Exceptions to the immutability of final judgments: (G.R. Nos.

180880-81, September 18,

KEPPEL CEBU SHIPYARD, INC. vs. PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY

"Anent the first procedural issue, Pioneer, in essence, faults the Court En Banc when it took
cognizance of the foregoing cases and ordered their reopening in its June 7, 2011 Resolution. It
argues that the decision in the present cases had already become final and, according to the
principle of immutability of judgment, once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable
and unalterable, however unjust the result of error may appear.
The rule is not absolute.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides that the Court En Banc shall act on the
following matters and cases:
(a)cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question;
(b)criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty or reclusion
perpetua;
(c)cases raising novel questions of law;
(d)cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
(e)cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;
(f)cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a judge, the disbarment
of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one year, or a fine
exceeding forty thousand pesos;
(g)cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the reinstatement in the judiciary of a
dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judge's
suspension or a lawyer's suspension from the practice of law;
(h)cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding Justice, or any
Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court;
(i)cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division may be
modified or reversed;
(j)cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
(k)cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
(l)Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on businesses or affects
the welfare of a community;
(m)Subject to Section 11(b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three
Members of the Division who are voting and present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en
banc;
(n)cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention; and
(o)all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of all courts and their
personnel. [Underscoring supplied]

On April 11, 2011, four (4) members of the Court's Second Division found that these cases were
appropriate for referral-transfer to the Court En Banc. Then, on June 7, 2011, the Court En Banc
by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of its members, settled the issue of immutability of judgment when
it accepted the referral, reasoning out that there were serious allegations in the petition that if the
decision of the Court would not be vacated, there would be a far-reaching effect on similar cases.
Verily, "under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land." This rule
notwithstanding, the Court En Banc had re-opened and accepted several cases for review and
reevaluation for special and compelling reasons. Among these cases were Manotok IV v. Heirs
of Homer L. Barque, Apo Fruits Corporation and Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Land Bank of the
Philippines, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, and Navarro v.
Ermita.

In these cases, the exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment was applied in order to
serve substantial justice. The application was in line with its power and prerogative to suspend its
own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it. "The power
to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter
even that which this Court itself had already declared final."

It bears mentioning, however, that when the Court En Banc entertains a case for its resolution
and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering
objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that the nature of the cases calls
for en banc attention and consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken
undue advantage of sheer voting strength. It is merely guided by the well-studied finding and
sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership that, indeed, the subject case is of
sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court. It is, of course,
beyond cavil that all the members of the Highest Court of the land are always imbued with the
noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law, jurisprudence,
rules and resolutions of the Court to the end that public interest be duly safeguarded and the rule
of law be observed.

On the second procedural issue, the rule is that the reviewing court can determine the merits of
the petition solely on the basis of the pleadings, submissions and certified attachments by the
parties. The purpose of the rule is to prevent undue delay that may result as the elevation of the
records of lower tribunals to the Court usually takes time. After all, the parties are required to
submit to the Court certified true copies of the pertinent records of the cases.
In this case, the Third Division of the Court deemed the attachments to the petition and the
voluminous pleadings filed sufficient and, on the basis thereof, ruled on the merits of these cases.

The Court finds no fault in the procedure undertaken by the members of the Division in this
regard. As stated by the Court in its October 20, 2010 Resolution:
Second: The elevation of the case records is merely discretionary upon this Court. Section 8,
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may require the elevation of the complete
records of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice. It also bears
mentioning that, under Section 4(d) of the same rule, the petition for review on certiorari filed
shall be "accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the
judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the court a quo and the
requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would
support the petition." Indeed, with the attachments to the consolidated petitions, the Court
deemed it sufficient to rule on the merits of the case.
At any rate, the records of the cases at bench are now before the Court."