DSMUN Better Bloc Resolution
DSMUN Better Bloc Resolution
Authors: The Republic of Kenya, The Federal Republic of Germany, The Republic of France
Signatories: Australia, Belgium, Colombia, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Iraq,
Ireland, Kenya, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom,
Vietnam
Reaffirming it’s full commitment to the strengthening of the United Nations Department for
Peacekeeping Operations,
Recalling all relevant and related resolutions and official member state statements on the topic of
issues in the peacekeeping operations,
Recalling in particular the resolution Resolution 2436 (2018) adopted by the Security Council
and their efforts to combat the problems faced within the body,
Fully aware of the honourable efforts by the thousands of United Nations Department for
Peacekeeping Operations personnel and highlighting that UN will not let a few failures tarnish
the achievements of the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations as a whole,
Stressing the importance of finding gaps and loopholes within the mandate and making
recommendations on bridging the gap and solving the loopholes,
Deeply disturbed by the numerous horrifying cases of sexual exploitation that is prevailing and
strongly condemns the same,
Recalling the Resolution 2242 (2015) for bringing to light the necessary role of women in United
Nations peacekeeping operations,
1) Urges member states for formation of specialized mandates for each Peace Operation to
ensure proper and effective implementation , these mandates should be made by a ‘Field
Analysis Unit ‘ under the United Nations Department Of Peacekeeping Forces keeping in
mind regional, socio and geopolitical differences ;
2) Recommends that The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization should be
mandated as the paramount organization for monitoring peace accords and similar
agreements instead of dividing these mandates between different peace operations
causing significant difference in policy conduct and implementation leading to
overlapping mandates and confusion;
3) Recommends ensuring clear definition of PoC objectives based on the strategic mission
framework in all plans of action, including through:
a) Prioritizing PoC in relevant directives, mission concepts, police and force
concepts of operations (CONOPS) and Comprehensive Performance Assessment
System (CPAS),
b) Highlighting the same in Results-based budgeting frameworks (RBB),
mission-specific rules of engagement (ROE) and police directives on use of force
(DUF), statement of unit requirements (SUR),
c) Underlining its importance in the memoranda of understanding with troop and
police contributing countries (T/PCCs) and other mission documents;
4) Further recommends improving training procedures by,
a) Using frameworks to analyse the performance of peacekeepers and including PoC
responsibilities in work ethics guidelines where appropriate to ensure
accountability,
b) Providing practical and context-specific training with reference to PoC for all
personnel and thoroughly investigating and analysing all reports of
underperformance and the implications,
c) Organising field missions and analysing reports to check whether all components
are operationally ready, able and willing to perform their responsibilities to
implement POC mandates and to work to address any gaps,
d) Insisting upon compliance with the Human Rights due diligence policy (HRDDP)
and facilitating the implementation of the same;
5) Recommends that the Secretary-General of the UN considers the creation of a council
which will function in the following capacities,
a) To maintain a State Fragility Index, with three levels of sensitivity ie, Green for
‘No Threat’, Yellow for ‘mild civil and governmental unrest’ and Red for a
situation that warrants the intervention of the UNDPKO, on the consent of the
nation in question,
b) Priority in cooperation between a United Nations mission and the host country
will be given to ensure communication and interaction with the host government,
rather than with the local population and civil society organisation,
c) To serve as a liaison between the government of the nation in question and the
peacekeeping forces of the UNDPKO, to prevent misunderstandings of the
principles of peacekeeping and to eliminate the threat of disrespect of local
cultures and traditions on the part of Peacekeepers,
d) The UNDPKO will maintain an outpost in each of its member nations, similar to
the NCB structure of the INTERPOL in order to have an ear to the ground on the
nations’ current with respect to a situation which could threaten the lives of
civilians and potentially escalate to a multilateral conflict;
6) Recommends that in a post-conflict scenario, after the status of the nation on the
aforementioned Fragility Index remains ‘Green’ for a period of 30 days, the UNDPKO
makes an official statement calling for the recall of the Peacekeeping forces;
7) Reaffirms the reassessing and recalling of troops from stabilized regions such as Haiti ,
Mali and Kosovo missions respectively is the need of the hour, these regions have
become fairly stabilized by still house a significant peacekeeping presence, this shall
allow for these troops to be restationed at regions where there is a shortage of troops and
support staff at vital locations worldwide, all such policy decisions should be carefully
drawn up by the Field Analysis Unit and the report be submitted to the UNSC ;
8) Reaffirms the A4P bulletin of the UN Secretary-General and advocates for,
a) refocus peacekeeping with realistic expectations,
b) make peace operations stronger and safer,
c) mobilize greater support for political solutions and for well-structured,
well-equipped, well-trained forces;
9) Calls upon member nations for mobilization and promotion of active participation of
small nations in support roles like Intelligence , Medical aid and Communications,
a) deploying small groups of military protection experts (including special forces
personnel) to provide intelligence and planning support to larger UN Contingents;
and,
b) offering case-specific training on protection issues, such as understanding local
conflict dynamics in remote areas, for un units deploying to challenging
environments;
10) Encourages UN actors such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
to implement multiple training programs for civilians of host nations in collaboration
with UN bodies such as the United Nations Education Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) on the issues of civil rights and local law in order to improve
post-operational protection of civilians;
11) Calls upon the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in voluntary cooperation with
representatives from of all members of the Security Council acting under the Security
Council Provisional Rules of Procedure, Chapter VI, article 28, to prepare an analysis of
the capacity of Member States to contribute peacekeeping troops focusing on,
a) Review of the history of a Member State and its soldiers prior to the deployment
of Peacekeeping personnel from the respective Member State checking if there is
a history of misconduct and if the troop-contributing Member State has at least
demonstrated significant progress to address these challenges,
b) Financial and technical capabilities of contributing nations in order to assess the
operational capacity and capabilities of the nation in question,
c) Forwarding the analysis of a Member State’s capacity to the Joint Peace
Operations Council leadership who will evaluate how best to use that Member
State’s contributions;
12) Reaffirms promotion of multilateral conventions and agreements like the Effectiveness of
Peace Operations Network (EPON) is to improve research-based knowledge on the
effectiveness of specific peace operations and the impacts they are having on the conflict
systems they are trying to influence,
a) The International Forum for the challenges of Peace Operations (challenges
forum) is a global partnership of 49 organizations and departments in 22 countries
aiming at improving the effectiveness of International Peace Operation;
13) Urges member nations to emphasize for the need for proper legal system frameworks to
hold violators accountable as the current framework only allows for repatriation and
banning at an international level with no legal procedures at the international level;
14) Reaffirms and urges that the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces have to be brought
under the mandate of the ICC for matters of violation, the ICC has mandate over war
crimes ,genocide and other matters of international importance , moreover sexual abuse
according to International Law also comes under its ambit , this shall also not infringe
upon the jurisdiction of contributing nations as the ICC mandates states for intervention
when state frameworks accordingly fail to provide legible support, the ICC’S role as a
court with complementary jurisdiction to national courts means that giving the ICC
jurisdiction over UN Peacekeepers would not take away national jurisdiction but merely
supplement national jurisdiction if countries fail to prosecute Peacekeeper misconduct
domestically under the Rome Statute, it would also be encouraged to hear any case after a
UNSC referral;
15) Reaffirms and urges for active participation in the UN Permanent Reserve Force under
the UNPKO mandate, current mechanisms only allows for deployment after an incident
has occurred, forces have to be arranged for under mandates and agreements, this causes
a lot of legal red tape and an unprecedented delay,
a) Through the PCRS, member states can pledge to have specific units available for
UN Peacekeeping, far in advance of a possible deployment, the UN secretariat
will perform an assessment of the readiness of the personnel, training, and
equipment of those units, select units can also be pledged to the rapid deployment
level of the pcrs and will be made available within 60 days of a request from the
UN Secretary-General,
b) For rapid deployment purposes, creation of a rapid deployment force under the
UNDPKO should be mandated with logistical support from the 3SI multilateral
agreement,
c) Deployment should be approved after quantitative analysis of available resources
and conformation of the same , mandates and specific requirements for
deployment should be reported under the report of an analytical body known as
the “Field Analysis Unit” under the UNDPKO mandate manned by analysts from
member nations and experts in respective fields ;
16) Emphasizes the importance of cross sharing and confidence building measures , updating
of training modules , joint exercises , uniform training for all as well as mental health
trauma response for troops and civilians,
a) creation of a common program of training and conduct for combat situations ,
policing and other areas of peace operations under the UNDPKO to be imparted
to all deployed contingents under the unity pact model of cross sharing to be
formulated by the Field Analysis Unit in its yearly report to suggest reforms to the
existing models of training and operational guides to be updated after the same,
b) rules of engagement and conduct rules should be uniform but flexible enough to
be molded according to geopolitical and socio economic needs;
17) Reaffirms that in accordance with the Brahmi Commission Report, no action or operation
should be mandated by the UNSC without confirmation of availability of resources to
carry out such a mission by the UNDPKO;
18) Emphasizes that once peacekeeping operation has been commenced the SFOA should be
drawn up by the Field Analysis Unit in a such a way that it emphasizes operating freedom
for peacekeeping operations with minimal interference and community building measures
to counter unrest at the grassroots level like Santa Domingo Pact and family
strengthening missions of the UNODC should be implemented in tandem with UNPKF
like done by Delta Contingent in Rwanda ;
19) Emphasizes the High Independent Investigation On Peacekeeping Operations (HIPPO)
understands that generic and template like language of mandates of peace operations
cause a great hindrance to on ground projects, mandates are often generic, and
inconsiderably broad , such as the Monusco which had a staggering 43 agenda items on
its mandate , hence advocates for crisp and concise mandates;
20) Reaffirms the provisions of the WHO and GHO mandate which has formulated a state of
art handbook and training procedure which is open to use for all member nations because
the conflict zones create erratic social communities , sexual abuse in conflict regions
causes both physical and psychological toll on an individual;
21) Emphasizes Stress and Trauma caused from operating in Peacekeeping Missions, mental
health aid to be given under the Supervision under the WHO and Mental Health
professionals,
a) the UNDPKO will maintain a resident psychology/psychiatry team to carry out
monthly psyche evaluations on members of the peacekeeping forces,
b) Community self-help and social support should be strengthened, for example by
creating or re-establishing community groups in which members solve problems
collaboratively and engage in activities such as emergency relief or learning new
skills, while ensuring the involvement of people who are vulnerable and
marginalized, including people with mental disorders,
c) Psychological first aid offers first-line emotional and practical support to people
experiencing acute distress due to a recent event and should be made available by
field workers, including health staff, teachers or trained volunteers,
d) Basic clinical mental health care covering priority conditions (for example
depression, psychotic disorders, epilepsy, alcohol and substance abuse) should be
provided at every health-care facility by trained and supervised general health
staff,
e) Psychological Interventions for people impaired by prolonged distress should be
offered by specialists or by trained and supervised community workers in the
health and social sector,
f) Protecting and promoting the rights of people with severe mental health
conditions and psychosocial disabilities is especially critical in humanitarian
emergencies,
g) Links and referral mechanisms need to be established between mental health
specialists, general health-care providers, community-based support and other
services (for example schools, social services and emergency relief services such
as those providing food, water and housing/shelter);
22) Recommends that the membership to the UNDPKO is contingent on, to the best of their
abilities, military and monetary support to the organisation by member states, each
member will be granted one vote and conventions will be presided over by an
independently appointed panel, consisting of 11 members total, with 2 representatives
from OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), Amnesty
International, ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), the World Health
Organisation, INTERPOL and the Secretary-General of the United Nations;
23) Calls for The Budgetary division of the UNDPKO to be held responsible for the
collection and redistribution of monetary contribution, resource management for an
active mission and accounting, to eliminate misappropriation of funds,
a) The UNDPKO will convene once every 6 months, to discuss budget allocations,
military training statuses, and deliver updates with respect to current missions;
24) Encourages the setting up of neutralised zone in disputed areas pursuant to Article 15 of
the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time Of War
with mutual agreement upon the free flow of humanitarian aid and necessities to civilians
and those deemed to be hors de combat;
25) Establishes an internal accounting department within the DPKO called the Peacekeeping
Civilian Complaint Office(PCCO) that will report to the United Nations Secretariat and
the Security Council, and is responsible for receiving complaints from civilians/victims
and responding to them, in the following ways ,
a) The establishment of an open communication pathway with the committee and
the host nations to allow for all complaints to come through fast and efficiently to
be processed and investigated,
b) Submitting reports and recommendations on a monthly basis to the United
Nations Security Council based on any complaints that are reported,
c) The establishment of international legislature that tries any proven offenders from
the peacekeeping forces,
d) Creating and storing data on any and all peacekeeping operations, specifically in
regards to training and conduct with a focus on tracking the impact of the new
accountability measure on the number of crimes against host civilians in close
collaboration with the Office on Internal Oversight of the United Nations and the
United Nations Peacekeeping Resource Hub;
26) Recommends the creation of a specialized , independent and effective investigative body
has to be formulated to replace the OIOS which is is effectively controlled by the same
senior management that it is supposed to investigate for wrongdoing hence ineffective,
legal precedent of Procurement Task Force (PTF) can be invoked to form a truly well
mandated and independent body with field branches to investigate misconduct and
provide these branches with an investigative function to effective replace the field
conduct and discipline office, with the collaboration of the documented reports by the
CJO ;
27) Encourages increasing the number of female peacekeepers internationally, especially to,
a) Fill the gap when male peacekeepers are unable to transcend cultural and social
barriers to build trust with displaced women and children who are often victims of
sexual abuse and violence and,
b) For establishing rapport with the local population — not only for intelligence
gathering but also to implement early warning systems, and conduct capacity
building,
c) Recommends that countries would be encouraged to employ and grant
membership to a larger number of female military personnel with the goal of
increasing the total number of women in the military aspect of the PKF to
approximately 34%.