GULU UNIVERSITY

NAME: AMOLA ARTHUR ISAAC

REG No: 18/U/1802/GBL/PS

COURSE UNIT: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

LECTURER: Mr. KITARA TONNY

Question

“Admission of facts of an alleged offense by a suspect amounts to a Confession and there

can never be any objections to its admissibility during the criminal trial” Per LLB III
Student Gulu University. Using your knowledge on Confessions, discuss.
Confession is an admission of guilt apropos the crime which the accused is charged. The
general rule regarding a Confession is that it must be made by the accused voluntarily to
be termed as evidence against him. 1 This stipulates that any confession adduced must be a
clear statement confirming to the facts. Lord Atkins as per Swami v King Emperor2
endorses any statement by an accused suggesting the inference that he committed a
crime. Justice Mulenga agrees with the above dictum as per Uganda v Yosamu3 where he
denotes that a confession is an unequivocal admission of having communicated an act
that is unlawful. In addition, my point of analysis stipulates that for a confession on
murder charge, the facts adduced must clearly sight malice aforethought, committing
unlawful killings.4

Before 1971, confessions could be made to a Police officer of the rank of corporal. 5 This is
interpreted by virtue of Decree 25 of 1971 that clearly emancipates the capability of any
Police officer pivoted the privilege to hearing confessions. 6 However, much emphasis is
clearly replicated by Justice Kanyeihamba in the famous case of Lutwama David v
Uganda7 as he stipulates his dictum upon, “no confession made by any person whilst he is
in the custody of a Police officer.” Upon the given facts, my analysis asserts that credibility
is echoed to any Police officers mandated with the initiative to hear confessions.

In Uganda, the law on admissibility of confessions is echoed by the facts that adduce
credibility of evidence. 8 This is interpreted by Section 23 (1) of the Evidence Act adducing
to the effect that no confession made whilst in custody is credible unless before a Police
Assistant or magistrate. Much emphasis is illustrated in Ngumba & anor v R9 where
notice of a confession to any other person is inadmissible unless to the magistrate or
1
The Admissibility of Confessions in Criminal Cases by T D MacDonald & A H Hart Halifax at 1
2
[1939] All ER 45
3
[1988] HCB 4
4
Penal Code Act Section 188
5
See, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in African Criminal Proceedings’ by M Cherif Bassiouni, Ziyad Motala (1995)
at 105
6
Also, ‘Evidence obtained in Consequence of an Inadmissible Confession’ by A Choo, 57 Journal of Criminal law
(1993) at 195-198
7
Criminal Appeal No 4/2003
8
Note, ‘Admission of Confessions in Uganda: Unpacking the theoretical, substantive and procedural considerations
of the Supreme court’ by Robert Doya Nanima (2017) at 1-5
9
[1975] EA 223
Police officer. With reference to the above facts, it can clearly be noted keen interest is
drawn to the fact that all admissible evidence is relevant but all relevant evidence isn’t
admissible.

The general rule on validity of confession is that all statements acknowledging facts
mustn’t be coerced.10 This is interpreted through Section 24 of the Evidence Act to the
effect that all confessions adduced by threats, violent force calculates to untrue
confessions and is inadmissible. As sighted in Muriuki v R11, we clearly witness that any
confessions inducted by threats are regarded as inadmissible. Henceforth, in my point of
analysis, the balance on the probability of voluntariness whilst adducing a statement is a
clear manifest of a valid confession.

However, the following procedures are to be effective whilst recording extrajudicial

statements as a confession. This is established in Festo Androa Asenua v Uganda12
advocating that the accused isn’t at trial and consequently mustn’t be taken in any court.
Thus in my point of analysis, we clearly witness that once admission of facts are adduced,
this bars the accused to being at trial.

Secondly, no police officer should be present in the making of the extrajudicial

statement.13 This is enshrined in Beronda v Uganda14 in which it is undesirable that any
police officer should be present whilst an extrajudicial statement is being recorded to
avoid inducements as well as enable voluntary confession. As a matter of fact, my point of
view clearly sights this as an initiative to protecting the accused’s point of interest
advocating for the right to be heard.

Thirdly, the magistrate should also inquire the language the prisoner speaks.
Consequently where the magistrate doesn’t understand it, he is required to send for an
interpreter and the charge of the arrest shall be explained to the accused. This is

10
Confessions and Admissions by M C Slough (1959) Fordham Law Review Volume 28 Issue 1 Article 2 at 102
11
[1975] EA 223
12
[1998] Supra No 1
13
C Fai, ‘Illegally obtained evidence 15 Singapore Law Review’ (1994) at 98
14
[1974] EA 46
expounded in Ekai v R15 emphasizing magistrates before whom a confession is made
must caution the person making the confession. With reference to the above facts, we can
conclude on inquiry of language negates the mindset by any magistrate as a rapport of
substantive law.

Fourthly, the prisoner should be asked if he wishes to say anything about the charges
against him and subsequently be informed of the right to remain silent.

In addition, the Magistrate needs to satisfy himself about the voluntariness of confessions
about to be made to him by the accused and consequently caution the accused about the
effect of the confession. This is endorsed in R v O’donoghue16 advocating any statement
must satisfy by all reasonably possible means that it is entirely voluntary.

The prisoner should also satisfy the correctness of the extrajudicial statement after it
being made and read to him subsequent times and consequently the maker should sign
or thumb print. The judicial officer and the interpreter should sign the extrajudicial
statement.

Lastly, the extrajudicial statement should then be handed over to the police officer who is
waiting outside the chambers.

To a smaller extent, admission of facts by a suspect amounts to a Confession as

follows;

For a confession to be admissible, it must be made voluntarily by the accused. This is

interpreted in Section 2 (1) of the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act that vitiates
any confessions replicated from torture. The onus of determining the voluntariness is
stipulated in Njuguna & Others v R17 in which the duty is predetermined upon the judge
to examine with closest care and attention all the circumstances in which the confession
was obtained. With reference to the above facts, we clearly note that voluntary
inducement of facts preempts to a confession as valid.

15
[1981] KLR 569
16
[1927] 20 Cr App 132
17
21 EACA 316
It should also be noted that the prosecution has to satisfy beyond reasonable doubt that
the statement procured is voluntarily. This is well illustrated in Director of Public
Prosecutions v Pin Lin18 in which the onus lied on the prosecution to satisfy beyond
reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary. On the balance, keen interest
henceforth reflects it is necessary to prove beyond reasonable doubt the statement
adduced is made voluntary.

Confessions must also be equivocal. The general rule stipulates clarity and should be free
from any ambiguity whilst adducing confessions. Lord Atkins as per Swami v King
Emperor19 endorses any statement by an accused suggesting the inference that he
committed a crime. Justice Mulenga agrees with the above dictum as per Uganda v
Yosamu20 where he denotes that a confession is an unequivocal admission of having
communicated an act that is unlawful. With reference to the above facts, my point f view
asserts the principle of clarity and freedom from any ambiguity whilst adducing facts as
admissible.

However, it should also be noted that not all admission of facts by a suspect
amounts to a Confession hence objections as follows;

Confessions made to a friend who appears as a witness is inadmissible. This is interpreted

in Deo Kinanan v R21 where emphasis stipulates that any confessions adduced to a friend
whose a witness is inadmissible unless the person has control over the accused. With
reference to the above facts, we can conclude that confessions adduced to any witness is
inadmissible if no control towards the facts is sighted.

Furthermore, confessions procured through torture are invalid because it diminishes

human rights. This is interpreted as per Article 24 22 that clearly prohibits any form of
torture and disregards information obtained whilst in the proceedings. 23 Lord Bingham in

18
[1973] 3 All ER 175
19
ibid
20
ibid
21
[1968] 2 All ER 346
22
1995 Constitution of Uganda as Amended
23
The Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act 2012, Section 14
his dictum per A v Secretary of State for Home Department 24 agrees with the
principles of common law compelling the exclusion of evidence procured through torture
as unreliable. This is also adopted with Uganda v Ewaku S/o Edulu 25 where emphasis
draws that a confession extracted from an accused by torture is hardly said to be
voluntary. On a balance, keen interest sights confessions procured through torture are
inadmissible.

In addition, a confession becomes an issue when it is challenged and seeks to deal with
repudiation and retraction. This is clearly witnessed in Tuwamio v Uganda26 endorsing
that a retracted statement occurs when the accused made a statement but now seeks to
renounce it on ground of force whilst repudiated statement entails that the accused
denies he never made the statement in the first place. This is further reechoed as per
Amos Binuge v Uganda27 stipulating that when the admissibility of extra judicial
statement is challenged, the accused must be given a chance to establish evidence
through a trial within a trial. Henceforth in my point of view, before any confession is
retracted it should pass the corroboration test.

Further, a confession can also be objected where the corroborative facts adduced don’t
preclude to the above crime. This is interpreted by Section 23 (b) that entails such
evidence should be corroborating with other matters sighted in the case. This is
witnessed in Uganda v Okumu (supra)28 where credit is acknowledged to the medical
report as sufficient evidence as corroboration for the confession made against crime.
With reference to the above facts, one should acknowledge the tremendous element of
corroborative facts because it acts as a scapegoat to the facts adduced.

On a balance, we can clearly agree that the profound principle that all admissible
evidence is relevant but not all relevant evidence isn’t admissible. This simply requires
voluntariness whilst adducing evidence and it shouldn’t be coerced.

24
[2006] 1 All ER 575
25
[1978] HCB 1
26
[1967] EA 84
27
[1989] Supra Cri App No23
28
BIBIOLOGRAPHY

1995 Constitution of Uganda as Amended

Evidence Act

Penal Code Act

Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act

Swami v King Emperor [1939] All ER 45

Uganda v Yosamu [1988] HCB 4

Lutwama David v Uganda Criminal Appeal No 4/2003

Ngumba & anor v R [1975] EA 223

Muriuki v R [1975] EA 223

Festo Androa Asenua v Uganda [1998] Supra No 1

Beronda v Uganda [1974] EA 46

Ekai v R [1981] KLR 569

R v O’donoghue [1927] 20 Cr App 132

Njuguna & Others v R 21 EACA 316

Director of Public Prosecutions v Pin Lin [1973] 3 All ER 175

Deo Kinanan v R [1968] 2 All ER 346

A v Secretary of State for Home Department [2006] 1 All ER 575

Uganda v Ewaku S/o Edulu [1978] HCB 1

Tuwamio v Uganda [1967] EA 84

Amos Binuge v Uganda [1989] Supra Cri App No23

The Admissibility of Confessions in Criminal Cases by T D MacDonald & A H Hart Halifax at 1

See, ‘The Protection of Human Rights in African Criminal Proceedings’ by M Cherif Bassiouni, Ziyad Motala (1995)
at 105

Also, ‘Evidence obtained in Consequence of an Inadmissible Confession’ by A Choo, 57 Journal of Criminal law
(1993) at 195-198

Note, ‘Admission of Confessions in Uganda: Unpacking the theoretical, substantive and procedural considerations
of the Supreme Court’ by Robert Doya Nanima (2017) at 1-5

Confessions and Admissions by M C Slough (1959) Fordham Law Review Volume 28 Issue 1 Article 2 at 102

C Fai, ‘Illegally obtained evidence 15 Singapore Law Review’ (1994) at 98