LSS - Module 8 - Ethics
LSS - Module 8 - Ethics
Author Information
James Fieser
Email: [email protected]
University of Tennessee at Martin
U. S. A.
Ethics
The field of ethics (or moral philosophy) involves systematizing, defending, and recommending
concepts of right and wrong behavior. Philosophers today usually divide ethical theories into
three general subject areas: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied
ethics. Metaethics investigates where our ethical principles come from, and what they mean. Are
they merely social inventions? Do they involve more than expressions of our individual emotions?
Metaethical answers to these questions focus on the issues of universal truths, the will of God, the
role of reason in ethical judgments, and the meaning of ethical terms themselves. Normative
ethics takes on a more practical task, which is to arrive at moral standards that regulate right
and wrong conduct. This may involve articulating the good habits that we should acquire, the
duties that we should follow, or the consequences of our behavior on others. Finally, applied
ethics involves examining specific controversial issues, such as abortion, infanticide, animal
rights, environmental concerns, homosexuality, capital punishment, or nuclear war.
By using the conceptual tools of metaethics and normative ethics, discussions in applied ethics
try to resolve these controversial issues. The lines of distinction between metaethics, normative
ethics, and applied ethics are often blurry. For example, the issue of abortion is an applied ethical
topic since it involves a specific type of controversial behavior. But it also depends on more
general normative principles, such as the right of self-rule and the right to life, which are litmus
tests for determining the morality of that procedure. The issue also rests on metaethical issues
such as, "where do rights come from?" and "what kind of beings have rights?"
Table of Contents
1. Metaethics
a. Metaphysical Issues: Objectivism and Relativism
b. Psychological Issues in Metaethics
i. Egoism and Altruism
ii. Emotion and Reason
iii. Male and Female Morality
2. Normative Ethics
a. Virtue Theories
b. Duty Theories
c. Consequentialist Theories
i. Types of Utilitarianism
ii. Ethical Egoism and Social Contract Theory
3. Applied Ethics
a. Normative Principles in Applied Ethics
b. Issues in Applied Ethics
4. References and Further Reading
LSS – MODULE 08: ETHICS
1. Metaethics
The term "meta" means after or beyond, and, consequently, the notion of metaethics involves a
removed, or bird's eye view of the entire project of ethics. We may define metaethics as the study
of the origin and meaning of ethical concepts. When compared to normative ethics and applied
ethics, the field of metaethics is the least precisely defined area of moral philosophy. It covers
issues from moral semantics to moral epistemology. Two issues, though, are prominent:
(1) metaphysical issues concerning whether morality exists independently of humans, and
(2) psychological issues concerning the underlying mental basis of our moral judgments and
conduct.
simply in the preferences of individual people. This view was advocated by Sextus, and in more
recent centuries by Michel Montaigne and William Graham Sumner. In addition to espousing
skepticism and relativism, this-worldly approaches to the metaphysical status of morality deny
the absolute and universal nature of morality and hold instead that moral values in fact change
from society to society throughout time and throughout the world. They frequently attempt to
defend their position by citing examples of values that differ dramatically from one culture to
another, such as attitudes about polygamy, homosexuality and human sacrifice.
Although emotional factors often do influence our conduct, he argued, we should nevertheless
resist that kind of sway. Instead, true moral action is motivated only by reason when it is free
from emotions and desires. A recent rationalist approach, offered by Kurt Baier (1958), was
proposed in direct opposition to the emotivist and prescriptivist theories of Ayer and others. Baier
focuses more broadly on the reasoning and argumentation process that takes place when making
moral choices. All of our moral choices are, or at least can be, backed by some reason or
justification. If I claim that it is wrong to steal someone's car, then I should be able to justify my
claim with some kind of argument. For example, I could argue that stealing Smith's car is wrong
since this would upset her, violate her ownership rights, or put the thief at risk of getting caught.
According to Baier, then, proper moral decision making involves giving the best reasons in
support of one course of action versus another.
2. Normative Ethics
Normative ethics involves arriving at moral standards that regulate right and wrong conduct. In
a sense, it is a search for an ideal litmus test of proper behavior. The Golden Rule is a classic
example of a normative principle: We should do to others what we would want others to do to us.
Since I do not want my neighbor to steal my car, then it is wrong for me to steal her car. Since I
would want people to feed me if I was starving, then I should help feed starving people. Using
this same reasoning, I can theoretically determine whether any possible action is right or wrong.
So, based on the Golden Rule, it would also be wrong for me to lie to, harass, victimize, assault,
or kill others. The Golden Rule is an example of a normative theory that establishes a single
principle against which we judge all actions. Other normative theories focus on a set of
foundational principles, or a set of good character traits.
The key assumption in normative ethics is that there is only one ultimate criterion of moral
conduct, whether it is a single rule or a set of principles. Three strategies will be noted here: (1)
virtue theories, (2) duty theories, and (3) consequentialist theories.
LSS – MODULE 08: ETHICS
a. Virtue Theories
Many philosophers believe that morality consists of following precisely defined rules of conduct,
such as "don't kill," or "don't steal." Presumably, I must learn these rules, and then make sure each
of my actions live up to the rules. Virtue ethics, however, places less emphasis on learning rules,
and instead stresses the importance of developing good habits of character, such as benevolence
(see moral character). Once I've acquired benevolence, for example, I will then habitually act in
a benevolent manner. Historically, virtue theory is one of the oldest normative traditions in
Western philosophy, having its roots in ancient Greek civilization. Plato emphasized four virtues
in particular, which were later called cardinal virtues: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice.
Other important virtues are fortitude, generosity, self-respect, good temper, and sincerity. In
addition to advocating good habits of character, virtue theorists hold that we should avoid
acquiring bad character traits, or vices, such as cowardice, insensibility, injustice, and vanity.
Virtue theory emphasizes moral education since virtuous character traits are developed in one's
youth. Adults, therefore, are responsible for instilling virtues in the young.
Aristotle argued that virtues are good habits that we acquire, which regulate our emotions. For
example, in response to my natural feelings of fear, I should develop the virtue of courage which
allows me to be firm when facing danger. Analyzing 11 specific virtues, Aristotle argued that most
virtues fall at a mean between more extreme character traits. With courage, for example, if I do
not have enough courage, I develop the disposition of cowardice, which is a vice. If I have too
much courage I develop the disposition of rashness which is also a vice. According to Aristotle, it
is not an easy task to find the perfect mean between extreme character traits. In fact, we need
assistance from our reason to do this. After Aristotle, medieval theologians supplemented Greek
lists of virtues with three Christian ones, or theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. Interest
in virtue theory continued through the middle ages and declined in the 19 th century with the rise
of alternative moral theories below. In the mid 20th century virtue theory received special
attention from philosophers who believed that more recent ethical theories were misguided for
focusing too heavily on rules and actions, rather than on virtuous character traits. Alasdaire
MacIntyre (1984) defended the central role of virtues in moral theory and argued that virtues are
grounded in and emerge from within social traditions.
b. Duty Theories
Many of us feel that there are clear obligations we have as human beings, such as to care for our
children, and to not commit murder. Duty theories base morality on specific, foundational
principles of obligation. These theories are sometimes called deontological, from the Greek
word deon, or duty, in view of the foundational nature of our duty or obligation. They are also
sometimes called nonconsequentialist since these principles are obligatory, irrespective of the
consequences that might follow from our actions. For example, it is wrong to not care for our
children even if it results in some great benefit, such as financial savings. There are four central
duty theories.
The first is that championed by 17th century German philosopher Samuel Pufendorf, who
classified dozens of duties under three headings: duties to God, duties to oneself, and duties to
others. Concerning our duties towards God, he argued that there are two kinds:
1. a theoretical duty to know the existence and nature of God, and
2. a practical duty to both inwardly and outwardly worship God.
Concerning our duties towards oneself, these are also of two sorts:
1. duties of the soul, which involve developing one's skills and talents, and
2. duties of the body, which involve not harming our bodies, as we might through gluttony
or drunkenness, and not killing oneself.
LSS – MODULE 08: ETHICS
Concerning our duties towards others, Pufendorf divides these between absolute duties, which
are universally binding on people, and conditional duties, which are the result of contracts
between people. Absolute duties are of three sorts:
1. avoid wronging others,
2. treat people as equals, and
3. promote the good of others.
Conditional duties involve various types of agreements, the principal one of which is the duty is
to keep one's promises.
A second duty-based approach to ethics is rights theory. Most generally, a "right" is a justified
claim against another person's behavior - such as my right to not be harmed by you (see
also human rights). Rights and duties are related in such a way that the rights of one person
implies the duties of another person. For example, if I have a right to payment of $10 by Smith,
then Smith has a duty to pay me $10. This is called the correlativity of rights and duties. The most
influential early account of rights theory is that of 17 th century British philosopher John Locke,
who argued that the laws of nature mandate that we should not harm anyone's life, health, liberty
or possessions. For Locke, these are our natural rights, given to us by God. Following Locke, the
United States Declaration of Independence authored by Thomas Jefferson recognizes three
foundational rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson and others rights theorists
maintained that we deduce other more specific rights from these, including the rights of property,
movement, speech, and religious expression. There are four features traditionally associated with
moral rights. First, rights are natural insofar as they are not invented or created by governments.
Second, they are universal insofar as they do not change from country to country. Third, they
are equal in the sense that rights are the same for all people, irrespective of gender, race, or
handicap. Fourth, they are inalienable which means that I cannot hand over my rights to another
person, such as by selling myself into slavery.
A third duty-based theory is that by Kant, which emphasizes a single principle of duty. Influenced
by Pufendorf, Kant agreed that we have moral duties to oneself and others, such as developing
one's talents, and keeping our promises to others. However, Kant argued that there is a more
foundational principle of duty that encompasses our particular duties. It is a single, self-evident
principle of reason that he calls the "categorical imperative." A categorical imperative, he argued,
is fundamentally different from hypothetical imperatives that hinge on some personal desire that
we have, for example, "If you want to get a good job, then you ought to go to college." By
contrast, a categorical imperative simply mandates an action, irrespective of one's personal
desires, such as "You ought to do X." Kant gives at least four versions of the categorical
imperative, but one is especially direct: Treat people as an end, and never as a means to an end.
That is, we should always treat people with dignity, and never use them as mere instruments. For
Kant, we treat people as an end whenever our actions toward someone reflect the inherent value
of that person. Donating to charity, for example, is morally correct since this acknowledges the
inherent value of the recipient. By contrast, we treat someone as a means to an end whenever we
treat that person as a tool to achieve something else. It is wrong, for example, to steal my
neighbor's car since I would be treating her as a means to my own happiness. The categorical
imperative also regulates the morality of actions that affect us individually. Suicide, for example,
would be wrong since I would be treating my life as a means to the alleviation of my misery. Kant
believes that the morality of all actions can be determined by appealing to this single principle of
duty.
A fourth and more recent duty-based theory is that by British philosopher W.D. Ross, which
emphasizes prima facie duties. Like his 17th and 18th century counterparts, Ross argues that our
duties are "part of the fundamental nature of the universe." However, Ross's list of duties is much
shorter, which he believes reflects our actual moral convictions:
LSS – MODULE 08: ETHICS
c. Consequentialist Theories
It is common for us to determine our moral responsibility by weighing the consequences of our
actions. According to consequentialism, correct moral conduct is determined solely by a cost-
benefit analysis of an action's consequences:
Consequentialism: An action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more
favorable than unfavorable.
Consequentialist normative principles require that we first tally both the good and bad
consequences of an action. Second, we then determine whether the total good consequences
outweigh the total bad consequences. If the good consequences are greater, then the action is
morally proper. If the bad consequences are greater, then the action is morally improper.
Consequentialist theories are sometimes called teleological theories, from the Greek word telos,
or end, since the end result of the action is the sole determining factor of its morality.
Consequentialist theories became popular in the 18th century by philosophers who wanted a quick
way to morally assess an action by appealing to experience, rather than by appealing to gut
intuitions or long lists of questionable duties. In fact, the most attractive feature of
consequentialism is that it appeals to publicly observable consequences of actions. Most versions
of consequentialism are more precisely formulated than the general principle above. In
particular, competing consequentialist theories specify which consequences for affected groups
of people are relevant. Three subdivisions of consequentialism emerge:
Ethical Egoism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more
favorable than unfavorable only to the agent performing the action.
Ethical Altruism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more
favorable than unfavorable to everyone except the agent.
Utilitarianism: an action is morally right if the consequences of that action are more
favorable than unfavorable to everyone.
All three of these theories focus on the consequences of actions for different groups of people.
But, like all normative theories, the above three theories are rivals of each other. They also yield
different conclusions. Consider the following example. A woman was traveling through a
developing country when she witnessed a car in front of her run off the road and roll over several
times. She asked the hired driver to pull over to assist, but, to her surprise, the driver accelerated
nervously past the scene. A few miles down the road the driver explained that in his country if
someone assists an accident victim, then the police often hold the assisting person responsible
LSS – MODULE 08: ETHICS
for the accident itself. If the victim dies, then the assisting person could be held responsible for
the death. The driver continued explaining that road accident victims are therefore usually left
unattended and often die from exposure to the country's harsh desert conditions. On the principle
of ethical egoism, the woman in this illustration would only be concerned with the consequences
of her attempted assistance as she would be affected. Clearly, the decision to drive on would be
the morally proper choice. On the principle of ethical altruism, she would be concerned only with
the consequences of her action as others are affected, particularly the accident victim. Tallying
only those consequences reveals that assisting the victim would be the morally correct choice,
irrespective of the negative consequences that result for her. On the principle of utilitarianism,
she must consider the consequences for both herself and the victim. The outcome here is less
clear, and the woman would need to precisely calculate the overall benefit versus disbenefit of
her action.
i. Types of Utilitarianism
Jeremy Bentham presented one of the earliest fully developed systems of utilitarianism. Two
features of his theory are noteworty. First, Bentham proposed that we tally the consequences of
each action we perform and thereby determine on a case by case basis whether an action is
morally right or wrong. This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as act-utilitiarianism. Second,
Bentham also proposed that we tally the pleasure and pain which results from our actions. For
Bentham, pleasure and pain are the only consequences that matter in determining whether our
conduct is moral. This aspect of Bentham's theory is known as hedonistic utilitarianism. Critics
point out limitations in both of these aspects.
First, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally wrong to waste time on leisure activities
such as watching television, since our time could be spent in ways that produced a greater social
benefit, such as charity work. But prohibiting leisure activities doesn't seem reasonable. More
significantly, according to act-utilitarianism, specific acts of torture or slavery would be morally
permissible if the social benefit of these actions outweighed the disbenefit. A revised version of
utilitarianism called rule-utilitarianism addresses these problems. According to rule-utilitarianism,
a behavioral code or rule is morally right if the consequences of adopting that rule are more
favorable than unfavorable to everyone. Unlike act utilitarianism, which weighs the consequences
of each particular action, rule-utilitarianism offers a litmus test only for the morality of moral
rules, such as "stealing is wrong." Adopting a rule against theft clearly has more favorable
consequences than unfavorable consequences for everyone. The same is true for moral rules
against lying or murdering. Rule-utilitarianism, then, offers a three-tiered method for judging
conduct. A particular action, such as stealing my neighbor's car, is judged wrong since it violates
a moral rule against theft. In turn, the rule against theft is morally binding because adopting this
rule produces favorable consequences for everyone. John Stuart Mill's version of utilitarianism is
rule-oriented.
Second, according to hedonistic utilitarianism, pleasurable consequences are the only factors
that matter, morally speaking. This, though, seems too restrictive since it ignores other morally
significant consequences that are not necessarily pleasing or painful. For example, acts which
foster loyalty and friendship are valued, yet they are not always pleasing. In response to this
problem, G.E. Moore proposed ideal utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that
we intuitively recognize as good or bad (and not simply as pleasurable or painful). Also, R.M. Hare
proposed preference utilitarianism, which involves tallying any consequence that fulfills our
preferences.
LSS – MODULE 08: ETHICS
3. Applied Ethics
Applied ethics is the branch of ethics which consists of the analysis of specific, controversial moral
issues such as abortion, animal rights, or euthanasia. In recent years applied ethical issues have
been subdivided into convenient groups such as medical ethics, business ethics, environmental
ethics, and sexual ethics. Generally speaking, two features are necessary for an issue to be
considered an "applied ethical issue." First, the issue needs to be controversial in the sense that
there are significant groups of people both for and against the issue at hand. The issue of drive-
by shooting, for example, is not an applied ethical issue, since everyone agrees that this practice
is grossly immoral. By contrast, the issue of gun control would be an applied ethical issue since
there are significant groups of people both for and against gun control.
The second requirement for an issue to be an applied ethical issue is that it must be a distinctly
moral issue. On any given day, the media presents us with an array of sensitive issues such as
affirmative action policies, gays in the military, involuntary commitment of the mentally impaired,
capitalistic versus socialistic business practices, public versus private health care systems, or
energy conservation. Although all of these issues are controversial and have an important impact
on society, they are not all moral issues. Some are only issues of social policy. The aim of social
policy is to help make a given society run efficiently by devising conventions, such as traffic laws,
tax laws, and zoning codes. Moral issues, by contrast, concern more universally obligatory
practices, such as our duty to avoid lying, and are not confined to individual societies. Frequently,
issues of social policy and morality overlap, as with murder which is both socially prohibited and
immoral. However, the two groups of issues are often distinct. For example, many people would
argue that sexual promiscuity is immoral, but may not feel that there should be social policies
regulating sexual conduct, or laws punishing us for promiscuity. Similarly, some social policies
forbid residents in certain neighborhoods from having yard sales. But, so long as the neighbors
are not offended, there is nothing immoral in itself about a resident having a yard sale in one of
these neighborhoods. Thus, to qualify as an applied ethical issue, the issue must be more than
one of mere social policy: it must be morally relevant as well.
In theory, resolving particular applied ethical issues should be easy. With the issue of abortion,
for example, we would simply determine its morality by consulting our normative principle of
choice, such as act-utilitarianism. If a given abortion produces greater benefit than disbenefit,
then, according to act-utilitarianism, it would be morally acceptable to have the abortion.
Unfortunately, there are perhaps hundreds of rival normative principles from which to choose,
many of which yield opposite conclusions. Thus, the stalemate in normative ethics between
LSS – MODULE 08: ETHICS
conflicting theories prevents us from using a single decisive procedure for determining the
morality of a specific issue. The usual solution today to this stalemate is to consult several
representative normative principles on a given issue and see where the weight of the evidence
lies.
for surgery. First, foregoing surgery appeared to be in the best interests of the infant, given the
poor quality of life it would endure. Second, the status of Baby Doe's right to life was not clear
given the severity of the infant's mental impairment. For, to possess moral rights, it takes more
than merely having a human body: certain cognitive functions must also be present. The issue
here involves what is often referred to as moral personhood, and is central to many applied
ethical discussions.
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