[No. L-803.

August 27, 1948]

JOSE P. SANDEJAS, plaintiff and appellant, vs.

ZACARIAS C. ROBLES, ELENA C. VDA. DE ROBLES
and ROSARIO Y. SINGSON, defendants and appellees.

1. ACTIONS; JUDGMENTS, WHEN BARRED BY PRIOR

(“RES JUDICATA") ; SAME CAUSE OF ACTION AND
PARTIES.—The pertinent facts alleged in the complaint
to which a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by a prior judgment is filed, are those
relating to the cause of action and the parties, because if
they are the same as the cause of action and the parties in
the prior judgment, or though the parties are different
they represent the same interest, and the court rendering
the prior judgment had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, the subsequent action is barred by
the prior judgment and should be dismissed.

2. ID.; “IN PERSONAM" AND “IN REM"; ACTION FOR

RESOLUTION OF CONTRACT OF SALE OF REAL
PROPERTY, “IN PERSONAM."—An action for the
resolution of a contract of sale of a real property is an
action in personam, and not quasi in rem.

3. ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION.—If the technical object of the

suit is to establish a claim against some particular person,
with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds
his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so
that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
defense, the action is in personam, although it may
concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on
the other hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against
the right sought to be established, and if anyone in the
world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging
facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem.

4. ID.; “QUASI IN REM" DISTINGUISHED FROM “IN

REM."—The action quasi in rem differs from the true
action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the
proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings
having for their sole object the sale or other disposition of
the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way
thus designated. The judgment entered in these
proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.

5. TRIAL; ABSENCE OF PARTY DUE TO OWN FAULT

NOT DEPRIVATION OF DAY IN COURT.—Where the
absence of a party from the

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Sandejas vs. Robles

trial was due to his own fault, he cannot claim that he was
deprived of his day in court.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of

Iloilo. Blanco, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Benjamin H. Tirol, Corazon C. Miraflores and Orlando
M. Jesena for appellant.
W.E. Greenbaum and Luis G. Hofileña for appellee
Rosario Y. Singson.
M.F. Zamora and Jose C. Robles for appellee Zacarias C.
Robles and Elena C. Vda. de Robles.

FERIA, J.:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First

Instance of Iloilo dismissing the plaintiff’s action upon
motion of the defendant on the ground that it is barred by
prior judgment.
The pertinent facts alleged in the complaint to which a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment is filed, are those relating to the
cause of action and the parties, because if they are the
same as the cause of action and the parties in the prior
judgment, or though the parties are different they
represent the same interest, and the court rendering the
prior judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties, the subsequent action is barred by the prior
judgment and should be dismissed.
In the present appeal, there is no question that the
parties in the present and prior action are the same or
represent the same interest, and that the cause of action in
both are the same, that is, the performance or non-
performance of the terms and conditions of a contract of
sale for the enforcement or resolution thereof. The only
question to be determined is whether the Court which has
rendered the former judgment had jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties.
The appellants contend that the lower court erred in
upholding the validity of the judgment of the Court of
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VOL. 81, AUGUST 27, 1948 423

Sandejas vs. Robles

First Instance of Iloilo during the Japanese occupation,

because: (1) “The said court had no jurisdiction to try civil
case No. 21, much less to render the decision in question on
October 2, 1944;" and (2) “That granting for the sake of
argument that the puppet Court of First Instance of Iloilo
had jurisdiction, yet such decision was rendered after
having deprived plaintiff of his day in court and is
therefore in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution.”
As to the first question, the appellants do not question
the ruling of this Supreme Court on the validity of the
judgments rendered by the courts established in these
Islands during the Japanese occupation
1
laid down in Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 41 Off. Gaz., 779; but they
contend that, as the three parcels of land involved or sold
in the contract of sale resolved by the prior judgment were
located in the Municipality of Passi, Province of Iloilo, and
“the puppet Republic of the Philippines since the middle of
the month of September, 1944, could no longer assert its
authority over the major portion of the territory of Iloilo
including the Municipality of Passi,” then under the
possession and control of the Panay guerrilla forces, the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo which rendered the prior
judgment had no jurisdiction over the res or the property
because the action was quasi in rem, and therefore the said
judgment is null and void.
This contention is premised on the wrong assumption
that the action for the resolution of a contract of sale of a
real property is an action quasi in rem. The action
instituted by the appellees to resolve the contract of sale of
said parcels of land, is in personam and not quasi in rem,
This Court quoted with approval in Grey Alba vs. De la
Cruz, 17 Phil., 61–62, the following definition of an action
in personam:

“‘lf the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against

some particular person, with a judgment which generally, in
theory at least, binds his body, or to bar some individual claim or
objection, so that only certain persons are entitled to be heard in
de

_______________

1 75 Phil., 113.

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424 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandejas vs. Robles

fense, the action is in personam, although it may concern the

right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other hand,
the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established,
and if anyone in the world has a right to be heard on the strength
of alleging facts which, if true, show an inconsistent interest, the
proceeding is in rem.” (Tyler vs. Judges, supra.)

According to American Jurisprudence, Vol. I, page 435, “An

action in personam has for its object a judgment against
the person, as distinguished from a judgment against
property, to determine its status. Whether a proceeding is
in rem or in personam is determined by its nature and
purpose, and by these only,, A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations
brought against the person and based on jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise
of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of
the court.”
In the case of Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca, 37
Phil., 921, 928, we held that “The action quasi in rem
differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that
in the former an individual is named as defendant, and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein
to the obligation or lien burdening the property, All
proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by
attachment, foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a
general way thus designated. The judgment entered in
these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.”
With respect to the second question, from the prior
judgment marked as Exhibit A of the motion to dismiss, it
appears that the appellants had submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo by
filing their answers to the complaint through their Atty.
Benjamin H. Tirol, the same attorney who represents them
now; that they were notified of the date set for the hearing
of the action, but when the case was called
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VOL. 81, AUGUST 27, 1948 425

Sandejas vs. Robles

for trial on September 29, 1944, their attorney asked and

obtained permission from the court to withdraw his
appearance as attorney for the appellants stating as
ground therefor that it was difficult to communicate with
his clients, who went to Arevalo, a suburb of and distant of
about six or seven kilometers from the Iloilo City, capital of
the Province of Iloilo; that to give the appellants
opportunity to be heard, the hearing was postponed and set
on the afternoon of the same date; and that as they did not
appear on the afternoon the case was heard and judgment
was rendered on October 2, 1944, declaring the resolution
of the contract between the parties and ordering the
appellees to return to the appellants the sum of P5,723.60,
received by the former from the latter as payment on
account of the sum of P35,000 agreed upon as purchase
price.
And, according to the allegations in appellants’
complaint, on October 25, 1944, the appellants filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the court,
and when they tried to appeal from the decision the court
denied the appeal on November 23, 1944, and declared the
judgment final and executory; and, on November 29, the
appellants filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the appeal, and up to the filing of the complaint in
the present case no resolution of the motion has been
received by the appellants.
In view of the foregoing facts set forth in the decision
Exhibit A and not contradicted or denied by the appellants,
which show that the absence from the trial of the
appellants was due to their own fault, appellants’
contention that they were deprived of their day in court is
untenable.
The appeal is therefore dismissed. So ordered.

Parás, Actg. C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla,

and Tuason, JJ., concur.

426

426 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Pakah
 PERFECTO, J.:

We dissent:
We are of the opinion that the appealed decision should
be reversed and the lower court ordered to proceed with the
case and render decision on the merits.
This stand is based on the reasons1 stated in our opinion
in Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 41 Off. Gaz., 779.
Appeal dismissed.

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