Streamlining Joint Operations by

Empowering Commanders at
Operational and Tactical Levels
by MAJ Joseph LaBarbera
Commander-centricity must be our war- tains of history, when compared to the normally considered generalship can be
fighting framework; the structure estab- modern company commander, had a my- witnessed at the tactical level. It’s a mis-
lished by the Goldwater-Nichols Act is opic viewpoint of the battlefield. The take that current doctrine establishes the
not the answer. It actually hinders us. modern company commander must not joint level at theater command because
only be what his predecessors were but the control, organization and autonomy
In joint operations, a commander should also know how to employ air support, in- seen as the general officer’s field must be
control the multiple and diverse forces tegrate his soldiers with mechanized as- cultivated on a lower level. Also, creat-
he needs to defeat his enemies. Although sault vehicles and grasp his unit’s impact ing robust commands at such a lofty lev-
this has traditionally been the domain of on the civilian population. He must also el sucks the autonomy from lower-level
generals, because of technical innova- have under his direct control the liaisons units and becomes a drain on their time
tions that limit a general’s span of con- and experts needed to best employ these and creativity.
trol, warfare has evolved into greater re- modern assets.
liance on lower-level decision-making. At the same time, the training and assets
Modern warfare now requires junior of- Looking deeper into the disparity be- a general possesses won’t be of much
ficers to show the same decisiveness and tween ancient and modern warfare, a use if the lower-level commanders em-
strategic thinking expected of a general modern company commander no longer ploying them don’t own these assets or-
in the past. Military practices that facili- has a narrow front to fight on, thus his ganically. This is especially true in coun-
tated tactical formations and operational span of influence can cover the same terinsurgency operations, where compe-
maneuvers in history can no longer facil- ground as a general’s of the pre-21st tition for resources among brigade
itate mission command in modern war- Century world. The company command- through company commands tends to
fare. er’s battalion commander is now less of occupy the commander’s time more than
a tactician but is instead more of a men- time spent gathering intelligence to de-
tor to company commanders and an op- feat the insurgency. From flawed opera-
Past and present erational planner. The brigade level now tions such as Grenada in 1983, Panama
As we examine how the junior officer’s operates on the campaign level of war- in 1989 and the escape of large portions
role has expanded, we see that from the fare – for example, we find Air Force li- of the Republican Guard during the 1991
Roman legions’ centurions to the 20th aisons at the battalion level and see inter- Gulf War,1 we see that to make joint op-
Century’s maneuver-company captains, agency cooperation at the brigade level. erations a reality, assets need to be better
the tactical commander must be an ex- streamlined into supporting maneuver
pert fighting man, a charismatic leader The joint level is therefore now at a low- units and not consolidated at such a high
and a disciplinarian. However, the cap- er level than ever before, and what was level that, due to a diversified and exten-

8 November-December 2011
 sive battlefield, we can’t employ as- The key in doing this is in auton-
sets efficiently in support of com- omous leadership, but to ac-
bined-arms warfare. complish this requires shed-
One thing the generals of history ding an excessive staff culture.
had was autonomous control of In name a command may be
their forces and unity of com- autonomous, but if a battalion
mand. An optimal example is commander finds himself sub-
the Roman Empire’s military – ject to the whims and machi-
Rome maintained the longest nations of higher staffs, he tru-
span of military victories and a ly isn’t a commander but is
more dominant military than merely a manager.
any other in history. What per- The Goldwater-Nichols Act creat-
sonified the Roman commander ed this excessive staff culture by es-
was his control over all assets he tablishing many robust higher com-
needed to fight and complete mands, which inadvertently influence
ownership of the tactics, training the “raising” of staff officers vice fu-
and personnel of his legions. ture commanders. Burdened by
this staff culture, U.S. military
Victorious generals of the early Roman joint operations have not been
Republic usually had this.2 In contrast, flexible and reactive enough to de-
when Rome sent its generals to war hav- feat asymmetric enemies. Also, it’s
ing to answer to the Senate, and when arguable that the U.S. military may have
two consuls commanded the same force difficulty with conventional enemies as
to satisfy political anxieties, the results they can control the in- well – two victories against Saddam’s
were poor. A case in point was the Battle flux and rotation of their troops and Iraq were more because of failures on
of Cannae, where a micromanaging Sen- leaders. No conventional Army brigade Saddam’s part rather than because of vir-
ate interfered with the two consul-com- has this ability but instead relies on sup- tues on our generals’ parts.6 This may be
manders, who had to make tactical deci- port from command-and-staff sections because of the staff-centric culture in our
sions through consensus. They were de- echelons above them to maintain a stable Army standing between the Army’s
feated by a weaker force under Hannibal personnel turnover and supply them spe- leaders and operational and tactical
Barca, a commander who undoubtedly cial-skills operatives with whom they units. As a result, the Army officer ad-
had unity of command and answered to coordinate their combined-arms support. vancement system often installs syco-
no one.3 Learning from this, Roman phantic staff officers as tactical leaders
commanders such as Fabius, Marcellus, Also, other Army units at brigade/regi-
ment level generally don’t see their sup- as opposed to real, effective ones.7
Scipio Africanus, Aemilius Paullus,
Scipio Aemilianus, Caius Marius, Serto- porting-arms units or train with them un- The system of multiple commands hold-
rius, Pompey, Germanicus, Corbulo, Ti- til immediately before a deployment. ing sway over units’ operations indicates
tus, Trajan, Julian the Apostate and This is because the framework of the why brigades have difficulty operating.
Belisarius all had either autonomy and combatant command gets in the way. Too often the brigade has to “sell” a plan
unity of command or stipulated it as a re- With such a powerful and absorbing en- to not only its Army commanding gener-
quirement.4 tity like a combatant command (and oth- al but to the Air Force command, theater-
er commands set up by the Goldwater- sustainment command, training com-
Nichols Act), much institutional atten-
Asset mismanagement tion caters to those commands’ needs
mand, etc. This becomes exacerbated as
each of these commands’ staffs copy this
In contrast to the Romans’ efficiency, our (which sometimes conflict with the relationship and, as a result, salesman-
current system mismanages assets. We needs of lower-level units); the result is a ship and systems manipulation become
have in the current U.S. military hierar- hesitancy to commit to a mission set so the officers’ predominant virtues instead
chy a pseudo-joint infrastructure that’s that actual operational units don’t get the of leadership and tactical prowess.
hostile to maneuver forces’ lower eche- time and training they need.
lons. The word “hostile” is appropriate The predominance of staff culture that
because that’s the result of these units’ The current campaign in Afghanistan ex- the Goldwater-Nichols Act inadvertently
current organization, which inhibits emplifies this dilemma.5 So much is induced resulted in the lack of the com-
them from having the capabilities need- wasted in the form of time and resources mander’s autonomy, degrading the prin-
ed for combined-arms warfare, both con- by these commands and the climate they ciple of unity of command. This is the
ventional and irregular. create that combat effectiveness is se- greatest inhibitor of joint operations. Our
verely downgraded. Until this is stream- ability to defeat enemy forces is con-
In contrast, a Marine Corps battalion lined, combined-arms warfare, applied strained by the combatant commands’
landing team, as part of a Marine expedi- efficiently, won’t be a reality. I note that heavy reliance on other components for
tionary unit, is an example of an effec- with so many higher commands and resources and small influence on the or-
tive combined-arms unit that employs staffs, the appearance of efficiency will ganization, training and character of
joint forces. Its form is only seen in two be creatively demonstrated in the form their fighting units. Further, multiple
U.S. Army units: 75th Ranger Regiment of PowerPoint briefings. limitations on command authority are in-
and 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment. stilled in doctrine, obviously influenced
These units, like the MEU, have organic by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
fire-support liaisons for not only surface- Excessive staff culture
delivered munitions but close-air support Streamlined effectively by autonomous For example, as the Army’s operations
as well, and they have organic aviation and unified commands, maneuver units manual, Field Manual 3.0, in Paragraph
units that train with and deploy with the can deploy jointly to fight conventional B-23 states, “Coordinating authority is
unit. Also, they maintain a healthy influ- and irregular conflicts without having to the authority delegated to a commander
ence over the personnel system, in which alter or change their task organization. or individual for coordinating specific

November-December 2011 9
 functions or activities involving forces of mental lineages under the bri- hostility from myriad generals who ex-
two or more military departments, two gade’s command. pected fealty from him in respecting
or more joint-force components, or two •  The brigade is often, with less than their turfs.12 The occasion of a brigade’s
or more forces of the same [s]ervice. The one year’s notice, assigned outside success shows that the combatant com-
commander or individual granted coor- the parent division to another divi- mand, designed to facilitate joint opera-
dinating authority can require consulta- sion, kind of like a sub-prime tions, is being marginalized by multiple
tion between the agencies involved but mortgage sold to another mortgage commands who have too much of a role
does not have the authority to compel company. in the brigade’s operations. The combat-
agreement. In the event that essential •  The combatant commander re- ant command’s marginalization is exac-
agreement cannot be obtained, the mat- ceives the brigade after a collec- erbated by the complexities of multiple
ter shall be referred to the appointing au- tive-training period of two weeks subcommands. Creation of these com-
thority.” at one of three training centers – mands ensures that robust staffs follow –
each of which has a different doc- and from this the marginalization of low-
This way of hamstringing commanders er-level commands, which inhibits cre-
trinal interpretation on how a bri-
permeates to the lowest levels in a dys- ativity and forestalls momentum.
gade should operate.
functional fashion. By the time a tactical
Army unit meets its enemy, it has been •  Throughout this time, the unit is
through a cauldron of interference from still losing and gaining personnel Commander isolation
so many commands and influences that in leadership positions down to For a joint-operations culture to perme-
it is operating under the illusion of a co- platoon and squad level. ate throughout the military, the military’s
hesive unit and is, in fact, an ad hoc orga- •  Within months, the brigade is as- table of organization and equipment
nization.8 The unit now finds that its pri- signed to the combatant com- must account for the personnel needed
mary requirement isn’t to get results on mander and is attached to a the- for effective joint ops. Otherwise, the
the battlefield but to appease the require- ater-level command; with little current ad hoc manner of task organiza-
ments of higher staffs. This is exacerbat- guidance, the brigade is often left tion will continue to throw assets at units
ed as fourth-generation warfare theorist to figure out its mission set on its without integration training, and this will
William Lind describes: “All those head- own.11 lead to failure. Compared to a Marine
quarters’ officers are continually looking •  Multiple commands outside the battalion landing team, an Army brigade
for something to do, and for some scrap mission the brigade is nested with lacks enough forward air controllers, hu-
of information that will give them 30 control the brigade’s pay and re- man-intelligence collectors, administra-
seconds of face time in the endless Pow- sources. tive specialists and logistical detach-
erPoint briefings that are American The result is that this tactical-level unit is ments at battalion level.13
headquarters’ main business. The result under the sway of multiple masters con- Instead, the Army brigade maintains ro-
is that they impose endless demands on tinuously and can do little more than oc- bust assets in the form of a support bat-
the time and energy of subordinate units. cupy ground and conduct shaping opera- talion and “special troops” battalion.
One Army battalion last year told me tions. FM 3.0 portrays an example of These battalions, instead of providing
they had to submit 64 reports to their di- supporting relationships: “Under joint real response to maneuver battalions, be-
vision every day.”9 doctrine, each joint force includes a [s] come entities of their own. Their com-
ervice component command that pro- manders compete for recognition from
vides administrative and logistic support the brigade commander. This is a gross
Affiliation issues to [s]ervice forces under [operational conflict of interest within the brigade
Adding to this drain of energy and time- control] of that joint force. However, and divides the brigade’s teeth from its
consuming disruption is the constant for- Army doctrine distinguishes between the tail.
mation and reformations of brigades be- Army component of a combatant com-
fore they deploy. The brigade has trouble mand and Army components of subordi- Also, as mentioned, the brigade com-
keeping its unit “corporate identity.” nate joint forces. Under Army doctrine, mander is isolated from his battalion
Consider these factors: Army service component command re- commanders through a robust filter in
fers to the Army component assigned to the form of a staff, with as many (or
•  In the span of one to two years, an a combatant command. There is only more) field-grade officers on the brigade
Army brigade is formed of indi- one ASCC within a combatant com- staff as in all the battalions combined. A
viduals from various commands, mand’s area of responsibility. The Army separate command can arise within the
all who have been trained at a components of all other joint forces are brigade in the form of a deputy brigade
number of Army schools – which called [Army forces].” commander, who will take charge of a
propose different warfighting phi- number of projects and generally get the
losophies and emphasize various From this, one can infer conflict arising forces he needs to accomplish them – for
specialties – and are led by offi- between the staffs of the maneuver units example, taking a military-police pla-
cers whose military upbringing and support units, although Army com- toon as his personal security detachment.
couldn’t be more schismatically manders will rarely publicize their griev-
diverse. ances. Conflict creates schism, leads to Combine this huge headquarters with the
•  The brigade’s soldiers are then rephrasing language about mishaps in only real fighting elements – two maneu-
trained by a mixture of U.S. Army reports and other documents, and shapes ver battalions, a recce squadron and an
Training and Doctrine Command a unit’s mission statement to meet the artillery battalion – and what results is
and division schools with different limitations of its inadequate capability. twofold: the battalion’s staff ends up
agendas, and little time is given working more for the brigade staff than
When a unit is successful, as in the inva- for their own commanders, and battalion
for collective unit training.10 sion of Iraq and 3rd ACR’s actions in Tal-
•  The brigade staff itself is often commanders can find themselves subor-
Afar, it’s because the brigade command- dinate to the brigade staff in many ways.
composed of officers with histori- er broke away from convention and op-
cal affiliations outside the unit and erated on his own. However, his autono- From the company level to the national
has little in common with the regi- my came at a cost to him in the form of level, command authority has to be sac-

10 November-December 2011
rosanct and supreme. The officer career mando company commander and the Command.” Accessed at http://www.dtic.
path should be much more command- 303rd Afghan Police Corps G-2 in North- mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=
centric if we want to grow great leaders ern Afghanistan. He received a bachelor’s GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA450914. School of
and not great secretaries. The Goldwa- of arts degree from the City University of Advanced Military Studies, academic year
New York and is completing his thesis for 05-06.
ter-Nichols Act’s creation of multiple his master’s of arts degree in national se-
entities may facilitate more collabora- curity studies at American Military Univer- Hope.
11

tion, but it detracts from streamlining sity. 12

McGregor.
and command authority. 13
The table of organization and equipment for
Fighting units must be guaranteed own- Notes a light infantry brigade, accessible at http://
ership of assets compatible with their www.fas.org/man/dod-101/army/unit/
1
Vandenbrouke, Lucien. Perilous Options:
mission set, and the chain of command toe/07015L000.htm, shows that these billets
Special Operations as an Instrument of
must be the sole authority in the military. are centralized and/or dependent on outside
Foreign Policy. London: Oxford University
We can achieve this by structuring the organizations to attach them. Also, in my ex-
Press, 1993.
unit’s doctrinal framework to be compat- perience, they are either misused or their
ible with joint operations and not attempt 2
Goldsworthy, Adrian. In the Name of employment is dictated by the parent unit.
to specialize it for one-time missions, as Rome: the Men Who Won the Roman Em- Many times soldiers come to a new unit jad-
the Army tries to do with its various for- pire. Phoenix, AZ: Orion Press, 2005. ed because of mis-leadership from the par-
mations. 3
Daly, Gregory. Cannae: The Experience of ent unit.
The most effective units continue to be Battle in the Second Punic War. London:
those that emphasize warfighting-skills Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group), 2004.
basics and have the most streamlined 4
Goldsworthy.
and capable leadership. They also be- 5
Hope, Ian COL. Unity of Command in Af-
come the most adaptable and effective ghanistan: a Forsaken Principal of War.
no matter what capacity they’re in, Accessed at http://www.strategicstudiesin- Acronym Quick-Scan
whether it’s conventional or irregular stitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub889.pdf. Strate-
warfare. Either way, when a commander gic Studies Institute, November 2008.
has unity of command and control of his ACR – armored cavalry regiment
6
McGregor, Douglas. “Fire the Generals: the ASCC – Army service component
assets, the issue of success becomes
Failure of U.S. Military Leadership in Iraq.”
much less complicated, as it is an issue command
Accessed at http://www.counterpunch.org/
of his ability and not the complexities of FM – field manual
macgregor05262006.html. Counterpunch,
the systematic machinations of doctrine MEU – Marine expeditionary unit
May 26, 2006.
or theory.
7
Ibid.
Lind, William Sturgiss. “Reorganization or
8

Reform?” Accessed at http://

MAJ Joseph LaBarbera is a student at
the Army’s Command and Staff College, www.military.com/opin-
Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has completed ion/0,15202,91380,00.html. Military.com,
four Global War on Terrorism deployments March 2006.
totaling 44 months. He served in various 9
Ibid.
command-and-staff positions in the conti-
nental United States, Iraq and Afghani- 10
Romagnioli, Paul. “Increasing the Effec-
stan, including rifle-company command- tiveness in Training and Doctrine
er, 2-14 Infantry, 10th Mountain Division;
armored-reconnaissance company train-
er (observer-controller), National Training
Center, Fort Irwin, CA; and three transi-
tion-team billets as an adviser. The advis-
er assignments were to an Iraqi army bri-
gade S-3, the 4-6 Iraqi army brigade com-