trial court orders
before the CA through a Rule 65 Petition. The CA, however, dismissed the petition in its Decision.

Sulpicio contends that Steamship's Petition should be dismissed outright on procedural

grounds arguing that it is only being couched as a Rule 45 Petition when it is actually a Rule 65
Petition because it contained arguments dealing with "grave abuse of discretion" allegedly
committed by the CA.

ISSUE:
Is a petition for review under Rule 45 proper despite allegations of grave abuse of
discretion in the petition?

RULING:
Yes, it a petition for review under Rule 45 is proper despite containing allegations of grave
abuse of discretion.

A Rule 45 petition is the proper remedy to reverse a decision or resolution of the CA even
if the error assigned is grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law. Allegations in the
petition of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA do not ipso facto render the intended
remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

In this case, what Steamship seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of judgment of
the CA. These errors pertain to Steamship's allegations of the CA’s failure to rule that a valid
arbitration agreement existed between the parties and to refer the case to arbitration. It does not
impute any error with respect to the CA’s exercise of jurisdiction, as such, the Petition is simply a
continuation of the appellate process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the
CA, and to this Court via Rule 45.

Therefore, the petition filed is proper in this case.

| 69
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CERTIORARI IS NOT AND CANNOT BE MADE A SUBSTITUTE FOR AN APPEAL

WHERE THE LATTER REMEDY IS AVAILABLE BUT WAS LOST THROUGH FAULT OR
NEGLIGENCE

Lourdes Padayhag vs. Director of Lands and Southern Mindanao Colleges

G.R. No, 202872 & 206062, November 22, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated cases involving a petition for review on certiorari
and a petition for certiorari. Both petitions assail the decision of the CA. In the Padayhag Petition,
petitioner Lourdes M. Padayhag did not file a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision and
went directly to the Court. In the SMC Petition, petitioner Southern Mindanao Colleges (SMC)
assailed the CA Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration filed by SMC. The CA Decision
dismissed SMC's appeal of the Decision dated May 30, 2006 of the RTC in a Cadastral Caseand
ruled that the RTC Decision is void ab initio for being rendered without jurisdiction.

The 6 parcels of land involved were claimed by two parties; namely the heirs of Lourdes
Padayhag and Southern Mindanao Colleges. The Director of Lands instituted with the RTC,
Cadastral case pursuant to the government’s initiative to place all lands under the cadastral
system. Both Lourdes Padayhad and SMC filed its answer in the cadastral case claiming that they
are the true owner of the lots. RTC rendered a decision in favor of SMC. The Padayhags filed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted. SMC appealed to the CA. the CA dismissed the
appeal for lack of merit. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. SMC
filed an Urgent motion for extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
which the court denied. SMC filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:
Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy to assail the CA decision
denying the motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45?

RULING:
No, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy.

A petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 is the proper
remedy of a party desiring to appeal by certiorari a judgment, final order or resolution of the CA.

In this case, SMC is not justified to avail itself of a Rule 65 certiorari petition after its earlier
attempt to avail of a Rule 45 certiorari petition had failed. SMC, prior to the filing of the SMC
Petition, attempted to comply with a Rule 45 certiorari petition when it filed an "Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court".
However, in its Resolution the Court resolved to deny SMC's motion for extension for lack of
payment of docket fees pursuant to Sections 2 and 3, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(c), Rule 56
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, an Entry of Judgment was issued certifying that
the said Resolution had become final and executory. Given that SMC resorted to successive Rule
45 and Rule 65 certiorari petitions to question the CA Decision and Resolution and that the Rule
45 certiorari petition had already been denied.

Therefore, the denial of the SMC Petition is in order because certiorari is not and cannot
be made a substitute for an appeal where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault
or negligence as in this case where the appeal was lost due to non-payment of docket fees.

70 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SECTION 4 OF RULE 43 LIMITS THE EXTENSION THE APPELLATE COURT MAY

GRANT FOR THE FILING OF AN APPEAL TO 15 DAYS

Philcontrust Resources Inc. vs. Carlos Santiago, et. al.

G.R. No. 174670, July 26, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Resolutions of CA
dismissing outright petitioner's appeal under Rule 43 against the Resolution of Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

Respondents are members of an organization called Kapisanan ng mga Magsasaka sa

lruhin. They filed a Complaint before the DARAB. Petitioner informed respondents of its acquisition
of the land and ordered them to stop its cultivation. The Adjudicator dismissed the complaint.
DARAB reversed said ruling. Petitioner attempted to obtain relief from CA and filed a Motion for
Time manifesting that it had until 21 March 2006 to file an appeal, under Rule 43 of the ROC, as it
received notice of the CA's ruling on its motion for reconsideration on 6 March 2006. Due to the
heavy workload of its counsel and the fact that it was securing "certified true copies of the pertinent
documents" from the DARAB, petitioner asked for an additional 30 days, or until 20 April 2006,
within which to file the appeal. CA granted the request, but only for 15 days.

Petitioner filed its appeal on 20 April 2006, which was the very last day of the extension it
had prayed for. CA dismissed the appeal for being filed beyond the extended period and some
other defects. Petitioner invokes the prevailing trend in the computation of the period to appeal,
which is that of liberality.

ISSUE:
May the appellate court extend the period for filing an appeal from 15 to 30 days?

RULING:
No, the appellate court cannot extend the period for filing an appeal to 30 days. The CA
did not commit error in relying on technical rules of procedure in dismissing the petition for having
been filed beyond the extended period granted.

Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the orderly and speedy
disposition of cases. Section 4 of Rule 43 limits the extension the appellate court may grant for the
filing of an appeal (which is 15 days). The pleading party must plead both substantial justice and
meritorious reasons before its request for liberality in the application of the Rules of Court may be
granted in accordance with sound judicial discretion.

In this case, the thirty-day extension that petitioner requested of the CA is incompatible
with the prescribed period. This Court is perplexed with petitioner's request for certified copies, as
they include copies of documents that petitioner itself had submitted to the DARAB and documents
that were copy-furnished to petitioner in the normal course of proceedings. Petitioner already
should have these documents in its possession, particularly in time for its appeal to the CA.
Petitioner could have pre-empted or dispelled our perplexity with an explanation, but it did not.

Therefore, the technical dismissal of petitioner's appeal is proper.

| 71
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RULE 42 TAKES A PARTICULARLY LIBERAL STANCE WITH REGARD TO THE PERIOD

FOR FILING PETITIONS; IT EXPLICITLY ENABLES EXTENSIONS, WHILE OTHER
MODES OF APPEAL DO NOT

Mario Magat, Sr. vs. Tantrade Corp.

G.R. No. 205483, August 23, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying
that the CA’s resolution denying the petitioners’, Mario Magat, Sr., et.al., Urgent Motion for
Extensionof Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 42 be reversed and set aside.

This case arose from the alleged unpaid purchases by Juliana Magat (Magat) from
Tantrade Corporation (Tantrade), which prompted Tantrade to file a collection suit with damages
against Juliana. The MTC ruled in favor of Tantrade. During appeal before the RTC, Juliana died,
she was then represented by her heirs, the petitioners. RTC affirmed the MTC and denied
petitioners MR. Petitioners filed two (2) Motions for Extension to file Petition for Review Under Rule
42, both requesting a 15-day extension due to financial constraints from the expenses they
incurred from Julia’s hospitalization and death.

The First Motion for Extension was denied for procrastination as they filed a motion a day
before the end of the reglementary period. The Second Motion for Extension was filed two (2) days
before the end of the first extension without the petitioners receiving the CA resolution denying the
First Motion for Extension. They filed their Petition for Review a day before the end of the second
extension. They only received the first Resolution after their last petition. Petitioners filed their MR
explaining that their distance from the court, financial difficulties, and lengthy time needed for the
preparation of documents, did not permit them to file the appeal on time. The CA denied the MR.
Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review under Rule 42 proper?

RULING:
Yes, an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review in Rule 42 is proper.

Rule 42 of the Rules of Court which governs appeals taken to the CA from decisions of
RTC rendered in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction takes a particularly liberal stance with
regard to the period for filing petitions. It explicitly enables extensions, while other modes of appeal
do not. In contrast with Rule 42, Rule 40 and Rule 41 make no similar reference to any extension
to file such appeals. They even proscribe motions for extension to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration.

Rule 42 enables not just one (1) but two (2) extensions of 15 days each. An initial extension
may be given, provided that it is sought through a proper motion, docket and lawful fees are paid,
and a deposit for costs is made before the expiration of the reglementary period. After this initial
extension, Rule 42 permits a second extension of another 15 days. This second extension shall,
however, only be "for the most compelling reason."

In this case, the Court finds petitioners to have effectively complied the requirements and
pleaded grounds that warrant the extensions prayed for. It is a serious error for the CA to decry
petitioners' supposed procrastination when, to begin with, petitioners acted well within the periods
sanctioned by Rule 42. Petitioners were simultaneously afflicted with the tragedy of death and
constrained by their means. These were compelling reasons warranting a solicitous stance.

Therefore, motion was properly filed.

72 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE CA MAY GRANT A SECOND MOTION FOR EXTENSION TO FILE A PETITION FOR
REVIEW UNDER RULE 43 PROVIDED THAT (1) THERE EXISTS A MOST COMPELLING
REASON AND (2) IT DOES NOT EXCEED 15 DAYS

Editha B. Albor vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 196598, January 17, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolutions of
the CA which dismissed petitioner Editha B. Albor's (Editha) appeal from the Decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), for having been filed out of time.

Editha was the agricultural lessee of a parcel of land owned by one Rosario Andrada
(Rosario). After Rosario’s death, her heirs sold the same parcel of land to respondent-spouses
Nery and Rudy Macasil (respondents). Editha instituted a complaint for redemption but the PARAD
dismissed her complaint upon finding that the consigned redemption price was insufficient. The
DARAB affirmed the decision of the PARAD in toto. Seeking to appeal to the CA, Editha filed a
petition for extension of time to file a Rule 43 petition for review, or until December 10, 2008.
Petitioner’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on December 3, 2008 then on December
9, 2008, Editha’s new counsel filed a motion for extension of time until January 9, 2009 to the CA.
Ultimately, Editha’s petition for review was filed on January 5, 2009.

The CA resolved dismiss Editha's petition for review for having been filed out of time. The
appellate court ratiocinated that it could not grant her second motion for extension which asked for
an additional time of thirty (30) days. The Supreme Court first ruled that Editha had taken the
improper remedy when she filed a petition for certiorari rather than a petition for review on
certiorari. Nevertheless, it sought resolve the error assigned to the CA.

ISSUE:
May an appellate court grant a second motion for reconsideration for extension which
asked for an additional time of 30 days?

RULING:
No, the appellate court cannot grant a second motion for reconsideration seeking an
extension for an additional time of 30 days.

Section 4, Rule 43 states that: Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of
the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the CA may grant an additional
period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall
be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Two
requisites must be satisfied before the second extension may be availed, to wit: there must exist
a most compelling reason for the grant of a further extension; and, in no case shall such extension
exceed fifteen (15) days.

In this case, even if the Court were to believe that the first counsel’s withdrawal was
"sudden", the corresponding motion to withdraw as counsel was filed with 7 days remaining from
the 15-day extension granted by the CA. Ordinary prudence should have impelled Editha to seek
the assistance of a new counsel immediately. Yet, regrettably, she hired her new counsel only 1
day before the expiration of the extension. In addition, the new counsel asked for an extension of
30 days in contravention of the Rules.

Therefore, the motion for reconsideration seeking an additional 30-day extension is

improper.

| 73
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE RULE ON STATEMENT OF MATERIAL DATES IN

THE PETITION MAY BE EXCUSED IF THE DATES ARE EVIDENT FROM THE RECORDS

Henry Yu et. al. vs. SR Metals, Inc.

G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Yu et.
al. (petitioners) seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed
outright, based on procedural grounds, the petition for certiorari that assailed the Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC which favored respondent SR Metals, Inc.

Labor cases were filed by petitioners against respondent for illegal dismissal and unfair
labor practices before the NLRC. The decision and resolution of the NLRC were adverse to the
petitioners which prompted them to come to CA. However, the petition for certiorari that was filed
was dismissed for failure to state the date of filing of the Motion for Reconsideration before the
NLRC and to indicate the serial number of the notary public's commission in violation of Rules on
Notarial Practice. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration afterwards was also denied.

ISSUE:
Is a dismissal of the petition for certiorari for failure to indicate the date of filing of the motion
for reconsideration proper?

RULING:
No, the dismissal of a petition for certiorari by reason of failure to indicate the date of filing
of the motion for reconsideration was improper.

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory
privilege that should be exercised only in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with the
provisions of the law and the requirements of the rules. For non-compliance, the right to appeal is
lost. Nonetheless, procedural rules are designed to promote or secure, rather than frustrate or
override, substantial justice.

The Court have consistently held that failure to comply with the rule on a statement of
material dates in the petition may be excused if the dates are evident from the records. The more
material date for purposes of appeal to the CA is the date of receipt of the order or resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration. Yet concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party to at least explain its failure to comply with
the rules. To merit liberality, a valid and compelling reason proffered for or underpinning it or a
reasonable cause justifying non-compliance with the rules must be shown and must convince the
court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of substantive
justice.

In this case, there is at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. In their
motion for reconsideration before the CA, petitioners in fact pointed out that in their motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, a copy of which was attached as Annex "B" of their petition for
certiorari before the CA, that it was mentioned that their motion for reconsideration was timely filed.
The same liberality should be applied with respect to petitioners' failure to indicate the serial
number of the notary public's commission.

Therefore, the dismissal of the petition was improper.

74 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT AN INITIATORY PLEADING THAT REQUIRES A

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING

United Interior Manggahan Homeowner’s Association vs. Hon Ambrosio De Luna

G.R. No. 216788, November 20, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the orders of the RTC in a civil case
expunging the records of the case, the notice of appeal filed by United Interior Manggahan
Homeowners Association for lack of authority from its Board of Directors to initiate the filing of the
same.

Petitioner, as represented by its president Daniel Calilung, filed before the RTC a complaint
for specific performance against spouses Villon. Spouses Villon filed a manifestation and motion
to dismiss on demurrer to evidence which RTC eventually granted. Aggrieved, petitioner moved
for reconsideration but was denied. Consequently, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. RTC ordered
petitioner’s Notice of Appeal expunged from the records for lack of authority from its Board of
Directors to initiate the appeal.

Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari arguing that pursuant to Section 9, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court, once an appeal is perfected, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction all
over the judgment and the action in which it is rendered so far as the rights of the parties under
the judgment are concerned. Thus, it has no power to do anything which affects the substantial
rights of the parties therein

ISSUE:
Is it improper for a trial court to expunge a Notice of Appeal fduelack of authority from a
party’s Board of Directors to initiate the same?

RULING:
Yes, it is improper for a trial court to expunge a notice of appeal due to lack of authority
from a party’s Board of Directors to initiate the appeal. RTC has committed grave abuse of
discretion in expunging the Notice of Appeal.

Under the Rules, an appeal from cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be made to the Court of Appeals by "filing a notice of appeal or record of appeal
in cases required by law with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from
and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party." The appeal shall be taken, with the full amount
of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees paid, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from.

In this case, it is clear from the foregoing provisions that a board resolution authorizing the
representative to initiate the appeal is not required for the purpose of filing a notice of appeal. This
is because a notice of appeal is not a pleading, initiatory or otherwise, that, when required by the
law or the rules, must contain, among others, a verification and certification against forum shopping
to be signed by the party or his/her representative, and, in the case of a representative, proof of
his/her authority to file the action, i.e., power of attorney or secretary's certificate with copy of the
board resolution.

Therefore, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it expunged the Notice of
Appeal.

| 75
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE TO ATTACH A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE ASSAILED DECISION IN A

PETITION FOR REVIEW (RULE 42) DOES NOT WARRANT DISMISSAL WHEN THE
SAME HAS BEEN ATTACHED IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Mark Montelibano v. Linda Yap

G.R. No. 197475, December 6, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside
the CA Resolutions dismissing petitioner’s petition for review of the RTC and MTCC cases which
found him guilty of violating BP blg. 22.

Herein petitioner Montelibano obtained a loan from private complainant Yap as additional
capital for his business. As payment, he issued a Metrobank-Cebu check dated May 31, 2001 in
the amount of Php2,612,500.00 as partial payment. When it was presented for payment, it was
dishonored for being drawn from a closed account.

Because of petitioner’s failure to pay despite demands, he was charged with violation of
BP blg. 22 before MTCC Branch 2, Cebu City. The MTCC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, finding petitioner’s contention untenable because the prosecution’s failure to
personally identify the petitioner during hearing can be attributed to petitioner’s failure to appear
despite due notice. On appeal, the RTC affirmed in toto the MTCC decision, ruling that the
petitioner's right to adduce evidence on his behalf was considered waived due to his failure to
appear in court and present its defense from the time the prosecution presented evidence up to
the time the case was submitted for decision.

When petitioner elevated the case to the CA on a petition for review under Rule 42, the CA
dismissed the same for failure of the petitioner to attach to the petition a certified true copy of the
MTCC decision, in violation of Sec. 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
Does the failure to attach a certified true copy of the assailed decision in a petition for
review warrants the dismissal of the same?

RULING:
No, the failure to attach a certified true copy of the assailed decision in a petition for review
will not warrant the dismissal of the petition if such copy has been attached in the MR.

On a procedural aspect, the Court has held that the subsequent submission of a certified true copy
of the assailed decision with the motion for reconsideration is substantial compliance with the rules.

In this case, nonetheless, the Court finds petitioners contentions on the merits
unconvincing. The failure to identify petitioner in open court was directly attributable to his actions.
To sustain petitioner's assertion and absolve him of penal liability on this ground alone would open
the floodgates for malefactors to evade conviction by the simple expedient of refusing to appear
on scheduled hearings where they expect to be identified in court. This sets a dangerous precedent
and is undoubtedly antithetical to the foundations of our justice system.

Therefore, the conviction of petitioner is affirmed.

76 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE RULE THAT ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW SHOULD BE RAISED IN A PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI ADMITS EXCEPTIONS

Swire Realty Development Corp. vs. Specialty Contracts General and

Construction Services, Inc.
G.R. No. 188027, August 9, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision and Resolution of the CA directing the petitioner Swire Realty Development Corporation
(Swire) to pay the defendant, Specialty Contracts General and Construction Services, Inc.
(SpecServe) for the latter’s additional works performed.

Swire and SpecServe entered into an agreement to Undertake Waterproofing Works (the
Agreement). Pursuant to the Agreement, SpecServe is to perform waterproofing works on Garden
View Tower - Swire’s condominium project.

A complaint for Sum of Money and Damages was filed by Swire against SpecServe for its
alleged breach of the Agreement. The RTC ruled in favor of Swire ordering SpecServe to pay for
actual damages representing the payments made in advance and contract price for the unfinished
work of SpecServe. The CA reversed and set aside RTC’s decision. Finding proof that additional
works (waterproofing of the swimming pool) were performed by SpecServe, it directed Swire to
pay SpecServe.

Swire now brings the matter before the Court via petition for review on certiorari after its
MR was denied. On the part of SpecServe, it points out that the Court cannot review the findings
of fact rendered by the CA since they are supported by the evidence on record.

ISSUE:
Can the Supreme Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 review the
findings of fact rendered by the CA?

RULING:
Yes, the Court can review the findings of fact rendered by the CA in a petition for review
on certiorari.

Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law should be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of exceptions, among which is when the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts and when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of
the trial court.

In this case, the factual findings of the CA and RTC vary as to whether the waterproofing
of the swimming pool constitutes additional work, and since the conclusion of the CA in this regard
is based on misapprehension of facts, the Court can therefore pass upon and review the same in
resolving the petition. The CA, in concluding that additional works were performed, relied on the
testimony during trial that instructions were given to the respondent to waterproof the pool again.
However, a plain reading of the Agreement reveals that works performed and accomplished are
included in the Scope of Works.

Therefore, the Court can review the findings of fact of the CA in this case.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ANY APPEAL FROM CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION CIAC)

ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS TO THE CA UNDER RULE 43 MUST REMAIN LIMITED TO
QUESTIONS OF LAW

CE Construction Corp. vs. Araneta Center, Inc

G.R. No. 192725, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner CE Construction Corp.
(CECON) against respondent Araneta Center Inc. (ACI) prays that the assailed Decision and
Amended Decision of the CA be reversed and set aside and that the Decision of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) be reinstated.

ACI awarded the contract for its Gateway Mall project to CECON as the developer. Several
negotiations and developments pursued which resulted to additional projects and increase in the
cost. Despite these, ACI still failed to formally award the project to CECON. The parties had yet to
execute a formal contract. This prompted CECON to write a letter to ACI emphasizing that the
project cost quoted was based on the prevailing price at that time.

Due to many changes and delays, CECON was unable to complete the project. It served
notice upon ACI that it would avail arbitration. It filed with the CIAC its Request for Adjudication
and prayed for the payment of the project cost. The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal awarded to CECON the
costs of arbitration. ACI filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 43. CA reduced the
award in favor of CECON and increased the award to ACI. Aggrieved, CECON filed the present
petition insisting on the propriety of the CIAC’s conclusions and findings. ACI insists the inviolability
of their agreement, on the immutability of the stipulated contract sum, and the impropriety of the
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal in writing its own terms for ACI and CECON to follow.

ISSUE:
Is the petition for review under Rule 43 proper in assailing an arbitral tribunal’s act of writing
its own terms other than what was stipulated by the parties in an agreement?

RULING:
No, the petition for review under Rule 43 is an improper remedy.

Section 19 of the Construction Industry Arbitration Law (CIAL) establishes that CIAC
arbitral awards may not be assailed, except on pure questions of law. Rule 43, Section 1 then
explicitly lists CIAC as among the quasi-judicial agencies covered. It indicates that appeals through
Petitions for Review under Rule 43 are to be taken to the CA whether the appeal involves questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

This is not to say that factual findings of CIAC arbitral tribunals may now be assailed before
the CA. Section 3's statement "whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law" merely recognizes variances in the disparate modes of appeal that Rule
43 standardizes. It emphasizes that though there may have been variances, all appeals under its
scope are to be brought before the CA. However, in keeping with the CIAL, any appeal from CIAC
arbitral tribunals must remain limited to questions of law.

In this case, the Court cited the case of F.F. Cruz v. HR Construction, stating that an inquiry
into the true intention of the contracting parties is a legal, rather than a factual, issue. However, in
F.F. Cruz, the parties' agreement had been clearly set out in writing. There was a definitive
instrument which needed only to be consulted to ascertain the parties' intent. In this case, there is
no established contract that simply required interpretation and application.

Therefore, Rule 43 is an improper remedy.

78 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45, THE COURT IS

LIMITED TO RESOLVING PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW

Ariel Ebuenga vs. Southfield Agencies, Inc.

G.R. No. 208396, March 14, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 praying that the Decision of
CA which affirmed the NLRC Decision in dismissing petitioner Ariel Ebunga’s (Ebuenga) complaint
for permanent disability benefits against respondents Southfield Agencies, Inc. (Southfield) and
Wilhemsen Ship Management Holding Ltd (Wilhemsen) be reversed and set aside.

Ebuenga was hired by Southfield as chief cook aboard Wilhemsen’s vessel. He requested
the respondents including Captain Sonny Valencia (Capt. Valencia) for him to be repatriated
immediately, which was granted. During his repatriation, he underwent checkup and was found to
be afflicted with Multilevel Disk Dessication and was advised to undergo physical therapy. He was
found to be permanently disabled and no longer fit to work as a seafarer. Consequently, Ebuenga
filed a complaint for permanent disability. Ebuenga disavowed voluntarily seeking repatriation on
account of family concern. It was the captain of the vessel who coerced him to sign a letter seeking
immediate repatriation due to an animosity between them that started when he reported the
incident of a crew who died from over fatigue. He also claimed to have reported to the captain that
he was suffering intense back pain but the latter refused to entertain such.

In their defense, respondents denied that Ebuenga encountered medical problems while
on board and noted that he had been a delinquent crew member. The LA dismissed the complaint
citing that his disability benefits could not be entertained as he failed to undergo the requisite post-
employment medical examination with the company-designated physician The NLRC up to the CA
denied the appeals and MRs. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 proper in assailing the CA decision
affirming the NLRC’s decision which involves factual issues?

RULING:
No, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is not proper.

In the present Rule 45 Petition, the Court is limited to resolving pure questions of law.
Accordingly, the Court does not re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC, an administrative body that has expertise
in its specialized field. Nor does it substitute its own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining
where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. The factual findings of the NLRC,
when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive on the Court.

In this case, the LA, the NLRC, and the CA are consistent in finding that petitioner's claim of
presenting himself for examination is direly unsupported by evidence. The CA emphasized that
petitioner's narration of facts is bereft of details as to the alleged report. Petitioner could not even
state when he actually wanted to have himself examined. He could neither identify the person he
approached for his request nor disclose the exact manner and circumstances.

Therefore, no specific grounds are clear to grant the petition for review on certiorari.

| 79
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW ARE ALLOWED IN A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE
45 OF THE RULES OF COURT

Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center vs. Asiamed Supplies and Equipment Corp.
G.R. No. 205638, August 23, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 praying that the Order and
Decision of the CA ordering petitioner Dee Hwa Liong Foundation Medical Center (DHLFMC) to
pay the balance interest, penalty and attorney’s fees to respondent Asiamed Supplies and
Equipment Coporation (Asiamed) - be reversed and set aside.

Pursuant to a contract of sale DHLFMC agreed to purchase from Asiamed machines for
Php 31M. Payment is to be made not later than two (2) working days upon delivery of the
equipment and prior to the installation. When the machines were delivered, DHLFMC did not pay
on time and refused to pay the balance despite demands. This prompted Asiamed to file a
complaint for sum of money, with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment before the
RTC. The application for the writ was granted and issued by the RTC. It likewise ordered DHLFMC
to pay Asiamed the balance and the interest incurred. The CA denied the appeal. It noted that
petitioners' main argument was that the Contract of Sale had been rescinded because a loan from
Planters Bank was not approved. However, the CA found that the text of the Contract of Sale did
not support this contention. Further, even assuming that the Planters Bank loan approval was a
condition for the effectivity of the Contract of Sale, petitioners did not prove that Planters Bank did
not approve the loan. Hence, this petition.

On its part, DHLFMC alleged that the purchase of the equipment was conditioned on the
approval of a loan from Planters Bank that was not approved. Thus, DHLFMC insist that the
contract of sale was rescinded while Asiamed argued that the contract was not rescinded, for it
was not proven during trial and the disapproved loan was not even mentioned.

ISSUE:
Is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 involving questions of fact proper?

RULING:
No, a petition for review on certiorari involving questions of facts is improper.

Only questions of law are allowed in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. It is a general rule that factual findings of the RTC are conclusive, especially when they
have been affirmed by the CA. The factual findings of the CA bind the Court. Although
jurisprudence has provided several exceptions to this rule, exceptions must be alleged,
substantiated, and proved by the parties so the Court may evaluate and review the facts of the
case.

In this case, the CA made a factual determination that the effectivity of the contract of sale
did not depend on any alleged loan application from Planters Bank. It relied on the evidence
presented, particularly the contract, which did not mention any loan from Planters Bank. Petitioners
have failed to show how the CA's factual determination based on the evidence presented is an
error of law. They have failed to allege, substantiate, or prove any exception to the general rule
allowing only questions of law to be raised in a petition for review so that the Court may evaluate
and review the evidence presented and the facts of the case.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 CAN ONLY RAISE

QUESTIONS OF LAW; REVIEW OF A FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE INVOLVES A
QUESTION OF FACT

Belina Cancio and Jeremy Pampolina vs. Performance Foreign Exchange Corporation
G.R. No. 182307, June 6, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing Decision and Resolution of the CA,
which overturned the RTC’s Decision. The RTC found Performance Foreign Exchange
Corporation (Performance Forex) solidarity liable with broker Rolando Hipol (Hipol) for
unauthorized trade transactions he made on Belina Cancio (Cancio) and Jeremy Pampolina's
(Pampolina) joint trading account. The CA, however, absolved Performance Forex from any
liability. Ocampo testified that clients must first sign a Purchase Order Form before respondent
could authorize an order transaction. Every transaction must have its own Purchase Order Form.
Erazo confirmed that dealings were still done manually at the time of the questioned transactions,
and that clients or agents must submit an actual signed Purchase Order Form.

Petitioners Cancio and Pampolina argue that bona fide transactions in respondent
Performance Forex's facility depends on signed purchase order forms from clients. Respondent
counters that it was unnecessary to examine other purchase order forms since "petitioners' cause
of action against respondent is grounded on defendant Hipol's purported unauthorized trading
transactions which occurred during the period 4 to 12 April 2000 and no other."
Cancio and Pampolina moved for reconsideration but were denied by the Court of Appeals in its
March 31, 2008 Resolution. Hence, this Petition was filed before this Court.

ISSUE:
Should the petition for certiorari under Rule 45 be dismissed outright since it raises
questions of fact by asking the Court to examine the probative value of the evidence introduced
before the RTC and the CA?

RULING:
Yes, the petition should be dismissed outright since it raises questions of fact with the SC.

This Court is not a trier of facts. Rule 45 of the Rules of Court requires that a petition for
review on certiorari only raise questions of law. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or
of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is
whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the
evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. The review of a
finding of negligence involves a question of fact which requires an examination of the evidence
presented by the parties to determine the basis of this negligence. Likewise held that determination
of the existence of a breach of contract is a question of fact.

In this case, petitioners do not plead that their case falls under any of the exceptions since
their contention is that their Petition only raises questions of law. They claim that this Court "need
not probe into the entirety of evidence on record, as the falsity or veracity of the facts, as stated in
the assailed decision, is not in issue. A petition for review filed under Rule 45 that assails the CA’s'
failure to find negligence or breach of contract based on the evidence presented is essentially
raising questions of fact. Hence, petition should be dismissed.

Therefore, for raising questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition, such petition must be
dismissed outright.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 SHALL ONLY PERTAIN

TO QUESTIONS OF LAW

Francisco Chavez vs. Imelda Marcos

G. R. No. 185484, June 27, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals February 28,
2008 Decision and November 24, 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 98799, dismissing
Francisco I. Chavez's (Chavez) Petition for Certiorari (Rule 45) and affirming the Regional Trial
Court order, which denied the prosecution's motion for inhibition.

This case involves 33 consolidated criminal cases filed against Imelda R. Marcos, among
others, for violations of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, in relation to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265, or the Central Bank Act. During the trial, the prosecution presented only two
(2) witnesses. As its second witness, the prosecution presented petitioner Chavez. He testified on
the formation of the task force, of which Del Rosario (the first witness) was a member and which
prepared the criminal complaints against the Marcoses and their cronies.

After the April 24, 2007 hearing, Chavez filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus dated May 3, 2007 with the Court of Appeals, docketed as C.A.-G.R. No. 98799,
praying that the Court of Appeals declare null and void Judge Pampilo's order in open court
denying the motion to inhibit. The CA dismissed said petition and affirmed RTC’s order.

This petition for review on certiorari alleges that the CA committed reversible error by
refusing to consider Judge Pampilo's demeanor and over-eagerness to decide the criminal cases
against Imelda Marcos intended to culminate in a judgment of acquittal - as clear evidence of grave
abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Should the petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 be dismissed for raising
questions of fact?

RULING:
Yes, the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 should be dismissed for raising
questions of fact.

A petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45 shall only pertain to questions of law.
Further, the Rules of Court mandate that petitions for review distinctly set forth the questions of
law raised. Essentially, petitioner takes issue with how the Court of Appeals interpreted the acts of
Judge Pampilo and found no manifest partiality, which are clearly not questions of law. He did not
even attempt to frame the issues as questions of law. By claiming that Judge Pampilo violated a
writ of injunction, petitioner attempts to cloak the second alleged error with some semblance of
being a question of law. However, petitioner does not provide any legal basis or coherent legal
argument to support the claim that a writ of injunction was violated, and this claim is totally
specious.

In this case, although this Court may, in exceptional cases, delve into questions of fact,
these exceptions must be alleged, substantiated, and proved by the parties before this Court may
evaluate and review facts of the case. Therefore, petitioner having failed to establish the basis for
this Court to evaluate and review the facts in this case, the petition may be dismissed on this
ground.

Therefore, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 should be dismissed for raising
questions of fact.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT MAY BE AVAILED ONLY WHEN THERE

IS EXTRINSIC FRAUD COMMITTED BY THE PREVAILING PARTY

Lourdes Estrellado vs. Presiding Judge of the MTC in cities, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 3,
Davao City
G.R. No. 164482 & 211320, November 8, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
For consideration are the consolidated appeals by Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45. These consolidated appeals originated from special civil actions for forcible entry involving
three adjacent parcels of land.

The Francisco started their uninterrupted possession of the entire landholdings of the
Estrellados in 1967. However, Franciscos could not produce the formal deeds of sale relevant to
subsequent made by the other Estrellados in 1969 to Spouses Eugene and Lourdes Estrellado,
Spouses Nicolas and Narcisa Estrellado and Spouses Alipio and Vivina Barredo.

The three bigger lots became the subject of the three forcible entry cases commenced in
MTC by Francisco against Estrellados. MTC rendered judgment in favor of the Franciscos. On
appeal, RTC and CA affirmed the MTCC’s judgment. Estrellados filed a petition for annulment of
the judgment in the RTC alleging that they were victims of extrinsic fraud claiming that their counsel
had failed to submit documents to support their defense. RTC rendered a judgment dismissing the
petition for annulment as the decision sought to be annulled had been affirmed by the RTC and
CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the remedy of Petition for Annulment of Judgment available to parties by reason of their
counsel’s failure to submit documents to support their defense?

RULING:
No, Petition for Annulment of Judgment is not an available remedy in case of their
counsel’s failure to submit documents in support of their defense.

It is worthy to emphasize that the petition for annulment of judgment is available only when
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

In this case, given that the petitioners herein (or their predecessors-in-interest) had earlier
availed themselves of the remedy of appeal, they could no longer resort to the remedy of
annulment of judgment. Moreover, the petitioners alleged extrinsic fraud, claiming that their
counsel had failed to submit important documents to support their defense. However, the allegation
could not justify the relief of annulment being sought. For purposes of Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court, only extrinsic fraud is recognized as a ground. Fraud is extrinsic when it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner in which the judgment is procured. The
overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the
petitioner from having his day in court. In this case, however, the Franciscos as the prevailing
parties had no part in the commission of the fraud committed by the petitioners' counsel.

Therefore, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is not available to the party.

| 83
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IT IS THE TRIAL COURT WHICH IS DUTY BOUND TO FORWARD THE RECORDS OF

THE CASE TO THE PROPER APPELLATE COURT UPON THE FILING OF A NOTICE OF
APPEAL FROM ITS FINAL DECISION OR ORDER

Angel Fuellas Dizon vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227577, January 24, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari appealing two Resolutions of the CA
which denied petitioner Angel Fuellas Dizon's (petitioner) Motion to Endorse the Case to the
Sandiganbayan (Motion to Endorse) and dismissing petitioner’s appeal from his conviction by the
RTC.

Petitioner, being the Special Collecting Officer of the Manila Traffic and Parking Bureau of
the City of Manila, was entrusted to collect monthly parking fees from various establishments, and
forward such fees to the City Treasurer of Manila. In the course of petitioner's employment, several
discrepancies were discovered in the parking receipts which he signed and issued. After
investigation, 6 Informations for Falsification of Public Documents were filed against him before
the RTC. The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. The records of the case were then forwarded
to the CA. Finding that his appeal should have been forwarded to the Sandiganbayan, as it is the
Sandiganbayan which has appellate jurisdiction over his case, he filed the Motion to Endorse Case
to the Sandiganbayan. The CA denied the motion. Then, as the appeal was indeed erroneously
filed, the CA dismissed his appeal, hence this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Was the petitioner’s failure to indicate the appellate body in his Notice of Appeal fatal to
his appeal?

RULING:
No. the failure to indicate the appellate body in the Notice of Appeal is not fatal to the
appeal.

In the case of Ulep v. People, the Court held that it was the trial court which was duty bound
to forward the records of the case to the proper forum. The case of Heirs of Pizarro, Sr. v.
Consolacion also stated that "in the notice of appeal, it is not even required that the appellant
indicate the court to which its appeal is being interposed. The requirement is merely directory and
failure to comply with it or error in the court indicated is not fatal to the appeal", as it should be in
this case.

In this case, petitioner duly filed his appeal before the RTC, absent any indication that his
case be appealed to either the CA or the Sandiganbayan. It is not disputed that the petitioner did
not specify where his appeal will be taken because it was not his duty to designate where the
appeal should be taken. The RTC was expected to know that petitioner's case should have been
appealed to the Sandiganbayan. Hence, the proper course of action was for the CA to grant the
Motion to Endorse and remand the records to the RTC for proper transmission of the records to
the proper appellate court.

Therefore, the failure to indicate the appellate body in the Notice of Appeal is not fatal to
the appeal made by the petitioner.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE APPELLATE COURT CANNOT CONSIDER NEW ISSUES RAISED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL

Analyn De Los Santos et al. vs. Joel Lucenio and All Other Persons Claiming Rights and
Authority Under Him
G.R. No. 215659, March 19, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
appealing the Decision and Resolution of the CA reversing the findings of the trial courts and finding
that respondent had a right to possess the subject property.

Petitioners filed an ejectment case against respondent Joel before the MTC. In his Answer,
Joel alleged that the property was owned by his sister and that he was deprived of due process
when the GSIS executed a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of petitioners without first acting on
his offer to purchase the property. The MTC, as well as the RTC on appeal, did not find merit in
Joel’s defense holding that the petitioners established a better right to the property.

On appeal to the CA, Joel raised for the first time, the alleged failure of the GSIS to comply
with the Maceda Law. He alleged that his sister was party to a prior contract of sale which had not
been cancelled and that she had not received the cash surrender value of the payments made on
the subject property. The CA thus reversed the RTC’s ruling.

Petitioners now ask the Court to find that the CA erred in allowing Joel to change his theory
on appeal. Petitioners attached a copy of the notarized cancellation of the contract from the GSIS
to dispute Joel’s allegation.

ISSUE:
Can Joel change his theory for the first time on appeal before the CA?

RULING:
No, Joel may not change his theory for the first time on appeal.

An issue not alleged in the complaint nor raised before the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal as this goes against the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. In
the same way, a defense not pleaded in the answer cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

In this case, it is apparent that the issue of whether the GSIS complied with the Maceda
Law was never brought to the attention of the petitioners, the MTC, and the RTC. Joel’s contention
that the MTC and the RTC should have taken judicial notice of the Maceda Law is untenable as
the issue of compliance with the Maceda Law is a factual matter, which should have been alleged
or raised as a defense in the Answer. Not having been raised, there was no reason for the MTC,
as well as the RTC, to resolve the issue and apply the Maceda Law. These belated allegations
changed the theory of respondent’s case, which is not allowed under the Rules.

Therefore, considering that respondent cannot change his theory for the first time on
appeal, the CA should not have considered these belated allegations, as these are factual matters,
which would require the presentation of additional evidence on the part of petitioners.

| 85
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CA IS ALLOWED TO RECEIVE EVIDENCE ON APPEAL PROVIDED A NEW TRIAL IS

FIRST GRANTED; EXCEPTIONS, INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND ONLY FOR THE MOST
MERITORIOUS OF REASONS

Republic of the Philippines vs. Banal na Pag-aaral, Inc.

G.R. No. 193305, February 5, 2018.
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal on the Amended Decision of the CA dated January 8, 2010 which allowed
the application for registration of land by Banal na Pag-aaral, Inc (respondent).

In its July 6, 2009 Decision, the CA initially dismissed respondent’s application for land
registration on the ground of its failure to prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable
and disposable. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a
Certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, declaring the
subject land alienable and disposable. Considering that the Office of the Solicitor General posed
no objection to such belated submission of document, the CA admitted the same. Petitioner now
questions the authority of the Court of Appeals in admitting the evidence on appeal despite
absence of an order granting new trial.

ISSUE:
May the CA admit evidence despite the absence of an order of new trial?

RULING:
Yes, the CA may admit evidence despite the absence of an order of new trial.

Under Section 9 of Batas Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, the CA has the power
to receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues. However, in
case of appeals, this authority is limited to instances where the CA has granted a new trial. In other
words, the CA cannot unqualifiedly admit evidence on appeal, as it did with the document in
question. The rule is that, evidence which has not been formally offered shall not be considered.
Nevertheless, the Court, in the interest of justice and only for the most meritorious of reasons, has
allowed the submission of certification in petitions of this kind, after the parties were granted the
opportunity to verify the authenticity and due execution of such document.

Therefore, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings in order
to determine the authenticity and due execution of the aforementioned document. The Court of
Appeals is directed to hear and receive evidence from the parties in furtherance of this purpose
and to forthwith submit its resolution to the Court for appropriate action.

86 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF AN APPEAL TO THE CA UNDER SEC. 1, RULE 50

OF THE RULES OF COURT ARE DISCRETIONARY UPON THE CA EXCEPT SEC. 1(b)

Dr. Gil J. Rich vs. Guillermo Paloma III et al.

G.R. No. 210538, March 7, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Dr. Gil Rich filed this Petition for Review under Rule 45 to challenge the
Decision and Resolution of the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC secured
by petitioner against respondents Guillermo Paloma III, Atty. Evarista Tarce, and Ester Servacio.

The controversy involves an equitable redemption effected by respondent Servacio on

behalf of a dissolve corporation, Maasin Traders Lending Corporation (MTLC), on the basis of a
junior mortgage encumbrance established over the same property acquired by petitioner at public
auction.

A preliminary issue in this case is whether respondents had violated Section 13, Rule 44
of the Rules of Court when the latter's Appellant's Brief before the CA, "failed to contain a subject
index with page of reference and compliant statement of facts."

ISSUE:
Should the CA have dismissed the respondents’ appeal on account of its failure to comply
with the rules on the form of the Appellant’s Brief?

RULING:
No, the CA should not have dismissed the appeal on account of the failure to comply with
the rules on the form of the Appellant’s Brief.

Rule 50, Sec. 1(f) of the Rules of Court states that “an appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals [for] absence of specific assignment of errors in appellant’s brief, or of page
references to the record as required in Section 13, paragraphs (a), (c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44.”
However, in De Leon v. Court of Appeals, the Court also held that the grounds for dismissal of an
appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, except Sec. 1(b), are discretionary upon
the CA. The guiding principle is that if the citations found in the appellants brief could sufficiently
enable the CA to locate expeditiously the portions of the records referred to, then there is
substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 44.

In this case, the CA did not exercise the discretion to dismiss the appeal based on the
absence of "a subject index with page of reference and compliant statement of facts" in the
appellant's brief. Clearly, the CA did not find that the tenets of justice and fair play were disregarded
by this omission. Hence, the appellant's brief was implied to be substantially sufficient when the
CA chose to decide the case on the merits.

Therefore, the CA should not have dismissed the appeal on account of the failure to comply
with the rules on the form of the Appellant’s Brief.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PETITIONERS' WITHDRAWAL OF PETITION AND THE LACK OF ACTION ON

RESPONDENT'S PART RENDERS AN ACTION MOOT AND ACADEMIC

Teodorico Castillo, Alice Castillo, and St. Ezekiel School, Inc. vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. 214053, June 6, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the CA dismissing the appeal,
as well as its Resolution denying herein petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Prudential Bank
- now Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), herein respondent- extended various loans to petitioners
Teodorico and Alice Castillo amounting to at least ₱20 million. As security, petitioners mortgaged
property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 102607 (the subject property) for which
corresponding deeds of real estate mortgage were executed.

Petitioners defaulted in their loan payments. BPI thus filed a Petition for Extrajudicial
Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage before the RTC, BPI emerged as the highest bidder.
Petitioners were unable to redeem the subject property. A Certificate of Sale was thus issued in
BPI's favor. BPI filed a Petition for Ex Parte Issuance of Writ of Possession before the RTC,
Petitioners interposed an appeal before the CA then moved to reconsider, but in its Resolution,
the CA held its ground. Hence, the present Petition.

On March 4, 2015, respondent filed its comment to the instant petition. On October 13,
2016, however, petitioners filed a Withdrawal of Petition, with a prayer for withdrawal or dismissal
of the instant petition on the ground of compromise. Thereafter, the Court required BPI to comment
on the petitioners' Withdrawal of Petition. However, to date, the bank has failed to file its written
comment.

ISSUE:
Is the withdrawal of the petition by the petitioner and inaction of the respondent to the same
render the action moot and academic?

RULING:
Yes, withdrawal of the petition by the petitioner and inaction of the respondent to the same
shall render the action moot and academic.

In this case, considering the lapse of time – 1 year and 7 months - since the filing of the
petitioners' Withdrawal of Petition and the lack of action on respondent's part, it appears that the
instant Petition has been rendered moot and academic and is thus ripe for dismissal. Since the
withdrawal of the Petition came upon the initiative of petitioners, respondent's inaction may be
considered to be an implied concurrence or approval of the same.

Therefore, petition is dismissed due to the withdrawal of the petitioner and inaction of the
respondent.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE PRINCIPLE OF THE LAW OF THE CASE RELATES TO QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
GOVERN SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS IN SAME CASE; PRINCIPLE NOT APPLICABLE
IF IT INVOLVES A QUESTION OF FACT AND WHERE A SEPARATE CASE INSTITUTED

Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Franklin Cual, et. al

G.R. No. 207684, July 17, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA reinstating the LA's finding that petitioner Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc.
(Philtranco) illegally dismissed the respondents, who were drivers, conductors, and maintenance
personnel of Philtranco.

Respondents were all included in a retrenchment program embarked on by Philtranco.

Respondents alleged that they were not absorbed despite the fact that the company was hiring
new employees; thus, they filed a labor complaint for illegal dismissal (first NLRC case). The LA
found union president Olivar to have been illegally dismissed and entitled, among others, to
reinstatement. Respondents' claims, however, were dismissed for their failure to sign the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping of the complaint and position paper. The
decision attained finality and respondents remained excluded from the award.

On the belief that the dismissal of their claims due to a technicality was without prejudice
to their refiling of the same complaint, the respondents filed the second NLRC case. The LA found
respondents to have been illegally dismissed. The LA applied the law of the case principle, stating
that the first NLRC case is binding upon Philtranco. NLRC reversed and stated that the principle
of law of the case applies only to Olivar. However, the CA reinstated the LA's decision agreeing
that it is inappropriate to consider the belatedly filed audited financial statements.

ISSUE:
Is the principle of the law of the case applicable in the second NLRC complaint when the
first complaint was dismissed due to a technicality?

RULING:
No, the principle of the law of the case is not applicable in the second NLRC complaint.

The law of the case doctrine has been defined as that principle under which determinations
of questions of law will generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages
where such determination has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is
merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to
where its application will result in an unjust decision. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is
confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case.

In this case, the second NLRC case is certainly not a continuation of the first NLRC case
from which respondents were excluded. It is a separate case instituted anew by respondents
because the prior case was only given due course with respect to the parties who signed the
complaint and position paper. Furthermore, the matter of whether or not Philtranco sufficiently
proved its basis for the retrenchment program is a question of fact and not a question of law. The
appellate court's finding that the retrenchment undertaken by Philtranco was invalid, may not be
invoked as the law of the case.

Therefore, the law of the case doctrine finds no application in this case.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION, A MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE RTC EXCEPT

WHEN THERE EXISTS A CLAIM ADVERSE TO THAT OF THE DEBTOR-MORTGAGOR

Heirs of Peñaflor vs. Heirs of Dela Cruz

G.R. No. 197797, August 9, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari wherein petitioners Heirs of Peñaflor assail the
decision and resolution by the CA which annulled and set aside the Writ of Possession and Notice
to Vacate issued by the RTC, thereby reinstating respondents Heirs of Artemio and Lydia Dela
Cruiz (Heirs of Dela Cruz) to the possession of the subject property.

Dela Cruz (Nicolasa) mortgaged her property in favor of Jose Peñaflor, the predecessor-
in-interest of the petitioners to secure the loan obtained by Nicolasa. Due to Nicolasa’s failure to
pay, Peñaflor filed an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage. The property was sold
at public auction. As the highest bidder, Peñaflor was issued a certificate of sale followed by a
Final Bill of Sale since the period of redemption expired without the property being redeemed.
Thus, he executed an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership. Nicolasa refused to deliver
possession to Peñaflor. This prompted Peñaflor to file a petition for the ex parte issuance of a writ
of possession before the RTC. There was no appeal made, thus the same lapsed into finality. The
RTC in its amended order granted the writ of possession and issued the same.

A notice to vacate was then issued. However, Artemio Dela Cruz (Artemio), son of
Nicolasa, and his wife filed a motion to quash the writ of possession and notice to vacate claiming
that as strangers, the writ could not be enforced against them. The RTC issued another notice to
vacate and it is when the respondent heirs of Dela Cruz in substitution of their parents, filed another
motion to hold the implementation of the writ in abeyance. But the same was denied. On appeal,
the CA annulled and set aside the writ of possession and notice to vacate. It ruled that respondents
are holding the property adverse to Nicolasa, the judgment obligor. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is a doubtful claim considered an exception in the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue a
writ of possession?

RULING:
No, a doubtful claim is not considered an exception in the ministerial duty of the RTC to
issue a writ of possession.

Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, imposes upon the RTC a ministerial duty to issue
a writ of possession to the new owner upon a mere ex parte motion. There are, however, several
exceptions to this ministerial duty established by law and jurisprudence. One is provided in Section
33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court: when a third party in possession of the property claims a right
adverse to that of the debtor-mortgagor in a foreclosure case.

In this case, Artemio cannot be considered as a third party who is actually holding the
property adversely to the judgment obligor. Artemio's claim over the subject property is riddled with
material inconsistencies that are equally doubtful that he even had possession of the subject
property at the time it was mortgaged to Peñaflor.

Therefore, the annulment of the writ of possession and notice to vacate was improper.

90 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN ENFORCING THE WRIT OF EXECUTION IN EJECTION CASES, THE SHERIFF SHALL

FIRST GIVE NOTICE THEREOF AND DEMAND THE DEFENDANT TO VACATE THE
PROPERTY BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE LEVY

Rolando Soliva vs. Reynaldo Taleon

A.M. No. P-16-3511, September 06, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a resolution concerned with the letter-complaint filed by complainant Rolando Soliva
against respondent Reynaldo Taleon, Sheriff IV, RTC, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del
Norte, for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and grave abuse of authority.

Complainant was one of the defendants in a civil case for forcible entry and damages,
before the MCTC. The MCTC, however, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved, complainant filed
a petition for annulment of judgment and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before the
RTC. Complainant’s urgent motion for issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction was set for a hearing.

Complainant, however, alleged that, while the said urgent motion was pending, respondent
issued notices of garnishment to several banks. Complainant argued that respondent should have
first made a demand on the judgment obligors before resorting to garnishment and/or levy. He also
submitted a supplemental complaint alleging that respondent filed an ex-parte
request/manifestation to put his properties under levy on execution. Moreover, respondent had not
submitted a report or return relative to the case. Furthermore, he caused the publication of a Notice
of Sale on Levy on Execution. Complainant also alleged that the MCTC Order directed respondent
to follow the procedure under Rules of Court by first making a demand on the defendants to vacate
the subject land and to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiffs. However, instead of complying
with the court's directive, respondent proceeded with the levy. On the other hand, respondent
submitted his Comment alleging that complainant did not want to pay the damages awarded to the
plaintiffs. Moreover, he alleged that he had given the occupants of the subject land sufficient time
to vacate the premises.

ISSUE:
Did respondent abide with the procedure under the Rules of Court by the mere issuance
of notices of garnishment and proceeding with the levy without making prior demand on the
judgment obligors to vacate the land?

RULING:
No, respondent did not abide by the procedure in proceeding with the levy and issuing
notices of garnishment without making prior demand on the judgment obligors to vacate the land.

The sheriff’s duty in the implementation of a writ is purely ministerial. Pursuant to Section
10(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in enforcing the writ of execution in ejection cases, the
sheriff shall give notice thereof and demand the defendant to vacate the property in three days.
Moreover, in the execution of a judgment for money, the sheriff must make a demand first on the
judgment obligor, before resorting to garnishment and/or levy.

In this case, while respondent argued that he first made a demand on the defendants, such
claim is not supported by a Sheriff’s Return which means he did not comply with what is required
by law.

Therefore, respondent was incorrect procedurally in executing the judgment against the
complainant.

| 91
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PARTIES ACQUIRING THE RIGHT OF POSSESSION OVER A PROPERTY SUBJECT OF

FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS HAVE A RIGHT TO APPLY FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
WRIT OF POSSESSION EVEN IF NOT PURCHASERS IN THE PROCEEDINGS

Spouses Rosalino R. Reyes vs. Spouses Herbert and Wienna Chung

G.R. No. 228112, September 13, 2017
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision of the CA
which dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners Spouses Reyes and upheld the Decision of the
RTC which granted the respondents Spouses Chung's "Ex Parte Petition for the Issuance of Writ
of Possession under Act No. 3135," as well as the Resolutions of the same court.

Petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation which caused the subject
property in being extrajudicially foreclosed and sold at public auction, with EIBI as the highest
bidder. After the petitioners' failure to redeem the subject property within the one-year redemption
period, the title thereto was consolidated in EIBI' s name. Later, EIBI sold the subject property to
LNC Corporation. To acquire possession of the subject property, the respondents made several
demands on the petitioners to vacate the same and surrender its possession. The demands went
unheeded. Thus, the respondents lodged a Complaint for Ejectment against the petitioners before
the MeTC. However, said Complaint was dismissed. The dismissal was appealed by the
respondents to RTC. Pending resolution of the appeal, the respondents filed an "Ex-Parte Petition
for Issuance of Writ of Possession” before the RTC. The following day, the respondents withdrew
their appeal before RTC. The trial court allowed the withdrawal per its Order. Thereafter, the RTC
granted the respondents' Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Accordingly, a
notice to vacate addressed to the petitioners and a writ of possession directing the sheriff to place
the respondents in possession of the subject property were issued. Nonetheless, upon the service
of the writ of possession and the notice to vacate on the petitioners, the latter refused to sign them.

ISSUE:
Do the respondents have a right to a writ of possession even though they were not the
purchasers in the foreclosure proceedings?

RULING:
Yes, the respondents have a right to a writ of possession even if they are not purchasers
in the foreclosure proceedings.

A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the

possession of land. In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, the purchaser becomes the
absolute owner thereof if no redemption is made within one year from the registration of the
certificate of sale by those entitled to redeem. Being the absolute owner, he is entitled to all the
rights of ownership over a property.

The original right to file a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession belonged to EIBI,
being the mortgagee-purchaser at the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. But, it sold the subject
property to LNC, which, in tum, sold the same to the respondents. As such, by the sale, the
respondents became the new owners of the subject property and were vested with all the rights
and interests of their predecessors EIBI and LNC, including the right to the possession of the
property. Undoubtedly, the respondents can apply for the issuance of a writ of possession even
though they were not the purchasers at the foreclosure proceedings. It was an error, however, for
the RTC to issue the writ of possession to the respondents ex parte.

Therefore, respondents have a right to a writ of possession in the case at bar.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOTION TO REOPEN MAY BE PRESENTED TO PREVENT A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE

Cecilia Rivac vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224673, January 22, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision and the Resolution dated
of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the conviction of petitioner Cecilia Rivac (Rivac) for
the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).

Rivac went to the jewelry store owned by private complainant Asuncion C. Fariñas
(Fariñas) where she received from the latter several pieces of jewelry in the aggregate amount of
P439,500.00, which were meant for her to sell on consignment basis, as evidenced by a document
called jewelry consignment agreement (consignment document). Fariñas and Rivac agreed that
after seven (7) days, Rivac was obligated to either remit the proceeds of the sold jewelry or return
the unsold jewelry to Fariñas should she fail to sell the same. However, despite the lapse of the
aforesaid period, Rivac failed to perform what was incumbent upon her, causing Fariñas to send
her a demand letter. Criminal charges were filed against Rivac for Estafa.

The RTC found Rivac guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. After the
promulgation of the aforesaid Judgment and before it lapsed into finality, Rivac moved to reopen
proceedings on the ground that she intends to present the testimonies of Fariñas and a certain
Atty. Ma. Valenie Blando (Atty. Blando) to prove the true nature of her transaction with Fariñas.

ISSUE:
Was the reopening of the case improper under the Rules of Court?

RULING:
No, the reopening of the case was not improper under the Rules of Court.

Section 24, Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure governs the
reopening of criminal cases for further trial. It states in verbatim: "At any time before finality of the
judgment of conviction, the judge may, motu proprio or upon motion, with hearing in either case,
reopen the proceedings to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The proceedings shall be terminated
within thirty (30) days from the order granting it." The following requirements for reopening a case:
(1) the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued by
the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing is
conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of
additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days from the issuance of the
order.

A motion to reopen may thus properly be presented only after either or both parties had
formally offered and closed their evidence, but before judgment is rendered, and even after
promulgation but before finality of judgment and the only controlling guideline covering a motion to
reopen is the paramount interest of justice. To reiterate, a motion to reopen may be filed even after
the promulgation of a judgment and before the same lapses into finality, and the only guiding
parameter is to "avoid the miscarriage of justice."

Therefore, the RTC correctly allowed the reopening of proceedings to receive Fariñas's
subsequent testimony in order to shed light on the true nature of her transaction with Rivac, and
potentially, determine whether or not the latter is indeed criminally liable.

| 93
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DISMISSAL OF A PETITION CARRIES WITH IT THE LIFTING OF STATUS QUO ANTE

ORDER

Saturnino C. Ocampo et. al., vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez (in his capacity as the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces Of The Philippines
G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, assailing decision of the
Court, which dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos), former President of the Republic of the Philippines, at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani (LNMB).

On November 8, 2016, the Court dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of
the mortal remains of Marcos at the LNMB. As the Filipino public witnessed through the broadcast
media and as the Office of the Solicitor General manifested based on the letter sent by the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office of the Department of National Defense, Marcos was finally laid
to rest at the LNMB around noontime of November 18, 2016, which was 10 days after the
promulgation of the judgment and prior to the filing of petitioners' separate motions for
reconsideration.

Lagman et al. contend that the right of a party to file a Motion for Reconsideration is
impaired and that due process is derailed if a decision that is not yet final and executory is
implemented. In this case, the Decision must become final and executory before the dissolution of
the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO) can take effect.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of the main petition a cause for the lifting of SQAO?

RULING:
Yes, the dismissal of the main petition caused the lifting of SQAO.

While the Court concedes that execution takes place only when decisions become final
and executory, there are cases that may be executed pending appeal or are immediately executory
pursuant to the provisions of the Rules and the statutes as well as by court order. Yet, the fact that
a decision is immediately executory does not prevent a party from questioning the decision before
a court of law.

In this case, by nature, a SQAO is similar to the provisional remedies of TRO and WPI.
Thus, when the Court dismissed the petitions in the Main Decision, the SQAO, in effect, became
functus officio; it could not stand independent of the main proceeding. Such dismissal necessarily
carried with it the lifting of the SQAO issued during the pendency of the action. Being interlocutory
and ancillary in character, the order automatically dissolved upon dismissal of the main case. The
SQAO is effective immediately upon its issuance and upon its lifting despite the existence of the
right to file and the actual filing of a MR or appeal. Finally, based on the title, allegations, and relief
being sought, this consolidated case is one for prohibition; hence, essentially in the nature of
petitions for injunction. Under Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules, judgments in actions for injunction
are immediately executory; it shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by
an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

Therefore, Marcos may be allowed to be laid to rest at the LNMB even before the resolution
of the motion for reconsideration.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF EXECUTION MUST ALSO BE WITHIN FIVE-YEAR PERIOD

FROM ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR EXECUTION AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

Daniel A. Villareal Jr. (On Behalf of Orlando A. Villareal), vs. Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System
G.R. No. 232202, February 28, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the RTC’s decision of denying the
motion for reconsideration of petitioner Daniel Villareal Jr., (Villareal), affirming the issuance of Writ
of Execution and Sheriffs Notice to Vacate and Pay.

In a Decision dated October 30, 2000, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the
case for Unlawful Detainer, for being prematurely filed and for lack of cause of action. On appeal
by MWSS, the RTC reversed the MeTC and on September 27, 2002, the RTC’s judgement was
entered after becoming final and executory. On May 17, 2004, MWSS filed a Motion for Issuance
of Writ of Execution with the MeTC.

However, it was only on October 26, 2015, after more than 10 years from the filing of
MWSS motion for execution, that the MeTC issued the writ. When petitioner received a notice to
vacate from the Sheriff of the MeTC, he filed this present petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
arguing that the five-year period for execution has prescribed.

ISSUE:
May a writ of execution still be issued despite the lapse of 10 years from the time the motion
for its issuance was filed?

RULING:
No, a writ of execution cannot be issued due to the lapse of 10 years from the time the
motion for its issuance was filed.

Under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules, for execution by motion to be valid, the judgment
creditor must ensure the accomplishment of two acts within the five-year prescriptive period, as
follows: (a) the filing of the motion for the issuance of the writ of execution; and (b) the court's
actual issuance of the writ. The five-year prescriptive period reckoned from the entry of judgment,
should be observed both by both by the winning party who filed the motion, i.e., judgment
obligee/creditor, and the court that will resolve the same. The winning party may file the motion for
execution within the five-year period; and the court should issue the actual writ of execution
pursuant to the motion within the same period. After the lapse of the five-year period, any writ
issued by the court is already null and void, since the court no longer has jurisdiction over the
issuance of the writ.

In this case, records show that after the filing of MWSS' Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution in 2004, and Orlando's Comment/Opposition thereto, the MeTC issued an Order
granting the said motion only on July 28, 2014. More than a year after the grant, or on October 26,
2015, the MeTC issued the Writ of Execution. Reckoned from the entry of judgment on December
15, 2002, more than 12 years have elapsed after the actual writ of execution was finally issued by
the MeTC. This is clearly beyond the five-year prescriptive period within which the court may issue
the writ of execution. By then, the MeTC was already stripped of its jurisdiction. Hence, the writ of
execution issued on October 26, 2015 is null and void.

Therefore, being beyond the 5-year prescriptive period, the writ of execution cannot be
issued.

| 95
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOTION FOR REVIVAL OF JUDGMENT BEYOND FIVE YEARS ALLOWED IF DELAY IS

NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE PREVAILING PARTY

Simeon Piedad (deceased) vs. Candelaria and Mariano Bobilles

G.R. No. 208614, November 27, 2017
Leonen J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, filed by the petitioners, the heirs of Simeon Piedad,
appealing the Resolution of the CA, which denied their motion for the resumption of the writ of
demolition filed against respondents Candelaria and Mariano Bobilles.

Simeon Piedad filed a case for annulment of an absolute deed of sale made in favor of the
respondents. He secured a favorable judgement and after the failure of the respondents’ appeal,
the case became final and executory. A writ of execution and demolition was issued against the
respondents. However, the same day, respondent Mariano also filed a Petition for Probate of Last
Will and Testament of Simeon Piedad in another court and eventually secured an injunction against
petitioner.

Several motions were filed by the petitioners but the judges who handled the cases did not
resolve them. Thus, the petitioners filed an administrative complaint against the judges for
unreasonable delay in resolving their motions and gross ignorance of the law the judges were
found guilty, so the case was transferred to a new court.

After the case was transferred, the petitioners filed for a Motion that an order be issued to
resume the unfinished writ of execution but was denied. The judge opined that since more than 12
years have passed, the proper remedy of the petitioners is to commence an action for revival of
judgment. The CA dismissed their appeal holding that the proper remedy against the trial court’s
decision was a petition for certiorari. Hence this appeal from the CA’s resolution.

ISSUE:
May the Motion to Revive Judgement be allowed despite being filed beyond 5 years?

RULING:
Yes, a motion to revive judgement may be allowed despite being filed beyond 5 years.

It is true that under Rule 39 Sec. 6 or the Rules on Civil Procedure, the general rule is that
the prevailing party may move for the execution of a final and executory judgment as a matter of
right within 5 years from entry of judgment. After the period, the judgment can only be enforced by
instituting a complaint for the revival of judgment within 10 years from its finality. However, this
court has allowed for the execution of a final and executory judgment even if prescription has
already set in, if the delay was not caused by the judgment obligor.

In the case, the writ of demolition was never served on the respondents due to their dilatory
tactics and undue delay of the judges handling the case. It cannot be said that the petitioners slept
on their rights as they filed a motion for execution, but it was thwarted by respondent’s
machinations.

Therefore, due to respondents’ schemes, they were able to prevent the heirs of Simeon
Piedad from enjoying what has already been decreed to be rightfully theirs. The motion for revival
of judgment should be allowed as the delay is not attributable to the prevailing party.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JURISDICTION OVER A PETITION TO REVIVE JUDGMENT IS PROPERLY WITH THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT AND NOT WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS

Douglas F. Anama vs. Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank)
G.R. No. 192048, December 13, 2017
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside
the Decision of the CA dismissing the petitioner's action to revive judgment.

Petitioner Anama had executed a promissory note and a chattel mortgage in consideration
of a loan he obtained from the Citibank. Due to his failure to pay, Citibank filed a complaint for sum
of money and replevin with the CFI of Manila (RTC). Before Citibank could seize the subjects of
the chattel mortgage however, the petitioner was able to secure the nullification of the RTC’s orders
of seizure. The nullification of such orders because final and executory after a failed appeal to the
Supreme Court by Citibank and an entry of judgement was entered in 1999.

In 2009, however, Anama filed a petition for revival of judgment with the CA which sought,
among others, to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings, particularly his
counterclaims against Citibank. In its comment, Citibank argued that the petition should be
dismissed as an action for revival of judgment is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
RTC. It also argued that laches has set in against Anama for having slept on his rights for almost
10 years. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Does the CA have jurisdiction over an action for revival of judgment?

RULING:
No, the CA does not have jurisdiction to hear and decide Anama's action for revival of
judgment.

An action to revive a judgment is an action whose exclusive purpose is to enforce a

judgment which could no longer be enforced by mere motion. Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it
executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment.
If the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after the lapse of five years,
said judgment is reduced to a right of action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint
in a regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment becomes final.

In this case, as an action for revival of judgment is an independent action with a new cause
of action, the rules on instituting and commencing actions apply, including the rules on jurisdiction.
Its jurisdictional requirements are not dependent on the previous action and the petition does not
necessarily have to be filed in the same court which rendered judgment.

Therefore, as an action to revive judgment raises issues of whether the petitioner has a
right to have the final and executory judgment revived and to have that judgment enforced and
does not involve recovery of a sum of money, we rule that jurisdiction over a petition to revive
judgment is properly with the RTC.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IF THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANT'S EVIDENCE DOES NOT PERSUADE THE COURT OF

THE VALIDITY OF HIS TITLE OR RIGHT TO POSSESSION THERETO, THE THIRD-
PARTY CLAIM WILL, AND SHOULD BE DENIED

Tee Ling Kiat v. Ayala Corporation (Substituted by its Assignee and Successor-in-interest,
Bienvenido B.M. Amora Jr.)
G.R. No. 192530, March 07, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court appealing
the Decision of the CA, which ruled that petitioner lacked the legal personality to file a third-party
claim.

The present petition arose from a judgment for a sum of money obtained by Ayala
Corporation against Continental Manufacturing Corporation (CMC) and Spouses Dewey and Lily
Dee (Spouses Dee) in 1990. A Writ of Execution was issued against the Spouses Dee. Thereafter,
a Notice of Levy on Execution was issued and addressed to the Register of Deeds to levy upon
specific parcels of land and any improvements thereon.

The parcels of land that were levied however were registered in the name of Vonnel
Industrial Park, Inc. (VIP), in which Dewey Dee was also an incorporator. Before the scheduled
sale on execution, Tee Ling Kiat filed a Third-Party Claim in his personal capacity, arguing that
VIP is a corporate entity which has a legal personality separate and distinct from Mr. Dewey Dee.
Thus, the properties of VIP cannot be executed upon. To establish his legal standing, he showed
evidence that the shares of Dee in VIP had been sold to him.

The third-party claim was disallowed by the RTC on the ground the Mr. Tee Ling Kiat had
no personality to file the terceria. The CA affirmed on appeal. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Should the third-party claim of the petitioner be disallowed due to lack of personality to file
such?

RULING:
Yes, the CA is correct in disallowing the third-party claim of Tee Ling Kiat due to lack of
personality to file such.

It is a basic principle of law that money judgments are enforceable only against property
incontrovertibly belonging to the judgment debtor, and certainly, a person other than the judgment
debtor who claims ownership over the levied properties is not precluded from challenging the levy
through any of the remedies provided for under the Rules of Court. In the pursuit of such remedies,
however, the third-party must, to reiterate, unmistakably establish ownership over the levied
property.

In this case, in as much as the validity of the third-party claim would only be relevant if the
person instituting the same has established that he has a real interest in the levied property, the
Court will not belabor the merits of the third-party claim in view of the conclusive determination that
Tee Ling Kiat has not adduced evidence to prove that the shares of stock of Dewey Dee were
indeed sold to him.

Therefore, being unable to establish his ownership over the said property, petitioner’s third-
party claim may be disallowed for lack of personality to file such.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION FROM EXECUTION OF A FAMILY HOME IS NOT PRESUMED

AND MUST FIRST BE PROVED

Felicitas L. Salazar vs. Remedios Felias

G.R. No. 213972, February 5, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
The is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the CA
decision affirming the RTC decision that declared the Heirs of Nivera as the absolute owners of
the subject property.

In 1990, Respondent Felias, representing the heirs of Catalino Nivera, filed a Complaint
for Recovery of Ownership, Possession, and Damages against the Spouses Lastimosa before the
RTC. The former sought to recover from the latter four parcels of land located in Pangasinan.
During the trial of the case, Romualdo Lastimosa died. A Motion for Substitution was filed by the
decedent's wife, Felisa, and their children (Heirs of Lastimosa). The RTC declared the Heirs of
Nivera as the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question, and thereby ordered the Heirs of
Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender possession.

A Writ of Execution and Demolition was thereafter issued by the lower court. Pursuant
thereto, the sheriff levied upon one of the subject properties which however was by then in the
possession of Petitioner Felicitas, who is a successor-in-interest of one of the heirs. Among other
allegations to forestall execution, she alleged that the execution on the property was illegal as the
levied property is her family home and thus exempt from execution.

ISSUE:
May a family home be exempt from execution despite lack of sufficient evidence or proof?

RULING:
No, a family home may not be exempt from execution due to lack of sufficient evidence or
proof.

There is no doubt that family homes are exempt from execution to the extent provided by
the Family Code. However, a mere claim that the property is exempt from execution for being the
movant's family home is not a magic wand that will freeze the court's hand and forestall the
execution of a final and executory ruling. It must be noted that it is not sufficient for the claimant to
merely allege that such property is a family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old
Civil Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up and proved.

In this case, a perusal of the petition, however, shows that aside from her bare allegation,
Felicitas adduced no proof to substantiate her claim that the property sought to be executed is
indeed her family home. Interestingly, Felicitas admitted in her Motion for Reconsideration that she
is, and has always been a resident of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Similarly, the address indicated in
Felicitas' petition for review on certiorari is Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Thus, she does not even reside
on the property. Equally important, the Court takes judicial notice of the final ruling of the RTC in
the case for recovery of ownership, that the subject property has belonged to the Heirs of Nivera
since the 1950s. This automatically negates Felicitas' claim that the property is her family home.

Therefore, it is not sufficient for the claimant to merely allege that such property is a family
home; he must prove it with sufficient evidence.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ALTHOUGH A JUDGMENT IN A PRIOR EJECTMENT SUIT IS IN PERSONAM, A

TRESPASSER IS NEVERTHELESS BOUND EVEN IF HE WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE
PRIOR EJECTMENT SUIT

Heirs of Alfonso Yusingco vs. Amelita Busilak

G.R. No. 210504, January 24, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Petitioners filed five (5) separate Complaints for accion publiciana and/or recovery of
possession of three (3) parcels of land against herein respondents. The suits were then
consolidated and filed with the MTCC of Surigao City. After the trial, the MTCC issued an Omnibus
Judgment in favor of petitioners alleging that petitioners, in an earlier case for accion
reivindicatoria, were already declared as the true and lawful owners of the subject properties.

Aggrieved, respondents filed an appeal with the RTC on the ground that they are not bound
to the prior case as they were not impleaded therein. The RTC rendered a Decision which affirmed
with modification the Omnibus Judgement of the MTCC. The case was brought to the CA through
a petition for review under Rule 42 where the CA set aside and dismissed the consolidated cases.
The CA held that since an accion reivindicatoria is an action in personam, the judgments in the
said case binds only the parties properly impleaded therein. Since respondents were not parties
to the said action, the CA concluded that they could not be bound by the judgments declaring
petitioners as owners of the disputed properties. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Can decisions rendered in a previous accion reivindicatoria be binding upon persons not
impleaded therein?
.
RULING:
Yes, decisions rendered in a previous accion reivindicatoria may be binding upon persons
not impleaded therein.

It is true that a judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is

in personam. It is conclusive, not against the whole world, but only "between the parties and their
successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action." An action to recover
a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual
only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard.

However, this rule admits of the exception that even a non-party may be bound by the
judgment in an ejectment suit where he is any of the following: (a) trespasser, squatter or agent of
the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the judgment; (b) guest or occupant
of the premises with the permission of the defendant; (c) transferee pendente lite; (d) sublessee;
(e) co-lessee; or (f) member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

Therefore, the CA erred in its ruling because respondents, even not impleaded, being
trespassers on the subject lots, are bound by the said judgments, which find petitioners to be
entitled to the possession of the subject lots as owners thereof.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A DECISION IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA CASE DOES NOT OPERATE AS RES JUDICATA

IN A SUBSEQUENT CASE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE COVERING THE SAME PROPERTY

Heirs of Victor Amistoso vs. Elmer T. Vallecer, Represented by Edgar Vallecer

G.R. No. 227124, December 06, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari appealing the CA’s decision which upheld the RTC’s
denial of petitioners’ Motion to Hear and Resolve Affirmative Defenses for their failure to
substantiate their affirmative defenses of res judicata, prescription, and laches.

Civil Case No. S-606 was a complaint for recovery of possession of a parcel of land in
Zamboanga del Norte was filed by respondent against petitioners. It alleged that the property was
purchased after confirming with the DAR that it was not tenanted. In due course of proceedings,
the CA ruled that under the Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) issued in favor of the petitioners,
the petitioners are "deemed owner" of the land after full payment of its value. Having proven full
compliance for the grant of title, petitioners have a right to the land which must be respected.

Civil Case No. L-298 on the other hand is a subsequent complaint for quieting of title filed
by respondent claiming that petitioners' CLT does not contain the technical description of the
property which it purportedly covers. Petitioners invoked res judicata, prescription and laches.
They pointed out that the prior decision had already became immutable.

The RTC denied petitioners' Motion to dismiss declaring that res judicata would not apply
in view of the lack of identity of causes of action. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the case for recovery of possession of property bar the case for quieting of title by
res judicata?

RULING:
No, the case for recovery of possession of property does not bar the case for quieting of
title by res judicata.

For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.

In Civil Case No. S-606, respondent never asked that he be declared the owner, but only
prayed the recovery of possession thereof from petitioners. As such, the case should be classified
as an accion publiciana, or a plenary action to recover the right of possession of land. Hence, while
petitioners were acknowledged by the DAR as "deemed owners" of the land, such declaration was
merely provisional as it was only for the purpose of determining possession. On the other hand,
in Civil Case No. L-298, respondent asserted his ownership over the property by virtue of his
Torrens title and that petitioners' CLT does not contain the technical description of the property
which it purportedly covers and therefore does not show that their alleged tenancy right falls on his
property.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, it is clear that the causes of action in Civil Case Nos.
S-606 and L-298 are different from each other. And thus, the ruling in the former would not operate
as res judicata on the latter.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THERE MUST BE SIMILAR IDENTITY OF PARTIES, OF SUBJECT MATTER, AND OF

CAUSES OF ACTION FOR RES JUDICATA TO BAR A SUBSEQUENT ACTION

Teresa R. Ignacio vs. Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City

G.R. No. 221620, September 11, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the CA which affirmed
the Resolution of the RTC dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner Teresa R. Ignacio for
annulment of warrant of levy, public auction sale, recovery of ownership and possession, and
damages on the ground of res judicata.

Petitioner filed a complaint alleging that she is the registered co-owner of a real property
which public respondents, with malice and bad faith, sold at a public auction to Sps. Dimalanta
without notice of the levy and auction sale proceedings, thereby depriving her of said property
without due process of law. Public respondents argued that they had strictly complied with the
legal and procedural requirements for the conduct of the public auction sale, that they sent the
auction sale notice to the address she provided the Office of the City Assessor, which which
petitioner has not changed to date.

Public respondents subsequently filed a Manifestation, moving for the dismissal of the
Annulment Complaint on the ground of res judicata as petitioner’s cause of action is barred by the
final judgment in the cancellation case rendered by the RTC which upheld and confirmed the
validity of the auction sale.

ISSUE:
Is the cause of action for annulment of sale barred by res judicata by reason of the final
judgment in a cancellation case upholding the validity of the auction sale?

RULING:
No, the cause of action for the annulment of sale is not barred by res judicata by reason of
a final judgment in a cancellation case confirming the validity of the auction sale.

For res judicata to absolutely bar a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur:
(a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be on the merits; (c)
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and
(d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and
of causes of action.

In this case, it was found that there is no identity of causes of action between the two
cases. In the Cancellation Case, the cause is the expiration of the one-year redemption period
without the landowners having redeemed the property; in the Annulment Case, the cause is the
alleged nullity of the auction sale for denial of the property owners' right to due process. The LRC,
in the Cancellation Case, granted Sps. Dimalanta's petition based on a finding that there was a
failure to redeem the property within the one-year period, without ruling on whether the property's
owners were duly notified of the sale. In other words, the validity of the auction sale raised as an
issue in the Annulment Case was never an issue, nor determined with finality, in the Cancellation
Case.

Therefore, petitioner’s cause of action is not barred by res judicata.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN ASCERTAINING THE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION, THE TEST IS TO LOOK

INTO WHETHER THE SAME EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTS AND ESTABLISHES BOTH
PRESENT AND FORMER CAUSES OF ACTION

Jose Diaz, Jr. vs. Salvador Valenciano, Jr.

G.R. No. 209376, December 6, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari against the decision of the CA which reversed
the decision of the RTC and reinstated the MTCC’s decision, dismissing the complaint for unlawful
detainer on the ground of res judicata.

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioner against Valenciano, Sr., the father
of the respondent on the ground that they are the lawful owners of a lot. Thereafter, petitioner and
Valenciano, Sr. entered into a Compromise Agreement where they agreed to amicable settle the
case provided that Valenciano, Sr. will vacate and surrender the property within 1 ½ years and to
pay rent. The MTCC approved the agreement. For failure to abide with the agreement, Diaz filed
a Motion for Execution which the MTCC granted. By tolerance, Diaz did not enforce the execution
until after 15 years from its issuance and allowed Valenciano, Sr. to stay. Meanwhile, the latter
passed away.

Because of the refusal to vacate, Diaz filed a complaint for unlawful detainer. They claimed
to be the lawful and registered owner of the parcel of land. Valenciano, Jr. contended that the
complaint was barred by res judicata in view of the judicially-approved Compromise Agreement in
the first unlawful detainer case. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of respondents dismissing
the case.

ISSUE:
Will a second unlawful detainer case involving the same property barred by res judicata by
reason of a judicially-approved Compromise Agreement that was never executed by mere
tolerance of petitioners?

RULING:
No, the second unlawful detainer case is not barred by res judicata.

In ascertaining the identity of causes of action, the test is to look into whether or not the
same evidence fully supports and establishes both the present and the former causes of action.

In this case, in applying the "same evidence rule," the Court cannot fully agree with the
MTCC that the evidence necessary to obtain affirmative in the second unlawful detainer case
based on tolerance is the same as in the first one which· is also based on tolerance.The cause of
action in the first unlawful detainer case is Valenciano Sr.’s breach of the implied promise to vacate
the property being occupied by his family by mere tolerance of petitioners, whereas the cause of
action in the second case is another breach of implied promise to vacate the same property by
Valenciano Jr., the son and successor-in-interest of Salvador Sr., despite the judicially-approved
Compromise Agreement which petitioners neglected to enforce even after the issuance of a writ
of execution.

Therefore, res judicata does not bar the second action in the case at bar.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RES JUDICATA APPLIES WHEN THERE IS A VALID PRIOR FINAL JUDGEMENT

INVOLVING SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME PARTIES OVER THE SAME CAUSE OF
ACTION AND SAME PRAYER FOR RELIEFS

Angelica G. Cruz vs. Marylou Tolentino

G.R. No. 210446, April 18, 2018
Leonardo De-Castro, J.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision, which affirmed the
Decision of the RTC, dismissing the case on the ground of litis pendentia.

Alfredo S. Cruz (Alfredo) is the registered owner of two parcels of land. He executed a
special power of attorney (SPA) in favor of his wife, Purificacion G. Cruz (Purificacion), authorizing
her to sell, transfer, convey, and/or mortgage the aforementioned properties. Thereafter, Alfredo
passed away. 2 Deed of Absolute Sales were ostensibly executed between Alfredo and Tolentino
over said parcels of land. One was notarized and specifically mentions the SPA in favor of
Purificacion while the other does not. TCT’s thereafter were issued in favor of Tolentino.

Petitioners, who are the children of Alfredo, filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale & Title,
Damages & Injunction before the RTC of Mandaluyong, seeking to avoid the Deeds of Sale and
the certificates of title in Tolentino’s favor. Tolentino however alleged that the present action is
barred by res judicata. Tolentino pointed to a separate petition for mandamus she filed against
Purificacion enforcing her rights over said Deeds of Sale.

Thus, the RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint holding that the requisites of res judicata
are present. According to the RTC, the Deed of Absolute Sale and the SPA executed by Alfredo
in favor of Purificacion were ruled as valid and effective in the previous action filed by Tolentino.
On appeal however, the CA reversed the RTC, holding that only litis pendentia is present.

ISSUE:
Does res judicata apply considering that the prior action was brought against petitioners’
mother and not herein petitioners?

RULING:
Yes, res judicata applies considering that the prior action was brought against petitioners’
mother and not herein petitioners.

The Court finds that there is a substantial identity of parties. Petitioner substituted
Purificacion in the case filed by Tolentino when Purificacion died. Moreover, petitioners had a
community of interest with Purificacion since they were one in disputing the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in both cases. Then a perusal of the two cases shows that the parties are asserting
the same rights and prayed for the same reliefs. As the resolution of both cases hinged on the
determination of the issue of whether or not the Deeds of Absolute Sale were valid and legal,
judgement in one would bar the other. Finally, the prior case filed by Tolentino has already been
decided with finality on the merits.

In this case, the elements of res judicata, as a bar by prior judgment, are present. Notably,
we observe that petitioners are asking this Court to annul the prior judgement and would have the
Court delve into the merits of the prior case. Hence, the Court is already precluded from scrutinizing
the merits of the case as any attempt to relitigate the same would run afoul the doctrine.

Therefore, res judicata applied even the previous action was brought only against
petitioners’ mother and not against petitioners themselves.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN RES JUDICATA BY CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT, IT IS NOT REQUIRED FOR

THERE TO BE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION

Spouses Firmo and Agnes Rosario vs. Priscilla Alvar

G.R. No. 212731, September 6, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Agnes Annabelle
Dean-Rosario (Agnes) against respondent Priscilla Alvar (Alvar) assailing the Decision of the CA.

Agnes mortgaged two lots in favor of Priscilla Alvar (Priscilla). After the mortgages were
discharged, Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same lots were executed by Agnes in favor of
Evangeline Arceo (Evangeline), Priscilla’s daughter. Evangeline later sold the lots to Priscilla. By
virtue of the sale, Priscilla sent a demand letter to petitioners to vacate the lot. This prompted
petitioners to file before the RTC a complaint for declaration of nullity of contract of sale and
mortgage against Priscilla. Priscilla in turn filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of
possession. RTC granted Prisiclla’s complaint. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision but
still denied the complaint for nullification and ruled that although transfers from Agnes to Priscilla
were identified as absolute sales, the contracts are deemed equitable mortgages. No appeals or
MRs were made, thus the judgment became final and executory. Later on, Priscilla sent a letter to
Agnes demanding the payment of her outstanding obligation. Due to the failure of petitioners to
heed the demand, Priscilla filed before RTC a complaint for judicial foreclosure. The RTC ruled in
favor or Priscilla. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC.

As per the petitioners, Priscilla had no legal personality to institute the judicial foreclosure
proceedings, as the Deeds were executed by Evangeline. They also claim that the obligation has
no legal basis and that the deeds of absolute sale must be reformed before the lots can be judicially
foreclosed. Priscilla, on the other hand, maintains that she has legal personality pursuant to the
CA decision which has long attained finality and established petitioners’ indebtedness.

ISSUE:
Is res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment present in this case where there is only
identity of parties and subject matter?

RULING:
Yes, res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment is present in this case even there is only
identity of parties and subject matter

The factual findings and conclusions of the said Decision may no longer be disputed by
petitioners as res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment, which bars them from challenging the
same issues. Unlike res judicata by prior judgment, where there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action, there is only identity of parties and subject matter in res judicata by
conclusiveness of judgment. Since there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment in the first
case is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined.

In this case, all the elements of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment are present: (1)
the Decision has attained finality; (2) said decision was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) said decision disposed of the case on the merits; and (4)
there is, as between the previous case and the instant case, an identity of parties.

Therefore, petitioners are barred by conclusiveness of judgment and are estopped from
raising issues that were already adjudged in the Decision.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A COURT THAT ISSUES A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT WITHOUT VALID

GROUNDS THEREFOR ACTS IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION

Tsuneishi Heavy Industries (Cebu), Inc. vs. Mis Maritime Corporation

G.R. No. 19357, April 4, 2018
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner Tsuneishi Heavy Industries
(Cebu), Inc. (Tsuneishi) questions the decision of the CA seting aside the RTC’s issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment.

Respondent MIS Maritime Corporation (MIS) contracted Tsuneishi to dry dock and repair
its vessel M/T MIS-1. When Tsuneishi conducted an engine test, the vessel’s engine emitted
smoke. Tsuneishi paid for the vessel's new engine crankshaft, crankpin, and main bearings. It then
billed MIS US$318,571.50 for its repair and dry docketing services. MIS refused to pay and
demanded that Tsueneishi to pay US$471,462.60 as payment for the income that the vessel lost
in the six months that it was not operational and dry docked at Tsuneishi's shipyard.

Tsuneishi then filed a complaint against MIS before the RTC seeking the issuance of an
order to arrest the vessel and/or writ of preliminary attachment pursuant to Sec. 21 of the Ship
Mortgage Decree and Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary
attachment without hearing.

MIS then filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC’s order.
The CA ruled in favor of MIS on the ground that the evidence on record shows that MIS has
sufficient properties to cover the claim.

ISSUE:
May an application for a writ of attachment be granted without hearing and despite lack of
proof of one of the grounds under Rule 57?

RULING:
No, an application for a writ of attachment cannot be granted without hearing and due to
lack of proof of one of the grounds under Rule 57

The reason why a writ of preliminary attachment is available only in specific cases as
enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 57 is that it entails interfering with property prior to a
determination of actual liability. It is issued with great caution and only when warranted by the
circumstances. Furthermore, jurisprudence has consistently held that a court that issues a writ of
preliminary attachment when the requisites are not present acts in excess of its jurisdiction.

In this case, the record does not state that MIS has no other sufficient security for the claim
sought to be enforced. This is a requirement under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. In
fact, MIS did not act with fraud in refusing to pay the obligation. When fraud is invoked as a ground
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there must
be evidence clearly showing the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud. Fraud cannot be
presumed from a party's mere failure to comply with his or her obligation. Even assuming that MIS
is wrong in refusing to pay Tsuneishi, this is nevertheless not the fraud contemplated in Section 1
(d), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Civil law grants Tsuneishi various remedies in the event that the
trial court rules in its favor such as the payment of the obligation, damages and legal interest. The
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment is not one of those remedies.

Therefore, the application for such injunctive relief cannot be granted.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LEGAL RIGHT AND THE INJURY SUSTAINED BY

THE PLAINTIFF, AN ORDER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION WILL BE NULLIFIED

Bicol Medical Center vs. NoeBotor

G.R. No. 214073, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing CA’s decision in ordering the RTC to
issue the writ of preliminary injunction.

Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital (CSPH) donated 5 hectares of land to DOH. This
included the Training and Teaching Hospital and Road Lot 3. The Training and Teaching Hospital
became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC). BMC constructed a steel gate to control the flow of
vehicle and pedestrian traffic in the hospital premises. The steel gate drew a lot of criticism
prompting the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City to pass a resolution authorizing the mayor
to dismantle the gate. Instead, the Mayor filed a Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against BMC. Intervenors were allowed in this case. The case was
dismissed by RTC. The intervenors filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA granted the same
ruling that the petition for the application of the writ showed, prima facie, the city’s right to such
relief.

Naga City presented the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its
Identification Map which both identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the Province of
Camarines Sur, with witnesses to corroborate the same. CA held that the city was able to prove
the public character of Road Lot No. 3. BMC and DOH filed this petition for review on certiorari to
assail CA’s decision.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in directing the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction based on a tax
map and claims of customary use?

RULING:
Yes, the CA erred in directing the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction.

The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or she
has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which injunction is
directed violate such right; and there is a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by the plaintiff,
an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified.

In this case, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a preliminary injunction is not
proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a
ground for a preliminary injunction. Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc.
explained that a clear legal right which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ
"contemplates a right 'clearly founded in or granted by law.

Therefore, there being doubt in the plaintiff’s right, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction is improper.

| 107
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

APPLICANT TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF MUST SHOW HE HAS A CLEAR LEGAL AND

UNMISTAKABLE RIGHT TO BE PROTECTED

Hon. Mylyn Cayabyab vs. Jaime Dimson

G.R. No. 223862, July 10, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision and resolution
of the CA directing the RTC to issue a TRO against petitioner Mayor Mylyn Cayabyab's Cease and
Desist Order (CDO) and Closure Order to respondent Jaime Dimson's poultry farm.

Respondent applied for a barangay clearance for his poultry farm. However, his application
was refused. The respondent then received a CDO from the office of petitioner directing him to
desist from further conducting any poultry farming. Thereafter, a Closure Order was issued by
petitioner effectively shutting down the poultry farm.

Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition (With Application for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction) and prayed for the issuance of a TRO against petitioners.
Respondent maintained that petitioners grossly abused their discretion when they withheld his
permits, and issued the CDO and Closure Order. On the other hand, petitioners averred, among
others, that the non-issuance of the barangay clearance was based on valid grounds, and that the
issuance of the Orders was justified.

The RTC denied respondent's application for TRO for failure to establish a clear and
unmistakable right to said issuance and to show that he will suffer irreparable injury. The CA
granted the petition and held that respondent was able to establish the concurrence of the
requisites for the issuance of injunctive relief.

ISSUE:
Is the absence of petitioner’s clear and unmistakable right to be protected fatal in
applications for TRO against the implementation of a CDO and Closure order?

RULING:
Yes, the absence of petitioner’s clear and unmistakable right to be protected is fatal in
applications for TRO against the implementation of a CDO and Closure order.

A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies
for the protection of substantive rights and interests. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the
applicant must show that: (a) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) this
right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined; (c) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and (d) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
and irreparable damage.

In this case, in the absence of a business permit, respondent has no clear legal right to
resume his operations pending final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case for
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition. A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law, which is not extant in the present case. It is settled that
the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the
issuance of an injunctive relief.

Therefore, respondent is not entitled to injunctive relief.

108 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TO JUSTIFY THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUCTION,

IT MUST BE SHOWN THAT THE COMPLAINANT HAS A CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT

SM Investments Corporation vs. MAC Graphics Carranz International Corporation

G.R. Nos. 224131-32, June 25, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court are petitions for review on certiorari (Petitions) under Rule 45 assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 22, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 132392
and 132412 and the Resolution dated March 31, 2016. The CA Decision denied the petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner SM Investments Corporation (SMIC) and petitioner
Prime Metroestate, Inc. (PMI) before the CA while the CA Resolution denied their motions for
reconsideration.

Mac Graphics Carranz International Corp., which is engaged in advertising and operation
of billboards, entered into a Contract of Lease with Pilipinas Makro, Inc. (Makro) for exclusive use
of the latter's billboard sites for a period of 20 years. Makro sent a letter to Mac Graphics
terminating the lease contract effective immediately because of the latter's alleged failure to obtain
the relevant Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and local government permits and to
obtain a comprehensive all-risk property insurance for the sites. Makro and SMIC then removed
Mac Graphics' billboards. They also prevented Mac Graphics from entering the leased premises.

Mac Graphics filed an application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injuction before the RTC, praying that they be restored possession and allowed unrestrained use
of the billboard structures. The RTC granted the petition. SMIC and PMI filed their respective Rule
65 Petitions for Certiorari with the CA which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC, stating that the requisites for the issuance of a WPMI have been complied with.

Hence, this petition where PMI argues that the CA erred in granting the injunctive relief
despite the absence of: (a) a right in esse of Mac Graphics that warranted protection; (b) proof of
material and substantial violation of Mac Graphics' right; and (c) grave and irreparable damage
that Mac Graphics would sustain if no such injunctive writ was issued.

ISSUE:
Is possession of a clear legal right a requisite for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction?

RULING:
Yes, a clear legal right is a requisite for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

To justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown that:
(1) the complainant has a clear legal right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the
other party is material and substantial; and (3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right
which is merely contingent and may never arise. To be protected by injunction, the alleged right
must be clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law.

In this case, while the pre-termination of the lease contract is established, the non-
compliance of the licenses/permits and insurance stipulations by Mac Graphics is likewise
undisputed. Given the foregoing, the Court held that Mac Graphics has failed to establish prima
facie a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right, rendering the issuance of the WPMI
improper.

Therefore, Mac Graphics is not entitled to the said writ of preliminary injunction.

| 109
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TO ISSUE AN INJUCTIVE WRIT, THE APPLICANT MUST ESTABLISH HIS OR HER

RIGHT SOUGHT TO BE PROTECTED AND MUST PROVE THAT HE IS THE REAL
PARTY-IN-INTEREST

Power Generation Employees Association-NPC vs. National Power Corp.

G.R. No. 187420, August 8, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to
permanently enjoin the implementation of the Operation and Maintenance Agreement (Agreement)
jointly executed by the respondents National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) and Power Sector
Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM) and to declare the same void. The petitioner, Power
Generation Employees Association-NPC (PGEA-NPC) is composed of the employees of
NAPOCOR.

In the Agreement entered into by NAPOCOR and PSALM, NAPOCOR is to perform “all
functions and services necessary to successfully and efficiently operate, maintain and manage”
the assets and facilities until its transfer or turn over to PSALM. In filing the petition for injunction
with prayer for TRO and/or WPI, PGEA-NPC argue that as employees of NAPOCOR, they will be
affected by the Agreement’s implementation as they are the ones engaged in the operations and
maintenance of the subject assets.

On its part, the OSG, argues that the petitioners are not entitled to injunctive relief for not
being real parties-in-interest and for failure to show that they will suffer grave and irreparable injury
with the Agreement’s implementation. Respondent PSALM contends that since petitioners were
not privy to the Agreement, they have no capacity to assail its validity and that the representatives
of PGEA-NPC were not authorized to file the petition.

ISSUE:
Will an injunctive relief issue in favor of an applicant who is not a real party in interest to
an agreement sought to be restrained?

RULING:
No, an injunctive relief will not issue in favor of an applicant who is not a real party in
interest to an agreement sought to be restrained.

Petitioners, not being privy to the Agreement, have no cause of action against respondents.
They are not the real parties-in-interest to question its validity. Provisional reliefs, such as a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, are ancillary writs issued by the court
to protect the rights of a party during the pendency of the principal action. To issue an injunctive
writ, the applicant must establish his or her right sought to be protected. The action must be
instituted by the real parties-in-interest. Otherwise, the action may be dismissed for lack of cause
of action.

In this case, the petition, however, fails to show how NAPOCOR employees will be affected
by the Agreement's implementation. They have not claimed any right sought to be protected for
any direct injury they will suffer from the remittance of NAPOCOR’s revenue to PSALM. Petitioners
failed to establish how they will benefit by enjoining the implementation of the Agreement. They
did not establish the injury they will suffer if the Agreement is not enjoined.

Therefore, petitioners, not being real-parties-in-interest, are not entitled to injunctive relief.

110 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

AN INJUNCTIVE WRIT IS GRANTED ONLY TO APPLICANTS WITH ACTUAL AND

EXISTING SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AND THAT THE INVASION OF THE RIGHT IS
MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL

Evy Construction and Development Corporation vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corporation
G.R. No. 207938, October 11, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is the petition on review for certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
which found that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it denied Evy Construction’s
application for the issuance of TRO.

Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land in from Linda Ang and Sened Uyan. At the
time of the sale, no lien or encumbrance was annotated on the title, except for a notice of adverse
claim filed by Ang. The Register of Deeds annotated a Notice of Levy on attachment on the title of
such land. This annotation was by virtue of a Preliminary Attachment issued by RTC in a civil case
entitled Valiant Roll Forming Sales Corp. vs. Angeli Lumber and Hardware Inc. and Linda Ngo
Ang. Two other encumbrances were also annotated on the title. RTC rendered a decision in favor
of Valiant. A writ of execution and a Notice of Levy were issued against the real property. Evy
Construction filed a Notice of third-party Claim in the civil case informing the court that it already
filed with the sheriff an affidavit of Title/ownership. By virtue of the writ of execution, the sheriff
issued a notice of sale on execution of real property. A certificate of sale was issued to Valiant as
the winning bidder. Evy construction filed this complaint for Quieting of Title/Removal of Cloud,
Annulment of Execution Sale and Certificate of Sale, and Damages, with application for TRO
and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the Register of Deeds from annotating any further
transactions relating to the civil case.

Petitioner claims that it was denied due process when no valid hearing for the application
for preliminary injunction was set by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Should the application for injunctive relief be granted pending a final determination of a
party’s actual and existing right over the property?

RULING:
No, the injunctive relief shall not be granted, pending a final determination of a party’s
actual and existing right over the property.

An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual and existing substantial rights"
or rights in esse. Further, the applicant must show "that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage." Thus, the writ will not issue to applicants whose rights are merely contingent or to compel
or restrain acts that do not give rise to a cause of action.

In this case, respondent’s attachment liens may have been superior to whatever right
petitioner may have acquired by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale. However, the validity of the
liens and the validity of the deed of absolute sale are factual matter that has yet to be resolved by
the trial court.

Therefore, no injunctive writ could be issued pending a final determination of petitioner’s

actual and existing right over the property. The grant of injunctive writ could operate as a
prejudgment of the sale.

| 111
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, BEING AN EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY,

MUST BE GRANTED ONLY IN THE FACE OF INJURY TO ACTUAL AND EXISTING
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS

Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation vs. Spouses Danilo Cereño and Cerina Cereño
G.R. No. 218236, February 07, 2018
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review assailing CA’s Decision and Resolution affirming the Orders of
the RTC, denying the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction filed by petitioner Sumifru (Philippines) Corporation (Sumifru).

Petitioner Sumifru, entered into several growership agreements with respondent spouses
Danilo and Cerina Cereño (spouses Cereño) covering the latter's titled lands. Under the parties'
agreements, the spouses Cereño were the growers and undertook, among others, to sell and
deliver the bananas produced from the contracted areas exclusively to Sumifru. Such bananas
had to conform to the volume and quality specifications defined by the agreements.

In 2010, Sumifru filed a Complaint against the spouses Cereño, alleging that the spouses
Cereño flagrantly violated their agreements when the spouses Cereño harvested the bananas
without the consent of Sumifru, packed them in boxes not provided by Sumifru, and sold them to
buyers other than Sumifru. Sumifru made several demands upon the spouses Cereño to comply
with their contractual obligations, but they refused to heed the demands.

In the complaint, Sumifru prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction which the RTC
denied, finding that there was no urgency to issue the injunctive reliefs prayed for in order to
prevent injury or irreparable damage to Sumifru pendente lite. Sumifru thus assailed the
interlocutory order denying the application in a petition for certiorari before the CA, which was also
denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Can a court deny a prayer for preliminary injuction if a party failed to show any irreparable
damage that would result to him?

RULING:
Yes, a court can deny a prayer for preliminary injuction if a party failed to show any
irreparable damage that would result to him.

A writ of preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong arm
of equity or a transcendent remedy, must be granted only in the face of injury to actual and existing
substantial rights. A right to be protected by injunction means a right clearly founded on or granted
by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. An injunction is not a remedy to protect or enforce
contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue to protect a right not in esse, and which may
never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action. When the
complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore,
injunction is not proper.

In this case, the RTC found that Sumifru did not establish any clear right to the injunction
as it failed to show any irreparable damages that would result if the Spouses Cereno are enjoined
from continuing with their acts.

Therefore, the injunction was correctly denied.

112 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE DISMISSAL OF AN APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION DOES NOT BIND THE AWARD FOR DAMAGES

Excellent Essentials International Corporation vs. Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 192797, April 18, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA’s Decision, which reversed the
RTC’s, by ordering petitioner to pay respondent damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.

A complaint filed by E. Excel International, Inc. and Excellent Essentials against

respondent for damages and to enjoin the latter from selling, distributing, and marketing E. Excel
products in the Philippines. E. Excel International and respndent entered into an exclusive rights
contract wherein the latter was granted exclusive rights to distribute E. Excel products in the
Philippines. Respondent experienced intra-corporate struggle over the control of the corporation
and the operations of its various exclusive distributors in Asia. The dispute even reached the
Judicial District Court of Utah. Stewart revoked respondent’s exclusive rights contract and
appointed Excellent Essentials as its new exclusive distributor in the Philippines. Despite the
revocation of its exclusive rights contract and the appointment of Excellent Essentials, respondent
continued its operation in violation of the new exclusive distributorship agreement.

With its demand unheeded, E. Excel International and Excellent Essentials filed a
complaint for injunction and damages against respondents. The CA's decision with regard the
dismissal of the injunction became final and executory. Petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration anymore and filed the present petition before this Court.

ISSUE:
Is a ruling dismissing the preliminary injunction conclusively binding with regard to the
award for damages in the instant case?

RULING:
No, a ruling dismissing the preliminary injunction conclusively is not binding with regard to
the award for damages in the instant case.

The writ of preliminary injunction is temporary until the main case is resolved on the merits,
the evidence submitted during the hearing on the preliminary injunction is not conclusive; for only
a "sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the justification for its issuance pending the
decision of the case on the merits. The CA's findings, despite being final and executory, were
clearly limited to the issuance of an injunctive relief pending the final resolution of the main case.

In this case, the resolution of the issue as to the existence or non-existence of an injury to
Excel Philippines was determined only to preserve the status quo between the parties and not to
prejudge the outcome of the claim for damages. Accordingly, we must remember that the sole
object of a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status
quo and prevent further injury on the applicant until the merits of the main case can be heard. A
litigant for the preservation and protection of his rights or interests may only resort to the injunctive
writ during the pendency of the principal action. Here, Excellent Essentials persuades us that the
issues resolved during the preliminary injunction proceedings should simply carry over in the
resolution of main case.

Therefore, since it would appear that Excellent Essentials' continued operations have no
effect at all on Excel Philippines, there is no injury to speak of when it comes to awarding damages
in favor of the latter.

| 113
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DETERMINATION OF ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP IN A REPLEVIN SUIT IS MERELY

PROVISIONAL

Demosthenes Arbilon vs. Sofronio Manlangit

G.R. No. 197920, January 22, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the CA decision which
reversed and set aside the RTC decision dismissing the case filed by respondent Sofronio
Manlangit (Manlangit) and ordering the return of the possession of the Atlas Copco Compressor
to the petitioner Demosthenes Arbilon.

This case stemmed from a complaint for recovery of possession of personal properties
with Writ of Replevin and/or sum of money. In his complaint, respondent alleged that he purchased
on credit one (1) compressor and one (1) unit of Stainless Pump, three (3) horsepower, single
phase for P200,000.00 and P65,000.00, respectively, from Davao Diamond Industrial Supply
(Davao Diamond). Respondent claimed that the compressor had been in the possession of
petitioner from November 1997 up to the time of the filing of the complaint, and that despite
demand, petitioner failed to return the same to respondent.

Petitioner alleged that the ownership of the compressor was never vested to respondent
since the latter failed to pay the purchase price of P200,000.00. During the trial, respondent alleged
that he was once a financier and operator of a gold mine in Davao del Norte but when he ran out
of funds, petitioner and Major Efren Alcuizar (Alcuizar) took over the mining operations. When
petitioner and Alcuizar also ran out of funds, Lucia Sanchez Leanillo (Leanillo) became the
financier of the mining operations.

ISSUE:
Can the court adjudicate with finality questions of ownership in an action for recovery of
possession?

RULING:
No, the court cannot adjudicate with finality questions of ownership in an action for recovery
of possession.

While the Court may pass upon the issue of ownership, the same is limited to the
determination of who between the parties has a better right to possess the property. This
adjudication, however, is not a final and binding determination on the issue of ownership. Since
the determination of ownership is merely provisional, the same is not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property.

In this case, it was found out that Leanillo paid the compressor in behalf of respondent.
The latter has therefore complied with his obligation to fully pay the compressor. Ownership of the
compressor can now legally pass to respondent. As such, the latter has the right to possess the
compressor since possession is an attribute of ownership.

Therefore, the CA did commit error when it ruled that respondent is the owner of the
compressor when it is merely an action for recovery of possession.

114 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHEN AN APPEAL IS AVAILABLE, CERTIORARI WILL NOT PROSPER ESPECIALLY IF

THE APPEAL WAS LOST BECAUSE OF ONE'S OWN NEGLIGENCE OR ERROR IN THE
CHOICE OF REMEDY

Bureau of Internal Revenue vs. Hon. Ernesto Acosta, et. al.

G.R. No. 195320, April 23, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition on Certiorari assailing the resolution promulgated the CTA – Special First
Division (CTA First Division) which considered the motion for reconsideration (MR) filed by the BIR
a mere scrap of paper.

Chevron Phil. Inc. (Chevron) filed a claim for refund or credit with the BIR; however, the
BIR did not act on the former’s claim. Chevron then elevated the case to the CTA First Division
via a Petition for Review. The latter party granted the petition. The BIR thereafter moved for
reconsideration.

Chevron filed its opposition to the motion for reconsideration asserting that it was a pro
forma motion because the BIR failed to set the motion for hearing. Chevron further maintained that
non-compliance with the notice of hearing requirement was a fatal defect. The CTA First Division
denied the MR of the BIR. The BIR filed again another MR which was again denied by the CTA
First Division with finality. For failure to appeal to the CTA En Banc, the CTA First Division informed
the BIR that it has entered judgement against it.

The BIR then filed a Motion to Lift Entry of Judgment before the CTA First Division on the
ground that it intended to exhaust the remedy of filing a Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court under Rule 65

ISSUE:
Is a special civil action for certiorari available as a remedy without first elevating the matter
to CTA en banc via an appeal?

RULING:
No, special civil action for certiorari is not available as a remedy when appeal exists.

The remedy against a final judgement or order is an appeal. A writ of certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal. When an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper especially if the
appeal was lost because of one's own negligence or error in the choice of remedy, even if the
ground is grave abuse of discretion.

In this case, the resolution in favour of Chevron is a final judgement. After the BIR's Motion
for Reconsideration on the Decision for allowing refund which the CTA First Division denied, the
BIR again filed a motion for the reconsideration of this resolution. The CTA First Division denied
the second MR and resolved with finality the case in favour of Chevron. Clearly, the CTA First
Division disposed of the case in its entirety and no other issues were left to further rule upon.
Therefore, the appropriate remedy to challenge the Resolution is an ordinary appeal, not a petition
for certiorari. BIR had every opportunity to elevate the matter to the CTA En Banc but chose not
to avail itself of this remedy.

Therefore, a petition for certiorari is not an available remedy to the BIR in the case at bar.

| 115
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

LIBERAL APPLICATION OF RULE 65 AS THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE SO REQUIRES

Career Executive Service Board vs. Civil Service Commission

G.R. No. 196890, January 11, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to declare null and
void the CSC decision which declared null and void the Memorandum issued by Chairman
Abesamis of the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

Blesilda Lodevico (Lodevico) was appointed as Director III, Recruitment and Career
Development Service, CESB. She possesses a Career Service Executive Eligibility. On June 30,
2010, the Office of the President (OP) issued a memorandum circular declaring all non-CESO
positions vacant. Chariman Abesamis, pursuant to this, issued a memorandum which informed
Lodevico that she shall remain in office until July 31, 2010. Lodevico appealed to the CSC, which
declared null and void the termination of her services. CSC rules that CESB Chairman Abesamis
has no power to terminate Lodevico.

ISSUE:
Is the requirement that there exists no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law absolute in petitions for certiorari?

RULING:
Yes, the requirement that there exists no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law is not absolute in petitions for certiorari.

It is well-settled that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition are resorted to
only where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. However, the SC ruled that the rules of procedure should give way to strong
considerations of substantive justice. Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be
entertained if it will obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the
prevailing circumstances of the case under consideration.

In this case, it is clear that the second requirement is absent as petition for review under
Section 1 of Rule 43 is available to petitioners. However, there are exceptions to the
aforementioned rule, namely: "(a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy
dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and
(d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority."

Therefore, considering the foregoing and the circumstances obtaining in this case, SC
allowed the application of liberality of the rules of procedure to give due course to the petition filed
by petitioners as the broader interest of justice so requires.

116 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS A

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION THAT MAY BE RESORTED TO ONLY IN THE ABSENCE OF
APPEAL OR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY
COURSE OF LAW

National Power Corporation vs. The Court of Appeals, Hon. Jose D. Azarraga
and Atty. Rex C. Muzones
G.R. No. 206167, March 19, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in dismissing the petition filed by National Power Corporation (NPC) for being filed out of time.

Spouses Romulo and Elena Javellana (Spouses Javellana) filed a case for the collection
of a sum of money and damages against NPC and National Transmission Corporation (Transco).
The RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Javellana. Pending appeal, Transco negotiated with
Spouses Javellana for the extra-judicial settlement of the case. Thereafter, Atty. Rex C. Muzones
(Atty. Muzones), the counsel of the Spouses Javellana, filed a Notice of Attorney's lien. Transco
then filed a Motion to Dismiss in view of the extra-judicial settlement of the case.

Thereafter, the respondent judge ordered NPC and Transco to pay Atty. Muzones the
amount of P52,469,660.00 as his attorney's lien, stating that such is separate and distinct from the
amount to be paid to the Spouses Javellana. Transco filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
orders, while NPC filed its comment to the Clarificatory Order. The respondent judge denied the
motion for reconsideration. NPC then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated August
6, 2008. The respondent judge however denied the same in his Order dated September 22, 2008.
Aggrieved, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment
on the ground of error of judgement?

RULING:
No, petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of
judgment on the ground of error of judgement.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that
may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law." In the instant case, NPC has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
appeal the CA decision, which is to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order, or resolution
is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse
of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution. The
existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the latter remedy is that there should be no appeal.

Therefore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of
judgment on the ground of error of judgement.

| 117
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION MUST BE DEMONSTRATED WITH DEFINITENESS FOR

CERTIORARI TO PROSPER

Polytechnic University of the Philippines vs. National Development Company

G.R. No. 213039, November 27, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of CA
Resolution dismissing PUP’s petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.

In 1977, NDC leased a portion of the NDC compound in Sta. Mesa to Golden Horizon
Realty Corp. (GHRC). In 1989, President Aquino issued a Memorandum ordering the transfer of
the whole NDC Compound to the National Government which in turn would be turned over to PUP
at acquisition cost. In 2004, the RTC rendered a decision sustaining GHRC’s right to purchase the
leased areas. However, on Sept. 5, 2011, RTC ordered that PUP is entitled to the purchase price.
But in February 2, 2012, RTC issued another order modifying the previous order due to the finding
that the subject properties were not conveyed to PUP.

Aggrieved, PUP filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65, which the CA
dismissed.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court required to
demonstrate with definiteness the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the board, body or
tribunal?

RULING:
Yes, the petitioner in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is required
to demonstrate with definiteness the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the board, body or
tribunal.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a special civil action confined solely to questions
of jurisdiction because a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.

In the instant petition, nowhere does it show that the issuance of the disputed Decision
dated February 19, 2014 of the appellate court was patently erroneous and gross that would
warrant striking it down. In its assailed Decision, the appellate court pointed out that when the RTC
rendered the questioned February 2, 2012 resolution, it laid out the premises for modifying the
September 5, 2011 order. It merely sought to give resolution on the seemingly impossibility of
complying with the Court's order of reconveyance considering that the subject property was not
under PUP's name.

Therefore, the CA correctly found that no grave abuse of discretion attended the RTC's
issuance of the Resolution as the same merely clarified what was seemingly confusing in the
decision of the RTC.

118 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WRIT OF CERTIORARI MAY BE ISSUED ONLY FOR THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF

JURISDICTION OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION

Agnes Coeli Bugaoisan vs. Owi Group Manila

G.R. No. 226208, February 7, 2018
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to partially annul, reverse,
and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the CA which modified the Decision of the NLRC and
denied petitioner Agnes Coeli Bugaoisan's (Agnes) partial motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner was employed as a chef in Australia through her agent, respondent OWI
Group Manila, Inc. (OWI). Due to the extensive work that was given to her, she suffered from
Bilateral CTS and was declared unfit to work for several days. She was also advised to undergo
surgery. Petitioner filed a compensation claim with the Worker's Compensation and Injury
Management of Australia to seek compensation for her wages while she was still unfit for work or
reimbursement of her medical expenses, but her application was denied.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that the petitioner was illegally dismissed from employment.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the findings of the LA. Aggrieved, respondents filed with the CA
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the NLRC's decision and resolution, with prayer
for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The CA then
issued its assailed Decision partially granting the petition, modifying the factual findings of the
NLRC. The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Can the court go beyond the issues of the case and the assigned errors in
a certiorari petition under Rule 65?

RULING:
No, the court cannot go beyond the issues of the case and the assigned errors in
a certiorari petition under Rule 65.

A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It cannot be used for any other
purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction.
The supervisory jurisdiction of the CA under Rule 65 is confined only to the determination of
whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the issues brought
before it on appeal.

In this case, without an iota of doubt, the CA decided questions of fact which were outside
the scope of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The CA is only tasked to determine whether or
not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in its appreciation of factual issues presented
before it by any parties. The CA is not given unbridled discretion to modify factual findings of the
NLRC and the LA, especially when such matters have not been assigned as errors nor raised in
the pleadings of the respondents.

Therefore, a writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

| 119
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI CANNOT BE USED TO RAISE ERRORS OF JUDGEMENT

TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division)

and Camilo Loyola Sabio,
G.R. Nos. 228494-96, March 21, 2018.
Reyes Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Decision of the Sandiganbayan
acquitting private respondent Camilo Loyola Sabio (Sabio),

Sabio, the then Chairperson of the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG) with Salary Grade 30, was charged before the Sandiganbayan with (a) one count for
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act; and (b) two counts for Malversation of Public Funds as defined and
penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. After trial ensued and on the basis of
insufficiency of the evidence engendering reasonable doubt, the Sandiganbayan acquitted Sabio
from the all the charges against him. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was
denied on the ground of the right of Sabio against double jeopardy.

Aggrieved, the People filed this petition for certiorari claiming that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or in excess of its jurisdiction when it
capriciously and wantonly ruled against the evidence presented by the prosecution.

ISSUE:
Did the Sandiganbayan capriciously and wantonly rule against the evidence of the
prosecution as to amount to grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:
No, the People is correct in that the prosecution cannot appeal an acquittal without violating
the prohibition against double jeopardy and that the rule admits two extraordinary exceptions
where acquittal can be challenged in a certiorari proceeding under Rule 65: (1) if the judgment of
acquittal was rendered with grave abuse of discretion by the court; if (2) where the prosecution
had been deprived of due process.

An action for certiorari does not correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdiction.
The nature of a Rule 65 petition does not entail a review of facts and law on the merits in the
manner done in an appeal. Misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based
on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse
of discretion. Even granting that the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to grave abuse of discretion.

A cursory reading of the present petition for certiorari demonstrates however shows that it
raises errors of judgement and asks the court a prodding to review the judgment of acquittal
rendered by the Sandiganbayan on account of grave abuse of discretion. However, though
enveloped on a pretext of grave abuse, the petition in actuality aims to overturn the decision of
Sandiganbayan due to perceived mistake in the appreciation of facts and evidence.

Therefore, a petition for certiorari cannot be used to raised errors of judgement to

circumvent the prohibition against double jeopardy.

120 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AGAINST THE BANGKO SENTRAL AND THE

MONETARY BOARD AS A QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCY ARE COGNIZABLE ONLY BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS, UNLESS OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND THE RULES
OF COURT

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
and the Monetary Board
G.R. No. 200678, June 04, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, appealing the CA’s decision and resolution ruling
that the trial court has no jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 against the Bangko
Sentral (BSP) and the Monetary Board (MB).

In 1991 Decision, the SC directed the Central Bank (replaced by the BSP pursuant to R.A.
No. 7653) and the MB to reorganize Banco Filipino and to allow it to resume business under their
control. However, due to heavy withdrawals, Banco Filipino sought BSP’s financial assistance. The
request for financial assistance was later granted but such was subject to certain conditions,
among which was the withdrawal or dismissal with prejudice to all pending cases filed by Banco
Filipino against BSP and its officials. Banco Filipino thus filed before the RTC a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for issuance of TRO assailing the acts and orders of the BSP and MB. It
alleged that the imposition of the condition was unconstitutional and contrary to public policy. On
the other hand, the BSP and MB filed their Motion to Dismiss, assailing the RTC’s jurisdiction. The
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss stating that the acts complained of pertained to BSP's regulatory
functions, not its adjudicatory functions.

This prompted the BSP and MB to file a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA granted
the petition and enjoined the RTC from proceeding with the original petition. According to the CA,
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus filed by Banco Filipino
since special civil actions against quasi-judicial agencies are only cognizable by the CA.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over petitions for Certiorari against quasi-judicial agencies
like the BSP and the MB?

RULING:
No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the petitions for Certiorari filed against quasi-judicial
agencies like the BSP and the MB.

Section 4 of Rule 65 categorically provides that petitions for certiorari involving acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency "shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.”
Unless otherwise provided for by law and the Rules of Court, petitions for certiorari against a quasi-
judicial agency are cognizable only by the CA.

The BSP is constituted as an independent central monetary authority. In addition, to its

administrative functions, it is vested with quasi-judicial powers, which it exercises through the MB.
Hence, any action filed against the MB is an action against a quasi-judicial agency, and any special
civil actions against quasi-judicial agencies must be filed with the CA.

Therefore, petitions for certiorari against the Bangko Sentral and the Monetary Board as a
quasi-judicial agency are cognizable only by the court of appeals, unless otherwise provided for
by law and the Rules of Court.

| 121
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS ONLY A NOMINAL PARTY AND SHOULD NOT TAKE AN

ACTIVE PART IN THE PROCEEDING

National Electrification Administration vs. Maguindanao Electric Cooperative, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 192595-96, April 11, 2018
Jardeleza, J.

FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the decision of the CA which
found that the National Electrification Administration issued two letter-directives in grave abuse of
discretion.

In 2008, NEA issued two letter-directives. The first letter directive approved the cancellation
of memorandum of agreement and transition plan executed by and between MAGELCO Main and
MAGELCO-PALMA. Meanwhile, the second letter directive declared that the PPALMA Area is
under the coverage of COTELCO and not MAGELCO-PALMA and ordered MAGELCO-PALMA's
depository banks to disburse funds from MAGELCO-PALMA's bank accounts solely to COTELCO
for the necessary and incidental expenses of the operation in the PPALMA Area.

MAGELCO-PALMA filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition which challenged the NEA's
two letter-directives on the ground that they were issued in grave abuse of discretion. The petition
was granted by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. As a result, NEA appealed the decision of the
CA.

ISSUE:
Can a quasi-judicial agency file an appeal of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 which
challenges CA’s official acts?

RULING:
No, NEA has no standing to file a petition for review on certiorari of a CA case nullifying its
decision for grave abuse of discretion under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Section 5 of Rule 65 provides that: “if the case is elevated to a higher court by either party,
the public respondents shall be included therein as nominal parties.” However, unless otherwise
specifically directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings therein. In
Barillo v. Lantion, the Court held that when the official act of a public respondent is challenged
through a special civil action for certiorari and the judgment therein is eventually elevated to a
higher court, the public respondent remains a nominal party. This means that the public respondent
has no personal interest in the case. The public respondent "should maintain a detached attitude
from the case and should not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding which relates
to official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his principal task of hearing and
adjudicating the cases in his court. The “public respondent” refers to any "judge, court, quasi-
judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person."

In this case, the NEA is a quasi-judicial agency. The doctrine enunciated above applies to
a public respondent quasi-judicial agency which files before this Court an appeal of a finding in a
special civil action for certiorari that it acted with grave abuse of discretion.

Therefore, NEA has no standing to file its petition for review on certiorari before this Court.
Hence, it is as if no such petition was filed.

122 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ABUSE OF DISCRETION MUST BE GRAVE FOR CERTIORARI TO LIE

Ma. Sugar M. Mercado vs. Hon. Joel Socrates S. Lopena

G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Petition), invoking the power of the Court "to promulgate rules concerning protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, to declare the cases filed by private respondents against
petitioners as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP)."

The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses petitioner
Mercado and private respondent Kristofer Go. The dispute led to the filing of numerous suits by
both parties against each other. Respondent Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Custody
of their children. Petitioner avers that the cases filed by private respondent Go are forms of SLAPP
intended to harass, intimidate, and silence them. In this regard, petitioners claim that public
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
taking cognizance of the subject cases even though petitioner Mercado is a "judicially declared
victim of domestic violence" and in whose favor a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) has been
issued.

ISSUE:
In petitions for certiorari, is it important to show that the subject cases fall outside of the
respective jurisdictions of public respondents?

RULING:
Yes, in petitions for certiorari, it is important to show that the subject cases fall outside of
the respective jurisdictions of public respondents.

The writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary remedies that may
be availed of when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.

In this case, petitioners failed to demonstrate that the subject cases fell outside of the
respective jurisdictions of public respondents; there was no showing that the subject matters of the
said cases were not properly cognizable by the offices of public respondents. While the PPO
indeed enjoins private respondent Go from committing acts amounting to physical, psychological,
and emotional abuse, and from harassing, annoying, contacting, or communicating with petitioner
Mercado, such directive can hardly be construed to extend to public respondents in their act of
dispensing the functions of their office. There is absolutely nothing that precludes public
respondents from exercising their respective jurisdictions over the complaints or cases filed before
them; anything less would be tantamount to an abdication of their public offices.

Therefore, the public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance of the case.

| 123
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 WILL ONLY PROSPER IF GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IS ALLEGED AND PROVED TO EXIST

Republic of the Philippines vs. Florie Grace Cote

G.R. No. 212860, March 14, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the CA in applying the procedural rules in a proceeding for recognition of foreign decree
of divorce.

At the time of their marriage, Rhomel Cote and respondent Florie Grace Cote were both
Filipinos. Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit of Hawaii
which was granted. Florie commenced a petition for recognition of foreign judgment granting the
divorce before the RTC. RTC granted the petition and declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry
and held that Rhomel was already an American citizen when he obtained the divorce decree.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the RTC, believing that the petition was covered by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal because
the notice was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner then filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion. CA denied the
petition.

ISSUE:
Is a trial court’s denial of an appeal by applying A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, requiring a notice
of appeal to be preceded by a motion for reconsideration, tantamount to grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:
No, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying said appeal.

Although the Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC erroneously misapplied A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, such error does not automatically equate to grave abuse of discretion. The Court
has ruled time and again that not all errors attributed to a lower court or tribunal fall under the
scope of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.

In this case, after a careful consideration of the evidence presented and Florie having
sufficiently complied with the jurisdictional requirements, judgment was rendered by the lower court
recognizing the decree of foreign divorce. The CA is correct in denying the Rule 65 petition for
certiorari, notwithstanding the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's appeal.

Therefore, the dismissal, albeit erroneous, is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

124 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

REMEDIES OF APPEAL (INCLUDING PETITIONS FOR REVIEW) AND CERTIORARI ARE

MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, NOT ALTERNATIVE OR SUCCESSIVE

GSIS Board of Trustees vs. Former Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde

G.R. No. 230953, June 20, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Ret. Judge Ma. Lorna P. Demonteverde served in the government for 32 years, and in the
judiciary for 16 years. Demonteverde filed with the Supreme Court and GSIS a retirement
application for her service in the Judiciary and outside of the Judiciary, respectively. Both GSIS
and the SC, through the Office of the Court Administrator and the GSIS Board of Trustees (GSIS
BOT) agreed that she was entitled to a retirement benefits under RA No. 910, as amended, the
law on retirement benefits for Judges and Justices applicable to her when she joined the Judiciary.

GSIS BOT rendered a decision granting her petition. Demonteverde then filed a Motion for
Execution, which she later on withdrew because she questioned the accrual date of her retirement
benefits arguing that the date of her retirement should be the date when she reached 60 years of
age, even when she was still in the active government at that time, and not on the date of her
actual retirement. The GSIS BOT denied her motion to withdraw the motion for execution for being
filed out of time. She then filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, and Prohibition under Rule 65
with the Court of Appeals, but it was dismissed on the ground that the proper mode of appeal is a
petition for review under Rule 43. However, the CA reversed itself upon Demonteverde’s motion
for reconsideration, arguing that her case can be considered as an exception to the rule for
considerations of public policy.

ISSUE:
Can a party substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for the remedy of appeal?

RULING:
No, a party cannot substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court for the remedy of appeal.

Remedies of appeal (including petitions for review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive,
not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or
lapse. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave
abuse of discretion.

In this case, Demonteverde’s claim of public policy as a justification of her inability to

comply with the general rule on appeal is unacceptable in the absence of legal and factual bases
of its invocation.

Therefore, the CA erred in reinstating the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 when appeal
via Petition for Review under Rule 43 is available.

| 125
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FOR A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO PROSPER, THERE MUST BE NO APPEAL, NOR

ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY

Gov. Aurora E. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission, et. al.

G.R. No. 180845, November 22, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
In this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision CA Decision and
Resolution dated November 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals - Twenty First Division (CA).

R.A. No. 8973 entitled "An Act creating the Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur and for other purposes" was passed. As a result, the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA) of the province of Zamboanga del Sur was reduced by 36%. Because of
such reduction, petitioner Gov. Cerilles, sought the opinion of CSC on the possibility of reducing
the workforce of the provincial government. The public respondent issued an opinion that in the
event reorganization is carried out in that province, the same must be authorized by appropriate
Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) resolution. Subsequently, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Zamboanga del Sur passed Resolution approving the new staffing pattern of the provincial
government. Petitioner appointed employees to the new positions in the provincial government.
The private respondents were among those who were occupying permanent positions and have
been in the service for a long time but were not given placement preference.

Private respondents brought the matter to CSC regional office who ruled that the subject
appointments violated Republic Act No. (RA) 66567 for allegedly failing to grant preference in
appointment and invalidating some appointments already made. Gov. Cerilles claimed that it was
not within the prerogative of the CSCRO to revoke an appointment as the same was within her
exclusive discretion, so he appealed with CSC who dismissed the appeal and subsequent motion
for reconsiderations. Cerilles elevated the matter to the CA through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 that the CSC committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the invalidation of the
subject appointments.

ISSUE:
Is a petition under Rule 65 available when an appeal, plain, speedy and adequate remedy
exists?

RULING:
No, petitioner may not avail of the remedy under Rule 65 to assail the decision affirming
the invalidation of the subject appointments.

It is well-established that as a condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari, there must
be no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law.

In this case, the CA correctly observed that a Rule 43 petition for review was then an
available mode of appeal from the above CSC resolutions. Rule 43, which specifically applies to
resolutions issued by the CSC. The Court thus finds Governor Cerilles' failure to abide by the
elementary requirements of the Rules inexcusable. That she repeatedly invoked "grave abuse of
discretion" on the part of the CSC was of no moment; the records failed to demonstrate how an
appeal to the CA via Rule 43 was not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy as would allow a
relaxation of the rules of procedure.

Therefore, the petitioner may not avail of the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 as a Rule
43 petition for review was then an available mode of appeal.

126 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOTION FOR EXTENSION ALLOWED IN PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE

65 SUBJECT TO THE COURT'S SOUND DISCRETION AND ONLY UNDER EXCEPTIONAL
OR MERITORIOUS CASES

Adtel, Inc. vs. Marijoy Valdez

G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the resolutions of the CA.

Petitioner Adtel Inc. (Adtel) hired respondent, Valdez, to work as accountant for them.
Thereafter, Valdez filed a civil and criminal case for libel against petitioner and its officers,
respectively. Adtel terminated her from the company. Valdez filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the LA.

Adtel filed a MR which was denied by the NLRC on 24 December 2008. Adtel received the
NLRC Resolution on 5 February 2009. On 7 April 2009, the last day for filing its petition for certiorari
with the CA, Adtel filed a motion for extension of time with the CA. On 22 April 2009, fifteen (15)
days after the last day for filing Adtel filed its petition for certiorari with the CA.

The CA ruled that Adtel had until 7 April 2009 to file its petition for certiorari. Instead of
filing the petition for certiorari, Adtel filed a motion for extension of time on 7 April 2009 on the
ground of heavy workload and subsequently filed its petition for certiorari on 22 April 2009, the last
day of the extended period prayed for by Adtel. The CA held that the reglementary period to file a
petition for certiorari can no longer be extended.

ISSUE:
Can the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari be extended?

RULING:
Yes, the reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari be extended subject to court’s
sound discretion and only under exceptional or meritorious cases.

A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was timely
filed, the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration must be made not later than sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of the
motion. In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that following A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from the notice of judgment
or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. Likewise, in Mid-Islands Power Generation
v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a motion for extension was allowed in petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 subject to the Court's sound discretion and only under exceptional or meritorious
cases.

In this case, heavy workload, which is relative and often self-serving, ought to be coupled
with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be
substantiated by affidavits of merit.

Therefore, standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-
day rule.

| 127
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE 65 ARE CONFINED TO QUESTIONS OF

WHETHER JUDGMENT IS VOID ON JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

People of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan and Juan Roberto L. Abling

G.R. No. 198119, September 27, 2017
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner People assails
the decision of public respondent Sandiganbayan acquitting private respondent Juan Roberto L.
Abling (Abling) of the crime of malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Abling was the Executive Director of the Economic Support Fund Secretariat (ESFS). In
January 1986, ESFS issued 5 disbursement vouchers claimed to be “for the payment of
miscellaneous expenses as per instruction of President Marcos,” all amounting to P35 million. In
February 1986, after the EDSA People Power Revolution took place, COA Commissioner
Guingona authorized the audit of certain confidential funds, including that of the ESFS. Based on
the audit, it appeared that only P13 million out of the said amount was returned. The COA required
Abling to liquidate the balance but the latter failed to do so. Thus, an information was filed against
Abling for malversation of public funds. During trial, Abling testified that the balance of P22 million
was delivered by him to then President Marcos. His testimony was supported by multiple
memoranda where the word “Approved” appeared, written by President Marcos. Sandiganbayan
held that Abling successfully controverted the presumption of misappropriation by such testimony
presented, and thereby acquitted the latter.

The People contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when
they accepted the defense of Abling, arguing that Abling’s testimony was insufficient to overturn
the legal presumption of malversation.

ISSUE:
Did the Sandiganbayan act with grave abuse of discretion such as to warrant the reversal
of the acquittal?

RULING:
No, the Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Judicial review in certiorari proceedings shall be confined to the question of whether the
judgment for acquittal is per se void on jurisdictional grounds. The Court will look into the decision's
validity if it was rendered by a court without jurisdiction or if the court acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not on its legal correctness. The petitioner
must show that the prosecution's right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was
a sham.

In this case, even if the court a quo committed an error in its review of the evidence or
application of the law, these are merely errors of judgment. The extraordinary writ of certiorari may
only correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For as long as the court acted within its jurisdiction, an error of
judgment that it may commit in the exercise thereof is not correctable through the special civil
action of certiorari.

Therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not act with grave abuse of discretion such as to warrant
the reversal of the acquittal.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WITHOUT GRAVE ABUSE IN THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, THE PRESIDENT’S

DECISION ON A POLITICAL QUESTION IS OUTSIDE THE AMBIT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Saturnino C. Ocampo et. al., vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez (in his capacity as the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of The Philippines
G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, assailing decision of the
Court, which dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal remains of
Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos), former President of the Republic of the Philippines, at the Libingan
ng mga Bayani (LNMB).

On November 8, 2016, the Court dismissed the petitions challenging the intended burial of
the mortal remains of Marcos at the LNMB. As the Filipino public witnessed through the broadcast
media and as the Office of the Solicitor General manifested based on the letter sent by the
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office of the Department of National Defense, Marcos was finally laid
to rest at the LNMB around noontime of November 18, 2016, which was 10 days after the
promulgation of the judgment and prior to the filing of petitioners' separate motions for
reconsideration.

Lagman et al. contend that the right of a party to file a Motion for Reconsideration is
impaired and that due process is derailed if a decision that is not yet final and executory is
implemented.

ISSUE:
Is the president’s exercise of discretion without grave abuse reviewable by the courts?

RULING:
No, the president’s exercise of discretion without grave abuse is not reviewable by the
courts.

As they are concerned with questions of policy and issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure, political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial
review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by Section 1 of
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it vested in the judiciary the power to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

In this case, the Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military
shrine purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall
promote national healing and forgiveness.

Therefore, there being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, President
Duterte's decision on that political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THERE ARE FEW SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTIONS WHEN THE EXTRAORDINARY

REMEDY OF CERTIORARI MAY BE RESORTED TO DESPITE THE AVAILABILITY OF AN
APPEAL

Privatization and Management Office (PMO) vs. Edgardo vs. Quesada

G.R. No. 224507, September 20, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
giving due course to the petition for certiorari of Quesadas inspite the availability of appeal.

Respondents Edgardo Quesada et. al. are owners of a parcel of land in Quezon City. The
original copy of the TCT on file with the Register of Deeds was destroyed by fire. The owner’s copy
is in possession of petitioner PMO. Quesada alleged that whatever obligation they had had already
been extinguished by prescription, among others. They demanded from PMO the delivery of the
owner’s copy but the same remained unheeded. Thus, prompting then to file a Petition to
Surrender the Withheld Duplicate Certificates pursuant to Section 107 of PD 1529. PMO, through
the OSG filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of, among others, lack of jurisdiction. The same
was granted. Quesada filed a petition for certiorari with the CA seeking to reverse the decision of
the RTC, the same was granted by the CA assailing that RTC has jurisdiction over the petition to
surrender title for being a land registration court.

PMO filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the propriety of the remedy used by
Quesadas. The CA ruled by denying the same and treating the petition as an ordinary appeal, and
invoking the liberal spirit of the rules and substantial justice to justify the grant of the petition for
certiorari. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed.

ISSUE:
Does the CA have the authority to treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as an appeal?

RULING:
Yes, the CA has the authority to treat a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as an appeal.

In the case of China Banking Corp v. Cebu Printing and Packaging Corp., the court has
treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari and allowed resort to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari despite availability of an appeal: (1) if the petition for certiorari
was filed within the reglementary period to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
Likewise in the case of LBP v. CA, the court resorted to a liberal treatment of the wrong mode of
appeal “where the exigencies of the case are such that the ordinary methods of appeal may not
prove adequate either in point of promptness or completeness so that a partial or total failure of
justice may result, a [certiorari] writ may issue.”

Also in the case of Leyte IV Electric Cooperative Inc v. LEYECO IV Employees Union-ALU,
the Court ruled that there are few significant exceptions when the extraordinary remedy of certiorari
may be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal namely: (a) when public welfare and the
advancement of public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when
the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority.

Therefore, the Court ruled that there was sufficient justification for the CA to deviate from
the strict rule of procedure.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH PROCEDURAL RULES

CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS

Marvin Cruz and Francisco Cruz, in his capacity as Bondsman vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 224974, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari of petitioners for being the wrong remedy.

An information against Marvin Cruz and 7 others was filed in the RTC charging them of
Robbery in an Uninhabited Place and by a Band. Cruz posted bail through a cash bond.
Afterwards, private complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance due to lack of interest in pursuing
the case. As a result, Asst. Prosecutor Tan filed a Motion to Dismiss, which was granted by the
RTC. Cruz, through his bondsman Francisco Cruz filed a Motion to Release Cash Bond. RTC
denied the motion on the ground that the case was dismissed through desistance and not acquittal.
The MR was likewise denied. Thereafter, the Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA
arguing that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the Motion to Release Cash
Bond. CA dismissed the petition on the ground that the proper remedy was an appeal.

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of a petition in blatant disregard of the law within the ambit of a petition for
certiorari?

RULING:
Yes, the dismissal of a petition in blatant disregard of the law is within the ambit of a petition
for certiorari.

Non-compliance with the Rules of Court constitutes grave abuse of discretion. In Crisologo
v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation, the SC held that “manifest disregard of the basic rules and
procedures constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.” When a court renders a decision tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, the proper remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. The Court likewise added, in Belfast Surety and Insurance Company Inc. v. People,
it ruled that while appeal is the proper remedy from judgment of forfeiture of a bond, certiorari is
still available if the judgment complained of was issued in lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the case
of Bahasa v. Lineharger, the SC ruled that a party may file a petition for certiorari in instances
where the lower court commits grave abuse of discretion in excess of its jurisdiction.

In this case, the law is clear, in Rule 114, Section 22, that bail shall be deemed
automatically cancelled in 3 instances: (1) acquittal, (2) dismissal of the case, and (3) execution of
judgment of conviction. SC ruled that the blatant disregard of Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of
Court constituted grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, the filing of the petition for certiorari with
the proper court was a proper remedy.

Therefore, the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari, as it is the proper remedy
for correcting a decision tainted with grave abuse of discretion by a lower court or tribunal.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE FILING OF A PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI

Bureau of Customs vs. Hon. Paulino Q. Gallegos

G.R. No. 220832, February 28, 2018
Tijam,J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari filed by Petitioner Bureau of Customs which seeks to assails
the Omnibus Order and injunctive writ issued by RTC Manila City in favor of private respondent
Joint Venture of Omniprime Enterprises and Intrasoft International.

Private Respondents is the highest bidder in the second phase Philippine’s National Single
Window Project. However, BOC Commissioner Lina requested for the discontinuance of the
procurement process of the PNSW 2 project. Hence, Director Syquia issued Notice of Cancellation,
aborting the bidding process for the project. This prompted the private respondent to file a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with a prayer for issuance of TRO and Writ of Injuction before RTC
Manila City.

As opposition to the issuance of the Omnibus order and injunctive writ in favor of the joint
venture, the BOC filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 directly to the Supreme Court without
filing a motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Should a motion for reconsideration be first availed before filing a Petition for Certiorari to
the Supreme Court?

RULING:
Yes, a motion for reconsideration of an assailed order is required before filing a Petition for
Certiorari.

Certiorari under Rule 65 inherently requires the filing of a motion for reconsideration, which
is the tangible representation of the opportunity given to the office to correct itself. The plain and
adequate remedy referred to in Section 1 of Rule 65 is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed
decision. The purpose of the motion is to enable the court or agency to rectify its mistakes without
the intervention of a higher court. To dispense with this requirement, there must be a concrete,
compelling, and valid reason for the failure to comply with the requirement.

Furthermore, the direct filing the petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court is in disregard
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court,
CA and the RTC to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
Direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extraordinary or compelling reasons that justify
the same.

In this case, petitioners maintain that since the petition raises purely questions of law, their
failure to file a motion for reconsideration is not fatal. Except for this bare allegation, however,
petitioners failed to show sufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior motion
for reconsideration. Indeed, petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of
whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not.

Therefore, the petition filed by the BOC is dismissed for being procedurally infirm.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS REQUIRED BEFORE FILING OF PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI; EXCEPTION, WHEN MR WOULD BE USELESS

Genpact Services, Inc. and Danilo Sebastian Reyes vs. Maria Katrina Santosfalceso
G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Genpact Services Inc. assailing
the resolution of the CA dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it solely on procedural
grounds.

Genpact is engaged in business process outsourcing. One of its clients is AllState

Insurance Company. It hired herein respondents to service its Allstate account. AllState ended its
account with Genpact which eventually lead to the termination of service by respondents.
Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC against petitioner for illegal dismissal among
others. Genpact argued that the termination of respondents was justified on the ground of closure
or cessation of AllState’s account as part of its global downsizing due to heavy losses, and that
they complied with the procedural requirements as provided for by law. Respondents allege that
the retrenchment was not justified and failure of Genpact to comply with the procedural
requirements required by law.

LA ruled in favor of Genpact and dismissed the complaint. NLRC affirmed. MR was partially
granted to increase the respondent’s entitlement to separation pay. The decision included the
phrase: “No further motion of similar import shall be entertained.” Petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, which likewise dismissed the petition purely on procedural grounds. It held
that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to elevating the
case to the CA is a fatal infirmity which rendered their petition for certiorari before the latter court
dismissible

ISSUE:
Is the dismissal of the CA of the petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC proper?

RULING:
No, the dismissal of the petition is not proper.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may
be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration may be considered as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Hence, as a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration is required to be first filed to the lower court before resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari. The rationale being to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case. This, of course, admits of well-defined exceptions: xxx (d) where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was
deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; xxx.

In this case, it was due to the words imported in the NLRC decision partially granting the
MR, which says: “No further motion of similar import shall be entertained,” that gave an impression
on the minds of the petitioner that moving for reconsideration with the NLRC would be futile. The
tenor of the warning effectively derived petitioners of the opportunity to file an MR, thereby violating
their right to due process.

Therefore, petitioners were justified in pursuing direct recourse to the CA.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY BEFORE FILING FOR A PETITION

FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65

Republic of the Philippines vs. O.G. Holdings Corporation

G.R. No. 189290, November 29, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
which nullified and set aside the Orders of DENR suspending the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) of O.G. Holdings Corporation (O.G. Holdings), herein respondent.

The EMB-Region 7 issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to Panglao

Island Nature Resort (PINR) for the beach resort project owned by respondent O.G. Holdings. The
EMB-Region 7 monitored the project for compliance and found that it violated three conditions in
the ECC. Consequently, the bureau issued a Notice of Violation.

Subsequently, EMB-Region 7 again sent O.G. Holdings a Notice of Violation with respect
to ECC Condition No. 2.2.29. The respondent replied, in a letter sent on November 10, 2005, that
compliance with the condition was legally impossible. It blamed the local government unit for
allegedly failing to act on its request that the Panglao Island Nature Resort Corporation be given
a favorable endorsement for a foreshore lease. Having failed to comply, EMB-Region 7 suspended
the ECC of the respondent. The respondent moved for reconsideration, but upon inspection of the
EMB-Region 7, they issued another suspensive order. This time, O.G. Holdings did not move for
reconsideration but filed for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA ruled in
favor of the O.G. Holdings and nullified and set aside the orders of EMB-Region 7.

ISSUE:
Is a petition for certiorari dismissible when there is failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration?

RULING:
Yes, a petition for certiorari is dismissible when there is failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration.

A motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can

resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This well-
established rule is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or
fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.

In this case, O.G. Holdings no longer moved for the reconsideration of the 7 February 2007
order. To assail the order, it instead filed posthaste a petition for certiorari with the appellate court.
Furthermore, O.G. Holdings failed to abide by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. Administrative remedies existed against the suspension of the subject ECC, made
available via DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 2003 (A.O. No. 30).

Therefore, the CA erred in granting O. G. Holdings' petition when there was a failure to
move for reconsideration before seeking certiorari.

134 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NOT A PRE-REQUISITE TO A PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI WHEN IT WOULD BE USELESS TO DO SO OR IF A RELAXATION OF THE
RULES IS DEMANDED BY PUBLIC POLICY

Republic of the Philippines vs. Alvin C. Dimarucot and Nailyn Tanedo-Dimarucot

G.R. No. 202069, March 07, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 against the CA’s decision of
denying a petition on certiorari on the ground that the petition warrants outright dismissal because
it was filed without the benefit of a motion for reconsideration — an indispensable requirement for
the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

After a whirlwind romance that resulted in marriage, respondent Alvin filed a Petition for
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage (RTC Petition) before the RTC on September 22, 2009
against Nailyn. On July 2, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring respondents' marriage
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. On July 27, 2010, the Republic, through the
OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) which was denied. Thus, on September 1, 2010, the
Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. The notice was denied however as the record shows that the
Republic’s MR did not comply with the requirements set forth under Rule 15, sections 4, 5, and 6
of the Rules, in that it was not set for hearing. Since the MR did not interrupt the running of the
period of appeal, the RTC Decision rendered in this case attained finality.

Subsequently, on October 22, 2010, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
CA, ascribing RTC’s grave abuse of discretion for issuing the August and September 2010 RTC
orders denying its MR and Notice of Appeal. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Is a Motion for Reconsideration an indispensable requirement before the filing of a Petition
for Certiorari?

RULING:
No, a prior motion for reconsideration is not always necessary for a petition for certiorari to
prosper in cases where such motion would be useless.

While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-defined
exceptions established by jurisprudence. The Republic invokes one such exception and argues
that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the September 2010 RTC Order would have been
useless.

Moreover, considering the nature of the case and the issues involved therein, the Court
finds that relaxation of the Rules was called for. It is well settled that procedural rules may be
relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the "strict and rigid application, [of
procedural rules] which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed." Here, the State's policy of upholding the sanctity
of marriage takes precedence over strict adherence to Rule 15, for the finality of the RTC Decision
necessarily entails the permanent severance of Alvin and Nailyn's marital ties.

Therefore, a motion of reconsideration is not a pre-requisite to a petition for certiorari when

it would be useless to do so or if a relaxation of the rules is demanded by public policy.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NOT REQUIRED BEFORE FILING PETITION FOR

CERTIORARI WHEN THE ISSUE HAS BEEN RAISED AND PASSED UPON BY THE
LOWER COURT

Spouses Larry and Flora Davis vs. Spouses Florencio and Lucresia Davis
G.R. No. 233489, March 07, 2018
Velasco Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 which challenges the CA
resolutions which dismissed outright on purely procedural grounds the Petition for Certiorari of the
herein petitioners Spouses Larry and Flora Davis and subsequently denied their motion for
reconsideration thereof.

Petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance with damages against respondent
spouses due to the latter’s failure to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale despite full payment. RTC
ruled in favor of petitioners. A writ of execution was issued in favor of petitioners. The writ of
execution cannot be enforced because it turned out that the subject property was sold by
respondents to third persons. Hence, petitioners were compelled to file an action for annulment of
title against the new owners of the property. Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and
Motion for the implementation of the writ of execution which was denied by Branch 78.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the CA. However, CA held that a Motion for
Reconsideration is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to the petitioners to assail the
said Order and it is a condition sine qua non before a Petition for Certiorari may be given due
course.

ISSUE:
Is a motion for reconsideration required before filing a petition for certiorari when the lower
court has already passed upon the very same issue raised in the petition?

RULING:
No, a motion for reconsideration before filing a petition for certiorari is superfluous when
the very same issue raised in the certiorari has already been passed upon by the lower court.

While it is true that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of
a Petition for Certiorari, the purpose of which is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case, it is not, however, an ironclad rule as it admits well-defined exceptions. One of these
exceptions is where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and
passed upon by the lower court or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower
court.

In this case, RTC Malolos Branch 78 denied the said Urgent Ex -Parte Manifestation and
Motion reasoning that the petitioners' filing of another case involving the subject property before
Branch 15 does not toll the running of the period to file a motion for execution. It is clear therefrom
that any motion for reconsideration would then be superfluous, as Br. 78 had already passed upon
and resolved the very same issue raised in the Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

Therefore, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in outrightly dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed by Spouses Davis.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS AN INDISPENSABLE

CONDITION BEFORE RESORTING TO THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

Evelyn L. Miranda et. al. vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 144760-61, August 2, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan
(SB) convicting petitioners, Miranda, et.al., for violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019 or “Entering, on
behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.”

Nava, the DECS Director of Region XI, and the school superintendents met to discuss an
Allotment Advice issued by DECS-Manila. During the meeting, Nava and the school
superintendents agreed that the allotment be sub-allotted to the divisions to be used to procure
science laboratory tools and devices (SLTDs). DECS Davao procured SLTDs from D'Implacable
Enterprises owned by Tan. DECS Davao paid such SLTD in addition to the miscellaneous
operating expenses for the 20 nationalized high schools. COA audited the transaction, and upon
finding anomalies causing loss to the government, issued a COA Circular and DECS Order in
violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019. The Ombudsman filed a case against Nava et.al. before the SB
for 2 counts of violation of Sec. 3(g) of RA 3019. They filed a motion to quash the information but
the same was denied. SB then found them guilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE:
Will a petition for certiorari prosper when the remedy of a motion for reconsideration exists?

RULING:
No, a petition for certiorari will not prosper when the remedy of a motion for reconsideration
exists.

The special civil action of certiorari will not lie unless the aggrieved party has no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A recourse affording prompt relief
from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered "plain,
speedy and adequate" remedy. Time and again, SC ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration is an indispensable condition before resorting to the special civil action for
certiorari to afford the court or tribunal the opportunity to correct its error, if any.

In this case, the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to Miranda, which she opted
not to avail of, was to file a motion for reconsideration so as to afford the Sandiganbayan another
chance to review any actual or conjured errors it may have committed when it resolved her motion
to quash. For sure, her arraignment would not have proceeded unless the Sandiganbayan had
resolved her motion for reconsideration before that date. Her scheduled arraignment was clearly
not sufficient justification to dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration.

Therefore, the petition for certiorari should not prosper for failure to file a motion for
reconsideration.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY ALSO BE TREATED AS AN APPEAL WHEN

JUSTIFIABLE REASONS EXIST, AND THE SAME WAS FILED WITHIN THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD TO FILE AN APPEAL

Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion vs. People of the Philippines and Carmelita Punongbayan

G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse the CA decision which affirmed
the ruling of the RTC convicting Marilou Punongbayan-Visitacion (Visitacion) of libel.

On July 26, 1999, Visitacion wrote a letter to respondent Carmelita Punongbayan

(Punongbayan) assailing her alleged appointment as the president of St. Peter’s College in an
uncivil and confrontational manner. Insulted, Punongbayan filed a complaint for libel against
Visitacion. RTC convicted Visitacion of libel.

Aggrieved, Visitacion filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary injunction before the CA. CA dismissed the petition and opined
that it should have been through an appeal where she could have raised the issues in the present
petition for certiorari. It noted that at the time Visitacion filed her petition, the period to file an appeal
had yet to expire. Thus, the CA elucidated that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause
for dismissal of the petition for certiorari because it is not a substitute for a lost appeal.

ISSUE:
Did the CA act contrary to law in not treating the petition for certiorari as appeal,
notwithstanding the fact that such petition was filed within the reglementary period of time to file
an appeal and despite existence of valid reasons to treat it as an appeal?

RULING:
Yes, the CA acted contrary to law in not treating the petition for certiorari as appeal,
notwithstanding the fact that such petition was filed within the reglementary period of time to file
an appeal and despite existence of valid reasons to treat it as an appeal.

In Department of Education v. Cuanan, the Court exercised liberality and considered the
petition for certiorari filed therein as an appeal: The remedy of an aggrieved party from a resolution
issued by the CSC is to file a petition for review thereof under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court within
fifteen days from notice of the resolution. Recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 renders
the petition dismissible for being the wrong remedy. Nonetheless, there are exceptions to this rule,
to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader
interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

In this case, the Court finds that the interest of substantial justice warrants the relaxation
of the rules and treats Visitacion's petition for certiorari as an appeal. This is especially true
considering that the same was filed within the reglementary period to file an appeal.

Therefore, the CA acted contrary to law in not treating the petition for certiorari as appeal,
notwithstanding the fact that such petition was filed within the reglementary period of time to file
an appeal and despite existence of valid reasons to treat it as an appeal.

138 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ORIGIN, NATURE, AND PURPOSE OF IMPEACHMENT AND QUO WARRANTO,

MATERIALLY DIFFERENT

Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida

vs. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a special civil action under Rule 66 to declare as void respondent Maria Lourdes P.
A. Sereno’s appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The position of Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012. The Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) required applicants to submit, among others, all of their Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and
Net worth (SALNs) up to Dec 30, 2011. Respondent, then Associate Justice of the Court, applied
for the position. It appears, however, that respondent’s SALNs were incomplete. In 2017, an
impeachment complaint was filed against the respondent due in part to failure to file her SALNs.

The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), claims that quo
warranto was the proper remedy to question the validity of respondent’s appointment as it
questions the qualification and eligibility of the respondent, contradistinguished from impeachment
which is concerned with culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in
office. The phrase “may be removed from office” in Sec. 2, Art. XI of the Constitution signifies that
impeachable officers may be removed through modes other than impeachment.

The respondent contends that, the phrase “may be removed from office” does not signify
that impeachable officers may be removed through other modes other than impeachment. She
also argues that quo warranto is time-barred, one year either from the cause of the ouster in 2012,
or discovery of disqualification which is even earlier considering that UP HRDO is required to
submit a list of employees who failed to file their SALNs.

ISSUES:
Are impeachment and quo warranto different modes of removal of a public officer, ergo no
forum shopping?

RULING:
Yes, impeachment and quo warranto are different modes of removal of a public officer,
ergo no forum shopping exists.

the most basic, impeachment is political in nature exercised by the legislative which
determines the public officer’s fitness to stay in office; while quo warranto is a judicial proceeding
regarding the eligibility of election or appointment, or legal right to the office, based on pre-
determined rules. In other words, while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit
to continue exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him ineligible to
hold the position to begin with. Incidentally, there is ergo no violation of separation of powers.

The causes of action are different: in impeachment it is the commission of an impeachable

offense while in quo warranto it is the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding of public office. In
quo warranto ceases to hold an office which he is ineligible to hold while in impeachment he is
removed from office that he legally holds. It is not legally possible to impeach a person from an
office he does not and cannot legally hold. The two proceedings may proceed independently and
simultaneously.

Therefore, no forum shopping exists in this case.

| 139
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN QUO WARRANTO, PRESCRIPTION DOES NOT LIE AGAINST THE STATE

Republic of the Philippines, represented by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida

vs. Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a special civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court for the issuance of
the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void respondent Sereno’s appointment as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

The position of Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012. The Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) required applicants to submit, among others, all of their Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and
Net worth (SALNs) up to December 30, 2011. It appears, however, that respondent’s SALNs were
incomplete. In 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed against the respondent due in part to
failure to file her SALNs.

The Republic, represented by the OSG, claims that quo warranto was the proper remedy
to question the validity of respondent’s appointment as it questions the qualification and eligibility
of the respondent, contradistinguished from impeachment which is concerned with culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. The OSG posits alternatively
that either the action is within the one-year reglementary period under Sec. 11, Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court to be counted from the discovery of the act (House hearings) or that the action is
imprescriptible under the principle nullum tempus occurit regi (lapse of time does not bar the right
of the crown).

The respondent argues that quo warranto is time-barred, one year either from the cause
of the ouster in 2012, or discovery of disqualification which is even earlier considering that UP
Human Resource Development Office is required to submit a list of employees who failed to file
their SALNs.

ISSUES:
Does prescription lie against the state in quo warranto?

RULING:
No, prescription does not lie against the state.

The one-year prescription period under Sec. 11, Rule 66 refers to private individuals
asserting their right to office, not the OSG. Sec. 2 of the same Rule in fact makes it compulsory for
the Solicitor General to commence the action through the word “must” used therein. Citing Agcaoili
v. Suguitan and People ex rel. Moleney v. Pullman’s Palace Car Co., because the action came
from government, prescription does not lie against the State. Further, as held in Cristobal, among
the exceptions to prescription is there is no acquiescence or inaction on the part of the petitioner
amounting to abandonment of his right to the position, or it was the act of the government through
its responsible officials which contributed to the delay in the filing of the action.

In this case, neither is present as the respondent’s qualifications were questioned only
during the hearings on the House. Prior to that, there is no indication that would have prompted
the Republic to assail respondent’s appointment. In any case, the Court finds it more important to
rule on the merits of this case rather than dismiss it merely on a technicality.

Therefore, prescription does not lie aganinst the state as the one-year prescription period
under Sec. 11, Rule 66 refers to private individuals.

140 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

VALUE OF THE JUST COMPENSATION IS TO BE DETERMINED AS OF THE DATE OF

THE TAKING OF THE PROPERTY OR THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT, WHICHEVER
CAME FIRST

National Power Corporation vs. Apolonio Marasigan et. al

G.R. No. 220367, November 20, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the decision of the CA
which affirmed the decision of the RTC, in the expropriation case commenced by NPC against
respondents as registered owners of the property.

For purposes of constructing and maintaining its steel transmission lines and wooden
electric poles for its Naga-Tiwi 230 KV (Single Bundle), Naga-Tiwi 230 KV (Double Bundle) and
69 KV Naga-Daraga Transmission Lines, NPC sought an easement of right of way to the subject
properties owned by respondents. NPC filed, on January 23, 2006, an expropriation complaint
against respondents as registered owners of the four parcels of land that would be affected by the
construction. While interposing no objection to the expropriation, respondents nevertheless
opposed the classification of the properties. After the pre-trial, RTC issued an Order of
Expropriation and fixed the provisional value of the properties. RTC rendered a decision affirming
the recommendation of the appraisal committee for the payment of just compensation based on
the BIR zonal valuation of the properties classified as residential, commercial and industrial as of
the time of the filing of the complaint on January 23, 2006.

NPC filed an appeal and argued that award is contrary to the zonal valuation of the property
classified as agricultural and erroneously reckoned as of the time of the filing of the complaint
instead as of the time of taking.

ISSUE:
Should the computation of the value of the property be reckoned strictly from its taking?

RULING:
No, computation of the value of the property is reckoned from the taking or upon the filing
of the complaint, whichever came first.

Sec. 4, Rule 67 lays down the basic rule that the value of the just compensation is to be
determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever
came first. The case of National Transmission Corporation v. Oroville Development
Corporation, settles that just compensation should be reckoned from the date of actual taking when
such preceded the filing of the complaint for expropriation.

In this case, there being no sufficient proof that NPC actually took the subject properties at
a date preceding the filing of the expropriation complaint, the time of the taking should be taken to
mean as coinciding with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings on January 23,
2006.

Therefore, the value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be the basis for the
determination of the value when the taking of the property involved coincides with or is subsequent
to the commencement of the proceedings.

| 141
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE FINAL COMPENSATION MUST INCLUDE INTERESTS ON ITS JUST VALUE TO BE

COMPUTED FROM THE TIME THE PROPERTY IS TAKEN TO THE TIME WHEN
COMPENSATION IS ACTUALLY PAID OR DEPOSITED WITH THE COURT

Lucila Yared vs. Land Bank of the Philippines

G.R. No. 213945, January 24, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to set aside the decision of CA,
which affirmed with modification (by deleting the award of legal interest, exemplary damages and
attorney's fees) the decision of RTC, directing Land Bank to pay the remaining balance of just
compensation.

In 1996, petitioner Lucila Yared’s property was placed under the coverage of
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under RA No. 6657 or the compulsory
acquisition scheme of the government. Land Bank initially valued the property at P7,067,426.91
and deposited the amount, in cash and agrarian reform bonds, to the account of petitioners.
Dissatisfied with the valuation, the petitioners initiated a case before the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for recomputation. Land Bank, then, submitted a re-
evaluation of the property in the amount P11,366,366.15.

Petitioners filed a Petition for the Determination of Just Compensation before the RTC,
sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC). RTC recomputed the initial valuation of Land Bank. As
compensation for the time lost and delay, an award of legal interest was imposed on the amount
of P 11,537,478.00 or the difference between the initial deposit of P7,067,426.91 and judicially
determined compensation of P18,604,478.00 from September 25, 1996 until full payment of just
compensation. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an MR before the CA, but the same was denied in
a resolution.

ISSUE:
Shall legal interest be imposed on the unpaid balance of the just compensation reckoned
from the time of taking until full payment?

RULING:
Yes, legal interest shall be imposed on the unpaid balance reckoned from the time of taking
until full payment of just compensation.

The court has held that if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited
with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interest[s] on
its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. The rationale of which is to compensate the petitioners
for the income they would have made had they been properly compensated for their properties at
the time of the taking. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the
position he was in before the taking occurred

In this case, there is a difference between the initial deposit and the judicially determined
just compensation. Hence, an interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed on the unpaid
balance of P11,537,478.00 from September 25, 1996 until June 30, 2013. Thereafter, an interest
rate of 6% p.a., in line with the amendment introduced by BSP-MB Circular No. 799, series of
2013, shall be imposed until full payment.

Therefore, legal interest shall be imposed on the unpaid balance reckoned from the time
of taking until full payment of just compensation.

142 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RTC HAS FULL DISCRETION TO MAKE A BINDING DECISION ON THE VALUE OF THE
PROPERTIES

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raul T. Manzano

G.R. No. 188243, January 24, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review of Landbank, seeking to reverse and set aside the CA
decision, upholding the Special Agrarian Court's determination of the just compensation to be paid.

Petitioner Landbank alleges that CA erred in accepting the commissioners'

recommendation without conducting a hearing, in directing DAR and Landbank to pay 6% legal
interest, and in granting the motion for execution pending appeal without good reasons. It also
argues that the commissioners disregarded the applicability of Republic Act No. 6657,
Administrative Order No. 05-98, and Joint Memorandum Circular No. 07-99. Thus, it avers that CA
should not have sustained the RTC Order, which adopted the Consolidated Commissioners'
Report (CCR).

On the other hand, respondents assert that petitioner was given the opportunity to ventilate
its objections to the CCR. First, it was allowed to submit its position paper and incorporate its
comments or objections to respondents' position paper. Second, petitioner was able to file its
Comment to the CCR, part of which was documentary evidence that it admittedly intended to
present. The CCR also considered the factors mentioned by Republic Act No. 6657 in relation to
Administrative Order No. 05-98.

ISSUE:
In determining just compensation, does the RTC have the full discretion to make a binding
decision on the value of the properties?

RULING:
Yes, the RTC has the full discretion to make a binding decision on the value of the
properties.

Under Rule 67, Section 8 of the ROC, the RTC may accept the Consolidated
Commissioners' Report, recommit it to the same commissioners for further report, set it aside and
appoint new commissioners, or accept only a part of it and reject the other parts. The determination
of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department
or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the
guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court's findings.

Republic Act No. 6657, Section 57 gives to the Special Agrarian Courts the "original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners."
The use of the word "final" in the statute should not be construed to mean that the Special Agrarian
Court serves as an appellate court that must wait for the administrative agencies to finish their
valuation. There is no need to exhaust administrative remedies through the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, or the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board before a party can go to the Special Agrarian Court for determination of just
compensation.

Therefore, the RTC has the full discretion to make a binding decision on the value of the
properties.

| 143
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN EXPROPRIATION, LANDOWNER’S REMEDIES INCLUDE RECOVERY OF PROPERTY

IF ITS RETURN IS STILL FEASIBLE OR, IF IT IS NOT, HE MAY DEMAND PAYMENT OF
JUST COMPENSATION FOR THE LAND TAKEN

Paz E. Rebadulla vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 222159 & 222171, January 31, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
These are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA decision,
ordering the Republic to pay just compensation for the taking of parcels of land belonging to the
petitioner, Rebadulla family, and the CA resolution, denying the latter's MR.

In 1997, the DPWH took parcels of land belonging to the Rebadullas for its Small Water
Impounding Management Project (SWIM Project) in Northern Samar but, no expropriation
proceedings were instituted. In 2002, the Rebadullas filed a Complaint for mandamus and
damages before the RTC, against the Republic, for just compensation for the taking and use of
their properties. The RTC held that while the case was one for mandamus and damages, the
allegations in the complaint establish an action for recovery of just compensation which was the
only relief available to the Rebadullas since they already rejected DPWH's offer and it was no
longer feasible to demand the return of the property as it was already taken and used in
constructing dams. The RTC, however, found that both parties failed to satisfy the quantum of
proof to support their respective valuations of the properties. The parties' respective MRs were
both denied. Both parties appealed to the CA, which affirmed RTC's determination of just
compensation, increasing the interest rate to 12% per annum, and deleting the award of attorney's
fees. The Rebadullas filed an MR, which was denied.

In the instant petitions, both parties impugn the CA's ruling. The Government maintains
that the determination of just compensation is improper in a mandamus proceeding because the
same is available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, and not one involving the
exercise of sound judgment and discretion.

ISSUES:
When the return of the property subject of expropriation is no longer feasible, is the
payment of just compensation the proper remedy to the landowner?

RULING:
No, when the return of the property subject of expropriation is no longer feasible the
payment of just compensation is the proper remedy to the landowner.

Jurisprudence provides that the nature of an action is determined based on the averments
in the complaint and the character of the relief prayed for; and that the landowner's remedies when
his property is taken by the government for public use: he may recover his property if its return is
still feasible or, if it is not, he may demand payment of just compensation for the land taken.

In this case, the return of the subject properties is no longer feasible as they had been
used in the construction of dams for the DPWH's SWIM project. Thus, the Rebadullas' relief was
to recover just compensation. It is true that the case filed by the Rebadullas was one for
"mandamus and damages,” but the complaint plainly sought to recover just compensation for the
taking of their properties. In fine, the allegations and the reliefs prayed for in the complaint make
out a case for payment of just compensation as determined by the court, damages (plus interest)
and attorney's fees.

Therefore, the case is remanded to the RTC for the determination of just compensation.

144 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

VALUE OF LANDHOLDINGS SHOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO THE PRINCIPAL SUM OF

THE JUST COMPENSATION DUE AND INTEREST DUE SHOULD BE PAID TO
COMPENSATE FOR THE UNPAID BALANCE OF THIS PRINCIPAL SUM AFTER TAKING
HAS BEEN COMPLETED

Republic of the Philippines vs. Leonor Macabagdal

G.R. No. 227215, January 10, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the CA which affirmed
the Decision of RTC Valenzuela City imposing legal interest on the unpaid balance of the just
compensation for the subject lot at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum (p.a.) computed
from the time of the taking of the property until full payment.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DPWH, filed before the RTC a
complaint for the expropriation of a lot located in Valenzuela City, for the construction of the C-5
Northern Link Road Project. Petitioner was granted a writ of possession on May 5, 2008 over the
lot and was required to deposit with the court the amount of ₱550,000.00 (₱2,750.00/sq. m.).
Respondent Leonor Macabagdal, represented by Eulogia Macabagdal Pascual, was substituted
as party-defendant upon showing that the subject lot is registered in her name under a TCT.
Respondent did not oppose the expropriation, and received the provisional deposit. RTC fixed the
just compensation for the subject lot at ₱9,000.00/ sq. m., directed petitioner to pay the same, less
the provisional deposit of ₱550,000.00; and imposed legal interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) p.a. on the unpaid balance, computed from the time of the taking of the subject lot until full
payment. CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Is just compensation composed only of the value of the land?

RULING:
No, just compensation is composed not only of the value of the land but also of the interest
of the unpaid balance of the principal sum after taking has been completed.

The Court recognizes that the owner's loss is not only his property, but also its income-
generating potential. Thus, when property is taken, full compensation of its value must be
immediately paid to achieve a fair exchange for the property and the potential income lost.

In this case, from the date of the taking of the subject lot on May 5, 2008 when the RTC
issued a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, until the just compensation therefor was finally
fixed at ₱9,000.00/sq. m., petitioner had only paid a provisional deposit in the amount of
₱550,000.00 (i.e., at ₱2,750.00/sq. m.). Thus, this left an unpaid balance of the "principal sum of
the just compensation," warranting the imposition of interest. Nonetheless, it bears to clarify that
legal interest shall run not from the date of the filing of the complaint but from the date of the
issuance of the Writ of Possession on May 5, 2008, since it is from this date that the fact of the
deprivation of property can be established. As such, it is only proper that accrual of legal interest
should begin from this date.

Therefore, the value of landholdings should be equivalent to the principal sum of the just
compensation due, and interest due should be paid to compensate for the unpaid balance of this
principal sum after taking has been completed.

| 145
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION PRESCRIBES 10 YEARS FROM NOTICE OF

COVERAGE

Land Bank of The Philippines vs. Herederos De Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc.
G.R. No. 206992, June 11, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court
of CA in. The CA denied the petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), a case for preliminary
determination of just compensation.

Herederos De Ciriaco Chunaco Distileria, Inc. was the owner of several parcels of land
with an aggregate area of 22.587 hectares situated at Barangay Masarawag, Guinobatan, Albay.
Respondent voluntarily offered for sale the subject lots to the Republic under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Petitioner, by virtue of its mandate under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, came up with the CARP compensation for the subject lands and offered the same to
respondent in the amount of P957,991.30. Upon receipt of the valuation of the properties,
respondent rejected the offered compensation.

Petitioner argues that when it received the February 17, 2004 Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Albay (PARAD) decision on February 24, 2004, it timely filed a motion for
reconsideration thereof, on March 9, 2004; when it received the April 1, 2004 resolution of the
PARAD denying its motion for reconsideration on April 6, 2004, it had a fresh fifteen (15)-day
period within which to file the petition for judicial determination of just compensation before the
RTC-SAC; from the moment that the petition was filed in the RTC-SAC, the PARAD lost its
jurisdiction over the determination of just compensation; and the PARAD cannot anymore enforce
or execute its February 17, 2004 decision. In its Comment, respondent argues that the February
17, 2004 decision of the PARAD had become final and executory because it was belatedly fie in
the RTC-SAC under Section 11 of the DARAB Rules.

ISSUE:
Is the action for determining just compensation imprescriptible?

RULING:
No, it prescribes 10 years from the notice of coverage.

Accordingly, R.A. Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, Congress expressly granted the RTC,
acting as SAC, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners. While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which
a landowner can file a petition for the determination of just compensation before the SAC, it cannot
be imprescriptible because the parties cannot be placed in limbo indefinitely. The Civil Code settles
such conundrum. Considering that the payment of just compensation is an obligation created by
law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received the notice of coverage.

In this case, respondent voluntarily offered for sale its twelve (12) parcels of land in
November 2001. Accordingly, the 10-year prescriptive period began at that moment because
respondent knew that its lands would be covered by the CARP.

Therefore, the petition for judicial determination of just compensation filed on April 12, 2004
before the RTC-SAC, which was even tolled by the proceedings before the PARAD, was squarely
and timely filed within the 10-year prescriptive period.

146 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY IN EMINENT DOMAIN IS ESSENTIALLY A JUDICIAL

FUNCTION WHICH CANNOT BE VESTED IN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) vs. Eugenio Dalauta

G.R. No. 190004, August 8, 2017
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the decision of
the CA affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), in the
determination of just compensation to a land subjected to the compulsory acquisition under CARL.

Respondent Dalauta was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Butuan City. The
land was placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR under CARP. LBP offered a valuation of
the land, but Dalauta rejected the valuation for being too low. The case was referred to DARAB
which determined the appropriate just compensation. PARAD affirmed the valuation made by the
LBP. Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC sitting as SAC.
During trial, SAC constituted the Board of Commissioners to make a report on the land. SAC
ordered DAR and LBP to pay a higher valuation based on the evidence presented. MR was denied.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court was filed before the CA, arguing
that SAC erred in taking cognizance of the case when the DARAB’s decision has long attained
finality, among others. CA affirmed the jurisdiction of SAC stating that it had original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.

ISSUE:
Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction in determining just compensation despite finality of the
PARAD Resolution?

RULING:
Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction in determining just compensation.

In agrarian reform cases, under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, primary jurisdiction rests with DAR to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under DA and
DENR. On the other hand, SACs are expressly granted by law with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. In LBP v.
Heir of Trinidad S. vda. De Arieta, it is the SAC that should make the final determination of just
compensation. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is
vested with the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the
reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the CARP, but such determination
is subject to challenge in the courts.

In this case, even if the decision of the DAR had already attained finality due to the
prescription, nonetheless, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC would be undermined
if the DAR would vest in administrative officials the original jurisdiction in compensation cases and
make the SAC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Pursuant to Section
9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. In Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, the Court ruled that the valuation of
property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in
administrative agencies.

Therefore, in determining just compensation, the RTC has jurisdiction to do so.

| 147
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE

PROJECTS, IT IS NOT THE AMOUNT OF OWNER’S INVESTMENT BUT THE VALUE OF
INTEREST IN LAND TAKEN BY EMINENT DOMAIN THAT IS GUARANTEED TO
OWNER

Republic of the Philippines vs. Belly H. Ng

G.R. No. 229335, November 29, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA decision affirming the RTC
decision fixing the just compensation for the subject lots at P15,000.00/sq.m and the replacement
cost of the improvements at P12,000.00/sq.m.

On February 12, 2013, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint seeking to expropriate
the lots registered under the name of respondent Ng located in Brgy. Ugong Valenzulea City for
the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension Project, Stage II-C. Petitioner manifested the
offer price including a replacement cost of P11,138,362.74. Respondent contended that the offer
price is unreasonably low and that the fair and just replacement cost of the improvements on the
subject lots should be P22,276,724.00 pursuant to Sec. 10 of the IRR of RA 8974. RTC decision
fixing the just compensation for the subject lots at P15,000.00/sq.m and the replacement cost of
the improvements at P12,000.00/sq.m.

ISSUE:
In national infrastructure projects, is the determination of just compensation for
improvements confined to the owner’s investment cost?

RULING:
No, in national infrastructure projects, the determination of just compensation for
improvements is not confined to the owner’s investment cost.

The case of Republic v. Mupas instructs that in using the replacement cost method to
ascertain the value of improvements, the courts may also consider the relevant standards provided
under Section 5 of RA 8974, as well as equity consistent with the principle that eminent domain is
a concept of equity and fairness that attempts to make the landowner whole. Thus, it is not the
amount of the owner's investment, but the "value of the interest" in land taken by eminent domain,
that is guaranteed to the owner.

In this case, the RTC and the CA upheld the recommendation of the court-appointed
commissioners, fixing the just compensation for the improvements on the expropriated properties
at ₱12,000.00/sq. m., which merely considered their location, classification, value declared by the
owner, and the zonal valuation of the subject lots. However, there is no competent evidence
showing that it took into account the prevailing construction costs and all other attendant costs
associated with the acquisition and installation of an acceptable substitute in place of the affected
improvements/structures as required by the IRR.

Therefore, the Court cannot uphold and must set aside the said valuation as the just
compensation for the subject improvements.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION MUST BE BASED ON RELIABLE AND

ACTUAL DATA

The Manila Banking Corporation vs. Bases Conversion and Development Authority
G.R. No. 230144, January 22, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
which reversed and set aside the order of the RTC.

Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA) filed a complaint against petitioner,
The Manila Banking Corporation (TMBC), seeking to expropriate a parcel of land In Porac,
Pamapaga to pave the way for the implementation of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway
(SCTEX). TMBC contended that the offered price of ₱30 per square meter is way below the fair
market value of the subject property.

During the hearings, the three Commissioners testified and the parties presented their
respective evidence. After the formal offer of evidence and submission of the parties' respective
memorandum, the case was submitted for decision. In a Decision dated September 4, 2012, the
RTC ordered respondent BCDA to pay petitioner TMBC the amount of ₱250 per square meter as
just compensation for the property taken. The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC
and set the just compensation at P75.00/sq.m.

ISSUE:
Should the determination of just compensation be based only DPWH transactions of
neighboring properties without taking into account the Deeds of Absolute Sale entered into by the
same expropriating agency and neighboring landowners?

RULING:
No, the determination of just compensation must not be based only DPWH transactions of
neighboring properties without taking into account Deeds of Absolute Sales entered into by the
same expropriating agency and neighboring landowners.

Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to
intensify the meaning of the word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.
Such ‘just’-ness of the compensation can only be attained by using reliable and actual data as
bases in fixing the value of the condemned property. Trial courts are required to be more
circumspect in its evaluation of just compensation due the property owner, considering that
eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public funds.

In this case, in arriving at the amount of ₱250 per square meter, the trial court relied on the
eight DPWH transactions of neighboring properties as relevant market data on the actual value of
the subject property in November 2003. The RTC failed to consider the nine Deeds of Absolute
Sale between BCDA and several landowners for the sale of properties situated in Barangay
Dolores, Porac, Pampanga with selling price ranging from ₱60 to ₱75 per square meter, which
were executed between March 2004 and September 2008. The CA is correct as it noted that while
the trial court based its first valuation on the recommendations of the commissioners, it did not
give any explanation on how it arrived at the amount of ₱250 per square meter.

Therefore, the CA is correct in reversing the trial court’s decision and in fixing the just
compensation at P75.00/sq.m.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE TO ALLEGE THE MARKET VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY, GROUND

FOR DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR PARTITION

Ma. Rosario Agarrado, et. al. vs. Cristita Librando-Agarrado and Ana Lou Agarrado-King
G.R. No. 212413, June 6, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
The Decision of the CA, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC, is
challenged by the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Petitioners, Ma. Rosario Agarrado, Ruth Librada Agarrado, and Roy Agarrado are children
of the late spouses Rodrigo and Emilia Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square
meter land (subject property) in Bacolod City, Negros Occidental. The subject property was
registered in the name of spouses Rodrigo and Emilia and was covered by TCT No. T-29842-B.
Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and their children as her compulsory heirs. Unknown to the
petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with respondent Cristita Librando-Agarrado, with
whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King. As it turned out, Ana Lou was conceived
during the existence of the marriage between Rodrigo and Emilia but was born one month after
the dissolution of Rodrigo and Emilia's marriage through the latter's death. Rodrigo married and
died, leaving his surviving spouse, Cristita, his legitimate children by his marriage with Emilia, and
Ana Lou. Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the RTC for the partition of the subject
property.

ISSUE:
Does failure to allege the market value of the subject property in the complaint for partition
warrant the dismissal of the case?

RULING:
Yes, failure to allege the market value of the subject property warrants the dismissal of the
case.

For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. The plaintiff seeks, first, a
declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the subject properties, and second, the conveyance of
his/her lawful share. Clearly, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level
courts. Under Sec. 33 (3) of B.P. Blg. 129, they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC
where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila,
or P20,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00, it is the
Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19 (2). Hence, a failure by the plaintiff to
indicate the assessed value of the subject property in his/her complaint, or at the very least, in the
attachments in the complaint is dismissible because the court which would exercise jurisdiction
over the same could not be identified.

In this case, the complaint did indeed lack any indication as to the assessed value of the
subject property. More, none of the documents annexed to the complaint indicates any such
amount.

Therefore, this case of partition filed by respondents must be dismissed, without prejudice.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IF ENTRY IS ILLEGAL AT THE INCEPTION, AN ACTION FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY IS PROPER;

OTHERWISE, AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE FILED

Teresita Bugayong-Santiago vs. Teofilo Bugayong

G.R. No. 220389, December 6, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the RTC
decision which set aside the MCTC’s decision and dismissed the petitioner Teresita Bugayong-
Santiago’s complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent, Teofilo Bugayon.

Petitioners contend that from the start, they have tolerated and have been tolerating the
stay and occupation of respondent over two-third (2/3) portion of the commercial lot and the
building situated thereon. Petitioner allowed her sister, Cachola, to occupy the subject property
located in Asingan, Pangasinan. Petitioners allege that sometime in 2002, respondent, in the
presence of Cachola, just entered the property without their knowledge and consent and had been
occupying two-third (2/3) portion of the property without paying any lease rental. Since petitioners
wanted to take possession of the subject property, they sent a demand letter for respondent to
vacate the premises. Respondent, on the other hand, maintains that he had been in actual
possession and enjoyment of the subject property, being one of the forced heirs of the registered
owners, his parents.

Thus, petitioners filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer dated 15 March 2008 with the
MCTC. The MCTC ordered respondent to vacate the property. The RTC reversed the MCTC
decision and dismissed the case. The CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
If the entry is illegal at the inception, is an action for forcible entry proper?

RULING:
Yes, if the entry is illegal at the inception, is an action for forcible entry proper.

The Rules are clear that if the entry into the property is illegal, the action which may be
filed against the intruder is forcible entry and this action must be brought within one (1) year from
the illegal entry. But if the entry is originally legal then became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess, an unlawful detainer case may be brought within one (1) year
from the date of the last demand. This action will only prosper in a case where the plaintiff allows
the defendant to use the property by tolerance without any contract, and the defendant is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on demand.

In this case, petitioners claimed that respondent entered the property "without their
knowledge and consent" on one hand, and by mere "tolerance" on the other. It can be concluded
then that respondent occupied the subject property without petitioners' knowledge and consent
and thereafter petitioners tolerated respondent's stay in the property for many years.

Therefore, since there was forcible entry at the beginning and tolerance thereafter, an
action for unlawful detainer cannot prosper.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER ACTS OF TOLERANCE MUST BE PRESENT RIGHT FROM

THE START OF THE PLAINTIFFS’ POSSESSION BY DEFENDANT

Queen Errika L. Saddi vs. Maricris Renomeron

G.R. No. 211004, August 23, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner Queen Errika Saddi filed this Petition for Review of the CA decision dismissing
her complaint for ejectment, challenging its decision that Respondent Maricris Renomeron cannot
be evicted from the property.

The MeTC and RTC ruled in favor of Saddi finding that Renomeron's stay in the subject
property was not through strategy or stealth as Renomeron was allowed to stay in the subject
property after she purchased it. When Saddi terminated the tolerance, she extended to Renomeron
and demanded that she vacate the subject property and the latter refused, Renomeron's right to
the possession of the property had expired and she is considered to be unlawfully detaining the
property. However, the CA found that Saddi's allegations in her Complaint ran counter to the
requirements of an unlawful detainer suit that the possession of the defendant be originally legal
and his/her possession was permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract.

Petitioner claims that the tolerance or permission given to respondent was from the
beginning of her possession when she stepped into the shoes of the seller. Meanwhile, respondent
avers that she was in possession of the property long before the said sale. Renomeron’s mother
was residing in the said property with her, thus, she may not be evicted from the property as her
possession is by virtue of being a co-owner thereof.

ISSUE:
Will a complaint for unlawful detainer prosper when the plaintiff failed to prove tolerance
from the start of possession of the defendant?

RULING:
No, a complaint for unlawful detainer will not prosper when the plaintiff failed to prove
tolerance from the start of possession of the defendant.

In Spouses Golez v. Heirs of Bertulo, the Court held that to justify an action for unlawful
detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right
from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession
was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.

In this case, petitioner’s Eviction Letter dated August 4, 2010, states that petitioner, as new
owner, was requesting respondent to vacate the said place and was giving her four days to transfer
or move out all her belongings in the said premises, evincing that respondent was in possession
of the property even before August 4, 2010, the date when petitioner alleged that respondent asked
her permission to stay in the property. Hence, the alleged tolerated four-day stay was actually for
Renomeron to pack up her belongings from the premises and leave. Thus, petitioner failed to
satisfy the requirement that her supposed act of tolerance was present right from the start of the
possession by defendant. It is worth noting that the absence of the first requisite is important in the
light of respondent's claim that she has been occupying the property as a co-owner thereof even
before the property was purchased by petitioner.

Therefore, as respondent's possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

OCCUPYING THE LAND WITH THE CONSENT OF THE OWNER UPON THE
CONDITION THAT THE FORMER WOULD VACATE WHEN LAND IS NEEDED, A
PROPER SUBJECT OF AN ACTION FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Rene Michael French vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 220057, July 12, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 against the resolution of the CA setting aside
the RTC’s decision and reinstating the decision of the MTCC in favor of private respondent, O’dell.

Private respondent, Magdalena O’dell is an American citizen residing in USA. She is the
owner of a land which petitioner French’s father, Henry, sought her permission to cultivate without
payment of rental, with the agreement that Henry would pay some of her loans with PNB and would
vacate the lot once she needed it. Upon Henry’s death, petitioner cultivated the land without her
permission and through mere tolerance. She sent a demand letter to vacate the land in 2008 but
he failed to comply. She filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner Rene. Rene
argues that the possessors and acting owners of the land was his father Henry and French-Solinap
Development Corporation (the corporation) since 1985. That Magdalena and Thomas obtained a
loan from PNB using the land as collateral. Upon default, they asked Henry to redeem the land,
which he was able to do through the corporation. PNB turned over the original owner’s copy of the
TCT to Henry.

MTCC held that Rene’s occupancy was by mere tolerance of the owner. It found that the
SPA to mortgage the property was executed by Magdalena and Thomas in accommodation of
their relatives Wilson and Edward French, and that Henry, another relative, was allowed to cultivate
the land without rentals on the condition that they would pay the loan. RTC affirmed MTCC’s
findings but set the same aside for lack of jurisdiction. CA ruled in her favor, stating that MTCC
has jurisdiction as the allegations in the complaint was for unlawful detainer, not forcible entry. The
CA reinstated MTCC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Is the act of occupying the land with the consent of the owner upon the condition that the
former would vacate when land is needed, a proper subject of an action for unlawful detainer?

RULING:
Yes, the act of occupying the land with the consent of the owner upon the condition that
the former would vacate when land is needed is a proper subject of an action for unlawful detainer.

A complaint for an action for unlawful detainer is sufficient if the following allegations are
present: (1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant
of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one
year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint
for ejectment.

In this case, the allegations in the complaint constituted a cause of action for unlawful
detainer. The complaint stated that: (1) Magdalena allowed Henry to occupy the land on certain
conditions, (2) that Henry would vacate once the land was needed, (3) however, upon Henry’s
death, and order to vacate, Rene, Henry’s son refused to do so, (4) which prompted Magdalena
to filed the case within a year.

Therefore, the allegations in the complaint clearly provides for a case of unlawful detainer.

| 153
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE FILED WITHIN A YEAR, OTHERWISE THE PROPER

ACTION WOULD BE ACCION PUBLICIANA

Eversley Child’s Sanitarium vs. Spouses Barbarona

G.R. No. 195814, April 4, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Eversley Child’s Sanitarium
(Everesly), appealing the CA’s decision to uphold both the MTC and RTC’s decision ordering them
to vacate the disputed property.

Respondents filed with the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against petitioner, alleging that
despite demands to vacate, petitioner-occupants refused to do so. The occupants alleged that they
had possessed the land for more than 70 years, so the case should be one for recovery of
possession and not summary proceedings for ejectment.

Respondents alleged that their right of ownership was derived from their predecessors-in-
interest, the Spouses Gonzales, and maintained that the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over
their complaint since prior physical possession is not an indispensable requirement and all that is
required is "that the one-year period of limitation commences from the time of demand to vacate."

ISSUE:
Is an action for ejectment proper when the occupants are in possession for 70 years?

RULING:
No, an ejectment is not proper since the occupants are in possession for 70 years.

A summary ejectment case only resolves the issue of who has the better right to actual
possession of the property. The right of possession does not pertain to legal possession. While a
party may later be proven to have the legal right of possession by virtue of ownership, he or she
must still institute an ejectment case to be able to dispossess an actual occupant of the property
who refuses to vacate. As such, it is jurisdictional that the party seeking to enforce its right to
ownership allege when the defendant’s possession became unlawful. The ejectment case must
be filed within 1 year from the date the defendant lost its rights to possess.

In this case, respondent’s complaint did not state how and when their dispossession
started. It only alleged that the petitioner’s occupation was illegal. Such an allegation is insufficient
to determine if the action was filed within a year from dispossession, a jurisdictional requirement
in an ejectment case.

Therefore, the proper remedy of respondents should have been to file an accion publiciana
and not summary proceedings for ejectment.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER SHOULD SHOW THAT POSSESSION WAS

INITIALLY LEGAL OR TOLERATED

Fatima O. De Guzman-Fuerte vs. Spouses Silvino S. Estomo

G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the CA decision which dismissed the unlawful
detainer and damages case filed by Fuerte against respondent Spouses Estomo.

The controversy arose from the foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject
property between Fuerte and Manuela Co. The writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since
Co was no longer residing at the property and that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied
the same. In the complaint for unlawful detainer, RTC reversed the MTCC and ruled in favor Fuerte
and ruled that notice to vacate the subject property served through registered mail is a substantial
compliance with the modes of service under Section 2, Rule 70.

Petitioner maintains that it is a hornbook rule that the purchaser of a real property from a
vendor who no longer occupies the said property need not prove as an essential requisite how and
the manner the present possessor came into occupation. As long as she fulfills the requisite of
demand to vacate, she may bring an action for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE:
Should a complaint for unlawful detainer show that respondent’s possession was initially
legal or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful possession?

RULING:
Yes, a complaint for unlawful detainer should sufficiently show that possession of the
respondents is initially legal or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful possession.

In summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only issue to
be determined is who between the contending parties has better possession of the contested
property. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the
following: (a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff
to the defendant about the termination of the latter's right of possession; (c) Thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and
(d) Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. In the absence of these factual allegations, an
action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court does not have
jurisdiction over the case.

In this case, the complaint did not comply with the requirements of unlawful detainer. It did
not allege that spouses Estomo's occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent. Likewise,
the Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest tolerated the
spouses' possession on account of an express or implied contract between them. Neither was
there any averment which shows any overt act on Fuerte's part indicative of her permission to
occupy the land. Hence, the complaint failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer.

Therefore, MTCC failed to acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of Fuerte's complaint and the
CA correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case against the Spouses Estomo.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER, THE ACTS OF TOLERANCE MUST BE PROVED, FOR BARE

ALLEGATION OF TOLERANCE WILL NOT SUFFICE

Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. vs. Dela Cruz
G.R. No. 208284, April 23, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the
decision of the RTC and MTC dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer filed by Petitioner
Iglesia against respondent Dela Cruz.

Galvez, a representative of Iglesia demanded Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot and
surrender the peaceful possession of the chapel and to stop using the property for the activities of
Church of Jesus Christ, "New Jerusalem.” The MTC and RTC favored Dela Cruz ruling that
petitioner had failed to establish that it had a better right of possession over the disputed property
arising from its claim of ownership. Moreover, it found that Dela Cruz had proven that she was the
representative of the registered owner of the disputed property.

Petitioner insists that that respondents' right to the possession of the disputed property,
was through mere tolerance, and expired upon receipt of its demand for them to vacate the same
through a letter dated February 12, 2007 and that the date of unlawful deprivation is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate resulting to respondents' continued possession of the
disputed property as unlawful, warranting their ejectment therefrom.

ISSUE:
Is a complaint for unlawful detainer sufficient even if there is failure to show that the
possession of respondent is merely tolerated?

RULING:
No, the complaint is not sufficient if it fails to show that the possession of respondent is
merely tolerated.

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following: (1) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contact with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s
notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the
defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and
(4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within 1 year from the last demand to vacate
the property. In possession by mere tolerance, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative
of its predecessor's tolerance. The acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of
tolerance did not suffice. In Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin, the Court recognized that even as the
registered owner generally has the right of possession as an attribute of ownership, nevertheless
the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer is justified where proof of preponderant
evidence of material possession of the disputed premises has not been convincingly adduced.

In this case, petitioner miserably failed to substantiate its claim that it merely tolerated
respondents' possession of the disputed property. It did not adduce such evidence. It is thus quite
evident from the allegations and evidence presented by petitioner that its claim that it merely
tolerated respondents' entry into and possession of the disputed property, is baseless and
unsubstantiated.

Therefore, the complaint for unlawful detainer is properly dismissed.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

AVERMENTS IN A COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER ARE JURISDICTIONAL

AND MUST APPEAR ON THE FACE OF THE COMPLAINT

Pablo C. Hidalgo vs. Sonia Velasco

G.R. No. 202217, April 25, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and the
Resolution of the CA. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC, that the MCTC had no jurisdiction
over petitioner Pablo B. Hidalgo's Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages.

Petitioner claims that in year 2000, previous owner Juana H. Querubin, executed a Deed
of Donation in his favor, conveying three (3) parcels of land unto him, which is the subject of this
controversy. When petitioner visited the property, respondent was in possession. He sent several
letters demanding that she vacate. Respondent contended that the MCTC had no jurisdiction over
the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Damages since the ejectment complaint was not
compliant with the one-year filing period for unlawful detainer cases.

MCTC resolved the suit in petitioner’s favor. However, the RTC rendered a decision in
respondent’s favor and that petitioner failed to aver in the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer certain
jurisdictional elements to qualify as a complaint as an unlawful detainer suit when he failed to aver
that respondent had held possession of Cadastral Lot No. 77 by virtue of an express or implied
contract that later expired or terminated. The CA affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this petition where
petitioner insists that the subject complaint sufficiently amounted to a case for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE:
Does the MCTC have jurisdiction over the case of unlawful detainer when there is failure
to allege the jurisdictional facts?

RULING:
No, the MCTC does not have jurisdiction because of the failure to allege the jurisdictional
facts.

The basic rule is that what determines the natures of an action, as well as the courts that
has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause
of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) That initially, the possession of the
property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) That eventually,
such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter's right of possession; (3) That thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) That within one year from the
last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
These averments are jurisdictional and must appear on the face of the complaint.

In this case, the subject complaint fails to aver, at the very least, the first and the second
recitals. We thus agree with both the RTC and the CA that it fails to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements of an action for unlawful detainer, following which, the MCTC could not exercise
jurisdiction over it.

Therefore, the MCTC had no jurisdiction and the dismissal was proper.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A PERSON WHO COMMITS ANY IMPROPER CONDUCT TENDING, DIRECTLY OR

INDIRECTLY, TO IMPEDE, OBSTRUCT, OR DEGRADE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE MAY BE PUNISHED FOR INDIRECT CONTEMPT

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) vs. Federico A. Serra, et. al.
G.R. No. 216124, July 19, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for indirect contempt with prayer of issuance of TRO filed by petitioner,
RCBC, against respondents, Federico Serra and Sps. Andueza, for alleged disregard of the SC’s
final and executory decisions.

In a previous case, RTC-Makati rendered a decision directing respondent Serra to sell to

RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate on which the Masbate Business Center of RCBC was located.
RCBC filed a motion for execution of such decision. It turns out that during the pendency of the
civil case, Serra mortgaged the property to Sps. Andueza, which was annotated in the OCT. RTC
denied the motion for execution for lack of basis for having been filed 18 years after the decision
became final and executory. RCBC filed a petition for review with the SC praying for the issuance
of a TRO. The TRO was granted and made permanent.

Meanwhile, Sps. Andueza filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage since Serra defaulted on his loan obligation. RCBC filed a motion for execution with the
RTC-Makati to enforce the restraining order granted by the SC. Andueza filed an opposition. RTC-
Makati granted the motion for execution holding that the REM is inferior to RCBC’s right to
mortgage. Acting on the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure the provincial sheriff of RTC-Masbate
held a public auction. RCBC filed a petition for injunction before RTC-Masbate which granted a
72-hour TRO. Afterwards, the sheriff scheduled anew the public auction. Meanwhile, Andueza won
the bidding, and a certificate of sale was issued in their favor. Andueza filed an ex-parte motion for
the issuance of writ of possession in RTC-Masbate which was granted. RCBC filed a petition for
indirect contempt before the SC assailing that Serra refused to obey the Court's restraining order.

ISSUE:
Is a person liable for indirect contempt for impeding the administration of justice by allowing
a possessor to be removed from the subject property?

RULING:
Yes, a person is guilty of indirect contempt.

Contempt of court is a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. Indirect

contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. A
person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits
any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.

In this case, by virtue of the TRO made permanent, Serra was enjoined to perform any act
to remove RCBC from the subject property. Yet, by defaulting on his loan obligation with Andueza,
and Andueza's foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in effect allowed the removal of
RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to impede the administration of justice by
effectively allowing RCBC to be removed from the premises of the subject property, in
contravention of the clear directive in the decision and restraining order.

Therefore, respondent Serra is liable for indirect contempt.

158 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

INDIRECT CONTEMPT IS COMMITTED THROUGH ANY OF THE ACTS ENUMERATED

UNDER RULE 71, SECTION 3 OF THE RULES OF COURT

Bro. Bernard Oca et.al. vs. Laurita Custodio

G.R. No. 199825, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari via Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA
affirming RTC’s decision in finding petitioners, Oca et. al. guilty of indirect contempt.

St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle brothers. The two
parties executed a MOA under which De La Salle Greenhills (LSGH) will supervise the academic
affairs of St. Francis School. Petitioners and respondent are members of the Board of Trustees
(BoT) of St. Francis School. The members of the BoT came to a disagreement. The petitioners
ruled that LSGH’s supervision be expanded to include matters relating to finances, administration
and operation, to which respondent Custodio was the lone opposer. Custodio was removed from
the BoT and as Curriculum Administrator. She filed a complaint against petitioners for violation of
the Corporation Code with prayer for issuance of a TRO to enjoin the remaining board members
from holding meetings and to prevent Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from discharging their
functions as members, trustees, and officers of St. Francis School. The TRO was granted.

A day after the hearing, Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion, alleging that after the
hearing for the TRO, counsel for petitioners went to the school and among others, instructed the
parents to pay matriculation fees exclusively to the son of petitioner, Cirila, instead of the school
cashier Reynante. She likewise filed a Motion for Clarification, to which RTC issued an Order
designating Reynante to act as school cashier and directed petitioners to turn over all money
previously collected. Despite several orders of the RTC to fully comply with the previous order,
petitioners failed to turn over the full amount. This prompted Custodio to file a Petition to Cite
Respondents in Contempt of Court against petitioners. RTC found them guilty of indirect contempt.
CA affirmed the decision. MR was denied.

ISSUE:
Is a person guilty of indirect contempt for refusal to turn over the fees despite court orders?

RULING:
Yes, the continuous refusal to turn over the fees despite several court orders constitutes
indirect contempt.

Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its
authority, justice, and dignity. It constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court
and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their witnesses during litigation." Indirect
contempt is committed through any of the acts enumerated under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

In the case at hand, petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt which punishes,
“disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court.” They were
given several opportunities to comply with the court orders, but they refused to obey. They keep
on questioning the legality of the orders which are immediately executory as held under Section 4
of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies as amended. Such
failure to comply showed petitioner’s defiance and disregard for the authority of the trial court.

Therefore, petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.

| 159
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

OFFENSIVE AND DISRESPECTFUL STATEMENTS IN A MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION BY A PARTY AND ITS COUNSEL MAY BE SANCTIONED FOR
INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT

Fortune Life Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Commission on Audit Proper et al.
G.R. No. 213525, November 21, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
The Court issued a resolution which denied petitioner Fortune Life Insurance Company’s
motion for reconsideration and required petitioner and counsel to show cause as to why they
should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for using in the said Motion for
Reconsideration harsh and disrespectful language towards the Court.

In their Joint Explanation, both have apologized for the statements made but have stated
nonetheless that they had been constrained to attach cut print-outs of registry receipt numbers
because the Makati City Central Post Office (MCPO) stopped issuing registry receipts and had
adopted an electronic system instead; that they thought that the Court, in mentioning proof of
service, had been referring to the non-submission of the affidavit of service; that Atty. Fortaleza
had been only lacking in finesse in the formulation of his submissions; that the petitioner honestly
believed that it had faithfully complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court on the service
of pleadings; and that because of time constraints Atty. Fortaleza had not been able to sufficiently
go over the Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Is a person guilty of indirect contempt of court by employing harsh and disrespectful
language in the Motion for Reconsideration that accused the Court and its members of ignorance
and recklessness in the performance of their function of adjudication?

RULING:
Yes, he is guilty of indirect contempt of court for employing harsh and disrespectful
language in the Motion for Reconsideration.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically
granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought
to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence,
respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve
themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for
contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the due
administration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respect of the
courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the
courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation

In this case, the statements of the petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza unquestionably tended to
attribute gross inefficiency and negligence to the Court and its staff. It is worse because the
statements were uncalled for and unfounded. As such, the statements should be quickly deterred
and gravely sanctioned for actually harming and degrading the administration of justice by the
Court itself. The wrong the statements wrought on the reputation and prestige of the Court and its
operating staff must by all means be vindicated, and even undone if that was at all possible.

Therefore, petitioner and Atty. Fortaleza are guilty of indirect contempt for employing harsh
and disrespectful language that accused the Court and its members of ignorance and recklessness
in the performance of their function of adjudication.

160 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

GOOD FAITH SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS

L.C. Big Mak Burger, Inc. vs. Mcdonald's Corporation

G.R. No. 233073, February 14, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari which seeks to reverse the decision of the Court
of appeals finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.

In the infringement case between L.C. Big Mak and Mcdonald’s Corporation, the
Infringement Court restrained petitioner from using the name "Big Mak" or any other mark, word,
name, or device, which by colorable imitation is likely to confuse, mislead or deceive the public
into believing that the goods and services of petitioner is affiliated with respondent for its fast food
restaurant business.

However, respondent filed a Petition for Contempt against petitioner and its President. It
argued that L.C. Big Mak continues to disobey and ignore their judgment obligation by continuously
using the words "Big Mak” and refusing to pay the damages awarded to respondent.

Petitioner argued that pursuant to the injunction order, it has been using its corporate
name, “L.C Big Mak” or “Super Mak” instead of the proscribed mark in their business operations.
As to the damages, petitioner offered and tendered payment through the sheriff, but respondent
refused to accept the same and demanded that payment be made directly to it.

ISSUE:
Should the good faith of the contemnor to comply with a court’s order be considered contempt
proceedings?

RULING:
Yes, good faith of the alleged contemnor should be considered in contempt proceedings.

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public

authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of
a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect
due to such a body. The intent goes to the gravamen of the offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack
of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered in contempt proceedings. A person should
not be condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and in good
faith however erroneous may be his conclusion as to his rights.

In this case, petitioner's good faith in complying with the court's order is manifest. Pursuant
to the injunction order, it has been using its corporate name, “L.C Big Mak” or “Super Mak” instead
of the proscribed mark in their business operations such as in the wrappers of their goods.

Therefore, petitioner is not guilty of indirect contempt because it complied with the
injunction order in good faith.

| 161
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

INTESTATE COURTS CANNOT ADJUDICATE TITLE TO PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE

PART OF THE ESTATE; JURISDICTION IS LIMITED TO MATTERS HAVING TO DO
WITH THE SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS

Teresa R. Ignacio vs. Ramon Reyes, Florencio Reyes, Jr., Rosario R. Du and Carmelita R. Pastor
G.R. No. 213192, July 12, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of certiorari filed by petitioner Teresa Ignacio challenging the
decision of the CA which annulled and set aside the orders of the RTC.

The RTC of Pasig City, the intestate court, declared Petitioner Teresa Ignacio as the
administratrix of the estate of their father. She executed lease contracts over parcels of land. The
respondents filed in the RTC of Baguio City complaints for partition, annulment of lease contract,
accounting, and damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioner and the lessees, alleging they are co-owners of the properties but she misrepresented
that Florencio Sr. is the sole owner of the properties and leased them to other persons without
their conformity. The Baguio RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate
court regarding the possible distribution of the subject properties. The intestate court denied the
motion. However, the CA annulled and set aside the orders of the intestate court.

Petitioner maintains that the intestate court asserted its jurisdiction and authority over the
subject properties and proceeded to conduct hearings to resolve the issues. The Baguio RTC
opted to defer and not to proceed with the cases. However, she agrees with the findings of the CA
that the Magsaysay property is co-owned by the parties, and should not be covered by the estate
proceedings.

ISSUE:
Does the intestate court have jurisdiction to determine the issue on ownership regarding
the properties?

RULING:
No, the intestate court does not have jurisdiction to determine the issue on ownership
regarding the properties.

A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot

adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed
to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.

In this case, the Court holds that the rule on the limited jurisdiction of the RTC as intestate
court is applicable. As to the Magsaysay property, it is evident from the certificate of title that the
rights of parties will be impaired should the intestate court decide on the ownership of the property.

Therefore, the intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it asserted
jurisdiction over the subject properties since its jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons.

162 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHILE THE PROBATE COURT EXERCISES LIMITED JURISDICTION, IT MAY SETTLE

QUESTIONS RELATING TO OWNERSHIP WHEN THE CLAIMANT AND ALL OTHER
PARTIES HAVING LEGAL INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY CONSENT, EXPRESSLY OR
IMPLIEDLY, TO THE SUBMISSION OF THE QUESTION TO THE PROBATE COURT

In The Matter Of The Intestate Estate Of Reynaldo Guzman Rodriguez; Anita Ong Tan vs.
Rolando C. Rodriguez, et al.
G.R. No. 230404, January 21, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals
filed by petitioner Anita Ong Tan (Anita).

Respondents are children of Reynaldo Rodriguez (Reynaldo) and Ester Rodriguez (Ester),
who died on August 27, 2008 and September 11, 2004 respectively. Reynaldo and Ester left
several properties to their surviving children. On February 13, 2009, respondents executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Reynaldo and Ester. On the other hand, Anita is
a co-depositor in a Joint Account under the name Anita Ong Tan and Reynaldo in the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI). Anita filed before the trial court a petition for the: (a) settlement of the
Intestate Estate of the late Reynaldo; and (b) issuance of letters of administration to any competent
neutral willing person, other than any of the heirs of Reynaldo. Anita alleged that the funds used
to open the BPI joint account were her exclusive funds, which came from her East West Bank
account. Anita presented the testimony of Mineleo Serrano, Branch Manager of East West in
Tomas Morato, to corroborate her testimony. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that
the funds deposited in the BPI joint account belonged exclusively to Reynaldo.

The RTC ruled in favor of Anita and held that she had sufficiently adduced evidence to
rebut the presumption that the funds deposited under the BPI joint account of Anita and Reynaldo
were owned by them in common. On appeal, CA reversed the RTC ruling.

ISSUE:
Can the probate court settle questions relating to ownership?

RULING:
As a rule, no, the probate court cannot settle questions relating to ownership.

The rule, that the determination of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved
by the RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court
is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of
practice "which may be waived." Such waiver introduces the exception to the general rule that
while the probate court exercises limited jurisdiction, it may settle questions relating to ownership
when the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment.

In this case, the Court notes that the parties submitted to the jurisdiction of the intestate
court in settling the issue of the ownership of the joint account. While respondents filed a Motion
to Dismiss, which hypothetically admitted all the allegations in Anita's petition, the same likewise
sought affirmative relief from the intestate court. Said affirmative relief is embodied in respondents'
claim of ownership over the funds in said joint account to the exclusion of Anita, when in fact said
funds in the joint account was neither mentioned nor included in the inventory of the intestate
estate of the late Reynaldo.

Therefore, respondents impliedly agreed to submit the issue of ownership before the trial
court, acting as an intestate court, when they raised an affirmative relief before it.

| 163
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

NO EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT SHALL BE BINDING UPON ANY PERSON WHO

HAS NOT PARTICIPATED THEREIN OR HAD NO NOTICE THEREOF

Amparo S. Cruz et.al. vs. Angelito S. Cruz et.al.

G.R. No. 211153, February 28, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to validate the extrajudicial settlement
executed between the heirs.

Amparo S. Cruz et.al (petitioners) and Angelito S. Cruz et.al. (respondents) are the heirs
of Spouses Felix Cruz who executed extrajudicial settlement among themselves, agreeing that
each of them is entitled to one (1) share each of the subject property. However, it was later
discovered by the heirs that Antonia has been allocated with two (2) lots contrary to the extrajudicial
agreement. Amparo and Antonia defrauded their sibling, Concepcion who was illiterate, to sign the
deed of extrajudicial settlement without explaining fully its contents, thereby depriving her of her
inheritance. Thus, respondents asked that the deed be declared null and void. Petitioners argued
that the Deed was freely and voluntarily agreed upon and thus free from vitiated consent.

The RTC ruled that there was no vitiation of consent and that the action has been barred
by prescription. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision holding that in case one of the
parties to a contract is unable to read and fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must
show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.

ISSUE:
Is an extrajudicial settlement, signed by an illiterate to whom the contents of such
settlement have not been explained, resulting in an heir getting a bigger share than the other heirs
valid?

RULING:
No, the extrajudicial settlement is not valid signed by an illiterate to whom the contents of
such settlement have not been explained.

No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. As the partition was a total nullity, it did not affect the excluded
heirs. Under the law, "the children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares."

In this case, one heir was able - through the expedient of an extrajudicial settlement that
was written in a language that is not understood by one of her co-heirs - to secure a share in the
estate of her parents that was greater than that of her siblings, in violation of the principle in
succession that heirs should inherit in equal shares. This is a simple case of exclusion in legal
succession, where co-heirs were effectively deprived of their rightful share to the estate of their
parents who died without a will- by virtue of a defective deed of extrajudicial settlement or partition
which granted a bigger share to one of the heirs and was prepared in such a way that the other
heirs would be effectively deprived of discovering and knowing its contents.

Therefore, the extrajudicial settlement is void.

164 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS CANNOT BE ISSUED IF THE PERSON ALLEGEDLY

DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED UNDER A LAWFUL PROCESS OR ORDER OF
THE COURT

In The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas Corpus, Ssgt. Edgardo L. Osorio vs.
Assistant State Prosecutor Juan Pedro C. Navera et al.
G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolutions of CA. The CA found
that custody over Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio) was by virtue of a valid judicial
process; thus, it denied SSgt. Osorio's Petition for Issuance of a Writ of habeas corpus.

SSgt. Osorio, together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan was
charged in two (2) Informations before RTC Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of the
Philippines students Karen E. Empeño and Sherlyn T. Cadapan. SSgt. Osorio was arrested by
Col. Herbert Yambing, the Provost Marshall General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the CA contending that he was
being illegally deprived of his liberty and mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court had
jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the
offense charged was allegedly "service-connected.”

The CA held that SSgt. Osorio's confinement was "by virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial
process.” The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is punished under the Revised
Penal Code and is not "service-connected." Thus, the RTC properly took cognizance of the case
and, consequently, the warrants of arrest were issued under a valid judicial process.

ISSUE:
Is the petition for habeas corpus a proper remedy for a person who has been deprived of
liberty but thereafter was restrained under a lawful order of the Court?

RULING:
No, the petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy for a person who has been
deprived of liberty but thereafter was restrained under a lawful order of the Court.

A writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty
is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint then has become legal.
Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic.

In this case, SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to pursue the orderly course of trial and
exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which would be a motion to quash, filed before arraignment,
on the following grounds: the facts charged do not constitute an offense; the court trying the case
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so. SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under Article
267 of the RPC. Applying R.A. No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court,
specifically by the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the crime of kidnapping.

Therefore, the petition for habeas corpus is not the proper remedy anymore.

| 165
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RULE 108 GOVERNS THE PROCEDURE FOR THE CORRECTION OF SUBSTANTIAL

CHANGES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

The Republic of the Philippines vs. Virgie (Virgel) L. Tipay

G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the CA that denied the appeal of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) from the Decision of the RTC.

Respondent Virgel Tipay sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate with
the RTC. Copies of his birth certificates reflect his gender as "FEMALE" and his first name as
"Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of birth in the local civil registrar's copy was
blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he was born on May 12, 1976. Virgel
alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of his birth certificate as follows:
(a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name, from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c)
his month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976.

RTC granted the petition. The Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due
course by the trial court. The Republic, through the OSG argued that the change of Virgel's name
from Virgie should have been made through a proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, premised on the assumption that the summary procedure under Rule 108 is
confined to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors, which excludes one's name or date of
birth. On appeal, CA ruled in favor of Virgel.

ISSUE:
Does Rule 108 govern the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the civil
registry?

RULING:
Yes, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry.

It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a person, are considered substantial errors that were beyond the
purview of the rule. The Court ultimately recognized that substantial or controversial alterations in
the civil registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as long as
the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate adversarial proceedings— effectively limiting
the application of the summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors

In this case, the Republic does not assail whether the proceedings before the trial court
were adversarial, but merely insists on the erroneous premise that a Rule 108 proceeding is limited
to the correction of harmless, clerical or typographical errors in the civil registry. Having established
that the proper recourse for the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry is Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, the Court cannot sustain the Republic's assertion on this matter. The Court has
long settled in Republic v. Olaybar that as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 were
observed, substantial corrections and changes in the civil registry, such as those involving the
entries on sex and date of birth, may already be effected.

Therefore, the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court applies in the correction of
substantial changes in the civil registry.

166 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR PERTAINS TO A MISTAKE COMMITTED

IN THE PERFORMANCE OF CLERICAL WORK THAT IS HARMLESS AND INNOCUOUS,
AND CAN BE CORRECTED OR CHANGED ONLY BY REFERENCE TO OTHER EXISTING
RECORD/S

The Republic of the Philippines vs. Michelle Soriano Gallo

G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision of the CA which denied
the Republic of the Philippines' appeal from the RTC Order granting herein respondent Michelle
Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.

Respondent Michelle Gallo has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has
always been female. She alleged that her Certificate of Live Birth contained errors, which should
be corrected. For her, she was not changing the name that was given to her; she was merely
correcting its entry. RTC granted the petition. It lent credence to the documents Gallo presented
and found that the corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous.”

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through OSG, appealed. It alleged that the
applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. It
argued that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the
title of her Petition and the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo.”
However, the CA denied the appeal. It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy under Rule
108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous.

ISSUE:
Does correcting of a misspelled name involve a substantive change under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court instead of mere correction of clerical errors?

RULING:
No, a correcting of a misspelled name involves a mere correction of clerical errors.

A clerical or typographical error pertains to a mistake committed in the performance of

clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless
and innocuous which is visible to the eyes, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records.

In this case, Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely
correcting the misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as "Michael,"
especially since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are exactly the same. The
differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at the end of "Michelle."
"Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly, considering the possibility of different
accents or intonations of different people. In any case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a
different appellation. The lower courts have determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all
throughout her life. She is merely seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given name.

Therefore, correcting of a misspelled name does not involve a substantive change under
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but instead, it involves a mere correction of clerical errors.

| 167
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

COURT HAS DUTY TO MAKE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT WHEN CONFRONTED

WITH MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF
PROBABLE CAUSE

Priscilla Z. Orbe vs. Leonora O. Miaral

G.R. No. 217777, August 16, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul
the Decision of the CA which annulled the Orders of the RTC.

Leonora O. Miaral (Miaral) agreed to engage in the garment exportation business with
her sister, Priscilla Z. Orbe (Orbe). On one trip to the United States of America respondent told
Orbe that the latter could join Miaral and her daughter Anne Kristine in the trip to the United
States. Miaral convinced Orbe to pay for the plane tickets of Miaral and Anne Kristine amounting
to US$2,071 with a promise to pay Orbe once they arrive in the United States. Upon arrival,
Miaral issued three (3) checks drawn in a bank in the United States as payment. However, one
of the checks was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.

Orbe demanded from Miaral and Anne Kristine the total payment of Two P203,999 and
One Thousand Dollars US$1,000.00. Despite demands, Miaral and Anne Kristine failed to return
the money. Petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against respondent before the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP). The City Prosecutor filed with the RTC a Motion to Withdraw Information on
the ground of lack of probable cause. The RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Withdraw
Information, and directing the arraignment of Miaral and Anne Kristine.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC have authority to deny Motion to Withdraw Information filed by City
Prosecutor?

RULING:
Yes, the RTC has the authority to deny the City Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw
Information.

Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, all criminal actions commenced by a complaint
or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. The general
rule is that in the conduct of a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is given a wide latitude of
discretion to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause. The
exception is where there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, the OCP erred with grave abuse of discretion for dismissing the complaint
for lack of probable cause. The RTC made its own independent assessment whether or not
probable cause exists that the crime was committed. When the RTC is confronted with a Motion
to Withdraw Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, its duty is to make an
independent assessment of the totality of the evidence presented by both parties

Therefore, the CA erred in its ruling because the RTC does have the authority to deny
the City Prosecutor's Motion to Withdraw Information.

168 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

QUALIFYING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES MUST BE STATED IN

ORDINARY AND CONCISE LANGUAGE AND NOT NECESSARILY IN THE LANGUAGE
USED IN THE STATUTE

People of the Philippines vs. Jerson Dasmarinas y Gonzalez

G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Under review is the decision promulgated by the CA affirming with modification judgment
rendered by the RTC finding accused Jerson Dasmarinas (Dasmarinas) and Nino Polo (Polo) guilty
of murder.

The Office of the Prosecutor charged Dasmarinas and Polo with murder. The accusatory
portion of the information stated that the above-named accused conspired and confederated
together and both of them mutually helped and aided each other without justifiable motive, with
intent to kill and with treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation. Dasmarinas
and Polo both pleaded not guilty. After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment, finding and
pronouncing Dasmariñas guilty of murder but acquitting Polo.

Dasmarinas denied killing victim PO2 Marlon Anoya together with accused Polo and stated
that he was at the house of his live-in partner when the killing happened. He also claimed that he
was not charged before for murder and there is no reason why the instant case should be filed
against him.

ISSUE:
Is the use of the word “treachery” in the information sufficient as factual averment to convict
Dasmarinas of murder?

RULING:
No, the use of the word “treachery” in the information is not sufficient as factual averment
to convict Dasmarinas of murder.

Rule is Sec. 9, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, among others, that
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances. The nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by
the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts stated in
the indictment, that is, the actual recital of the facts in the body of the information, and not the
caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated.

In this case, the acts constitutive of treachery were not sufficiently averred. The mere
usage of the term treachery in the information, without anything more, did not suffice for such term
was a conclusion of law, not a factual averment.

Therefore, the cause of accusation stated in the information was not sufficient to charge
Dasmarinas with murder.

| 169
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

COURTS HAVE JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES CONSTITUTING PSYCHOLOGICAL

VIOLENCE UNDER R.A. NO. 9262 COMMITTED THROUGH MARITAL INFIDELITY
EVEN IF THE ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP OCCURRED OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY

AAA vs. BBB

G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition review under certiorari under Rule 45 to nullify the Resolutions of RTC
Branch 158, Pasig City. The assailed Resolution granted the motion to quash the information which
charged respondent BBB under Sec.5(i) of RA no. 9262 (Anti-Violence against Women and their
Children Act of 2004).

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006. Their union produced two
children: CCC and DDD. In May 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
became a permanent resident. AAA claimed that BBB sent little to no financial support, compelling
her to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight attendant.
There were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and
physical and sexual violence. Worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair and live with a
Singaporean woman. On April 19, 2011, AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in
Singapore during her visit with their kids. The investigating prosecutor found sufficient basis to
charge BBB for causing AAA mental and emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.
An Information was filed, and a warrant of arrest was issued against BBB. The case was archived
because BBB continued to evade arrest.

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused with Omnibus
Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest was
filed on behalf of BBB. The trial court granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because the acts complained of occurred in Singapore. Aggrieved by the denial of the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct recourse
to this Court via the instant petition on a pure question of law.

ISSUE:
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the offense of psychological violence under R.A. No.
9262 even if the marital infidelity was committed outside the Philippines?

RULING:
Yes. The RTC has jurisdiction over the offense of psychological violence under R.A. No.
9262 even if the marital infidelity was committed outside the Philippines.

R.A. No. 9262 does not criminalize the marital infidelity per se but the psychological
violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering
of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense. It is necessary
that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed.

In this case, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig
City since March 2010.

Therefore, the RTC has jurisdiction over the offense of psychological violence under R.A.
No. 9262 even if the marital infidelity was committed outside the Philippines.

170 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ONCE AN INFORMATION HAS BEEN FILED IN COURT, THE COURT IS THE BEST AND
SOLE JUDGE ON HOW TO DISPOSE OF THE CRIMINAL CASE

Rural Bank of Mabitac, Laguna Inc. vs. Melanie M. Canicon

G.R. No. 196015, June 27, 2018
Jardaleza, J.

FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC, petitioner seeks to nullify
the CA’s Decision which denied petitioner’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 against the Order
of the RTC.

Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for estafa against its employees, Aguilar, Canicon, and
Espeleta. A preliminary investigation was conducted, wherein probable cause was found against
the accused. Thereafter, an Information for estafa was filed against the accused. Espeleta then
filed a motion for reinvestigation, claiming that a preliminary investigation was conducted hastily.
Meanwhile, Prosecutor Lamada conducted a reinvestigation.

In a report, the prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case against Espeleta and
the filing of an amended information. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor filed a motion for
leave to amend the information. The RTC, through Judge Cabuco-Andres, granted the
prosecutor’s motion and admitted the amended information. Thereafter, the RTC, this time through
Judge Laguilles, issued a Resolution which set aside the initial order issued by the prosecutor,
ruling that a procedural misstep was committed when Prosecutor Lomarda conducted the
reinvestigation without prior leave of court.

The accused then filed motion for reconsideration. The RTC, through Judge Baybay,
granted the said motions. The RTC held that the public prosecutor has the sole discretion to decide
whether to indict a person.

ISSUE:
Should the disposition of the case, once filed in court, be under the sole discretion of the
judge?

RULING:
Yes, the disposition of the case, once filed in court, be under the sole discretion of the
judge.

Once an information is filed in court, all actions including the exercise of the discretion of
the prosecution are subject to the disposal of the court. This includes reinvestigation of the case,
the dropping of the accused from the information, or even dismissal of the action as to the accused.
In the landmark case of Crespo v. Mogul, the Court emphasized that once an information has been
filed in court, the court is the best and sole judge on how to dispose of the criminal case. The rule
therefore is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case as to
its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.

In this case, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it merely approved
the position taken by Prosecutor Lomarda without assessing the evidence on record.

Therefore, the RTC did not err in granting the motion for reconsideration.

| 171
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE IS AN EXECUTIVE FUNCTION; REVIEWABLE

ONLY UPON SHOWING OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Price Richardson Corporation Consuelo Velarde-
Albert, and Gordon Resnik
G.R. No. 197032, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that
the CA’s decision, affirming the Resolutions of the Department of Justice (DOJ), which denied the
petition for review filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), be reversed and set
aside.

The SEC filed before the DOJ its complaint against Price Richardson Corporation and its
incorporators and directors for violation of Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC and Secs. 26.3 and 28 of
the Securities Regulation Code. State Prosecutor Reyes issued a resolution, dismissing the
Securities and Exchange Commission's complaint for lack of probable cause. SEC moved for
reconsideration which was denied by Reyes in a resolution. The SEC then filed before the
Department of Justice a petition for review of State Prosecutor Reyes’ resolutions, which was
denied by Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez. The SEC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was
denied by Secretary Gonzalez in his resolution. The SEC filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA for the annulment of Secretary Gonzalez’s resolutions. The CA affirmed the assailed
resolutions, holding that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Secretary Gonzalez.

Petitioner claims that Secretary Gonzalez committed grave abuse of discretion in not
finding probable cause to indict respondents.

ISSUE:
May the court pass upon the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause?

RULING:
Yes, the court may pass upon the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause.

Jurisprudence establishes that the determination of probable cause to charge a person of

a crime is an executive function, which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor and the justice secretary. The court may not pass upon or interfere with the prosecutor's
determination of the existence of probable cause to file an information regardless of its correctness.
However, if the public prosecutor erred in its determination of probable cause, an appeal can be
made before the Department of Justice Secretary. Simultaneously, the accused may move for the
suspension of proceedings until resolution of the appeal.

In this case, the SEC provided sufficient bases to form a belief that a crime was possibly
committed by respondent Price Richardson and an examination of the records reveals that
probable cause exists to file an information against respondent Price Richardson for violating the
laws.

Therefore, the court may pass upon the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause.

172 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

COURTS OF LAW ARE PRECLUDED FROM DISTURBING THE FINDINGS OF THE

PUBLIC PROSECUTORS AND THE DOJ ON THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF
PROBABLE CAUSE, UNLESS SUCH FINDINGS ARE TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION

Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation vs. Manu Gidwani

G.R. No. 234616, June 20, 2018
Velasco Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by Philippine Deposit
Insurance System (PDIC) assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The
challenged rulings reversed the finding of probable cause to charge respondent Manu Gidwani
(Manu) with estafa through falsification, and for money laundering as defined in Section 4(a) of RA
9160.

Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued resolutions closing the rural banks owned by the
Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Banks), and thereafter placed them under the receivership
of Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). Gidwani and 86 other individuals represented
themselves to be owners of deposit accounts with the Legacy Banks and filed claims with PDIC.
PDIC then processed and issued crossed checks “Payable to the Payee’s Account Only” to the
owners of the deposit accounts. Despite this explicit instruction, all checks were credited to a single
account owned by Manu Gidwani (Manu) with RCBC.

PDIC then found out that some of the accounts with the Legacy Banks were in the names
of helpers and rank-and-file employees of the Spouses Gidwani. It then filed a criminal complaint
before the DOJ Task Force against the Spouses Gidwani, but it was dismissed for lack of probable
cause. On appeal, Undersecretary of Justice Justiniano denied the same because PDIC failed to
overcome the presumption of ownership over the subject deposits. Upon motion for
reconsideration, Secretary of Justice Caparas, reversed the previous resolutions upon findings of
probable cause and stated that the individual depositors committed false pretenses when they
made it appear that they were legitimate owners of the subject bank accounts. Manu then elevated
the manner to the Court of Appeals which reversed the Caparas Resolution and stated that SOJ
Caparas virtually had no option but to affirm the findings of the DOJ Task Force and of SOJ
Justiniano.

ISSUE:
Can the Court of Appeals pass upon the findings of the prosector’s existence of probable
cause?

RULING:
Yes, the CA pass upon the findings of the prosector’s existence of probable cause.

Courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of the public prosecutors and the
DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal
information, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, SOJ Caparas has the power and discretion to make his own personal
assessment of the pleadings and evidence subject of review. He is not bound by the rulings of his
predecessors because there is yet to be a final resolution of the issue, and the matter is
still pending before his office after all. To hold otherwise would render the filing of the motion a
futile exercise, and the recourse, pointless.

Therefore, it was an error for the CA to have ruled that SOJ Caparas virtually had no option
but to affirm the findings of the DOJ Task Force and of SOJ Justiniano.

| 173
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JUDGES ARE MANDATED TO DETERMINE PROBABLE CAUSE BASED ON THE

EVIDENCE PRESENTED

People of the Philippines vs. Ernesto Delos Santos

G.R. No. 220685, November 29, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Amended Decision
and Resolution of the CA which dismissed the complaint for qualified theft against Ernesto Delos
Santos (Delos Santos) for lack of probable cause and quashed the arrest warrant against him.

Delos Santos undertook the construction of the CTTL Building, adjacent to the Benguet
Pines Tourist Inn, owned and operated by University of Manila (UM). At that time, Delos Santos’
father, Virgilio, President of UM, permitted the former to tap into the UM’s electricity and water
supply. After a year, Virgilio died and was succeeded by Emily De Leon as President of UM. UM,
represented by De Leon, filed a criminal complaint before the Office of City Prosecutor in Baguio
City against Delos Santos for qualified theft on the electricity and water supply of BPTI, with a total
value of around P3,000,000.00. The Office of the Prosecutor filed an Information charging
respondent of qualified theft was filed before the RTC Branch 7 of Baguio City.

Delos Santos filed before the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause, alleging the Information failed to show sufficient proof to warrant a finding of
probable cause. The RTC denied the Urgent Omnibus Motion upon finding that a probable cause
exists. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision in toto. Delos Santos moved for
reconsideration and inhibition, attributing irregularities on the members of the said Division. The
case was re-raffled to another CA Division which issued an Amended Decision setting aside the
RTC orders, dismissing the complaint, and quashing the arrest warrant against respondent.

ISSUE:
Is the judge mandated to determine probable cause based on the evidence presented?

RULING:
Yes, the judge is mandated to determine probable cause based on the evidence presented.

Under Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, a judge may immediately dismiss a case
if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. Otherwise, the judge should not
dismiss the case and thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. In doubtful cases, however, the
appropriate course of action would be to order the presentation of additional evidence.

In this case, the RTC gravely erred when it denied the respondent’s motion for judicial
determination of probable cause. It should have granted the same and accordingly dismissed the
case as the records are bereft of evidence to establish probable cause.

Therefore, the CA did not err in finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in holding
that probable cause existed against Delos Santos, since the evidence presented clearly fails to
establish the same.

174 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS POWER TO EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW OVER

FINDINGS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Robertson S. Chiang vs. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co.

G.R. No. 196679, December 13, 2017
Jardaleza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA Decision and Resolution which
nullified and set aside DOJ Resolutions dismissing the complaint of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Co. (PLDT).

PLDT requested the assistance of Regional Intelligence Special Operation Office-National

Capital Region Police Office (RISOO), in conducting further investigation on illegal toll bypass
operations of Worldwide Web Corp. (Worldwide Web), Message One, Inc. (Message One), and
Planet Internet Mercury One (Planet Internet). Upon application of RISOO, the RTC of Quezon
City issued three search warrants against Worldwide Web, Message One, and Planet Internet for
violation of PD no. 401and Art. 308(1) in relation to Art. 309 of the RPC. RISOO served the search
warrant against Planet Internet and was able to seize various equipment. RISOO endorsed the
case to DOJ, recommending that petitioners, Lacson, and Julio be charged with violations of
paragraph 1 of Article 308 (theft), in relation to Article 309, of the RPC and PD No. 401. The Office
of City Prosecutor Pasig dismissed the charges for insufficiency of evidence and filed a motion to
withdraw the informations before the RTC. The RTC allowed the informations to be withdrawn.
PLDT filed a petition for review before the DOJ, but the same was denied and the findings of the
OCP Pasig were affirmed.

Thereafter, PLDT filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the DOJ committed
grave abuse of discretion in sustaining OCP Pasig’s findings. The CA granted the petition, finding
probable cause for the theft in petitioners’ act of depriving PLDT of fees and tolls.

ISSUE:
Does the CA have power to exercise judicial review over the findings of the DOJ where
there is grave abuse of discretion?

RULING:
Yes, the CA has power to exercise judicial review over DOJ findings where there is grave
abuse of discretion.

Jurisprudence establishes that the determination of probable cause is a function that

belongs to the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice, who may direct the
filing of the corresponding information or move for the dismissal of the case. However, the
resolution of the Secretary of Justice may be subject of judicial review when grave abuse of
discretion exists and is alleged.

In this case, the elements of the crime were clearly present and have sufficiently
engendered a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed. The DOJ, through its
secretary, thus committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding the same.

Therefore, the CA has the power to exercise judicial review over the findings of the DOJ
where there is grave abuse of discretion.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WAIVER UNDER ARTICLE 125 OF RPC NOT A LICENSE TO DETAIN AD INFINITUM

Integrated Bar of the Philippines Pangasinan Legal Aid and Jay-Ar R. Senin vs. Department of
Justice, Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, and
Philippine National Police
G.R. No. 232413, July 15, 2017
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for the issuance of Writ of habeas corpus filed by the IBP Pangasinan
Chapter Legal Aid, pursuant to its purpose, as stated in "In Matter of the Integration of the Bar of
the Philippines," issued by the SC and provisions under the Guidelines Governing the
Establishment and Operation of Legal Offices in All Chapters of the IBP.

IBP represents in this case its client, Jay-Ar Senin who was arrested while engaged in the
sale of illegal drugs during a buy-bust operation. Thereafter, he executed a waiver of the provisions
of Article 125 of the RPC. After preliminary investigation, the prosecutor resolved to dismiss the
case. The case was forwarded to DOJ for automatic review.

IBP claims that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and
the PNP, the unbridled right to detain Senin indefinitely subject only to the whims and caprices of
the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. Rules of Court provides that preliminary investigation must
be terminated within 15 days from its inception if the person arrested had requested for a
preliminary investigation and had signed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125. The detention
beyond this period violates Senin's constitutional right to liberty. The review of the investigating
prosecutor's resolution has been pending with the DOJ for more than eight months. BJMP
contended that Senin has been confined in its facility through a valid commitment order issued by
the court and cannot be released without an order directing the same.

ISSUE:
Does the waiver under Article 125 of the RPC gives the State the right to detain a person
indefinitely?

RULING:
No, the State has no right to detain a person indefinitely despite the waiver under Article
125 of the RPC.

The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and PNP
the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject him to the whims and
caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver of Article 125 must coincide with the
prescribed period for preliminary investigation as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. Detention beyond this period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty. Stated
differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license to detain a person ad
infinitum.

Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be promptly
released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a waiver of Article 125, if the
15-day period (or the thirty 30-day period in cases of violation of R.A. No. 9165) for the conduct of
the preliminary investigation lapses. This rule also applies in cases where the investigating
prosecutor resolves to dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made
the subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review.

Therefore, the State has no right to detain a person indefinitely despite the waiver under
Article 125 of the RPC.

176 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS DURING

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; A FUNCTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Public Attorney’s Office vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 197613, November 22, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the Resolution and Order
issued by the Office of the Ombudsman which dismissed, for lack of probable cause, the criminal
complaints against Atty. Rivera for violation of R.A. No. 6713, R.A. No. 3019, and R.A. No. 3815.

Atty. Rivera is a Public Attorney V for PAO Regional Office No. III in March 2004. PAO
received a Letter and Affidavit by a certain Hazel Magabo, alleging that contrary to PAO’s internal
rules, Atty. Rivera agreed to handle an annulment case sought to be filed by her brother and
received staggered payments in total of P93,000.00. Magabo later discovered that Atty. Rivera did
not file any petition on her brother’s behalf. PAO referred the letter to DOJ for proper disposition.
Thereafter, the DOJ issued a Resolution finding Atty. Rivera liable for conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of service. During the pendency of the DOJ proceeding, Atty. Rivera submitted a
Certificate of Service anent her attendance for November 2006. There were discrepancies
discovered between her Certificate of Service and the Certification issued by DPA Aclan.
Thereafter, the PAO Designated Resident Ombudsman (Atty. Recto) issued a Report
recommending that Atty. Rivera be held administratively and criminally liable for the acts committed
during her incumbency as Public Attorney.

Based on the said Report, Atty. Recto and the NBI filed criminal complaints against Atty.
Rivera. The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaints in a Resolution. PAO filed a Motion
for Reconsideration and subsequent Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Both motions were
denied by the Ombudsman for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Does the Ombudsman have the power to direct the dismissal of the criminal complaints
against Atty. Rivera for lack of probable cause?

RULING:
Yes, the Ombudsman has the power to direct the dismissal of the criminal complaints.

Jurisprudence is clear in that the determination of probable cause against those in public
office during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the Ombudsman.
He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it to be insufficient in form or substance, or
he may proceed with the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and
substance.

In this case, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible,
the Court shall respect such findings, unless the exercise of such discretionary powers is tainted
by grave abuse of discretion. The assailed Resolution and Order were issued within the bounds of
the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers.

Therefore, the Ombudsman has the power to direct the dismissal of the criminal complaints
against Atty. Rivera for lack of probable cause.

| 177
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT SUPPLEMENTS ON OMBUDSMAN’S

FINDINGS OF PROBABLE CAUSE DOES NOT REFUTE THE VALIDITY OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Carmencita O. Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 203797-98, June 27, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, which stemmed from the investigation of various transactions
of the famous P728,000,000.00 fertilizer fund allegedly involving public officers from the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and others, including petitioner Carmencita O. Reyes.

Based on the said Complaint, the Ombudsman filed two Informations against Reyes, one
for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." The
other for a violation of Article 220 of the RPC or Technical Malversation. Both were allegedly
committed during the incumbency of Reyes as Provincial Governor of Marinduque. Reyes filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion in the anti-graft and technical malversation cases.

Reyes argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no probable cause exists for either
case. Reyes assails the Sandiganbayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Senate
BRC) Report being not part of the record of the case and considers it hearsay, as well as the
finding that the "arguments propounded by the accused-movants reveal that they are matters of
defense."

ISSUE:
Is a dismissal of the case by the Sandiganbayan proper, even if it referred to the Senate
BRC Reports in its decision?

RULING:
Yes, the dismissal of the Sandiganbayan is proper, even if it referred to the Senate BRC
Reports in its decision.

In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have
the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There
is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

In this case, the Ombudsman itself conducted its own preliminary investigation. The
Ombudsman, faced with the facts and circumstances extant herein, was led to believe that a crime
has been committed and there is probable cause that Reyes was guilty thereof. That the
Ombudsman referred to the Senate BRC Report as additional basis, and that the Sandiganbayan
also made reference thereto, even if not formally part of the record, does not refute the validity of
the preliminary investigation.

Therefore, the dismissal of the case by the Sandiganbayan was proper, even if it referred
to the Senate BRC Reports in its decision.

178 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST, THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED MUST EXECUTE

AN OVERT ACT INDICATING THAT HE HAS JUST COMMITTED, IS ACTUALLY
COMMITTING, OR IS ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT A CRIME AND SUCH OVER ACT
MUST BE WITHIN THE VIEW OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER

Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on under Rule 65 are the decision and the resolution of
the CA affirming the decision of the RTC, convicting Jeffrey Miguel y Remegio (Miguel) of the crime
of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

A Bantay Bayan operative was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of
a man showing off his private parts. Together with a fellow operative, they went to the said street
and saw a visibly intoxicated person, which was Miguel, urinating and displaying his private parts
while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot. They approached Miguel and asked for an
ID card, but petitioner failed to produce one. Miguel emptied his pockets revealing two pieces of
rolled marijuana leaves. They seized the rolled marijuana leaves and took Miguel to the police
station. The Office of the Prosecutor filed an information before the RTC charging Miguel of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Sec. 11 of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002).

Miguel claims that he was just urinating in front of his workplace when the Bantay Bayan
operatives approached him. He also argued that arrest made on his person was illegal and, thus,
the marijuana purportedly seized was inadmissible as evidence.

ISSUE:
Is the arrest of a person by the Bantay Bayan operatives, in the absence of an overt act
indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime, illegal?

RULING:
Yes, the arrest of a person by the Bantay Bayan operatives, without any overt act indicating
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime, is illegal.

In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113, two elements must concur.
First, the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. Second, such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

In this case, the Bantay Bayan operatives simply responded to a purported report of a man
showing off his private parts which led to petitioner's arrest. Miguel went out to the street to urinate
when the Bantay Bayan operatives chanced upon him. These circumstances do not justify the
conduct of an in flagrante delicto arrest. There was no overt act constituting a crime committed by
petitioner in the presence of the arresting officer.

Therefore, the arrest made on Miguel by the Bantay Bayan operatives is, in the absence
of an overt act indicating he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime, illegal.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TO ASSAIL THE LEGALITY OF ARREST, ONE MUST MOVE TO QUASH THE

INFORMATION BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT

People of the Philippines vs. Joselito Bringcula y Fernandez

G.R. No. 226400, January 24, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is to resolve the appeal of appellant Joselito Bringcula y Fernandez (Bringcula) that
seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape.

On the night of May 2, 2011, private complainant AAA was sleeping in her house together
with her children, house helper and niece. She was awakened when a man wearing a mask
touched her shoulder and poked a firearm at her neck. The man told her that it was a robbery and
that she should keep quiet or else he would kill her. She was able to recognize the voice of the
man to be that of appellant Bringcula. Then, she was ordered to lie face down and was hogtied
using a shoelace.

The appellant took AAA's jewelries and thereafter, made AAA lie on her back and pulled
her pajama and underwear. He also removed his own clothing including his mask. Appellant
proceeded to lick AAA's vagina, kissed her neck, laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. AAA was unable to cry for help because appellant threatened to kill her if she does. After
satisfying his lust, appellant dressed up and took AAA's necklace and two (2) cellular phones.

When appellant left, AAA awakened her niece and told her to shout for help. A certain
BBB, Barangay Captain CCC, Kagawad EEE and some neighbors arrived at AAA's house and
when they asked who the culprit was, she opted not to immediately disclose appellant's identity.
Appellant denied the allegations and interposed alibi as a defense. He claimed that in the evening
of May 2, 2011, he was at home sleeping. His testimony was corroborated by his wife. He also
questions the legality of his warrantless arrest.

ISSUE:
May the accused still assail the validity of his arrest after he had pleaded to the offenses?

RULING:
Yes, the accused may still assail the validity of arrest after he had pleaded to the offenses.

The rule is that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed
to move to quash the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the
arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

In this case, as to the legality of his warrantless arrest, appellant is already estopped from
questioning such because it was never raised prior to his having entered a plea of not guilty.
Moreover, accused-appellant already pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him during
his arraignment without questioning his warrantless arrest. He actively participated in the
proceedings before the trial court thereafter. In effect, appellant is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court and waived any perceived defect or irregularity that may have
attended his arrest.

Therefore, the accused-appellant, in this case, cannot assail the validity of his arrest after
having pleaded to the offenses anymore.

180 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

NO LAWFUL ARREST WAS MADE ON THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT ACTING
SUSPICIOUSLY EXCEPT THAT SHE SMELLED OF LIQUOR

Leniza Reyes y Capistrano vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 229380, June 6, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision of the CA finding Leniza Reyes y Capistrano (Reyes) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating R.A. No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002.

The prosecution alleged that a group of police officers was patrolling when two teenagers
approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo on her left arm
had just bought shabu. A woman, later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description
and smelled like liquor passed by the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and
ordered her to bring it out. Reyes answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?" and
pulled something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right hand. PO1
Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station.

Reyes denied the charges, claiming she came from a drinking spree and was about to
board a jeepney until it was blocked by two civilian men in motorcycles whom she identified to be
one PO1 Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and bring out the shabu in her possession which
she denied having. She was then brought to the police station where the police officers extorted
from her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange for her freedom. But since she failed to give the
money, the police officers took her to Taytay for inquest proceedings.

ISSUE:
Is the warrantless arrest lawful even where Reyes was not acting suspiciously nor
committing an overt criminal act, except that she smelled of liquor?

RULING:
No, the warrantless arrest is unlawful since Reyes was not acting suspiciously nor
committing an overt criminal act; that she smelled of liquor being of no consequence.

As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be
considered a criminal act. Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Sec.
5 (b), Rule 113, particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or
circumstance indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. The validity of this
warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test, showing that "the accused exhibit
an overt act within the view of the police officers suggesting that [she] was in possession of illegal
drugs at the time [she] was apprehended."

In this case, no other overt act could be properly attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion
in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit
a crime. Hence, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. Records failed to show that PO1 Monteras
had any personal knowledge that a crime had been committed by Reyes.

Therefore, the warrantless arrest is unlawful since Reyes was not acting suspiciously nor
committing an overt criminal act; that she smelled of liquor being of no consequence.

| 181
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RES JUDICATA IS A CIVIL LAW PRINCIPLE; DOES NOT APPLY TO BAIL CASES IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Escobar

G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This Rule 45 petition assails the decision of the CA granting the Manuel Escobar’s
(Escobar) second petition for bail, which reserved the decision of the RTC, denying the second
petition for bail on the ground of res judicata.

Escobar filed the first bail petition before the RTC, after being arrested for allegedly being
in conspiracy with others for kidnapping for ransom of Mary Grace Cheng-Rosagasa. During the
hearing on Escobar’s petition for bail, Cubillas, the state witness, testified that Escobar is the
adviser of Villaber, the leader of the group. The RTC dismissed Escobar’s petition for bail for lack
of merit. Escobar appealed the denial of petition for bail before the CA. The CA affirmed the denial
of the first bail petition; Escobar moved to reconsider the CA’s decision affirming the denial of the
first bail petition but was denied. Thereafter, Escobar filed another petition for bail before the RTC.
The RTC denied Escobar’s second bail petition on the ground of res judicata. Escobar moved for
reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. He appealed to the CA via Rule 65, the CA granted
the petition for certiorari and ordered the RTC to determine the appropriate bail for Escobar’s
provisional liberty. Hence, this petition for review.

The prosecution assails the grant of Escobar’s second bail petition; the prosecution avers
that the doctrine of res judicata must be respected.

ISSUE:
Is the second bail petition of Escobar barred by res judicata?

RULING:
No, the second bail petition of Escobar is not barred by res judicata.

Res judicata, as found in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is a principle in civil law and has
no bearing on criminal proceedings. While certain provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied
in criminal cases, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is excluded from the enumeration under Rule 124
of the Rules of Court. Even if we are to expand the argument of the prosecution in this case to
contemplate, res judicata, will still not apply. Res judicata applies only when there is a final
judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order
is not appealed.

In this case, the denial of the first petition for bail being an interlocutory order, the decision
of the CA denying Escobar's first bail petition did not have the effect of res judicata. The kidnapping
case itself has not attained finality.

Therefore, Escobar’s second bail petition is not barred by res judicata.

182 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IF ON EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE RECORD, THE PRESUMPTION IS GREAT THAT

ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF A CAPITAL OFFENSE, BAIL SHOULD BE REFUSED

Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 224162, November 07, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which seeks
to nullify and set aside the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, denying Janet Lim Napoles'
(Napoles) application for bail because the evidence of her guilt for the crime of Plunder is strong.

Ombudsman received the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), regarding
its investigation on several persons, including Napoles, Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) and his former
Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes (Reyes). The Ombudsman Special Panel of Investigators
found probable cause to indict Napoles, among others, with one (1) count of Plunder and fifteen
(15) counts of violating Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019. They likewise recommended to immediately file
the necessary information against all the named accused. Napoles filed her petition for bail but
was later denied by the Sandiganbayan in a resolution. Napoles moved for the reconsideration of
the resolution denying her bail. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion for lack of merit.

Napoles argued that the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
May bail be denied even if there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused?

RULING:
Yes, bail may be denied even if there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

Jurisprudence is clear in that bail hearings are limited to the determination of whether there
is a strong presumption of the guilt of the accused. The law mandates the determination of whether
proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. "Proof evident" or "Evident proof” in this
connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded
dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that
accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered.

In this case, the Sandiganbayan properly denied admission to bail even when there is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is
guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. It is precisely the enormous gravity of this offense
that capital punishment is imposed on those who are found guilty of plunder. As a necessary
consequence, provisional liberty is not easily granted to those accused of this offense, especially
when the prosecution more than amply established that the evidence of guilt is strong.

Therefore, bail may be denied even if there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.

| 183
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING PRESUMPTION OF GUILT IS ENOUGH TO DENY A

PETITION FOR BAIL IN CAPITAL OFFENSES

Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 224162, February 6, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a motion for the reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated November 7, 2017.
The assailed decision of this Court upheld the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions denying Janet Lim
Napoles’ (Napoles) application for bail, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.

Napoles now invokes the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, which was promulgated
on July 19, 2016. The Court in that case reversed the Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer to
evidence in the plunder case against former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) based on
the prosecution's failure to specify the identity of the main plunderer, for whose benefit the ill-gotten
wealth was amassed, accumulated, and acquired.

According to Napoles, the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo should have been applied to her
case.

ISSUE:
Is a denial of the Sandiganbayan of a motion for bail, based only on presumption of guilt,
proper?

RULING:
Yes, a denial of the Sandiganbayan of a motion for bail is proper, even if based only on a
presumption of guilt.

The Court has previously discussed in our Decision dated November 7, 2017, that the trial
court is required to conduct a hearing on the petition for bail whenever the accused is charged with
a capital offense. In this hearing, the trial court's inquiry is limited to whether there is evident proof
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. This standard of proof is clearly different from
that applied in a demurrer to evidence, which measures the prosecution's entire evidence against
the required moral certainty for the conviction of the accused.

In this case, the distinction between the required standards of proof precludes the
application of Macapagal-Arroyo to the present case. The Sandiganbayan's denial of the demurrer
to evidence in Macapagal-Arroyo was annulled based on the paucity of the evidence of the
prosecution, which failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that former President GMA was the
mastermind of the conspiracy to commit plunder. In other words, there was a final determination
of former President GMA's innocence of the crime charged. The resolution of the issue of this case
does not involve an inquiry as to whether there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that Napoles,
or her co-accused as the case may be, was the main plunderer for whose benefit the ill-gotten
wealth was amassed or accumulated.

Therefore, the denial of the Sandiganbayan of petitioner’s motion for bail, based only on
presumption of guilt, was proper.

184 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JUDGES APPROVING BAIL APPLICATIONS IN CASES PENDING OUTSIDE HIS

TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION; GUILTY OF GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

Teodora Altobano-Ruiz vs. Hon. Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893, February 19, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a Complaint against respondent Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay (Judge Pichay)
for gross ignorance of the law and gross misconduct in connection with the latter's act of granting
bail in favor of Francis Eric Paran (Paran).

Complainant Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery case pending before MTCC
Cavite; accused Paran was apprehended at his residence in Quezon City by virtue of the Warrant
of Arrest issued by Judge Mapili. He filed an application for bail before, MeTC, Parañaque City,
which was promptly approved by respondent Judge Pichay. On the other hand, Ruiz voluntarily
surrendered before Judge Mapili and was temporarily released on bail.

Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to approve Paran's application for bail
since the latter already had a pending criminal case for adultery in another court, and he was
actually arrested in Quezon City which was outside Judge Pichay's territorial jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Can a judge grant an application for bail in cases not pending before his sala?

RULING:
No, a judge cannot grant an application for bail in cases not pending before his sala.

Sec. 17 (a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court anticipates two situations. First, the accused
is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is pending. Second, the
accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality other than where his case is pending. In
the first situation, the accused may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence
or unavailability of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province or
city. In the second situation, the accused has two options. First, he may file bail in the court where
his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city or
municipality where he was arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail
with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial judge therein.

In this case, Judge Pichay approved bail bond, and issued a release order, for a case not
pending in his sala. Although Paran was detained at the Parañaque City Police Station, he was
arrested in Quezon City. Considering this, he could file his bail application before any branch at
the RTC of Quezon City, and in the absence of any judge thereat, then before any branch of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Paran could have also filed his bail application before the
MTCC Cavite, where his case was pending. The only circumstance where Judge Pichay can rule
on Paran's bail application is if the latter, who was detained in Parañaque City, was not yet charged
with a criminal offense in another court.

Therefore, the approval of bail applications and issuance corresponding release orders in
a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction, constitute gross ignorance of the law.

| 185
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PLEA BARGAINING IS A PROCEDURAL MATTER; POWER TO PROMULGATE RULES

THEREON BELONGS EXCLUSIVELY TO THE SUPREME COURT

Salvador Estipona, Jr. y Asuela vs. Hon. Frank E. Lobrigo

G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 is the constitutionality
of Sec. 23, the plea-bargaining provision, of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is charged with violation of Sec. 11, R.A. No. 9165 or
possession of dangerous drugs. Estipona filed a motion to allow the accused to enter into a plea
bargaining agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty
for violation of Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 9165 or possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-
time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Estipona argued that Sec. 23 of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 violates the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court, as well as the principle of separation of powers among
the three (3) equal branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Does Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the said
law, violate the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court?

RULING:
Yes, Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the said
law violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court.

Under Sec. 5, par. (5), Art. VIII of the Constitution, The Supreme Court has the sole
prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules, provided that it shall be limited to the
preservation of substantive rights, the former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter.
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by
constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts
belongs exclusively to this Court.

In this case, the Court holds that the rules on plea bargaining neither creates a right nor takes
away a vested right. Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

Therefore, Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the said law
violates the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court.

186 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION IS ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN THERE IS DOUBT ON THE

IDENTITY OF THE OFFENDER CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION AND SUBJECT OF
TRIAL

People of the Philippines vs. Romeo Garin y Osorio

G.R. No. 222654, February 21, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal, Romeo Garin (Garin) assails the decision of the CA affirming with modification
the RTC decision convicting him of rape through sexual assault, in relation to R.A. No. 7610.

During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to a stipulation of facts in which the
defense admitted the identity of Garin as named in the Information; that the victim AAA was a 4-
year old minor; and that the date of the incident was December 25, 2010.

Garin in his appeal, puts in issue the fact that there was no in-court identification.

ISSUE:
Is an in-court identification essential in establishing the guilt of the accused?

RULING:
No, in-court identification is not essential at all times.

In People v. Quezada, the Court held that in-court identification of the offender is essential
only when there is a question or doubt on whether the one alleged to have committed the crime is
the same person who is charged in the Information and subject of the trial.

In this case, there was no doubt since the parties already stipulated on the identity of
appellant. This was done in order to protect AAA, the minor victim, from being traumatized.

Therefore, in the absence of doubt as to the identity of the offender charged in the
information and the person subject of the trial, there is no basis for resort to in-court identification.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DEATH OF THE STATE WITNESS PRIOR TO TRIAL PROPER WILL NOT

AUTOMATICALLY RENDER HIS TESTIMONY DURING THE DISCHARGE
PROCEEDING INADMISSIBLE

People of the Philippines vs. Roger Dominguez y Santos

G.R. No. 229420, February 19, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), seeking to nullify the Resolutions of the CA for directing the testimony of
the deceased state witness Alfred Mendiola (Mendiola) be stricken off the records.

In January 2011, a group of men, later pinpointed as including Mendiola, abducted Venson
Evangelista, a car salesman. Hence, an information against Mendiola and others for Carnapping
with Homicide under Anti-Carnapping Act. A hearing was conducted on the prosecution's motion
that Mendiola be discharged as an accused to become a state witness. Mendiola gave his
testimony and was cross-examined by the counsel for the defense. By a surprise turn of events,
Mendiola was found dead. The RTC issued the assailed Order directing that the testimony of
Mendiola be stricken off the records. The trial court cited Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, noting that there is a requirement that Mendiola must testify again as a regular witness
during trial proper to secure his acquittal. Non-compliance with this requirement, according to the
RTC, amounted to the deprivation of respondents of their constitutional right to due process, and
of their right to confront the witnesses against them.

The OSG argues that the RTC is in error, such justification cited by the court does not
entail inadmissibility of the deceased state witness’ testimony.

ISSUE:
Does the death of the state witness prior to trial automatically render his testimony during
the discharge proceeding inadmissible?

RULING:
No, the death of the state witness prior to trial did not automatically render his testimony
during the discharge proceeding inadmissible.

Under Sec. 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, it is explicit that the testimony of the
witness during the discharge proceeding will only be inadmissible if the court denies the motion to
discharge the accused as a state witness.

In this case, the hearing for the motion had been concluded and the motion for discharge,
approved. Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete. While it is true, that under Rule 119 requires
the accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness, non-compliance
therewith would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an acquittal; it does not
speak rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the discharge proceeding
inadmissible. The testimonies and admissions of a state witness during the discharge proceedings
may be admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse to
testify in accordance with his sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge.

Therefore, the death of the state witness prior to trial did not automatically render his
testimony during the discharge proceeding inadmissible.

188 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL IS DETERMINED BY THE LENGTH,

REASONS, AND PREJUDICE CAUSED BY DELAY AS WELL AS THE ASSERTION OF THE
RIGHT BY THE ACCUSED

Angelito Magno vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 230657, March 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari appealing the decision of the SB which found that
petitioner's right to speedy trial was not violated.

An Information was filed on May 14, 2003 before the RTC charging petitioner with Multiple
Frustrated Murder and Double Attempted Murder. After arraignment, petitioner objected to the
formal appearance of one Atty. Sitoy, who intended to act as a private prosecutor in behalf of the
Ombudsman. The RTC did not allow Atty. Sitoy to participate in the trial. The order was assailed
by the People all the way to the Supreme Court (Private Prosecutor Case).

While the Private Prosecutor Case was still pending, the CA enjoined the RTC from
implementing its orders to exclude Atty Sitoy. However, it clarified that its injunctive writs do not
operate to enjoin the proceedings in criminal aspect of the case, provided that it is conducted in
the presence of the private prosecutor. Thus, trial commenced until it was again halted when the
prosecution challenged an order of the RTC excluding a piece of evidence as inadmissible. The
“Objection Case” delayed proceedings so petitioner filed on a Motion resume trial invoking his right
to speedy trial, which was granted. The prosecution’s presentation was again halted due to the
handling prosecutor’s illness in 2007. It appears that no further hearings were conducted until April
2010 when the petitioner had to move again for the continuation of the trial. Still, trial was reset 3
times until September 2010 so petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of violation of his
right to speedy trial.

The RTC granted petitioner's motion to dismiss. The Sandiganbayan however reversed on
appeal ruling that since both parties contributed to the delays in the case, the petitioner-accused
cannot invoke his right to speedy trial.

ISSUE:
Is a petitioner's right to speedy trial violated when the case is decided more than a decade
after its filing?

RULING:
Yes, a petitioner's right to speedy trial is violated when the case is decided more than a
decade after its filing.

An accused's right to "have a speedy, impartial, and public trial" is guaranteed by the
Constitution. In the determination of whether the defendant has been denied such right, the
following factors may be considered and balanced: (a) the length of delay; (b) the reasons for the
delay; (c) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (d) the prejudice caused
by the delay.

In this case, more than a decade has elapsed from the time the Information was filed on
May 14, 2003, until the RTC promulgated its Orders dated September 30, 2013 and November 28,
2014 dismissing the case on the ground of violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial. The long
delay from 2007 to 2010 largely remains unjustified. Crucially, petitioner was not remiss in
asserting his right to speedy trial.

Therefore, the facts of this case clearly show a violation of the right to speedy trial.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE ACCUSED CAN ONLY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE WHEN IT IS BOTH

CHARGED AND PROVED

Dr. Francisco M. Malabanan vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 186584-86 & 198598, August 2, 2017
Sereno, CJ.

FACTS:
This is a petition under Rule 45 praying for the reversal of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan, convicting Abusama M. Alid (Alid) of the crime of falsification of private document
under Article 172(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

Alid was the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture Cotabato City.
Frisco M. Malabanan (Malabanan). Alid was charged with falsifying Philippine Airlines (PAL) ticket
under Article 171 of the RPC. Upon arraignment, Alid pleaded not guilty. The Sandiganbayan
rendered a decision convicting Alid of falsification of a private document under Article 172(2) of the
RPC for altering the PAL ticket.

Alid did not raise the defense that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him has been violated. However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole
matter for the review of any question, including those questions not raised by the parties.

ISSUE:
May the accused be convicted of a crime different from that charged in the information
which was proved during the trial?

RULING:
No, the accused may not be convicted of a crime different from that charged in the
information which was proved during the trial.

Sec. 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that when there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved. Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when
it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged, although proved, or if it is proved, although not
charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof. In other words, variance between the allegation
contained in the Information and the conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a conviction for
either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the other.

In this case, it cannot be overlooked that there is a variance between the felony as charged
in the Information and as found in the judgment of conviction. Applying the rules, the conviction of
Alid for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2, Article 172 is valid only if the
elements of that felony constituted the elements of his indictment for falsification by a public officer
under Article 171.

Therefore, the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Alid of the crime of falsification of private
document under Article 172(2) of the RPC.

190 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT HAS NO APPLICATION IN

CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

Miguel D. Escobar vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the
Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which found petitioners Maglinte, Alzate and Zoleta
guilty of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents, and petitioners Escobar,
Telesforo, and Cagang guilty of malversation.

An information filed before the Sandiganbayan charged petitioners of misappropriating

P300,000.00 in public funds by falsifying Disbursement Voucher and other supporting documents.
In its assailed Decision, the Sandiganbayan that the documents had been falsified which led to the
disbursement of public funds, supposedly to be given as financial assistance for the Malungon
Market Vendors Association, which neither prepared the documents nor received the financial
assistance. It found Zoleta, Maglinte, and Alzate acted in conspiracy in falsifying the letter request
and the project proposal, which led to the malversation of public funds. Likewise, the
Sandiganbayan held that Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang approved the disbursement voucher
even though it lacked the documentation required under COA Circular No.96-003. On the issue of
conclusiveness of judgment, the Sandiganbayan held that the issue in another criminal case was
different from the issue in this case.

Petitioners argue that conclusiveness of judgment bars these determinations of the

Sandiganbayan on material facts from being litigated again. Respondent argues that the principle
of conclusiveness of judgment is inapplicable because this case is not a continuation of the other
criminal case.

ISSUE:
Does the principle of conclusiveness of judgment in the other criminal case bind the
Sandiganbayan in this case?

RULING:
No, the principle of conclusiveness of judgment in the other criminal case does not bind
the Sandiganbayan in this case.

This Court has held that conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation of issues already
litigated and settled in litigation between identical parties in different causes of action, and on
occasion, has applied this principle in criminal cases. However, the concept of res judicata is a
civil law doctrine, not to be applied in criminal proceedings, except with respect to civil cases
impliedly instituted.

In this case, if the Court accepts the argument that conclusiveness of judgment bars this
case considering that the Sandiganbayan already found that Escobar is not an accountable officer,
which was an error of law in light of Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, it will lead to an absurd effect. Once
a person has been acquitted of a crime, despite the ground being a question of law resolved
erroneously, once that decision is final, that person can commit the exact same crime against the
same party with impunity, under the claim that even where the subject matter differs, the erroneous
application of the law is forever binding on those parties.

Therefore, the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is not applicable in this case.

| 191
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

NEW AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE IS A GROUND FOR NEW TRIAL WHICH, IF

INTRODUCED AND ADMITTED IN THE TRIAL, WOULD PROBABLY CHANGE THE
JUDGMENT

Farouk B. Abubakar, Ulama Baraguir, Datukan Guiani vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 202408, 202409, 202412, June 27, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
The case involves several Petitions for Review on Certiorari concerning alleged anomalies
in the implementation of infrastructure projects within the ARMM. The petitioners question the
Decisions and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Petitioners were officials of the DPWH-ARMM when they were implicated in several
irregularities in public bidding of regional and provincial infrastructure projects. Based on a report
submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman conducted a preliminary
investigation and found probable cause to indict the regional officials of DPWH-ARMM for violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July 31, 1998, 21
separate Informations were filed against petitioners and other officials of DPWH-ARMM. The
Sandiganbayan found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused Abubakar and Baraguir filed their respective motions for new trial and
reconsideration on separate dates. They anchored their prayer for new trial on the alleged
incompetence of their former counsel.

ISSUE:
Are Accused Abubakar and Baraguir entitled to a new trial on the ground of incompetency
of their former counsel?

RULING:
No, Abubakar and Baraguir are not entitled for new trial on the ground of incompetency of
their former counsel.

In criminal as well as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders
and mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result
of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a new
trial. Section 2(b), Rule 121 of the ROC provides that the Court shall grant a new trial when the
new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.

In this case, Abubakar and Baraguir failed to convince the Court that they have meritorious
defenses and that the evidence they seek to introduce would probably lead to their acquittal. Based
on the cases of US v. Umali and Abrajano v. CA, it is incumbent on the movant to present a
meritorious defense and convince the Court that the evidence omitted by their former counsel
would probably alter the result of the case if introduced. Abubakar and Baraguir failed to discharge
this burden as to entitle them to new trial.

Therefore, Abubakar and Baraguir are not entitled to avail the remedy of new trial on the
alleged incompetence of their former counsel.

192 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

OSG PARTICIPATION ON APPEAL NOT INDISPENSABLE WHEN STATE IS NOT A

PARTY IN INTEREST

Allan S. Cu vs. Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation

G.R. No. 211222, August 07, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the decision of the CA in
granting the petition filed by respondent Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation (SB
Corp.) and setting aside the decision of the RTC.

Golden 7 Bank (G7 Bank), is a banking corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws. Allan S. Cu (Cu), an officer of G7 Bank, was one of the authorized signatories to
the loan documents. G7 Bank applied for, and was granted, a credit line of Php 90,000,000.00. Cu
and his co-signatory, Lucia C. Pascual, issued more than a hundred postdated checks as payment
to various drawdown made on the credit line. Upon maturity of the checks, all of them were
dishonored for reason of “Account Closed.” Cu and Pascual failed to make good the dishonored
checks, prompting SB Corp. to file a complaint-affidavit for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the
Office of the City Prosecutor.

Cu contends that SB Corp., could not, on its own, take an appeal from the decision of the
RTC, as it is only the Solicitor General who can represent the people of the Philippines on appeal,
with respect to the criminal aspect.

ISSUE:
Is the rule that the OSG’s participation in the appeal of the dismissal of a criminal case
indispensable, absolute?

RULING:
No, the rule that the participation of the OSG in the appeal of the dismissal of a criminal
case is indispensable, is not absolute.

Jurisprudence establishes that the OSG is the law office of the Government whose specific
powers and functions. If there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, only the OSG may
bring an appeal of the criminal aspect. This Court has, however, taken exceptions and given due
course to several actions even when the respective interests of the government were not properly
represented by the OSG, as when the challenged order affected the interest of the State or the
People and the ends of justice would be defeated if all those who were brought to court were not
afforded opportunity to present their sides.

In this case, SB Corp., being a mere private complainant, has no authority to appeal the
criminal aspect of these cases. The Court, however, is inclined to interpose the exception in the
present petition for justice to prevail and if only to write finis to the criminal cases from which the
petition originates.

Therefore, the rule that the participation of the OSG in the appeal of the dismissal of a
criminal case is indispensable, is not absolute.

| 193
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A PETITION UNDER RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF COURT RELATES ONLY TO

QUESTIONS OF LAW

Napoleon O. Cedeño vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. Nos. 193020 & 193040-193042, November 8, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
Through their separate petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioners seek
the reversal and setting aside of Sandiganbayan Decision and Resolution which found them guilty
of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

On October 1993, Regional Office No. XII of the Commission on Audit conducted an audit
of the purchase of desks by DECS. The audit covered nine school divisions. A report of the findings
revealed that the Government was defrauded in the amount of Php5,268,610.00 due to the short
delivery of 10,487 desks. Hence, the audit team executed a Joint Affidavit, treated by the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao as a complaint, against several officers of DECS Region XII Cotabato
City together with private proprietors. After the preliminary investigation, six informations for
violations of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were filed before the Sandiganbayan.

After the trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision for all six criminal cases, finding all
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Kadon, Dy, Pundaodaya, and Cedeno moved for
reconsideration, to which the Sandiganbayan granted in favor of Kadon and Dy but denied against
Cedeno.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners correct in adopting as remedy, a petition for review on certiorari in
assailing the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan?

RULING:
No, the petitioners erred in adopting petition for review on certiorari as their remedy in
assailing the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan.

A petition pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertains to
questions of law and not to factual issues. The general rule is that the Court is not a trier of facts,
and it is not its function to examine, review or evaluate the evidence all over again. Issues raised
before the Court on whether the prosecution's evidence proved the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was properly accorded the accused,
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a charge of conspiracy, or whether the defense
of good faith was correctly appreciated are all, in varying degrees, questions of fact.

In this case, the issues raised by the petitioners show that these are questions of fact in
which its resolution would involve a scrutiny of the evidence introduced before the Sandiganbayan.
The Court finds that the petitions are bereft of any persuasive showing to warrant a factual re-
evaluation of the cases.

Therefore, the petitioners erred in adopting as remedy a petition for review on certiorari in
assailing factual findings of the Sandiganbayan.

194 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

AN ORDER GRANTING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION IS A FINAL

ORDER WHICH MAY BE QUESTIONED THROUGH APPEAL

Personal Collection Direct Selling Inc., vs. Teresita Carandang

G.R. No. 206958, November 8, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA which dismissed Personal Collection’s petition for certiorari Rule 65.

Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence against Carandang before the Office of City Prosecutor in Quezon City. Thereafter, the
Office of the Prosecutor filed an Information against Carandang, charging her with estafa under
Art. 315 par. 1(b) of the RPC. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued. Carandang filed a
counter-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, claiming that her failure to completely
liquidate cash advances was due to her sudden termination with Personal Collection. In a
Resolution, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended that the complaint against Carandang
be dismissed. It found that Personal Collection’s cause of action is anchored primarily on
Carandang’s failure to liquidate her remaining cash advances. Thus, her acts could only be a
subject of a civil action for sum of money.

Prosecutor Morales filed a Motion to Withdraw Information before the RTC of Quezon City,
stating that the Office of the City Prosecutor found that there was lack of probable cause to hold
Carandang liable. The RTC granted the motion. Personal Collection filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA, arguing that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when if granted the Motion
to Withdraw Information. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Is a Rule 65 petition the proper remedy against an order granting a motion to withdraw
information?

RULING:
No, a Rule 65 petition is not the proper remedy against an order granting a motion to
withdraw information.

The proper remedy available is via ordinary appeal under Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
Any party may appeal provided that the accused will not be placed in double jeopardy. An order
granting a motion to withdraw an information and dismissing a criminal case, before arraignment,
is final.

In this case, the remedy to question this final order is an appeal as it will not place the
accused in double jeopardy. It bears stressing that the Order of the RTC, granting the motion of
the prosecution to withdraw the Information and ordering the case dismissed, is final because it
disposed of the case and terminated the proceedings therein, leaving nothing to be done by the
court.

Therefore, a Rule 65 petition is not the proper remedy against an order granting a motion
to withdraw information.

| 195
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

APPEAL IS THE PROPER REMEDY TO ASSAIL METC DECISION EVEN ON

JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS; NOT CERTIORARI

John Dennis G. Chua vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 195248, November 22, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the RTC Order which
affirmed the Decision of the MeTC finding petitioner John Chua (Chua) guilty for four counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner Chua was charged with four counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing four
checks that were drawn from a closed account. Upon dishonor of checks, Yao personally delivered
her demand letter to the office of petitioner. Failing to settle payment for the checks, the Office of
the Prosecutor filed the aforementioned criminal cases against Chua. The cases were raffled to
Branch 58 MeTC. In its decision, signed by Judge Santos, a pairing judge, the MeTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for all four counts.

Aggrieved, Chua filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC, assailing Judge Santos’ authority to
render the decision. The RTC affirmed his conviction. Unconvinced, the petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Did the petitioner correctly avail of a Rule 65 petition to assail his conviction by the MeTC
on grounds of lack of jurisdiction?

RULING:
No, the petitioner availed of the wrong remedy when he sought to assail his conviction by
the MeTC, even on grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

First, it has been consistently held that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party,
the special civil action of certiorari will not be entertained. The two remedies are mutually exclusive,
not alternative or successive. The existence and availability of the right to appeal prohibits the
resort to certiorari because one of the requirements for the latter remedy is the unavailability of
appeal. Second, even if the petition for certiorari is the correct remedy, petitioner failed to comply
with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration. As a general rule, a motion for
reconsideration is a prerequisite for the availment of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Third,
the petitioner failed to establish his allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC.
Where a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the
petitioner should establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

In this case, the filing of notice of appeal was available to Chua as a remedy. And even
assuming that a Rule 65 petition was proper, still, he failed to observe the required motion for
reconsideration with the MeTC, and failed to properly allege grave abuse of discretion in his
petition.

Therefore, petitioner wrongly availed of a Rule 65 petition when he sought to assail his
conviction by the MeTC, even on grounds of lack of jurisdiction.

196 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

STATEMENT OF COMPELLING REASONS UNDER SECTION 2(b) OF RULE 126 CANNOT

BE VIEWED AS AN ADDITIONAL REQUISITE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH
WARRANT

Re: Report on the Preliminary Results of the Spot Audit in The Regional Trial Court,
Branch 170, Malabon City
A.M. No. 16-05-142-RTC; September 5, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This administrative matter refers to the report on the preliminary results of the spot audit
conducted by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 170,
Malabon City.

In 2016, the OCA sent a team to conduct a spot audit of search warrant applications raffled
to Branch 170, due to persistent reports pertaining to the alleged irregular issuance of search
warrants by Presiding Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge Docena). The OCA submitted to the Court
its Report on the preliminary results of the spot audit. In the Report, the OCA made the following
observation that out of the 761 applications assigned to Branch 170, Judge Docena issued 113
search warrants which are enforceable outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Malabon
City. The OCA found this to be in violation of Section 2 (a) of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which
provides that an application for a search warrant shall be filed with "[a]ny court within whose
territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed." Upon the OCA's recommendation, the Court issued
a Resolution placing Judge Docena under immediate preventive suspension for a period of six
months.

Judge Docena clarifies that he had no control over which search warrant applications will
be filed in the RTC of Malabon City, much less those that will be raffled to Branch 170. Neither
does he or the court personnel under him have any hand in the implementation of the search
warrants issued by him or the outcome or results thereof.

ISSUE:
In the issuance of a search warrant outside a trial court’s jurisdiction, is the statement of
compelling reasons essential?

RULING:
No, in the issuance of a search warrant outside a trial court’s jurisdiction, the statement of
compelling reasons is not essential.

The statement of compelling reasons is only a mandatory requirement in so far as the

proper venue for the filing of a search warrant application is concerned. It cannot be viewed as an
additional requisite for the issuance of a search warrant. It is also important to stress that an
application for a search warrant merely constitutes a criminal process and is not in itself a criminal
action. The rule that venue is jurisdictional in criminal cases does not apply thereto. Venue is only
procedural, and not jurisdictional, in applications for the issuance of a search warrant. Note that
the determination of the existence of compelling reasons under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126 is a
matter squarely addressed to the sound discretion of the court where such application is filed.

In this case, Judge Docena simply exercised the trial court's ancillary jurisdiction over a
special criminal process when they took cognizance of the applications and issued said search
warrants. The propriety of the issuance of these warrants is a matter that should have been raised
in a motion to quash or in a certiorari petition, if there are allegations of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the issuing judge.

Therefore, Judge Docena committed no misconduct in issuing the subject search warrants.

| 197
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DENIAL TO THE LAWFUL OCCUPANT OF THE HOUSE, ROOM, OR PREMISES TO

WITNESS THE SEARCH RENDERS EVIDENCE GATHERED INADMISSIBLE AGAINST
HIM

Jorge Dabon a.k.a. George Debone vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 208775, January 22, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Jorge Dabon (Dabon), questioning the of the decision of the CA which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court RTC ruling that the search implemented in Dabon's residence
was valid and consequently finding Dabon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections
11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Armed with a search warrant, law enforcement officers and the CIDG went to the house of
Dabon after receiving an information that the latter was engaged in illegal drug-related activities.
The group were accompanied by Brgy. Kagawad Angalot and SK Chairman Angalot. The search
yielded three plastic sachets and drug paraphernalia found in the bedroom of Dabon and the drug
paraphernalia recovered from Eusubio Dumaluan (Dumaluan), who at that time was staying in
Dabon’s kitchen. Test confirmed that the seized articles were positive for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, two Informations were filed against Dabon for violation of
Sections 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. An information for violation of Section 12, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165 was also filed against Dumaluan

Dabon argued that they were not allowed to witness the search conducted by the CIDG.
RTC ruled against Dabon and Dumaluan. RTC upheld the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the police officers' duties in the absence of ill motives on their part. Only Dabon
decided to file a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA still ruled against him. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Will the denial to the lawful occupant of the house, room or premises to witness the search
render the evidence gathered inadmissible against him?

RULING:
Yes, the denial to the lawful occupant of the house, room or premises to witness the search
renders the evidence gathered inadmissible against him.

One of those parameters set by law to limit the officer’s discretion in executing warrants is
Section 8 of Rule 126, to wit: Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in presence
of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in
the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This section
provides that the search should be witnessed by two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or
any member of his family.

In this case, it is undisputed that Dabon and his wife were actually present in their residence
when the police officers conducted the search in the bedroom where the drugs and drug
paraphernalia were found.

Therefore, the failure of Dabon to witness the search rendered the evidence against him
inadmissible.

198 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SEARCH WARRANT MUST BE ISSUED WITH ONE SPECIFIC OFFENSE TO PREVENT

THE ISSUANCE OF THE SCATTER SHOT WARRANT

People of the Philippines vs. Amador Pastrana

G.R. No. 196045, February 21, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the CA Decision which affirmed the Omnibus Order of the RTC, which
nullified the Search Warrant applied for by The NBI Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI
Gaerlan) for the premises of Amador Pastrana (Pastrana).

The NBI Special Investigator Albert Froilan Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application
for a Search Warrant for the purpose of conducting a search of the office premises of Pastrana at
Corporate Center, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged some of their employees would call prospective
clients abroad whom they would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing
shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks were instructed to make a transfer for the
payment thereof. No shares of stock, however, were actually purchased. Gaerlan averred that the
scheme not only constituted estafa under Article 315 of the RPC, but also a violation of the
Securities Regulation Code (SRC). RTC and CA ruled that the Search Warrant is null and void
because it was issued in connection with two (2) offenses.

The People argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined
that the punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered as including or are necessarily
included in the other.

ISSUE:
Was the search warrant null and void for violating the requirement that a search warrant
must be issued in connection with one specific offense only?

RULING:
Yes, the search warrant is null and void for having been issued for more than one specific
offense.

One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search warrant is that it must be
issued based on probable cause which, under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific
offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter — shot warrant. The search warrant was issued for
"violation of The Securities Regulation Code and for estafa.” Violation of the SRC is not an offense
in itself for there are several punishable acts under the said law, even the charge of estafa under
Article 315 of the RPC is vague for there are three ways of committing the said crime. Thus, unlike,
the drugs law wherein there is a clear delineation between use and possession of illegal drugs, the
offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped together in categories. Hence, it is
imperative to specify what particular provision of the SRC was violated.

In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant did not state one specific
offense. It included the violation of the SRC which, as previously discussed, covers several penal
provisions and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.

Therefore, the search warrant is null and void for having been issued for more than one
specific offense.

| 199
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST, A LAWFUL ARREST MUST PRECEDE

THE SEARCH; IT CANNOT BE REVERSED

People of the Philippines vs. Renante Comprado y Bronola

G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA finding Renante Comprado y Bronola
(Comprado) guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. Comprado was charged with violation of
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

A confidential informant sent a text message to Police Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr.
(P/Insp. Orate), that an alleged courier of marijuana together with a female companion, was sighted
at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged courier had in his possession a backpack containing
marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. The policemen stopped
and boarded the bus and saw Comprado who fit the description given to them by the CI. Comprado
was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap. After P/Insp. Orate asked the
Comprado to open the bag, the police officers saw a transparent cellophane containing dried
marijuana leaves.

Comprado denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. When they were about to leave,
Nacorda requested him to carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City. They were then brought to the
police station where they were subjected to custodial investigation without the assistance of
counsel.

ISSUE:
Are the items seized in the search preceding the lawful warrantless arrest admissible in
evidence?

RULING:
No, the items are inadmissible as evidence because the lawful warrantless arrest must
precede the search; the process cannot be reversed.

Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court gives the instances wherein one may lawfully arrest
a person even without a warrant: the first instance is an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. The elements of an arrest effected in hot pursuit, as the
second instance, are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.

In this case, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, accused-appellant could
not be said to have executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officers which would indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-
appellant had just committed an offense.

Therefore, the arrest being unlawful, the items seized are inadmissible.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SEARCH WARRANT THAT COVERS SEVERAL COUNTS OF A CERTAIN SPECIFIC

OFFENSE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE ONE-SPECIFIC-OFFENSE RULE

Jaylord Dimal vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 216922, April 18, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
reverse and set aside the CA Decision which dismissed the petition for certiorari under Rule 65
assailing the order of the RTC which denied the Omnibus Motion to Quash Search Warrant and
Declare the Seized Items as Inadmissible in Evidence, said motion filed by herein accused Jaylord
Dimal (Dimal).

Echague Police filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, a
criminal complaint for Kidnapping for Ransom and Multiple Murder against Jaylord Dimal, Allan
Castillo. Police Inspector Roy Michael S. Malixi filed an Application for the Issuance of a Search
Warrant before the RTC Ilagan, Isabela, in connection with the kidnapping and multiple murder of
Lucio, Rosemarie and Gemma which was granted. Petitioners Dimal and Castillo, together with
Michael Miranda, filed an Omnibus Motion to quash Search Warrant No. 10-11 and to declare the
seized items as inadmissible in evidence.

They argued that the search warrant is invalid because it was issued in connection with,
not just one single offense, but two crimes, i.e., kidnapping and multiple murder. Petitioners submit
that the search warrant is also void for failing to identify with particularity the place to be searched
and the items to be seized.

ISSUE:
Was the search warrant null and void because it was issued in connection with two
unrelated offenses (i.e. kidnapping and murder)?

RULING:
No, the search warrant is valid because it was applied for in connection with two related
offenses, i.e. kidnapping and murder.

Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court requires that such warrant must be issued in relation
to one offense. Where a person is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, there is only
one special complex crime for which the last paragraph of Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code
provides the maximum penalty that shall be imposed, i.e., death. It is not amiss to add that a search
warrant that covers several counts of a certain specific offense does not violate the one-specific-
offense rule.

In this case, Judge Ong found probable cause to issue a search warrant after a searching
and probing personal examination of applicant P/Insp. Malixi and his witnesses. The testimonies
show a reasonable ground to believe that the three victims went to Dimal's compound to sell palay,
but were probably killed by Dimal, and that they may have left personal belongings within its
premise. There is only one offense, which is a special complex crime.

Therefore, the search warrant is valid because it was applied for in connection with two
related offenses, i.e. kidnapping and murder.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE NOT STRICTLY OBSERVED IN PROCEEDINGS BEFORE

ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

Norlina G. Sibayan vs. Elizabeth O. Alda

G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision and resolution of the CA
which the orders of the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services of the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas (OGCLS-BSP) denying herein petitioner Norlina G. Sibayan's (Norlina) resort to
modes of discovery in connection with an administrative case filed against her.

The case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by respondent Elizabeth O. Alda

(Elizabeth) with the (OSI-BSP) charging Norlina, who was then the Assistant Manager and
Marketing Officer of Banco De Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO), with unauthorized deduction of her BDO
Savings Account as well as for failure to post certain check deposits to the said account. Norlina
argued that the charges were only meant to harass her and BDO as the latter previously filed a
criminal case against Elizabeth, Ruby, and their cohorts, for theft, estafa, and violation of Republic
Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devise Regulation Act of 1998. Norlina alleged that
the said case proceeded from the acts of Elizabeth and her co-defendants therein of withdrawing
and laundering various amounts erroneously credited by BDO to Ruby's Visa Electron Fast Card
Account.

When Norlina filed a Request to Answer Written Interrogatories addressed to Elizabeth

and subsequent Motion for Production of Documents praying that UCPB and BPI be ordered to
produce and allow the inspection and copying or photographing of the Statements of Account to
bolster her claim against Elizabeth, the OGCLS-BSP denied such.

Norlina persistently relies and quotes the provisions of the Rules of Court on modes of
discovery and argues her right to utilize the same.

ISSUE:
Are the technical rules of procedure and evidence strictly adhered to in administrative
investigations?

RULING:
No, the technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in
administrative investigations.

Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules on evidence,
the same does not hold true for administrative bodies. Technical rules applicable to judicial
proceedings are not exact replicas of those in administrative investigations.

In this case, the court pronounced that proceedings before the OGCLS-BSP is summary
in nature. Decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers or other documentary
evidence only. The information sought to be elicited from the written interrogatories, as well as the
bank documents, are already available in the records of the case. The grant of Norlina's motions
would merely delay the resolution of the case.

Therefore, strict compliance to the technical rules of procedure are not generally applicable
in administrative proceedings.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MERE ALLEGATION IS NOT PROOF AND COULD NOT JUSTIFY SENTENCING A MAN
TO JAIL OR HOLDING HIM CRIMINALLY LIABLE

Raffy Brodeth and Rolan Onal vs. People of the Philippines and Abraham Villegas
G.R. No. 197849, November 29, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioners Raffy Brodeth
(Brodeth) and Rolan B. Onal (Onal) assailing Decision and Resolution of the CA which affirmed
petitioners' criminal liability for violating B.P. Blg. 22.

The petitioners were charged before the MeTC of Manila for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. In
both the informations, it was alleged that the petitioners made, drew, and issued the subject checks
in the City of Manila. It stemmed from the complaint-affidavit of Villegas where it was categorically
stated that the checks were issued in Manila. The herein petitioners assails the jurisdiction of the
MeTC. Both the RTC and CA maintained that the MeTC has jurisdiction to try the case for the
reason that the affidavit-complaint of private complainant categorically stated that the checks were
issued in Manila.

The petitioners maintained that the CA erred in its reliance on hearsay evidence to
establish territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC of Manila.

ISSUE:
Is the complaint-affidavit of Villegas sufficient evidence to prove the territorial jurisdiction
of the MeTC of Manila?

RULING:
No, the complaint-affidavit of Villegas is not sufficient evidence to prove the territorial
jurisdiction of the MeTC of Manila.

A criminal complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 may be filed and tried either at the place
where the check was issued, drawn, delivered, or deposited. In the present case, however,
evidence on record is missing at any of these material places.

In this case, the only factual link to the territorial jurisdiction of the MeTC is the allegation
in the complaint-affidavit of Villegas that the subject checks were issued in Manila. Otherwise, a
mere allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally
liable. To stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be made equivalent to proof.

Therefore, since the prosecution failed to prove that the subject checks were issued in
Manila nor was any evidence shown that these were either drawn, delivered, or deposited in
Manila, the MeTC has no factual basis for its territorial jurisdiction.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CONFESSION ILLEGALLY OBTAINED FROM ONE OF THE ACCUSED IS INADMISSIBLE

AGAINST HIS OTHER CO-ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Romaldo Lumayag y Dela Cruz, et al.

G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal filed by Diony Opiniano y Verano (Opiniano) under Section 13(c),
Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, from the decision of the CA affirming his
conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

Spouses Eladio Santos and Leonor Santos were found dead in the garage of their house
and the store and their house were in disarray. Previous to such, PO2 Rodolfo Paule and SPO1
Eduardo Roderno were traversing C-3 Road when they noticed a man carrying a heavy-looking
bag. His right leg was stained with blood and his right waistline was bulging, which turned out to
be a double bladed 9-inch mini kris. They brought him to the police station and identified himself
as Jerry Dela Cruz. Upon further interrogation, Dela Cruz verbally confessed that he and his
companions, whom he later revealed as Lumayag, and Opiniano, "had just killed and robbed an
old couple." During cross-examination, PO2 Paule affirmed that Dela Cruz was not aided by a
lawyer, nor was his confession reduced into writing.

Appellant Opiniano argued that the extra-judicial confession of Dela Cruz, implicating him
in the crime, is inadmissible in evidence, as it was obtained without the assistance of counsel.

ISSUE:
Is the extrajudicial confession made by Dela Cruz without the assistance of a counsel
admissible in evidence against Opiniano?

RULING:
No, the extrajudicial confession made by Dela Cruz without the assistance of a counsel is
not admissible in evidence against Opiniano.

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that the right to remain silent and to
have a competent and independent counsel cannot be waived; except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Appellant Dela Cruz was merely told of these Constitutional rights, but he
was never asked whether he understood what he was told or whether he wanted to exercise or
avail himself of such rights.

In this case, it is undisputed that Dela Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his
confession reduced into writing. When the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a
lawyer, the latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a valid waiver of
these rights. Consequently, any confession obtained under these circumstances is flawed and
cannot be used as evidence not only against the declarant but also against his co-accused.

Further, in People v. Jara, G.R. No. L-61356-57; September 30, 1986, this Court held that
where a confession was illegally obtained from two of the accused, and consequently were not
admissible against them, with much more reason should the same be inadmissible against a third
accused who had no participation in its execution.

Therefore, Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession is likewise inadmissible against appellant

Opiniano.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS NEED NO LONGER BE PROVED; NEGATIVE-PREGNANT IS A

NEGATIVE EXPRESSION WHICH CARRIES WITH IT AN AFFIRMATION OR AN
IMPLICATION OF SOME KIND FAVORABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTY

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 189590, April 23, 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking
the nullification and setting aside of the portion of the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in the civil
case entitled "Republic of the Philippines v. Romeo Gatdula Panganiban, et al.".

Petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), filed before
public respondent Sandiganbayan a petition for the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties of
private respondents Romeo, et al., including Geraldine Labunos Panganiban, pursuant to Section
2 of Republic Act No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property
Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the
Proceedings Therefor." Petitioner alleged that private respondent Romeo owned the same and
that they were unlawfully acquired during his incumbency as Regional Director at the DPWH.

Private respondent Romeo denied the allegations, and averred that his wife and his sisters
had the financial capacity to purchase the real estate properties registered in their names; and that
private respondent Fe contributed substantially to the family income as a business owner.
Thereafter, private respondents Romeo, et al., filed a Demurrer to Evidence with leave of court
seeking the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner Republic failed to sufficiently
prove that private respondent Romeo unlawfully acquired the five real properties and other
amounts subject of the forfeiture proceeding. The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer.

ISSUE:
Should the judicial admission of Romeo that the Los Angeles property was jointly acquired
by Geraldine and wife Fe, thus making him a co-owner of his wife’s share be disregarded by the
Sandiganbayan?

RULING:
No, the judicial admission of Romeo should not have been disregarded by the
Sandiganbayan.

Judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course
of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial
proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.

In this case, facts pleaded in the petition and answer/joint answer are deemed admissions
of petitioner Republic and private respondents Romeo, et al., respectively, who are not permitted
to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.
Though the title to the property was initially filed in court through the Joint Answer, however,
petitioner Republic failed to refute the same, and even marked it during pre-trial. Hence, petitioner
Republic already admitted its genuineness and due execution.

Romeo’s denial of his ownership of the subject property is pregnant with an admission,
i.e., that he has an interest in his wife's share in the property by virtue of their marital union. This
is a negative pregnant, which is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation
or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party.

Therefore, the judicial admission of Romeo need no longer be proved.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS ARE BINDING TO THE DECLARANT NO MATTER HOW

MUCH HE RATIONALIZES IT

Metro Rail Transit Development Corporation vs. Gammon Philippines, Inc.

G.R. No. 200401, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) Decision
awarding Gammon Philippines, Inc. (Gammon) its monetary claims for lost profits and
reimbursements for engineering services, design work, and site de-watering and clean up, due to
breach of contract.

This case involves MRT's MRT-3 North Triangle Description Project (Project) covering 54
hectares of land, out of which 16 hectares were allotted for a commercial center. Parsons Interpro
JV (Parsons) was the Management Team authorized to oversee the construction’s execution. It
engaged the services of Gammon after the latter won the bidding. It was alleged that the work
includes the furnishing of labor, supervision, materials, plant, equipment and other facilities and
appurtenances necessary to perform all the works in accordance with contract document.
However, by reason of several suspensions, the relationship between the two did not end up good
and Gammon notified Parsons of its claim for payment of all costs, damages, and expenses due
to MRT's suspension order and the consequences of its award of the contract to another party.
CIAC ruled in favor of Gammon and ordered MRT to pay the former. CIAC ruled that as MRT had
already admitted its liability for the claims, it was bound by this admission. MRT argues that while
it expressed its willingness to pay Gammon the reimbursements, it only applies to those supported
by official receipts.

Gammon claims that MRT is bound by its allegation. It argues that MRT failed to show that
its admission was made by palpable mistake.

ISSUE:
Is MRT bound by its judicial admission to pay Gammon for the claims due the latter even
without the Gammon presenting any receipt?

RULING:
Yes. MRT is bound by its judicial admission and now is now barred to require presentment
of receipts.

Judicial admissions may be made by a party in his or her pleadings, during the trial, through
verbal or written manifestations, or in other stages of the judicial proceeding. They are binding
such that no matter how much the party rationalizes it, the party making the admission cannot
contradict himself or herself unless it is shown that the admission was made through a palpable
mistake.

In this case, MRT alleges that it is willing to pay Gammon the total amount of
P5,493,639.27, which comprises the latter's claim for cost of engineering and design services, and
de-watering and clean-up works. MRT's allegation was not qualified. It neither stated that Gammon
must first present proof of its claims for the cost of engineering and design services, and of de-
watering and clean-up works.

Therefore, MRT is bound by this admission and is estopped from denying its
representation.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

AN EXCEPTION TO STRICT COMPLIANCE OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY WOULD APPLY

ONLY (1) WHERE THE PROSECUTION RECOGNIZED THE PROCEDURAL LAPSES, AND
EXPLAINED THE CITED JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS, AND (2) WHEN THE PROSECUTION
ESTABLISHED THAT THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE EVIDENCE
SEIZED HAD BEEN PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Dela Rosa Y Lumanog "Manny"

G.R. No. 230228, December 13, 2017
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the Decision of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC in finding
accused-appellant Manuel dela Rosa y Lumanog (accused-appellant) guilty of violation of Section
5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

In an Information, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of illegal sale of marijuana
weighing 0.682 gram. On July 22, 2009, he was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty." Thereafter,
trial ensued. The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable of the crime of violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Accused-appellant appealed before the CA arguing that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the confiscated item was not secured because it was merely wrapped in a banana leaf and it
was not placed in an envelope or evidence bag; that there was an inconsistency as to who received
the confiscated drug at the crime laboratory; and that the crime laboratory was not secured at the
time of the examination because any personnel and policemen could enter the premises and even
sleep there. The CA dismissed the appeal.

ISSUE:
Did the prosecution strictly comply with the Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING:
No. the prosecution did not strictly comply with the Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

As a rule, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not
readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution either by accident or
otherwise. The exception found in the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 comes into play when strict compliance
with the proscribed procedures is not observed. This saving clause, however, applies only (1)
where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited
justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized had been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of
invoking the presumption of regularity and bears the burden of proving - with moral certainty - that
the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was confiscated from the accused during
his arrest.

this case, the prosecution was not able to explain the absence of a representative of the
DOJ and the distant conduct of the inventory of the seized item. Echavaria attempted to explain
that the said inventory was not done at the place of the arrest at Puerto Galera because they could
not secure a representative of the media or the DOJ and, thus, went back to their office in Calapan
City.

Therefore, the accused was properly acquitted because the prosecution did not establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt even and for its failure to strictly comply with the
prescribed procedure under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY IS NOT FATAL, PROVIDED

THERE IS JUSTIFIABLE GROUND AND THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE
OF THE ITEMS ARE PROPERLY PRESERVED

People vs. Lumudag y Racman

G.R. No. 201478, August 23, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Parok Lumudag y Racman appeals the decision of CA, affirming his conviction for violation
of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002)
by the RTC.

The prosecution alleged that an informant reported to the District Anti-Illegal Drug (DAID)
the drug peddling activities of a certain alias Akmad in Quaipo. When PO2 Donato and the
confidential informant arrived, the latter approached Lumudag and introduced PO2 Donato as
buyer. The latter handed the P 200.00 marked money to Lumudag. After receiving the money, he
took out from his pocket one (1) plastic sachet and handed it to PO2 Donato. The latter immediately
executed the signal prompting the other officers to effect the arrest. PO2 Donato marked the
confiscated drug "DAID". Lumudag was brought to the police station. The confiscated drug was
submitted to the Manila Police District Crime Laboratory for examination. The forensic chemist
conducted a qualitative examination and found that the specimen tested positive for shabu, a
prohibited drug. The RTC convicted Lumudag.

In his appeal, Lumudag challenged the police officers' failure to comply with the
requirements outlined in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. CA affirmed his conviction.

ISSUE:
Is Lumudag’s conviction contrary to the facts, law, and applicable jurisprudence because
of the alleged failure of the buy-bust team to physical inventory and photograph the illegal drug
immediately upon seizure in the the presence of a representative of the media, the DOJ, and of
any elected public official?

RULING:
Yes, Lumudag’s conviction is contrary to the facts, law, and applicable jurisprudence for
failure of the buy-bust team to physical inventory and photograph the illegal drug immediately upon
seizure in the the presence of a representative of the media, the DOJ, and of any elected public
official.

The concurrence of the following elements must be established for the conviction of the
accused for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur-buyer; and (b) that the
dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti. Additionally, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and Section 21 (a), Article
II of its IRR are pertinent. While Section 21(a) of the IRR provides that the "non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items”.

In this case, the records bear out that the required justification was not given by any of the
members of the buy-bust team. Verily, without the State's justification for the lapses or gaps, the
chain of custody so essential in the establishment of the corpus delicti of the offense charged
against Lumudag was not shown to be unbroken and preserved. The non-disclosure of the
justification by the members of the buy-bust team underscored the uncertainty about the identity
and integrity of the shabu admitted as evidence against Lumudag.

Therefore, Lumudag deserves acquittal from the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt of his guilt.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE FAILURE TO STRICTLY CONFORM TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 21 OF

R.A. NO. 9165 DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY MAKE THE SEIZED DRUGS INADMISSIBLE
AS EVIDENCE, PROVIDED THAT THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY WORTH OF
THE SEIZED ARTICLES WERE MAINTAINED

People of the Philippines vs. Emma Bofill Pangan

G.R. No. 206965, November 29, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal led by Emma Bofill Pangan (Pangan) from the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial Court ruling that she was guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.

In a successful test-buy, PO1 Carillo was able to buy a sachet of shabu worth P1,000.00
from Pangan. He then expressed his interest to buy more drugs. Pangan instructed him to return
in the afternoon of that day as more shabu would allegedly be delivered to her via Fastpak. PO1
Carillo reported the same and applied for a search warrant. On the next instance, there was indeed
a Fastpak package delivered to Pangan and when the pre-arranged signal was made, the police
officers advanced to Pangan’s store and read her the search warrant. While inside the store, PO1
Carillo and another officer inspected the Fastpak package. Pangan suddenly became unruly, trying
to grab the package from PO1 Carillo. The police officers brought Pangan out of the store to
continue the search and to prevent Pangan from harming herself. Members of the media and
barangay officials were present during the entire course of the search and seizure. The confiscated
items were turned over to SPO1 Lebria for marking and inventory, which was signed by the third-
party witnesses, who were present during the search. PO1 Carillo took pictures of the premises
and the seized items.

Pangan questions whether or not her enforced inability to witness the marking and
inventory of the confiscated items has sufficient justification to allow a deviation from Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE:
Does the failure to strictly and immediately conform to the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 make the seized drugs inadmissible as evidence?

RULING:
No, the failure to strictly and immediately conform to the requirements of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 does not make the seized drugs inadmissible as evidence.

Such failure does not immediately make the seized drugs inadmissible as evidence,
provided that the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized articles were maintained and the
prosecution should acknowledge and explain the deviations they committed.

In this case, Pangan's main point of contention rests on her absence during the inventory
and marking of the confiscated articles. The police officers acknowledged their breach, offering a
justifiable reason why they had to dispense with Pangan's presence during the search, inventory,
and photographing. The police narrated how Pangan became "uncontrollable." This is a fact
corroborated by the accused herself when she testified that she "struggled to free herself [and] she
accidentally swiped a bottle in front of her store that fell and broke into pieces." Therefore,
Pangan's aggressive actuations urged the police officers to lock her up in the vehicle for the search
to smoothly proceed. Apart from Pangan's unsupported claims, no cogent proof was shown to
attest that the seized items were tampered in any way.

Therefore, the seized items are admissible.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE RULE ON CHAIN OF CUSTODY ALLOWS SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Niño Flor y Mora

G.R. No. 216017, January 19, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal filed by Niño Flor y Mora (appellant) assailing the decision of the
CACAG. which affirmed Judgment of the RTC finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The prosecution alleged that team of police officers of the Anti-Illegal Drug Special
Operation Task Force of the Philippine National Police (PNP) conducted a buybust operation
against appellant after a police asset reported that appellant was engaged in selling shabu. The
buybust operation resulted to the seizure of a plastic sachet of shabu from herein appellant. The
police proceeded to apprehend the appellant and thereafter successfully marked the subject
sachet. While the appellant was being arrested, one of the police officers chanced upon Illuminado
Acosta (Acosta), who was previously arrested for illegal possession of Shuba. Acosta was
apprehended by the police but he resisted and successfully shot one of the police officers.
Thereafter, after the filing of the information and a full-blown trial, he RTC convicted appellant
herein for the crime charged.

Appellant alleged that there was a failure to conduct an immediate inventory and taking of
photographs of the seized items after his apprehension. Hence, RTC erred in convicting him
considering that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody over the seized sachet
of shabu.

ISSUE:
Did the failure of the police to conduct an immediate inventory and take photographs of the
seized item constitute a failure to establish unbroken chain of custody?

RULING:
No, the failure of the police to conduct an immediate inventory and take photographs of
the seized item does not constitute a failure to establish unbroken chain of custody.

While the ideal scenario in the prosecution of Dangerous Drugs Act violations is that the
chain of custody must be unbroken, the law likewise admits of substantial compliance thereto. The
Court has consistently upheld the procedure adopted by the police in handling seized illegal drugs
as long as it is shown that that integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items was
preserved. The failure of the police officers to immediately take an inventory of the seized shabu is
not fatal to the prosecution of the case. It did not render the arrest of the appellant who was
caught in flagrante delicto illegal nor did the omission render the seized drugs inadmissible.

In this case, the arresting officers were not able to take an inventory immediately after the
arrest because of two intervening events: 1) appellant ran away from the police officers upon
seeing SPO4 Belleza; and 2) a shooting incident transpired where Acosta was shot and had to be
taken to the hospital.

Therefore, the rule on chain of custody also allows substantial compliance therewith.

210 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE SUFFICIENT IN CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE AS LONG AS

THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE SEIZED ITEMS ARE PROPERLY
PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Brian Villahermoso

G.R. No. 218208, January 24, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Brian Villahermoso from the decision of the CA affirming
the judgment RTC-Cebu City, Br. 17 finding the appellant guilty of selling shabu in violation of R.A.
No. 9165.

During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of the poseur-buyer PO2 Joseph
Villaester. The same relayed that PCI Armendarez III, without prior surveillance on account of a tip
received, suddenly called a conference and formed a buy-bust team to counter the selling
of shabu by the appellant. The buy-bust was done with prior coordination with the PDEA. After
dispatch, Villahermoso was handcuffed and was brought to the office of RCIDU together with the
seized shabu. RTC rendered judgment finding the appellant guilty of the charge against him. This
was affirmed by the CA.

On appeal, the appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He puts in issue the alleged failure of the police to conduct prior surveillance
and to comply with the Chain of Custody Rule as the seized items were not properly marked,
inventoried, and photographed.

ISSUE:
Is there substantial compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule in this case despite the
absence of prior surveillance?

RULING:
Yes, there was substantial compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule despite the absence
of prior surveillance.

Jurisprudence has consistently held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the
validity of an entrapment operation especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target
area by their informant. As to the Chain of Custody Rule, the Court, taking into consideration the
difficulty of complete compliance with the said rule, has considered substantial compliance
sufficient as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending police officers.

In this case, PO2 Villaester, designated as the poseur buyer, was assisted by the
confidential informant, who informed the appellant that there was a prospective buyer. Moreover,
the policemen were justified in marking the sachets of shabu at their office. Appellant was
struggling and trying to get away from the police, as testified by defense witness Alex Esconas.
The priority of the arresting officers is to apprehend the offender. They would have had difficulty,
if not impossibility, in marking the corpus delicti at that the scene of the crime considering that the
appellant was quite out of control. Likewise, the absence of a physical inventory and the lack of a
photograph of the seized items are not sufficient justifications to acquit the appellant as the Court
in several cases has affirmed convictions despite the failure of the arresting officers to strictly
comply with the Chain of Custody Rule as long as the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti of
the crime are preserved.

Therefore, the Chain of Custody Rule was substantially complied with.

| 211
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

AS A RULE, STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY IS REQUIRED;

EXCEPTION

Rommel Ramos y Lodronio vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227336, February 26, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the CA decision
affirming RTC’s decision convicting Petitioner Rommel Ramos (Ramos) for illegal possession of
marijuana, a dangerous drug.

Acting on a tip by an informant that Bautista and Ramos were selling drugs, Caloocan
Chief of Police PSI Allan Emlano (Emlano) formed a buy-bust team. PO1 Madronero (Madronero)
was designated as the poseur-buyer. The operation proceeded and pursuant thereto, Bautista and
Ramos were arrested charged of the crimes as afore-mentioned. During the trial, the prosecution
completely failed to present in evidence the inventory and the photographs of the seized items
because the apprehending team did not bother to conduct the same.

Hence, in this petition, petitioner argues that the testimonies of the prosecution witness
relative to the marking of the plastic sachets cast serious doubt on the integrity of the said items,
thus on this ground, his guilt could not be established beyond reasonable ground.

ISSUE:
Is it correct to convict the accused despite failure to conduct inventory and photographs of
the seized items by the apprehending team?

RULING:
No, it is not correct to convict petitioner despite failure to conduct inventory and
photographs of the seized items by the apprehending team. The CA gravely erred in affirming the
conviction and ignoring the utter failure of the prosecution to comply with the chain of custody rule
under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

It is well settled that it is essential that the identity of the seized drug/paraphernalia be
established with moral certainty. As a rule, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure under
Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is required because of the illegal drug's unique characteristic that renders
it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration, or substitution either
by accident or otherwise. The exception found in the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 comes into play when
strict compliance with the prescribed procedures is not observed. This saving clause, however,
applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained
the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity and
evidentiary vale of the evidence seized had been preserved.

In this case, the prosecution completely failed to present in evidence the inventory and
the photographs of the seized items because the apprehending team did not bother to conduct the
same The OSG simply gave a flimsy excuse that petitioner cannot anymore question the
apprehending officers' non- compliance with Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because it is an objection
to the evidence which may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Therefore, it is not correct to convict petitioner despite failure to conduct inventory and
photographs of the seized items by the apprehending team.

212 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE OF THE AUTHORITIES TO IMMEDIATELY MARK THE SEIZED DRUGS

RAISES REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Benedicto Veedor, Jr. y Molod

G.R. No. 223525, June 25, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC, finding
appellant Benedicto Veedor, Jr.,y Molod (Veedor) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On September 2, 2004, NBI agents served a search warrant on appellant Veedor at his
house. The NBI agents searched the house and found 323 small plastic sachets of suspected
marijuana.

Veedor claims that the CA committed an error when it disregarded the testimony of the
barangay chairman who stated that the marijuana presented in court was different from what he
saw when he opened the cabinet in appellant’s house. However, the CA found that Veedor was
not able to discharge his burden of proving the absence of the element of animus possidendi.

ISSUE:
Did the failure of the NBI arresting agents to immediately mark the seized drugs
compromise its evidentiary value?

RULING:
Yes, the failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs compromise its
evidentiary value.

The most crucial step in proving an unbroken chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions
is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs and other related items thereto, as it is the starting
point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of said items will use as a reference point. Thus,
preventing the switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence, whether by accident or
otherwise. As such, it has been consistently held that the failure of the authorities to immediately
mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices
to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the first link in the chain of custody for failure
of the NBI agents to properly conduct the inventory and marking of the seized items.

Therefore, the chain of custody was broken, and the integrity of the seized marijuana was
tainted. Veedor is hereby acquitted.

| 213
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

GAP IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY CAUSED BY THE LACK OF MARKING UPON

CONFISCATION UNDERMINED THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE
CONFISCATED DRUG, RAISING REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE SPECIMEN
PRESENTED IN COURT IS THE SAME ONE CONFISCATED

Arnel Calahi vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 195043, November 20, 2017
Martines, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the
decision of CA, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession and use of
dangerous drugs under Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425.

An information stated that the petitioners were all caught in the act of sniffing shabu inside
the XLT passenger type jeepney and one of them was caught in possession of the remaining
shabu, without any authority of law. Petitioners posited that the integrity and identity of the seized
items were tarnished because the arresting officers failed to make inventory and photograph the
seized items in petitioners' presence, contrary to the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3,
series of 1979, as amended; and, that the prosecution also failed to show that the arresting officers
marked the items immediately after the alleged seizure; and that the identity of the drug is
consequently suspect.

The OSG argued that a violation of the said regulation is a matter strictly between the DDB
and the arresting officers and is irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case; that
noncompliance thereof will not necessarily render the petitioners' arrest illegal nor the seized items
inadmissible in evidence.

ISSUE:
Did the absence of an inventory and photograph of the specimen purportedly seized affect
the continuity of the custody of the same, tarnishing the integrity of the evidence?

RULING:
Yes, the absence of an inventory and photograph of the specimen purportedly seized
affected the continuity of the custody of the same, tarnishing the integrity of the evidence.

Failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on
the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties. The marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link,
thus, it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding handlers of
the specimens will use the markings as reference. Furthermore, the chain of custody rule requires
proof of every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it is presented in
court and offered into evidence, such that witnesses constituting the chain are able to testify on
how it was given and received, including the precautions taken to ensure that the seized item was
not altered or tampered with. Failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from
the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence, warranting acquittal on reasonable doubt.

In this case, the records reveal that the instant case does not merely involve irregularities
in the marking of the confiscated shabu, but also the complete absence of evidence indicating that
it was even marked in the first instance.

Therefore, the lack of due marking upon confiscation renders the identity of the shabu, the
corpus delicti presented in court, highly questionable.

214 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE MARKING AND IDENTIFICATION OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUG IS AN

ESSENTIAL PART OF THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Siegfred Cabellon y Cabañero

G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the conviction of accused-appellant
Siegfred Cabellon y Cabañero (Cabellon) for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Appellant Cabellon was arrested after a buy-bust operation. After Cabellon's arrest, the
poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of shabu he purchased from Cabellon to PO3 Bucao. That
same date, a sachet marked with "SCC 04/13/06" was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory
for examination. P/S Insp. Mutchit G. Salinas (P/S Insp. Salinas), a forensic chemist, testified that
she had examined a heat-sealed plastic sachet of white crystalline substance labelled with "SCC
04/13/06." On appeal, Cabellon averred that the police officers did not comply with the mandatory
requirements under Section 21, R.A. No. 9165, requiring the apprehending team to immediately
physically inventory and photograph the seized drugs in the presence of the accused, a
representative from media or the Department of Justice, and any elected official. He also points
out that the prosecution was unable to show an unbroken chain of custody. PO3 Bucao testified
that the poseur-buyer handed him the sachet after Cabellon was arrested, but he never testified
as to whom he gave it next or who marked it.

ISSUE:
Is the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt proved despite the non-observance of
chain of custody rule provided in Section 21 of R.A. 9165?

RULING:
No, the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt was not proved. The prosecution was
not able to prove the identity of the shabu supposedly seized from the accused.

The marking and identification of the seized dangerous drug is an essential part of the
chain of custody. Absent this step, a gap is created which casts a shadow of doubt on the identity
and integrity of the dangerous drug presented as evidence, creating reasonable doubt, which must
be resolved in favor of the accused.

In this case, PO3 Bucao claimed that the poseur-buyer turned over to him the sachet
purchased from the accused and that he had custody of the sachet until he reached the police
station. He then handed the sachet to PO3 Abellar, who supposedly prepared the request for the
chemical analysis of the seized item. However, PO3 Bucao failed to identify who placed the
markings on the sachet. A noticeable gap exists in the chain of custody with the prosecution's
failure to present evidence that the seized sachet was actually marked by any of the three (3)
apprehending officers. The prosecution likewise did not present evidence that the seized sachet
was inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused or his representative, a
representative from the media or the Department of Justice, and an elected public official. The
prosecution utterly failed to proffer evidence on who placed the markings on the sachet.
Furthermore, it also failed to account for the seized sachet's transfer from PO3 Bucao to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination, creating another gap in the chain of custody.

Therefore, the identity and integrity of the seized items were not proved.

| 215
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE PHYSICAL

INVENTORY AND PHOTOGRAPHY OF ITEMS SEIZED IS FATAL TO THE
PROSECUTION’S CASE

People of the Philippines vs. Ronaldo Paz y Dionisio

G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
On appeal, Ronaldo Paz (Paz) assails the decision of the CA which affirmed his conviction
by the RTC for violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
(R.A. No. 9165).

Paz’s conviction came about as a result of a buy-bust operation conducted on the basis of
a tip from an informant. PO1 Jeffrey Agbunag (PO1 Agbunag) acted as poseur-buyer and
thereafter carried out the arrest. He was joined by PO3 Arnold Balagasay (PO3 Balagasay) in
apprehending two other persons in the target area. PO1 Agbunag, after instructing Paz to empty
his pockets, marked all 4 plastic sachets. Thereafter, the buy-bust team took the confiscated plastic
sachets and drug paraphernalia to the Pasig City Police Station where the requisite inventory was
conducted by PO1 Agbunag. After the inventory, Paz, together with two others, was brought for
medical examination, and a drug test.

In his re-direct examination, PO3 Balagasay testified that the only ones present at the time
of the taking of inventory were the operatives and the suspects. Further, he maintained that the
practice is that it is only when they have a search warrant that they invite barangay officials and
media representatives.

ISSUE:
Does the non-compliance with the procedural requirements in the physical inventory of the
items seized necessitate the acquittal of the accused?

RULING:
Yes, non-compliance with the procedural requirements in the physical inventory of the
items seized necessitate the acquittal of the accused.

The law provides that the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after
seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official (Sec. 21(1),
R.A. No. 9165). In the absence of such witnesses, the apprehending officer must ensure that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, and in addition, the
prosecution must satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

In this case, procedural lapses committed by the police officers militate against the finding
of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised.

Therefore, prosecution’s failure to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with the
requirements set forth by Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165 warrants the acquittal of the accused-appellant.

216 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROSECUTION MUST EXPLAIN FAILURE TO ABIDE TO THE PROCEDURAL

REQUIREMENT UNDER THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE SO AS NOT TO RENDER VOID
THE SEIZURE OF THE SUBJECT ITEM

People of the Philippines vs. Allan Bugtong y Amoroso

G.R. No. 220451, February 26, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC decision finding accused-
appellant Allan Bugtong (Bugtong) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, as defined under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Pursuant to a buy-bust operation, records reveal that SPO1 Puasan (Puasan) acting as
poseur-buyer bought an item, suspected as shabu, from Bugtong and who accepted the marked
money, and who was thereafter arrested. The buy-bust team then brought Bugtong to the police
station where Puasan kept the confiscated item inside a locker accessible only to her.

During cross-examination, both Puasan and a certain P/Supt. Baldevieso claimed to have
placed the markings "AB" on the sachet. However, the records did not indicate that there were two
"AB" markings on the specimen. Also, the prosecution failed to show that the buy-bust team
physically inventoried and photographed the seized item in the presence of the witnesses
required under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE:
Is it correct to convict the accused despite failure of the prosecution to justify deviation on
the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING:
No, the accused’s guilt cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt despite failure of the
prosecution to justify deviation on the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

For a charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs to prosper, it is crucial that the integrity of
the seized drug be preserved; in this regard, the prosecution must prove an unbroken chain of
custody over the subject illegal drug.

As starting point of the chain of custody, the immediate marking of the specimen is
necessary because it serves as reference for and by the subsequent handlers of the item. Marking
is also used to distinguish the subject item from any similar or related evidence from their seizure
until their disposal after the proceedings. However, despite of deviation from the immediate
marking, under justifiable reasons, it shall not render void the seizure of the subject item provided
the prosecution must nonetheless explain its failure to abide by such procedural requirement, and
show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item was preserved.

In this case, the prosecution in fact failed to show that the buy-bust team physically
inventoried and photographed the seized item in the presence of the witnesses required. Further,
no such explanation was offered by the prosecution for its non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165.

Therefore, the accused’s guilt cannot be proven beyond reasonable doubt despite failure
of the prosecution to justify deviation on the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
The accused-appellant's acquittal is in place.

| 217
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE TO IMMEDIATELY MARK THE SEIZED DRUGS IS PATENT IRREGULARITY;

PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY CANNOT APPLY

People of the Philippines vs. Jay Suarez y Cabuso

G.R. No. 223141, June 06, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the Decision of CA affirming the conviction of Jay Suarez y Cabuso
(Cabuso) for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The City Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Team of Olongapo City, in coordination with
the PDEA conducted a buy-bust operation against appellant, wherein a confidential agent
introduced PO1 Tan to appellant as a marijuana user. After the transaction, PO1 Tan arrested
appellant and introduced himself as a police officer while PO1 Mateo conducted a body search on
appellant which yielded the marked money from the latter’s right pocket and 11 sachets of
suspected marijuana from the left pocket. The buy-bust team then decided to bring appellant to
the police station due to a commotion at the place of arrest. At the police station, it was only then
that PO1 Tan marked the sachet that was the subject of the buy-bust sale. PO1 Mateo also marked
the 11 sachets she confiscated from appellant during the body search.

ISSUE:
Does the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized constitutes failure to
establish the chain of custody in drug cases?

RULING:
Yes, the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized constitutes failure to
establish the chain of custody in drug cases.

Under R.A. No. 9165, each element of the crime must be proved: the identities of the buyer
and seller, the transaction or sale of the illegal drug and the existence of the corpus delicti. To
remove any doubt on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must show that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered. The prosecution has
the duty to prove every link in the chain, and thus, the following links must be established: (1) the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and (4) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish the first link in the chain of custody as there
was a failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were allegedly seized from appellant. They
were marked only at Police Station A, and the prosecution offered no reasonable explanation for
such. PO1 Mateo merely stated in passing that there was a commotion because it was a public
place.

Therefore, the failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized constitutes
failure to establish the chain of custody in drug cases leading to acquittal.

218 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROPER MARKING AND TURNOVER OF THE CONFISCATED DRUG

PARAPHERNALIA MUST BE MADE FOR THE ACCUSED TO BE HELD LIABLE

People of the Philippines vs. Francis Taboy y Aquino

G.R. No. 223515, June 25, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC’s Decision finding
accused-appellant Francis Taboy y Aquino (Taboy) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 12 (possession of drug paraphernalia) Article II of RA 9165.

PDEA agents conducted a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant Taboy, wherein

they found the accused in possession and control of a drug paraphernalia fit or intended for
consuming dangerous drugs such as a disposable lighter, stainless lighter, and a roll of aluminum
foil without being authorized by law.

Accused-appellant Taboy raised an alibi that he was partaking in a drinking spree and was
brought to the highway wherein he was forced to board a car. Thereafter, he was brought to the
police station. The prosecution, on the other hand narrated that the buy-bust operation was due to
the positive result of the surveillance.

ISSUE:
Does the absence of evidence that there was proper marking and turnover of the
confiscated drug paraphernalia acquit the accused?

RULING:
Yes, the absence of evidence that there was proper marking and turnover of the
confiscated drug paraphernalia acquit the accused.

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, provides for the proper
disposition of the items seized, including therein that immediately after seizure and confiscation,
the apprehending team must conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and afterwards, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination. Proper marking and turnover of the confiscated drug, drug paraphernalia and the
other seized items must be made in order for the accused to be liable.

In this case, PO2 Navero did not testify at all that he marked the paraphernalia confiscated
from accused-appellant. His only assertion was that he itemized the objects they found from
accused-appellant's bag. At the same time, there was no indication that PO2 Navero properly
turned over the alleged paraphernalia to the crime laboratory, as the request for laboratory
examination pertained only to the seized drug from accused-appellant.

Therefore, the prosecution failed to prove that the buy-bust team complied with the chain
of custody requirement anent the subject drug paraphernalia.

| 219
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SOLE PRESENCE OF ELECTED PUBLIC OFFICIAL IN TAKING OF PHYSICAL

INVENTORY NOT SUFFICIENT; REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE DOJ AND THE MEDIA
MUST LIKEWISE BE PRESENT

People of the Philippines vs. Jovencito Miranda y Tigas

G.R. No. 229671, January 31, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
On appeal, Jovencito Miranda (Miranda) assails the judgment of the CA affirming the RTC
decision, convicting him of violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165). Records reveal that following the buy-bust operation, MADAC
operative Delno Encarnacion, the designated poseur-buyer, marked the seized items in the
presence of Miranda and an elected public official, but not in the presence of any representative
of the DOJ and the media. During cross-examination, Encarnacion testified that only him, PO2
Aseboque, Miranda, and the witness barangay kagawad were present at the time of the
preparation and signing of the inventory.

In affirming the RTC, the CA declared that the police officers—notwithstanding their failure
to immediately mark, inventory, and photograph the seized items at the place of arrest—
substantially complied with the chain of custody rule. It added that the marking, inventory, and
photography of the items were witnessed by a barangay kagawad, which thus belied any incidents
of tampering or switching of evidence. Further, it held that any lapses in the safekeeping of the
seized illegal drugs which affect their integrity and evidentiary value should be raised at the trial
court level.

ISSUE:
Does the sole presence of an elected public official constitute sufficient compliance with
the witness requirement under the chain of custody rule?

RULING:
No, the sole presence of an elected public official does not constitute sufficient compliance
with the witness requirement under the chain of custody rule.

The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as a representative from
the DOJ and the media in order to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove
any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. In cases of deviations, as the
requirements are clearly set forth in the law, the State retains the positive duty to account for any
lapses in the chain of custody of the drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether
or not the defense raises the same in the proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of
having a conviction overturned on grounds that go into the evidence’s integrity and evidentiary
value, albeit the same are raised only for the first time on appeal, or even not raised, become
apparent upon further review.

In this case, there is in fact non-observance of the requirement of presence of the DOJ and
the media during the marking and photograph of the seized items. Further, despite said
noncompliance, no practicable reasons were given by the police officers to justify the same.

Therefore, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised, Miranda’s acquittal is in order.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SECTION 21 OF R.A. NO. 9165 IS A MATTER OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW AND CANNOT BE

BRUSHED ASIDE AS A SIMPLE PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITY

People of the Philippines vs. Philip Mamangon y Espiritu

G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
In this ordinary appeal, accused-appellant Philip Mamangon y Espiritu (Mamangon)
assails the Decision dated November 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 06565, which affirmed the Decision dated September 17, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 53 (RTC) in Crim. Case Nos. 09-266829 and 09-266830 finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11 (3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The prosecution alleged that at around seven (7) o'clock in the evening of February 20,
2009, a tip was received from a confidential informant that a certain "Pepe," who was later on
identified as Mamangon, was selling illegal drugs along the railroad track of Dagupan Extension
and Antipolo Street in Tondo, Manila. Acting on the said tip, a buy-bust operation was organized.

After which, the poseur buyer and arresting officer PO3 Guzman marked the seized items
in the presence of Mamangon. Thereafter, the arresting team went to the barangay hall but
immediately left since no one was around. They then proceeded to Police Station 7, where PO3
Guzman turned over Mamangon, as well as the seized items, to the investigator on duty, PO2 Dela
Cruz. PO2 Dela Cruz then conducted the requisite inventory, while PO3 Guzman took photographs
of the confiscated items in the presence of Mamangon and the other arresting officers.

ISSUE:
Did the apprehending officers sufficiently comply with the Chain of Custody Rule by merely
conducting the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated drugs in the presence of
Mamangon and the other officers?

RULING:
No, the apprehending officers did not sufficiently comply with the Chain of Custody Rule.

It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive
law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.

In this case, records reveal that while the requisite inventory and photography of the
confiscated drugs were conducted in the presence of Mamangon and the other apprehending
officers, the same were not done in the presence of an elected public official and any
representative from the DOJ and the media. Additionally, it also appears that when the police
officers subsequently arrived at the barangay hall, they had every opportunity to coordinate with
the barangay officials and secure the presence of the other witnesses, yet they decided to leave
and immediately proceed to the police station. The prosecution did not proffer a plausible
explanation - apart from their unsubstantiated claim that "no one is around" the barangay hall when
they arrived - in order for the saving clause to apply.

The law requires the presence of these witnesses to ensure the establishment of the chain
of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

Therefore, considering the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
drugs are seriously put into question.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE REQUIRE NOTHING

LESS THAN STRICT COMPLIANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Joshua Que y Utuanis

G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
On appeal, Joshua Que (Que) assails the CA decision convicting him for violation of
Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

Following Que’s arrest, the marked bill and a sachet of shabu were recovered. Que was
then brought to the police station where the sachets of shabu and marked bill were turned over to
the investigator SPO4 Eulogio Tubo (SPO4 Tubo), who then marked the items with his initials. He
also prepared the letter request for laboratory examination of the sachet’s contents. P/C Insp.
Diestro recounted that the two plastic sachets tested positive for shabu.

The records did not disclose whether the marking of the confiscated drugs was conducted
at a police station and in the presence of an elected public officer and a representative from the
media and the DOJ. The intervening period between the supposed handover of the sachet from
Que to PO3 Lim, to the marking of the sachets by SPO4 Tubo as well as the measures taken
during transit from the target area to the police station, were likewise unaccounted for.

ISSUE:
Is strict compliance with the statutory requirements of chain of custody necessary to convict
the accused?

RULING:
Yes, strict compliance with the statutory requirements of chain of custody necessary to
convict the accused.

R.A. No. 9165 requires nothing less than strict compliance. The precision required in the
custody of seized drugs and drug paraphernalia is affirmed by the amendments made to Sec. 21
by R.A. No. 10640.Sec. 21(1) was simultaneously relaxed and made more specific by R.A. No.
10630. Originally, the use of the conjunctive “and” indicated that Sec. 21 requires the presence of
all the persons enumerated thereunder, in addition to the accused or his counsel. As amended by
R.A. No. 10640, Sec. 21(1) uses the disjunctive “or”, thus, a representative from the media and a
representative from the National Prosecution Service are not alternatives to each other. Further, it
now includes a specification of locations where the physical inventory and taking of photographs
must be conducted.

In this case, admitted deviation from Sec. 21’s prescribed process is an admission that
statutory requirements have not been observed. This notwithstanding, there was no showing that
the non-compliance thereof was supported by justifiable grounds, and that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs or drug paraphernalia were properly preserved. What is
critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking and photographing. Instead, it
is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity, even as they
make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an investigating officer, to
a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as evidence.

Therefore, in view of the failure of the prosecution to offer a justification for the deviations
from Sec. 21(1), the case must fail.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PRESENCE OF ALL ENUMERATED WITNESSES, NECESSARY IN ENSURING

INTEGRITY OF CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Christian Kevin Guieb y Butay

G.R. No. 233100, February 14, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
On appeal under Rule 45, Cristhian Kevin Guieb (Guieb) assails the decision of the CA
affirming his conviction by the RTC of violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

Following the buy-bust operation organized with the objective of apprehending Guieb, the
buy-bust team then brought Guieb and the seized items to the Municipal Police of San Nicolas.
Thereat, PO2 Richard Rarangol (PO2 Rarangol) conducted the marking, inventory, and
photography of the seized items in the presence of Guieb and Barangay Captain Francisco Bagay,
Sr. Thereafter, PO2 Rarangol brought the seized sachets to the crime laboratory where a
qualitative examination of the contents revealed that the same were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

RTC, affirmed in toto by the CA, in holding Guieb guilty, found that the police officers
complied with the chain of custody rule under the law.

ISSUE:
Is the absence of a representative from the DOJ and the media a justified deviation from
the chain of custody rule?

RULING:
No, the absence of a representative from DOJ and the media is a justified deviation from
the chain of custody rule. The police officers committed unjustified deviations, thereby putting into
question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs seized.

The law requires the presence of the enumerated witnesses—namely, an elected official,
as well as a representative from the DOJ and the media—to ensure the establishment of the chain
of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting or contamination of evidence.

In this case, while the requisite inventory and photography of the confiscated drugs were
indeed conducted, the Certificate of Inventory shows that only an elected official was present and
that there were no representatives from the DOJ and the media. Moreover, the prosecution did not
proffer a plausible explanation as to why there was a complete absence of an elected official and
a representative from the DOJ and the media in order for the saving clause to apply.

Therefore, the absence of a representative from DOJ and the media is an unjustified
deviation from the chain of custody rule.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ASIDE FROM THE ACCUSED OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE, PRESENCE OF

REPRESENTATIVES FROM MEDIA, DOJ AND ANY ELECTED OFFICIAL DURING THE
INVENTORY WOULD HAVE PRESERVED AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Wilson Ramos y Cabanatan

G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the CA Decision which affirmed the decision of the RTC finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Pursuant to a pre-organized buy-bust operation, Intelligence Officer 1 Cesar Dealagdon,

Jr. (Dealagdon) acting as a poseur – buyer, performed the pre-arranged signal, prompting his
back-ups to swoop in and arrest Ramos. Ramos was then frisked, resulting in the recovery of the
marked money, and thereafter, was brought to the police station. Thereat, the PDEA operatives
conducted the inventory and photography of the seized items in the presence of Barangay
Kagawad Jose Ruiz (Kgd. Ruiz). Dealagdon then brought the seized items to the PDEA Crime
Laboratory where the contents were confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction of the appellant, holding that the prosecution had
shown the presence of all the elements of the crime charged. It also refused to give credence to
Ramos' insistence that the arresting officers failed to observe the chain of custody rule by failure
to make an inventory at the place of his arrest in the presence of a media or a government official.

ISSUE:
Is it correct to convict the accused despite the absence of representatives from the DOJ
and the Media during the inventory?

RULING:
No, it is not correct to convict Ramos despite the absence of representatives from the DOJ
and the Media during the inventory.

Sec. 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value. Under the said section, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team
shall immediately after seizure, conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized
items in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same.

In this case, The PDEA operatives could have used that time before the operation to secure
the presence of representatives from the DOJ and the media who would have accompanied them
in the conduct of the inventory and photography of the items to be seized from Ramos on account
of the buy-bust; but unfortunately, they did not. Verily, the procedural lapses committed
by the PDEA operatives, which were unfortunately left unjustified by the State, militate against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Ramos, as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. The police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and
evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs allegedly seized from Ramos.

Therefore, the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of
custody rule, thereby putting into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the dangerous
drugs allegedly seized from Ramos.

224 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CHAIN OF CUSTODY REQUIRES THE PRESENCE OF THE ACCUSED OR HIS

REPRESENTATIVE, MEDIA, DOJ AND ANY ELECTED OFFICIAL DURING THE
INVENTORY

People of the Philippines vs. Roy Magsano y Sagauinit

G.R. No. 231050, February 28, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Assailed in this appeal is the CA Decision upholding the RTC’s finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of accused-appellant Roy Magsano (Magsano) for violating Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002".

Pursuant to a buy-bust operation to entrap Magsano the buy-bust team effected the arrest,
frisked Magsano, and found two (2) more sachets of suspected shabu. Magsano was then taken
to the barangay hall, where the confiscated drugs were marked and inventoried in the presence of
Barangay Kagawad George Achacoso.

The RTC ruled that the prosecution proved all the essential elements of the crimes charged
and found an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the dangerous drugs. It held further that
the absence of representatives from the media and the DOJ during the inventory did not render
the buy-bust operation illegal, since it was shown that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized drugs was nevertheless preserved. Same was affirmed in toto by the CA. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Is it correct to convict the accused despite the absence of representatives from the DOJ
and the Media during the inventory?

RULING:
No, the conviction was not proper because of the absence of representatives from the DOJ
and the media during the inventory.

Sec. 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must
follow when handling the seized drugs in order to preserve their integrity and evidentiary
value. Under the said section, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team
shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and
photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items
were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be
turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination. In the case of People v. Mendoza, the Court stressed that the presence of such
witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody.

In this case, the records reveal that while the inventory of the seized drugs was conducted
in the presence of Magsano and an elected public official, the same was not done in the presence
of a representative from the media or the DOJ. Despite this, the police officers did not provide any
plausible explanation as to why the presence of these required witnesses was not procured.

Therefore, their unjustified non-compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section
21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 puts into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the drugs
purportedly seized from the accused. Hence, Magsano's acquittal is in order.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ASIDE FROM THE ACCUSED OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE, PRESENCE OF

REPRESENTATIVES FROM MEDIA, DOJ AND ANY ELECTED OFFICIAL DURING THE
INVENTORY WOULD HAVE PRESERVED AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Ramoncito Cornel y Asuncion

G.R. No. 229047, April 16, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the CA’s Decision affirming the RTC Decision convicting appellant of Violation
of Sec. 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165.

On December 15, 2013, pursuant to a buy-bust operation conducted by a team of eight

police officers, one of which unarmed, Ramoncito Cornel was arrested for selling what was
identified as shabu, a dangerous drug. The inventory was, however, conducted at the barangay
hall and thereafter, PO1 Angulo turned the seized items over to the duty investigator, a Request
for Laboratory Examination was prepared, and the seized items were submitted to the Scene of
the Crime Operatives for examination. For security purposes and to prevent any damage, the
arresting team decided to make the markings at the Barangay Hall of East Rembo, Makati.
Affirming the RTC’s conviction, CA concluded that there was no break in the chain of custody,
hence, the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty that guilt of the accused. Further,
despite deviation on the marking and inventory, the same was properly justified by the commotion,
as explained by the prosecution. -- Cornel claims that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt as there are irregularities in the inventory of the confiscated item and insists that there was
a broken chain of custody of the confiscated dangerous drug. Further, no explanation nor a valid
reason was also given for the absence of a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice during the inventory of the item seized.

ISSUE:
Is it correct to convict the accused despite deviations from the requirement on inventory of
seized items under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165?

RULING:
No, it is not correct to convict the accused despite deviations from the requirement on
inventory of seized items under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165. The CA is not correct in affirming the
accused’s conviction.

The amendatory law, approved on July 15, 2014 mandates that the conduct of inventory
and photograph must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public
official and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. Here, the old provisions of Sec. 21,
however shall apply since the alleged crime was committed (2013) before the amendment (2014).
This old provision provides that presence of a representative from the media and the DOJ, and
any elected public official during the inventory is required to guarantee against frame up. However,
this is with exception. It is settled in the amended law (and in the IRR of the old law), that in cases
of deviation from the chain of custody rule, under justifiable grounds and as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved, seizure shall not be rendered
void.

In this case, despite deviations on the inventory requirement, no valid reason was given
for the absence of a representative from the media and the DOJ. Also, reason of commotion
justifying inventory at the barangay hall was found unjustifiable since apprehending team was
composed of eight officers.

Therefore, it is apt to acquit the appellant.

226 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES IN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE OFFICERS BREAK

THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People vs. Vicente Sipin

G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal which seeks to reverse the decision of the CA affirming the decision of
the RTC finding accused-appellant Vicente Sipin guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of
Section 5 and 11 of RA 9165 for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

During the buy-bust operation, the police officers ordered Enteng to take out the contents
of his pocket, placed him under arrest, and read him his rights. PO1 Diocena confiscated the
marked money and the plastic containing shabu, then turned them over to PO1 Raagas who
marked the items in the presence of the accused. From the place of the incident to the police
station, PO1 Raagas took custody and hand carried the specimens wrapped in a bond paper, then
turned them over to PO1 Gorospe, who prepared the booking sheet, the arrest report and the
request for laboratory examination of the specimens. Pictures of Enteng and the specimens were
taken in the presence of PO1 Raagas and Diocena. The specimens were then given to PO1
Diocena who brought them to the crime laboratory. P/Insp. Ballesteros personally received the
subject specimens, which later tested positive for shabu.

Accused, through the Public Attorney’s Office, argued that the trial court erred in relying
on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty in favor of the police officers.
No inventory containing the signature of the appellant, a representative from the media, any
elected public official and a representative of the DOJ was presented and identified in court by the
prosecution witnesses, and that no justifiable reason was offered to excuse non-compliance with
Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165.

ISSUE:
Does the failure to establish unbroken chain of custody of drugs warrant the acquittal the
accused?

RULING:
Yes, the failure to establish unbroken chain of custody of drugs warrant the acquittal the
accused.

The accused is acquitted of the charges of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous
drugs for failure to establish the unbroken chain of custody of said drugs. The links that must be
established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, are as follows: (1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
(2) the turn-over of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer; (3) the turn-over by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and (4)
the turn-over and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court.

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the third link in
the chain of custody. Serious inconsistencies in the testimonies of the police officers also broke
the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs from the time they were seized from appellant until
they were presented in court, thereby undermining the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence.

Therefore, the accused is acquitted due to the lapses in the chain of custody in handling
the dangerous drug.

| 227
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE SEIZED DRUGS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITH

MORAL CERTAINTY

People vs. Narciso Supat y Radoc

G.R. No. 217027, June 6, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal which seeks to reverse the ruling of RTC Laguna finding Narciso
Supat guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

During the buy-bust operation, the police seized the 100-peso marked money and 3
sachets of white crystalline substance. The seized items were handed to SPO4 Dela Peña and
were taken to the police station, together with the accused. Marking and inventory of the seized
items were conducted. SPO4 Dela Peña transferred the custody of the seized sachets to the crime
laboratory for examination. Forensic Chemist Police Senior Inspector Huelgas conducted the
laboratory examination specimens and was determined to be shabu. During the trial, the accused
admitted the existence and due execution of the chemistry report findings.

Accused Supat contented that that the identity of the seized drugs was not proven in
violation of Section 21 of RA 9165. Supat argued that there were irregularities in the conduct of
the buy-bust operation and there were gaps in the chain of custody of the seized items. No
inventory of the seized items was conducted in the presence of representatives from media,
Department of Justice (DOJ), and elective official; and (2) no photographs of the seized items were
taken. There was no information on what happened after the seized drugs were marked at the
police station and the prosecution did not present the forensic chemist who examined the seized
drugs.

ISSUE:
Was the failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9156 and the gaps in the chain of
custody of seized drugs warrant the acquittal of the accused?

RULING:
Yes, the failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9156 and the gaps in the chain of
custody of seized drugs warrant the acquittal of the accused.

Accused Supat is acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove that the buy-bust team
complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and to establish the
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs. In illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the confiscated drug constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense. The identity and
integrity of the seized drugs should be established with moral certainty. The prosecution must
prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the substance seized from the accused is exactly the same
substance offered in court as proof of the crime. Each link to the chain of custody must be
accounted for. Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 plainly requires the apprehending team to conduct
a physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the same immediately after
seizure and confiscation. Further, the inventory must be done in the presence of the accused, his
counsel, or representative, a representative of the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official,
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In this case, buy-bust team committed several and patent procedural lapses in the conduct
of the seizure, initial custody, and handling of the seized drug - which thus created reasonable
doubt as to the identity and integrity of the drugs and, consequently, reasonable doubt as to the
guilt of the accused.

Therefore, accused Supat is acquitted.

228 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN PROSECUTING BOTH ILLEGAL SALE AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS

DRUGS, CONVICTION CANNOT BE SUSTAINED IF DOUBT PERSISTS ON THE
IDENTITY OF SAID DRUGS

People of the Philippines vs. Jefferson del Del Mundo y Abac and Mitos Lacson-Del Mundo
G.R. No. 208095, September 20, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s conviction of accused-
appellant Jefferson Del Mundo y Abac (Jefferson) for illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and accused-appellant Mitos Lacson-Del Mundo (Mitos) for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.

Appellants Jefferson and Mitos were arrested after a buy-bust operation in their house.
During the buy-bust operation, Jefferson was caught inside the toilet and was seen throwing
something into the toilet bowl. Using a broomstick, the police officers retrieved four (4) plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substances from the toilet bowl. After the sachets were wiped
clean, SPO2 Espiritu turned these over to PO3 Rodil. At the police station, the seized items were
photographed, inventoried and marked by PO3 Rodil with her initials, in the presence of the
accused-appellants, a barangay kagawad, and the president of Kill Droga movement in the area.
The plastic sachet seized by PO3 Rodil was marked with the initial "YEL" while the 4 plastic sachets
recovered by SPO2 Espiritu were marked with the initials MDR1, MDR2, MDR3, and MDR4. PO3
Rodil then prepared letter-requests for laboratory examination and sent them together with the five
(5) heat-sealed transparent sachets to the crime laboratory. The defense merely offered denial
and insinuation of frame up and planting of evidence.

ISSUE:
Has the prosecution sufficiently established an unbroken chain of custody of the seized
items presented as evidence even if they were not dated and no inventory was made immediately
after its seizure?

RULING:
No, the prosecution has not sufficiently established an unbroken chain of custody of the
seized items presented as evidence even if they were not dated and no inventory was made
immediately after its seizure.

In prosecuting both illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, conviction
cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the identity of said drugs. The identity of the dangerous
drug must be established with moral certainty.

In this case, the buy-bust team failed to observe the proper procedure in taking custody of
confiscated dangerous drugs, as provided for in Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. While the
prosecution was able to present the inventory of confiscated items, the same were not dated and
does not comply with the requirement that the inventory was made immediately after seizure.
Further, none of the persons required to sign the inventory under the law was made to sign the
same. Also, none of the alleged photographs of the seized items were presented in Court. Non-
observance of the mandatory requirements under Section 21 casts doubt on the integrity of the
shabu supposedly seized from accused-appellant. This creates reasonable doubt in the conviction
of accused-appellant.

Therefore, as reasonable doubt thus exists, the quantum of proof required for the
conviction of Jefferson for illegal possession of dangerous drugs was not met. His acquittal is,
therefore, in order.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROSECUTION MUST ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUG

IN A WAY THAT THEIR INTEGRITY IS WELL PRESERVED

People of the Philippines vs. Namraida Alboka y Naning

G.R. No. 212195, February 21, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
On appeal is the decision of the CA affirming the RTC decision convicting accused-
appellant Namraida Alboka, aka “Malira” (Alboka) with two counts of violation of R.A. No. 9165,
one for violation of Sec. 5 in relation to Sec. 26, Art. II and Sec. 11, Art. II thereof.

Following a tip from an informant that a certain alias "Bobby" was involved in drugs, a buy-
bust operation was put in place where Lagos and Turingan were assigned as poseurbuyer. Upon
arriving at the transaction place, the informant received a call from Bobby informing him that the
item he ordered had been passed on to a certain Malira who was later identified as accused-
appellant herein. Lagos was able to recover the marked money and two pieces of plastic sachets
of shabu. Lagos placed markings on the sachets of shabu handed to him by Malira and on the
other sachets recovered. The markings represented the initials of Lagos and the date, month, and
year the crime happened.

While it was during the re-cross examination that it was shown that the markings were
placed by Lagos at the scene of the crime, the joint affidavit of arrest was deafeningly quiet on this
matter. Further it cannot be established with certainty that the same substance were the ones
brought to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.

ISSUE:
Is it correct to convict the accused despite the doubts on the identity of the seized item
during the trial?

RULING:
No, it is not correct to convict the accused despite the doubts on the identity of the seized
item during the trial

The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous
drug itself. "For both offenses, it is crucial that the prosecution establishes the identity of the seized
dangerous drugs in a way that their integrity is well preserved — from the time of seizure or
confiscation from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court. The fact that the
substance said to have been illegally sold or possessed was the very same substance offered in
court as exhibit must be established." The chain of custody rule performs this function as it ensures
that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

In this case, records failed to show that a physical inventory of the seized items was
conducted in the presence of the accused-appellant, a representative from the media, the DOJ,
and any elected public official, and that the items were photographed. Lagos claimed that he knew
that other than the marking, the inventory was also required.

Therefore, it is not correct to convict the accused despite the doubts on the identity of the
seized item during the trial.

230 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IDENTITY OF THE DANGEROUS DRUG MUST BE ESTABLISHED BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT

People vs. Manuel Ferrer y Remoquillo

G.R. No. 213914, June 6, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal which seeks to reverse decision CA which affirmed the decision of RTC
Muntinlupa City guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

During the buy-bust operation, accused Manuel Ferrer, Kiyaga, and Dimas were arrested
for the sale of illegal drugs. SPO1 Viernas marked the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets as
Exhibits A and B with his initials "BFV." The accused-appellants were informed of their
constitutional rights and thereafter were brought to Camp Lim. Viernes was in possession of the
confiscated plastic sachets from the time they left the mall until they reached Camp Lim. Upon
arriving at their office, Viernes prepared the certificate of inventory of the seized items. On the
same day, he bought to the laboratory the request for laboratory examination of the sachets and
the request for drug testing of the accused-appellants. The chemistry report showed that the
sachets contain shabu and only Manuel was tested positive of shabu.

The accused contended that his guilty was not proved beyond reasonable doubt due to
the gaps in the chain of custody committed by the police officers in violation of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165.

ISSUE:
Does the violation of mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 warrant the
acquittal of the accused?

RULING:
Yes, the violation of mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 warrant the
acquittal of the accused.

In all prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug
itself, the existence of which is essential to a judgment of conviction. Thus, its identity must be
clearly established beyond reasonable doubt to prove its case against the accused. Without the
insulating presence of the representative from the media or the Department of Justice, or any
elected public official during the seizure and marking of the seized drugs, the evils of switching,
'planting' or contamination of the evidence negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and
confiscation of the said drugs.

In this case, the prosecution was not able to prove that the seized items were inventoried
and photographed in the presence of the accused-appellants and that copies thereof were
furnished to them. The certificate of inventory was not even signed by the accused-appellants or
their representatives. While it appears in the certificate of inventory that the inventory was made
in the presence of a barangay kagawad and a member of the Press Corps, the prosecution never
tried to elicit from SPO1 Viernes how and when these witnesses to the inventory affixed their
respective signatures on the certificate.

Therefore, the gaps in the chain of custody show that the prosecution was not able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed illegal sale of drugs. Hence, the accused is
acquitted.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE PROSECUTION MUST BE ABLE TO ACCOUNT FOR EACH LINK IN THE CHAIN OF
CUSTODY OVER THE DANGEROUS DRUG FROM THE MOMENT OF SEIZURE UP TO
ITS PRESENTATION IN COURT AS EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS DELICTI

People of the Philippines vs. Evangeline Abella y Sedego

G.R. No. 213918, June 27, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
In an appeal under Rule 45 before the SC, accused Abella and Sendiong assail the
Decision of the CA, affirming in toto the finding of the RTC of the guilt of said accused.

The prosecution alleged that after receiving a tip and upon surveillance, the police officers
went to Upper Luke Wright to conduct an entrapment. During the entrapment, Tubio, the poseur-
buyer, convinced the accused that he wanted to buy shabu. When Abella agreed to sell, Tubio
handed her the buy-bust money. Sendiong then gave the sachet to Abella, who handed it to Tubio.
When the transaction was consummated, Tubio signaled the team to effect arrest of the accused.
SPO1 Germodo informed the accused appellants of their rights. After Tubio handed the sachet to
PO2 Corsame, he immediately marked the sachet handed to him. SPO2 Ferrer then confiscated
the marked money from Abella. SPO1 Germodo arrested Sendiong and confiscated from her a
swiss knife key holder contained another sachet. SPO1 Germodo handed the sachet to PO2
Corsame who also marked the same. PO2 Corsame then conducted an inventory of the items
seized in the presence of the accused. SPO1 Germodo took pictures during the inventory. PO2
Corsame took possession of the seized items to the PDEA office. SPO1 Germodo took a picture
when the seized items were being received at the PDEA office. On the same day, PO2 Corsame
submitted to the PDEA crime laboratory the marked seized items for examination by PCI Llena, a
forensic chemist. After examination, it was found that the sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride. PCI Llena personally resealed the two sachets and marked the same.

ISSUE:
Was the prosecution able to establish the unbroken chain of custody of the seized items?

RULING:
Yes, the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody.

There are four links in the chain of custody that the prosecution must establish: 1) seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer; 2) the turnover of the drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; 3)
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and 4) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.

In this case, immediately after the transaction was consummated, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the place where the sale transaction took place and the police officers marked the
seized items. It was also at the scene of the crime that PO2 Corsame personally conducted an
inventory of the items seized which was witnessed by the DOJ and elected official representatives,
respectively. Likewise, the police took pictures while the DOJ and elected official representatives
were signing the receipt in the presence of the accused-appellants. At the PDEA office, PO2
Corsame prepared the request for the laboratory examination of the seized items. During the same
day, PO2 Corsame turned over the seized items to the PNP laboratory, thru PCI Llena. It was also
on that same day that PCI Llena released her report finding that the seized items contained shabu.
Thereafter, PCI Llena turned over the seized items to the RTC thru its branch clerk of court.

Therefore, the identity and integrity of the subject matter of the sale has been preserved.

232 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CITY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, NOT A PART OF THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF SEIZED

DANGEROUS DRUGS

People of the Philippines vs. Glenn De Guzman y Delos Reyes

G.R. No. 219955, February 5, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal under Rule 45, appellant Glenn De Guzman (De Guzman) assails the judgment
of the CA affirming his conviction by the RTC of violating Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

The prosecution claimed that following the entrapment operation, De Guzman was brought
to the police station. Thereat, PO1 Reyes marked the confiscated sachet and turned it over to
SPO1 Delos Reyes who then separately marked the other sachets and plastic pack confiscated
from De Guzman during the body search. SPO1 Delos Reyes prepared the inventory receipt, the
letter request for laboratory examination, and the request for drug test. Photographs were taken,
and the physical inventory of the seized items was conducted in the presence of two barangay
official.

Records showed that the testimonies of PO1 Reyes and SPO1 Delos Reyes were silent
as to details concerning the handling and disposition of the seized items after the arrest. Further,
they did not disclose the identity of the person/s who had custody and possession of the
confiscated items after their seizure. SPO1 Delos Reyes also did not testify as regards the identity
of the person who turned over the items to the forensic chemist, and the identity of the person who
had custody thereof afterwards. Notably, the forensic chemist did not testify in court. Further, it
was revealed that the PNP Crime Laboratory agreed to turn over the custody of the seized items
to an unnamed receiving person at the City Prosecutor’s Office before they were submitted as
evidence to the trial court.

ISSUE:
Is the link in the chain of custody broken when the City Prosecutor’s Office took custody of
the dangerous drugs before they were brought to the court?

RULING:
Yes, links in the chain of custody were broken when the City Prosecutor’s Office took
custody of the dangerous drugs before they were brought to the court.

In line with the procedure under Sec. 21, par. 1, R.A. No. 9165, the following links must be
established to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized items had not been compromised:
(1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; (3) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and (4), the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

In this case, the prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the
seized illegal drugs because the City Prosecutor’s Office is not, nor has it ever been, a part of the
chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs. It has absolutely no business in taking custody of
dangerous drugs before they are brought before the court.

Therefore, links in the chain of custody were broken when the City Prosecutor’s Office took
custody of the dangerous drugs before they were brought to the court.

| 233
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FAILURE TO PRESENT TESTIMONY OF INVESTIGATING OFFICER AND FORENSIC

OFFICER, FATAL TO PROSECUTION’S CASE

People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Dumagay y Suacito

G.R. No. 216753, February 7, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal under Rule 45, appellant Jesus Dumagay (Dumagay) assails the CA decision
sustaining his conviction by the RTC for violating Sec. 5 of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

During trial, the prosecution dispensed with the presentation of SPO1 Melvin Gallego, the
investigating officer, and PCI Mercedes Diestro, the forensic chemist, after having agreed with the
defense to enter into a stipulation of facts. Among others, they stipulated that SPO1 Gallego was
the investigator who received Dumagay and the seized items; that he conducted an inventory of
the items and took pictures thereof; and that he prepared the Investigation Report and the Request
for Laboratory Examination. Further, they stipulated that PCI Diestro received the Request for
Laboratory Examination of the vials and conducted the examination thereon, which yielded a
positive result for the presence of morphine.

No testimonies or stipulations were made on the details of the turnover of the seized vials
from the police station to the crime laboratory, and on the turnover and submission of the same
from the crime laboratory to the court.

Dumagay contends, among others, that the chain of custody rule was not complied with
for failure of the investigating officer and the forensic chemist to testify in court.

ISSUE:
Is the prosecution’s failure to present the investigating officer and forensic chemist fatal to
its case?

RULING:
Yes, the prosecution’s failure to present the investigating officer and forensic chemist was
fatal to its case.

Well-settled is the rule that each link in the chain of custody rule must be sufficiently proved
by the prosecution and examined with careful scrutiny by the court. Failure to strictly comply with
the rules of procedure however, does not ipso facto invalidate or render void the seizure and
custody over the items as long as the prosecution is able to show that (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.

In this case, the prosecution, in dispensing with the testimonies of the investigating officer
and the forensic chemist, failed to show every link of the chain of custody. Without their
testimonies, the Court cannot ascertain whether the seized vials presented in evidence were the
same vials seized from appellant when he was arrested. Likewise, the prosecution failed to give a
justifiable reason why the apprehending police officers had failed to mark the seized items and
conduct physical inventory of the same at the place where appellant was arrested.

Therefore, the prosecution’s failure to present the investigating officer and forensic chemist
was fatal to its case. And in view of the foregoing, appellant Dumagay must be acquitted.

234 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN WARRANTLESS ARRESTS, APPREHENDING OFFICER GIVEN THE OPTION WHERE

TO MARK, INVENTORY, AND PHOTOGRAPH SEIZED ITEMS

People of the Philippines vs. Abdulwahid Pundugar

G.R. No. 214779, February 7, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal under Rule 45, appellant Abdulwahid Pundugar (Pundugar) challenged the
decision of the CA affirming his conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

Following the buy-bust operation, Pundugar was arrested and was subsequently brought
to the police station. Thereat, PO2 Julaton immediately marked the confiscated sachets of shabu
he retrieved from Pundugar’s pocket. He also took photographs of the items in front of appellant
and made an inventory of the drugs seized. Thereafter, the confiscated drugs were brought to the
laboratory for examination which yielded a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.

However, Pundugar claims that there was non-compliance by the apprehending police
officers with Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165 and its IRRs resulting in a broken chain of custody over the
confiscated drugs, for not immediately marking the illegal drugs upon confiscation, and in not
having representatives from the media, the DOJ, and an elective government official during the
conduct of the inventory and taking of photographs. On this point, the prosecution explained that
they were not able to invite representatives from the media, the DOJ or an elected public official
because they could not find anyone available, and that they were pressed for time.

ISSUE:
Does non-compliance with the requirements set forth under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
render the seizure and custody over the illegal drugs void or invalid?

RULING:
No, non-compliance with the requirements under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 does not render
the seizure and custody over the illegal drugs void.

Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that noncompliance of these requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and
custody over said items. Moreover, A.1.3 of the IRR provides that in warrantless seizures, the
marking, inventory and photograph of the seized items in the presence of the violator shall be done
immediately at the place where the drugs were seized or at the nearest police station or nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable. Thus, the apprehending officer
has the option whether to mark, inventory, and photograph the seized items immediately at the
place where the drugs were seized, or at the nearest police station, or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer, whichever is the most practical or suitable for the purpose.

In this case, the apprehending officers found it more practicable to mark, inventory, and
photograph the seized drugs at the police station.

Therefore, non-compliance with the requirements set forth under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165
did not render void or invalid such seizure and custody over the illegal drugs.

| 235
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

BARANGAY BLOTTER NOT A SUFFICIENT SUBSTITUTE FOR THE PHYSICAL

INVENTORY REQUIREMENT UNDER THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY RULE

People of the Philippines vs. Raul Manansala y Maninang

G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
On appeal, Raul Manansala (Manansala) assails the decision of the CA affirming his
conviction by the RTC of the violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A. No. 9165).

Records reveal that following the buy-bust operation conducted by the team of PO2 Renato
Magadia (PO2 Magadia), the seized items were marked immediately, upon confiscation at the
place of arrest and in the presence of Manansala. However, the same was not done in the
presence of any elected public official, representative of the media or DOJ. PO2 Magadia in his
testimony, explained that they were not able to comply with the provisions of Sec. 21, R.A. No.
9165 because “the commotion already happened”, that “[they] just made a blotter on the
barangay”, and that photographs were not taken “because [they did] not have a camera at the
time.”

The records were also bereft of evidence showing that a physical inventory of the seized
items was made or that photographs of the same were taken.

ISSUE:
Is barangay blotter a sufficient substitute for the inventory requirement under Sec. 21, R.A.
No. 9165?

RULING:
No, a barangay blotter is not a sufficient substitute for the inventory requirement under
Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165. It constitutes only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein and is
not an adequate substitute for the physical inventory requirement under the chain of custody rule.

It is well-settled that the procedure in Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165 is a matter of substantive
law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Therefore, it must be shown
that earnest efforts were exerted by the police officers involved to comply with the mandated
procedure so as to convince the Court that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given
circumstances. The barangay blotter, which is merely a recording of the incident, is not equivalent
to or substitute for a physical inventory that accounts and lists down in detail the items confiscated
from the accused. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated and are not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions
or inquiries.

In this case, the records reveals that while the prosecution was able to show that the seized
items were marked by PO2 Magadia immediately upon confiscation at the place of arrest and in
the presence of Manansala, the same was not done in the presence of any elected public official,
as well as a representative from the DOJ and the media. Despite the failure to observe these
requirements, no justifiable ground was given to explain such lapse. Additionally, records are bereft
of evidence showing that a physical inventory of the seized items was made or that photographs
of the same were taken.

Therefore, in view of the failure of the police officers to carry out the positive duty of proving
compliance with the procedure set forth under Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165, Manansala’s acquittal is in
order.

236 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE STATE, NOT THE ACCUSED, HAS THE HEAVY BURDEN OF JUSTIFYING AT THE
TRIAL THE LAPSES OR GAPS IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Geronimo y Agustine

G.R. No. 180447, August 23, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Fernando Geronimo appeals the decision promulgated by the CA, which pronounced him
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

During trial, Geronimo denied the charges against him and claimed that the arresting police
officers had arrived and conducted a search of another house near the house of his sister where
he was at the time. But, the RTC observed that the prosecution had established the elements of
illegal sale of shabu by showing that Geronimo had been caught in flagrante delicto during the
buy-bust operation; that his allegation about his unlawful arrest had been a mere afterthought; and
that he had not called to the attention of the investigating prosecutor the manner of his illegal arrest
during the inquest proceedings. CA upheld his conviction and ruled that the prosecution had
established that the arrest was pursuant to a lawful buy-bust operation.

Review of the records, however, indicates that the procedure laid down by R.A. No. 9165
and its IRR was not followed by the agents of the State. Firstly, no photograph of the seized shabu
was taken either at the place of the entrapment and arrest, or even later on after the team had
brought the accused-appellant to their office. Secondly, although PO1 Sabo attested that she had
placed her initials "JAS" on the confiscated shabu at the place of the entrapment right after the
accused-appellant had been apprised of his constitutional rights, none of the members of the buy-
bust team saw the need to photograph the seized shabu and the confiscated bills. Thirdly, no
elected official, member of the media, or representative of the DOJ was present.

ISSUE:
Does the accused have the burden of proving at the trial the lapses or gaps in the chain of
custody?

RULING:
No, the State, not the accused, has the heavy burden of justifying at the trial the lapses or
gaps in the chain of custody.

Under R.A. No. 9165, every prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu prohibited, the State carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of
the offense, failing in which the State would not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the State does not establish the corpus delicti, such as when
the dangerous drug subject of the prosecution is missing, or when substantial gaps in the chain of
custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited
substance presented as evidence in court, then the crime is not established beyond reasonable
doubt.

In this case, the procedural lapses committed by the buy-bust team underscored the
uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the shabu presented and admitted as evidence
against the accused-appellant. The unavoidable consequence of the non-establishment of the
chain of custody was the serious doubt about the shabu presented as evidence at the trial being
really the shabu seized from the accused-appellant. Without the justification, the chain of custody
is not shown to be unbroken; hence, the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was not
preserved.

Therefore, the State, not the accused, has the heavy burden of justifying at the trial the
lapses or gaps in the chain of custody.

| 237
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE STATE CARRIES THE HEAVY BURDEN OF JUSTIFYING THE LAPSES OR GAPS IN
THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Alvin Velasco y Huevos

G.R. No. 219174, February 21, 2018
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
On appeal, accused-appellant Alvin Velasco seeks to reverse the CA decision which
affirmed the RTC’s decision convicting him and co-accused Vevir Diaz for the crime illegal sale of
prohibited drugs as defined and punished by Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.

Records reveal that following a buy-bust operation, Velasco with his-co-accused, together
with the seized items, were brought to the Calapan City Police Station and were photographed in
the presence only of Barangay Captain Frayre. Thereupon, the heat-sealed plastic sachets were
marked.

On appeal, CA affirmed the convictions of Velasco and Diaz, upholding the RTC's findings
that the Prosecution established all the elements of the offenses charged; and that the chain of
custody of the seized drugs had remained intact despite deviation from the chain of custody rule
under Sec. 21, par. 1, of R.A. No. 9165, thereby preserving the integrity, identity and value of the
drugs as evidence.

ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in finding Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite failing to mark
the seized drugs immediately, in deviation of the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21, par. 1, of
R.A. No. 9165?

RULING:
No, the CA is not correct in finding Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite failing
to mark the seized drugs immediately, in deviation of the chain of custody rule under Sec. 21, par.
1, of R.A. No. 9165.

It is well settled that in every prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs prohibited under
R.A. No. 9165, chain of custody rule must be complied with. However, in cases of deviation from
said rule, the State, not the accused, carried the heavy burden of justifying at the trial the lapses
or gaps in the chain of custody. Without the justification, the chain of custody is not shown to be
unbroken; hence, the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was not preserved. The result
is that a doubt about whether the evidence presented to the trial court was the substance that was
the subject of the illegal sale arose. The accused could not be justifiably found and held guilty of
the offense charged in the face of such doubt.

In this case, the procedures outlined under the Sec. 21, par. 1, of R.A. No. 9165 were not
followed by the members of the apprehending team. They did not mark and photograph the seized
drugs, or make an inventory of the seized drugs immediately upon confiscation at the place of the
buy-bust operation and in the presence of Velasco, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, and an elected public official who should then have signed the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy thereof, even with the sufficient amount of time they had prior
to the buy-bust operation. Further, even with Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165’s
saving mechanism - the applicability of the same is conditioned upon the rendering by the
apprehending team of a justification for such non-compliance - the prosecution still failed to explain
sufficiently.

Therefore, the CA is not correct in finding Velasco guilty beyond reasonable doubt despite
failing to mark the seized drugs immediately, in deviation of the chain of custody rule under Sec.
21, par. 1, of R.A. No. 9165.

238 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

BEST EVIDENCE RULE APPLIES ONLY WHEN THE CONTENTS OF THE DOCUMENT
ARE THE SUBJECT OF INQUIRY

PO2 Jessie Flores y De Leon vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018
Gesmundo, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside
the decision and resolution of the CA which affirmed with modification the decision of RTC-Quezon
City, Br. 91 finding petitioner PO2 Jessie Flores y De Leon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Simple Robbery (Extortion) as defined and penalized under Article 294 (5) of the RPC.

Petitioner was arrested via an entrapment operation pursuant to a complaint by private

complainant Roderick France. The complaint alleged that France was asked to prepare the
amount of ₱2,000.00 so he can get back his driver's license. When France returned to the station,
PO2 Flores asked him if he brought with him the money. He opened a drawer and told France to
drop the money inside. PO2 Flores then counted the money using his left hand. As soon as France
asked for his driver's license, the entrapment team suddenly materialized. They arrested PO2
Flores and confiscated the things inside his drawer including the marked money. Subsequently,
RTC found petitioner guilty of simple robbery (extortion).

On appeal, now petitioner Flores averred that the RTC incorrectly convicted him by giving
weight on pieces of evidence in violation of the Best Evidence Rule. He argued that the
prosecution's exhibits were mere photocopies and the original pieces of the marked money were
never even presented.

The prosecution, thru the OSG, argued that all the elements of the crime charged were
adequately established. It added that the photocopies of the exhibits were sufficient and admissible
since they were public records. It also said in its brief that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were enough to prove the elements of the crime and that the presentation of the original
marked money was no longer necessary.

ISSUE:
Are the photocopies of the exhibits such that of the marked money sufficient for conviction?

RULING:
Yes, the photocopies of the exhibits such that of the marked money were sufficient and
admissible.

In People vs. Tandoy, G.R. No. 80505; December 4, 1990, the Court held that the best
evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where
the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.

In this case, the marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose
of establishing its existence and not its contents. Therefore, other substitute evidence, like a xerox
copy thereof, is admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

Therefore, photocopies of the exhibits such that of the marked money were sufficient and
admissible conforming to the rules of admissibility.

| 239
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MERE PHOTOCOPY OF A DEED OF SALE CANNOT BE USED TO PROVE FORGERY

Hilario Lamsen vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 227069, November 22, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA in affirming the
Decision of the RTC sustaining the decision of the MeTC of Manila finding Lamsen guilty of
falsification of documents.

Aniceta dela Cruz owned a parcel of land. Upon her death, she left her two nieces as
surviving heirs, Teresita dela Cruz Lao and Carmelita Lao Lee. After Aniceta’s death, Teresita
went to the former’s house to look for the duplicate title of the subject property, but it was not found.
Teresita executed an affidavit of loss and annotated the same with the Register of Deeds of
Valenzuela. Later, Teresita petitioned for the second issuance of a duplicate title. Lamsen opposed
the petition claiming that the title is in his possession. Later, the Register of Deeds notified Teresita
that a deed of sale involving the subject property is being register. However, the application was
withdrawn. Teresita went to the Notarial Section if Manila to have a copy of the deed, but was only
given a photocopy of the said deed since the original was no longer in file. Teresita sent the
document to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The result showed that the signatures of
Aniceta and her husband were forged.

Hence, Teresita filed a criminal charge against Lamsen. In his defense, Lamsen denied
the allegations arguing that he used to rent the subject property and eventually bought the same.

ISSUE:
Is it correct to convict the accused of falsification of public documents based on the
presentation of a photocopy of the falsified document as evidence?

RULING:
No, the accused should not be convicted of falsification of public documents based on the
presentation of a photocopy of the falsified document as evidence. Mere photocopy of the subject
document cannot be used to prove competently the forgery.

The elements of the said crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b)
the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171; and (c) the
falsification was committed in a public document. Relatedly, the prosecution must likewise
establish the fact of falsification or forgery by clear, positive, and convincing evidence, as the same
is never presumed. Withal, the fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized to have been forged. The genuineness and due execution of a photocopied
document cannot be competently established without a copy of the original. Photocopies are
considered secondary evidence which can be rendered inadmissible absent any proof that the
original was lost, destroyed, or in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the
evidence is offered.

In this case, not only did the prosecution fail to present the original copy of the subject
deed in court, it likewise did not provide ample proof that the same was lost, destroyed, or in the
custody or under the control of Lamsen. Since mere photocopies of the subject deed were used
to examine the questioned and standard signatures of spouses Tandas, no valid comparison can
be had between them, thereby rendering Batiles' declaration inconclusive to support a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt against Lamsen.

Therefore, Lamsen could not be convicted of falsification of public documents.

240 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHEN THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN REDUCED INTO WRITING,

THERE IS NO OTHER EVIDENCE OF SUCH TERM OTHER THAN THE CONTENTS OF
THE AGREEMENT

Philippine National Bank vs. James Cua

G.R. No. 199161, April 18, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside CA’s decision, which
affirmed with modification RTC’s Decision favoring James Cua and ordering PNB to pay James.

James Cua together with his brother, Antonio Cua maintained a US Dollar Savings Time
Deposit with PNB, Sucat, Parañaque branch, evidenced by Certificate of Time Deposit (CTD) No.
B-630178 with a face value of US$50,860.53. The brothers allegedly had the practice of pre-
signing loan application documents with PNB for the purpose of having a standby loan or ready
money available anytime. James alleged that sometime in 2004, he learned that he had a loan
obligation with PNB which had become due and demandable. He, however, denies this and posits
that he had never availed of its loan proceeds. Later, to see if his dollar time deposit was still
existing and in order to revive his machine shop business, James requested from PNB the release
of P500,000.00 to be secured by his US Dollar Savings Time Deposit. PNB, however, rejected his
loan application since his dollar time deposit had already been applied in payment to the earlier
loans he had with the bank. After PNB failed to release his funds, James filed a complaint for sum
of money praying that PNB return to him the entire amount of the said dollar account. In this
petition, PNB contended that James properly received the proceeds of the subject loan as
evidenced by promissory notes signed by James and Antonio. It also contended that CA gravely
erred when it disregarded the contents of the notarized promissory notes, despite the lack of clear
and conclusive evidence sufficient to overthrow the parol evidence rule.

ISSUE:
Can the receipt of the loan proceeds be proved through the presentation of promissory
notes covering the same?

RULING:
Yes, the receipt of the loan proceeds be proved through the presentation of promissory
notes covering the same.

It is well settled that promissory note is the best evidence of the existence of the loan.
Moreover, Rule 130, Section 9 of the Rules of Court provides for the parol evidence rule which
states that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. This rule
admits of exceptions but to overcome the said presumption, the parol evidence must be clear and
convincing and of such sufficient credibility as to overturn the written agreement.

In this case, James does not deny that he executed promissory notes in favor of PNB.
However, his allegation was said notes were only pre-signed for future loans. Nothing, however,
in the promissory note would suggest that it was merely to secure future loans. In fact, it is clear
from the wordings – “FOR VALUE RECEIVED”- used therein that James acknowledged receipt
of the proceeds of the loan.

Therefore, there is no reason to deviate from the terms of the loan as appearing on the
promissory note. Consequently, RTC and CA erred when they considered James' unsubstantiated
claim and ruled that PNB failed to prove James' receipt of the loan proceeds.

| 241
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WITNESS' CREDIBILITY IS ASCERTAINED BY HIS DEGREE OF ATTENTION BASED ON

CONDITIONS OF VISIBILITY AND THE EXTENT OF TIME FOR HIM TO BE EXPOSED
TO THE PERPETRATORS, PERUSE THEIR FEATURES, AND ASCERTAIN THEIR
IDENTITY

People of the Philippines vs. Crisente Pepano Nuñez

G.R. No. 209342, October 4, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves an appeal under Rule 45 Decision of the CA affirming with modification the
decision of the RTC, finding Crisente Pepano Nunez (Nunez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide.

George Marciales, Orly Nabia, Paul Pobre, and a certain alias "Jun'' were charged with
robbery with homicide, under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. At first, only Marciales and
Nabia were arrested, arraigned, and tried. The RTC pronounced Marciales and Nabia guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced them to death. Nunez was apprehended by the Philippine
National Police on the premise that he was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the information.
Prosecution witnesses identified him as one (1) of the alleged robbers. The information was then
amended to state Nuñez's name in lieu of Paul Pobre.

Nuñez argued claimed that on the date of the said crime, was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal with
his aunt at her fish store.

ISSUE:
Is the testimony of a witness who identified the accused as the author of the crime credible
despite his first testimony saying that he could not recall the features of the accused?

RULING:
No, the testimony of a witness who identified the accused as the author of the crime is not
credible despite his first testimony saying that he could not recall the features of the accused.

A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two factors, i.e., the witness'
opportunity to view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the witness' degree of attention at
that time, based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may have
been, for the witness to be exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain their
identity.

There are two (2) principal witnesses who allegedly identified accused-appellant as the
same Pobre who participated in the robbery. When the first witness was initially put on the witness
stand, she asserted that she could not recall any of the features of Pobre. After many years, with
the police presenting her with Nuñez, she positively identified him as the missing perpetrator. The
second principal witness' testimony on the alleged participation of accused-appellant is so
fundamentally at variance with that of the other principal witness. The prosecution did not account
for the details of the presentation of Nuñez to the two (2) witnesses after he was arrested.

Therefore, the identity of Nuñez was not sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt.

242 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

AGE IS NOT A FACTOR IN DETERMINING QUALIFICATION OF WITNESS TO TESTIFY

People of the Philippines v. Golem Sota and Amidal Gadjadli

G.R. No 203121, November 29, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal of Sota and Gadjadli from the CA decision which affirmed with
modification the RTC Decision that found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and
Arson.

According to Jocelyn, prosecution’s witness, she saw and recognized appellants Sota and
Gadjadi outside their house and demanding food from her father, Artemio. Artemio was willing to
comply on the condition that he would hand the food through a wall opening since he was afraid
of being harmed. The group, using a torch, started to burn the house, but Artemio was able to put
it out. The group demanded that Artemio open the door, otherwise they would burn the house.
When Artemio refused to open the door, the group fired at the house, with Gadjadi firing the first
shot at Artemio. At the instance, Jocelyn jumped out of the window and escaped. When she looked
back, she saw their house burning while Artemio was fired at by the group. In their defense, both
Sota and Gadjadi denied involvement in the killing of Artemio and in burning their house. Moreover,
Gadjadli averred that Jocelyn could have recognized his presence at Artemio’s house because he
shouted at her and Artemio to run.

The CA affirmed with modifications the decision of the RTC, finding Jocelyn as a credible witness
who held her ground even during cross-examination.

ISSUE:
Is a 12-year-old competent to testify?

RULING:
Yes, a 12-year-old is competent to testify.

Section 20 of Rule 130 provides that except as provided in the next succeeding section,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of crime
unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification. Section 21 of the same
rule states that the following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at
the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others; and (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them
truthfully.

In this case, although Jocelyn was only twelve years old when the incident happened and
when called to the witness stand, the Court takes note of the truth that she possessed all the
qualification and none of the disqualification to testify in these cases. Jocelyn's young age had no
bearing on her qualification to testify on what happened that night on 19 November 1999. As the
rules show, anyone who is sensible and aware of a relevant event or incident, and can
communicate such awareness, experience, or observation to others can be a witness.
Significantly, even under the crucible of an intense cross-examination, Jocelyn never wavered in
her narration as to the incidents that led to the killing of Artemio and the burning of their house,
and in the affirmative identification of Sota and Gadjadli as two of the five persons who were
responsible for these crimes.

Therefore, Jocelyn is a credible witness and instant appeal is denied.

| 243
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TESTIMONY OF AN INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED VICTIM IS ADMISSIBLE IF

COHERENT

People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores

G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by respondent Edgar Allan Corpuz y Flores assailing the decision
of the CA which affirmed the ruling of the RTC-Villasis, Pangasinan, Br. 50 finding Allan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of Simple Rape of AAA, a mental retardate.

During trial, the prosecution presented several witnesses who testified to the admissions
of AAA as regards the rape incident. Before taking the witness stand, AAA underwent
neuropsychiatric examinations which revealed that the latter had a mild degree of mental
retardation. When AAA testified, she identified respondent as XXX’s father. Upon conviction of the
crime charged, the trial court ruled that AAA’s testimony was categorical, straightforward and
credible. The CA affirmed the trial court's ruling that the testimony of AAA was credible. Her positive
identification of the accused and the narration of the sordid acts committed against her sufficed.

In his appeal, Allan insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because
the records were bereft of any credible proof indicating that he raped AAA four times. AAA failed
to testify when and where she was raped. Respondent also alleged that AAA was inconsistent in
her testimony because when she was interviewed, she actually did not know who raped her.

ISSUE:
Is the testimony of AAA as a mental retardate admissible as evidence?

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of AAA, despite being a mental retardate, is admissible as evidence.

Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that except as provided in these rules,
all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. In addition, Sec. 21 of the same rule provides that those whose mental condition, at the
time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others cannot be witnesses. Thus, to qualify as a witness, the basic test
is "whether he or she can perceive and, perceiving, can make known his or her perception to
others."

Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A
person with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her
perception to others. Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason,
ineligible from testifying in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to
relate what he or she knows. If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is
admissible in court.

Therefore, the testimony of AAA, despite being a mental retardate, is admissible as

evidence.

244 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

EVERY CHILD IS PRESUMED QUALIFIED AS WITNESS

People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Golidan

GR No. 205307, January 11, 2018
Leonardo-De Castro, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the CA decision finding accused-appellants Eduardo Golidan (Golidan)
and Francis Nacionales (Nacionales), and their co-accused Teddy Ogsila (Ogsila) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape, murder, and frustrated murder.

When Jennyline Aniban went to her mother's house she saw Cherry Mae, her niece with
cerebral palsy, lying on her side facing the wall of a room. She saw then, through the transparent
curtain separating the bedroom from the sala, the exposed legs of Elizabeth Leo, the babysitter of
Cherry Mae and Jennyline’s son, Namuel. She entered the bedroom and saw Elizabeth lying naked
on her back. There was blood on the head and vagina of Elizabeth and her nipples were cut. She
also saw Namuel’s exposed brains and blood oozing from his nose.

Muriel Bantiway, the mother of Jennyline, stated that she witnessed how Cherry Mae
identified the persons who had killed and raped Elizabeth, murdered Namuel, and wounded her,
on three occasions. Cherry Mae pointed at the photographs of appellants Golidan, Nacionales and
Ogsila during the picture line up as the ones who entered Muriel's house. In open court, Cherry
Mae identified appellants Ogsila, Nacionales, and Golidan from a line up composed of 10 persons,
as the ones who entered their house. On their defense, the appellants invoked Sections 20 and
21 of Rule 130, contending that Cherry Mae is not a competent witness.

ISSUE:
Is a child with cerebral palsy a qualified witness?

RULING:
Yes, a child with cerebral palsy a qualified witness. Cherry Mae, is a competent witness.

Any child can be a competent witness if he/she can perceive, and perceiving, can make
known his/her perception to others and of relating truthfully facts respecting which he/she is
examined. The Court recently explained in People v. Esugon, that the witness is a child cannot be
the sole reason for disqualification. The dismissiveness with which the testimonies of child
witnesses were treated in the past has long been erased. Under the Rule on Examination of a
Child Witness, every child is now presumed qualified to be a witness. To rebut this presumption,
the burden of proof lies on the party challenging the child's competency. Only when substantial
doubt exists regarding the ability of the child to perceive, remember, communicate, distinguish
truth from falsehood, or appreciate the duty to tell the truth in court will the court, motu proprio or
on motion of a party, conduct a competency examination of a child.

In this case, the trial court found sufficient basis to consider the testimony of Cherry Mae,
unique though it may have been because of her condition, to be valid. The court invited expert
witnesses to testify on the nature of cerebral palsy and the capacity of one who has it, specifically
Cherry Mae, to perceive events surrounding her and to express them. The trial court was able to
see consistency in the child's testimony, specifically in her positive identification of the appellants.

Therefore, a child with cerebral palsy a qualified witness

| 245
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

YOUTH AND IMMATURITY ARE GENERALLY BADGES OF TRUTH AND SINCERITY

People of the Philippines vs. Pedro Rupal

G.R. No. 222497, June 27, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
In an appeal under Rule 45 before the SC, accused appellant Rupal assails the Decision
of the CA, which affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC, finding him guilty of Rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC.

The prosecution alleged that accused appellant went to the school of the victim, AAA, a
thirteen-year-old high school, to give her the P100.00 bill which AAA’s mother asked the accused
to give her. Accused appellant informed AAA that she needed to have the hundred-peso bill
changed because he used the P50.00 for his fare. Since AAA still had classes, the accused
appellant informed her that he will return for the remaining P50.00 bill. When accused appellant
returned, he pulled her towards the coconut plantation, pushed her to the ground, and mounted
her. After having carnal knowledge of AAA, accused appellant threatened AAA that he would kill
BBB and her siblings. Afraid that accused appellant would not make good his threats, AAA did not
tell her mother what happened to her.

Several days later, bystanders witnessed accused appellant chasing AAA. Thereafter,
AAA was inquired if she was raped. She was then submitted to medical examination. In Dr. Auza’s
analysis, lacerations were found at the vaginal opening. AAA then revealed that she was raped by
accused appellant twice: first, when she was nine years old and, second, in 2005. Accused
appellant was then formally charged with Rape.

Both the RTC and the CA ruled in favor of AAA. Accused appellant contended that there
was inconsistency between AAA's testimony that she was raped by him since she was nine years
old until she turned thirteen, with that of BBB who claimed that AAA admitted to her that she was
raped only twice.

ISSUE:
Did the sole testimony of AAA sufficiently prove the charge of the crime of Rape?

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of AAA proved the crime of rape.

To stress, inconsistencies on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance, truth, or weight of the victim's testimonies. Even granting that there were
inconsistencies in AAA's claim as to the number of times accused-appellant had carnal knowledge
of her, jurisprudence instructs that "when the offended party is of tender age and immature, courts
are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative
vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified
is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."

In this case, AAA's testimony that she was raped finds support in Dr. Auza's medical
findings that the lacerations in AAA's vaginal opening could have been caused by the forcible entry
of a hard object, possibly a male genitalia, and that her hymen was no longer intact. Together,
these pieces of evidence produce a moral certainty that the accused-appellant indeed raped the
victim.

Therefore, the testimony of AAA proved the crime of rape. The RTC and CA correctly found
the accused appellant guilty of rape.

246 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE TESTIMONY OF A RAPE VICTIM WHO IS OF TENDER AGE IS CREDIBLE

People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Tanglao y Egana

G.R. No. 219963, June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal by accused-appellant Ricardo Tanglao y Egana (Tanglao) from the
Decision of the CA, affirming, with modification as to the award of damages, the Decision of the
RTC XXX City, finding him guilty of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph
1(d) of R.A. No. 8353.

Accused-appellant Tanglao and BBB were the father and mother respectively of CCC,
DDD, and AAA. Sometime in September 2001, AAA, who WAS then seven years old, went to
Tanglao’s house and on that night, Tanglao told AAA and DDD to go to sleep and then placed
himself between AAA and DDD at the upper portion of a double-deck bed. Suddenly, the accused-
appellant covered AAA's mouth, kissed her lips and neck, and forcefully inserted his penis into her
vagina causing her so much pain. DDD, who was then positioned beside the wall, heard AAA
whimpering as if her mouth was covered. DDD tried to get some sleep and avoided looking at
AAA's direction as the accused-appellant might be doing something to his sister. DDD had a hard
time going to sleep because the bed was shaking. With the light coming from the lamppost outside,
DDD saw that AAA's legs were quivering and that the accused appellant seemed to be "malikot"
(restless) moving his body back and forth. After a few minutes, AAA left the room to urinate after
asking permission from the accused appellant. When AAA came back to the room, she and DDD
occupied the lower deck while the accused-appellant who came thereafter occupied the upper
deck. AAA whispered to DDD "ni rape ako ni papa" (I was raped by papa). Accused-appellant
proceeded to testify that actually, it is BBB, Reyes (BBB’s live-in partner) and EEE (BBB’s brother)
who abused AAA and that he accompanied AAA to the NBI to report the abuse. Subsequently, he
contended that AAA could not have been raped because there was “no evident injury” in her
genitalia.

ISSUE:
Is the lone testimony of the complainant-witness sufficient to sustain conviction?

RULING:
Yes, the lone testimony of the complainant-witness is sufficient to sustain conviction.

Clearly applicable in this case is the well-settled rule that the testimony of a rape victim
who is of tender age is credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused
deserves full credence. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. The
child's willingness to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament
to the truth of her complaint. The same can be said of her brother DDD who, despite being a minor
during the time he took the witness stand, courageously and credibly testified against the accused
appellant.

In this case, a review of AAA's and DDD's respective testimonies proves that neither
wavered in their statements despite the gruelling cross-examination by the defense. AAA positively
identified the accused-appellant as the one who raped her and this was incisively re-echoed by
DDD when he testified. Also, even granting that there was truth to the accused-appellants’
complaint before the NBI that BBB, EEE and Reyes abused AAA, this however, does not destroy
the very glaring truth substantiated by the records that he had carnal knowledge of AAA.

Therefore, the lone testimony of the complainant-witness is sufficient to sustain conviction.

| 247
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RULE ON ADMISSION BY SILENCE IN CASES OF ADVERSE STATEMENTS IN WRITING

IS RELAXED IN THE ABSENCE OF MUTUAL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE
PARTIES

Spouses Cipriano Pamplona and Bibiana Intac, vs. Spouses Lilia I. Cueto and Vedasto Cueto
G.R. No. 204735, February 19, 2018
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Under review is the decision promulgated by Court of Appeals (CA) reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissing the respondents' complaint, and ordering the
petitioners instead to execute a deed of sale on the property in favor of the respondents upon the
release of the consigned amount.

Plaintiff Lilia and defendants entered into a contract to sell involving the subject immovable.
Lilia started paying her balance as soon as the possession was transferred to her. When she
moved abroad, she allowed her son to reside at the subject property. Through her son, religiously
paid the annual realty taxes on the premises. Lilia soon found out that her son was evicted in the
premises by the defendant after obtaining a favorable judgment in an unlawful detainer suit. Lilia
was prompted to go back home and make peace with the defendants. Earnest efforts were made
only to end constrained to consign the US$11,000.00, as final payment to defendants. Thereafter,
she filed for specific performance, conveyance, consignation and damages before the RTC. RTC
ruled against Lilia. CA reversed and declared the existence of the oral contract to sell which was
already partially executed by reason of Lilia’s previous payments.

The petitioners now assail the decision of the CA by raising the failure of Roilan to raise as
a defense in the unlawful detainer suit against him the existence of the contract to sell between
Bibiana and Lilia.

ISSUE:
Can Roilan’s silence be properly construed as an admission by silence on the part of Lilia.

RULING:
No. Roilan’s silence could not be properly construed as an admission by silence on the
part of Lilia.

For an act or declaration to be admissible against a party as an admission by silence, the

following requirements must be present, namely: (a) the party must have heard or observed the
act or declaration of the other person; (b) he must have had the opportunity to deny it; (c) he must
have understood the act or declaration; (d) he must have an interest to object as he would naturally
have done if the act or declaration was not true; (e) the facts are within his knowledge; and (f) the
fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence is material to the issue

In this case, the first two requirements are lacking in the case of Lilia. She was not shown
to have heard or seen the admissions by Vedasto and Roilan that were in writing because she was
then abroad. She was not shown to have had the opportunity to deny their written admissions
simply because she was not a party to the written admissions.

Therefore, Lilia is not bound by Roilan’s failure to assert the existence of the contract to
sell between Lilia and the defendant.

248 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF A WITNESS IS A SUBSTANTIVE PREREQUISITE FOR

ACCEPTING TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE THAT ESTABLISHES THE TRUTH OF
DISPUTED FACT

Fernando Mancol, Jr. vs Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)

G.R. No. 204284, November 22, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari (under Rule 45) from the Decision of the CA
affirming the Orders of the RTC.

Fernando Mancol, Jr. (Mancol, Jr.) executed an SPA in favor of his father Fernando
Mancol, Sr. (Mancol Sr.) to represent and negotiate on his behalf, over a sale of a residential lot
with a two-storey building which the respondent DBP has made invitations to bid for a negotiated
sale. Pursuant to the SPA, Mancol Sr. signed the Negotiated Offer to Purchase and Negotiated
Sale Rules. The DBP issued a receipt in the name of Mancol Jr. for the initial payment paid by
Mancol Sr. During the negotiations, DBP officials allegedly agreed, albeit verbally to arrange and
effect the transfer of title of the lot in petitioner's name, including the payment of capital gains tax
(CGT) and to get rid of the occupants of the subject property. However, the DBP denied obligation
to effect such alleged verbal agreements. During trial, witness Villanueva testified he was the one
commissioned by one Atty. De Asis of DBP to effect payment with the BIR. Mancol Sr. testified
that DBP undertook to get rid of the occupants, when its lawyer filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession which is pending in the RTC. On appeal, DBP contended that
the testimonies of Villanueva and Mancol Sr. were hearsay evidence as they do not have personal
knowledge of the alleged facts.

ISSUE:
Are the testimonies of witnesses who have no personal knowledge of the facts in issue
admissible?

RULING:
No, the testimonies of witnesses who have no personal knowledge of the facts in issue are
inadmissible.

It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only on the facts that he knows of
his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which are derived from his own perception. A witness may
not testify on what he merely learned, read or heard from others because such testimony is
considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned, read or
heard. Hearsay evidence is evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of what he has
heard from others.

In this case, Villanueva's testimony falls within the category of hearsay evidence. Contrary
to petitioner's claim, Villanueva had no personal inkling as to the contemporaneous verbal
agreement between petitioner and DBP. The same conclusion can be drawn from Mancol, Sr.'s
testimony. Although the records show that by virtue of an SPA executed by the petitioner, Mancol,
Sr., there is dearth of evidence to prove that indeed, he personally entered into a verbal agreement
with DBP. There was no mention as to who actually and personally appeared before DBP or any
of its officials in order to forge the alleged verbal agreement.

Therefore, Villanueva and Mancol, Sr.’s testimonies are inadmissible for being hearsay
evidence.

| 249
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

UTTERANCES OF THE VICTIM IS NOT A DYING DECLARATION BUT ADMISSIBLE AS

PART OF THE RES GESTAE

People of the Philippines vs. Christopher Badillos

G.R. No. 215732, June 06, 2018
Martijes, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal which seeks to reverse the decision of RTC Bulacan finding accused-
appellant Badillos guilty of the crime of murder.

During the trial, a witness of the prosecution testified that when he arrived at the crime
scene, he saw the victim Alex bloodied, sprawled on the ground, and almost dying or
"naghihingalo”. While ripping his own shirt, the victim told him that he was stabbed by accused
Badillos. The victim was brought to the hospital and died on the same night. In addition, another
witness positively identified the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.

ISSUE:
Should the utterances of the victim be considered as admissible dying declaration?

RULING:
No, the declaration of the victim cannot be considered as a dying declaration but the same
is admissible as part of the res gestae.

In order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent
death must be entered into by the declarant. It is the declarant's belief of his impending death and
not the rapid succession of his death that renders his declaration admissible as a dying declaration.
The test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looks on death as
certainly impending.

In this case, it does not appear that the declarant himself was conscious of his impending
death. The fact that victim was ripping his shirt while he uttered the name of his assailant is not
sufficient to qualify such as a dying declaration. Nevertheless, while the victim’s statement may
still be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule for being part of res gestae. The statement is
considered part of the res gestae because (1) the stabbing incident constituted a startling
occurrence; (2) there was no sufficient time contrive or devise a falsehood when he uttered the
name of his assailant to the witness; (3) the statement concerned the circumstances surrounding
the stabbing of the victim.

Therefore, the statements made by the victim at the point of death is admissible as part of
the res gestae.

250 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DYING DECLARATION AND PART OF THE RES GESTAE MAY BE ADMITTED AS

EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE

People of the Philippines vs. Geraldo Santillan y Villanueva and Eugene Borromeo y Natividad
G.R. No. 227878, August 9, 2017
Mendoza, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed decision of the RTC-Caloocan
City, Br. 128, finding accused-appellants Geraldo Santillan y Villanueva and Eugene Borromeo y
Natividad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.

Ernesto Garcia, the victim, was invited to go out. Minutes later, Michael, Ernesto's son,
saw his father running towards their gate while being chased by Ramil Santillan and Geraldo.
Thereupon, Ramil stabbed Ernesto at the back. Ernesto ran towards Michael. Michael then called
out Julie Ann, his sister. Julie Ann asked Ernesto who his assailants were and Ernesto answered
Dodong, Eugene, Ramil, and a certain "Palaka."

Accused-appellants contended that Ernesto's statement, as relayed to Julie Ann, was

inadmissible. They posited that Ernesto was incompetent to testify had he survived and advanced
the proposition that since the incident happened at night, darkness made it improbable for Ernesto
to identify his assailants.

ISSUE:
Was the statement of Ernesto admissible as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?

RULING:
Yes, the statement of Ernesto is admissible both as a dying declaration and/or part of the
res gestae.

A dying declaration may be admitted when the following requisites concur: (a) the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b)
at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death;
(c) the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for
homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is a victim.

In this case, all of the requisites are present. Ernesto communicated his ante-mortem
statement to Julie Ann, identifying accused-appellants and the other two as the persons who
stabbed him. At that time, Ernesto was conscious of his impending death, having sustained
multiple incise and stab wounds. Ernesto would have been competent to testify on the subject of
the declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal
prosecution for murder in which Ernesto was the victim. Further, the postulate that darkness of the
night prevented Ernesto from identifying his assailants must be rejected. Basic is the rule that mere
allegation and speculation is not evidence, not equivalent to proof. Ernesto’s statement may also
be considered part of the res gestae. His statement referred to a startling occurrence, that is, him
being stabbed. At the time he relayed his statement to Julie Ann, he was wounded and blood
oozed from his chest. Given his condition, it is clear that he had no time to contrive the identification
of his assailants.

Therefore, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling
occurrence.

| 251
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE OPINION OF HANDWRITING EXPERTS IS NOT NECESSARILY BINDING UPON

THE COURT, THE EXPERT’S FUNCTION BEING TO PLACE BEFORE THE COURT DATA
UPON WHICH THE COURT CAN FORM ITS OWN OPINION

Heirs of Peter Donton through their legal representative, Felipe G. Capulong vs. Stier and
Maggay
G.R. No. 216491, August 23, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45), assailing the dismissal of the complaint
for annulment of title and reconveyance of property with damages originally led by now-deceased
Peter Donton (Donton), the predecessor of herein petitioners Heirs of Peter Donton (petitioners),
for insufficiency of evidence.

While Donton was in the United States (US), he found out that respondents Duan Stier
(Stier) and Emily Maggay (Maggay) took possession and control of his property located in Cubao,
Quezon City. He alleged that the respondents were able to transfer ownership of said property in
their names through forging his signature in a Deed of Absolute Sale. During trial, Donton
presented the findings of Rosario C. Perez (Perez), Document Examiner of the (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, who, after comparing the alleged signature of Donton on the Deed of Absolute Sale to
his standard ones, found "significant divergences in the manner of execution, line quality, stroke
structure, and other individual handwriting characteristics" between them, and concluded that they
were not written by one and the same person, to which Perez testified in Court. However, on cross-
examination, Perez admitted that he did not verify the source of the documents he examined. The
respondents waived their right to present evidence.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents for lack of sufficient evidence, the CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Is the expert testimony of a handwriting expert sufficient to prove forgery in this case?

RULING:
No, the expert testimony of a handwriting expert is not sufficient to prove forgery in this
case. Perez's findings deserve little or no probative weight at all, considering that the signatures
which she used for comparison came from an unverified source.

It bears stressing that the opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon
the court, the expert's function being to place before the court data upon which the court can form
its own opinion. This principle holds true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the
questioned signatures with those of the currently existing ones. A finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts, because the judge must conduct an
independent examination of the questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion
as to its authenticity.

In this case, Perez’s testimony was self-serving. She admitted that she had no actual
knowledge of whether the documents given to her for examination came from Donton, and that
she merely proceeded to examine them without verifying the source.

Therefore, the source of the documents being unverified, it cannot be concluded that the
signatures thereon are the genuine signatures of Donton.

252 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS ENJOY DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY;

OVERCOME BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY

Teodora C. Tortona vs. Julian C. Gregorio

G.R. No. 202612, January 17, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. This assailed Decision
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC which ruled in favor of then plaintiffs, now
petitioners, in their action for recovery of real property with damages against then defendants, now
respondents. This case is an offshoot of Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly entered into by sisters
Rufina Casimiro (Rufina), the purported seller, and Rafaela Casimiro (Rafaela), the purported
buyer. Petitioners are the heirs of Rufina, while respondents are the heirs of Rafaela.

Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of real property with damages against
respondents. They alleged that their cousin Emilio Casimiro (Emilio) offered them a balato of
P50,000.00 for the sale of the parcel of land owned by their mother, Rufina. Upon checking the
Office of the Registry of Deeds to verify the supposed sale, they were surprised to discover the
Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Rufina and Rafaela on February 14, 1974. Petitioners
underscored that their mother was illiterate and that she would usually just affix her thumbmark on
documents, and whenever she did so, she was always assisted by at least one (1) of her children.
In this case, however, none of them knew about this sale. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners,
but this was subsequently reversed by the CA. CA found that the Deed of Absolute Sale was a
notarized document and had in its favor the presumption of regularity.

Petitioners herein presented an expert witness to overcome the disputable presumption of

regularity attached to the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondents presented their lone
witness, Atty. Arcadia Espiritu (Atty. Espiritu), the notary public who notarized the Deed of Absolute
Sale

ISSUE:
Were petitioners able to overcome the disputable presumption of regularity attached to
duly notarized document by presenting clear and convincing evidence to the contrary?

RULING:
Yes, the petitioners were able to overcome the presumption of regularity attached to the
document by presenting clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that generally, a notarized document carries the

evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity.
Nevertheless, while notarized documents enjoy the presumption of regularity, this presumption is
disputable. They can be contradicted by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely
preponderant.

In this case, with the aid of an expert witness, petitioners contrasted Rufina's apparent
thumbmarks on the Deed of Absolute Sale with specimen thumbmarks on authentic documents.
They demonstrated disparities that lead to no other conclusion than that the thumbmarks on the
contentious Deed of Absolute Sale are forged.

Therefore, the presumption of regularity attached to the duly notarized document was
overcome by the petitioners by presenting clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

| 253
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY INAPPLICABLE WHERE THE OFFICIAL ACT IS

IRREGULAR ON ITS FACE, CLEARLY SHOWING A BROKEN CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Andrada y Caampued

G.R. No. 232299, June 20, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
Andrada was indicted before the RTC for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

According to the RTC, the evidence adduced by the prosecution warranted the conviction
of the appellant for the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The RTC lent credence to the
prosecution evidence which established that Andrada was caught in flagrante delicto selling 0.03
gram of shabu at the time he was arrested. It rejected the defense of denial and frame-up
interposed by the appellant because the same was not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.

The RTC ruled that the failure of the arresting officers to strictly observe the procedure laid
down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is of no moment since technical procedure must give way to
the need to aptly dispense substantial justice by ridding of incorrigible drug-pushers like the
accused-appellant. Upon appeal, the CA rendered decision affirming Andrada’s conviction.

ISSUE:
Can the court apply the presumption of regularity where the official act is irregular on its
face, as when the officer who received the seized drugs was not the one who turned over the same
for examination?

RULING:
No, the court cannot apply the presumption of regularity where the official act is irregular
on its face, as when the officer who received the seized drugs was not the one who turned over
the same for examination.

This Court has held that the presumption of regularity applies when nothing in the record
suggests that the law enforcers deviated from the standard conduct of official duty required by law;
where the official act is irregular on its face, the presumption cannot arise. Also, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duties can be rebutted by contrary proof, being a mere
presumption, and more importantly, it is inferior to and could not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Given the procedural lapse the police committed in handling the seized
shabu and the obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties cannot be made.

In this case, the Court finds no further need to discuss and pass upon the merits of
Andrada's defense of denial. Well-settled is the rule in criminal law that the conviction of an
accused must be based on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness or
absence of evidence of the defense. The accused has no burden to prove his innocence, and the
weakness of the defense he interposed is inconsequential. He must be acquitted and set free
should the prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor.

Therefore, the court cannot apply the presumption of regularity where the official act is
irregular on its face, as when the officer who received the seized drugs was not the one who turned
over the same for examination.

254 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES IN

FAVOR OF THE POLICE OFFICERS WILL NOT SAVE THE PROSECUTION'S CASE,
GIVEN THE FOREGOING LAPSES AND GAPS IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY

People of the Philippines vs. Rommel Diputado

G.R. No. 213922, July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Challenged in this appeal is the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of RTC-
Iloilo City, Br. 36 finding accused-appellant Rommel Diputado guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

An Information was received that a certain Rommel Diputado is engaged in selling drugs.
PO1 Ronald Estares and POl Ygan were then instructed, to conduct surveillance and test buy on
the accused. During the test buy, they were able to purchase suspected shabu from the accused
so they conducted a buy-bust operation. This eventually led to the arrest of Diputado.

Accused-appellant claimed that the seized illegal drug was not marked accordingly.
Another break in the chain of custody was the failure of the prosecution to present P03 Allen
Holleza, the person who allegedly received the Request for Laboratory Examination. The non-
presentation of PO3 Holleza was fatal to the prosecution's case considering that there is an
additional marking "RGE" on the plastic sachet which was not mentioned in any document
presented by the prosecution nor was it explained by any of the police officers.

ISSUE:
Did the failure to elaborate the additional marking of RGE created a reasonable doubt as
to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drug?

RULING:
Yes, the failure to elaborate the additional marking of RGE created a reasonable doubt to
the prosecution’s case.

The Court held in People vs. Larry Mendoza, G.R. No. 192432; June 23, 2014 that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties in favor of the police officers will not
save the prosecution's case, given the foregoing lapses and gaps in the chain of custody. The
presumption stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of
the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the presumption of regularity will never
be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.

In this case, the prosecution failed to elaborate on the additional marking of "RGE" on the
seized item. These are the doubts that lingered in the minds of the Court. PO3 Holleza, who
allegedly received the request for examination from PO1 Estares, was the only one who can shed
light on the said marking but the prosecution failed to present him. As such, another break in the
chain of custody occurred. The prosecution failed in its duty to ensure that the seized item from
accused-appellant was the same item marked and subjected to examination and ultimately
presented in court.

Therefore, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties in favor of the
police officers will not save the prosecution's case, given the foregoing lapses and gaps in the
chain of custody.

| 255
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TESTIMONY OF, AND POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY, LONE EYEWITNESS WITHOUT

MORE CANNOT BE BASIS OF CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Joseph San Jose y Gregorio and Jonathan San Jose y Gregorio
G.R. No. 206916, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed the trial court’s decision finding
accused-appellants Joseph San Jose y Gregorio and Jonathan San Jose y Gregorio, the San Jose
brothers, guilty of the crime of murder.

Jilito O. Espino testified that he saw the San Jose brothers punched his brother, Carlito
Espino. Jonathan then stabbed Carlito from behind on the side of his body while Joseph stabbed
him in front. On the other hand, Jocelyn Espino also testified on San Jose brothers' behalf stating
that they were informed of a commotion involving Carlito. She claimed that Jilito only learned of
the incident when he went outside of their house.

OSG argues that Jilito was consistent in his testimony. It maintains that he was able to
positively identify accused-appellants since they live in the same barangay. The autopsy report
likewise corroborates Jilito's testimony that Carlito was stabbed at the right side of his torso.

Accused-appellants, on the other hand, argued that Jilito's testimony on the presence of
two mortal wounds on the victim is directly contradicted by the autopsy report. They also point out
that a substantial portion of Jilito's testimony is hearsay since Jocelyn testified that at the time of
the incident, Jilito was inside their house.

ISSUE:
Is the testimony of and positive identification by Jilito as the prosecution’s lone witness,
without more, sufficient to convict the accused-appellants?

RULING:
No, the testimony of and positive identification by Jilito as the prosecution’s lone witness,
without more, is insufficient to convict the accused-appellants.

In People v. Capili, the Court ruled that proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed to
overcome the presumption of innocence. Accused-appellant's guilt must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt; otherwise, the Court would be left without any other recourse but to rule for
acquittal. The burden of proving the accused's guilt rests with the prosecution. A guilty verdict relies
on the strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. If the
prosecution's evidence produces even an iota of reasonable doubt, courts would have no choice
but to rule for the accused's acquittal. The determination of guilt requires courts to evaluate the
evidence presented in relation to the elements of the crime charged. The finding of guilt is
fundamentally a factual issue. Further, the factual findings of the trial court will not bind this Court
if "significant facts and circumstances were overlooked and disregarded which, if properly
considered, affect the result of the case."

In this case, the trial court and the CA placed heavy reliance on the testimony of the
prosecution's lone eyewitness, Jilito Espino, and his positive identification of the accused-
appellants as the assailants who murdered his brother. Thus, the review of finding of guilt
necessarily involves a re-evaluation of Jilito's testimony.

Therefore, the testimony of and positive identification by Jilito as the prosecution’s lone
witness, without more, is insufficient to convict the accused-appellants.

256 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATOR OF A CRIME AND A FINDING OF GUILT MAY REST

SOLELY ON THE STRENGTH OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Marlon Bacerra y Tabones vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the decision and resolution of the CA
which upheld the conviction of Marlon Bacerra y Tabones for the crime of simple arson.

Alfredo Melegrito and his family were sound asleep when suddenly, he heard sound of
stones hitting his house. When he looked at it, he recognized Bacerra who was then shouting
threats and vulgar expressions. Alfredo's son, Edgar, also witnessed the incident. Bacerra returned
and moments later, Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning. The RTC found Bacerra guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of arson which the CA affirmed in toto.

In this Petition for Review, Bacerra argued that his conviction based on circumstantial
evidence, being merely based on conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. No direct evidence was presented to prove that petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut.

ISSUE:
Is a number of circumstantial evidence sufficient, so credible to establish a fact from which
it may be inferred, be sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING:
Yes, a number of circumstantial evidence sufficient, so credible to establish a fact from
which it may be inferred, be sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides 3 requisites that should
be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be
established by circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be considered as a whole and
should create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.

In this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the
prosecution has established multiple circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety,
support the conclusion that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson. The
evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned private complainant's house
and threatened to burn him; that petitioner returned a few hours later and made his way to private
complainant's nipa hut; and that petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught
fire. Private complainant testified to all these which were corroborated by his son. The stoning
incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed separately. Instead, they must be
viewed and considered as a whole.

Therefore, a number of circumstantial evidence sufficient, so credible to establish a fact

from which it may be inferred, be sufficient to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt.

| 257
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WHEN AT ISSUE IS THE CREDIBILITY OF THE VICTIM, THE COURT GIVES GREAT
WEIGHT TO THE TRIAL COURT'S ASSESSMENT

People of the Philippines vs. Alfredo Gunsay y Tolentino

G.R. No. 223678, July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Alfredo Gunsay y Tolentino assails the Decision of the CA which
affirmed the judgment RTC-Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Br. 49 convicting accused-appellant of
rape.

The corroborative testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showed that AAA went to a
field to get saluyot. On their way home, AAA met the accused-appellant, who punched her on her
abdomen, put grass in her mouth, then dragged her to the corn plantation. Gunsay held a knife to
AAA and consummated the rape. Accused-appellant made a threat to AAA that he will kill her if
she will report the incident to anyone. Thereafter, AAA went home and told the incident to her
mother, BBB. The mother then testified that she brought AAA to Dr. Tumacder for physical
examination, who in turn, testified that AAA sustained fresh hymenal lacerations.

For his part, accused-appellant denied having raped AAA on the date, time, and place
indicated. The defense attempted to discredit AAA's testimony against accused-appellant claiming
solely that it was inconsistent with human experience. According to him, it could not have been so
daring to just pull and rape her considering that she had companions, who could easily seek help
from their neighbors who live nearby.

ISSUE:
Is the testimony of the victim, found credible by the trial court, and despite claimed
inconsistencies thereof by the accused, sufficient to convict the latter?

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of the victim, found credible by the trial court, and despite claimed
inconsistencies thereof by the accused, is sufficient to convict the latter.

As the Court held in People v. Caiñgat, G.R. No. 137963; February 6, 2002, when at issue
is the credibility of the victim, this Court gives great weight to the trial court's assessment. In fact,
the trial court's finding of facts is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is that the trial court
had the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner of testifying. It
is in a better position to properly evaluate testimonial evidence.

In this case, The Court believed in the testimony of AAA, which was corroborated by the
result of the medical examination. AAA's credibility is further strengthened by her prompt report of
the incident to her mother and authorities, despite the threats made by the accused-appellant. It
shows that she did not have the luxury of time to fabricate a rape story. The Court, however, is not
impressed by the defense of the Gunsay that AAA’s testimony was inconsistent with human
experience. It has time and again been said that rape is no respecter of time or place as it can be
committed in small, confined places or in places which many would consider as unlikely and
inappropriate, or even in the presence of other family members. Indeed, positive identification of
the accused, when categorical and consistent, and without any ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails, over alibi and denial.

Therefore, the testimony of the victim, found credible by the trial court, and despite claimed
inconsistencies thereof by the accused, is sufficient to convict the latter.

258 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MINOR INCONSISTENCIES IN TESTIMONY AND DELAY IN REPORTING THE CRIME

BY RAPE VICTIM IS NOT FATAL TO HER CREDIBILITY AS WITNESS

People of the Philippines vs. Ernie Carillo y Pabello and Ronald Espique y Legaspi
G.R. No. 212814, July 12, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Accused-appellants Ernie P. Carillo and Ronald L. Espique challenge the decision of the
CA which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape.

For the prosecution, AAA testified that, while waiting for a jeepney ride, someone held her
right arm and instructed her to just walk normally. She complied but due to extreme fear and
coupled with her menstrual period, she lost consciousness. Upon regaining such, AAA noticed that
she was lying on a "papag" with only her underwear on and saw five male persons standing in
front of her. Thereafter, the raping commenced. AAA testified that she did not actually see the
other three accused, Rafael, Randel and Dante at the time of the incident. It was Espique who
provided their names. The RTC found accused-appellants and Rafael guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for two counts of rape. However, the CA modified the ruling and acquitted Rafael since AAA
testified that she did not actually see the other three accused.

ISSUE:
Were the minor inconsistencies in statements of, and the delay in reporting to authorities
of the crime by, the victim, fatal to her credibility as a witness?

RULING:
No, the minor inconsistencies in statements of, and the delay in reporting to authorities of
the crime by, the victim, fatal to her credibility as a witness.

It is settled in this jurisdiction, citing People v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 191068; July 17, 2013,
that as long as the testimony of the witness is coherent and intrinsically believable as a whole,
discrepancies of minor details and collateral matters do not affect the veracity or detract from the
essential credibility of the witnesses' declarations. Moreover, in prosecuting a crime of rape, the
accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore,
jurisprudence has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being
raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule, citing People vs. Ogarte; G.R. No. 182690, May 30,
2011, that failure of the victim to shout or seek help does not negate rape.

In this case, the delay in reporting the incident to her parents or the proper authorities is
insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. The failure of AAA to disclose her
defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report the matter to the authorities
does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges
against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Many victims of rape never complain
or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than
reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders' making good their threats to kill or hurt their
victims.

Therefore, the minor inconsistencies in statements of, and the delay in reporting to
authorities of the crime by, the victim, fatal to her credibility as a witness

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

LESS PROBATIVE WEIGHT IS ASSIGNED TO A DEFENSE OF ALIBI WHEN

CORROBORATED BY RELATIVES

People of the Philippines vs. Marcial D. Pulgo

G.R. No. 218205, July 5, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed accused-appellant Marcial D.
Pulgo's conviction for Murder as rendered by the RTC-Cebu City, Br. 18 in its judgment.

According to the prosecution, Aurelio Sindangan was approached by the victim, Romeo
Lambo, asking to be accompanied to a certain place. As he stood side by side with Romeo,
accused-appellant Pulgo suddenly pulled out a knife and stabbed Romeo on his side.

Accused-appellant denied any involvement in the stabbing. Against Aurelio's categorical

and consistent testimony pointing to accused-appellant as Romeo's assailant, accused-appellant
puts forward the defenses of alibi and denial. He presented the testimonies of his mother, Violeta,
and his brother, Rosvil, to corroborate his claim that he was in a different place, in Moalboal, Cebu
when the stabbing took place.

Giving credence to Aurelio's testimony and positive identification of accused-appellant as

the assailant, RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused Marcial Pulgo guilty of the crime of
murder by treachery. As to the alibi presented, the trial court took judicial notice that Moalboal,Cebu
is only 3 hours away from Lorega, Cebu City where the crime took place.

ISSUE:
Can the defenses of alibi and denial forwarded by the accused-appellant and corroborated
by his relatives prosper in this case?

RULING:
No, the defenses of alibi and denial forwarded by the accused-appellant and corroborated
by his relatives cannot prosper in this case.

In People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 201092; January 15, 2014, it was jurisprudentially settled
that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter can easily be fabricated and is
inherently unreliable. The Court likewise consistently assigned less probative weight to a defense
of alibi when it is corroborated by relatives since we have established in jurisprudence that, in order
for corroboration to be credible, the same must be offered preferably by disinterested witnesses.

In this case, Violeta and Rosvil cannot be considered as disinterested witnesses. Being
accused-appellant's relatives, their testimonies are rendered suspect because the former's
relationship to them makes it likely that they would freely perjure themselves for his sake. The
defense of alibi may not prosper if it is established mainly by accused-appellant himself and his
relatives, and not by credible persons. Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused
must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime,
but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. These requirements of time and place must be strictly met. That Moalboal, Cebu is only 3
hours away from Lorega, Cebu City where the crime took place, it was not physically impossible
for accused-appellant to have left for Moalboal and to return to Lorega Street on the same day and
commit the crime.

Therefore, the defenses of alibi and denial forwarded by the accused-appellant and
corroborated by his relatives should cannot prosper in this case.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

VARIANCE IN MINOR DETAILS HAS THE NET EFFECT OF BOLSTERING WITNESS'

CREDIBILITY; THEY DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF A REHEARSED TESTIMONY

People of the Philippines vs. Federico Gerola y Amar

G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
This is an Appeal filed under Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the
decision of the CA Special Eighteenth Division which affirmed the decision of the RTC-Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental, Br. 55 convicting accused-appellant Federico Gerola y Amar for the 3
counts of rape.

Private complainant AAA was a minor when the acts of rape were committed. At the time
it occurred, she was living in the same house with her siblings, her mother MMM and AAA's step-
father, accused-appellant Federico Gerola. AAA did not tell her mother. Instead, AAA told her
friend who advised her to tell their teacher. AAA then narrated the incident to her teacher, Mrs.
Rafil, who, in turn, told her mother of what happened. AAA was then examined by Dr. Medardo
Estanda who made a report indicating that there were indeed penetrations. After trial, the RTC
rendered the decision finding accused-appellant guilty of all charges filed against him,

Accused-appellant's lone assignment of error rests on his claim that AAA could not exactly
determine what year the first rape incident occurred, which purportedly creates doubt on the
credibility of AAA. Gerola draws the same conclusion from AAA's failure to promptly disclose her
repeated defilement to the proper authorities. Such circumstances were not properly appreciated
by the RTC when it handed out his conviction.

ISSUE:
Did the minor inconsistencies and discrepancies in witness’ testimony, by such facts alone,
diminish the credibility of the same?

RULING:
No, the minor inconsistencies and discrepancies in witness’ testimony, by such facts alone,
did not diminish the credibility of the same.

In People v. Esquila, G.R. No. 116727; February 27, 1996, the accused therein similarly
cited contradictions and discrepancies in the victim's testimony in questioning his conviction for
rape. Notably, as in the present Appeal, the purported discrepancies consisted of statements
relating to date of the commission of the crime. In affirming the findings of the lower courts, the
Court brushed aside such inconsistencies and gave full weight and credit to the testimony of the
victim, who was likewise a minor.

In this case, the testimony of witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters
do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.
It is well to stress that variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing
the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead,
what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime
and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same.

Therefore, the minor inconsistencies and discrepancies in witness’ testimony, by such

facts alone, did not diminish the credibility of the same.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

WITNESSES' DIRECT AND CATEGORICAL DECLARATIONS ON THE WITNESS STAND

ARE SUPERIOR TO THEIR EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS

People of the Philippines vs. Rene Boy Dimapilit y Abellado

G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
The is an appeal filed by Rene Boy Dimapilit y Abellado from the decision of the CA which
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

Magdalena Apasan testified about Diego Garcia's death. On cross-examination, she

asserted that she did not know any personal grudge between Rene Boy and Diego. She did not
mention anything about Simeon in her sworn statement. She just stated that she hid behind a
mango tree out of fear. She admitted failing to ask for help. On direct-examination, she narrated
that Simeon asked Rene Boy to stop beating Diego. From their position, Magdalena and Simeon
saw Rene Boy beat Diego as there was no obstruction to their view. However, she did not also
bring this up in her sworn statement. Moreover, she admitted saying in her sworn statement that
she saw Junnel box Diego's jaw but in her direct examination, she said that it was Junnel and not
Joel who ran after Diego. However, it was really Joel who pursued Diego. Diego's unexpected
demise and the similarity in the names allegedly confused her.

Rene Boy underscores the material inconsistencies in Magdalena's testimony and insists
that they cannot serve as a basis for finding him guilty. Rene boy argues that it cannot be equated
the idea that Magdalena could have no other motive than to ensure justice to the conclusion that
a witness is credible because the defense has not shown any ill motive that would motivate her to
falsely testify.

ISSUE:
Did the minor inconsistencies between the sworn statement and testimony of Magdalena
affect her credibility as a witness?

RULING:
No, the minor inconsistencies between the sworn statement and testimony of Magdalena
did not affect her credibility as a witness.

As explained in People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500; September 11, 2012, inconsistencies
between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit
the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded
as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. In addition, an extrajudicial statement or
affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiant's statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not
infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness
stand are superior to their extrajudicial statements.

In this case, whether Magdalena was alone or with Simeon does not really matter. Also,
Magdalena's confusion with the names of the accused also does not affect her credibility as a
witness. It is possible that she might have interchanged the names due to their vivid similarity.
Moreover, the fact that Magdalena did not ask for help is not contrary to human
experience. Probably, out of fear for her life, Magdalena was constrained to be mum and helpless.

Therefore, the minor inconsistencies between the sworn statement and testimony of
Magdalena did not affect her credibility as a witness.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

BY HUMAN EXPERIENCE, WITNESS WHO HAD CLOSE ENCOUNTER WITH THE

ACCUSED COULD NOT BE MISTAKEN ABOUT LATTER’S IDENTITY

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio N. Polangcus

G.R. No. 216940, December 13, 2017
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of RTC
finding Rogelio Polangcus (Polangcus) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder.

An information was filed charging Polangcus for the crime of murder. Fernando Huerta
(Huerta), the son of the victim, was offered by the prosecution as its main witness. Huerta alleged
that it was around 7:30 o’clock in the evening when the shooting incident which instantaneously
killed his father occurred. Immediately after he heard a gunshot which he figured came from the
sugar plantation, he took his father’s knife and chased Polangcus, who at that time, was wearing
a bull cap colored black with stripes and was wearing an army jacket. Huerta was able to stab
Polangcus before the latter had the chance to escape. Thereafter, investigating authorities
received an information that somebody was admitted into the Western Leyte Hospital. Huerta and
the police proceeded to the hospital wherein Huerta positively identified the Rogelio, who at that
time was still wearing the same cap and army jacket. Both the RTC and CA ruled against Rogelio
despite his defense of Alibi.

Rogelio now insists that the evidence presented by the prosecution did not suffice to
establish the fact that he is the perpetrator and author of the crime. He capitalizes on the
circumstance that the crime was committed at night time where no light illuminated the area.

ISSUE:
Is the face to face encounter of the witness with the offender, even during nighttime,
sufficient to establish the identity of the accused as the perpetrator?

RULING:
Yes, the face to face encounter of the witness with the offender, even during nighttime, is
sufficient to establish the identity of the accused as the perpetrator.

Anent the identification of the accused, the High Court adopted the so-called Totality of
Circumstances Test on the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identification of suspects,
which utilizes the following factors, viz: (1) The witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the time
of the crime; (2) The witness's degree of attention at that time; (3) The accuracy of any prior
description given by the witness; (4) The level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) The length of time between the crime and the identification; (6) The
suggestiveness of the identification procedure

In this case, the face to face encounter of the witness Fernando Huerta with the accused
immediately after the commission of the crime, is more than sufficient evidence to establish that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. In this case, it is worthy to note that the accused was
still wearing his army jacket in the hospital when he was identified. The defense capitalized on the
darkness of the night to negate the identity of the accused as perpetrator of the crime. However,
the close encounter of the witness with the accused with whom he fought allows the former to have
a lose look on the latter, and his observations on the identity of the accused cannot be set aside.

Therefore, the face to face encounter of the witness with the offender, even during
nighttime, is sufficient to establish the identity of the accused as the perpetrator.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

DEFENSE OF MERE DENIAL COULD NOT PREVAIL OVER THE POSITIVE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES

People of the Philippines vs. Moises Dejolde, Jr. y Salino

G.R. No. 219238, January 31, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by appellant Moises Dejolde, Jr. y Salino (Dejolde) from the Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming with modification the· April 3, 2010 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City.

Dejolde was charged with Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale and Estafa for his
act of recruiting three persons to work as caregivers in the United Kingdom. The witnesses averred
that Dejolde charged them Php 450,000.00 for the processing of their visas which was later
discovered to be fake. The RTC rendered a decision finding Dejolde guilty of the charges against
him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the RTC but modified the penalties by increasing
the fine for the illegal recruitment in large scale to Php 1,000,000.00.

Appellant denied that he recruited private complainants to work as caregivers in the United
Kingdom and testified that he was engaged in the business of processing student visa applications;
that the sums of money he received from private complainants were for the payment of processing
of the student visas; and that he was not able to process their applications or refund their money
because he was arrested.

ISSUE:
Can Dejolde’s denial, unsubstantiated by any clear and convincing evidence, prevail over
the positive testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses?

RULING:
No, Dejolde’s denial, unsubstantiated by any clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses.

The Court often views with disfavor the defense of denial, especially if it is not substantiated
by any clear and convincing evidence. It is an inherently weak defense as it is a self-serving
negative evidence that cannot be given more evidentiary weight than the affirmative declarations
of credible witnesses. Moreover, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts are
accorded great respect because they are in the best position to assess the credibility: of the
witnesses having had the opportunity to observe their demeanor during the Trial.

In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution, through its witnesses, was able to prove
that appellant recruited private complainants for employment as caregivers in the United Kingdom
and that he collected money from them in the process.

Therefore, Dejolde’s denial, unsubstantiated by any clear and convincing evidence, cannot
prevail over the positive testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN RAPE CASES, SOLE CREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF A RAPE VICTIM IS SUFFICIENT TO

CONVICT; RAPE VICTIM NOT REQUIRED TO PROVE RESISTANCE

People of the Philippines vs. Junrel R. Villalobos

G.R. No. 228960, June 11, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal which seeks to reverse the decision of the CA affirming the decision of
the RTC finding accused-appellant Junrel R. Villalobos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape committed against AAA.

The accused brought AAA to a nipa hut 50 meters away from AAA’s house and raped her
at gunpoint. Although the nipa hut was not lighted, AAA saw and recognized the face of the
accused-appellant in the moonlight. AAA reported the crime the following day and underwent
medical examination.

Accused-appellant argues that the RTC erred in giving credence to the testimony of AAA
and claims that the prosecution evidence failed to overcome his constitutional presumption of
innocence. Villalobos submits that a reading of AAA's narration of the events leading to the alleged
rape would reveal that the coitus was committed with her acquiescence.

ISSUE:
(1) Is the sole credible testimony of a rape victim sufficient to sustain the conviction of the
accused?
(2) Does a rape victim have the burden to prove resistance to the alleged acts of rape?

RULING:
(1) Yes, the sole credible testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to convict the accused of
the crime charged.

In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim.
The credibility of a rape victim is enhanced when, as in the case at bench, she has no motive to
testify against the accused or where there is absolutely no evidence which even remotely suggests
that she could have been actuated by such motive.

In this case, the trial court found AAA's testimony to be credible as it was made in a candid
and straightforward manner. The trial court's reliance on the victim's testimony is apt, considering
that it was credible in itself and buttressed by the testimony of the medico legal officer. AAA
narrated in the painstaking and well-nigh degrading public trial her unfortunate and painful ordeal
in a logical manner. She was able to positively identify the accused as the perpetrator because of
the adequate moonlight and familiarity voice and face of the accused.

(2) No, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.

Jurisprudence establishes that the failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance cannot be
construed as a voluntary submission to culprit's desires. Also, failure of the victim to shout for help
does not negate rape. It is enough if the prosecution had proven that force or intimidation concurred
in the commission of the crime as in this case.

In this case, AAA cannot shout or resist the ravishing acts of the accused because she
was raped at gun point. Therefore, the credible testimony of AAA is sufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THERE CAN BE NO CONVICTION WITHOUT PROOF OF THE IDENTITY OF THE

CRIMINAL BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Ardin Cuesta Cadampog

G.R. No. 218244, June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal seeking to reverse the decision of the CA affirming the decision of the
RTC Cebu City finding accused-appellant Ardin Cadampog guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder.

While having dinner, victim was shot and died thereafter. The victim’s wife testified that
after peeping through the bamboo slats, she saw the accused running away from the crime scene
while wearing a dark jacket, short pants and a bullcap with the firearm in his hand. She positively
identified the accused as the perpetrator since she was familiar with the accused’s build, height
and profile of the body. Another witness corroborated the wife’s testimony and testified that he saw
accused walking fast and wearing the same clothes.

The accused impugns Alicia's credibility as a witness and contends that there was no
positive identification. As the assailant was allegedly running away at the moment the wife peeped,
the accused insists that she could not have possibly seen his face.

ISSUE:
Is the positive identification of the accused sufficient to convict him of the crime charged?

RULING:
Yes, the positive identification of the accused by the victim’s wife is sufficient to convict
him of the crime of murder.

Jurisprudence establishes that the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but
to prove the identity of the criminal. Even if the commission of the crime is established, there can
be no conviction without proof of the identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, the wife positively identified that accused and the same was corroborated by
the testimony of the other prosecution witness. The wife had the opportunity to observe the
circumstances surrounding her husband's death. It is not in conflict with common experience and
human behavior that after seeing the muzzle flashes, the wife’s instincts made her immediately
peep through the bamboo slats to see who fired the shots. This natural and spontaneous reaction
enabled her to catch a glimpse of the shooter's face.

Therefore, the positive identification of the accused by the victim’s wife is sufficient to
convict him of the crime of murder.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

INCONSISTENCY IN RAPE VICTIM’S TESTIMONY AS TO WHETHER PENETRATION

WAS FULL OR PARTIAL DOES NOT AFFECT CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS AND HER
TESTIMONY

People of the Philippines vs. Romulo Bandoquillo

G.R. No. 218913, February 7, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
On appeal, Romulo Bandoquillo (Bandoquillo) assails the judgment of the CA affirming
with modification the RTC decision which found him guilty of the crime of rape.

The facts of the case reveal that AAA, then only 14 years old, was sleeping, when she was
suddenly awakened by Bandoquillo, her father, who forcibly undressed her, touched her breasts
and kissed her neck. Bandoquillo succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA against her will.

When AAA testified in court, she initially claimed that Bandoquillo’s penis was only able to
enter the labia of her sexual organ but later stated that the latter was able to insert his penis into
her vagina.

In affirming the findings of the RTC, the CA found that AAA had testified in a firm,
consistent, credible and believable manner in recounting how Bandoquillo had carnal knowledge
of her. It explained that during her direct- and cross-examination, AAA remained consistent in her
assertion that appellant ‘inserted his penis into her vagina.’ Further, the CA noted that Bandoquillo
had failed to adduce evidence to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse him of
such serious offense as rape. Thus, it concluded that Bandoquillo’s denial cannot prevail over her
categorical and positive testimony.

ISSUE:
Is AAA’s testimony credible, notwithstanding inconsistency therein as to whether the
penetration was only partial or full?

RULING:
Yes, AAA’s testimony credible, as there is no real inconsistency therein as to whether the
penetration was only partial or full.

Well-settled is the rule that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and
their respective testimonies, the trial court’s observations and conclusions deserve great respect
and are often accorded finality, unless it is shown that the court a quo had overlooked,
misunderstood, or misappreciated some fact or circumstance of weight which, if properly
considered, would have altered the result of the case. This rule finds even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the CA.

In this case, a thorough review of AAA’s direct testimony as well as her cross-examination
shows that there is no real inconsistency in AAA’s narration of the rape incident. When the offended
party is a young and immature girl between the age of 12 and 16, courts are inclined to give
credence to her version of the incident, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the
public humiliation to which she would be exposed by court trial if her accusation were untrue.

Therefore, AAA’s testimony credible, as there is no real inconsistency therein as to whether

the penetration was only partial or full.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

EVALUATION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONIES IS

BEST UNDERTAKEN BY THE TRIAL COURT

People of the Philippines vs. Ronnie Dela Cruz a.k.a. “Barok”

G.R. No. 219088, June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision CA which affirmed with modification the Decision RTC
finding accused appellant Ronnie dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape. An information was filed against Dela Cruz charging him of the crime of Rape under
Article 266-A(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610
committed against AAA.

AAA, complainant herein, alleged that one night she and her friend “BBB” were drinking in
the house of a certain Noknok when Dela Cruz and his friends showed up joined them. Later on
that night, “BBB” asked Dela Cruz if AAA could sleep in his house because AAA did not want to
go home as she had a fight with her parents. When Dela Cruz and AAA were finally in the former’s
house, Dela Cruz allegedly raped AAA despite her objection. At 6am the next day, AAA left Dela
Cruz’ house and together with her parents, she was able to promptly report the same to the
authorities.

Cruz seeks to malign AAA's credibility by highlighting her demeanor while she was
testifying. He raised that at one point, AAA smiled during her testimony.

The CA sustained the trial court's assessment of AAA's credibility considering that it was
in the best position to ascertain and measure the spontaneity and sincerity of the witnesses.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Does the trial court’s assessment of AAA’s credibility deserve weight?

RULING:
Yes, the trial court’s assessment deserves weight.

In People v. Sapigao, Jr., the Court explained: It is well-settled that the evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude under grilling examination. For, indeed the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of the voice
are potent aids in ascertaining the witness credibility, and the trial courts have the opportunity and
can take advantage of these aids. These cannot be incorporated in the record so that all that the
appellate court can see are the cold words of the witness contained in the transcript of testimonies.

In this case, AAA's testimony was straightforward and categorical as she never flinched in
describing what happened to her and in identifying Dela Cruz as the one who did it. As such, the
fact that AAA was smiling at one point during her testimony does not necessarily destroy her
credibility and the isolated incident cannot discount the trauma she endured at Dela Cruz's hand.

Therefore, the court’s assessment of AAA’s credibility deserves weight.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

EVALUATION OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESS AND THEIR TESTIMONIES ARE

BEST UNDERTAKEN BY THE TRIAL COURT

Petronilo Napone, Jr. and Edgar Napone vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the CA which affirmed
with modification the Decision RTC finding accused-appellants Petronilo Napone, Jr. (Junior) and
Edgar Napone (Edgar) guilty of the crime of homicide. Petitioners Petronilo and Edgar are brothers.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Jocelyn Janioso (Janioso) and her storekeeper Dante
Sandaya (Sandaya), narrated that it was about 8 o’clock in the evening when Salvador and his
son, Robert Espelita (Robert) arrived at Janosio’s house calling out for help. Janosio saw
Salvador’s face oozing with blood. At that same time, Salvador was also holding Calib Napone
(Calib) by neck. Salvado told Janosio that Calib hacked him while he and his son were on their
way home from their farm. Thereafter, she directed one of her employees to find a vehicle to be
used to bring Salvador to the nearest hospital. However, the Napones entered the scene. Janosio
narrated that she saw Edgar threw a stone the size of a fist at Salvador. Subsequently, Junior shot
Salvador three (3) times with a small firearm, hitting the latter on the chest which caused him to
fall. The petitioners interposed self-defense and defense of relatives. The defense argued that the
Espelitas were the unlawful aggressor.

Both the RTC and CA ruled against the Napone brothers. The appellate court concurred
that the testimonies of Janioso and Sadaya were more truthful and candid

ISSUE:
Do the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses deserve a
high degree of respect?

RULING:
Yes, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of Janioso and Sandaya deserve
respect.

It is doctrinally settled that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a
high degree of respect and will not be disturbed during appeal in the absence of any clear showing
that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which could have altered the conviction of the appellant.

In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that the Napones, and not the Espelitas,
were the unlawful aggressors. Both Janioso and Sadaya's testimonies were positive and
categorical with respect to its material aspects. They were consistent and corroborated each other
in their narration of who committed the crime, and when and how it was committed. The
prosecution witnesses were not only credible but were also not shown to have harbored any ill
motive toward the Napones.

Therefore, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses
deserve a high degree of respect.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION MAY BE VALIDLY MADE THROUGH

PHOTOGRAPHS SHOWN TO THE WITNESS

People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Llamera y Atienza

G.R. No. 218703, April 23, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed the RTC decision finding
Respondent Antonio Llamera y Atienza (Llamera) guilty of Robbery with Rape.

According to the prosecution, On March 28, 2000 accused-appellant, with Edwin Sical
(Edwin) and Alvin Adayo (Alvin) barged into the house of BBB armed with firearms. Thereafter,
they proceeded to ransack the house. During the robbery, the accused-appellant saw AAA and
instructed her to enter the office of her uncle, BBB, and succeeded in molesting her and inserting
his finger inside her vagina.

The accused-appellant and his co-accused all raised the defense of denial and alibi.

RTC found the accused-appellant guilty of robbery with rape and his co-accused, of
robbery. The CA affirmed the conviction and rejected the accused-appellant’s claim that the
police’s act of showing his picture to the witness for identification was not free from impermissible
suggestion. It held that accused-appellant's identity was duly established because the witnesses,
especially AAA, had the opportunity to be physically close to him.

ISSUE:
Is the out-of-court identification, by showing the witness photographs which contained the
names and the crimes for which each person was arrested, valid?

RULING:
Yes, the out-of-court identification, by showing the witness photographs which contained
the names and the crimes for which each person was arrested, was valid.

The Court has laid down the two guiding principles in order to sustain the validity of an out-
of-court identification: first, a series of photographs must be shown and not merely that of the
suspect; and second, when a witness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and display
should in no way suggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. In addition,
photographic identification should be free from any impermissible suggestions that would single
out a person to the attention of the witness making the identification. Further, a defective out-of-
court identification may be cured by subsequent in-court identification. In People v. Rivera, it was
ruled that "even assuming arguendo that the out-of-court identification was defective, the defect
was cured by the subsequent positive identification in court for the 'inadmissibility of a police line-
up identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court
identification.'" In this case, CCC was unequivocal when he was asked during trial to identify their
assailants.

In this case, the identifications in this case were made by credible witnesses who clearly
saw accused-appellant during the incident and whose stories were inherently believable and not
contrived. It must also be stressed that AAA, with whom accused-appellant was alone for several
minutes, positively identified the latter in court as her assailant.

Therefore, the out-of-court identification, by showing the witness photographs which

contained the names and the crimes for which each person was arrested, was valid.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED ESSENTIAL TO A CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Herminio Vidal, Jr. y Uayan

G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the judgment of RTC finding
accused-appellants Herminia Vibal Jr. y Uayan (Vibal) and Arnold David y Cruz (David) guilty of 2
counts of complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder and 1 count of Direct Assault with Frustrated
Murder.

On May 10, 2005, several men, including the accused-appellants Vibal and David shot
Mayor Leon Arcillas of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and PO3 Almendras, PO2, Binmaot, and PO2 Rivera
and two other civilians. During the investigation, Cipriano Refrea appeared and told the police that
accused-appellants Vibal and David were his companions when the killing transpired. Refrea
pointed to them as the gunmen and members of Royal Blood Gangsta.

The accused-appellants both denied their participation in the crime and claimed that they
were arrested for being involved in a gang war and not for the shooting of Mayor Arcillas.

RTC found the accused-appellants guilty and rejected their alibi and defense in light of the
positive identification of the prosecution’s witness, PO3 Almendras. CA affirmed the ruling and
held that the credible testimony of PO3 Almendras is sufficient to sustain the conviction of the
appellants despite the appellants’ contention that PO3 Almendras could not have properly seen
and identity the assailants at the time of the shooting incident because after he was shot, he felt
dizzy and lost consciousness.

ISSUE:
Did the CA err in giving full credence to the clear testimony of the victim who positively
identified the accused-appellants?

RULING:
No, the CA did not err in giving full credence to the clear testimony of the victim who
positively identified the accused-appellants.

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1) the fact of the
crime, the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and (2)
the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. When a crime is committed, it is the duty
of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the crime beyond reasonable doubt for
there can be no conviction even if the commission of the crime is established. Apart from showing
the existence and commission of a crime, the State has the burden to correctly identify the author
of such crime. Both facts must be proved by the State beyond cavil of a doubt on the strength of
its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. As every crime must be
established beyond reasonable doubt, it is also paramount to prove, with the same quantum of
evidence, the identity of the culprit. It is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction until
and unless an accused has been positively identified.

In the case at bench, the RTC and the CA were one in declaring that the identification of
appellants Vibal and David as the gunmen based on the recognition of PO3 Almendras was clear,
worthy of credence and has met the requirements of moral certainty. The Court agrees, and finds
no cogent reason to disturb this conclusion of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.

Therefore, the CA did not err in giving full credence to the clear testimony of the victim who
positively identified the accused-appellants.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

INCONSISTENCIES OVER TRIVIAL MATTERS DO NOT DISCREDIT WITNESS

People of the Philippines vs. Michael Delima

G.R. No. 222645, June 27, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal of the CA decision affirming the RTC decision finding the accused-
appellants Michael Delima (Michael) and Allan Delima (Allan) guilty of the crime of murder for the
death of Ramel Mercedes Congreso (Ramel).

Jose Gajudo, Jr. testified that when he was about to go home from visiting Anthony Nator’s
house, he saw five individuals ganging up on Ramel — the scuffle was around eight meters from
Anthony's house. When they saw him, three of the five assailants scampered away while the two
left continued to beat Ramel, whom they stabbed while they held and pulled him back by his pants.
Scared of what he saw, Jose rushed back inside Anthony's house. Anthony was surprised that
Jose was back because he had already asked permission to go home. When he asked why, Jose
told him about the stabbing incident and asked Anthony to accompany him to where it happened.
There, Jose pointed to the two persons whom he saw holding and stabbing Ramel and asked
Anthony who they were. Anthony said Allan was the one Jose saw stab Ramel while Michael held
the victim by his pants; and that after the incident, he saw Michael and Allan just walk away from
the crime scene.

RTC found Michael and Allan guilty of murder. CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and ruled
that the perceived inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pertained to
minor details which, in fact, strengthened their credibility because they tended to prove that their
testimonies were not rehearsed.

ISSUE:
Are Jose and Anthony considered as credible witnesses despite their inconsistent
testimonies over trivial matters, which were insignificant to the act to be proved?

RULING:
Yes, Jose and Anthony are considered as credible witnesses despite their inconsistent
testimonies over trivial matters, which were insignificant to the act to be proved.

In Avelino v. People, the Court explained why minor inconsistencies over trivial matters do
not discredit a witness, to wit: “Given the natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to
assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the
declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled that immaterial and
insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing
on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one
another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.”

In this case, the apparent inconsistency merely refers to insignificant matters as it only
pertained to the sequence of how the events unfolded. The assailed inconsistency is simply
whether Jose called Anthony before or after Ramel was stabbed. It does not discount the fact that
Jose's testimony categorically identified accused-appellants as those responsible for Ramel's
death and clearly narrated their respective participation. His testimony shows consistency on
material points.

Therefore, Jose and Anthony are considered as credible witnesses despite their
inconsistent testimonies over trivial matters, which were insignificant to the act to be proved.

272 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ON CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS AND THEIR

TESTIMONIES ARE ACCORDED RESPECT AND OFTEN WITH FINALITY

People of the Philippines vs. Carlos Bauit y Delos Santos

G.R. No. 223102, February 14, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of
the RTC Makati City finding the accused-appellant Carlos Bauit y Delos Santos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape.

In an Information dated July 25, 2011, the accused-appellant was charged with rape of his
biological daughter “AAA”. Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits then
ensued. Accused-appellant denied raping "AAA." Instead, he claimed that the filing of the rape
case against him was meant to cover up the wrongdoings of "AAA," she being a problem child and
rebellious.

RTC convicted the accused-appellant. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of
"AAA" and her positive identification of accused appellant as her rapist. It found the testimony of
"AAA" straightforward and categorical. It ruled that tenacious resistance on the part of "AAA" was
irrelevant considering his moral ascendancy over her. Accused-appellant argues that the testimony
of "AAA" was incredible considering the relative distance (about 16 meters away) between the
bathroom and the room they shared. "AAA" could have simply used a nearby bathroom. It rejected
accused-appellant's defense of denial in view of the straightforward testimony of "AAA. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:
Is the straightforward, clear and convincing testimony of his daughter sufficient to convict
the accused-appellant?

RULING:
Yes, the straightforward, clear and convincing testimony of his daughter sufficient to
convict the accused-appellant.

The Court has held that when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their
respective testimonies, the trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and
are often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing the witness' deportment
and manner of testifying. The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling
the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, its
assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of
the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent
application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

In this case, both the trial and appellate courts uniformly found the testimony of "AAA" in
narrating the rape incident to be straightforward, clear and convincing. The Court reviewed the
testimony of "AAA" and found nothing significant to justify a deviation from the above-quoted
general rule.

Therefore, the straightforward, clear and convincing testimony of his daughter sufficient to
convict the accused-appellant.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ACCUSED IN CASES OF RAPE MAY BE CONVICTED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE

VICTIM’S CREDIBLE TESTIMONY

People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Empuesto y Socrate

G.R. No. 218245, January 17, 2018
Maritres, J.

FACTS:
This resolves the appeal of accused-appellant Jesus Empuesto y
Socatre (Empuesto) seeking the reversal and setting aside of Decision of the Court of
Appeals which affirmed, with modification as to the award of damages Decision of the Regional
Trial Court Branch 52 finding him guilty of Rape under Art. 266-A 1(a) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC),as amended.

The prosecution established its case by presenting the private complainant AAA. AAA
alleged that the accused-appellant stealthily entered AAA's house through a hole on the floor.
When the accused-appellant got inside the mosquito net, he told AAA to remove her panty.
Because AAA's youngest child was crying, accused-appellant told AAA to breastfeed her child. It
was while AAA was breastfeeding that accused-appellant removed her panty, placed himself on
top of her, and forcefully inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA went to the house of her parents-
in-law and narrated to them what happened to her. Thereafter an information was filed against the
accused-appellant charging him of rape. Both the trial court and the CA found the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

Accused appellant claimed that AAA testified during the direct examination that somebody
was making his way inside her house before he (accused-appellant) had come in; but during cross-
examination she claimed that she noticed somebody was inside the house only upon seeing him
standing beside the mosquito net.

ISSUE:
Is AAA’s lone testimony, considered as credible and straightforward by the trial court,
sufficient to convict the accused-appellant herein?

RULING:
Yes, AAA’s lone testimony that is considered by the court credible and straightforward was
sufficient to convict herein accused-appellant.

This Court has repeatedly held that "In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is almost
always the single most important issue. If the testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility,
which means it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal
course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on that basis.”

In this case, contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, there was actually no inconsistency
in AAA's testimony. AAA stated during direct examination that she noticed that somebody had
entered her house when she heard sounds coming through the bamboo slats floor. Granting for
the sake of argument that there was inconsistency in AAA's testimony, it must be stressed that the
settled rule in our jurisprudence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses with respect
to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration, their
veracity, or the weight of their testimony.

Therefore, AAA’s lone testimony, considered as credible and straightforward by the trial
court, sufficient to convict the accused-appellant herein.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE EYEWITNESS TO A CRIME, EVEN IF

UNCORROBORATED, PRODUCES A CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS
LONG AS IT IS CREDIBLE AND POSITIVE

People of the Philippines vs. Cesar Balao y Lopez

G.R. No. 207805, November 22, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming the conviction of Cesar Balao y
Lopez (Balao) for the crime of murder.

Appellant Balao allegedly, with treachery, evident premeditation, and conspiring with
others killed one Wilfredo Villaranda (Villaranda). The prosecution presented several witnesses
but only Rodel Francisco suddenly appeared behind Wilfredo and stabbed him in the chest with a
fan knife and then immediately fled from the scene. Wilfredo was immediately rushed to a hospital
but was pronounced dead on arrival. Francisco also 275estified that he knew Balao as a
troublemaker in the area. On the other hand, Balao interposed the defense of alibi, corroborated
by several defense witnesses. He averred that Francisco, the sole eyewitness, has ill motives
against him and therefore his testimony should be re-examined and more weight should be given
to his alibi, which was corroborated bythe testimonies of the other defense witnesses.

The Court of Appeals emphasized that although Francisco was the only witness who
positively identified Balao as the perpetrator of the crime, his testimony was credible and sufficient
to support a finding of guilt.

ISSUE:
Is the testimony of the sole eyewitness sufficient to convict the accused?

RULING:
Yes. The testimony of a single eye witness to a crime, even if uncorroborated, produces a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt as long as it is credible and positive.

A conviction may rest on the sole testimony of an eyewitness provided that the testimony
is clear and straightforward.

In this case, Francisco, the sole eyewitness, was familiar with accused-appellant and knew
accused-appellant’s identity and reputation even before the stabbing incident took place. Also,
Francisco’s testimony on how Wilfredo was killed does not appear to be tainted with any
irregularity. Further, although Francisco stated that he disliked accused-appellant for being a
notorious troublemaker in their community, this does not conclusively establish that he was
animated by ill-motives in testifying against accused-appellant. The presumption then is that
Francisco testified in good faith.

Therefore, his testimony should be entitled to full weight and credit.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE TESTIMONY OF A LONE PROSECUTION WITNESS, IF CREDIBLE AND POSITIVE,

CAN PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Grabador, Jr., Roger Abierra, Dante Abierra and Alex
Abierra
G.R. No. 227504, June 13, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal under Rule 124 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure filed by herein
accused-appellant Alex Abierra (Alex), seeking the reversal of the Decision rendered by the CA
which affirmed the trial court's ruling convicting him of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).

The prosecution presented Noel Sumugat (Noel), brother of victim Dennis Sumugat
(Dennis), as the lone eye witness. He related that at around 4:00 p.m. of April 13, 2001, while he
was sitting outside of his house in Taguig City, he saw his brother Dennis talking to Rodolfo. Noel
was situated seven meters away from Dennis and Rodolfo. The two had an altercation, but shook
hands after their argument. Thereafter, Rodolfo left for home. Later on, at around 5:30 p.m.,
Rodolfo came back. He was accompanied by Alex, Roger and Dante. All of them were carrying a
homemade shotgun (sumpak). Suddenly, Alex shot Dennis. Noel knew the assailants because
they were his neighbors. Seeing his brother being shot, Noel immediately rushed to his aid. The
four men scampered away. Dennis was operated and confined in the hospital for multiple shotgun
wounds with cardiac pulmonary injury but later died.

On the other hand, Alex denied being in Taguig and presented witnesses that placed him
in Bicol at the time of the incident. He claims that the testimony of Noel was riddled with
inconsistencies that seriously cast doubt unto the veracity of his claim.

ISSUE:
Is the lone testimony of the prosecution witness sufficient to sustain conviction?

RULING:
Yes, the lone testimony of the prosecution witness is sufficient to sustain conviction.

Time and again, the Court has ruled that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness, if
credible and positive, can prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

In this case, Noel’s positive identification of Alex as the assailant prevails over the latter's
denial and alibi. The trial court found that Noel described what he saw and heard in that fateful
afternoon in full and vivid details. Noel, who was standing seven meters away from the incident,
witnessed the crime, and positively identified Alex as one of the culprits who shot Dennis. Plainly,
Noel knew the malefactors, as they were his neighbors, and thus, could not have mistakenly
identified them. Likewise, there is nothing in the records to show that Noel harbored any ill-will
against Alex or any of his co-accused. Neither did he have any reason to fabricate his testimony.

Therefore, absent any reason or motive for Noel to perjure himself, the logical conclusion
is that he was solely impelled to bring justice to his brother's untimely demise.

276 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

“SWEETHEART THEORY” AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN RAPE CASES MUST BE

CORROBORATED BY EVIDENCE

People of the Philippines vs. Ruperto Rubillar, Jr. y Gaberon

G.R. No. 224631, August 23, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal by accused-appellant Ruperto Rubillar, Jr. y Gaberon (Rubillar)
assailing the Judgment of the RTC Davao City finding Rubillar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape.

Complainant AAA testified that accused Rubillar, who is her father’s kumpare raped her.
She testified that she had not talked with Rubillar prior to the alleged incident and that she was
merely waiting for a jeepney when he offered her a ride. Accused Rubillar on the other hand,
admitted that there was indeed carnal knowledge but said that they were sweethearts. Rubillar's
allegation of relationship with AAA was corroborated by several witnesses. First, Odiongan (AAA’s
ex-boyfriend) testified that prior to the alleged incident, AAA introduced Rubillar to him as her new
boyfriend and that he saw them in an intimate embrace. Second, Laguardia (Rubillar’s neighbor)
recalled that Rubillar introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend, then, borrowed his motorcycle, which
Rubillar and AAA used. Third, Kalan, AAA's longtime friend testifed that AAA explicitly told her that
Rubillar was her boyfriend once before the alleged incident and a second time after AAA ran away
from home with the presence of their other friend, Calo. Calo also testified that Rubillar used to
fetch her and AAA from their on-the-job training office in July 2006 and that she observed that they
appeared "very close" during the trips.

ISSUE:
Is the complainant’s sole testimony sufficient evidence for the conviction of the accused
for the crime of rape?

RULING:
No, the victim's sole testimony examined in light of the other evidence presented in court,
failed to establish Rubillar's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the nonattendance
of force or intimidation. It is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and
consequently places on accused-appellant the burden of proving the alleged relationship by
substantial evidence. In People vs. Patentes, it is discussed that the appellant's bare invocation of
the sweetheart theory cannot alone stand. It must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial,
or other evidence. Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible testimonies of
those who know the lovers.

In this case, the testimony of Rubillar that they were sweethearts was corroborated by
several witnesses, the most relevant of which is the testimony of Calo that she and AAA know
Rubillar which rebutted AAA’s testimony that she didn’t know and talk to Rubilar prior the alleged
rape incident. The defense had sufficiently established the fact of relationship, thus, AAA's version
of what happened on the day of the incident appeared incredulous vis-a-vis Rubillar's version.

Therefore, the sole testimony of the complainant-victim failed to establish Rubillar’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

A MEDICO-LEGAL REPORT IS NOT INDISPENSABLE TO THE PROSECUTION OF A

RAPE CASE, IT IS AN EVIDENCE THAT IS MERELY CORROBORATIVE IN NATURE

People of the Philippines vs. Armando Labraque a.k.a. “Arman”

G.R. No. 225075, September 13, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC,
finding accused-appellant Armando Labraque a.k.a. "Arman" (Arman) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape committed against AAA, a minor victim.

Complainant-victim AAA is 12 years old when the alleged raped happened while accused-
appellant Arman is a 45-year old fisherman. BBB, AAA’s mother testified that AAA is 12 years old
when the incident happened and that on the said day, AAA came home crying and when probed,
AAA disclosed, "kinantot ako ng Tito ni Dave" at the second floor of an unfinished house near the
Christian Habitat. Subsequently, she and the barangay tanods proceeded to the house of Dave
where they found Arman where AAA pointed at him as the person who molested her. A medico-
legal officer of the PNP who conducted AAA’s genital examination noted the presence in AAA's
hymen of a deep-healed laceration or tearing of the mucosa at 4 o'clock position, which was usually
caused by a blunt force or penetrating trauma such as an erect penis. During her interview with
AAA, the latter admitted that there was a penile penetration of her vagina. However, it was
concluded that "there are no external signs of application of any form of trauma," i.e., no external
injuries like contusions or bruises, suffered by AAA. Arman merely denied the allegations and tried
to attack AAA’s credibility saying it is incredulous because the medico-legal findings show that
AAA was clearly no longer in a virgin state given the presence of deeply-healed lacerations on her
hymen, the cause of which was inflicted much earlier than the time of the alleged rape incident.

ISSUE:
Is the medico-legal report indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case?

RULING:
No, the medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case. Even if
the Court accept as a fact that AAA is no longer a virgin because the deeply-healed lacerations on
her hymen was inflicted much earlier than the time of the alleged rape incident, such does not
automatically result to Arman's acquittal.

Suffice it to say that a medico-legal report is not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape
case; it is an evidence that is merely corroborative in nature. It is a jurisprudential principle that
testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.

In this case, accused appellant's imputation of ill-motive to the young victim deserves scant
consideration. As found by the RTC and CA, AAA's testimony was candid, spontaneous, and
consistent. Besides, as can be gleaned from the records, the assailed findings and ruling were not
solely based on AAA's testimony. The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses,
corroborating that of AAA's, were also considered.

Therefore, even without the medico-legal report, the accused can be convicted with the
sole testimony of the complainant-victim.

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 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

IN RAPE CASES, THE COURT SIMPLY CANNOT BE STUCK TO THE MARIA CLARA
STEREOTYPE OF A DEMURE AND RESERVED FILIPINO WOMAN IN EVALUATING
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY

People of the Philippines vs. Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho

G.R. No. 225642-43, January 17, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is is an appeal from the decision of Court of Appeals finding respondents Juvy
Amarela (Amarela) and Junard Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two different
charges of rape.

On February 10, 2009, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, AAA was watching a beauty
contest at a basketball court. AAA then went to the comfort room where Amarela pulled her under
the stage of the day care center, punched her in the abdomen, and undressed her. He placed
himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina. When she shouted for help, Amarela
fled. AAA was then brought to the Racho residence. Neneng Racho asked her son Racho to bring
AAA to her aunt's house instead. AAA claimed that Racho brought her to a shanty along the way
against her will and was told to lie down. When she refused, Racho boxed her abdomen. He, then,
undressed himself and placed himself on top of AAA. After consummating the act, Racho left. So,
AAA went home alone.

Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what happened with
AAA. On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping
her. On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping
her.

ISSUE:
Was the victim’s testimony sufficient to convict the accused?

RULING:
No, AAA’s testimony is not sufficient to convict the accused.

The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. And while
the factual setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be
reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara
stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such mindset
and accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years
transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her
rights.

In this case, after a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony,
reasonable doubt lingers as we are not fully convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following
circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her testimony: (1) the version
of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in court;
(2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only
saw him for the first time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under
the stage against her will; and (4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are
inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.

Therefore, AAA’s testimony is not sufficient to convict the accused.

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COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE WITNESS IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Cristanto Cirbeto y Giray

G.R. No. 231359, February 7, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant Crisanto Cirbeto y Giray
(accused-appellant) assailing the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Eyewitness Dalimoos saw his friend Casipit with the accused Cirbeto walking towards a
nearby mall. He witnessed Cirbeto pulling a knife from the right side of his back and stab Casipit.
Casipit was stabbed once and then managed to run away. Cirbeto ran after him, caught up to him
and stabbed him multiple times until Casipit died. Police officers from the Marikina Police Station
quickly responded and were able to recover the knife used to stab the victim.

Cirbeto denied both the killing of Casipit and knowing eyewitness Dalimoos. He claims that
Dalimoos mistakenly identified him as the perpetrator and that the latter was coached to lie in his
testimony.

ISSUE:
Was the testimony of a single witness sufficient to support the conviction of murder?

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of a single witness sufficient to support the conviction of murder.

It should be emphasized that the testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, as
in the case of Dalimoos, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder.

Time and again, the Court has held that when the issues involve matters of credibility of
witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies, and its assessment of
the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern whether or not they
are telling the truth.

In this case, Dalimoos’ testimony consistently, straightforwardly, and positively identified

Cirbeto as the person who walked with the victim Casipit and stabbed the latter. Dalimoos's
testimony did not waver; neither did it suffer from any grave or material inconsistency as would
strip away his credibility as an eyewitness to the crime. It must be noted that Casipit was completely
unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking with Cirbeto on the date and time in
question. Deliberate intent to kill Casipit can also be inferred from the location and number of stab
wounds he sustained.

Therefore, the testimony of a single witness sufficient to support the conviction of murder.

280 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CATERGORICAL TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIM IS

SUFFICIENT TO PROVE RAPE

People of the Philippines vs. Benedict Gomez y Ragundiaz

G.R. No. 220892, February 21, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
Before the Court is an appeal on the August 20, 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) finding appellant Benedict Gomez y Ragundiaz (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of simple rape.

“AAA” was 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. She was serving drinks
to a group having a drinking session. She herself had 10 shots of Matador making her dizzy. After
another glass, she lost consciousness. She woke up naked to Benedict Gomez on top of her with
his penis inside her vagina. “AAA” tried to push Gomez but to no avail. She realized that an
unidentified man was lying next to her and that one Neil Iliw-Iliw was standing by the door. One
Ronald Severino even held her hand when she started to struggle. When “AAA” woke up the next
day, Neil’s brother Joe told her that she was raped by Mark, Glen, Neil, Ronald, Macky, Dexter,
and Talibao. She was feeling weak, felt pain in her vagina which was bleeding. "AAA" told her
mother what happened and she submitted herself to a medico-legal examination. The examination
revealed that she suffered from “recent blunt force or penetrating trauma."

Gomez claims that he and “AAA” were once sweethearts. He denied having carnal
knowledge of “AAA” and argued that “AAA” was just upset with him because, when they were
sweethearts, he had other girlfriends aside from her.

ISSUE:
Was the testimony of the victim sufficient to convict the accused of rape?

RULING:
Yes, the testimony of the victim sufficient to convict the accused of rape.

"AAA" clearly testified that when she was awakened on January 20, 2007, she found
herself naked and appellant, who was also naked, was on top of her. During that time, appellant's
penis was inside her. "AAA" pushed him twice but to no avail; and, a certain Ronald even held her
hands preventing her from moving; and, after a while, she lost consciousness. The straightforward
and categorical testimony of "AAA" and her positive identification of appellant proved that the latter
had carnal knowledge of "AAA" against her will and without her consent. As such, her testimony
must prevail over the uncorroborated and self-serving denial of appellant.

Moreover, her prompt report bolstered her credibility. “AAA” reported the incident to her
mother a day after it transpired. "AAA" immediately underwent a medico-legal examination. These
matters only proved that "AAA" did not have the luxury of time to fabricate a rape story.

Therefore, the Court sees no cogent reason to disturb the uniform findings of the RTC and
the CA that appellant was guilty of simple rape and in imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Such is the case since there was no showing that the trial court, in assessing the
credibility of the witnesses in relation to their testimonies, had overlooked, misapprehended or
misconstrued any relevant fact that would affect the outcome of the case.

| 281
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

EXISTENCE OF CARNAL KNOWLEDGE IS ESTABLISHED WHEN THE TESTIMONY OF

A RAPE VICTIM IS CORROBORATED BY THE MEDICAL FINDINGS OF THE
EXAMINING PHYSICIAN

People of the Philippines vs. Emiliano De Chavez

G.R. No. 218427, January 31, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal filed by Emiliano De Chavez (appellant) from the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape by
sexual assault and two counts of qualified rape.

"XXX" who was then thirteen (13) years old, was sleeping on the floor of their room while
her siblings were sleeping with their father on the bed. "XXX" was suddenly awakened when her
father lay [beside her]. Appellant slowly raised her shirt. He whispered "Sundin mo na lang ako at
pag hindi mo ako sinunod ay papatayin ko ang mga kapatid mo at guguluhin ko ang nanay mo x
x x," then he told "XXX" ''ibaba mo ang jogging pants at panty mo." Because of fear, ''XXX'' followed
her father's order. Appellant then started kissing her and inserted his finger into her vagina. "XXX''
cried as she felt pain in her vagina. She did not ask for help because she was afraid of her father's
threat. After a few minutes, appellant removed his finger and returned to bed. XXX later told her
mother who reported the incident to the police.
The accused was charged with 2 counts of rape and sexual assault. He contends that the story is
made up in retaliation for scolding and punishing the children. In assailing his conviction, appellant
puts in issue the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, which he
believes is an indication that they were coached.

ISSUE:
Is the inconsistent testimony of the witness reliable to prove the crime?

RULING:
Yes, the inconsistent testimony of the witness is reliable to prove the crime.

Inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the testimony of a rape victim is not unusual

considering that the painful experience is oftentimes not remembered in detail as "it causes deep
psychological wounds that scar the victim for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind
would opt to forget." Besides, the determination of the credibility of a witness is best left to the trial
court, which had the opportunity to observe the deportment and demeanor of the witness while
testifying.

Moreover, the Court has consistently ruled that there is sufficient basis to conclude the
existence of carnal knowledge when the testimony of a rape victim is corroborated by the medical
findings of the examining physician as ''lacerations, whether healed or fresh, are the best physical
evidence of forcible defloration."

In this case, the victim's testimony is corroborated not only by her sister but also by the
medical findings of the examining physician, who testified that the presence of deep healed
lacerations on the victim's genitalia is consistent with the dates the alleged sexual acts were
committed.

Therefore, the inconsistent testimony of the witness is reliable to prove the crime.

282 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MINOR INCONSISTENCIES IN WITNESSES’ TESTIMONIES DO NOT PREVAIL OVER

CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTS

People of the Philippines vs. Gloria Nangcas

G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of CA affirming RTC decision on finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Trafficking in Persons

As stated in the information, by means of fraud, deception, and taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the victims, Gloria Nangcas willfully and unlawfully recruited, transported and
transferred four (4) women, 3 of whom were minors aged 13-17, for the purpose of offering and
selling said victims for forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude. She did so by promising them
local employment as househelpers in Cagayan De Oro City. However, said accused brought them
to Marawi City and sold them for PhP1,600.00. CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:
Do inconsistencies in the testimonies of the private complainants warrant acquittal?

RULING:
No, the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the private complainants do not warrant
acquittal. The supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies pertained to minor details
that, in any case, could not negate Nangcas' unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208.

The Court has ruled time and again that factual findings of the trial court, its assessment
of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and the conclusions
based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect.

In this case, Nangcas still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies were conflicting and improbable. Such alleged inconsistencies pertained to the
testimonies of Judith and the other minor victims as to who was employed by whom. These
inconsistencies, however, are of no consequence to the fact that Judith and the three minor victims
were taken by appellant to Marawi City against their will and were made to work as house helpers
without pay.

Therefore, the inconsistencies in the testimony do not warrant acquittal. The Court will not
weigh anew the evidence already passed upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.

| 283
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MERE RETRACTION BY A WITNESS OR BY COMPLAINANT OF HIS OR HER

TESTIMONY DOES NOT NECESSARILY VITIATE THE ORIGINAL TESTIMONY OR
STATEMENT, IF CREDIBLE

Carlose Jay Adlawan vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 197645, April 4, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the
CA which affirmed with modification the RTC’s judgment convicting Carlos Jay Adlawan of the
crime of Frustrated Homicide and the CA’s Resolution denying the Joint Motion to Dismiss and to
Admit Private Complainant's Affidavit of Recantation and Desistance.

Petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder and Attempted Robbery. In its judgment,
the RTC acquitted petitioner of attempted robbery, but convicted him of the crime of frustrated
homicide. Although there was insufficient evidence to prove the attempted robbery, the RTC was
convinced that petitioner mortally wounded victim as both an eyewitness and the victim positively
identified the petitioner-accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC.

Thereafter, the petitioner, with the victim’s conformity, filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss and
to Admit Private Complainant's Affidavit of Recantation and Desistance where the victim admitted
to fabricating her accusations and explained her injuries as merely accidental as a result of slipping
while boarding a multi-cab. The CA however, denied the petitioner's motion. It reasoned that as a
rule, an affidavit of desistance, by itself, cannot be a ground for the dismissal of the case. Hence,
this petition. Petitioner alleges that the affidavit merely confirmed what the records of the case
already revealed - that the victim fabricated the allegations. Thus, the affidavit would not be the
sole basis for the dismissal.

ISSUE:
Does an affidavit of recantation and desistance necessarily warrant an acquittal?

RULING:
No, an affidavit of recantation and desistance does not necessarily warrant an acquittal.

Mere retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her testimony does not necessarily
vitiate the original testimony or statement, if credible. An affidavit of desistance is merely an
additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in
acquittal. The general rule is that courts look with disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. It is only where there exist special circumstances which, when coupled
with the desistance or retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony or statement given,
can a retraction be considered and upheld.

In this case, the SC found the testimony given by the victim in open court credible. Her
testimony was clear, candid, and straightforward. She positively identified petitioner as the person
who hacked her several times. She did not waver in her identification despite the arduous direct
and cross-examinations conducted on her. The credibility of the victim's testimony is clear. On the
other hand, the affidavit of recantation and desistance is unreliable. The affidavit was executed
after petitioner had already been convicted by the trial and appellate courts. Moreover, the victim's
explanation therein on how she sustained her wounds defies common sense.

Therefore, an affidavit of recantation and desistance does not necessarily warrant an

acquittal.

284 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE CIVIL IN NATURE;

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED FOR SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION

Republic of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo M. Cuenca, et al.

G.R. No. 198393, April 4, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 filed by the Republic, is the Decision of
the Sandiganbayan dismissing the Republic's complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution of the alleged ill-gotten wealth by the respondents Cuenca, et al., and respondent
corporations alleged to be beneficially owned or controlled by respondent Cuenca, which the latter
allegedly acquired in unlawful concert with one another, in breach of trust, and with grave abuse
of right and power, resulting to their unjust enrichment during Ferdinand E. Marcos' rule. Assailed
likewise is Sandiganbayan's Joint Resolution dismissing the Republic's motion for reconsideration.

The Republic argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when it disregarded the fact that
Cuenca, in his answer and in his testimony, admitted that Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), obtained loans from local and American Banks and
government financial institutions. The Republic also assails the Sandiganbayan's exclusion of its
documentary evidence showing the loans, financial assistance, guarantees and other favors
bestowed upon Cuenca on the ground of the best evidence rule. It argues that by its exhibits, it
has proven that the such documents really existed and were actually executed and that the
contents thereof were established by Cuenca's judicial admissions.

ISSUE:
Does the evidence of the Republic, consisting only of instructions from President Marcos
to extend financial support to CDCP and inadmissible photocopies, preponderate to prove that
Cuenca amassed ill-gotten wealth?

RULING:
No, the evidence of the Republic, consisting only of instructions from President Marcos to
extend financial support to CDCP and inadmissible photocopies, does not preponderate to prove
that Cuenca amassed ill-gotten wealth.

Jurisprudence establishes that "preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and

value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with
the term greater weight of the evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. Preponderance
of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth.

In this case, a careful examination of the afore-mentioned issuances yields that while it
may be true that then President Marcos gave instructions to certain government institutions to
extend financial support to the CDCP, there is nothing in them which would substantiate the
Republic's claims that Cuenca, through the CDCP, enjoyed a magnitude of special favors to
unjustly enrich himself. Even if the Court were to take into consideration the testimonies of the
Republic's witnesses, it finds that these are not sufficient to establish that the Cuenca engaged in
"schemes, devices or stratagems" to acquire ill-gotten assets. Further, the documents in question
were rendered inadmissible in evidence as they were only photocopies.

Therefore, the evidence of the Republic, consisting only of instructions from President
Marcos to extend financial support to CDCP and inadmissible photocopies, does not preponderate
to prove that Cuenca amassed ill-gotten wealth.

| 285
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

APPLICANT IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS MUST PROVE BY CLEAR AND

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE LAND IS AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE

Suprema T. Dumo vs. Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 218269, June 6, 2018
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner Suprema Dumo (Dumo) challenges the
decision of the CA in dismissing the application for land registration of Dumo.

Dumo filed an application for registration of two parcels of land alleging that the lots
belonged to her mother and that she and her siblings inherited them upon their mother's death.
However, Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove that the land she seeks
to register is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The CA affirmed the RTC's decision dismissing the application for land registration of
Dumo, finding that she failed to demonstrate that she and her predecessors-in-interest possessed
the property in the manner required by law to merit the grant of her application for land registration.

ISSUE:
Was Dumo able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the land has been
classified as alienable and disposable, despite not submitting the original classification of the
DENR Secretary and the CENRO/PENRO certificate of land classification status based on the
original classification?

RULING:
No, Dumo was not able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the land has been
classified as alienable and disposable, because she failed to submit the original classification of
the DENR Secretary and the CENRO/PENRO certificate of land classification status based on the
original classification.

Pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome this presumption, an
applicant seeking registration is bound to establish that the property subject of his application is
alienable and disposable. There are 2 documents which must be presented: first, a
copy of the original classification approved by the Secretary of the DENR and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records; and second, a certificate of land classification
status issued by the CENRO or the PENRO based on the land classification approved
by the DENR Secretary. Both these documents be based on the land classification approved
by the DENR Secretary is not a mere superfluity. This requirement stems from the fact
that the alienable and disposable classification of agricultural land may be made by the President
or DENR Secretary.

In this case, Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove that the land
she seeks to register is alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

Therefore, Dumo was not able to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the land has
been classified as alienable and disposable, because she failed to submit the original classification
of the DENR Secretary and the CENRO/PENRO certificate of land classification status based on
the original classification.

286 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

BEFORE DIVORCE DECREE CAN BE RECOGNIZED BY OUR COURTS, THE PARTY

PLEADING IT MUST PROVE IT AS A FACT AND DEMONSTRATE ITS CONFORMITY TO
THE FOREIGN LAW ALLOWING IT

Redante Sarto y Misalucha vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision
and Resolution of the CA which affirmed the Decision of the RTC Naga City in Criminal Case
finding petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy.

On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of Bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and the
second, without having the first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe).
The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4 June 2007.

Redante contended that he was able to obtain a divorce decree prior to contracting his
subsequent marriage. RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment.

ISSUE:
Is the mere certificate, not decree, of divorce sufficient to prove the existence of divorce
under the Rules?

RULING:
No, the mere certificate, not decree, of divorce is insufficient to prove the existence of
divorce under the Rules.

Jurisprudence establishes that before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which, the divorce was secured is mandatory considering
that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. For
the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented
and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given
presumptive evidentiary value only after it is presented and admitted in evidence. In particular, to
prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must present copies
thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Pursuant to
these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven through (1) an official publication
or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said documents. If the
office which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated
by the seal of his office.

In this case, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce
as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.
His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

Therefore, the mere certificate, not decree, of divorce is insufficient to prove the existence
of divorce under the Rules.

| 287
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

MERE PHOTOCOPY OF A PRIVATE DOCUMENT NOT AUTHENTICATED IS

CONSIDERED HEARSAY EVIDENCE

Esperanza Berboso vs. Victoria Cabral

G.R. No. 204617, July 10, 2017
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by petitioner
Esperanza Berboso assailing the Decision of the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of
the DARAB dismissing the case filed by respondent Victoria Cabral for cancellation of
emancipation patents (EP).

The subject matter of this case is a parcel of land which was awarded to Alejandro Berboso
by virtue of a Certificate of Land Title (CLT). Upon registration, the CLT was then replaced by the
EP. After complying with all the requirements, the Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of
Alejandro, thereby cancelling the EP. Meanwhile, respondent Cabral filed with the DAR-PARAB
her first petition to cancel the said EP. The PARAB rendered a decision and affirmed the validity
of the EP. DARAB denied the respondent’s appeal and upon further appeal, CA affirmed the
decisions of the PARAB and DARAB.

Pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent, the latter filed
her second petition for the cancellation of the said EP before the PARAB. Respondent claimed
that petitioner sold a portion of the subject land to a certain Rosa Fernando, as evidenced by a
photocopy of the Kasunduan, within the prohibitory period under the existing rules and regulations
of the DAR.

ISSUE:
Is the offer of photocopy of the Kasunduan as evidence admissible?

RULING:
No, the offer of photocopy of the Kasunduan as evidence is not admissible.

Sec. 20, Rule 132, of the Rules of Court must be observed which states that a private
document, before the same can be admitted as evidence, must first be authenticated either by
anyone who saw the document executed or written or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker. The Kasunduan is merely a private document since the
same was not notarized before a notary public, so the foregoing shall Rule shall be observed. In
Otero v. Tan, G.R. No. 200134; August 15, 2012, the requirement of authentication is excused
only in four instances: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Sec. 21, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document
have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document is not being offered
as genuine.

In this case, the Kasunduan is not authenticated by the respondent. No one attested to the
genuineness and due execution of the document. Fernando was not presented nor did he submit
an affidavit to confirm and authenticate the document or its contents. Neither was the requirement
of authentication excused under the above-cited instances. Since the Kasunduan was not
authenticated and was a mere photocopy, the same is considered hearsay evidence and cannot
be admitted as evidence against the petitioner.

Therefore, the offer of photocopy of the Kasunduan as evidence is not admissible.

288 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROPER NOTARIZATION OF A DEED OF SALE IS NECESSARY; OTHERWISE IT IS

STRIPPED OF ITS PUBLIC CHARACTER AND IS REDUCED TO A PRIVATE DOCUMENT

Spouses Edgardo M. Aguinaldo and Nelia Torres-Aguinaldo vs. Artemio T. Torres, Jr.
G.R. No. 225808, September 11, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45) assailing the Decision of RTC, dismissing
the complaint for (a) annulment of sale, cancellation of title, and damages filed by petitioners
Spouses Edgardo M. Aguinaldo and Nelia T. Torres-Aguinaldo (Nelia; collectively, petitioners)
against respondent Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (respondent).

Petitioners claimed that they are the registered owners of three (3) parcels of land located
in Tanza, Cavite. They alleged that the tittles to subject properties were transferred to respondent
who, in bad faith, and through fraud, deceit, and stealth, caused the execution of a 1979 deed of
sale, purportedly selling the subject properties to him. Respondent denied participation in the
execution of the 1979 deed of sale, and averred that the subject properties were validly sold by
petitioners to him through a 1991 deed of sale. On respondent's motion, a copy of the 1991 deed
of sale was transmitted to the NBI Questioned Documents Department for examination and
determination of its genuineness and it concluded that petitioners' questioned signatures thereon
and their sample signatures were written by the same persons

RTC dismissed the complaint, holding that petitioners failed to establish their claim by
preponderance of evidence. However, the CA found that the 1991 deed of sale cannot be validly
registered with the Register of Deeds, because it was improperly notarized.

ISSUE:
Did the improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale strip it of its public character,
reducing the same into a private instrument?

RULING:
Yes, the improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale stripped it of its public character
and reduced it to a private instrument.

Sec. 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved “by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker." In relation
thereto, Section 22, Rule 132 of the same Rules provides the manner by which the genuineness
of handwriting may be proved, i.e., by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.”

In this case, while the improper notarization rendered the deed to be a private instrument,
the CA nevertheless made an independent examination of petitioners' signatures on the 1991 deed
of sale and concluded that they are the same signatures found on other pertinent documents,
which is the same conclusion arrived at by the NBI.

Therefore, the improper notarization of the 1991 deed of sale stripped it of its public
character and reduced it to a private instrument.

| 289
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

JAR DOES NOT ABSOLUTELY PROHIBIT SUBMISSION OF ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

Lara’s Gift and Decors, Inc., vs. PNB General Insurers Co., Inc
and UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 230429, January 24, 2018
Velasco, Jr., J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the CA ruling
dismissing the petition and held that RTC has discretion to allow the Questioned Documents and
grants the submission of the 2nd supplemental Judicial Affidavits of Mrs. Villafuerte.

Lara’s Gifts and Decors, Inc (LGDI)’s handicraft products, raw materials, and machineries
and equipment were insured against fire and other allied risk with the respondent PNB General
Insurers Co. (PNB Gen). On February 19, 2008, a fire broke out and razed the compound of the
petitioner. The respondents denied petitioner's claim for coverage of liability under the insurance
policy. LGDI filed a complaint for specific performance and damages.

During Mr. Villafuerte's cross-examination on July 10, 2014, petitioner furnished

respondents with a copy of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte dated July
9, 2014. PNB Gen, through a Motion to Expunge, sought to strike from the records the said 2nd
Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte and all documents attached thereto for alleged
violation of the Judicial Affidavit Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial. RTC overruled the objections
of respondents and allowed petitioner to propound questions relating to the Questioned
Documents. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Does the JAR and Guideline on Pre-Trial proscribe the submission of additional evidence
even after the trial had already commenced?

RULING:
No, the JAR and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of
additional evidence even after trial had already commenced.

Sec. 10 of the A.M. No. 12-8-8-SC does not contain a blanket prohibition on the submission
of additional evidence. However, the submission of evidence beyond the mandated period in the
JA Rule is strictly subject to the conditions that: a) the court may allow the late submission of
evidence only once; b) the party presenting the evidence proffers a valid reason for the delay; and
c) the opposing party will not be prejudiced thereby. Corollary thereto, the Guidelines on Pre-Trial
instructs the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three (3) days before the pre-
trial, containing, inter alia, the documents or exhibits to be presented and to state the purposes
thereof.

In this case, with regard to the admission of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit, we
[Supreme Court] reiterate the requirements laid down in Sec. 2 of the JA Rule. Nevertheless, the
Court is constrained to rule that the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit was properly admitted in
evidence by the trial court. As can be gleaned from Page 64 of the Pre-Trial Order, both parties
reserved the right to present additional evidence, thus: “All the parties made a reservation for the
presentation of additional documentary exhibits in the course of the trial.” The foregoing
reservation is tantamount to a waiver of the application of Secs. 2 and 10 of the JA Rule

Therefore, the JAR and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission
of additional evidence even after trial had already commenced.

290 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DOES NOT MEAN SUCH DEGREE AS PROOF AS
EXCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF ERROR TO PRODUCE ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY,
ONLY MORAL CERTAINTY IS REQUIRED

People of the Philippines vs. Willington Rodriguez y Hermosa

G.R. No. 211721, September 20, 2017
Martires, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the CA affirming Rodriguez's conviction for qualified
trafficking in persons, in violation of R.A. No. 9208, otherwise known as the Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2003.

During a police operation called Oplan Bugaw, PO1 Escober testified that he flagged down
by Rodriguez who allegedly offered the sexual services of three (3) pickup girls. Police Officer 1
Raymond Escober (PO1 Escober), readily gave Rodriguez the pre-marked P500.00 bill as
payment. This signaled his backup PO2 Reynaldo Bereber (PO2 Bereber) and Police Inspector
Pruli James D. Lopez (P/Insp. Lopez) to enter the scene and aid in the arrest. PO1 Escober then
retrieved the pre-marked bill. In his defense, Rodriguez averred that the prosecution failed to
present any evidence that would establish that he recruited, transported, or transferred the alleged
three (3) women for the purpose of prostitution as these women, in fact, were not presented in
court and neither did they execute any sworn statement. Rodriguez also faulted the prosecution
for not presenting the original marked money despite the fact that it was in P/Insp. Lopez's
possession. In addition, Rodriguez maintained that the testimony of PO1 Escober was not
corroborated by any of his companions who allegedly took part in the operations.

ISSUE:
Is the sole testimony of PO1 Escober and a photocopy of the marked money sufficient
evidence to warrant conviction?

RULING:
No, the sole testimony of PO1 Escober and a photocopy of the marked money is not
sufficient evidence to warrant conviction.

It is a basic rule that the conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the prosecution. This is premised on the constitutional presumption
that the accused is innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as, excluding the possibility of
error, to produce absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The gravamen of the crime of human trafficking is
not so much the offer of a woman or child; it is the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent,
a fellow human being for sexual exploitation.

In this case, the prosecution miserably failed to prove this. The prosecution did not bother
to present the testimonies of the alleged victims (the 3 pickup girls). Their testimonies that they
were sexually exploited against their will through force, threat or other means of coercion are
material to the cause of the prosecution. These women would be in the best position to say that
Rodriguez had recruited or used these women by giving them payments or benefits in exchange
for sexual exploitation.

Therefore, the sole testimony of PO1 Escober and a photocopy of the marked money is
not sufficient evidence to warrant conviction. To rely solely on the testimony of PO1 Escober as
basis for convicting Rodriguez would run riot against logic and reason, and against the law.

| 291
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

BARE ALLEGATIONS, UNSUBSTANTIATED BY EVIDENCE, ARE NOT EQUIVALENT TO

PROOF

Republic of the Philippines vs. Katrina S. Tobora-Tionglico

G.R. No. 218630, January 11, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the decision of the CA which
affirmed the decision rendered by the RTC- Imus Cavite, Br. 20, granting the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of
Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.

It was alleged that Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he
knew nothing about children and how to run a family. Katrina noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly
dependent on his mother and suffered from a very high degree of immaturity. Lawrence would
repeatedly taunt Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them. When they were
already separated, Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano, who confirmed her
beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. The RTC granted the petition and declared the
marriage of Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio.

Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each and every
case for the nullity is different from the other and must be appreciated for its distinctiveness. She
points out that the psychological report of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and
reliable tests to come up with his findings. In any case, the decision must be based not solely on
the expert opinions but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings, which
the RTC and the CA have found to have been sufficient.

ISSUE:
Can the assessment of the clinical psychologist, without other evidence to substantiate the
same, be relied upon to substantiate the psychological incapacity of the husband?

RULING:
No, the assessment of the clinical psychologist, without other evidence to substantiate the
same, cannot be relied upon to substantiate the psychological incapacity of the husband.

Citing Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064; February 6, 2017, basic is the rule that bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, such that mere allegations
are not evidence.

In this case, although this Court commiserates with Katrina's predicament, the Court is
hard-pressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support
the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other
evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological
incapacity. Here, it should be reiterated that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present
other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her
testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.

Therefore, the assessment of the clinical psychologist, without other evidence to

substantiate the same, cannot be relied upon to substantiate the psychological incapacity of the
husband.

292 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CONVICTION MAY BE ANCHORED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AS LONG AS

SERIES OF CIRCUMSTANCES DULY PROVED ARE CONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER
AND EACH ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED

People of the Philippines vs. Benito Lababo, et al.

G.R. No. 234651, June 8, 2018
Velasco, J.

FACTS:
This is an ordinary appeal from the decision of the CA affirming the RTC’s decision
convicting the accused-appellant Benito Lababo, Wenefredo Lababo, and FFF of the crime of
murder and frustrated murder.

On October 27, 2007, gunshots, accompanied by a child's scream, were heard emanating
from near Benito's house. After such, the victims AAA and BBB were seen lying on the ground,
wounded. While the victims were sprawled on the ground, Benito was seen standing near them,
holding a 29-inch "bardog" together with Wenefredo, FFF, and Junior, all armed with bolos. AAA
died from a single gunshot wound to the back and BBB sustained eight (8) gunshot wounds.

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that despite the fact that there was no eyewitness
to the actual commission of the crime, the combination of the circumstantial evidence points out to
accused-appellants as the perpetrators and conspirators.

ISSUE:
May circumstantial evidence, consisting of a series of circumstances duly proved and
consistent with each other, be sufficient to convict the accused?

RULING:
Yes, circumstantial evidence, consisting of a series of circumstances duly proved and
consistent with each other, may be sufficient to convict the accused.

Jurisprudence holds that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a)

there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

In this case, although none of the witnesses were able to testify on the actual shooting and
BBB was not presented as a witness, still, the prosecution's evidence formed a coherent narration
of the events that transpired that the only logical conclusion thereon is that it was Benito who shot
the two victims. Aside from Benito being seen standing near the sprawled bodies of the victims
while holding a firearm and that the wounds sustained by the victims emanated from a firearm,
there is no evidence that there was another person there who was wielding a firearm and who
could have fired the shots at the victims. Thus, for as long as the prosecution is able to meet the
requirements for a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt anchored purely on circumstantial
evidence, there is nothing to prevent a court from handing out a judgment of conviction.

Therefore, circumstantial evidence, consisting of a series of circumstances duly proved

and consistent with each other, may be sufficient to convict the accused.

| 293
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, IF SUFFICIENT, COULD SUPPLANT LACK OF OR

ABSENCE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE

Celerino Chua Alias Suntay vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
Celerino Chua (Chua) seeks to reverse the decision the CA affirmed his convictions for
carnapping in violation of Republic Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) and for robbery as
defined and punished by Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code handed down by the Regional
Trial Court.

Prosecution witness Teresa Legaspi-Ravago (Teresa) alleged that an armed robbery

occurred in their dwelling. Robbers successfully loaded the stolen items in a stainless type jeep
registered under the name of Teresa’s mother. The robbers were later on identified as Arnold Lato
and Leonardo Reyes They were connected to Chua because the latter reffered the robbers to a
certain Gerry for employment. Another withness alleged that the carnapped stainless jeep came
into his possession after Chua proposed to sell it to him. It was alleged that before Chua went into
hiding, he wrote the Ravagos to keep quiet about the incident, otherwise, harm would befall their
family. Both RTC and CA found Leonardo, Arnold and Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged. Only Chua seeks the reversal of the case.

Chua argued that the CA erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged despite the
insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence

ISSUE:
May sufficient circumstantial evidence supplant the lack or absence of direct evidence and
be the basis to convict the accused?

RULING:
Yes, sufficient circumstantial evidence may supplant the lack or absence of direct evidence
and be the basis to convict the accused.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if the conditions enumerated therein are shown to exist, to wit: Section
4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

In this case, circumstances considered are the following: First, the day before the incident,
Reynaldo Ravago told his compadre about the broker's commission he received in the sale of a
fishpond. Appellant Chua eavesdropped and intently listened to the conversation.
Second, on the day of the robbery, Leonardo and Arnold, the two (2) other accused, asked for the
said broker's commission. Only Celerino Chua could have told Arnold and Leo About said
commission. Third, subsequent to the commission of the crime, Celerino Chua disappeared. He
left the place where he stayed. He hid in his father's house in Malolos Bulacan. Flight in
jurisprudence has always been a strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade
responsibility. Fourth is the sale of the owner type jeep. The seller was Celerino Chua.

Therefore, sufficient circumstantial evidence may supplant the lack or absence of direct
evidence and be the basis to convict the accused.

294 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE MUST SHOW THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED

AND POINT TO THE ACCUSED AS THE PERPETRATOR, TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL
OTHERS; OTHERWISE THERE CAN BE NO CONVICTION

People of the Philippines vs. Gil Ramirez y Suyu

G.R. No. 218701, February 14, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
In his appeal, Gil Ramirez (Ramirez) assails the decision of the CA affirming with
modification the judgment of the RTC, convicting him of rape under Art. 335 of the RPC, violation
of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and attempted rape under par. 1 of Art. 335 of the RPC.

AAA was born to BBB, her mother, and to Ramirez. The records of the case disclosed that
sometime when AAA was still a minor, Ramirez made her inhale a substance which caused her to
lose consciousness. Upon regaining awareness, she noticed that there was blood in her shorts
and that her underwear was no longer worn properly. In another occasion, AAA claimed that
Ramirez began touching her and tried inserting his penis into her vagina, but she fought him off.
Later, Ramirez carried out a few more attempts of similar nature but was unsuccessful. For several
years, AAA suffered in silence out of fear. At 27 years of age, AAA testified against Ramirez.

The CA found no direct evidence of penile penetration. Nonetheless, in upholding the guilt
of Ramirez as to the charge of rape, the CA found several pieces of circumstantial evidence which
constituted evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt: (1) AAA was sleeping in their house; (2)
AAA was awakened when appellant forced her to smell a substance that caused her to lose
consciousness; (3) AAA positively identified appellant as the only person she saw before she lost
consciousness; (4) upon regaining consciousness, there was blood on AAA’s shorts; (5) AAA’s
panty was also reversed; and (6) AAA felt pain in her vagina. AAA testified that based upon these
circumstances, she “presumed that [her] father raped [her].”

ISSUE:
Is circumstantial evidence sufficient to convict when the same does not establish the guilt
of the accused with certainty?

RULING:
No, circumstantial evidence is not sufficient to convict when the same does not establish
the guilt of the accused with certainty.

According to case law, circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a
fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. In
order for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are deprived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with innocence, and the other with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to convict the accused.

In this case, the circumstances cited by the CA did not establish with certainty the guilt of
Ramirez as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of rape was in fact committed or
that he was the perpetrator of the offense charged.

Therefore, the testimony of AAA that she presumed she was raped, and that the accused
was the last person she saw before losing consciousness, sufficient to convict latter.

| 295
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

UNLESS SUBSTANTIATED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF, ALIBI AND DENIAL

ARE NEGATIVE, SELF-SERVING, AND UNDESERVING OF ANY WEIGHT IN LAW

People of the Philippines vs. Eleuterio Bragat

G.R. No. 222180, November 22, 2017
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the CA affirming with modifications the RTC in
convicting Bragat for robbery with rape.

Bragat (appellant) was charged with the special complex crime of robbery with rape.
According to spouses AAA and BBB, appellant and three other companions went inside their house
and tied and asked them where they kept their money. Appellant thereafter raped AAA even if she
was trying to resist him and even told him she had menstruation. After the crime, the spouses
proceeded to Dr. Amadora to have AAA checked and conducted sperm identification. The former
testified in the RTC that the tests yielded negative results because of different factors.

Appellant, on his part contended that during the alleged time of the commission of the
crime, he had just returned the trisikad to his employer’s garage and stayed in his employer’s
house where he stays during weekdays together with two other trisikad drivers. The RTC convicted
appellant with robbery with rape.

ISSUE:
Will the alibi of appellant, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing proof, merit reversal of
his conviction?

RULING:
No, the alibi of appellant, being unsubstantiated by clear and convincing proof, will not
merit his acquittal.

Jurisprudence establishes that absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the
witnesses, a categorical, consistent, and positive identification of the appellant prevails over the
appellant's alibi that "he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime." Unless substantiated by
clear and convincing proof, alibi and denial are negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any
weight in law.

In this case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were sufficient and credible to
sustain the conviction of appellant. Appellant not only failed to discredit the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, but also failed to strengthen his alibi. Appellant did not introduce as
witnesses his alleged companions that night, his employer and the other two trisikad drivers, to
testify that it was physically impossible for appellant to be in the spouses' house because appellant
was with them in another municipality.

Therefore, the alibi of the appellant, being unsubstantiated by clear and convincing proof,
will not merit his acquittal.

296 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

THE WRIT OF AMPARO COVERS EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED

DISAPPEARANCES, OR THREATS THEREOF; NO ENFORCE DISAPPEARANCE IF
STATE ACKNOWLEDGES DETENTION OF PERSON

Lorie Marie Tomas Callo vs. Commissioner Jaime H. Morente

G.R. No. 230324, September 19, 2017
Carpio, Acting C.J.

FACTS:
This case involves a petition for a writ of amparo. Petitioner Lorie Marie Tomas Callo
(Callo) seeks the release of Danielle Tan Parker (Parker) from the Immigration Detention Facility
in Camp Bagong Diwa.

On June 5, 2014, Parker was arrested pursuant to a Summary Deportation Order (SDO)
issued against Danielle Nopuente, also known as Isabelle Nopuente and Danielle Tan Parker for
being a fugitive from justice in the U.S. Parker was not in the list of approved applications of the
DFA for dual citizenship and her American Passport had been revoked by the United States
Department of State. Thus, she was considered an undocumented, undesirable, and overstaying
alien, in violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.On September 12, 2014, Parker filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus but RTC Pasig dismissed it finding that the detention of Parker was
legal by virtue of the SDO. Parker appealed to the CA. CA affirmed the RTC ruling and found that
Parker failed to prove her Filipino citizenship.

On March 23, 2017, Callo filed this petition for writ of amparo arguing that Parker is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, thus, there is no reason for her to be detained by the Bureau of
Immigration.

ISSUE:
Is Parker’s detention and the alleged endangerment of his life, even if the detention is
acknowledged by the Bureau of Immigration, sufficient for the issuance of the writ of amparo?

RULING:
No, Parker’s detention and the alleged endangerment of his life, when the detention is
acknowledged by the Bureau of Immigration, is insufficient for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

Sec. 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC provides that the petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
Elements constituting enforced disappearance as defined under RA No. 9851 were clearly laid
down by this Court: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization's refusal to
acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo
petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection
of the law for a prolonged period of time.

In this case, the elements are not attendant. While there is indeed a detention carried out
by the State through the Bureau of Immigration, there is no refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of freedom or refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Parker because as Callo admits,
Parker is detained in the Immigration Detention Facility of the Bureau of Immigration.

Therefore, Parker’s detention and the alleged endangerment of his life, when the detention
is acknowledged by the Bureau of Immigration, is insufficient for the issuance of the writ of amparo.

| 297
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

RULE ON AMPARO ALLOWS ARCHIVING OF CASES WHEN IMPELLED BY A VALID

CAUSE; AS WHEN INVESTIGATION REACHES IMPASSE DUE TO LACK OF ACTIVE
LEADS

Arthur Balao, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.

G.R. No. 186050 & G.R. No. 186059; August 1, 2017
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
This case brought before the Supreme Court seeks to determine whether to approve the
recommendations of the RTC to archive the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo regarding
the abduction of a certain James Balao considering that the ongoing investigation had reached an
impasse.

The relatives of James Balo filed the aforementioned petition alleging that he was abducted
because of his activist/political leanings as a founding member of the Cordillera People’s Alliance.
RTC granted the petition and ordered the investigation by the AFP and the PNP to determine the
whereabouts and circumstances behind the disappearance of James. Due to the problems
encountered in gathering evidence, the RTC recommended the archiving of the case. The Court
partially adopted the RTC’s recommendations ruling that there was still an active lead worth
pursuing by the PNP.

According to its report, the RTC concluded that the investigation has reached another
impasse for failure to uncover relevant leads and recommended anew to archive the cases, to be
revived upon motion by any of the parties should a significant lead arise. RTC thus asks the Court
to relieve the PNP of its mandate to investigate the matter until new witnesses or relevant evidence
appear or are discovered.

ISSUE:
Should the present amparo case be archived because the investigation is in standstill for
lack of active leads?

RULING:
Yes, the present amparo case should be archived because the investigation is in standstill
for lack of active leads.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC allows archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a valid cause,
such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their lives or to similar analogous
causes that would prevent the court from effectively hearing and conducting the amparo
proceedings. Archiving of cases is a procedural measure designed to temporarily defer the hearing
of cases in which no immediate action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright
dismissal. Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the situation
obtains in which action thereon can be taken.

In this case, the PNP had indeed conducted the required investigation on the angle
presented by Gonzales and further attempted to ascertain the identities of "Uncle John" and Rene"
who are persons of interest in these cases. This notwithstanding, none of the material witnesses,
could provide any information on the identities of these persons, despite having been presented
with various photographs of James and his companions. As such, the investigation of the PNP on
James's case has once more reached an impasse without, this time, any other active leads left to
further pursue.

Therefore, the present amparo case should be archived because the investigation is in
standstill for lack of active leads.

298 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ONLY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF

AMPARO

Gen. Emmanuel Bautista vs. Atty. Maria Catherine Dannug-Salucon

G.R. No. 221862, January 23, 2018
Bersamin, J.

FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners assail the decision promulgated by the
CA granting the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data in favor of respondent Atty. Maria
Catherine Dannug-Salucon (Atty. Salucon). Petitioners herein are the Acting Regional Director of
the Police, Regional Office 2, Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and the chief of staff
of the AFP.

Atty. Salucon's petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data alleged
while she was at a lunch meeting with the relatives of a detained political prisoner client, her
paralegal informed her that he had personally observed that surveillance was being conducted on
them. Thus, he suggested certain security measures for her own protection. She realized the
significance of Bugatti's advice when he was fatally gunned down later that evening. She also
learned that she was being secretly followed by agents of the Intelligence Service of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) and that person looking like military/policemen had been asking
people around her office about her whereabouts and routine.

Petitioners categorically denied respondent's allegations that she was ever under
surveillance by the military and/or police under the command of petitioners' officials. Nevertheless,
the instant Petition for the Issuance of the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data is granted.

ISSUE:
Is substantial evidence, comprising even of hearsay testimony but consistent with
admissible evidence adduced, sufficient to issue the writ of amparo?

RULING:
Yes, substantial evidence, comprising even of hearsay testimony but consistent with
admissible evidence adduced, sufficient to issue the writ of amparo.

This Court has held that the privilege of the writ of amparo may be granted on the basis of
the application of the totality of evidence standard. Such application may extend to the use of
relevant circumstantial evidence. Hearsay testimony that is consistent with the admissible
evidence adduced may also be admitted and appreciated. The petition for the writ
of amparo partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is to be always borne in
mind that such proceeding is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or to allocate liability for damages based on preponderance of evidence, or to
adjudge administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence.

In this case, what the respondent obviously established is that the threats to her right to
life, liberty and security were neither imaginary nor contrived, but real and probable. The gunning
down of her paralegal Bugatti after he had relayed to her his observation that they had been under
surveillance was the immediate proof of the threat.

Therefore, substantial evidence, comprising even of hearsay testimony but consistent with
admissible evidence adduced, sufficient to issue the writ of amparo.

| 299
COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

TO GRANT THE WRIT OF KALIKASAN, THERE MUST BE AN ACTUAL OR

THREATENED VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A HEALTHFUL
AND BALANCED ECOLOGY

Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña vs. Joel Capili Garganera

G.R. No. 231164, March 20, 2018
Tijam, J.

FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari , under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases filed by petitioner Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña, in his capacity as City Mayor of Cebu (Mayor
Osmeña), seeks to reverse the Decision and Resolution of CA granting the privilege of the Writ
of Kalikasan and ordered Mayor Osmeña to permanently cease and desist from dumping garbage
or solid waste at the Inayawan landfill and to to rehabilitate the same.

On April 6, 1993, the DENR issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) to the
Solid Waste Sanitary Landfill Project at Inayawan landfill proposed by the Metro Cebu
Development Project Office (MCDPO). Thereafter, the Inayawan landfill served as the garbage
disposal area of Cebu City. After several years Inayawan landfill was formally closed. In 2016,
however, under the administration of Mayor Margot Osmeña, the Inayawan landfill was re-opened.
On September 6, 2016, the DOH issued an Inspection Report wherein it recommended the
immediate closure of the landfill due to the lack of sanitary requirements, environmental, health
and community safety issues.

On September 23, 2016, Respondent Joel Capili Garganera for and on his behalf, and in
representation of the People of the Cities of Cebu and Talisay and the future generations, including
the unborn filed a petition for writ of kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of a TEPO before the
CA. The CA granted the same.

ISSUE:
Is the re-opening of the Inayawan landfill by Mayor Osmeña, which raises serious
environmental concerns, a sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan?

RULING:
Yes, the re-opening of the Inayawan landfill by Mayor Osmeña, which raises serious
environmental concerns, is a sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan.

Section 1 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the following
requisites must be present to avail of this extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened
violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants
in two or more cities or provinces. The Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of
environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial scope
of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy.

In this case, the record discloses that the City Government's resumption of the garbage
dumping operations at the Inayawan landfill has raised serious environmental concerns. Also, the
air and water quality impact assessment of the EMB Compliance Evaluation Report (CER) made
remarks that the air quality poses a threat to nearby surroundings/habitat while the water quality
poses threat of water pollution.

Therefore, the re-opening of the Inayawan landfill by Mayor Osmeña, which raises serious
environmental concerns, is a sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan.

300 |
 COVERED CASES (JULY 1, 2017 TO JUNE 30, 2018)
ON REMEDIAL LAW

ADR ACT OF 2004 IS A GENERAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ALL CASES RESOLVED

THROUGH ADR

Department of Foreign Affairs vs. BCA Corporation International & Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal
G.R. No. 225051, July 19, 2017
Peralta, J.

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul Procedural Order Nos. 11
and 12, both issued by the UNCITRAL Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal in the arbitration proceedings
between petitioner DFA and respondent BCA International Corporation.

In an Agreement, petitioner awarded the Machine-Readable Passport and Visa Project to

respondent BCA International Corporation. Petitioner then sought to terminate the Agreement.
Respondent opposed the termination and filed a Request for Arbitration. In Procedural Order No.
11, the Tribunal granted respondent's Motion to Admit Attached Amended Statement of Claims on
the premise that respondent would no longer present any additional evidence-in-chief. In
Procedural Order No. 12, the Tribunal decides to allow the submission of additional documentary
evidence by any Party in support of its position in relation to the Amended Statement of Claims.
Petitioner states that 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules grants a tribunal the discretion to deny a
motion to amend.

Petitioner contends that to compel a party to be bound by the application of a different rule
on arbitration such as the ADR Act of 2004 or RA No. 9285 transgresses a vested right and
amounts to vitiation of consent to participate in the arbitration proceedings.

ISSUE:
Do other rules on arbitration, such as the ADR Act of 2004, its IRR, and the Special ADR
Rules, apply in the case despite the agreement of parties to refer any dispute to arbitration under
the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules?

RULING:
Yes. ADR Act of 2004, its IRR, and the Special ADR Rules apply in this case despite such
agreement to refer any dispute to arbitration under the 1976 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.

Arbitration is deemed a special proceeding and governed by the special provisions of RA

9285, its IRR, and the Special ADR Rules. RA 9285 is the general law applicable to all matters
and controversies to be resolved through alternative dispute resolution methods. Under Article 33
of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules governing the parties, "the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law
designated by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute." "Failing such designation
by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of laws rules which
it considers applicable." Established in this jurisdiction is the rule that the law of the place where
the contract is made governs, or lex loci contractus.

In this case, as the parties did not designate the applicable law and the Agreement was
perfected in the Philippines, our Arbitration laws, particularly, RA No. 876, RA No. 9285 and its
IRR, and the Special ADR Rules apply. The IRR of RA No. 9285 provides that "[t]he arbitral tribunal
shall decide the dispute in accordance with such law as is chosen by the parties. In the absence
of such agreement, Philippine law shall apply."

Therefore, our rules on arbitration, such as the ADR Act of 2004, its IRR, and the Special
ADR Rules, shall apply in this case.

| 301
 ABOUTTHEBOOK

Thismat erialiscomposed oft wo (

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