AN ANALYSIS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY:

The Evolution of Political Paranoia

Michael Sinclair

OCCASIONAL PAPER GELEENTHEIDSPUBUKASIE

DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE INSTITUUT IAN INTERNASIONALE AANGELEENTHEDE

THE SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
Michael Sinclair is lecturer in the Department of International Relations
at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. Dr Sinclair obtained
his MA degree cum laude from the University of Pretoria and Ph.D from the
University of Leicester. He is Editor of the South African Journal of
Political Science and Chairman of the Study Group on Internal Relations.
Dr Sinclair has contributed to several academic publications, his primary
research interest being political decision-making processes.

It should be noted that any opinions expressed In this article are the
responsibility of the author and not of the Institute.
 AN ANALYSIS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

THE EVOLUTION OF POLITICAL PARANOIA

Michael Sinclair

ISBN : 0 908371 11X

The South African Institute of International Affairs

Jan Smuts House
P 0 Box 31596
BRAAMFONTEIN
2017

April 1983
THE FUNDAMENTALS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

At independence in 1960, the Nigerian state represented a contrived federal

balance between three ethnically and politically divided federal states.
The political rivalry and tension between the three factions precluded the
evolution of any specific 'Nigerian ideology or doctrine* and the emergence
of any single charismatic national leader (33 was the case in most other
emergent African states) who could be identified as the 'voice of Nigeria'.

Thus, the characteristic conservatism of Nigerian foreign policy at

independence, often interpreted as weakness or lack of sovereignty (Prime
Minister Balewa was patronisingly , referred to as the "golden voice of
Africa"), is more realistically ascribed to the uncertainty of the Nigerian
political leadership* s domestic political footing. In formulating foreign
policy the leadership elite was faced with the dilemma of internal disunity
and a patently contrived and unstable federal political balance. In order
to bridge the cleavage between internal dlvisiveness and the wider notion
of 'Nigerlanism', the political leadership (in view of the lack of any
characteristic or cohesive Nigerian nationalism) sought to project
Nigeria's external objectives into a wider pan-Africanist framework.

An 'African consciousness' (far stronger than any 'Nigerian consciousness')

had been a motivating force of the pre-independence nationalist movement
and was thus a major influence in the political leadership's ideological
perception and socio-political experience. The inability of the leadership
to draw upon any national value hierarchy or national objective in the
formulation of an international 'role' which would enjoy the united support
of the Nigerian nation (and, thereby, consolidate the domestic political
stability), made a close commitment to the more abstract, and less
domestically sensitive, continental whole Inevitable.

Nigeria's declared policy motivation, as a result, was scarcely distingui-

shable from that of Africa as a whole :

"... Nigeria is an African nation, it is part and parcel of

that continent of Africa and therefore it is so completely
involved in anything that pertains to that continent that it
cannot be neutral and must never be considered as a
neutralist country ... We are independent in everything but
neutral in nothing that affects the destiny of Africa".^)

At independence the Nigerian political leadership elite was made up of an

alliance of conservative political parties.(2) While there is no doubt as
to the perception of the international role which the Nigerian leadership
considered the country predestined and ably endowed to play, such
perceptions were only asserted with any measure of conviction in the
domestic constituency.

Africa has replaced the Middle East as the mediator between

East and We3t In world affairs. I think ... there will be a
vacuum unless it Is filled with some Idea, and the idea we
suggest Is militant pan-Africanism, a union of African
peoples. People say that leadership Is the birthright of
this country ...(^) * •

... Nigeria ... is the largest single unit in Africa ...

(and so) must lead Africa ... and we are not going to
abdicate the (leadership) position in which God Almighty has
placed us.(4)
 - 2-

Nigeria is dest Ined to lead Africa ... black Africa as a

whole to the total emancipation of all our p e o p l e s ^

... if we appear well meaning to the countries of Africa,

there is no reason why they should not give us our recognisd
position by virtue of our size and population ..."(6)

Statements of foreign policy were vague and unspecific as to Nigeria's

aspired role in the external environment and centred on the notion of
"pursuit of the national interest" which, although repeatedly referred to
as the sole parameter of Nigerian external interaction, remained undefined
and intangible.

In formulating its policy for the conduct of foreign

affairs, the Federal Government recognises that its primary
duty is to safeguard and promote the interests of the
Federation and of its citizens. We have already declared
our intention of applying to join both the Commonwealth and
the United Nations ... we shall nevertheless have a free
hand to select those policies' which we consider to be most
advantageous for Nigeria, subject always to our belief in
the principles of the United Nations.

We shall, of course, endeavour to remain on friendly terms

with every nation which respects and recognises our
sovereignty, we shall not blindly follow the lead of anyone
... We consider it wrong for the Federal Government to
associate itself as a matter of routine with any of the
power blocs. Our policies ... will be founded on Nigeria's
interests, and will be consistent with the moral and
democratic principles on which our constitution is based.(')

The vague and abstract nature of the stated policy objectives may be seen
as an attempt to transpose the inherently conservative Nigerian nationalist
objectives ("sovereignty", "self-reliance", "equality") to the wider
African and global plane and thereby formalize the image which the Nigerian
leadership elite perceived as being rightfully Nigerian, but lacked the
ideological wherewithal to reinforce-

This Inability to create an ideological or doctrinal linkage between the

Nigerian leadership's perception of the country's predestined leadership
role in Africa and its perception of the external environment may be
abscribed principally to the constraints of internal instability. However,
on a secondary level, we argue first, that the leadership elite perceived
their foreign policy options to be limited by a degree of historical
determinism, which dictated a strong practical (economic) and psychological
commitment to Britain (and by extension, the West). In the post-
independence 'Cold-War' milieu, this fact compromised any doctrinaire
devotion to non-alignment. Secondly, that newly independent Nigeria found
itself curiously isolated In West African regional terras, in as much as its
natural ally, Ghana, under Nkrumah, was politically opposed to the Nigerian
Government and in collusion with opposition political factions.

Moreover, the Nigerian leadership (being a conservative Alliance) was

ideologically opposed to, and resented the vociferous recalcitrance of
Nkruraah. Kwame Nkruraah, and to a lesser degree Mobida Keita of Mali and
Sekou Toure of Guinea, by means of the rhetoric of intransingence, had
effectively usurped the political leadership in Africa, and thus
constrained Nigeria in its foreign policy options.
 - 3 -

Furthermore, Nigeria perceived itself to be surrounded by francophone

states, which presented a threat to the leadership's perception of
Nigeria's "predestined leadership role in Africa"; first, in that these
states formed a cohesive bloc in their close identification with France,
and secondly, because France, under de Gaulle, was seeking to carve out a
world role for itself free of British or American influence* and this
conflict of interests between the metropolitan powers evoked a degree of
polarization and antagonism between their African spheres of influence.

Thus, it is clear that the policy imperatives for the post-independence

Nigerian leadership were twofold : (a) the need to exert Nigerian
independence and thus maintain a modicum of credibility with (if not
leadership of) the emergent African states; and (b) the need to focus the
national objective on an issue which would unite the support of all
Nigerians and provide a distraction from the domestic rivalry in a singular
national purpose and commitment. The issues of southern Africa in general
and apartheid in particular (dramatised by the March 1960 Sharpeville
shootings and the disintegration of the Central African Federation)
provided a propitious distraction. The apartheid issue presented Nigeria
(and indeed, the rest of Africa) with the opportunity to consolidate the
concept of the national interest and the self-image.

The issues of southern Africa/apartheid served to create a 'tangible' focus

for the diplomatic energies of those African states struggling to come to
terms with the realities of their domestic and international post-colonial
predicaments; it served to structure the African continental value
hierarchy and continental objective, and to internationalise the "African
condition".

The apartheid issue has permeated every facet of international intercourse

and, through the cumulative nature of diplomacy, has become the antithesis
of accepted international morality. The African continent (as the collec-
tive victim of the stigma of apartheid) is able to pose as the 'world
conscience 1, as the central focus of the international abhorrence at this
moral deviance. The fact that racial policies in South Africa have been of
such sustained international salience (as opposed to the relative disregard
for other instances of repression around the world) is due to the symbolism
of the racially oppressive, anti-libertarian, anti-African image of South
Africa in evoking everything which is contrary to African (as a cohesive
continental unit) values and ojectives. In short, the focus of apartheid
has provided a continental unity of values, objectives and purposes over
and above communal and nationalist interests. This degree of superficial
cohesiveness has given the African-bloc states a degree of influence in
international affairs largely inconsonant with their de facto capabilities.

Evidence would suggest that, while the southern African dilemma and the
system of apartheid was initially perceived by the emergent African states
as a threat to "... the African objective and vision of a new Africa, free
and defiant",(s) this perceived threat has come to offer some considerable
opportunity for manifesting African unity and projecting the African
condition into the forefront of International politics. Through this
influence, Africa in general has gained a considerable degree of
international leverage in the International system. Paradoxically
apartheid has in fact become the Instrument of "African freedom and
deviance".

The above argument is of direct relevance to an analysis of Nigerian

foreign policy since Nigeria is the epitome of the African experience.
 - 4

Over time, the linkage between threat and opportunity perceived in the
southern Africa/apartheid issue has been established as the fundemental
tenet of Nigeria's international role. The southern Africa/apartheid issue
is perceived as posing a sufficiently credible threat to the national
objective as to provide the opportunity for direct linkage between the
indignities of apartheid and the imperative of national unity (and on the
wider plane, African unity), the instability of which is historically a
real threat to national capability.

Through the process of cumulative diplomacy the precepts of Nigerian

external policy have evolved from the abstract and vague to the assertive
and specific. Over the 23 years since Nigerian independence there have
been only peripheral changes (most notably in terms of economic and
military capability), the basic imperatives remain unchanged. That is to
say; (a) the need to manifest and maintain domestic political stability and
national unity (most forcibly underscored by the experience of the civil
war); and (b) the need to exert its "predestined" leadership role in
Africa, in accord with pan-Africanist sentiment and objectives.

Since independence Nigeria has been engaged in the struggle to come to

terras with the legacy of its historical development, colonial circumstance
and contemporary socio-political precepts. We have argued that, in seeking
to come to terms with the realities of this predicament, Nigeria has
consciously sought to manifest a perceptional image of national unity that
concurrently shields the domestic stability from external demands and
maximizes the country's imporance in African affairs (and by implication,
world affairs).

Historically, Nigeria has been intimately involved in the main trends of

the African continent. As Stremlau has suggested :

Nigeria's self-avowed political interests related almost

exclusively to the changing conditions in Africa. In the
broadest sense, Nigerian leaders viewed their country's
international prestige as a function of the extent to which
Nigeria was considered a leader of black Africa.(")

After a considerable part of Africa had gained Its Independence of

colonialism, drives for continental unity among the newly Independent
African states, primarily in an effort to manifest and preserve their
sovereignty in an International political environment characterized by
radical super-power polarity, once again gathered momentum. Nigerian
foreign policy-makers have consistently worked to ensure that irredentist
and secessionist forces in Africa were contained within the existing
territorial boundaries of post-independence Africa. To this end, Nigeria's
political leaders played an active role in negotiating the pan-African
alliance that became the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In contrast
to the more radical leaders of the time, Nigeria sought an alliance that
would protect the territorial integrity of these fragile states and provide
at least a diplomatic weapon against any attempts from within or outside
the region to alter the status quo by means of wars of aggression or
subversion.

The right of self-determination does not apply, in Nigeria's view, to the

ethnic groups within member-states of the OAU, but only to insurgents
against colonial or White minority rule. Prior to the outbreak of the
1967-70 civil war over Biafran secession, Nigerian leaders were careful not
to interfere In the domestic affairs of other African states; despite the
 _ c _

carefully nurtured image of Nigeria as fGiant of West Africa*, there was no

effort to establish regional hegemony.

It is not surprising that Nigeria's role in external affairs prior to the

civil war has been projected as one of diplomatic correctness. Besides the
fact that the Nigerian political leadership was politically conservative
several other factors delimited the options : historically determined links
with Britain (and by extension, the West), internal political instability,
a perception of regional isolation and Ghanaian hostility, and signifi-
cantly, the fact that while Nigeria had considerable apparent economic
potential (in 1963 the population of Nigeria was 22% of that of all
Africa), it remained economically and militarily underdeveloped and
dependent on the export of agricultural products, primarily to the British
market. Furthermore, Nigeria possessed no characteristic, dynamic
leadership, and at a time when 'leadership in Africa1 was measured In terms
of personalized extrovert recalcitrance, the apparent conservatism in
Nigeria's pre-civll war foreign policy Is understandable.

This assertion Is borne out by the following outline of Nigeria's African

policy as stated by the Nigerian foreign minister :

(a) 'Policies must be clear and practicable, not fatuous or

sentimental or designed to soothe people* s nerves or for
propaganda purposes'. (b) Help would be offered to any
African state to solve its problems, but the help must be
solicited and unpubliclzed. (c) Promotion of cultural and
economic links with Africa, (d) Territorial boundaries must
be respected to avoid chaos and bloodshed. (e) No
interference in the Internal affairs of others so as to
prevent 'unrest and harm to the overall plan for the future
unity of the African continent' ...(1^)

The Nigerian civil war marked the end of the euphoric post-Independence
phase in African policies. During this time International prestige was
measured in degrees of diplomatic intransigence and strong expression of
sentiments of doctrinaire pan-African unity. The bitter rivalry evoked by
the Nigerian civil war dispelled illusions of pan-African unity and the
amicable settlement of disputes, thus ushering in a more pragmatic phase In
African politics.

During this phase the primacy of national Interests, personal diplomacy and
the manifest continental leadership vacuum were to be the salient para-
meters of policy. The authority and credibility of the OAU had been
severely tarnished. Similarly, Nigerian military rulers were faced with a
crisis of political confidence and authority both internally (in their
ability to maintain political stability and order) and In the external
environment. Nigerian leaders had been alarmed by the recognition accorded
the Biafran secessionists by Tanzania, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Zambia, and
perceived the Internationalization of the Issue as a manifestation of neo-
colonlalist designs aimed at disrupting African unity.( 11 )

In order to consolidate the tenuous national unity and to regenerate the

credibility and cohesiveness of the OAU, the Nigerian leadership embarked
on an assertive foreign policy, with Gowon visiting 20 African states
between 1970 and 1973 - including the four deviants. In a reconciliatory
gesture to Zambia, which had led the bid in the OAU to recognize the
Biafran secession, Nigeria sent $750 000 to compensate that state for the
closing of its border with Rhodesia.(12) Gowon warned : "... the enemies
 - 6 -

of African freedom fighters, particularly Portugal, and the racist minority

regimes of South Africa, and Rhodesia ..." that Nigeria planned to take the
offensive-C1^)

Besides the domestic rationale for seeking to externalize Nigerian

political objectives, the Nigerian leadership recognized that the perceived
threat of African disunity would damage Africa's credibility in interna-
tional affairs and Nigeria's role as leader of the continent. Thus
Nigerian rulers indulged in forceful rhetoric, the perennial substance of
which was southern Africa/apartheid.

Gowon committed his country to :

.*. support all people engaged in the struggle to rid their

land of colonialism and racism especially in such parts of
Africa as Angola, Mozambique and Namibia ...(*•*)

Whether Africa will find an effective and independent role

to play in the new international relationship, and whether
Nigeria can prove its worth so that the black man is treated
with dignity throughout the world : these are the problems
that should be engaging our attention . ..(l*)

Those who perceive the disaster in South Africa in terms of

ideological conflict are either missing the point or
deliberately confusing the issues ... our peoples and their
leaders are driven by three main motives : the inalienable
right to self-determination; the necessity for a decent
life; and the unquestionable demand for human dignity. In
the attainment of these objectives, whoever supports Africa
would be her friend, but those who for whatever reasons
twist and turn our purpose for immediate and selfish gains
would not qualify for our respect, least so, our
company.(*•")

In reviewing Nigeria's continental role it is evident that the linkage

between the domestic constituency (the need to maintain national unity and
stability) and the desire to exert a leadership role within Africa, pre-
determines policy action. However, Nigeria is more likely to take
idiosyncratic Initiatives when the issue proffers a greater opportunity to
maximize the dictates of the former. When the opportunity to consolidate
the domestic constituency Is less great, Nigeria has consistently preferred
to universalize the perceived threat (African solidarity, neo-colonialism,
imperialism, etc) in an endeavour to orchestrate and consolidate the
continental reaction, and to act in concert with a wider, more abstract
constituency.

Thus, for example, the first opportunity after the civil war for Nigeria to
galvanize the tenuous African unity and to dramatize the threat of neo-
colonialism, was the alleged (and at any rate very short-lived) invasion
during December 1970 of Guinea by Portuguese armed forces. At the
initiative of Nigeria an extra-ordinary session of the OAU Council of
Ministers was convened at Lagos. Simultaneously, the Defence Commission
convened in Addis Ababa and Nigeria renewed the call for the establishment
of an African High Command to defend African states in the front-line of
the 'liberation offensives'.
 — 7 —

Similarly, in 1971 Nigeria determined to secure, from the OAU Council of

Ministers, a declaration condemning South Africa's 'dialogue policy1 and
forbidding member-states from taking up the South African dialogue
initiative so as to maintain a united OAU opposition. So too, Nigeria led
initiatives to reconcile the OAU member-states who were in favour of those
against the seating of the representative of the Amin regime at OAU
conferences during the first half of 1971.

Ironically, Nigeria which itself had been so reluctant to accept OAU

mediation endeavours has, since the civil war, actively encouraged
continental belligerents to submit to OAU mediation : the Guinea-Senegal
border dispute, the 1971 Arab-Israeli conflict, the civil war in Sudan,
tribal massacres in Burundi, recurring border clashes between Tanzania and
Uganda, conflict between Equitorlal Guinea and Gabon, and the conflict
between Morocco and Mauritania over the Spanish Sahara.

As Nigerian economic prosperity, based on the fortunes of crude oil, began

to increase, Nigeria sought to assert itself economically and to
consolidate African economic co-operation. (By mid-1972 Nigeria had
bilateral trade agreements with 25 African states.) Nigeria was severely
critical of the terms of the Yaounde Convention governing terras of trade
between Africa and the EEC. Nigeria perceived in the reverse preference
granted EEC countries and tariff and non-tariff barriers, restrictions on
African economic co-operation and development.

Thus, prompted by the projected accession of Britain, Denmark and Eire to

the EEC in January 1973, Nigeria brought together trade ministers from all
African, Caribbean and Pacific Island states (ACP), during 1973, to forge a
unified position on their relationship with the EEC (meetings were held in
Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa and Lagos before unanimity was agreed).
Negotiations between the ACP and EEC were protracted over a two-year period
and culminated in the signing of the so-called Lome Convention in February
1975. The main objective of the Convention is to promote trade between the
contracting parties, taking account of their respective levels of
development, and the need to secure additional benefits for the trade of
ACP states, so as to accelerate the rate of growth of their trade and
improve the conditions of access of their products to the markets of the
EEC. The EEC guarantees access to its markets of a wide range of ACP
products (96% of ACP products) in return for "most favoured nation
treatment" in EEC trade with the ACP states.( 17)

That General Gowon should be deposed while attending the summit of the OAU
Heads of State at Kampala in July 1975, is more than coincidental and
reflects the leadership's ever greater concern with external affairs as the
Internal political situation became more unsettled and unmanageable. The
foreign minister of the new regime assessed the symptoms as follows :

... our external image was based on two things - the former
Head of State himself, because he toured extensively, and
oil. Those were the two things for which Nigeria was well
known In the past few years ... I think that as we bring
discipline Into our national life, as we pursue good
economic and political policies, and as the country .attains
the greatness which is due to it, our external image will
improve.(*°)

Nigeria was once again In a state of political crisis. Fortuitously,

however, a dramatic turn of events presented the Nigerian leadership with
 — 8 —

an opportunity to consolidate domestic political unity and to reassert

Nigeria's position in African politics.

The Nigerian government had, historically, refused to recognise any one of

the three (UNITA/MPLA/FNLA) liberation movements engaged in the civil war
in Angola in the wake of the withdrawal of the Portuguese colonial
authority. During the latter part of 1975, Southern Angola was invaded by
South African armed forces (as surrogates of the United States) in support
of the UNITA/FNLA forces against the MPLA forces, which were receiving
large-scale assistance from Cuba and the USSR. The Nigerian government,
almost immediately, recognised the MPLA as the governing authority in
Angola, and embarked on a concerted diplomatic effort among OAU
member-states to evince African support for an MPLA government and the
Nigerian stand.

We in Nigeria are committed to the total liberation of the

whole of Africa and we will not fold our hands to see our
brothers and sisters in Angola subjugated, exploited and
recolonised by the racialists and imperialists in South
Africa and their supporters.(^)

The domestic linkage in the Nigerian stand on the Angolan issue is clearly
discernible from the following statement by the Nigerian Head of State :

In an issue like Angola, our national interest has been made

quite clear and that is the liberation of Angola and
Africa. The Federal Military Government has made a
determined effort to pursue what it considers the correct
line of action and it is gratifying to see the extent of
national consensus and agreement on this subject.(™)

The Angolan crisis marked the end of the general dearth of diplomatic
initiative characteristic of African politics during the early seventies.
In mustering majority support for the Nigerian initiative, the OAU had been
seen to act decisively and abide by its decision in the face of
considerable (particularly US) international pressure; it marked a
significant shift from the display of continental disunity and organisa-
tional incapacity in the Nigerian civil war crisis, and Nigeria took full
advantage of the high level of national and continental unity which the
Angolan issue evoked. The Nigerian leadership unequivocally declared
Nigeria's commitment to the emancipation of Africa :

... especially Southern Africa where the entire world is

convinced that problems created by racial injustice are fast
threatening the peace and shared goodwill of the human race
. •. The style of Nigerian foreign policy today is,
therefore, determined largely by these two unambiguously
articulated factors : African solidarity and an unflinching
adherence to the principles of non-alignment. Nigeria's new
posturng has emerged as a realistic approach to the
prevailing structure and condition of the international
community. Nigeria has, therefore, come to the conclusion
that essential steps must be taken toward creating an
African solidarity, an inter-African consensus without which
Africa would not overcome its numerous post-colonial and
neo-colonial problems, without which social stability and
economic viability will continue to elude a greater part of
the continent.(21)
 - 9 -

Nigeria subsequently has consciously sought to project an image of

r e l i a b i l i t y and high political/diplomatic morality (verging on the notion
of 'continental matchmaker' or 'honest-broker*), exemplified by the
intrusion of Nigerian 'good offices' in sundry continental mediation
endeavours; most notably between Angola and Zaire during the invasion of
the Shaba Province of Zaire by Katangese rebels during 1977; the Lancaster
House negotiations on independence for Zimbabwe; the conflict in the
Western Sahara and the c i v i l war in Chad.

Through the cumulative process of diplomatic and p o l i t i c a l precedent, t h i s

notion of Nigeria the 'honest-broker' in African p o l i t i c s has become
virtually inseparable from Nigeria the 'continental leader*. Thus
President Shehu Shagari sumtned-up his administration's foreign policy
objectives for the 1980s as follows :

Africa remains the cornerstone of Nigeria's Foreign Policy.

My Administration is committed to the cause of the total
liberation of Africa and the abolition of racism in a l l i t s
manifestations. We shall neither relax nor relent until a l l
Africans and a l l black men are free. It should be
understood that political freedom is not complete without
economic and cultural freedom. My Administration's Domestic
Policy for peace, unity and s t a b i l i t y in Nigeria t r a n s l a t e s ,
at the f i r s t instance, into being good neighbours . * .
Nigeria stands for African unity.

Let me state in categorical terras that freedom and unity in

Africa will contribute to Third World solidarity as well as
to international peace and co-operation. To t h i s extent,
Nigeria will play more active roles in mediatory efforts
within the international community, always fulfilling its
due obligations and responsibilities, within the
international system.(")

Of fundamental significance in the pursuit of Nigerian foreign policy

objectives, after the c i v i l war, was the consolidation of a regional
support base. The significance of t h i s fact was underscored by the
Nigerian suspicion of "neo-colonialist complicity" in seeking to undermine
the allegiance of Nigeria's neighbours and, thereby, Nigerian national
sovereignty. More ostensibly though, Nigerian a t t i t u d e s to regional
interaction were influenced by :

(a) the perceived need for Nigeria to re-establish its

credibility within the continental system; and

(b) the projected entry of Britain (Nigeria's principal

trading partner) into the EEC, an event perceived as
constituting some disadvantage for Nigerian economic
development, in the loss of trading preference and
benefits previously extended Nigeria by Britain.

Regional relations were thus characterized by both economic and p o l i t i c a l

imperatives and were conducted on two l e v e l s . First on the level of
unilateral personal diplomacy; between 1970 and 1973 Gowon made official
v i s i t s to a l l Nigeria's immediate neighbours, signing b i l a t e r a l trade and
friendship t r e a t i e s and seeking to re-establish Nigerian bona-fides in the
wake of what was perceived by most of Nigeria's neighbours as a brutal
war. The second level was characterized by attempts on the part of Nigeria
 - 10 -

to "woo" West African states Into a regional economic agreement for the
harmonization of economic policies, trade liberalization and the joint co-
ordination of economic development. In this raanouevering Nigeria nurtured
the notion of "leader among equals" rather than offensively preponderant.

The successful ACP/EEC Initiative set a precedent for negotiation and co-
operation between francophone and anglophone states which Influenced a
measure of confidence in the proposal for a West African regional
grouping. The concept was eventually formalized in the so-called "Lagos
Treaty", thus bringing into being the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) in May 1975.

The Community's principal objective was stated In the promotion of

co-operation and development In all fields of economic activity and the
gradual economic integration of the region.. The member-states agreed to
evolve gradually common policies in the areas of transport, communications,
energy and the exploitation of mineral resources; and to co-operate In the
fields of research, training, agricultural processing and marketing,
forestry, animal husbandry and fisheries.

There shall be progressively established in the course of a

transitional period of fifteen years from the definitive
entry into force of this Treaty ... a Customs Union among
the Member States. Within this Union customs duties or
other charges with equivalent effect on Imports shall be
eliminated. Quota, quantitative or like restrictions or
prohibitions and administrative obstacles to trade among the
Member States shall also be removed. Furthermore, a common
customs tariff In respect of all goods imported into the
Member States from third countries shall be established.(")

The principal governing institution of the Community is vested in an

"Authority of Heads of State and Government". As the ultimate executive
organ, the Authority directs and controls the performance of the executive
functions of the Community for the progressive development of the Community
and the achievement of Its objectives. A Council of Ministers, consisting
of two representatives of each member-state Is directly responsible to the
Authority. Although the Council of Ministers Is empowered to give
direction to all subordinate institutions of the Community, its proposals
to the Authority, regarding matters of Community policy are advisory and
the Authority is apparently under no obligation to accept them. Other
institutions include the Executive Secretariat, the Tribunal of the
Community, a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development (FCCD),
and four Technical and Specialized Commissions grouped as follows ; (i)
Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission; (II)
Industry, Agriculture and Natural Resources Commission; ( H i ) Transport,
Telecommunications and Energy Commission; (Iv) Social and Cultural Affairs
Commission. ^

The primary objective and raison d'etre of ECOWAS Is clearly regional

economic advancement. From an economic point of view, the development of
the smaller and poorer states as well as the larger states within the West
African region can best be facilitated within such a co-operative economic
union. The immediate advantages are : (a) the larger market for the
products of member-states; (b) the extended infra-structural facilities;
(c) complimentary raw material access; (d) the stimulation of regional
economic activity; (e) the increase In Investment potential; (f) an
Increase In industrial processing and capacity; (g) the raising of levels
 - 11 -

of national income. Nigeria as the predominant economic power in the

region stands to benefit more from the Increased markets and stimulated
economic activity than the other member-states. (This despite the fact
that Nigeria contributes 30% of the ECOWAS budget, the contributions being
estimated on the basis of GDP and per capita income,) However, in terms of
Nigerian role perception, we argue that ECOWAS Is primarily of political
significance and that the Nigerian leadership perceives ECOWAS, in the
long—terra, as a potential continental and international political actor,

Nigerian leadership has, since independence, been afflicted with a

perception of regional insecurity and Insularity. This was Initially
manifest in perceptions of French inspired francophone hostility and the
blatant Ghanaian endeavours to undermine Nigerian national sovereignty
during the early years of independence. Such insecurity was realised
during the Nigerian civil war, when the possibility of neighbouring states
aiding the secessionist forces became a reality. This element of sustained
regional insecurity In the perceptional image of the Nigerian leadership
was perceived to constitute a direct threat to the maximization of the
primary objectives of national unity and predestined continentlal
leadership. Nigeria perceived in its regional environment a threat to Its
national sovereignty, inspired by a desire (•propagated by neo-
coloniallsts') among Its regional neighbours to undermine Nigerian actual
and potential influence, both regionally and contlnentally. The linkage
between Nigeria's primary objectives and its perceived regional insecurity
has characterized Nigerian regional Interaction since Independence, and
both this linkage, and the need to consolidate the Nigerian regional
support/interest base, became increasingly more profound, until they
reached crisis proportions In the uncertainties of the civil war period.

Nigeria emerged from the civil war militarily and economically

preponderant, but still vulnerable to regional antagonism and the potential
of neighbouring states to undermine Nigerian national unity (the Nigerian
Achilles heel) together with the linkage between national unity and aspired
continental leadership- The Nigerian leadership was mindful of the role of
the concerted Zambian, Tanzanlan, Kenyan and Ugandan diplomatic Initiative
in Internationalizing the Nigerian civil war, as well as the inability of
the OAU to manage the crisis In an effective way. The consolidation of the
Nigerian regional constituency became Imperative, both for the security of
Nigerian territorial integrity (In April 1978, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol on
Non-Aggression, recognising Inter alia, the inviolability of national
borders and guaranteeing the non-aggressive intentions of member-states)
and the maintenance of national unity, and as a base from which to project
Nigerian continental leadership ambitions. In aspiring to the role of
continental leader, the Nigerian leadership has perceived the need for the
country to be seen to represent a wider constituency and support base
within the continent vis-a-vis other continental factions and regional
groupings (de facto or psychological). The perception of Nigeria as the
leader of the largest African regional organisation is of self-evident
significance to Nigerian continental leadership credentials. Herein lies
the primary significance of ECOWAS, namely, that the Nigerian leadership
perceives in ECOWAS a base for the projection of continental role
objectives. It is possible to envisage ECOWAS forming a cohesive political
bloc within the OAU In time, and the pragmatism of the gradualist approach
lies herein, since It Is evident that the socialisation of member-states
for a common 'political' purpose Is a long-term and subtle process.
Similarly, it is conceivable that the Nigerian leadership has perceived the
possibility of the emergence of a powerful economic and political regional
bloc In the southern African sub-continent once the remaining Namibia/
 - 12

apartheid issues are "resolved". The eraergece of such a bloc, centred on

the mineral wealth of South Africa, would radically alter the balance of
power in Africa and seriously challenge any notions of Nigerian continental
leadership.

Nigerian foreign policy is largely predetermined by the linkage between the

domestic constituency (the need to maintain national unity and stability)
and the "predestined" right to exert a leadership role in Africa.
Paradoxically, the more imperilled is domestic stability the greater the
need for assertive external action (whether rhetorical or practical) and
consequently, the more forceful the projection of Nigerian leadership.
These elements are fundamental to Nigerian policy in Africa and in
relations with the rest of the international community. Within this
context, the issues of southern Africa/apartheid have provided a constant,
and increasingly single-issue focus.

The essence of Nigerian foreign policy has been succinctly put as follows :

You won't find Nigeria being a flag waver for the Third
World or the nonaligned movement, although we are involved
with both. Really, our preoccupation is in Africa, in
helping African countries solve conflicts among themselves
... We have a two-pronged policy. One is the commitment to
effective liberation of Southern Africa. The second is to
bring about a transfer of technology to Nigeria.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTEXT

The deduction which may be drawn from the above is that as long as domestic
tranquillity prevails, the Nigerian government will seek, to play an active
and constructive role in African politics, while seeking to advance
Nigerian plans for economic development. At the same time the functional
structure of Nigerian foreign policy attitudes is built upon an increasing
paranoia, ostensibly about the intransigence of the South African
government, but more realistically about the enduring inability of African
states to achieve desired political and economic objectives.

The notorious inability of African states to attain foreign policy

objectives has become a point of derision for detractors of the African
cause. Rational discussion on recent events, and their implications, in
Nigeria has been submerged by media emotionalism and the attempt from
various quarters to score political points, either about the nature of the
regimes in both Ghana and Nigeria, or about black Africa generally.
Ironically though, the reaction of those states most closely affected by
Nigerian policy action has been characteristically restrained. The reason
for this is not just an understanding of Nigeria's difficulties, or a
desire to remain on good terms with the most influential state in the
region, but the fact that Nigeria has always epitomized the African
dilemma, and these states to a greater or lesser degree are experiencing
similar pressures. . -

The inherent pressures on domestic political stability in Nigeria are

compounded by the evolution of two principal sets of circumstances, which
have had a mutually exacerbating effect : (a) a decline in economic
prosperity; and (b) increasing political restiveness in the rutv-up to the
 - 13 -

presidental elections, constitutionally prescribed for the latter part of

this year.

Diagnosis of Nigerian economic ailments is not difficult - at the root is a

structural imbalance in an economy that depends on the export of one
product. Oil exports account for nearly 80% of government revenue (and
about 95% of foreign exchange), the spending of which is critical for the
level of other activities in the economy. The fact that Nigeria* s
manufacturing capacity is almost entirely dependent on imported raw
materials implies that if foreign exchange earnings from oil decline, the
rest of the economy goes into recession. This is precisely what has come
to pass.

The oversupply of oil on the international market, the insistence by OPEC

on the maintenance of existing price structures, and the undercutting of
OPEC prices by non-OPEC oil producers has had damaging effects on most OPEC
economies. In the case of Nigeria, oil production has fallen from 2
million barrels per day in 1981 to 0.5 million barrels per day in February
1983. The nett result is that Nigeria has to endure a worsening balance of
payments position, resulting in a drastic cut in foreign imports, a fall In
foreign exchange reserves (which in January 1983 were said to be
insufficient to cover one month's imports), an inability to service the $5
billion foreign debt which is already over three months in arrears and a
$4.8 billion deficit on the 1982 budget. By the end of 1982 an estimated
45 000 workers had been retrenched, the inflation rate was running at 20%
and growth was down from an average 8% during the 1970s to zero growth.

Desperate efforts have been made in recent months to stem the tide of
worsening economic recession, including a 50% restriction on imports over
1982 levels, a cut of 20% in government spending for 1983, and eventually
on February 19, 1983 a precipitous $5.5 break with the official OPEC price
of $35 per barrel. All this adds up to what has been described as the
collapse of a dream. The country's ambitious five-year development plan
(1981-85) has been subject to constant downward revision from the day it
was launched. The plan's aim of diversifying the manufacturing base of the
economy and setting agriculture on the path of a "green revolution" is no
longer viable.

The significance of such deep economic difficulty is greatly compounded by

the tense political circumstances which prevail in the extended run-up to
the presidential elections. Nigeria's return to civilian rule four years
ago, after thirteen years of military government, created the world's
fourth largest democracy. Nigeria has a US-style constitution and federal
system* It has nineteen states and there is pressure to create more. Most
of the nineteen states.are In severe financial difficulties, but because
the spoils are so great for political leaders, all political parties agree
that more states are a fine idea. The only difficulty is that none of the
existng federal states is over-keen to be subdivided.

Politics in Nigeria has been described as the only growth industry. The
election campaign was Initiated 18 months in advance of the scheduled
election date and has been characterized by political manouevering and
increasing violence.

The initiative in the field of political manouevre lies, as Is customary,

with Presldet Shehu Shagari and the ruling National Party of Nigeria
(NPN). Shagari's biggest political challenge comes from two southern-based
parties of the Ibo and Yoruba tribes. The Ibo, Nigerian People's Party
 - 14 -

(NPP) is headed by Nnamdl Azikiwe, and the Yoruba are led by the United
Party of Nigeria (UPN), headed by Obafemi Awolowa.

Political enmity between the tribes goes back for generations and the
effort to bridge the gap of political suspicion with an alliance of
opposition parties is considered a necessity if neither of these parties is
to have a chance of winning the presidency. However, the question of which
of the two leaders would be the allience's candidate for president has
proved a stumbling block.

Aware of opposition wrangling, as well as the serious challenge which an

alliance of opposition parties would present (in 1979 Shagari polled 5
million fewer votes than the combined opposition), Shagari played a
political trump in December 1982, by extending a pardon to the former Ibo
rebel leader Emeka Ojukuwu. The thinking behind the manouevre was that
Ojukuwu would be pardoned in return for an undertaking, on the former
rebel's part, of "delivering" the 12 million Ibo vote for Shagari.

Traditionally the Ibo are not NPN supporters - in the absence of Ojukuwu
they have supported Aziklwe and the NPP. However, in his eagerness to lure
Ibo voters, Shagari is in danger of losing support within his party. With
Ojukuwu being tipped as Shagari1s running-mate and future Vice President,
NPN leaders fear the former rebel is being given too much power within the
party.

On the other hand, it appears as though Shagari might have outmanouevered

himself, since there are reports that large sections of the Ibo community
have branded Ojukuwu a traitor for supporting the NPN which has its base
among the Hausa tribe - traditional enemies of the Ibo. Shagari1 s return
to office is thus very much in the balance and the prospect of a collapse
of constitutionalism should no alternative candidate win convincingly Is
real.

The reality of this latter contingency is underscored by two factors : (a)

the increase in sporadic violence, and (b) bureaucratic Inefficiency in
organising the mechanics of the election. During the latter part of 1982
severe rioting, claiming the lives of some 1 000 people, broke out In the
Northern states. Although this violence has been officially attributed to
religious fanatics, it Is symptomatic of the volatile atmosphere which
prevails. Observers have suggested that the violence in the Northern
states Is more realistically attributed to the high levels of unemployment
in that part of the country and the strain of economic austerity. Further-
more, Nigeria is traditionally prone to labour unrest, but the wave of
strikes and industrial action in all sectors of the economy in recent
months are said by President Shagari to be crippling the economy. While
the labour movement has not const ituted it self into a politleal group,
labour leaders appear determined to capitalize on their control of the key
Industrial sectors, many of which are federal government monopolies. The
atmosphere of crisis has been heightened by a spate of major cases of
arson, directed against federal government Installations. The most
significant Instance being the complete destruction by fire of the multi-
storeyed telecoramunications department skyscraper in Lagos, severing
Nigerian communication with the rest of the world In the process.

There is doubt whether the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) will be

able to organise proper electoral lists or arrange for adequate polling
stations, vote collection and vote counting. The police force has formed
33 new mobile units, each of company strength (about 200 men). Evenly
 - 15 -

distributed, that means two units per state. The idea at present is that
these units should keep the peace rather than assist the mechanics of the
election.

When the decision was taken to form these units the bureaucratic problems
were unforeseen, as was the degree of tension created by party politics and
the economic crisis. At the time the suggestion of possible array
involvement In the election was widely considered as dangerously
provocative. Today it has been discussed publicly by a number of senior
officers and has been discussed in detail with government officials. It is
argued that if widespread public disorder is to be deterred effectively,
the army will have to be deployed beforehand, rather than be called out of
barracks after a failure by the police to keep order.

This rather calamitous set of political and economic circumstances had

foreign policy repercussions in the expulsion, in January 1983, of an
estimated two million Illegal aliens employed in Nigeria. Facts submerged
in the welter of media hysteria are that these people were Illegally
resident and employed in Nigeria, a situation which no state could tolerate
in normal circumstances, let alone at times of economic recession and
political instability. (It is the case that Nigerians were expelled en
masse from Ghana in 1969 and on other occasions from Zaire, Gabon and
Equatorial Guinea.) The nub of the question, of course, is how two million
people are able to illegally infiltrate Nigerian society. The answer Is
two-fold : on the one hand bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, and on
the other, a willingness to turn a blind eye, In the good times, to a
source of cheap menial labour.

Significantly, the attention which this issue has focussed upon Nigeria
underscores the intimate linkage between domestic stability and foreign
policy action which is the thrust of this analysis. In essence thus, the
issue is one of severe economic decline at a time when the federal
government needs to maximize Its popularity and its political skills. In
the light of Nigeria's political history, the federal government is
particularly sensitive to two accusations; that of economic mismanagement,
and inability to maintain law and order.

The body of two million illegal aliens presented itself inevitably as the
personiflciation of Nigerian Ills; the implication being that, at once, the
Nigerian system has been cleansed by the expulsion of all aliens. This
move has been widely applauded by Nigerians, partly because of the notions
of inherent superiority nurtured by all Nigerians, but also because of a
belief in federal government reasoning that these outlaws are at the root
of current political unrest and are logically a severe drain on the
economy. It is difficult to substantiate either suggestion, there is
little evidence to suggest foreign subversion or connivance in the sundry
Instances of political unrest and further, since these aliens were employed
either in menial or semi-skilled positions, which Nigerians are loath to
fill, their expulsion from the Nigerian economy Is likely to leave a very
large vacuum at this level, resulting In even greater disorganisation and
disintegration of the economic system.

The conclusion that the federal government has found a political scapegoat
expedient Is unavoidable. As a result one may be confident that the
content of Nigerian foreign policy is unlikely to change, also that,
whereas Nigeria will of necessity give limited attention to external
relations In the months ahead, the medium-term diplomatic standing and
Influence of the "Nigerian giant" in African politics will be unaffected.
 - 16 -

The reaction from neighbouring countries has for the most part been
restrained and concentrated on some of the logistical problems In shipping
such a large number of individuals back home. Ghana, the state
particularly affected, has seen some press criticism in strong terms but
official reaction has been contained. With regard to ECOWAS, Nigeria has
pointed out that it has been acting entirely within the rules. The
Protocol on the free movement of peoples Is one of the key ECOWAS texts
but It only permits a 90 day free-entry visa.

The move, though technically in order, does seem, to strike a blow at the
spirit of ECOWAS, much as Ghana*s own border closure last September or
Sierra Leone's expulsion of members of the Foulah community last December.
All these measures, like Nigeria's, have been conditioned by a serious
economic downturn, suggesting that this is not the time to advance regional
co-operation. Paradoxically though, a special committee was set up, in May
1982, to investigate new orientations for the organisation, and Nigeria is
in the forefront of those states pressing for ECOWAS to start making real
advances.

Nigeria has been the victim on various occasions In the past of similar
expulsions and is clearly not unmindful of appeals to ECOWAS sentiment.
There are, after all, large Nigerian communities presently In many ECOWAS
states. What would be unfortunate would be for some of the French-speaking
states, who have been dragging their feet In making progress in ECOWAS, to
now point to the expulsion issue as a failure of faith in the ECOWAS
objectives, and to continue to concentrate on forming smaller francophone
regional units- In this direction Nigeria, as guiding light and principal
financier of ECOWAS, has some fence-mending to do.

There Is no comfort to be drawn from the current political and economic

disarray In Nigeria, or Africa at large. Economic collapse and concomitant
political instability provide the opportunities for the foreign meddling
and exploitation which Impinges upon the hard-won national sovereignty
closely guarded by African states. The consequence will be an intensifi-
cation of Nigerian paranoia and the butt of Increasing political
frustration will be apartheid South Africa.
 - 17 -

REFERENCES

1. Wachuku, J., In United Nations General Assembly Official Records, 16th

Session, 1031st Plenary Session, October 10, 1961, p. 339.

2. The Northern People's Congress (NPC), The National Council of Nigeria

(NCN) and the United People's Party (UPP).

3. Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, September 4,

1961, Col. 2813.

4. Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, January 16,

1960, Cols. 154-155.

5. Quoted in West Africa, May 16, p. 4.

6. Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, November 16,

1960, Cols. 197-198.

7. Federation of Nigeria, House of Representatives Debates, August 20,

1960, Cols. 2669-71.

8. Statement by His Excellency Lt. Gen. Yakubu Gowon quoted in Nigerian

Bulletin of Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, No. 1, 1971, p. 43.

9. Streralau, J., The International Politics of the Nlgerial Civil War

1967-1970, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1971, p. 11.

10. Wachuku, J., in House of Representatives Debates, September 4, 1961,

Cols. 332-71.

11. Foreign Meddlers in the Nigerian Crisis, Federal Ministry of Informa-

tion, Lagos, 1970, pp. 3-8.

12. Herskovitz, J. , "Nigeria : Africa's New Power" in Foreign Affairs,

Vol. 55, 1975, p. 323.

13. Statement by His .Excellency, Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon at the Seventh
Summit of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, Addis Ababa,
September 1-4, 1970, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1970.

14. Nigerian Mission of Friendship to the Soviet Union, Federal Ministry

of Information, Lagos, 1970.

15. His Excellency Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon, Text of Broadcast to the
Nation, October 1, 1972, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1972.

16. Statement by His Excellency, Maj. Gen. Yakubu Gowon at the Eleventh
Summit of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, Mogadishu, June
1974, in Nigeria Today, No. 47, July 1974, Nigerian High Commission,
London, 1974, p. 7.

17. Art. 2-4 and Art. 7 (29) of the Lome Convention, in Djamson, E.C., The
Dynamics of Euro-African Co-operation, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague,
1976, pp. 293-294.

18. Transcript of NBC-TV interview with Col. Joseph Garba, Nigerian

Commissioner of External Affairs.
 - 18 -

19. Message of Goodwill from the Federal Military Government of Nigeria to

the Government of the People's Republic of Angola, December 19 1975.

20. Lt. Gen. Olesugun Obazanjo, "Nigeria First" in Call to Duty : A

Collection of Speeches, Federal Ministry of Information, Lagos, 1978,
p. 33.

21. Adefore, H.E., Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs, "Foreign

Policy : Nigeria's Primary Objectives" in Nigeria Today. Vol. 9, No.
1, Jan/Feb, 1979, Nigerian High Commission, London, p. 2.

22. His Excellency, Pres. Shehu Shagari, Presidential Address to the

Nigerian National Assembly, House of Representatives Debates Vol. 4
No. 40, March 18, 1980, Col. 2074. * *

23. Treaty establishing The Economic Community of West African States

Lagos, May 1975, Art. 12. *

24. Ibid, Art. 5.

25. Interview with Aklnyemi, B., Director of the Nigerian Institute of

International Affairs.