Edna Diago Lhuillier vs British Airways

GR 171092 March 15, 2010

FACTS: On February 28, 2005, petitioner Lhuillier took respondent British Airways’s flight 548 from
London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday, one of
the respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead bin.
However, Halliday allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that "If I
were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I would have a broken back!" Petitioner further alleged that
when the plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan, singled her
out from among all the passengers in the business class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly,
Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of
lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the plane.

Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to respondent’s ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight stewards were "only doing their job;” prompting
petitioner to file herein complaint for damages.

On April 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Complaint for damages against respondent before the RTC of Makati
City. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the
person of the respondent. Respondent alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome,
Italy, have jurisdiction over the complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article
28(1) of which provides that:

“An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of
domicile of the carrier or his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or before the court of the place of destination.”

Petitioner argues that her cause of action arose not from the contract of carriage, but from the tortious
conduct committed by airline personnel of respondent in violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on
Human Relations. Since her cause of action was not predicated on the contract of carriage, petitioner
asserts that she has the option to pursue this case in this jurisdiction pursuant to Philippine laws.

In contrast, respondent maintains that petitioner’s claim for damages fell within the ambit of Article
28(1) of the Warsaw Convention. As such, the same can only be filed before the courts of London,
United Kingdom or Rome, Italy.

The RTC dismissed the case hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over a tortious conduct committed against a
Filipino citizen and resident by an airline personnel of a foreign carrier.

HELD: NO. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In
Santos III v. NOA we held that:

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It
took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its
Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by
 President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government
on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9,
1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201,
declaring our formal adherence thereto, “to the end that the same and every article and clause
thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the
citizens thereof.”

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as
such, has the force and effect of law in this country. The Warsaw Convention applies because the air
travel, where the alleged tortious conduct occurred, was between the United Kingdom and Italy, which
are both signatories to the Warsaw Convention. Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:

“1. This Convention applies to all international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by
aircraft for reward. It applies equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft performed by an air transport
undertaking.

“2. For the purposes of this Convention the expression "international carriage" means any carriage in
which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination, whether or not there be a break in the carriage or a transhipment, are situated either within
the territories of two High Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party,
if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or
authority of another Power, even though that Power is not a party to this Convention. A carriage
without such an agreed stopping place between territories subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of the same High Contracting Party is not deemed to be international for the
purposes of this Convention.”

Thus, when the place of departure and the place of destination in a contract of carriage are situated
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international
carriage". The High Contracting Parties referred to herein (UK and Italy) were the signatories to the
Warsaw Convention and those which subsequently adhered to it. Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before –

1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;

2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business;

3. the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or

4. the court of the place of destination.

In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a British corporation domiciled in London, United
Kingdom with London as its principal place of business. Hence, under the first and second jurisdictional
rules, the petitioner may bring her case before the courts of London in the United Kingdom. In the
passenger ticket and baggage check presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it appears that
the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy. Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the petitioner has
the option to bring her case before the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the petitioner and
respondent aver that the place of destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly designated given the
routing presented in the said passenger ticket and baggage check. Accordingly, petitioner may bring her
action before the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC ofMakati correctly ruled that it does
not have jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.