Some Answered Questions

A Philosophical Perspective

Ian Kluge

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to identify and explore the
philosophical positions explicitly and implicitly embedded in
Some Answered Questions (SAQ) which celebrates the centenary
of its publication this year. Such a study of SAQ is valuable
for at least five reasons. First, it facilitates a deeper and more
precise understanding and appreciation of the philosophical
foundations of the Bahá’í Writings. Indeed, SAQ itself clearly
invites examination from a philosophic perspective not only by
the way it implicitly incorporates philosophical concepts or
ideas in its explanations but also by its explicit discussions of
such topics as the “reality of the exterior world,”1 the nature of
God, proofs for God’s existence, the difference between
emanation and manifestation and the four-fold analysis of
causality to name only the most obvious. While these examples
all refer to ontological issues, SAQ also deals explicitly with
issues in onto-theology, epistemology, personal and social
ethics as well as in philosophical anthropology and psychology.
Second, `Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that “in this age the peoples
of the world need the arguments of reason”2 also invites a
rational, i.e. philosophical analysis of SAQ (and the Writings)
in order to make our teaching more effective by meeting
people’s need for the “arguments of reason.” Bahá’u’lláh’s
exhortation to “be anxiously concerned with the needs of the
age ye live in”3 reinforces our obligations in this regard.
Third, a philosophic understanding of SAQ is extremely
useful in conducting rational inter-faith dialogue, not only to
discover the foundational similarities we would expect to find
since religions are essentially one, but also to give precise
formulations and analyses of historically developed doctrinal
differences. By putting such dialogue on a rational,
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 150

philosophical footing, we are more likely to generate genuine

understanding than by mere exchanges of competing views.
Fourth, a philosophic understanding of SAQ (and the Writings
as a whole) also facilitates the task of apologetics, of explaining
and defending the teachings against critique or even outright
attack. This is difficult to accomplish without a good
understanding of the philosophic foundations of the Bahá’í
teachings and the issues they involve. Even if opponents are not
convinced, it will at least be possible to demonstrate that the
teachings have a rational foundation and form a coherent
world-vision or Weltanschauung. A philosophically based,
rational apologetics will be an increasingly useful, too, as the
Faith becomes better known and subject to more sophisticated
critiques. Finally, a philosophical understanding of SAQ will
help scholars determine the nature of the ideas that inform the
Bahá’í Faith, and to identify those philosophical schools with
which it shares the greatest affinities. Conversely, it will help us
discover which schools are the most difficult to reconcile with
SAQ (and the Writings in general) and why this is so. Such
understanding also helps us to determine what makes the Bahá’í
teachings philosophically unique and uniquely fitted to meet
“the needs of the age [we] live in.”4
In studying SAQ from a philosophic perspective, we shall
examine not only the explicitly given philosophical statements
but also their wider implications or extensions in order to
show their applicability to a wide variety of areas. For example,
`Abdu’l-Bahá makes use of Aristotle’s theory of four-fold
causality — a concept often misunderstood by modern
philosophers and scientists — and says that this analysis of
causality applies to “the existence of everything.”5 Thus, as we
shall demonstrate, it is possible to extend its application to the
analysis of the family, society in general or even the Bahá’í
community. Moreover, implicit in this causal analysis is an
entire ontology of matter and form, essence, substance,
essential and accidental attributes and teleology. These terms
and categories exemplify a particular way of observing and
analysing reality that differs dramatically from other schools
of thought such as modern empiricism or postmodernism.
Bahá’ís wishing a more complete philosophic understanding of
SAQ (and the Writings) should be familiar with this way of
analysing reality which has clear affinities to the philosophical
tradition begun by Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus — what this
paper calls ‘the Athenian tradition’ — and continues most
Some Answered Questions 151

actively in our time in the work of Whitehead and in the works

of the various schools of neo-Aristotelians and neo-Thomists. 6
This study will also begin the process of extracting implicit
philosophical principles and implications from SAQ, such as,
for example, a version of intelligent design theory inherent in
the teaching that “Nature is subjected to an absolute
organization, to determined laws, to a complete order and a
finished design.” 7 This statement clearly rules out the more
militant forms of Darwinism promulgated by such writers as
Dawkins 8 and Hitchens, 9 which claim that the universe, and
life, especially human life, are merely a result of blind
fortuitous accidents. This does not imply that SAQ embraces
the Christian versions of intelligent design, but it does imply
that SAQ accepts some variation of intelligent design theory.
Consequently, in light of the teaching of harmony between
religion and science, Bahá’ís are faced with a new philosophic
challenge of how to reconcile the acceptance of intelligent
design with vehement scientific rejection of any such concept.
The resulting investigations will inevitably lead us to further
explorations of the Writings and the philosophy of science.
1. SAQ’s Ontology: Some Basic Principles
In its simplest terms, ontology concerns our theory of being
i.e. what we mean when we say that something ‘is’ or ‘is real’ as
opposed to being ‘unreal;’ ontology also explores the nature of
real things and how they are related to each other. Doing
ontology is unavoidable since, either explicitly or implicitly,
every statement about the world contains ontological
assumptions that guide our understanding and action. For
example, the simple statement, ‘I shall walk the dog’ assumes (a)
that ‘I’ exists in some way, (b) that ‘I’ have could make such a
decision, (c) the dog exists in some way, (d) that ‘I’ and the dog
are distinct and separate entities, exterior to each other, (e)
that motion is possible and real and that (f) the city street
outside also exists. It is, of course, possible to dig much, much
deeper, but this simple example illustrates that we cannot avoid
doing ontology even in our simplest thought processes and
actions.
This certainly applies to religious texts. For example, if a
religion teaches that there is a transcendent God Who is the
source or ground of the material world, it has made several
ontological claims. The most obvious is that reality contains
two different kinds of entities. On one hand we have a
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 152

contingent, material world that depends on something else for

its existence and on the other, an entity which is non-
contingent, independent and not material. It follows therefore
that ontologically speaking, existence has at least a dualistic,
two part structure involving two radically different kinds of
entities and that the existence of one ‘part’ i.e. God, is a
logically necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of
the other, i.e. creation. This, in turn, has implications for our
relationship to non-contingent, independent source as well as
its contingent and dependent world this Source created. At
this point, ontology reveals practical implications for our lives
because how we conduct our lives is a determined by how we
understand reality. Ontology begins to show its onto-
theological and ethical implications.
We shall begin our exploration of the ontology embedded in
SAQ by asking a fundamental question: is the exterior world
real or is it unreal i.e. a dream, illusion, fiction or
construction created either by Descartes’ demon, Maya or even
by ourselves? The belief that the exterior world is a mere fantasy
may be called ‘maya-ism’ after the veiling or illusion creating
power (sometimes portrayed as a goddess) in the Hindu
religion. In SAQ, `Abdu’l-Bahá flatly rejects the view that
reality is a phantasm.
Certain sophists think that existence is an illusion, that
each being is an absolute illusion which has no
existence — in other words, that the existence of beings
is like a mirage, or like the reflection of an image in
water or in a mirror, which is only an appearance
having in itself no principle, foundation or reality.
This theory is erroneous. 10
It is noteworthy that `Abdu’l-Bahá refers to those who
maintain that the world is an “absolute illusion” as “sophists,”
a term traditionally associated with flawed and deceptive
reasoning. Use of this term signals His rejection of maya-ism
which is confirmed by His statement that “[t]his theory is
erroneous.” Consequently, for any Bahá’í-based philosophy, the
unqualified assertion that “existence is an illusion” is not an
option for understanding reality. This limitation is significant
because it helps establish the view that SAQ contributes to
laying out guidelines within which any Bahá’í-based philosophy
must work.
Some Answered Questions 153

2. Ontological Realism

Three closely related far-reaching consequences follow from

`Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement. The first and most obvious is that
“each being”11 in the exterior world is real, i.e. possesses some
“principle, foundation, or reality”12 which give it some degree
of existence “in itself.” In other words, “each being” has at least
some degree of innate existence, is individual, is distinct and
possesses some detachment or independence from other beings
and is, in that sense, unique. As `Abdu’l-Bahá’ says in a later
section of this passage, “in their own degree they [things in the
exterior world] exist.”13 Each thing “in the condition of being
[] has a real and certain existence.”14 They are not mere
“appearances” of something else, i.e. epiphenomena, passive
side-effects or by-products that possesses no “principle,
foundation or reality” of their own. This idea is re-enforced by
the following statement:
for though the existence of beings in relation to the
existence of God is an illusion, nevertheless, in the
condition of being it has a real and certain existence.
It is futile to deny this. For example, the existence of
the mineral in comparison with that of man is
nonexistence … but the mineral has existence in the
mineral world … Then it is evident that although beings
in relation to the existence of God have no existence,
but are like the mirage or the reflections in the mirror,
yet in their own degree they exist. 15
This statement makes it unequivocably clear that according to
`Abdu’l-Bahá while degrees of reality differ, every being is, in
its own degree, undeniably real. It is worth noting that He
flatly rejects any contradictory viewpoint: “It is futile to deny
this,” He says, thereby foreclosing any argument to the
contrary. He emphasises the reality of creation elsewhere by
stating “Now this world of existence in relation to its maker is
a real phenomenon.”16 In other words, it has its own,
undeniable degree of reality. The reason for this will be
discussed in the section on “Existence and Nonexistence.”
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that each thing has its degree of
existence provides a realist foundation for Bahá’í ontology and
epistemology. If “each being” has its own “principle,
foundation or reality” and reflects one of the names of God in
its own way, it is, therefore, not only genuinely distinct from
all other things but also independent from them, i.e. has its
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 154

own principle or foundation of existence “in itself.”17 Having

this principle or foundation “in itself” establishes a basis for
the ontological independence of “each being” (except, of
course, from God) including independence from human
observers, which is to say, the ontological status of “each
being” is does not depend on being observed by humans or on
human beliefs or linguistic practices. As we shall have occasion
to discover in later discussions, the realist orientation to
reality has enormous implications for epistemology especially
in regards to the concept of ‘essence.’ It also has far-reaching
implications for the relations between Bahá’í philosophy and
contemporary postmodernism. 18
3. Ontological Pluralism

The second major consequence is that in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s

statement we find the ontological basis for ontological
pluralism, i.e. the belief that reality is made up of a multiplicity
of individual things each of which “proclaims to us one of the
names of God”19 in its own way and to the limits of its
capacity. In other words, reality is made up of genuinely
distinct beings whose differences are real and fundamental and
not merely an appearance, illusion or matter of perspective.
Their individual existence is not merely a “mirage” or reducible
to something else that is ‘more fundamental’ such as a ground
of being, or God.
Accepting some form of ontological pluralism entails the
rejection of ontological monism according to which there are
no fundamental divisions or distinctions among things —
including the distinction between the independent Creator and
the dependent creations. In other words, the things of created
world can ultimately be reduced to particular modes of being
or appearances of God who is the only real thing or substance
in existence. All distinctions are illusory for those possessing
the enlightenment to see through the unreal distinct surface
phenomena to the one reality underneath. According to SAQ,
however, the distinctions between individual beings are real,
i.e. “each being” has its own “principle, foundation or
reality”20 though, of course, ultimately, this multiplicity of
beings operates “under one law from which they will never
depart.”21
Moreover, as we shall see, in our discussion about the nature
of God, SAQ categorically rejects any suggestion that God, the
independent and non-contingent Creator can in any way be
Some Answered Questions 155

ontologically one with dependent and contingent creation. The

distinction between the independent and non-contingent and
the dependent and contingent cannot be undone or overcome.
The reason is obvious. For humans to become ontologically one
with the absolutely independent and non-contingent God
would be to lose their particular identity as the kinds of beings
they are, and the same would hold true for God were He to
unite with the contingent. Not only would this deny
ontological pluralism by vitiating real differences, but it would
also imply that there can be change in God insofar as He could
be unified with His creation in some way.
The belief that the existence of the exterior world and its
beings are an illusion vis-à-vis God’s absolute existence is not
an inadvertent re-admission of monism into Bahá’í ontology.
It might be argued that since only God really, i.e. absolutely
exists, then all other things are not real, illusory or mirages.
Consequently, only one being remains — God — as real, and
that, of course, is precisely the monist position, i.e. there is
only one real substance, or being or will and that everything else
is ultimately, unreal, mere epiphenomena. In other words, the
distinctions between things are unreal or illusory, including the
distinction between God and His creation. However, `Abdu’l-
Bahá clearly rejects this position; speaking of the things of this
world, He says, “in their own degree they exist.”22 Elsewhere He
says,
So man exists; the animal, the plant and the mineral
exist also — but the degrees of these four existences
vary. What a difference between the existence of man
and of the animal! Yet both are existences. It is evident
that in existence there are differences of degrees. 23
These statements indicate that although the existence of things
is bestowed by God, it nevertheless is real in its own right and
not merely a chimera. Like a gift, it really belongs to the
recipient though it originates from the wealth and bounty of
another. Here again, we see the commitment to ontological
pluralism re-enforced since from this perspective, the reality of
different grades of being are guaranteed by God’s perfections.
The Creator always had a creation; the rays have always
shone and gleamed from the reality of the sun, for
without the rays the sun would be opaque darkness. The
names and attributes of God require the existence of
beings, and the Eternal Bounty does not cease. If it
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 156

were to, it would be contrary to the perfections of

God. 24
Pluralism is guaranteed because the “names and attributes of
God require the existence of beings,” i.e. require the existence
of beings genuinely different from God. The fact that God is
the origin of this difference does not make it any less real.

4. Distinctions of Being and Power

According to SAQ, the distinctions between the various
kinds of being are based on differences in powers or ability.
For example, “The vegetable spirit is the power of growth …
[t]he animal spirit is the power of all the senses”25 and “human
spirit which distinguishes man from the animal is the rational
soul”26 which
embraces all beings, and as far as human ability
permits discovers the realities of things and becomes
cognizant of their peculiarities and effects, and of the
qualities and properties of beings.27
In other words, ontological differences in the degrees of
being are reflected in the various capacities and powers with
which each kind of being is gifted. Each station includes the
powers possessed by the preceding station and adds a new
power as illustrated by `Abdu’l-Bahá’s assertion.
As well as having the perfections of the mineral, of the
vegetable and of the animal, he [man] also possesses an
especial excellence which the other beings are without —
that is, the intellectual perfections.28
Also,
there is no doubt that from its effects you prove that
in the animal there is a power which is not in the plant,
and this is the power of the senses — that is to say,
sight, hearing and also other powers; from these you
infer that there is an animal spirit. In the same way,
from the proofs and signs we have mentioned, we argue
that there is a human spirit. Since in the animal there
are signs which are not in the plant, you say this power
of sensation is a property of the animal spirit; you also
see in man signs, powers and perfections which do not
exist in the animal; therefore, you infer that there is a
power in him which the animal is without.29
Some Answered Questions 157

In other words, the degree of being possessed by an entity

manifests itself in the kind of powers and capacities it has. We
shall have more to say about this in our discussion of the
essences of things. For now, suffice it to note that this image
of successively more inclusive levels of being establishes the
concept of creation as having an underlying order, of being a
hierarchy of successively more expansive capacities which
ultimately ends or finds its origin in God. In this way, the
cosmic order itself becomes evidence for God’s existence.
Finally, it should be noted that this cosmic order reinforces the
pluralist ontology exemplified by SAQ because it shows the
existence of different kinds of being.
It is also worth noting that the terms ‘being’ or ‘existence’
cannot be applied univocally to God and His creation, i.e. they
do not have exactly the same meaning in each case. Indeed, the
‘being’ of God and man are so dissimilar that there is a
difference of kind between them insofar as God is non-
contingent and independent and man is not. Consequently, in
SAQ the concepts of ‘being’ or ‘existence’ are applied in an
equivocal manner to God and man; there is some analogous
similarity insofar as in both Creator and creatures, the word
‘existence’ distinguishes them from ‘non-existence’ but the
manner or mode of this existence is radically different in each
case. This is important to keep in mind because it is one of the
reasons for saying that God is essentially unknowable to
humankind.
5. Ontological Hierarchism
The third consequence that follows from the teaching that all
things have various degrees of being is the establishment of an
ontological hierarchy with God’s absolutely independent, non-
contingent and incomprehensible being at the top and matter
at the bottom. All beings between have existence “in their own
degree,”30 i.e. their own place in this universal hierarchy of
being:
the beings, whether great or small, are connected with
one another by the perfect wisdom of God, and affect
and influence one another. If it were not so, in the
universal system and the general arrangement of
existence, there would be disorder and imperfection.
But as beings are connected one with another with the
greatest strength, they are in order in their places and
perfect. 31
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 158

Therefore, in Bahá’í ontology, ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’ means

possessing one’s own degree of reality and having one’s own
unique place in the hierarchy of being based on the degrees of
existence possessed by various kinds of things such as minerals,
plants, animals or humans. Indeed, in discussing the various
kinds of “beings which inhabit the world, whether man, animal,
vegetable, mineral,”32 `Abdu’l-Bahá says the following
all beings are connected together like a chain; and
reciprocal help, assistance and interaction belonging
to the properties of things are the causes of the
existence, development and growth of created beings.33
Our main point, of course, is that `Abdu’l-Bahá’s image of a
chain or order made up of different kinds of beings can be
viewed as support for the underlying concept of an ontological
hierarchy in SAQ. Just as a chain needs links in different
positions, so creation requites higher and lower degrees of
being with the inevitable result that “as the degrees of existence
are different and various, some beings are higher in the scale
than others.”34 The mineral, plant and animal are of a lower
degree than man, whom God “selected for the highest degree,”35
though, of course, “material beings are not despised, judged
and held responsible for their own degree and station.”36 This
hierarchy of being is also reflected in the differences among
humankind, among whom there may be a “difference of station
… [which] is not blameworthy.”37 This station, just like the
station of minerals, plants and animals is given and is not
alterable by our action. In contrast, what can be affected by
our actions are the “difference of faith and assurance”38 and
therefore, “the loss of these is blameworthy.”39 SAQ adds,
“man is praiseworthy and acceptable in his station, yet as he is
deprived of the perfections of that degree, he will become a
source of imperfections, for which he is held responsible.”40
Furthermore, no being has the right to complain of the
station or degree of being into which we have been placed.
the mineral, has no right to complain, saying, “O God,
why have You not given me the vegetable perfections?”
In the same way, the plant has no right to complain
that it has been deprived of the perfections of the
animal world …No, all these things are perfect in their
own degree, and they must strive after the perfections
of their own degree. The inferior beings, as we have
said, have neither the right to, nor the fitness for, the
Some Answered Questions 159

states of the superior perfections. No, their progress

must be in their own state. 41
It should be immediately noted that “inferior” here does not
mean inferior in value but less comprehensive in powers, as for
example, the mineral lacks of powers of growth or the plant,
and the plant lacks the powers of movement of the animal.
However, all are “prefect in their own degree.” The idea that
differences in degree do not imply differences in valuation is
evident, for example, in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s discussion of the
various characters of human beings.
Hence it is clear that in the original nature there exists
a difference of degree and varieties of worthiness and
capacity. This difference does not imply good or evil
but is simply a difference of degree. One has the highest
degree, another has the medium degree, and another the
lowest degree.42
No moral evaluation is associated with any degree of being
in and of itself. To assert otherwise would be tantamount to
claiming that creation has inherent imperfections — a claim
which impugn the “Divinity Who has organized this infinite
universe in the most perfect form, and its innumerable
inhabitants with absolute system, strength and perfection.”43
Such imperfection is not conceivable from God.
The concept of ontological hierarchy also appears in the
following:
this limitless universe is like the human body, all the
members of which are connected and linked with one
another with the greatest strength. How much the
organs, the members and the parts of the body of man
are intermingled and connected for mutual aid and
help, and how much they influence one another! In the
same way, the parts of this infinite universe have their
members and elements connected with one another,
and influence one another spiritually and materially. 44
Here, too, we observe not just the idea of mutual
connection and inter-action at work, but also the idea of
hierarchy as indicated in the simile associating the universe and
“the human body,” i.e. a hierarchically structured organism in
which everything is interconnected. In this passage, `Abdu’l-
Bahá also alludes to the idea that the universe functions like an
organism and is not merely an unorganised collection or
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 160

aggregate of isolated individual parts working in isolation.

Instead, they are all parts working with an organised whole for
their own well-being and for the well-being of the whole. This
vision lays the ontological foundation for the Bahá’í social
vision of each person functioning as part of an organic
community for mutual benefit in a balance of interests
between part and whole.
6. Hierarchy After Death

The hierarchical nature of existence is also continues in life

after death. Punishment consists of “falling into the lowest
degrees of existence”45 where “He who is deprived of these
divine favours, although he continues after death, is considered
as dead by the people of truth.”46 The same idea is at work in
the following statement:
In the same way, the souls who are veiled from God,
although they exist in this world and in the world after
death, are, in comparison with the holy existence of the
children of the Kingdom of God, nonexisting and
separated from God. 47
Here, too, `Abdu’l-Bahá makes clear that the conduct of our
lives determines our degree of existence in the next life; in
comparison to those who receive God’s favours those who do
not are as “dead” or “nonexisting” — just as, analogously,
creation has no existence compared to the absolute existence of
God. This ontological hierarchy also lays the foundation for
the epistemological principle that “the difference of conditions
in the world of beings is an obstacle to comprehension,”48
which is to say, that the lower degrees of being cannot
comprehend the higher. Humankind, for example, cannot
comprehend the Essence of God because our degree of being is
too low and God is too different from us. We shall explore this
further in our discussion of the epistemology inherent in SAQ.
It is important to emphasise that these statements about a
chain of being refer to the ontological nature of different kinds
of beings — “man, animal, vegetable, mineral”49 — and are not
statements about the value of these kinds of beings; no kind of
being is devalued, as SAQ makes clear by referring to their
“reciprocal help, assistance and interaction.” All beings in all
stations play a necessary part in the cosmic process, though
these parts are very different. In short, the ontological
hierarchy does not of itself imply inherent unimportance of
Some Answered Questions 161

any station. As noted above, “all beings” take part in the

cosmic process of influencing and being influenced.
7. Kinds and their Perfections

As indicated each link in the chain, each degree or station of

being is necessary:
Know that the order and the perfection of the whole
universe require that existence should appear in
numberless forms. For existing beings could not be
embodied in only one degree, one station, one kind,
one species and one class; undoubtedly, the difference
of degrees and distinction of forms, and the variety of
genus and species, are necessary — that is to say, the
degree of mineral, vegetable, animal substances, and of
man, are inevitable; for the world could not be
arranged, adorned, organized and perfected with man
alone.50
Here we find an unmistakeable proof that all the various kinds
of being are necessary for the perfection of the created
universe. We also find in this statement an indication that
SAQ accepts the principle of plenitude, i.e. the belief that all
possible forms of being will be actualized at some time and in
some way. That is why `Abdu’l-Bahá’ says that “the whole
universe require[s] that existence should appear in numberless
forms.” These forms are numberless because degrees of being
are numberless, though, of course, they may be divided into
groups or kinds. They are all needed for the universe to achieve
its evolutionary perfection.
8. A Dynamic Ontology

The fact that each thing has particular degree of being

suggests that all things must strive for the perfections
appropriate to their kinds, or for “their own degree.” These
perfections differ: the vegetable world finds perfection or
purpose in growth and supporting animal and human life51 ; the
animal finds perfections in achieving a comfortable physical
existence and in supporting human life; finally, the perfection
of the human world is to attain “the good attributes and
virtues which are the adornments of his reality.”52 Each station
or place in the hierarchy of being has its own characteristics
and its own perfections.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 162

We should also note that `Abdu’l-Bahá’s concept of this

chain or hierarchical order of being is dynamic insofar as
“reciprocal help, assistance and interaction”53 is concerned.
Indeed, SAQ asserts unequivocably the general principle that
all existence is dynamic:
Know that nothing which exists remains in a state of
repose — that is to say, all things are in motion.
Everything is either growing or declining; all things are
either coming from nonexistence into being, or going
from existence into nonexistence. 54
The exact nature of this dynamism is not only motion,
coming into existence, growth, decline and going out if
existence but also either direct and/or indirect involvement in
the existence of other beings. According to SAQ “every being
universally acts upon other beings, either absolutely or through
association.”55 ‘To be,’ therefore, not only means that a thing
has the principle or foundation of its existence “in itself” but
also means that ‘to be’ involves an active relationship with
other beings, i.e. to influence and to be influenced, to be active
and receptive. This on-going interaction among things means
that all beings communicate their existence and the particular
nature of their existence to the world around them; they ‘share’
themselves as part of a cosmic community of such ‘sharing’ or
self-communication. In creation, existence is relational or
social and this fundamental fact, which encompasses all
created reality, provides the ontological foundation for Bahá’í
social philosophy. To keep the relational aspects of human
existence in good order is precisely one of the tasks of the
Manifestations.
9. A Nested Hierarchy

The foregoing considerations strongly suggest the

conclusion that according to SAQ, creation is not an
ontological flatland in which all things possess the same degree
and manner of existence. In other words, existence is arranged
in a successively transcendent levels of reality, with successively
higher degrees of being, until we come to God Whose being is
of another kind completely. From the perspective of the degrees
of being, creation is not arranged on egalitarian principles
with each kind of thing possessing the same degree. Of course,
as seen above, from the perspective of valuation all things have
an equally necessary part in the cosmic process although their
function and place in the hierarchy of being differs.
Some Answered Questions 163

The kind of hierarchy observed in SAQ is a nested hierarchy

i.e. hierarchy in which higher levels contain lower levels. This is
evident in the statement that
the Divine Essence surrounds all things. Verily, that
which surrounds is greater than the surrounded, and
the surrounded cannot contain that by which it is
surrounded, nor comprehend its reality. 56
Elsewhere He says, “the Essence of Unity surrounds all and is
not surrounded.”57 The same situation holds true in regards to
the Manifestations: “the Sanctified Realities, the supreme
Manifestations of God surround the essence and qualities of
the creatures, transcend and contain existing realities.”58 This
is also true of humankind:
The most noble being on earth is man. He embraces the
animal, vegetable and mineral kingdoms — that is to
say, these conditions are contained in him.59
To “embrace,” is, of course, to include or surround. The same
situation holds true in the case of the spirit and the human
body: “for the spirit surrounds the body,”60 and idea repeated
in the assertion that “This spirit, which in the terminology of
the philosophers is the rational soul, embraces all beings.”61
As we have observed in our discussion of the degrees of
being, each ontologically higher level includes the powers of the
lower and adds some new power, as humankind includes the
powers of vegetable growth, animal motion and sense and adds
the powers of the rational soul. Thus, it embraces or surrounds
the lower within itself but also transcends it by being more.
Therefore SAQ suggests a nested ontological hierarchy that
starts with the most inclusive and transcendent, i.e. God, and
ends with the least inclusive and least transcendent.
God
The Manifestation(s)
Humankind
Animal
Vegetable
Mineral/matter
Refinements and subdivisions may, of course be added if we
take other Writings into consideration, but SAQ itself
provides warrant for only these.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 164

10. Panentheism

The nested hierarchy proposed by SAQ has an important

implication for the Bahá’í concept of God. The belief that God
ontologically surrounds, embraces and includes all created
things and at the same time transcends it is one form of a
doctrine known as panentheism.62 This is not to be confused
with pantheism (or monism) according to which God and
creation are identified as one substance and the diversity of
created beings are ultimately no more than “mirages” or
illusions. (We have seen how SAQ categorically rejects this
view. 63 ) Panentheism, however, admits that all created beings
have their own degree of existence, even though they are
contained within God. 64 The universe is within God, God is
not within the universe. Thus God’s presence is everywhere in
creation but He transcends this presence and thus remains
unknowable to humankind. 65 This transcendence is what
differentiates pantheism and monism from panentheism which
is distinguished from deism by the fact that it does not see God
as completely unconnected from nature or creation.
There is more here than just a change of wording.
Panentheism provides a rational alternative to pantheism and
monism which reduce the plurality of beings to the divine —
and thereby create problems for the concept of free will. How
can we be free if we are only mirages or illusions and God is the
only real source of action? It also provides a rational
alternative to the forms of theism in which God seems
disconnected from His creation and often so distantly
transcendent as to be remote and beyond interest for human
beings. In panentheism, God is both present throughout all
creation, and still personal and transcendent. Later in this
paper we shall demonstrate the effect panentheism has on the
epistemological teachings promulgated in SAQ.
11. Ontology: Causality
Causality is one of the most important issues in ontology,
one that has been controversial since Hume’s reduction of
causality to regular succession. This is most commonly
understood to mean that when we say ‘A caused B’ we really
mean ‘Whenever A occurs, B immediately follows.’ He rejects
the idea that somehow A ‘does something’ to make B happen.
There is no necessary objectively real connection between the
two; any connection is human inference or projection based on
Some Answered Questions 165

mental habits. Hume’s understanding of causality has gained

acceptance in light of some interpretations of quantum
mechanics, though there has recently been a revival of Bohmian,
i.e. causal interpretations. 66
There is no question that SAQ rejects Hume’s analysis of
causality and accepts the traditional concept of causality
being the influence or affect of one thing or event on another.
It is confirmed through evidences and proofs that
every being universally acts upon other beings, either
absolutely or through association. Finally, the
perfection of each individual being — that is to say, the
perfection which you now see in man or apart from
him, with regard to their atoms, members or powers —
is due to the composition of the elements, to their
measure, to their balance, to the mode of their
combination, and to mutual influence. 67
Here `Abdu’l-Bahá asserts that beings affect or influence one
another and that these affects have certain results, in this case,
the “perfection” of individual beings which is “due to,” i.e.
caused by these influences among other things. Elsewhere He
says,
There is no doubt that this perfection which is in all
beings is caused by the creation of God from the
composing elements, by their appropriate mingling and
proportionate quantities, the mode of their
composition, and the influence of other beings. For all
beings are connected together like a chain; and
reciprocal help, assistance and interaction belonging
to the properties of things are the causes of the
existence, development and growth of created beings.68
Not only does `Abdu’l-Bahá state that “reciprocal help,
assistance and interaction” affect all beings but also, in the
image of a chain, he conveys the idea of a necessary order and
connection among these mutually interacting beings. Such
necessary connection is precisely what Hume and his followers
deny.
11.1 Four-Fold Causality

In SAQ, one of the most radical and far-reaching

statements about ontology concerns the subject of causality:
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 166

the existence of everything depends upon four causes —

the efficient cause, the matter, the form and the final
cause. For example, this chair has a maker who is a
carpenter, a substance which is wood, a form which is
that of a chair, and a purpose which is that it is to be
used as a seat. Therefore, this chair is essentially
phenomenal, for it is preceded by a cause, and its
existence depends upon causes. This is called the
essential and really phenomenal.69
This assertion is radical because it is a revival, both in
conception and in terminology, of Aristotle’s much
misunderstood theory of causality as expounded in his
Physics 70 and Metaphysics. 71 Here, too, Aristotle discusses the
four causes, using precisely the terminology confirmed later by
`Abdu’l-Bahá: the material cause, or matter of which something
is made; the formal cause, or form which makes an entity the
particular thing it is; the efficient cause, i.e. mover or maker
which directly brings the entity into being, i.e. “brings form to
the matter”72 ; and the final cause, or purpose of the entire
activity of making. Not only does `Abdu’l-Bahá employ
Aristotle’s terms, He uses them exactly as Aristotle used them
in order to analyze causality and, furthermore, He uses them to
draw a general conclusion about the nature of how causality
works in creation. It is interesting to note that SAQ contains
no suggestions of the Muslim philosopher Ibn Sina’s four
subspecies of the efficient cause. 73
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify exactly what
Aristotle means by four-fold causality lest we entrap ourselves
in philosophical misunderstandings that have dogged science
and philosophy since the time of Descartes and Galileo. To
produce any kind of real change in something, there must be
matter or what `Abdu’l-Bahá calls “substance”74 because there
must be something in which the change happens. There must
also be a form from which the change begins and to which it
proceeds; in the case of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s example, we have the
substance in the form of wood being changed into a substance
in the form of a chair. There must also be an efficient cause
which initiates the change when a new form emerges from an
old one, as the chair ‘emerges’ from the block of wood by way
of the carpenter’s action. Finally, there is the final cause or
purpose which determines how the efficient cause will act, i.e.
whether it will act one way or another depending on what is
compatible with the goal. All four of these causes must be
present for any change to occur. It should be noted that in
Some Answered Questions 167

`Abdu’l-Bahá’s illustration, the final cause is in the mind of the

carpenter, i.e. is extrinsic to the material and substantial
causes.
This fact leads to a major complaint about four-fold
causality, namely, that it is anthropomorphic, applies to
conscious and deliberative human actions, but does not apply
to natural processes. Indeed, since the time of Descartes and
Galileo, accepting final causality has been regarded as an
identifying feature of unscientific thinking. Nature, it is said,
does not operate with a purpose towards final goals. Only
higher animals and humans can conceive of objectives to work
for, but the rest of nature certainly does not. Therefore,
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s use of four-fold causality does not harmonize
with the accepted science of the last four centuries.
Unfortunately, as numerous experts on Aristotle have pointed
out, this view is predicated on Descartes’ and others’
misunderstanding of Aristotle.
The problem with Descartes’ and all subsequent
misinterpretations of final causality is that they assume that
Aristotle meant the term in the sense of an extrinsic conscious,
deliberative finality even in the case of natural processes.
However, Aristotle never thought that such an extrinsic
deliberative cause was at work in all changes. Such is obviously
not the case in the growth of a plant, or the digestive process,
but because there is no extrinsic and conscious final cause at
work does not logically mean that there is not mean there is no
final cause at all. As Aristotle writes, “It is absurd to suppose
that purpose is not present because we do not observe the
[conscious] agent deliberating.”75 He was clearly aware that in
natural processes, we see no such extrinsic agent guiding the
changes. According to Aristotle, in natural processes “the form
[formal cause], the mover [the efficient cause], ‘that for the
sake of which’ [the final cause] … often coincide.”76 In other
words, the efficient cause or mover, the final cause and the
formal cause may be one, i.e. three principles operating at
once, which is to say, that the final cause may be intrinsic to
the process of change. That is why John Wild, a neo-
Aristotelian, says that “the only final cause in subhuman
processes is the natural form,”77 a view echoed by Aristotle
expert, Abraham Edel: “Thus in nature the final cause and
formal causes are one.”78 The form at whatever stage of
development it may be, limits the actions of the efficient cause,
and these successive limitations in turn, effectively close and
open various paths of development, thereby leading to a
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 168

particular result. As Aristotle scholar Henry B. Veatch points

out that in nature,
Aristotelian final causes are no more than this: the
regular and characteristic consequences or results that
are correlated with the characteristic actions of the
various agents and efficient causes that operate in the
natural world. 79
Veatch’s example is strikingly simple: we expect sunlight to
warm a window sill, we do not expect sunlight to fragment the
sill into thousands of pieces, turn it blue or to make it float in
the air and fly around like a cloud. Those are not the “regular
and characteristic” affects that the laws of physics allow
sunlight to have on window sills. Indeed, the laws of physics
clearly limit or characterize the action of energy transfer that
we observe and this characterization or limitation is what
Aristotle means by ‘final cause’ in regards to non-human
nature. As W. Norris Clarke, S.J. points out, this means that
the “final causality is necessarily inherent in every exercise of
efficient causality.”80 This final cause must be inherent in every
efficient cause because
[i]f the efficient cause at the moment its productive
action is not interiorly [inherently] determined or
focused towards producing this effect rather than
that, then there is no sufficient reason why it should
produce this one rather than that. 81
Efficient causes always lead to particular effects, and if
there is no reason why an efficient cause should produce one or
another effect, then any effect might follow: a window sill
might flight after being touched by sunlight. However, we
know that efficient causes do not produce random results, but
rather particular results on a regular basis according to the
laws of nature as described by physics and chemistry. “This
inner determination of the causal agent [efficient cause]
towards the effect-to-be produced is precisely final
causation.”82 In nature, the efficient cause and the final cause
are unified because the efficient causes obey the laws of nature,
i.e. fall within the limits imposed by these laws and this
conformity to law shapes the outcome. Because the final cause
may be implicit in the formal and efficient causes, we cannot
simply avoid or side-step the issue of final causes.
Some Answered Questions 169

11.2 Consequences of Four-Fold Causality

What does `Abdu’l-Bahá’s acceptance of Aristotle’s four-

fold causality mean for our understanding of the philosophical
positions inherent in SAQ? The first and most obvious effect
is that if understood correctly, four-fold causality and
particularly final causality do not place religion in conflict
with science which rejects the notion that subhuman processes
are shaped by deliberately formulated goals extrinsic to the
processes themselves. While processes involving human
intervention are guided by such consciously developed goals,
natural processes are not. However, nowhere does Aristotle say
that final goals must be always be conscious and deliberative,
and indeed, as we have seen in Physics, he explicitly denies that
they are.
The concept of final goals only becomes problematical when
it is misunderstood anthropomorphically as a consciously
intentional, extrinsically determined goal. However, as shown
above, this is not what Aristotle promulgated. Therefore,
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s acceptance of final causes does not create
disharmony with science once Aristotle’s teaching is correctly
understood. After the long-term and widespread
misrepresentations (originating with Bacon, Descartes and
Spinoza) of Aristotle’s doctrine, it will, unfortunately, be a
difficult struggle to overcome deeply entrenched
misinterpretations of Aristotle.
Four-fold causality also provides us with the intellectual
tools by which to analyse and explain all aspects of reality
except God and the Manifestations Who are not subject to
such analysis. In other words, four-fold causality is a
particular way of understanding reality and is, therefore, an
embryonic ontological world-view with all kinds of
implications for various human endeavours.
12. Teleology

The second conclusion we may draw from `Abdu’l-Bahá’s

acceptance of four-fold causality is that in Bahá’í ontology,
reality is teleological, i.e. informed or guided in its processes
by intrinsic and/or extrinsic final causes. The ubiquity of final
causes means that creation is not random or anarchic but
rather law abiding and organised. On this topic, `Abdu’l-Bahá
states regarding nature,
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 170

This composition and arrangement, through the

wisdom of God and His preexistent might, were
produced from one natural organization, which was
composed and combined with the greatest strength,
conformable to wisdom, and according to a universal
law. From this it is evident that it is the creation of
God, and is not a fortuitous composition and
arrangement. 83
If a series of events is not fortuitous or accidental, then some
principle of order or lawfulness must be at work in nature
either extrinsically or intrinsically or both to shape events and
their consequences. If there were no ordering principle or
guiding law, then any results might follow an action.
Aristotle’s four-fold causality is simply a philosophical
explanation of why this does not happen, i.e. why results are
regular unless disturbed by other extraneous factors. Hence,
order, pattern i.e. organisation emerge from the action of
intrinsic final causes (and thus establish the very conditions
for the existence of science).
13. Intelligent Design
However, `Abdu’l-Bahá goes much further than the assertion
of order, pattern and organisation. Nature, He says,
is subjected to an absolute organization, to
determined laws, to a complete order and a finished
design, from which it will never depart — to such a
degree, indeed, that if you look carefully and with keen
sight, from the smallest invisible atom up to such large
bodies of the world of existence as the globe of the sun
or the other great stars and luminous spheres, whether
you regard their arrangement, their composition, their
form or their movement, you will find that all are in the
highest degree of organization and are under one law
from which they will never depart.84
In other words, nature as a whole shows “finished design,” i.e.
is not “a fortuitous composition and arrangement”85 — phrases
suggesting not only that existence is organised and lawful, but
more strongly, that existence is characterised by a design. This,
of course, brings up a sensitive question: does SAQ
promulgate a variation of intelligent design theory? From these
statements, and others we shall examine later, it is clear that the
answer is affirmative, though the variation of intelligent design
Some Answered Questions 171

in SAQ is not that of Biblical literalism. If the natural world is

not “a fortuitous composition and arrangement,” if it is
“conformable to wisdom”86 and if it is “subjected to an
absolute organization, to determined laws, to a complete order
and a finished design,”87 then it is clear that nature is not a
result of undirected accidents and random events but of some
ordering principle however complex its workings may be. This
design requires the existence of an extrinsic consciously
deliberative final cause. As `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
the least change produced in the form of the smallest
thing proves the existence of a creator: then can this
great universe, which is endless, be self-created and
come into existence from the action of matter and the
elements? How self-evidently wrong is such a
supposition!88
Here, too, the subject of change and by implication,
causality, emerges, since without the guidance of final
causality inherent in the efficient and formal causes of change,
change would be undirected and accidental. However,
according to `Abdu’l-Bahá, this change is so far from being
random that it “proves the existence of a creator,” i.e., an
ultimate source of the laws manifest in the changing process.
The universe cannot have come into existence only “from the
action of matter and the elements” because this matter requires
form in order to be the particular kind of matter it is and act
in the particular way it does — and form, as Aristotle points
out, intrinsically includes final causality in natural processes.
This intrinsic form of final causality of course leads to the
question about the source of order and lawfulness, i.e., to
God. It is worth noting how hylomorphism (see below) is
implicitly assumed in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s argument as well as His
explicit endorsement of the foundational principle of
intelligent design, namely that we can legitimately reason our
way from events in nature to the existence of “a creator.”89 In
other words, we have moved from a final cause intrinsic to
natural processes to an extrinsic, deliberative and conscious
final cause. That `Abdu’l-Bahá regards such a reasoning process
as correct is rhetorically shown by His categorical rejection of
the contrary view: “How self-evidently wrong is such a
supposition!” Even though some Bahá’ís may find this
association with some form of intelligent design theory
uncomfortable, intelligent design, albeit not in its Biblically
literal version, is a fact of Bahá’í ontology in SAQ.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 172

However, this does not necessarily cause a conflict with

science insofar as science concerns itself with intrinsic final
causality as evident in the operation of empirically verifiable
natural laws, whereas religion’s concern is extrinsic final
causality as known through revelation and rational reflection.
Each explores aspects of final causality appropriate to its
methods. If conflict develops, it is a consequence of choosing
to let this happen.
14. Hylomorphism

The acceptance of four-fold causality is an important

contact point between SAQ and the philosophical tradition
begun by Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus (the Athenian tradition)
and continued in various forms in the modern world. This
would be even more apparent if we were to embark on a
detailed analysis of what is entailed in four-fold causality, for
example the implication that any entity is made up of matter
(as in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s example) and form, the latter being
provided by the carpenter in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s illustration. SAQ
itself makes a passing reference to this view, stating, “The sun
is born from substance and form, which can be compared to
father and mother.”90 SAQ then proceeds to say that darkness,
which, as an absence of light has no existence in itself, i.e. “has
neither substance nor form, neither father nor mother, and it is
absolute imperfection.”91 This suggests that in order for
entities to exist requires substance or matter and form, or to
put it another way, all things existing in nature are made of
substance and form.
Those familiar with the history of western philosophy will,
of course, recognise the doctrine of hylomorphism which
asserts that all sensible things are exemplify a union of matter
and a form that makes it a certain kind of thing. 92 The
hylomorphic theme is not explicitly developed in SAQ, but the
statement that “the existence of everything depends upon four
causes”93 strongly suggests its universal applicability in our
understanding of reality and thus creates an unmistakeable
contact point with the Athenian tradition both in its
European and its Muslim branches as seen in the philosophy of
Aquinas and such Muslim philosophers as Ibn Sina and Ibn
Rushd.
Some Answered Questions 173

15. An Application of Four-Fold Causality

In order to understand the versatility of four-fold causality

as an analytical tool, we shall briefly outline how it may be used
in the analysis of society or any other community. The matter
or material cause of a society are the individuals who make up
the society or group. The final cause (which may or may not be
explicitly conscious in all members) is the common good for
which the individuals work, either deliberatively or though
being enlisted by the rules, customs and trends in that society.
For example, the final cause of Communist society was to
establish the dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary step
to the abolition of all rulers. The formal cause of a society is
made up of the rules, duties, obligations, rights and offices
required to achieve the common good. These give society its
particular form or shape. The efficient cause is the people’s
willingness to achieve the common good, their willingness to
abide by the rules and fulfill their obligations, i.e. the love of
the common good. For a society or community to be healthy
requires that all of these four causes are working appropriately.
If, for example, a community loses sight of its final cause i.e.
the common good towards which it is dedicated, it will soon
lose its way and dissolve into rampant individualism where the
pursuit of the good of individual persons dominates lives.
16. Platonic Trends in SAQ

Another contact point with the Athenian tradition is the

suggestion scattered throughout SAQ that the world in which
we live is or will be mirror of a superior, spiritual world. Such a
view is usually described as Platonic, i.e. reminiscent of Plato’s
teaching that the world is only a shadow, imitation, reflection
or image of the superior real world of ideas. These shadows or
reflections are embodied in the ever-changing world of matter.
For example, `Abdu’l-Bahá says, “the earth is the mirror of the
Kingdom; the material world corresponds to the spiritual
world.”94 It is “the outward expression of the inward,”95 i.e. the
material expression of the spiritual or the expression of the
“spiritual world” in the material realm. Such views are certainly
Platonic in nature insofar as they posit a material world which
is a counterpart or copy of a spiritual or non-material model.
The Kingdom, according to `Abdu’l-Bahá, “is not a material
place; it is sanctified from time and place. It is a spiritual
world, a divine world … it is freed from body and that which is
corporeal.”96 Unfortunately, this material world is all-to-often
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 174

a distorted reflection of the spiritual world, a condition that

the revelation of Bahá’u’lláh is intended to remedy: “The world
will become the mirror of the Heavenly kingdom.”97 Here, too,
the Platonic theme is evident. Platonism also has applications
for they key doctrine of progressive revelation and ethics.
`Abdu’l-Bahá says, “what is meant by the term Holy of Holies is
that spiritual Law which will never be modified, altered or
abrogated; and the Holy City means the material Law which
may be abrogated.”98 The “material Law” is an earthly image of
the eternally unchanging “spiritual Law” which is reflected in
varying material conditions. In this case, Plato’s Ideas — such
as the Idea of the perfect horse — has been transferred into
ethics; instead of perfect Ideas of things, we have perfect Ideas
of eternal ethical principles which we try to imitate or reflect as
best we can.
If the material world reflects or corresponds to the spiritual
world, one of the consequences is that reality is structured as a
series of correspondences between the spiritual and the
material. This is illustrated by the statement that “The Sun of
Reality”, like the material sun, has numerous rising and
dawning places.”99 As we shall see in the section on
epistemology, these correspondences have far-reaching
consequences for the epistemology explicitly and implicitly
present in SAQ. It means, for example, that we cannot
understand the phenomena of material reality fully without
taking into account what has been revealed about their
spiritual counterparts. This is most readily illustrated in the
case of human nature which cannot be properly understood
only on the basis of material studies but must also take into
consideration the divine ideal of which actually existing man is
a reflection, image or shadow.
17. The Reality of Universals
The subject of Platonism raises another important
ontological question for SAQ, namely, does SAQ recognise
the reality or existence of at least some universals? Universals
are the
supposed referents of general terms like ‘red’, ‘table,
‘tree, understood as entities distinct from any of the
particular things described by those terms. 100
For example, ‘dog’ is a universal but ‘Otto’ is a particular
example or instantiation of this universal. All individual dogs
Some Answered Questions 175

have certain characteristics in common that make them

members of the universal class ‘dog.’ There are three possible
viewpoints (and variations thereof) about universals. One is
extreme realism espoused by Plato, which holds that universals
i.e. Ideas, are real entities in themselves in “a non-spatio-
temporal existence distinct and separable”101 from all
particular instantiations. The second is moderate realism held
by Aristotle which maintains that universals are real but only
in their individual instantiations. The human mind abstracts
them — but it abstracts from something real in the individuals.
The third view is nominalism, “the view that things
denominated by the same term share nothing in common except
that fact.”102 In other words, there are no such things as
universals and all so-called universal terms are arbitrary
constructions.
The reason this ontological issue is so important well beyond
its technical philosophic aspects and receives considerable
attention is that it has an enormous impact on personal and
social ethics, psychology, philosophical anthropology as well as
positive and natural law. For example, it concerns whether or
not there is such a thing as human nature, what it is and what
role is its role in individual and social ethics. Does human
nature establish norms in behavior and ethics? Postmodernism
and some forms of existentialism, adopt the nominalist view
and deny that any such thing as human nature exists; in their
view, it is nothing short of totalitarian to establish ethics or
laws on the basis of standards based on so-called human
nature. Only individuals are real and any concepts of universal
essences, natures or attributes are constructions of fictions
imposed upon individuals. Perhaps Sartre sums up this
attitude best when he writes, “As we have seen, for human
reality, to be is to choose oneself; nothing comes from the
outside or from within which it can receive or accept.”103 There
is no ‘pre-made’ human nature or any other nature, there are
only individuals making themselves.
SAQ rejects the nominalist position. `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
spirit is universally divided into five categories: the
vegetable spirit, the animal spirit, the human spirit, the
spirit of faith, and the Holy Spirit.
The vegetable spirit is the power of growth which is
brought about in the seed through the influence of
other existences.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 176

The animal spirit is the power of all the senses, which is

realized from the composition and mingling of
elements …
The human spirit which distinguishes man from the
animal is the rational soul, and these two names — the
human spirit and the rational soul — designate one
thing. This spirit, which in the terminology of the
philosophers is the rational soul, embraces all beings,
and as far as human ability permits discovers the
realities of things and becomes cognizant of their
peculiarities and effects, and of the qualities and
properties of beings. But the human spirit, unless
assisted by the spirit of faith, does not become
acquainted with the divine secrets and the heavenly
realities. It is like a mirror which, although clear,
polished and brilliant, is still in need of light. Until a
ray of the sun reflects upon it, it cannot discover the
heavenly secrets. 104
Here we have a virtually self-evident demonstration of belief
in universal attributes and powers that define different kinds,
species or essential; attributes things. These essential attributes
and powers are present in and identify all members of a kind as
vegetable, animal or human. Germane to our discussion is
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s categorical declaration about the spirit being
“universally divided into five categories,” indicating that this
division is an objective fact of creation or nature and not
merely a product of human intellectual construction. They are
simply given facts we have to work with as we explore the
world. The “five categories”105 are real — manifested in
differences of composition and capacity — and are not merely
arbitrary man-made contrivances. Their essential attributes
always appear in individuals and are known by the human
mind, but they have an objective basis in reality.
The reality of universals is emphasised from another
perspective when `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
Know that the order and the perfection of the whole
universe require that existence should appear in
numberless forms. For existing beings could not be
embodied in only one degree, one station, one kind,
one species and one class; undoubtedly, the difference
of degrees and distinction of forms, and the variety of
genus and species, are necessary — that is to say, the
Some Answered Questions 177

degree of mineral, vegetable, animal substances, and of

man, are inevitable; for the world could not be
arranged, adorned, organized and perfected with man
alone. In the same way, with only animals, only plants
or only minerals, this world could not show forth
beautiful scenery, exact organization and exquisite
adornment. Without doubt it is because of the
varieties of degrees, stations, species and classes that
existence becomes resplendent with utmost
perfection. 106
Here the issue of universals is taken up from the perspective
of the ontological principles of plenitude and perfection. The
principle of plenitude and perfection as given in this quotation
asserts that for creation to be perfect (How could it not be
given its origin in God?) requires diversity, i.e. more than “one
degree, one station, one kind, one species and one class.”
Degrees, stations, kinds, species and classes are all references to
universals, i.e. to terms that refer to types of beings, to
categories or collectives united by common essential
attributes. The fact that kinds are considered necessary for the
perfection of God’s creation demonstrates that they are real
and not mere human constructions of fictions.
A third indicator that Bahá’í ontology exemplifies some
form of realism in regards to universals are `Abdu’l-Bahá’s
statements about the evolution of humankind:
But from the beginning of man’s existence he is a
distinct species … But even when in the womb of the
mother and in this strange form, entirely different
from his present form and figure, he is the embryo of
the superior species … For the proof of the originality
of the human species, and of the permanency of the
nature of man, is clear and evident. 107
Throughout His discussion of the inalterability of human
nature, He makes clear that humankind represents a different
kind of species from minerals, plants and animals. References
to humankind’s existence as a distinct species with
characteristic capacities are also fund in his discussion of life
after death:
When we consider beings with the seeing eye, we
observe that they are limited to three sorts — that is to
say, as a whole they are either mineral, vegetable or
animal, each of these three classes containing species.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 178

Man is the highest species because he is the possessor of

the perfections of all the classes — that is, he has a body
which grows and which feels. As well as having the
perfections of the mineral, of the vegetable and of the
animal, he also possesses an especial excellence which
the other beings are without — that is, the intellectual
perfections. Therefore, man is the most noble of
beings.108
These statements are quite categorical about the objective
reality of these different “sorts” or “classes” and their various
species. Humankind’s differences from the others and its
position as the peak of this hierarchy are also presented as facts
of creation or nature and not merely as artefacts of human
subjectivity. They do not exist merely as thoughts without any
connection to reality.
Since classes, categories and species are ontologically real, it
remains to determine whether or not SAQ indicates if they
exist in a Platonic or Aristotelian manner. If they exist
Platonically, these universals exist objectively as part of a non-
spatio-temporal realm separate from the ever-changing material
world. If their existence is Aristotelian they exist objectively
but only in particular instantiations from which our ideas of
them are abstracted by the human mind.
This paper contends that on the issue of universals, the
interpretation most consistent with SAQ (and the Writings in
general) is the Platonic interpretation although it is not
developed in any great detail. In this connection, it should be
recalled that “the earth is the mirror of the Kingdom; the
material world corresponds to the spiritual world.”109 In other
words, the kinds, species and classes that exist physically on the
earth are the material reflections of their spiritual, i.e. non-
spatio-temporal counterparts. They key point is that the ideal
spiritual prototypes exist in the “Kingdom” and these are
reflected over time. A similar concept is found in the following
statement:
The Prophets, on the contrary, believe that there is the
world of God, the world of the Kingdom, and the
world of Creation: three things. The first emanation
from God is the bounty of the Kingdom, which
emanates and is reflected in the reality of the
creatures. 110
Some Answered Questions 179

Here, too, `Abdu’l-Bahá shows that the “world of Creation”

reflects of corresponds to the “world of the Kingdom,” which
thereby functions as an ideal Platonic realm to the former. It
is, of course, also possible to argue that these universals, the
kinds, classes or species exist as ideas in the “First Mind”111 and
then gradually actualised in the evolution of the material world.
Both of these alternatives would be in harmony with `Abdu’l-
Bahá’s statements that creation exemplifies design i.e.
something in which there is conscious deliberation and
forethought. That these universals may somehow pre-exist their
appearance in the material realm is suggested by the following
quote:
the terrestrial globe from the beginning was created
with all its elements, substances, minerals, atoms and
organisms; but these only appeared by degrees: first the
mineral, then the plant, afterward the animal, and
finally man. But from the first these kinds and species
existed, but were undeveloped in the terrestrial globe,
and then appeared only gradually. For the supreme
organization of God, and the universal natural system,
surround all beings, and all are subject to this rule. 112
In other words, the earth was created “from the beginning”
with all its potential beings and species within it. This implies
forethought and ideas for “these kinds and species” insofar as
specific plans are necessary to make such detailed provisions
for the future. The evidence provided by SAQ suggests that
such ‘Platonic’ ideas or models were present in the Kingdom or
the “First Mind” before the earth was created or any of them
had been turned into materially manifest realities.
18. Reflection and Participation

The ‘Platonic’ affinities in SAQ are also strengthened by the

teaching that all existing beings and kinds reflect one or more
of the names of God. According to `Abdu’l-Bahá,
The world, indeed each existing being, proclaims to us
one of the names of God, but the reality of man is the
collective reality, the general reality, and is the center
where the glory of all the perfections of God shine
forth.113
Elsewhere He states,
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 180

Without doubt each being is the center of the shining

forth of the glory of God — that is to say, the
perfections of God appear from it and are resplendent
in it … The world, indeed each existing being,
proclaims to us one of the names of God, but the
reality of man is the collective reality, the general
reality, and is the center where the glory of all the
perfections of God shine forth. 114
He also says, “all beings express something and partake of
some ray and portion of this [divine] light.”115 These
quotations assert that every being has within itself a reflection
of one or more of the names of God which is to say that every
being has a direct connection with the ideal or spiritual power
of the names of God. As a species human kind is distinguished
from other species because we reflect or participate in all of the
names of God: it is the “collective reality” which reflects or
participates in “all the perfections of God.” Other kinds,
classes or species of being only reflect one of these names.
In the language of the Athenian tradition in philosophy, the
reflection of one of God’s names in every being means that each
being ‘participates’ in the names of God, it instantiates or
exemplifies these names in its own way. Thus ‘to be’ means to
reflect one of the names of God, just as we have seen before
that ‘to be’ means to have one’s particular degree of being and
one’s appropriate place in the chain of being. In regards to
reflecting the names of God we might also say that beings
imitate the names of God in their instantiations of them, and
thus, collectively make the signs of God’s power present or
establish God’s presence in creation. This helps lay the
ontological foundations for a Bahá’í natural theology, since
such reflection, participation, imitation allows us to argue
from the created world to the Creator because “[a]ll the
creatures are evident signs of God.”116 `Abdu’l-Bahá reasons
from the created to the Creator in His various proofs of God’s
existence in SAQ. Indeed, some of His arguments such as the
argument that the creator must be more perfect than the
created — as the Kingdom is more perfect than the material
world — make no logical sense outside of a Platonic ontology in
which higher levels of being are more perfect than lower levels117
and the lower participate in the higher.
In this Platonic ontological schema, each being is also a
“pointer towards the Infinite.”118 Thus, the study of God’s
creation by the sciences takes on a religious significance
Some Answered Questions 181

insofar as such study will bring us closer to God — if

understood spiritually and not in strictly positivist, empiricist
and materialist terms. Such spiritual understanding of science
is justified because the material world and the metaphysical or
spiritual world are closed to each other, but inter-act through
reflection, imitation or participation. In this way, the
doctrine of reflection and participation provides an
ontological basis for the Bahá’í emphasis on science. It also lays
the ontological foundations for a Bahá’í philosophy of man or
philosophical anthropology. For example, `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
The reflection of the divine perfections appears in the
reality of man, so he is the representative of God, the
messenger of God. If man did not exist, the universe
would be without result, for the object of existence is
the appearance of the perfections of God. 119
In other words, the universe is incomplete without man, who
represents a necessary degree of perfection which gives the
universe a goal and purpose (note the teleological thinking) just
as the fruit is “is the reason”120 for the existence of the tree.
Humankind has a necessary place in the existence of the
universe which is why `Abdu’l-Bahá states, “it cannot be said
there was a time when man was not”121 and adds that the belief
that there was a time when man did not exists in some form in
the universe is “false and meaningless.”122 In short, humankind
has a cosmic role.
19. Existence and Nonexistence

In SAQ, `Abdu’l-Bahá makes a number of extremely

important and far-reaching statements about existence and
nonexistence.
The second proposition is that existence and
nonexistence are both relative. If it be said that such a
thing came into existence from nonexistence, this does
not refer to absolute nonexistence, but means that its
former condition in relation to its actual condition
was nothingness. For absolute nothingness cannot find
existence, as it has not the capacity of existence …
Though the dust — that is to say, the mineral — has
existence in its own condition, in relation to man it is
nothingness. Both exist, but the existence of dust and
mineral, in relation to man, is nonexistence and
nothingness.123
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 182

We have already discussed one aspect of this teaching in our

consideration of the degrees of being of different kind of
things. Our focus at this point, however, is the categorical
denial that anything can be produced or produce itself from
“absolute nothingness.”
`Abdu’l-Bahá offers two kinds of reasons why the ex nihilo
interpretation of creation is in error. The first is onto-
theological in nature i.e. bases its ontological argument on our
understanding of God’s nature. According to this view,
“absolute nothingness” cannot even theoretically exist as
implied in the doctrine that “the Eternal Bounty does not cease.
If it were to, it would be contrary to the perfections of
God.”124
Since God’s “Bounty” or emanations never stop and have
always been forthcoming, there must always have been a
creation in some form. This is reinforced by the argument that
the names and attributes of the Divinity themselves
require the existence of beings … a creator without a
creature is impossible … for all the divine names and
attributes demand the existence of beings. If we could
imagine a time when no beings existed, this
imagination would be the denial of the Divinity of God
… Therefore, as the Essence of Unity (that is, the
existence of God) is everlasting and eternal — that is to
say, it has neither beginning nor end — it is certain that
this world of existence, this endless universe, has
neither beginning nor end. 125
The questions underlying this argument are, ‘How can God be
the Creator if He has no creation?’ and ‘If God has no creation,
how can He claim perfection?’ Thus, the Christian and Muslim
doctrine of creation ex nihilo contradicts the belief that God is
perfect. This issue constitutes a major difference between
Bahá’í, Muslim and Christian onto-theology.
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s second reason for rejecting ex nihilo creation
is more philosophical in nature, i.e. is based on the logical
problems inherent in this concept. He says that “it is
impossible that from absolute nonexistence signs should
appear — for the signs are the consequence of an existence.”126
How could nothingness actively give a sign, i.e. take action and
communicate? What could it communicate? How could it
receive action? In order to receive, there must be a receiver,
something to receive. The whole concept dissolves into
Some Answered Questions 183

nonsense. Nor could “absolute nothingness” become anything

since there would not even be a capacity or potential for
something new to come into existence. Thus, `Abdu’l-Bahá
states, “Moreover, absolute nonexistence cannot become
existence. If the beings were absolutely nonexistent, existence
would not have come into being. 127
Therefore, the concept of “absolute nonexistence” must be
rejected and replaced by a concept of relative nonexistence,
which is exactly what he does: “existence and nonexistence are
both relative.”128 The diverse kinds and species that exist
potentially in the earth are only relatively nonexistent, i.e. they
exist “potentially”129 like the various attributes of the plant
hidden in a seed. They exist in a hidden plane, just like the
natural powers before they are brought “out from the plane of
the invisible and the hidden into the realm of the visible”130 by
humankind.
The denial of “absolute nothingness” lays the ontological
foundation for the belief that a creation, a universe of some
kind has always existed: “the world of existence has always
been”131 and can never fall into absolute annihilation although
particular worlds may do so. There is no ontological ground in
SAQ to believe that one day God will choose to bring about the
end of the world as many Christians have interpreted Matthew
24:35-36. On the basis of SAQ, it is also possible to reject
similar interpretations of such Qu’ranic suras as 20:15. 132
The denial of “absolute nothingness” also lays the
ontological foundations for the belief that whatever manifests
itself over a period of time was the result of the actualization
of potentials inherent in a being. Furthermore, it becomes the
basis for the teaching that all things have an essence and that
essences are real. Obviously, every being does not have all
potentials — the proverbial sow’s ear cannot become a silk
purse, a ski-boot cannot become an alligator. In other words,
both individual things and kinds of things have a limited array
of potentials available to them — as already seen in `Abdu’l-
Bahá’s explanations about the mineral, plant, animal and
human degrees of spirit. One aspect of essence is precisely this
limited collection of potentials which determine what kind of
thing a particular being is and what it can or cannot become.
Thus, we are led to the conclusion that the rejection of
“absolute nothingness” is the ontological foundation for the
essentialist nature of the philosophy embedded in SAQ.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 184

20. The Structure of Beings

Every being has a structure of actuality and potentiality, i.e.

what it is at the moment and what it could be in the future. The
actuality is what we encounter first but, nonetheless, as
`Abdu’l-Bahá informs us, every being has its potentials.
Speaking of a seed, He says, “So it is first the shoot which
appears from the seed, then the branches, leaves, blossoms and
fruits; but from the beginning of its existence all these things
are in the seed, potentially, though not apparently.”133 There is
more in the seed than what is manifest to us. The same is true
of the earth as a whole: “the terrestrial globe from the beginning
was created with all its elements, substances, minerals, atoms
and organisms; but these only appeared by degrees.”134 In other
words these beings existed potentially in the earth and gradually
were actualized. In reference to humankind, He says,
In the same way, the embryo possesses from the first all
perfections, such as the spirit, the mind, the sight, the
smell, the taste — in one word, all the powers— but they
are not visible and become so only by degrees. 135
Various perfections are potentially present in the embryo.
With this teaching of the reality of potentials, SAQ aligns
itself with the Aristotelian branch of the Athenian tradition in
philosophy in which all beings are a composite of actuality and
potentials, i.e. what is manifested (actuality) and what remains
to be manifested in the future (potentiality). This is why beings
are capable of change, i.e. they still have potentials left to
actualize, and why God is changeless, i.e. He has no potentials
to actualize and is absolute actuality; He needs no additional
completion. Except for God, every being is incomplete and
requires the realization of its potentials to be complete. The
potentials inherent in every being are the reason for the active
and evolutionary nature of each being as it actualizes its innate
potentials. This, in turn, re-emphasises the dynamic and
teleological nature of all beings. Indeed, these potentials or
“perfections”136 which gradually appear show that one aspect of
a being’s development is a self-perfecting process in which it
strives to maximise its being.
Every being is also a composite of substance or essence and
accidents, qualities or attributes as shown in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s
statement
Some Answered Questions 185

Know that there are two kinds of knowledge: the

knowledge of the essence of a thing and the knowledge
of its qualities. The essence of a thing is known through
its qualities; otherwise, it is unknown and hidden.137
He expresses the same idea when He says,
Some think that the body is the substance and exists by
itself, and that the spirit is accidental and depends
upon the substance of the body, although, on the
contrary, the rational soul is the substance, and the
body depends upon it. If the accident — that is to say,
the body — be destroyed, the substance, the spirit,
remains. 138
In this statement, the spirit is the substance, i.e. the essence
which is the basis of a thing’s existence as the kind of it is (in
this case, human) and possesses certain “accidental”
qualities.139 In both quotations, a being is composed of an
essence or substance as well as of particular qualities or
attributes. As the second quotation shows, some of the
attributes are “accident[s],” i.e. they are not absolutely
necessary or essential to the existence of the substance or
essence. When applied to humankind, this becomes the
ontological basis for the immortality of the soul which, being a
substance, can exist without its accidents. This leads to the
conclusion that some attributes are “accidental” and not
necessary, while others, such as immortality or rationality in
the case of humankind, are necessary or essential attributes.
They cannot be removed without changing the essence into
some other kind of being. It should be noted that here again,
SAQ analyses reality in the terms established by the Athenian
tradition, particularly by Aristotle.
In SAQ, we observe even God is discussed in these terms:
for the essential names and attributes of God are
identical with His Essence, and His Essence is above all
comprehension. If the attributes are not identical with
the Essence, there must also be a multiplicity of
preexistences, and differences between the attributes
and the Essence must also exist.140
The gist of this statement is a philosophical demonstration of
God’s unity: He is one because His Essence and His “essential
names and attributes” are identical. If they were not, then
God’s unity would be undermined by the difference between
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 186

God and His attributes. An additional implication of this

statement is that, unlike all other beings, God possesses no
unnecessary or accidental attributes that could be separated
from Him. All of His attributes are essential — but such is not
the case with any other kind of being all of which are made up
of both essential and accidental attributes.
Each being is also a composite of matter and form. Since we
have already touched on this in a foregoing discussion, there is
no need to repeat the relevant evidence here. Suffice it to say
that this acceptance of hylomorphism also places the
philosophy embedded in SAQ in the Athenian tradition.
21. Essence and Existence
SAQ provides reason to claim that each being is a
composite of existence and essence. We cannot imagine a being
which has pure existence but no essence. Even God, according
to SAQ, has an essence. 141 The moment we enquire ‘What is it
like?’ we are already asking for its nature, its essence and
attributes. There is no such a thing as simple ‘existence’;
existence is always the existence of some particular thing. On
the other hand, just because we can imagine an essence with all
its attributes e.g. a unicorn, does not mean it actually exists.
Existence and essence are clearly two different things. In every
real being they are joined.
All other beings, as we have seen above, possess varying
degrees of existence in contrast to God’s absolute existence
and independence from all other things. In other words, they
are contingent, i.e. not necessary: it is possible to conceive of
their not existing without tangling ourselves in all kinds of
logical difficulties. As contingent, they exist only by the will of
God Who chooses to bestow existence on them but Who was
obviously under no obligation to do so. They are utterly
dependent on God for their existence and lack any capacity to
bring themselves into being.
The fact that beings are contingent means that existence is a
freely given bestowal from God Who did not have to confer it.
Therefore, it is God’s gift to give existence as a real being to a
particular essence, even though this essence could have
remained either potential or imaginary. This gift is distinct
from the gift of our particular essence. Existence and essence
are two principles that are found at work in every actually
existing being, i.e. they are not things in any material sense but
Some Answered Questions 187

rather requirements that must necessarily be fulfilled for any

thing to be and which can be observed in any real being.
This composition of essence and existence is worth noting
first, because it provides an ontological foundation for the
Bahá’í teaching of the contingency of all beings except God and
second, because it provides an ontological foundation for our
gratitude to God for the gift of existence. Our obligation for
gratitude is rooted in the ontology of being-in-general. As we
can see from this, our ethical relationship to God also has
ontological roots.
22. God — an Epistemological Preview
Any discussion of God in regards to SAQ (and the Bahá’í
Writings in general) must deal with the limitations on our
knowledge of God. This requires a preview of some
epistemological issues. On the subject of knowing God,
`Abdu’l-Bahá says,
the essence and the attributes of the Lord of Unity are
in the heights of sanctity, and for the minds and
understandings there is no way to approach that
position. ‘The way is closed, and seeking is
forbidden.’142
Later He adds, “the essential names and attributes of God
are identical with His Essence, and His Essence is above all
comprehension.”143 Such strictures raise the inevitable
question, ‘What, if anything, do SAQ and the Writings allow
us to say about God?’
If we analyse the first statement, it is clear that we cannot
“approach” God, i.e. discover Him directly as He is in Himself
i.e. in His essence. The same applies to His names and
attributes because God is one with these. 144 In other words,
there is no direct knowledge of God because such knowledge
requires comprehension or ‘surrounding’ of the object to be
understood. In the case of God, this is impossible because
humankind lacks the capacity to ‘surround’ what is
ontologically higher.
It is evident that the human understanding is a quality
of the existence of man, and that man is a sign of God:
how can the quality of the sign surround the creator of
the sign? — that is to say, how can the understanding,
which is a quality of the existence of man, comprehend
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 188

God? Therefore, the Reality of the Divinity is hidden

from all comprehension, and concealed from the minds
of all men. It is absolutely impossible to ascend to that
plane. We see that everything which is lower is
powerless to comprehend the reality of that which is
higher. 145
However, SAQ (and the Writings) do not fall into the trap
of claiming that God is unknowable in any way whatever; were
that the case, we would have the problems created by a
disappearing God Whose very existence is unknowable and
ultimately irrelevant to humankind. However, SAQ provides
for knowledge of God indirectly, through the Manifestations:
all that the human reality knows, discovers and
understands of the names, the attributes and the
perfections of God refer to these Holy Manifestations.
There is no access to anything else: ‘the way is closed,
and seeking is forbidden.’146
In other words, we can know about God through the
Manifestation and we can reason about this knowledge but we
cannot know God directly without an intermediary. Indeed, all
of this knowledge about God
refer[s] to the Holy Manifestations — that is to say, all
the descriptions, the qualities, the names and the
attributes which we mention return to the Divine
Manifestations; but as no one has attained to the
reality of the Essence of Divinity… 147
However, we must not make the mistake of concluding that
this limited knowledge about God, is untrue or merely a fiction
or construct. Limited and indirect knowledge about something
is not necessarily untrue or a man-made fiction, especially
when it comes from a Manifestation. Thus, we may conclude
that while we have knowledge about God via the Manifestation,
we have no direct knowledge of God as He is in Himself.
Furthermore, we may reason about God from the information
provided us by the Manifestation.
It should be noted in passing that humankind’s inability to
know God’s essence decisively negates any claims that man and
God can be ontologically united in mystic states and the
suggestion that God and creation or any part of creation can
be one. Unity with God is forbidden by the extreme ontological
Some Answered Questions 189

differences between the independent and the dependent and all

claims to having achieved such unity are delusions.
23. The Existence of God: The Argument from Contingency

The ontology of SAQ is premised on the existence of God

Who is the ultimate source of all beings. To support His case,
`Abdu’l-Bahá provides various proofs for the existence of God.
The first of these is a variation of the proof from contingency:
One of the proofs and demonstrations of the existence
of God is the fact that man did not create himself: nay,
his creator and designer is another than himself. 148
Humankind is contingent, i.e. humankind cannot be
responsible for its existence and essence; therefore, logically, its
cause must be outside itself in something else. After all, a thing
that does not exist, cannot bring itself into existence, since to
do so would be to imply that it can act before it actually is in
existence. This is logically and physically impossible. For this
reason, human existence necessarily requires an external cause.
At this point it is important to digress briefly to note what
`Abdu’l-Bahá does not say, namely, that God is the immediate
cause for the existence of humankind. The kind of processes
studied by science may well be the immediate or proximate
causes by means of which humankind evolved but these
proximate causes do not necessarily exclude the ultimate cause
which begins and guides the evolutionary process through its
varying vicissitudes. In other words, once we distinguish
proximate from ultimate causes, there is not an inevitable
conflict with science on this issue.
From `Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement we also learn that God is our
ultimate efficient cause or “creator” and our ultimate final
cause or “designer.” As the final cause, He would also be our
formal cause, i.e. the source of our form or essence as human
beings. However, He is not our material cause since God is not
the matter or substance from which we are constituted as is
asserted by pantheism and monism according to which God
and creation are ultimately one substance. Finally, it is worth
noting `Abdu’l-Bahá’s use of the term “designer” in regards to
humankind strengthens the argument that SAQ supports some
variation of Intelligent Design theory in regards to human
origins. (See the Introduction.) Humankind, and creation as a
whole, is not merely a “fortuitous composition and
arrangement.”149
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 190

24. The Ontological Argument

In SAQ `Abdu’l-Bahá combines the argument from

contingency with the argument of perfection when He states,
The contingent world is the source of imperfections:
God is the origin of perfections. The imperfections of
the contingent world are in themselves a proof of the
perfections of God. 150
The argument from contingency was discussed above, so let us
turn our attention to the argument from perfection. It is
based on the degrees in which beings possess certain attributes.
For example, qualities like goodness and truth are found in
greater or lesser degrees in various beings. In other words, they
exist on a scale according to which some approach more closely
than others the greatest possible degree of a certain quality, i.e.
some approach perfection more closely than others. To say that
something is imperfect or approaches perfection more than
something else implies the existence of a perfect standard by
which to measure imperfection. Such a perfect standard
ultimately can only refer to God. Since we observe
imperfection around us, the perfect standard i.e. God must
exist. 151 If God, or this perfect standard did not exist, it
would not be perfect since it would lack the perfection of
existence.
`Abdu’l-Bahá makes use of this argument in SAQ, referring
to the attributes of power, knowledge and wealth, which, in
their imperfects become weakness, ignorance and poverty. The
existence of these imperfections proves that a supreme degree
of these qualities must exist, and since qualities cannot exist by
themselves they must exist in someone or something. Since
things cannot have wealth, knowledge, goodness or
truthfulness, these qualities must exist in someone, i.e. God:
Therefore, it becomes evident that there is an Eternal
Almighty One, Who is the possessor of all perfections,
because unless He possessed all perfections He would
be like His creation. 152
When this argument is applied to ‘being’ or ‘existence,’ it is
known as the ‘ontological argument,’ first propounded by Ibn
Sina, but also by St. Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz and in our
time, Charles Hartshorne and Alvin Plantinga. This argument,
still hotly debated today, exists in various forms, one of which
is:
Some Answered Questions 191

1. God possesses all perfections.

2. Existence is a perfection.
3. Therefore God possesses existence, i.e. God exists.
In the terms of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s argument above, all beings are
contingent, i.e. their degree of being is not absolute and
necessary. However, the existence of these lesser degrees means
there must be a perfect standard of existence, something that
exists absolutely and necessarily. This being is God.
The root assumption of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s argument from
perfection grows out of the Platonic position that the material
world is a less perfect, i.e. contingent and subject to all kinds
of vicissitudes. Even among members of a kind or species,
some members exemplify the perfections of that species or kind
better than others, as, for example, a healthy as opposed to a
crippled dog, a well-functioning car versus a ‘beater.’ The
deficient examples lack the perfection of the Kingdom. The
existence of these lesser degrees of perfection requires the
existence of an ultimate degree of perfection — and this is
identified with God. In a Platonic world-view, this line of
reasoning is completely logical, but it does not work in a non-
hierarchical world-view in which all things are understood as
having an equal share of perfection. So-called ‘imperfect’ people
are just ‘perfect’ in their own way, as are ‘imperfect’ plants,
cars and systems of governance. However, SAQ does not
accept this non-hierarchical view: “As the degrees of existence
are different and various, some beings are higher in the scale
than others.”153
25. The Argument from Design
`Abdu’l-Bahá also alludes to a variation of the watch-maker
argument when He says, “the smallest created thing proves that
there is a creator. For instance, this piece of bread proves that
it has a maker.”154 A piece of bread does not bake itself — and,
therefore, implies the presence of a baker, just as Paley’s watch
implies the existence of a watchmaker. `Abdu’l-Bahá applies this
idea to `the natural laws that operate in nature:
It is certain that the whole contingent world is
subjected to a law and rule which it can never disobey;
even man is forced to submit to death, to sleep and to
other conditions — that is to say, man in certain
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 192

particulars is governed, and necessarily this state of

being governed implies the existence of a governor. 155
In short, there can be no law without a law-maker, i.e.
someone or something who imposes limits on beings and their
actions. To appreciate the force of this argument we need to
do a thought-experiment: we must try to imagine a world where
there are no limits on any being or its actions. Indeed, it would
be difficult to imagine any beings at all since every being is
limited, and cannot do simply anything. For there to be beings
and inter-action among beings there must be something which
limits them — and this source of order is God.
26. The Argument from Change
Finally, `Abdu’l-Bahá refers to the argument from motion or
change: “the least change produced in the form of the smallest
thing proves the existence of a creator.”156 According to this
argument, every change requires an external cause and this line
of causes cannot be infinite; if it were, no action or change
would take place because nowhere do we find the necessary pre-
requisites for change, i.e. external causation. Each cause would
still be waiting for its predecessor to come into action and this
would go on ad infinitum. Therefore, a final first cause of all
change must exist and this first cause is God. Because `Abdu’l-
Bahá rejects the view that even the slightest motion can be self-
caused, He also rejects the suggestion that the universe could
have brought itself into being:
can this great universe, which is endless, be self-created
and come into existence from the action of matter and
the elements? How self-evidently wrong is such a
supposition!157
The question, of course, is rhetorical. What is noteworthy here
is the categorical way in which He rejects any contradictory
views by calling them “self-evidently wrong.”
`Abdu’l-Bahá ends the discussion of the proofs for God’s
existence by saying that “These obvious arguments are adduced
for weak souls; but if the inner perception be open, a hundred
thousand clear proofs become visible.”158 This, of course, has
important implications for epistemology insofar as it
recognises “inner perception” as a more powerful source of
knowledge of God’s existence than discursive arguments.
Some Answered Questions 193

Insight can teach us more than discursive reasoning in some

cases.
27. The Perfection of Creation

The argument from perfection inevitably raises the question

about the perfection of creation. If the imperfection of
creation is proof of God’s existence, is creation flawed?
Assuredly not, according to SAQ:
For all existing beings, terrestrial and celestial, as well
as this limitless space and all that is in it, have been
created and organised, composed, arranged and
perfected as they ought to be; the universe has no
imperfection.159
Elsewhere He emphases this point by saying, “All beings,
whether large or small, were created perfect and complete from
the first, but their perfections appear in them by degrees.”160 In
other words, all were created with their full or “complete”
endowment of potentials that will be actualised over time.
Although no being perfect in relationship to God — which is the
basis of the argument from perfection — each thing is created
perfect in itself, in its own degree, in its essence, but it does
not necessarily give perfect expression or actualization to its
perfect endowment of potentials. The vicissitudes of existence,
and, in the case of humankind, misuse of free will may hinder
the optimum actualisation of the originally perfect essence.
Thus, both from an ontological and existential view, there is no
contradiction between saying that the universe as originally
created by God is perfect but that there are more or less
imperfect actualisations of our perfect essential endowments.
`Abdu’l-Bahá also makes the following remark:
the universe has no imperfection, so that if all beings
became pure intelligence and reflected forever and ever,
it is impossible that they could imagine anything better
than that which exists. 161
This is a noteworthy statement because it seems to be another
variation of what has become known as Leibniz’s “best of all
possible worlds” argument, according to which God optimizes
and actualises all genuine possibilities in His creation, thereby
creating a universe that contains the optimal diversity of
beings. (This recalls the principle of plenitude discussed above.)
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s formulation of this argument is especially
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 194

interesting because it answers the usual criticism of Leibniz’

view, namely, the existence of evil and suffering negates the
alleged inherent perfection of the world. Basically, `Abdu’l-
Bahá’s answer is a challenge: let those who think they can,
design a better world with the same diversity of beings and
including human free will. He answers the challenge by saying
that no one could do so. In other words, the fact that evil and
ill exists is not in itself an argument against the essential
perfection of the world. `Abdu’l-Bahá illustrates this by saying,
a scorpion is evil in relation to man; a serpent is evil in
relation to man; but in relation to themselves they are
not evil, for their poison is their weapon, and by their
sting they defend themselves. But as the elements of
their poison do not agree with our elements — that is to
say, as there is antagonism between these different
elements, therefore, this antagonism is evil; but in
reality as regards themselves they are good. 162
28. A Process Ontology
One of the most common criticisms made of the Athenian
tradition is that it is a philosophy of stasis that is based on a
static vision of the universe. There is some debate about
whether or not this is actually the case, but that need not
detain us here. Rather, it is important to note that SAQ makes
it patently obvious that its ontology is an active, evolutionary
process ontology.
Know that nothing which exists remains in a state of
repose — that is to say, all things are in motion.
Everything is either growing or declining; all things are
either coming from nonexistence into being, or going
from existence into nonexistence. So this flower, this
hyacinth, during a certain period of time was coming
from the world of nonexistence into being, and now it
is going from being into nonexistence. This state of
motion is said to be essential — that is, natural; it
cannot be separated from beings because it is their
essential requirement, as it is the essential requirement
of fire to burn. 163
Motion or change, and existence are correlatives: change
“cannot be separated from beings because it is their “essential
requirement.” In other words, change is an essential attribute
that is necessary for a thing to exist, a statement that in
Some Answered Questions 195

passing re-affirms the essence and attribute analysis of reality

in SAQ, and implies the difference between essential and
accidental attributes. This statement also re-affirms the
teleological nature of our existence insofar as we are always
moving towards a goal of some kind, whether it be coming into
existence or going out.
Change is universal — “nothing which exists remains in a
state of repose” — and because it is a correlative of existence,
there is no possibility of avoiding it for individuals or
collectives. Here then, we discover the ontological foundation
of the teaching of progressive revelation which is predicated on
our subjection to endless change. That is why the revelation of
the “eternal verities”164 must be adapted to the ever-changing
condition of humankind and material civilization. Change is
also why the “contingent world is the source of
imperfections.”165 The reason is clear: change is only possible if
things have unactualised potentials or capacities to shed
and/or add unrealised attributes which means that by
definition they are incomplete and not fully themselves. That
by definition makes them imperfect.
The fact that change is ineradicably part of existence is also
seen in the statement that “[i]n this material world time has
cycles”166 This applies to spiritual issues as well; as `Abdu’l-
Bahá says, “for souls there are progress, retrogression and
education.”167 This, of course, also includes the development of
the human soul after death which once again draws attention
to the process-nature of all existence. As `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
“Both before and after putting off this material form, there is
progress in perfection but not in state,”168 as well as “as the
spirit continues to exist after death, it necessarily progresses
or declines.”169 Thus He affirms that change is inevitable both
in the material and the spiritual worlds.
Despite the ubiquity of change, we must not make the
mistake of assuming that all kinds of change are applicable to
all kinds of beings. “Intellectual realities”170 and spiritual
realities do not engage in physical motion:
entrance and exit, descent and ascent, are
characteristics of bodies and not of spirits — that is to
say, sensible realities enter and come forth, but
intellectual subtleties and mental realities, such as
intelligence, love, knowledge, imagination and thought,
do not enter, nor come forth, nor descend, but rather
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 196

they have direct connection … the intellectual realities

do not enter and descend, and it is absolutely
impossible that the Holy Spirit should ascend and
descend, enter, come out or penetrate, it can only be
that the Holy Spirit appears in splendor, as the sun
appears in the mirror. 171
Spirit and “intellectual realities” do not move through time
and space as material things do, but ‘move’ in their own way by
a “direct connection”172 that `Abdu’l-Bahá compares to the
reflection of the sun in a mirror. This has tremendous
implications for His teaching about what happens at death
because it means that the spirit or soul does not enter the body,
or inhabit the body as is so often imagined, and therefore has
no place ‘to go’ at the onset of death. It simply does not exist
in the spatio-temporal realm and is not subject to spatio-
temporal change.
The spirit never entered this body, so in quitting it, it
will not be in need of an abiding-place: no, the spirit is
connected with the body, as this light is with this
mirror. When the mirror is clear and perfect, the light
of the lamp will be apparent in it, and when the mirror
becomes covered with dust or breaks, the light will
disappear.173
The question remains, of course, about the exact meaning of
the metaphor of the light in the mirror. Here is one possibility:
the sun does not enter i.e. descend into the mirror
ontologically but maintains a formal but not substantial
presence in it by means of its power or light. Thus, we observe
the form of the sun but not its substance in the mirror and we
experience its power/light but neither the sun nor its
power/light depend on the body/mirror for their actual
existence. When the mirror breaks or is darkened there is
nowhere for this power/light to manifest itself and therefore it
‘disappears’ not in itself but in relation to us. To continue the
analogy, our soul after death is that ‘segment’ and amount of
light we have reflected in our life-times which will differ just as
each mirror reflects the sun in a slightly different manner.

Part II: Onto-Theology

For our purposes, onto-theology is the study of ontological
principles in relation to theological issues, or, if we wish, it
Some Answered Questions 197

refers to the theology of being. In other words, it examines

theological issues from an ontological perspective to explore
the nature of reality.
29. The Ontological Attributes of God

Scattered throughout SAQ is a catalogue of God’s

attributes and these may be divided into two broad categories:
God’s ontological attributes and His ethical attributes, i.e.
attributes related to the nature of God’s being as we are
informed of this subject by the Manifestation and `Abdu’l-
Bahá, and the attributes related to God’s ethical relationship to
His creation, as for example, the Merciful, the Educator and
the Compassionate for example. In this portion of the paper,
we shall focus on the ontological attributes because they form
the foundation on which the ethical attributes are built. For
example, if God were subject to time and had to wait for the
future to unfold before He knew what it was, He could not be
the all-knowing, omniscient educator Who could meet
humankind’s evolutionary needs.
According to SAQ, God possess certain attributes that
make Him absolutely unique and distinguish Him from the rest
of His creation. One of these is singleness which has several
possible meanings. First, it means God is an absolute unity:
That Lordly Reality admits of no division; for division
and multiplicity are properties of creatures which are
contingent existences, and not accidents which happen
to the self-existent. 174
This complex and far-reaching statement makes two points.
First, unlike all created beings, God is not a composite of
actuality and potential, essence and attribute, essence and
existence and substance and form. He is not a composite of
actuality and potential because if God had any potentials, i.e.
unactualised capacities, He would obviously be incomplete i.e.
imperfect and subject to additional change. This would make
God like all other contingent beings, it would be a demotion:
“[t]he descent of that Lordly Reality into conditions and
degrees would be equivalent to imperfection and contrary to
perfection, and is, therefore, absolutely impossible.”175 God is
not a composite of essence and attribute because “the essential
names and attributes of God are identical with His Essence,
and His Essence is above all comprehension.”176 `Abdu’l-Bahá
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 198

provides a very precise ontological reason why God’s essence

and attributes must be one:
If the attributes are not identical with the Essence,
there must also be a multiplicity of preexistences, and
differences between the attributes and the Essence
must also exist; and as Preexistence is necessary,
therefore, the sequence of preexistences would become
infinite. This is an evident error.177
In other words, if the essence and attributes are not one, then
both must be “pre-existence[s]” like God because they co-exist
with Him. However, this denies the singleness of God and
makes Him one of a multiplicity of co-existing things.
Moreover, if the attributes are prexistences, then there must be
an infinite number of them since the ontological ‘distance,’ the
degrees, between the essence of God and His attributes is
infinite if God is not one with His attributes. This leads to an
infinite sequence and the possibility of such a sequence is
denied by `Abdu’l-Bahá: “This is an evident error.” (His
rejection of an infinite real sequence is another link to the
philosophy of Aristotle.)
Because God has no potentials to actualise, i.e. is completely
actualized, God undergoes no change. There is nothing further
for God to change to; hence God is immutable:
The Sun of Reality, as we have said, has always been in
one condition; it has no change, no alteration, no
transformation and no vicissitude. It is eternal and
everlasting.178
Change is imperfection because it means that a being is not
yet ‘all it can be.’ Such a statement could only apply to
contingent beings because contingent beings depend on new
circumstances and conditions to initiate change. For them to
change means they also exist in time as they await new
circumstances and conditions. This is impossible in the case of
God because He does not exist in time: “Time has sway over
creatures but not over God.”179 Elsewhere `Abdu’l-Bahá asserts
that “beginning and end in relation to God are one,”180 which is
to say that for God, the future does not exist as something
distinct from the present and the past as they do for all created
and contingent beings: they are the one.
God is also not a composite of substance and form because
form must be imposed on a substance or material from
Some Answered Questions 199

outside; no material can give itself form, as in the case of the

chair in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s example of four-fold causality.
Furthermore, God cannot be a composite of essence and
existence because He is the only necessary being, i.e. the only
non-contingent being whose nature it is to exist. His essence
and existence are one. He exists necessarily, He is not
contingent or dependent 181 on anything else. That is why He
can bestow existence on others but none can bestow existence
on Him. In these four ways, God is different from all other
beings, i.e. is ontologically unique and cannot, logically
speaking, have any partner: “if we say that there is one Sun, and
it is pure singleness, and has no partner and equal, we again
speak truly.”182 This, it may be noted in passing, is the
ontological reason why there can be no Satan, i.e. no actually
existing being capable of challenging God’s absolute position
as Creator and ruler of creation. Such a being, would, in
effect, be a ‘partner’ or co-ruler.
Of course, we must also keep in mind that “the Divine
Reality is sanctified from singleness”183 and not just from
plurality. This statement reminds us that God is even beyond
‘one-ness,’ i.e. is beyond all conceivable categories of being
(‘number’ is one of those categories) — a position which sets the
ontological foundation for the necessity of knowing the Divine
only through the Manifestation. If God were conceivable by the
human mind, either by reason or by means of experience
through ‘mystic states,’ there would be no absolute necessity
for us to turn to the Manifestation to know about God.
It is important to remember that God does have names and
attributes revealed to us by the Manifestation, and, with the
guidance of `Abdu’l-Bahá we may reason about these as long as
we recall our thoughts are only partial and reflect an innate
human bias. (‘Partial’ of course does not mean ‘incorrect.’) For
example, `Abdu’l-Bahá tells us that “the names and attributes of
the Divinity themselves require the existence of beings.”184 He
proceeds to point out that there can be no creator without a
creation or a monarch without subjects. His statement is
challenging not because it implicitly names God as the Creator
but because it says that God’s names “require” a creation. Does
this not effectively deny God’s freedom to create because He is
being required to do so by something? Moreover, does not this
lack of freedom constitute an imperfection in God, a denial of
the principle that ““He doeth whatsoever He willeth”185 ? There is
at least one solution to this apparent contradiction. As we saw
earlier, God and His attributes are one, i.e. identical. Thus
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 200

God and the name of ‘Creator’ are one, and therefore, the
necessity to create and the will to create are one and the same.
Such distinctions do not exist in God for if they did, He would
no longer be a unity. Only to us, whose attributes and essences
are not always identical with our essence, is it possible for an
attribute to compel us to do something. Moreover, there is no
external entity imposing itself on God. What contingent and
dependent being could have the capacity to do so?
God’s absolute unity or “singleness” is only one of the ways
in which He is unique. Neither spirits nor God engage in
physical motion in any way and, therefore, really have no
physical or material mode of existence.
This state is neither abiding nor entering, neither
commingling nor descending; for entering, abiding,
descending, issuing forth and commingling are the
necessities and characteristics of bodies, not of
spirits; then how much less do they belong to the
sanctified and pure Reality of God. 186
This has important implications for science because it
means that any efforts to find the soul in the body is misguided
insofar as souls, like God, are not subject to the conditions of
place and time (nor of quantity) which are measurements
crucial to scientific endeavour. Their existence can neither be
proven nor disproven by these means, which means, in effect,
we have encountered one of the limitations of science.
Of course, SAQ, draws attention to other attributes of
God, such as the fact that He is omnipotent:
it becomes evident that this Nature, which has neither
perception nor intelligence, is in the grasp of Almighty
God, Who is the Ruler of the world of Nature; whatever
He wishes, He causes Nature to manifest. 187
`Abdu’l-Bahá also maintains that God is omniscient or all-
knowing: “He is the Omniscient, the Knower.”188
30. Emanationism

One of the signature doctrines of Bahá’í onto-theology is the

doctrine of emanation, which, historically gets its first
thorough explication in the Enneads of Plotinus in the 3rd
Century AD. The Enneads were a synthesis of Plato and
Aristotle and has great influence both in the Christian and
Some Answered Questions 201

Muslim traditions of philosophy. Plotinus’ main metaphor for

the emanative process was the sun and its light. `Abdu’l-Bahá
also uses this metaphor.
the light of the sun emanates from the sun; it does not
manifest it. The appearance through emanation is like
the appearance of the rays from the luminary of the
horizons of the world — that is to say, the holy essence
of the Sun of Truth is not divided and does not
descend to the condition of the creatures. In the same
way, the globe of the sun does not become divided and
does not descend to the earth. No, the rays of the sun,
which are its bounty, emanate from it and illumine the
dark bodies. 189
Several observations are in order. First, the sun, i.e. God,
retains His unity or “singleness” and does not divide or
distribute itself in its light or among His creations. `Abdu’l-
Bahá calls such division and distribution “proceeding through
manifestation”190 in which the “reality of a thing [appears] in
other forms.”191 His example of such manifestation is the
emergence of a tree or flower from a seed. Under no
circumstances does manifestation apply to God Who never
becomes part of creation and Who “has no change, no
alteration, no transformation, and no vicissitude”192 — a
position that effectively precludes even the slightest
suggestions of pantheism and monism since the teaching of
emanation supports ontological pluralism. It also effectively
precludes incarnationism, i.e. the Christian doctrine that in
the person of Christ, God Himself became part of creation.
The rejection of this doctrine defines a major difference
between virtually all branches of Christianity and the Bahá’í
understanding of the nature of the Manifestations.
To clarify the nature of emanationism, `Abdu’l-Bahá adds
the following statement:
The spirits of men, with reference to God, have
dependence through emanation, just as the discourse
proceeds from the speaker and the writing from the
writer — that is to say, the speaker himself does not
become the discourse, nor does the writer himself
become the writing. 193
The distinction between speaker and speech, and writer and
words clearly demonstrates the ontological difference between
God and creation: the difference between them is not one of
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 202

degree but rather, a difference of kind — hence the ontological

pluralism of SAQ. One is not a ‘lesser version’ of the other.
Reality is not the appearance of God “in other forms.”194
Emanationism requires that reality be strictly divided into
successive planes or levels of the emanative process with God as
the only absolutely independent non-contingent being as the
source or fountainhead of all other beings. This, of course, is
exactly what we observe in SAQ as we have already shown with
the hierarchy of mineral, vegetable, animal and human, and as
shall be demonstrated below in the hierarchy of the world of
God, the Kingdom and the material world. Moreover, in
emanationism each successive level of being has less and less
power or capacity and in that sense is proportionally less than
its predecessor which has its powers in addition to new ones.
For that reason, matter is described as “imperfection,”
“darkness” and “night,”195 and humankind is described as “the
end of imperfection [“materiality”]and the beginning of
perfection. He is at the last degree of darkness, and at the
beginning of light.”196
Emanationism stands in sharp contrast to creationism, i.e.
the doctrine that God created only once and that was out of
nothing. This is the commonly accepted doctrine in
Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Emanationism holds that
creation is eternal and on-going although there may be phases
in this process in which particular universes come into or go
out of existence. Emanationism is distinct from monism
insofar as emanationism does not see all of reality as one
without any ontologically fundamental differences between the
Creator and the created. The existence of the strict hierarchy
we have observed in SAQ negates any such undifferentiated
unity. Similarly, emanationism, though sometimes confused
with pantheism, is really quite different insofar as
emanationism does not identify God with creation or nature
since such an identification would involve God in change and
have Him descend into ordinary, material beings.
The emanationist ontology of SAQ (and the Writings in
general) creates bridges between Bahá’í teachings and teachings
found in other spiritual traditions such as Sufism, Kabbalah,
Advaita Vedanta and the Vijnanavada school of Buddhism.
Moreover, it establishes connections with such philosophers as
Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd in the Muslim tradition, with
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, John Scotus Erigena and
Some Answered Questions 203

Nicholas of Cusa in the Christian tradition and with

Maimonides in the Jewish tradition.
31. The Manifestations

Because God and creation are so ontologically different, an

intermediary level of reality is needed to connect them without
impugning God’s ontological absolute inviolability and
without raising the possibility of created beings ascending to
the level of the Creator as some mystics claim to do. The need
for an intermediary is the ontological basis for the three part
structure of reality as variously expressed in SAQ: “Know that
the conditions of existence are limited to the conditions of
servitude, of prophethood and of Deity…”197 The three
conditions mentioned here correspond to the levels of the
creation, the Manifestation and the Creator. `Abdu’l-Bahá also
expresses this three-part structure of existence by stating, “The
Prophets, on the contrary, believe that there is the world of
God, the world of the Kingdom, and the world of Creation:
three things.”198 Again we observe the three part structure with
an intermediary between God and His creation. The Kingdom,
as we have already seen, is the ideal world of which this world is
an image or shadow. The three-part structure is also implicit in
the following statement:
Therefore, all creatures emanate from God — that is to
say, it is by God that all things are realized, and by
Him that all beings have attained to existence. The first
thing which emanated from God is that universal
reality, which the ancient philosophers termed the
“First Mind,” and which the people of Bahá call the
“First Will.”199
In this case, there is God, the first emanation called the “First
Mind” or “First Will” and then the subsequent levels of
emanation. The “First Mind” or “First Will” stands between
them. The tripartite division is referred to implicitly when
`Abdu’l-Bahá, speaking of the impossibility of man devising
adequate concepts of God, says,
But for this Essence of the essences, this Truth of
truths, this Mystery of mysteries, there are reflections,
auroras, appearances and resplendencies in the world
of existence. The dawning-place of these splendors, the
place of these reflections, and the appearance of these
manifestations are the Holy Dawning-places, the
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 204

Universal Realities and the Divine Beings, Who are the

true mirrors of the sanctified Essence of God. 200
Again we observe the tripartite structure of God, the
“reflections, auras, appearances” and the “world of existence.”
We also observe how this ‘middle point’ or “dawning place,” of
“Universal Realit[y]” mediates or transmits the light of God
into the rest of creation. `Abdu’l-Bahá describes the
Manifestation as the “mediator of the Divine Bounty”201 to the
created world:
The splendors of the perfections, bounties and
attributes of God shine forth and radiate from the
reality of the Perfect Man — that is to say, the Unique
One, the supreme Manifestation of God. Other beings
receive only one ray, but the supreme Manifestation is
the mirror for this Sun, which appears and becomes
manifest in it, with all its perfections, attributes, signs
and wonders. 202
In the perfect Mirror, “the Sun of Reality becomes visible
and manifest with all its qualities and perfections.”203 This
ontological function comes into sharper focus when we
consider the third of the three stations of the Manifestations.
“The third station is that of the divine appearance and heavenly
splendour: it is the Word of God, the Eternal Bounty, the Holy
Spirit.”204 This connection between the Manifestation in His
third station with the Holy Spirit is significant because the
Holy Spirit is also described as “the mediator between God and
His creatures,”205 which re-emphasises the Manifestation’s role
as intermediary between the highest and lowest ontological
levels.
32. The Manifestation as World-Soul

However, in His third station, the role of the Manifestation

goes even further: it is
the divine appearance, which is the divine perfections,
the cause of the life of existence, of the education of
souls, of the guidance of people, and of the
enlightenment of the contingent world. 206
The teaching that the Manifestation is “the cause of the life of
existence” means that He functions like the traditional concept
of the ‘world-soul,’ the immediate source of existence and life
throughout the created universe. (This is another link between
Some Answered Questions 205

SAQ and the Athenian, particularly neo-Platonic tradition.)

Thus the Manifestation has a ‘cosmic’ function in the
evolution of the universe itself; His ‘work’ is not simply limited
to the human sphere. This third station “has neither beginning
nor end. When beginning is spoken of, it signifies the state of
manifesting.”207 In other words, this third station has always
existed as a part of the three-fold structure of existence.
This ‘world-soul’ function is emphasised vis-à-vis humanity
by the statement that
One Holy Soul gives life to the world of humanity,
changes the aspect of the terrestrial globe, causes
intelligence to progress, vivifies souls, lays the basis of
a new life, establishes new foundations, organizes the
world, brings nations and religions under the shadow
of one standard, delivers man from the world of
imperfections and vices, and inspires him with the
desire and need of natural and acquired perfections.208
Without the Manifestation in His three conditions — the
physical, the human or rational soul and the “divine
appearance”209 i.e. the “the Word of God, the eternal Bounty,
the Holy Spirit”210 — humankind could not exist. He is literally
the source of life to humanity (and by implication all the beings
humanity physically depends on) as well as the mover of
political, socio-economic and cultural progress. In other
words, the Manifestation beyond His specifically human
aspect, also has a cosmic and world-historical function. Thus,
according to SAQ, the Manifestation is more than a teacher of
moral and theological truths which is how Manifestations tend
to be viewed in other religions. Rather, The Manifestation’s
role is wider and more far-reaching than that of the
conventional theological understandings.
In the ontological schema we have examined, it is apparent
that God is ontological prior to all the other levels, i.e. the
existence of God is the condition that allows the other two
levels to exist. The same is true of the Manifestation Whose
existence is the necessary condition that allows creation to
exist. That is why `Abdu’l-Bahá says, “the Reality of Christ,
Who is the Word of God, with regard to essence, attributes
and glory, certainly precedes the creatures.”211 Without this
“Reality,” the rest of creation could not exist, a fact which
indicates the ontological function of the Manifestation.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 206

33. Three Comments

At this point two general comments are in order. First, SAQ

suggest correspondences from the onto-theological perspective.
The Manifestations of God occupy the station of
prophethood, which corresponds to the Kingdom and to the
“First Mind” or “First Will”: all of them occupy a middle
position between God and creation. This leads to the
possibility that there may be a deeper order or structure at
work in SAQ (and the other Writings) than what is explicitly
apparent. This suggestion, however, will require more research.
From this possibility, a question arises: ‘Why then, the
different terms for the ‘middle level?’ At this point a definitive
answer is difficult to establish but one possibility is that the
different terms arise due to different perspectives or contexts
and purposes. For example, the term ‘Manifestation’ is used
when the focus of discussion is the human and historical
presence of this first creation, i.e. when the focus of
discussion is onto-theological. The other terms are used when
the focus is more ontological and theoretical.
The second comment is that the conditions or levels of
reality are absolutely fixed insofar as “for every being there is a
point which it cannot overpass.”212 In other words, no being
can escape the condition of “servitude” in which it exists. For
example, “a mineral, however far it may progress in the mineral
kingdom, cannot gain the vegetable power,”213 and a human
being “however far he may progress in gaining limitless
perfections, will never reach the condition of Deity.”214
Obviously SAQ’s ontology inherently subscribes to a law of
limits vis-à-vis progress which effectively rejects any mystic
claims of being ontologically one with God, and any notion
that the creation and God can in any way be one. Moreover, we
might describe this ontological structure as ‘hard’ insofar as
there is no crossing over from one level or condition to
another. This provides additional support to the idea that the
universe has an underlying order and structure which in turn
supports the idea of a Creator. Finally, the ‘hard’ distinctions
between levels of reality provides ontological foundations for
the teaching that human beings cannot attain direct knowledge
of God.
In the foregoing discussion we have observed in passing that
the Manifestations exist on “three planes”215 or “conditions”216
or “stations”217 : the physical condition as with all material
beings; the “individual reality”218 of the rational human soul
Some Answered Questions 207

and the condition of the “divine appearance and heavenly

splendour.”219 A similar idea is found in the following: “but
Their heavenly condition embraces all things, knows all
mysteries, discovers all signs, and rules over all things.”220
However, even in rational condition of the human soul, the
Manifestation is not merely a man ‘like the others:’
But the individual reality of the Manifestations of God
is a holy reality, and for that reason it is sanctified
and, in that which concerns its nature and quality, is
distinguished from all other things.221
In other words, the Manifestation possesses an individual
rational soul, as do all human beings, but it is different from
ours in regards to its nature and quality. This establishes a
difference in kind between the Manifestation and the rest of
creation; He is not merely ‘one of us,’ at least not in His
second and third stations. One of the key differences concerns
Their knowledge of the world:
Since the Sanctified Realities, the supreme
Manifestations of God, surround the essence and
qualities of the creatures, transcend and contain
existing realities and understand all things, therefore,
Their knowledge is divine knowledge, and not acquired
— that is to say, it is a holy bounty; it is a divine
revelation. 222
Here we see how ontology impacts epistemology insofar as a
higher ontological station enables greater access to knowledge
of beings on a lower station. In this case, just as the human
soul surrounds the body and has intuitive knowledge of its
parts and their condition, the Manifestation ontologically
surrounds all created entities insofar as His powers and
capacities exceed theirs. (See the earlier section on nested
hierarchies.) Unlike us, His immediate knowledge is not limited
to His own body but extends to all creation. Therefore, He can
comprehend all things and know them intuitively just as we are
aware of our own bodies.
34. The Manifestations’ Superior Knowledge
Precisely because He has such superior knowledge of all
beings, He is capable of guiding humankind.
The Manifestation — that is, the Holy Lawgiver —
unless He is aware of the realities of beings, will not
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 208

comprehend the essential connection which proceeds

from the realities of things, and He will certainly not
be able to establish a religion conformable to the facts
and suited to the conditions. 223
Without His special insight into the conditions of “the
realities of things,” the Manifestation would not be able to be
the meet the needs of human spiritual and socio-economic
evolution. The ontological basis for this special insight is
found in the Manifestation’s role as a ‘world-soul Who is “the
cause of the life of existence.”224 This position allows Him
privileged insight into the nature of all beings. In this
connection, `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
the universal divine mind, which is beyond nature, is
the bounty of the Preexistent Power. This universal
mind is divine; it embraces existing realities, and it
receives the light of the mysteries of God. It is a
conscious power, not a power investigation and of
research … This divine intellectual power is the special
attribute of the Holy Manifestations and the Dawning-
places of prophethood. 225
In other words, the special and privileged insight into the
conditions of creation are a result of possessing the “universal
divine mind” which is supra-natural, i.e. “beyond nature.” This
means that the “universal divine mind” and its powers are
beyond natural explanation, i.e. cannot be explained in purely
natural or scientific terms. The fact that it is a “conscious
power” and not an investigative power means that the universal
mind does not engage in step-by-step discursive reasoning but
rather works by immediate insight.

Part III: Epistemology

Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerning itself
with questions about what we know, what is possible for us to
know, how we can know, and the reliability of our knowledge
and methods of acquiring it. Although SAQ has a considerable
amount to say on this subject, it does not contain an
epistemological theory worked out in minute detail. Instead,
SAQ sets out general guidelines which all proposed Bahá’í-
based epistemological theories must satisfy to be in harmony
with the Writings. It is, therefore, possible that there may be a
Some Answered Questions 209

variety of Bahá’í-based epistemologies which are consistent

with the Writings, though not necessarily with each other.
As already discussed above, epistemology is intimately
related with ontology because ontological station or condition
determines what and how we can acquire knowledge. One of the
principles which underlies SAQ’s epistemology is that
“everything which is lower is powerless to comprehend the
reality of that which is higher.”226 This is why humankind
cannot comprehend the “Reality of the Divinity”227 and why the
plant or animal cannot comprehend the human essence;
`Abdu’l-Bahá says, “the difference of conditions in the world of
beings is an obstacle to comprehension”228 and adds,
“[d]ifference of condition is an obstacle to knowledge; the
inferior degree cannot comprehend the superior degree.”229
Consequently, humankind needs the Manifestation to attain
knowledge of God: “if man attains to the knowledge of the
Manifestations of God, he will attain to the knowledge of
God.”230 Furthermore, this principle shapes SAQ’s view of
what philosophy is and can do: “Philosophy consists in
comprehending the reality of things as they exist, according to
the capacity and the power of man.”231
Here we observe not only the realist orientation of SAQ’s
epistemology in knowing “the reality of things as they exist,”
but also a re-affirmation of the principle that the capacity to
know is linked to one’s ontological condition.
35. Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth

As indicated in our discussion of ontology, SAQ falls

clearly into the realist camp. `Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that
each thing has its degree of existence provides a realist
foundation for Bahá’í ontology and epistemology. If “each
being” has its own “principle, foundation or reality”232 and
reflects one of the names of God in its own way, it is,
therefore, not only genuinely distinct from all other things but
also independent from them, i.e. has its own principle or
foundation of existence “in itself.”233 Having this principle or
foundation “in itself” establishes a basis for the ontological
independence of “each being” (except, of course, from God)
including independence from human observers, which is to say,
the ontological status of “each being” is does not depend on
being observed by humans or on human beliefs or linguistic
practices.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 210

SAQ builds on this realist ontological foundation by

asserting that
All sciences, knowledge, arts, wonders, institutions,
discoveries and enterprises come from the exercised
intelligence of the rational soul. There was a time when
they were unknown, preserved mysteries and hidden
secrets; the rational soul gradually discovered them and
brought them out from the plane of the invisible and
the hidden into the realm of the visible. This is the
greatest power of perception in the world of nature,
which in its highest flight and soaring comprehends the
realities, the properties and the effects of the
contingent beings. 234
The realist approach is clearly present in the assertion that the
rational soul discovers the unknown, and “comprehends the
realities, the properties and the effects of contingent beings.”
In other words, the rational soul does not construct them,
which is to say that these “realities” exist independently of the
human perceiver. They once existed in a hidden form and are
now revealed. Elsewhere `Abdu’l-Bahá states,
The mind and the thought of man sometimes discover
truths, and from this thought and discovery signs and
results are produced. This thought has a foundation.
But many things come to the mind of man which are
like the waves of the sea of imaginations; they have no
fruit, and no result comes from them. 235
Here `Abdu’l-Bahá goes into more detail. Discoveries lead to
“thought [that] has a foundation,” i.e. a foundation in reality.
This, in effect, asserts a correspondence theory of truth in
which correct thought has a “foundation” or basis in reality,
which is to say, corresponds to reality. `Abdu’l-Bahá also
differentiates such thought from imaginations which He says
lead to no real results. This idea is reinforced by His statement
that “Man is able to resist and to oppose Nature because he
discovers the constitution of things, and through this he
commands the forces of Nature.”236 The result of human
discoveries that have a “foundation” in or correspond to
reality is the ability to control nature. This, too, implies that
discovers the pre-existing “constitution of things” and does
not invent or construct them, i.e. they are independent of
human perception. Here is another example:
Some Answered Questions 211

the rational soul as far as human ability permits

discovers the realities of things and becomes cognizant
of their peculiarities and effects, and of the qualities
and properties of beings.237
The rational soul becomes “cognizant” of “their peculiarities
and effects,” i.e. perceives them in their nature and ways of
being, not in our constructions. We observe the “properties of
beings,” not the humanly constructed properties that we
ascribe to them.
Of course, humankind is not God or a Manifestation. Its
ability to acquire knowledge has limits; we know “as far as
human ability permits.” We are not omniscient. However, we
must not draw false conclusions from this. The fact that our
knowledge is limited by our human ontological station and to
our human capacities does not mean it is mistaken or a human
construct. A child’s knowledge of arithmetic is limited, but it
is not, thereby, in error, nor is it a construction dependent on
the human perceiver. Our knowledge that the Giants won the
Super Bowl 2008 is a limited knowledge of the actual game, but
nonetheless it is correct and not dependent on an observer.
Indeed, through the course of this study, we could not locate a
single direct or indirect epistemological reference in SAQ
which deviated from the realist position and the consequent
correspondence theory of knowledge.
SAQ reinforces the correspondence theory of knowledge in a
variety of statements. As already noted, `Abdu’l-Bahá states
that “Philosophy consists in comprehending the reality of
things as they exist, according to the capacity and the power of
man.”238 To comprehend “the reality of things as they exist” is
nothing other than to have one’s knowledge correspond to
reality. Naturally, this comprehension is limited by our station
and capacities but this does not mean that what we do in fact
comprehend does not correspond to reality. Imagine a very
dirty window with only one clear patch: what we see through
the clear patch is limited but that does not mean what we see is
not really there. Furthermore, `Abdu’l-Bahá asserts that we can
gain real knowledge by the power of inference: “From known
realities — that is to say, from the things which are known and
visible — he discovers unknown things.”239 His example is
Columbus who “through the power of his reason he discovers
another hemisphere,”240 whose inferred knowledge
corresponded to reality. Another example of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s to
a correspondence theory of knowledge is the following:
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 212

Reflect that man’s power of thought consists of two

kinds. One kind is true, when it agrees with a
determined truth. Such conceptions find realization in
the exterior world; such are accurate opinions, correct
theories, scientific discoveries and inventions. 241
Here He speaks specifically of a knowledge that “agrees with a
determined truth,” i.e. knowledge that corresponds to reality.
He also provides a test for this knowledge: it leads to “accurate
opinions” and “correct theories” which conform to reality as
well as to discoveries and inventions. In other words, such
knowledge has real results testable with the reality in question.
36. Rejection of Nominalism and Conceptualism
The inherent realism of SAQ places it squarely in opposition
to nominalism and its variant, conceptualism. Nominalism
holds that general or abstract terms i.e. ‘universals’ only exist
as names (hence ‘nominalism’) and do not correspond to any
reality. It is the
view that things denominated by the same term share
nothing in common except that fact: what all chairs
have in common is that they are called ‘chair.’242
According to nominalism, only individuals are real; kinds,
species and classes are not — something which, as we have seen,
SAQ emphatically denies in its assertion of the plant, animal
and human levels of spirit, each with its own particular set of
class, kind or ‘species’ attributes. The same is clear from
SAQ’s references to “degrees, stations, species and classes.”243
Furthermore, for nominalism, even the common qualities of
things such as colours, structure, function and materials are
human constructions and do not actually correspond to any
real qualities in the things perceived. This, too, conflicts with
SAQ which considers the attributes of plants, animals and
humans to be objectively real. Humankind, for example, has the
powers of growth attributable to plants, the powers of sense
and motion of animals as well as the “rational soul” which
distinguishes our species. These are objectively real qualities
inhering in things.
Moreover, as the following statement shows, humankind
“discovers the realities of things and becomes cognizant of
their peculiarities and effects, and of the qualities and
properties of beings.”244 It is noteworthy that we discover the
Some Answered Questions 213

realities, “peculiarities and effects,” and “the qualities and

properties of beings” — we do not invent or construct them.
Furthermore, the qualities which clearly belong to the things in
which they inhere are a source of knowledge about things: “our
knowledge of things, even of created and limited things, is
knowledge of their qualities.”245 Indeed, `Abdu’l-Bahá identifies
knowledge of qualities or attributes as one of two kinds of
knowledge:
Know that there are two kinds of knowledge: the
knowledge of the essence of a thing and the knowledge
of its qualities. The essence of a thing is known through
its qualities; otherwise, it is unknown and hidden.246
Obviously, in His view, qualities provide knowledge about
things. Hence SAQ does not agree with the nominalist view
that qualities do not correspond to anything real in objects.
It is important to emphasise this in order to locate the
philosophy of SAQ on the spectrum of available philosophies
and especially those of our time when nominalism in its various
forms is popular, especially in its postmodern guise. 247
Locating the Bahá’í philosophy on the spectrum of available
philosophies helps us determine its nature, not to mention its
closest relatives and its opponents. As explained at the
beginning of this paper, this has tremendous implications for
teaching and explicating the Faith as well as for inter-faith
dialogue, especially with religions that have strongly developed
philosophical traditions.
37. Sources of Knowledge

According to SAQ, there are four generally accepted sources

of knowledge. The first of these is knowledge based on the
evidence based on sensory observation or, as it is called today,
empirical knowledge. This kind of knowledge has its stronghold
in science. `Abdu’l-Bahá rejects this kind of knowledge as final
and authoritative because the senses can mislead us and
consequently mislead our thinking. Reason is the second
method of gaining knowledge, but He rejects it as final and
authoritative because it does not necessarily lead to agreement
and certainty: “the method of reason is not perfect.”248 The
third method is tradition, and this method is “not perfect,
because the traditions are understood by the reason …[and] the
reason itself is liable to err.”249 However, there is a fourth
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 214

method of acquiring knowledge which is able to provide

certainty.
But the bounty of the Holy Spirit gives the true method
of comprehension which is infallible and indubitable.
This is through the help of the Holy Spirit which comes
to man, and this is the condition in which certainty
can alone be attained. 250
Let us examine this carefully, for in the contemporary
philosophical climate, much depends on it. The “bounty of the
Holy Spirit” provides the conditions in which we can attain
“certainty,” “infallible” and “indubitable,” knowledge. Hence it
is possible, at least in principle, for humankind to attain
certain knowledge. The location of this passage as the
conclusion of a talk on epistemology is also of interest because
it demonstrates that in `Abdu’l-Bahá’s view, the spiritual
condition of humankind has consequences on what and how
much we are capable of knowing even in other areas. Our
natural abilities, i.e. our abilities unassisted by the Holy Spirit,
have inherent limitations that can only be overcome with divine
support. Our spiritual condition and our capacity for
knowledge are connected, as illustrated in the following
statement:
Now consider, in this great century which is the cycle
of Bahá’u’lláh, what progress science and knowledge
have made, how many secrets of existence have been
discovered, how many great inventions have been
brought to light and are day by day multiplying in
number. Before long, material science and learning, as
well as the knowledge of God, will make such progress
and will show forth such wonders that the beholders
will be amazed. 251
The spiritual and the scientific are not opposed to one another
and can work together in harmony. There is a further
association of the Holy Spirit with knowledge and
understanding when `Abdu’l-Bahá says that the appearance of
the Holy Spirit “dispels the darkness of ignorance.”252 Here,
too, spiritual condition and knowledge, i.e. epistemology, are
linked.
Even the possibility of attaining certain knowledge
distinguishes the epistemology of SAQ from that of
contemporary postmodern philosophies which cannot admit
that sure knowledge is possible even in principle. This is a
Some Answered Questions 215

‘continental divide’ among modern philosophies with some

philosophies, like those in the Athenian tradition, going one
way and others, such as postmodernism, going another.
Naturally it is necessary to ask ourselves what is meant by
the “bounty of the Holy Spirit.” `Abdu’l-Bahá offers one clue
when discussing the proofs for God’s existence:
if the inner perception be open, a hundred thousand
clear proofs become visible. Thus, when man feels the
indwelling spirit, he is in no need of arguments for its
existence; but for those who are deprived of the bounty
of the spirit, it is necessary to establish external
arguments. 253
In other words, when the mind is clear and open, we can
perceive directly that which we otherwise must laboriously
prove by discursive reasoning. We acquire knowledge by
immediate insight because we are enlightened by the “the
luminous rays which emanate from the Manifestations.”254
This is analogous to but not the same as Descartes’ “clear and
distinct ideas,”255 the difference being that `Abdu’l-Bahá
includes our spiritual and not merely our intellectual condition
in His statement about “the bounty of the Holy Spirit.”
However, in both cases, the insight attained, the
comprehension attained by the “bounty of the Holy Spirit” is
foundational, i.e. it cannot be doubted and is “infallible and
indubitable.” On these certain foundations we can build a
variety of inferences and deductions. Therefore, we may
conclude that the epistemological position of SAQ is
foundational insofar as “infallible and indubitable” knowledge
is at least possible for those who attain the “bounty of the Holy
Spirit.” SAQ is also foundational because the teachings of
Bahá’u’lláh are the certain foundations on which all other
certain knowledge claims must be based.
38. A Reflection on `Abdu’l-Bahá’s Statements

`Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements about the four methods of

knowledge do not assert that the senses, reason or tradition
cannot be used at all in the quest for certain knowledge but
rather that by themselves they are not sufficient. They are
“liable to error,”256 i.e. “not perfect”257 which does not mean
‘always wrong’ but rather, being possibly “exposed or subject
to some usually adverse contingency or action.”258 They may be
wrong in various degrees of probability, but this is not to say
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 216

that they are useless in the quest for knowledge; rather, it

indicates that they must be used with care and in the correct
conditions. They are necessary but are not sufficient.
According to `Abdu’l-Bahá the senses, reason and traditions
must be augmented and assisted by the inspiration or “bounty”
of the Holy Spirit; when this occurs, we meet the necessary and
sufficient condition for attaining certainty in our knowledge.
This assistance provides us with a touchstone, a perspective or
‘Archimedean point’ from which we can judge whether our
views agree with the revelation, are neutral towards it or
disagree. Consequently, we must reject views that patently
disagree with the revelation, assign various degrees of
probability to those that are neutral and accept those which are
endorsed or in harmony with the tenor of the Writings.
In considering the epistemology of SAQ, we must beware of
going to two extremes common in our time. On one hand, we
must not accept the senses, reason and traditions as absolute
sources of truth, the way science accepts empiricism or
religions often accept unexamined tradition. Such knowledge is
necessary but not sufficient for certainty. On the other hand,
we must not fall — as is common in postmodern philosophy —
into the trap of corrosive relativism and scepticism about all
knowledge claims and judge them all as equal because we ‘can’t
really know for sure.’ All truth-claims are judged to have the
same degree of probability or improbability, which is a
viewpoint that brings with it a host of philosophical
difficulties. 259 As we have seen, however, throughout SAQ,
`Abdu’l-Bahá has no hesitations in describing various views —
such as pantheism, maya-ism, re-incarnationism or a real
infinite regress — as erroneous.
If `Abdu’l-Bahá did not think that error and truth are real
and that progress involves moving from the former to the
latter, He would not be able to argue that humankind needs an
educator
so that knowledge and science may increase, and the
reality of things, the mysteries of beings and the
properties of existence maybe discovered; that, day by
day, instructions, inventions and institutions may be
improved; and from things perceptible to the senses
conclusions as to intellectual things may be deduced. 260
If there were no real knowledge, i.e. no difference between
truth and error, and no progress in knowledge, i.e. no
Some Answered Questions 217

displacement of error by truth, or if all truth-claims had the

some degree of probability or improbability, `Abdu’l-Bahá
could not speak meaningfully of the “progress science and
knowledge have made”261 since the inauguration of “the cycle of
Bahá’u’lláh.”262 Elsewhere He says, “at the time of the
appearance of each Manifestation of God extraordinary
progress has occurred in the world of minds, thoughts and
spirits.”263 Without improvements in knowledge there would
only be change and not progress; indeed, the whole idea of
progressive revelation is predicated on the progress i.e.
advancement of human kind. It is, therefore, clear that any
variant of scepticism would effectively negate two of the key
principles of progressive revelation, namely, that new
Manifestations appear because humankind has progressed to
the point of needing not just a renewal of the “eternal
verities”264 but also a new, more advanced teachings than
previous generations, and that the advent of the Manifestation
inaugurates a new era of progress and improvement.
SAQ encourages the conclusion that the senses, reason and
tradition may give us accurate knowledge, but that we must be
open to the possibility of error. This, of course, does not mean
we have to be sceptical as a matter of principle even when there
is no reason to be. SAQ does not to foster an all-corrosive
scepticism which would undermine even its own claims and
teachings on the importance of discovering the truth about
things. Furthermore, any wholesale rejection of reason would
undermine the teaching that the distinctively human attribute
is the “rational soul.”265 It would also contradict the praise
bestowed upon science, everything said about discovering
truths as well as the dictum that “in this age the peoples of the
world need the arguments of reason.”266
39. The Question of Certainty: Between Scylla and Charybdis
All this leads to an awkward and delicate question: ‘Can
human beings have certain knowledge?’ According to SAQ, the
answer is that in principle we can have “indubitable” knowledge
if we are open to the “bounty of the Holy Spirit.”
However, aside from this, the issue depends on what
definition we assign to ‘certainty.’ Were we to say that a fact
is certain if there is no reasonable evidence to doubt it — such
as ‘The Giants won Super Bowl 2008,’ ‘1 + 1 = 2’ and ‘People will
starve if they do not eat’ — then we can indeed have certain
knowledge. In other words, truth-claims can be accepted as
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 218

certainly true if they meet four conditions: (a) there is evidence

supporting them; (b) there is no bona-fide evidence against
them; (c) they are not self-contradictory or self-refuting and do
not necessarily lead us to demonstrably false conclusions and
(d) they are not in conflict with the teachings of the
Manifestation. No one would seriously doubt that the Giants
won Super Bowl 2008 or that people who do not eat will starve
to death. The evidence for these truth-claims is overwhelming
and there simply is no evidence against them whatever. The
statements ‘The Giants won Super Bowl 2008’ or ‘People who do
not eat starve to death’ contain no self-contradictions’ neither
do they undermine themselves or necessarily lead us to other
palpably false conclusions. Finally, they are not in conflict with
the Writings. In other words, we can have provisional
certainty, i.e. certainty until bona-fide evidence to the
contrary appears. The arrival of such evidence and the
replacement of one truth-claim by a better, more adequate one
is precisely what happens in scientific, social or spiritual
progress.
The idea of provisional certainty of knowledge suggest that
because of the short-comings of the senses, reason and
tradition as `Abdu’l-Bahá points out, any truth-claim is open
in principle to correction although in practice there is no
reason to doubt to await such correction. Who would
seriously assert that people can live indefinitely without food?
The world is brim full of countless such ‘humble facts’ — fire is
hotter than rice, people cannot eat rocks, alligators are not
ducks, the sun appears to rise at dawn — that may be doubted
only in principle, but not in actual practice. They are
provisionally or practically certain — and even SAQ makes use
of them, as in the following example:
Afterward comes the summer, when the heat increases,
and growth and development attain their greatest
power. The energy of life in the vegetable kingdom
reaches to the degree of perfection, the fruit appears,
and the time of harvest ripens; a seed has become a
sheaf, and the food is stored for winter. 267
Here is an example of sense observation that may be doubtable
in principle but is not doubtable in practice. However, rather
than state that this truth is absolute i.e. indubitable, we should
say that there are no reasons to doubt this — a formulation
that reminds us that all truth-claims, like all claims based on the
Some Answered Questions 219

senses, reason or tradition, are open to correction, at least in

principle.
In our understanding, SAQ essentially steers the middle
course of provisional certainty when the “bounty of the Holy
Spirit” is not involved. On one extreme is the Charybdis of a
rigid and dogmatic belief in our natural abilities to discover
absolute truth, a position that as `Abdu’l-Bahá points out, is
not warranted. On the other extreme is the Scylla of scepticism
and relativism which abandon all attempts to adjudicate
among truth-claims and, thereby, undermine the very concept
of progress — one of the foundation stones of this revelation —
as well as its epistemology of discovering truth and the
importance of education:
Human education signifies civilization and progress —
that is to say, government, administration, charitable
works, trades, arts and handicrafts, sciences, great
inventions and discoveries and elaborate institutions,
which are the activities essential to man as
distinguished from the animal.268
The middle course between dogmatic certainty and an
equally dogmatic scepticism and relativism is one of the key
strategies for the unity of science and religion, at least on the
methodological level. Science employs this policy, i.e. a
properly established truth-claim is accepted as true until bona
fide contrary evidence appears and then appropriate changes
are made. Some truth-claims, such as the spherical form of the
earth, are so well established and unchallenged by contrary
evidence that for all practical purposes they are certain. They
meet all of the four criteria noted above. However, others, such
as higher level interpretations of complex data in cosmology or
quantum physics are far from certain and still subject to
debate. With some of these, we may never attain even practical
certainty — and it is important not to lump these in with the
‘humble facts’ about which practical certainty is possible.
40. Moderate Rationalism

As we have observed, `Abdu’l-Bahá does not regard reason as

a sufficient criterion of truth — and yet SAQ itself defines the
human soul as the “rational soul,”269 praises reason’s powers of
discovery and invention,270 and tells us that “in this age the
peoples of the world need the arguments of reason.”271 How are
we to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the praise of
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 220

reason’s importance on one hand and the recognition of its

limits on the other?
The clearest solution is that SAQ exemplifies a position
known as moderate rationalism. If we ask the question, ‘How
much can reason know?’ there are basically three answers.
Extreme rationalism, as represented Spinoza, Leibniz and
modern positivists of various stripes, asserts that reason can
tell us everything that is genuine knowledge. Whatever is not
reasonable is not authentic knowledge; furthermore, there is
nothing that reason cannot tell us. This view represents an
absolute trust in the reliability of reason. Scepticism (and its
cousins relativism and nihilism) take the polar opposite view:
reason cannot give us any authentic knowledge since reason
itself is subject to challenge or is merely a prejudiced cultural
product that gives us nothing but viewpoints — but these are
not really knowledge per se. This view has its strongest
proponents in the ancient Sophists, Nietzsche and
contemporary postmodernism. 272 Moderate rationalism,
however, maintains that reason can tell us some things but not
others, that reason is necessary but is not all-sufficient, that
other ways of knowing are possible. It can, for example,
accommodate belief in divine inspiration and revelation as
part of a rationally based hierarchy of knowing in which
rational knowledge leads us to a point where other forms of
knowing are necessary. Moderate rationalism recognises that
reason must be augmented by other powers — such as by the
“bounties of the Holy Spirit” mentioned in SAQ.
41. Knowledge of Essences
One of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s most significant statements on
epistemology concerns our knowledge of the essences of things.
He says,
Know that there are two kinds of knowledge: the
knowledge of the essence of a thing and the knowledge
of its qualities. The essence of a thing is known through
its qualities; otherwise, it is unknown and hidden. 273
Aside from the fact that this statement confirms the existence
of essences — thereby clearly making Bahá’í philosophy a type of
essentialism — `Abdu’l-Bahá informs us that essences can be
known. However, He clearly specifies that essences can only be
known by means of their qualities or attributes and cannot be
known immediately through direct insight. Indeed, “our
Some Answered Questions 221

knowledge of things, even of created and limited things, is

knowledge of their qualities and not of their essence”274 He
announces, and repeats this theme when He says,
For example, the inner essence of the sun is unknown,
but is understood by its qualities, which are heat and
light. The inner essence of man is unknown and not
evident, but by its qualities it is characterized and
known. Thus everything is known by its qualities and
not by its essence. Although the mind encompasses all
things, and the outward beings are comprehended by
it, nevertheless these beings with regard to their essence
are unknown; they are only known with regard to their
qualities.275
In passing, let us note again how this passage confirms the
possibility of genuine knowledge about things, although it
limits the means by which we may attain this knowledge. We
can only know through the outer qualities or attributes, which
can tell us some things about an object, but cannot tell us
about its essence, its en-soi or ‘in-itself,’ from ‘within.’ In
other words, we can only know things from the externalized
signs of their interaction with us, which establishes specific
limits on human knowledge. In the case of humans, we would
say that our subjectivity is unknowable by others; all we can
know are externalized attributes such as EEG graphs and verbal
reports. Here is a limitation of human knowledge, including
science: to paraphrase Schopenhauer, our scientific knowledge
is phenomenal (of external attributes) and not noumenal (of
essences).
It is important to avoid assuming that any and all
knowledge of essences is forbidden by `Abdu’l-Bahá. If this is
what He meant, we would be trapped in a terrible conundrum
because if qualities are not associated with an essence and
cannot give us knowledge about the essence, what are they
giving us knowledge about? Unattached qualities can’t give us
knowledge about anything — which opens the door to radical
scepticism and the impossibility of knowledge which in turn
denies the teachings about progress in science, society and
spirituality. How can we say we know about the sun if its
qualities are not somehow connected with it? Thus, it would
seem clear that `Abdu’l-Bahá is not setting the stage for such
virulent scepticism. Rather, what He says is that our knowledge
about the essence must come from its attributes i.e. by means
of the attributes and not from direct insight or intuition.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 222

Furthermore, this knowledge is limited and cannot tell us

everything about an object for the good ontological reason
that every object always has a vast store of unactualised
potentials. (See the section on the composition of beings.)
Consequently, we conclude that SAQ does not absolutely
disallow knowledge of essences but disallows any direct access
to essences and requires use to gain our knowledge via the
attributes and to recognise that such knowledge has inherent
limits.
42. Objective and Subjective Knowledge
According to `Abdu’l-Bahá in SAQ, knowledge can be
divided into two major categories, both of which differ
essentially in kind and not merely in degree: subjective
knowledge and objective knowledge i.e. “an intuitive knowledge
and a knowledge derived from perception.”276 In objective
knowledge, which is “derived from perception” and belongs
“universally”277 (a essential species attribute) to all human
beings,
by the power of the mind the conception of an object
is formed, or from beholding an object the form is
produced in the mirror of the heart. The circle of this
knowledge is very limited because it depends upon
effort and attainment.278
The reference to the impression of the form of a perceived
object “in the mirror of the heart” agrees with the Athenian
tradition (especially Aristotle and Plotinus) that perception
concerns the form of things impressing themselves on the mind
or heart. However, this knowledge is limited “because it
depends on effort and attainment;” after all, our efforts suffer
not only the perceptive limitations of our species but also our
personal limitations. Such knowledge is external because it does
not originate within the object of perception.
By way of contrast, the Manifestation knows subjectively or
intuitively; this is “the knowledge of being, is intuitive; it is like
the cognizance and consciousness that man has of himself.”279
We, too, have subjective intuitive knowledge because “the
spirit surrounds the body”280 and is aware of the body’s
conditions as well as of all the body parts. However, in human
beings this capacity is limited to our own bodies; we cannot
actually feel another’s pain, despite our best efforts at
Some Answered Questions 223

empathy. The spirit knows the body from within because it is

in the higher ontological station of surrounding the body. The
Manifestations attain knowledge of the world in the same way
because He is on a higher ontological plane and spiritually
surrounds all lower beings.
Since the Sanctified Realities, the supreme Manifestations
of God, surround the essence and qualities of the creatures,
transcend and contain existing realities and understand all
things, therefore, Their knowledge is divine knowledge, and not
acquired — that is to say, it is a holy bounty; it is a divine
revelation. 281
Such immediate and intuitive knowledge of created beings is
necessary because
unless He is aware of the realities of beings, will not
comprehend the essential connection which proceeds
from the realities of things, and He will certainly not
be able to establish a religion conformable to the facts
and suited to the conditions. 282
Only immediate and intuitive knowledge of the
Manifestation can understand things from within, can
understand the essences or “realities of beings,” which means
that unlike scientists or any other human beings, the
Manifestation has access to the subjectivity of other beings.
For this reason He is able to understand “the essential
connections” which emanate from the essences or “realities of
things.”
Religion, then, is the necessary connection which
emanates from the reality of things; and as the supreme
Manifestations of God are aware of the mysteries of
beings, therefore, They understand this essential
connection, and by this knowledge establish the Law of
God. 283
This means that the religion established by the Manifestation is
based on His immediate and intuitive knowledge of the
essences or realities of beings and their “necessary
connections.” Because humankind does not and cannot possess
subjective or intuitive knowledge of those realities and the
connections between them, we must accept what the
Manifestation establishes as “the Law of God.”
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 224

From this situation it logically follows that humankind

could not reasonably challenge the “Laws of God”: we lack the
knowledge and insight to do so, nor will we ever be able to
acquire such knowledge. Since we cannot possibly ever possess
the necessary knowledge to base a challenge on the foundations
of knowledge, it makes no sense to do so. The necessary and
sufficient basis for any such challenge is missing. Indeed, it
would make more sense for a five year old to challenge the
judgment of an experienced physician (even a blind pig finds
the occasional acorn) than for humankind to challenge the
“Laws of God” established by the Manifestation. Thus, any
prohibition of challenging what the Manifestation establishes
is not evidence of domination, suppression or latent
totalitarianism but simply a rational outcome of the differing
ontological and subsequent epistemological situations of the
Manifestation and humankind.
43. Knowledge of God

One of the foundational principles of Bahá’í epistemology is

that the essence and attributes of God are unknowable to
humankind.
For the essence and the attributes of the Lord of Unity are in
the heights of sanctity, and for the minds and understandings
there is no way to approach that position. ‘The way is closed,
and seeking is forbidden.’284
Previously in this paper, we have already seen the ontological
reason why this is so: “everything which is lower is powerless to
comprehend the reality of that which is higher.”285 Although
humankind is obviously on a lower ontological level than God
and, therefore, barred from directly acquiring knowledge of
Him, this does not mean that such knowledge is impossible to
attain:
But for this Essence of the essences, this Truth of
truths, this Mystery of mysteries, there are reflections,
auroras, appearances and resplendencies in the world
of existence. The dawning-place of these splendors, the
place of these reflections, and the appearance of these
manifestations are the Holy Dawning-places, the
Universal Realities and the Divine Beings, Who are the
true mirrors of the sanctified Essence of God. All the
perfections, the bounties, the splendors which come
Some Answered Questions 225

from God are visible and evident in the Reality of the

Holy Manifestations.286
For this reason, “all that the human reality knows, discovers
and understands of the names, the attributes and the
perfections of God refer to these Holy Manifestations.”287
Thus, “if man attains to the knowledge of the Manifestations
of God, he will attain to the knowledge of God. 288
In light of these statements, it becomes clear that SAQ
steers a middle course between an apophatic theology
according to which all descriptions and conceptualizations of
God and subsequent discussions are false and should be
avoided because God’s essence is unknowable, and, on the
other hand, an extreme natural theology which tries to deduce
knowledge of God’s essence and attributes by humankind’s
natural powers without divine revelation through the
Manifestation. SAQ’s position seems to be that correct
reasoning about God and His attributes is possible — but it
must be based on and checked against what the Manifestation
reveals. Furthermore, we must remember that what the
Manifestation reveals is a limited and adapted not only to our
human capacities but also to what is comprehensible and
practical in our particular cultural-spiritual milieu. We may
know about God but only indirectly, in a mediated manner,
and in a manner consistent with our human, personal and
cultural capacity.
Of course, such limitations do not mean that the knowledge
of God we obtain is incorrect. How could it be if it comes
from the Manifestation? Moreover, as shown before,
‘incomplete’ does not mean ‘incorrect.’ Therefore, it is
apparent that we do indeed have knowledge of God, but it is
knowledge that comes to us via a particular route — the
Manifestation — and not by means of direct personal insight
or by mystical experience of God or His attributes.
The fact that we do, in fact, receive correct knowledge about
God from the Manifestation has an important consequence: it
means that on the basis of what has been revealed about God’s
attributes by the Manifestations, we can legitimately reason
about the implications and meaning of these attributes for us.
In other words, the denial of any direct knowledge of God’s
essence or attributes does not foreclose reasonable dialogue on
this subject though it does undercut dogmatic claims in any
dialogue based on what the Manifestation reveals. It does not,
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 226

of course, prohibit categorical rejection of claims that

contradict what the Manifestation says not to mention any
dismissal of God’s existence.
A final note in regard to the limitation of our knowledge by
our specifically human capacity and our personal and cultural
condition: this accords with one of the key principles of the
Athenian tradition in philosophy, namely, that all knowledge is
known according to the nature/essence and condition of the
knower. Animals, for example, can only know through the
senses whereas humans know through the senses as well as their
rational capacities. This principle is implicitly present in the
statement that “the differences of conditions in the world of
beings is an obstacle to comprehension.”289 Our place on the
ontological scale of being determines what we can and cannot
know. Agreement on this principle is another major
connection between SAQ and the Athenian tradition.
44. God’s Knowledge
In SAQ’s epistemology, God is “omniscient”290 because, as
we have seen, He surrounds all creation and, for that reason,
has immediate access to all that can be known. The
ontologically higher comprehends the lower, and the highest
comprehends all. There can be no obstacles to God’s
comprehension since anything that could be an obstacle would
be something with the power to limit God and this is
impossible: “God is powerful, omnipotent.”291 At this point,
the differences between God’s knowledge and that of other
beings can still be rationally explained in terms of the
ontological schema established in SAQ.
However, SAQ also points to one fundamental difference
between God’s knowledge and the knowledge of His creatures.
For human beings to have knowledge requires that there be an
object of knowledge, a tree, a person, an idea, a feeling —
something which is present to a subject. According to SAQ,
this is not the case with God Who, unlike other beings, does
not need an object of knowledge:
The Prophets say, The Knowledge of God has no need
of the existence of beings, but the knowledge of the
creature needs the existence of things known; if the
Knowledge of God had need of any other thing, then it
would be the knowledge of the creature, and not that of
God … The phenomenal knowledge [the knowledge of
Some Answered Questions 227

created beings] has need of things known; the

Preexistent Knowledge is independent of their
existence. 292
To need objects of knowledge would be a sign of
imperfection in God since that would put God in the position
of needing something other than Himself. This would be an
imperfection and would, in effect, make God’s knowledge
contingent or dependent on something else — which is an
impossibility because “sanctification from imperfections [] is
one of His necessary properties.”293 From divine perfection it
follows logically that God’s knowledge cannot be dependent on
anything else. However, if we attempt to understand this from
a purely natural point of view we may appreciate why things
must be this way but not how such knowledge can exist: “these
divine and perfect attributes are not so understood by the
intelligence that we can decide if the Divine Knowledge has need
of things known or not.”294 We are simply incapable of
knowing how knowledge can exist independently of an object
of knowledge present to a subject and, consequently, must
accept what the Manifestation and His authorized and divinely
guided interpreters tell us. Although the details of the belief
itself cannot be explained to us, the foundation of the belief,
namely, that God is necessarily independent of all things, is
rational.
45. Mind
According to SAQ, mind is an essential attribute of the
human spirit, i.e. a quality without which the human spirit
could not be itself. In short, it is an aspect of the essence of the
human spirit.
the mind is the power of the human spirit. Spirit is the
lamp; mind is the light which shines from the lamp.
Spirit is the tree, and the mind is the fruit. Mind is the
perfection of the spirit and is its essential quality, as
the sun’s rays are the essential necessity of the sun. 295
`Abdu’l-Bahá also describes the mind as a “power,” or
capacity to interact with the world in a certain way, i.e. to
acquire knowledge and form judgments. In the metaphor of the
mind as the fruit of the tree of the human spirit, as “the
perfection of the spirit,” He indicates that mind is the ultimate
purpose of spirit, its entelechy, that for which spirit exists. The
same idea is conveyed by the metaphor of the mind as light
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 228

from the lamp of the spirit; a lamp has no other reason to exist
than the production of light. Moreover, light enables us to
distinguish between things, and thereby establishes the basis of
all knowledge.
As we have had occasion to observe, the human mind
because of its high ontological position, “encompasses all
things”296 at least outwardly or phenomenally. However, it
cannot know their essences directly but only learn about them
by way of their qualities. SAQ makes it clear that the mind can
acquire truth and make something of these findings, though, of
course, the mind also can deceive itself.
The mind and the thought of man sometimes discover
truths, and from this thought and discovery signs and
results are produced. This thought has a foundation.
But many things come to the mind of man which are
like the waves of the sea of imaginations; they have no
fruit, and no result comes from them. 297
We can distinguish between mere imaginings and realities by
the lack of results. SAQ therefore seems to adopt a pragmatic
test to determine which discoveries are genuine knowledge and
which are fantasies.
46. Mind is Not Brain

Another attribute of the mind is that it is not subject to

time and space: “Place and time surround the body, not the
mind and spirit.”298 Simply put, locality in space and time to
do not apply to the mind; it is, to use a word from physics,
‘non-local.’ This allows “the spirit and mind of man [to] travel
to all countries and regions — even through the limitless space
of the heaven.”299 Such freedom from material conditions is
significant because it means that according to SAQ, mind
cannot be identified with or reduced to brain since the latter is
a purely material entity and mind is not. Unlike material
beings, “mind itself is an intellectual thing which has no
outward existence.”300 The distinction between mind and brain
is reinforced by the following statement:
Thus consider what thousands of vicissitudes can
happen to the body of man, but the spirit is not
affected by them; it may even be that some members of
the body are entirely crippled, but the essence of the
mind remains and is everlasting. 301
Some Answered Questions 229

Like spirit, mind is independent of the body, though not, as

we shall see, unconnected. The body cannot hinder the spirit in
itself but it can hinder the expression of that spirit in the
material world. The fact that the brain and spirit/mind are
distinct and separable (at death) but not unconnected entities
in this life suggests that the brain is only the material organ
through which mind manifests temporarily in the material
world.
Emphasising the difference between the mind and material
objects, `Abdu’l-Bahá points out that the mind is not involved
in physical motion of any kind:
Moreover, entrance and exit, descent and ascent, are
characteristics of bodies and not of spirits — that is to
say, sensible realities enter and come forth, but
intellectual subtleties and mental realities, such as
intelligence, love, knowledge, imagination and thought,
do not enter, nor come forth, nor descend, but rather
they have direct connection.302
In reading this, we must recall that the mind is a power of the
human spirit and shares its essential attributes and, therefore,
does not conform to the laws of material behavior. For this
reason it would be fallacious to attempt to study the mind by
scientific methods which have been specifically developed to
study material entities and their behaviors for to do so would
be confuse and conflate two different kinds of beings. Brain
research cannot tell us about the mind per se; what it can do is
tell us about how the mind acts through the material medium of
the brain i.e. about the material signs of the mind’s action. If
we wish to study the mind itself, other methods of study not
based on material objects must be developed.
If mind and body/brain are not identical, and are essentially
independent, then it is necessary to question how they are
connected. SAQ does not provide a technically detailed answer
to this question but instead supplies a metaphorical model
from which we can develop one or more solutions. Let us begin
by examining the relationship between the body and the human
spirit of which the body is a particular material instantiation.
According to SAQ, “the connection of the spirit with the body
is like that of the sun with the mirror.”303 Elsewhere it says,
This perfected body can be compared to a mirror, and
the human spirit to the sun. Nevertheless, if the mirror
breaks, the bounty of the sun continues; and if the
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 230

mirror is destroyed or ceases to exist, no harm will

happen to the bounty of the sun which is everlasting. 304
We should keep in mind that if the body functions like a
mirror, then obviously the brain — also a part of the body —
does too. The image of the sun in the mirror is used elsewhere in
SAQ to explain the connection between spirit and body: “the
spirit is connected with the body, as this light is with this
mirror.”305 `Abdu’l-Bahá also says, “The sun is not within the
mirror, but it has a connection with the mirror.”306 The import
of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement is that the mind — which is an
essential attribute of the human spirit — acts through the brain
the same way the image of the sun acts in the mirror.
47. Brain and Mind — A Formal Connection
Examining the nature of this connection, we find that the
sun is in the mirror not substantially but formally. The actual
sun is not in actually (ontologically) present in the mirror.
Instead, the form of the sun is present in the mirror and it is
there because the emanations of the sun, the light, condition
the mirror in a specific way to reflect the sun’s image. In other
words, the sun is formally but not substantially present and
through this formal presence conditions or determines what the
mirror reflects. (How, i.e. to what degree of brightness or
accuracy the mirror reflects depends on the qualities of the
mirror but that is a another issue.) In the same way, the “the
mind is connected with the acquisition of knowledge, like
images reflected in a mirror.”307 The mind is conditioned by the
formal presence of the images that it receives inasmuch as every
perception and idea or conception has its own specific form to
distinguish it from others. This form is what conditions the
mind so that it acquires information and knowledge:
the knowledge of things which men universally have is
gained by reflection or by evidence — that is to say,
either by the power of the mind the conception of an
object is formed, or from beholding an object the form
is produced in the mirror of the heart. 308
Whether it be the form of a perceived object or the
particular form of an idea or conception, the mind seems to
work by means of conditioning by formal causality. Formal
causality — which we have already encountered in `Abdu’l-
Bahá’s explication of four-fold causality acts as a cause
because it shapes or conditions something, which has an effect
Some Answered Questions 231

on how the conditioned object inter-acts with other things. A

piece of bronze in the form of a statue and the same bronze re-
cast as a suit of armour will inter-act differently with their
surroundings. Substantially they are the same but formally they
are not and this formal difference is decisive. This is an
example of formal causality in action.
The conclusion seems clear: mind and brain/body are
distinct and separate entities but are connected nevertheless:
“the mind has no place, but it is connected with the brain.”309
Thus, SAQ suggests a mind-brain dualism, the two being
different kinds of entities. As `Abdu’l-Bahá says, “spirit is
different from the body.”310 Indeed, He elaborates further,
adding, “the spirit of man is not in the body because it is freed
and sanctified from entrance and exit.”311 Mind, we must
recall is a power or attribute of the spirit. However, because
mind/spirit and body are connected, SAQ’s teachings about
the mind and body/brain cannot be taken as encouragement to
adopt occasionalism, the belief that mind and brain are so
different that they cannot interact and therefore require God
to coordinate their activities. Leibniz’ variation of this — the
doctrine of pre-established harmony — states that God had
arranged the universe so that all apparent cases of cause-and-
effect arose in a divinely pre-established sequences without any
interaction. 312 This, too, violates the formal causality that is
implicit in the image of the sun and the mirror.
This is, in our view, as far as we can go in understanding
how the mind works if we limit ourselves to SAQ. Of course,
SAQ does not go into the technical details of formal causality,
but in the image of the sun and the mirror, it provides us with
a direction in which to seek more detailed answer and to
exclude certain viewpoints such as the identity of brain and
mind. As `Abdu’l-Bahá says, “This explanation, though short, is
complete; therefore, reflect upon it, and if God wills, you may
become acquainted with the details.”313
According to SAQ, the human mind is not the only mind in
existence. There is also the “First Mind”:
the first thing which emanated from God is that
universal reality, which the ancient philosophers termed
the ‘First Mind,’ and which the people of Bahá call the
‘First Will.’ This emanation, in that which concerns its
action in the world of God, is not limited by time or
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 232

place; it is without beginning or end — beginning and

end in relation to God are one.314
Like the human mind, it is not limited by time and space,
though as the first emanation, it is on a higher ontological
plane than humankind or nature and can, therefore, surround
or comprehend more of reality. Elsewhere `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
But the universal divine mind, which is beyond nature,
is the bounty of the Preexistent Power. This universal
mind is divine; it embraces existing realities, and it
receives the light of the mysteries of God. It is a
conscious power, not a power of investigation and of
research. 315
Because this mind, which is a “bounty” or emanation of God,
is not subject to the laws of time and space, it is “beyond
nature” and surrounds all other things. For that reason, too, it
is a “conscious power,” i.e. a power that knows subjectively,
immediately and intuitively and is not dependent on
investigation, research and discursive reasoning. Furthermore,
This divine intellectual power [the “universal divine
mind”] is the special attribute of the Holy
Manifestations and the Dawning-places of
prophethood; a ray of this light falls upon the mirrors
of the hearts of the righteous, and a portion and a
share of this power comes to them through the Holy
Manifestations. 316
This divine mind, which is an essential attribute of the
Manifestations, helps establish a rational foundation for the
belief that the Manifestation possesses universal knowledge of
all creation and must, therefore be obeyed even though we, who
lack such knowledge, do not always understand.
48. Infallibility

Perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of SAQ’s

epistemology is the concept of infallibility. According to
`Abdu’l-Bahá, there are two kinds of infallibility, “essential
infallibility and acquired infallibility”317 which He compares to
“essential knowledge and acquired knowledge.”318 As we recall
from our examination of ontology and onto-theology, the
Manifestation is on a higher ontological plane than creation
and, therefore, comprehends or surrounds, which is to say, He
can know its conditions subjectively within Himself. His
Some Answered Questions 233

“knowledge of being, is intuitive; it is like the cognizance and

consciousness that man has of himself.”319 The Manifestation
knows creation the way He knows Himself and, therefore, is
able to reveal perfect laws that meet all of the hidden and overt
needs of creation. Our insight, of course, is only partial which
is why it is inappropriate for us to critique His
commandments. This explanation shows why the “Most Great
Infallibility”320 of the Manifestation is a necessary consequence
of His ontological position.
The second kind of infallibility is “acquired infallibility”321
which is bestowed by God upon some special souls: “Although
these souls have not essential infallibility, still they are under
the protection of God — that is to say, God preserves them
from error.322 These souls cannot be essentially infallible
because, unlike the Manifestations, they do not surround or
comprehend creation. However, the “protection of God …
preserves them from error” because if it did not, “their error
would cause believing souls to fall into error, and thus the
foundation of the Religion of God would be overturned, which
would not be fitting nor worthy of God.”323 This protection
from error extends to the Universal House of Justice as an
institution (not to its individual members) and in this case is
called “conferred infallibility.”324
The doctrine of infallibility has generated considerable
discussion about what it actually means. The ontological
foundations of the concept of the Manifestation show that the
“essential infallibility” of the Manifestation potentially covers
all areas of knowledge; He surrounds all creation not just parts
of it. There is no indication of a limitation to ‘faith and
morals’ or to anything else: “whatever emanates from Them is
identical with the truth, and conformable to reality.”325 The
Manifestation, after all, is not simply another human being like
the rest of us, occupying a higher plane of being.
The case of “acquired” and “conferred” infallibility is
somewhat different because human beings lack the
Manifestation’s superior ontological station. Consequently, it
may be possible to limit the range of infallibility to matters of
faith and morals, i.e. to that which affects our conduct as
Bahá’ís and to what the Writings declare to be true. This
practical limitation is evident in the concern that if holy souls
were not safe-guarded from error, they would mislead others. 326
Here we have a more practical concern about why “acquired” or
“conferred” infallibility is necessary. However, in SAQ we find
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 234

no evidence that “infallibility” is limited to a condition of

‘sinlessness’ as has been suggested. It very clearly refers to
knowledge of various kinds and not to personal states of being.

IV. Philosophical Anthropology

Philosophical anthropology, which originates with Kant’s
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Viewpoint, is a branch of
philosophy that explores the individual and collective nature of
humankind. It may also be called ‘theory of man.’ It examines
such subjects as individual and collective human nature,
humankind’s position and role in the universe and the purpose
of human existence. Philosophical anthropology has enormous
relevance to human existence. For example, all religions, all
systems of ethics are explicitly or implicitly based on a theory
of man. The same is true for all legal systems as well as all
systems of psychology and education. Each of these endeavours
makes assumptions about what people ‘are like,’ their needs and
desires, reasonable obligations as well as innate capacities. A
theory of man is also embedded in all cultures.
49. Human Nature

We shall begin this survey of the philosophical anthropology

in SAQ with an examination of its theory of human nature.
The very possession of such a theory is controversial in today’s
intellectual climate since such influential philosophies as
Sartrean existentialism and postmodernism completely reject
the idea of there being a given, universal human nature. Sartre
first sounded this note in 1943 in Being and Nothingness which
is based on the premise the “existence precedes essence,” that we
are not ‘oppressed’ by a pre-given, ready-made human nature
applicable to all persons but that we must make ourselves
through our own choices and actions. Without exception, all
major postmodernist philosophers follow Sartre on this point,
a position described most succinctly by Lyotard as a rejection
of “metanarratives.”327 A “metanarrative” is a universal
explanatory paradigm which purports to provide true
explanations of phenomena of a certain kind.
Sartrean existentialism and postmodernism notwith-
standing, SAQ promulgates the concept of a human nature
explicitly and implicitly in various ways and contexts. For
example, in His discussion of human evolution, `Abdu’l-Bahá
says, “For the proof of the originality of the human species,
Some Answered Questions 235

and of the permanency of the nature of man, is clear and

evident.”328 The nature of humankind exists, is stable and
“permanent” and, above all, “is clear and evident.” By
describing its existence and permanency as “clear and evident,”
`Abdu’l-Bahá, in effect, suggesting that those who disagree are
not seeing the evidence or not evaluating the evidence properly.
In short, He is dismissing their views as fundamentally
ignorant. Vis-à-vis ethics, He says that those who follow the
Manifestation are “delivered from the animal characteristics
and qualities which are the characteristics of human nature.”329
On a similar note, He points out that “brutal qualities exist in
the nature of man.”330 These remarks simply affirm the
existence of human nature as part of a discussing human
morality or lack of it. The same occurs in His discussion of
human evolution in which He refers to the human embryo
developing “until it reaches the degree of reason and
perfection.”331 The concept of human nature is also implicit in
the ontological hierarchy in which humankind is at the summit
because it possesses all the powers of the lower vegetable and
animal levels. Human nature also lifts humankind above the
rest of nature: neither sun nor sea “can never comprehend the
conditions, the state, the qualities, the movements and the
nature of man.”332
However, `Abdu’l-Bahá does not just refer to human nature
in passing; rather He provides a detailed picture of some of its
foundational attributes. These are common to all human
beings at all times and in all cultures — which is, of course,
what we would expect from a religious world-view that teaches
the essential oneness of humankind. Without such a universal
human nature, there would be no basis for the unification of
humankind because there would be no basis on which to
develop global teachings.
In SAQ, the most obvious attribute of human nature is that
we are essentially spiritual beings. This fact is reflected in our
ontological structure: “ the rational soul is the substance, and
the body depends upon it. If the accident — that is to say, the
body — be destroyed, the substance, the spirit, remains.”333
Briefly, in the Athenian tradition which this statement
exemplifies, the substance (not to be confused with matter) is
independent in its existence and possess certain qualities called
‘accidents.’ These accidents are not necessary to the existence
of the substance and can be altered without affecting the
identity or existence of the substance. For example, a cat is a
substance, but its color is an accident; if the color is changed,
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 236

the same cat continues to exist. Stating that the rational soul is
the substance, means that soul is what we essentially are and
that our bodily existence is a temporary ‘accident.’ From this it
follows that the soul and the body are not the same kinds of
‘things’ — which, in effect, is a form of soul/body dualism —
and that the soul is immortal because it is capable of existing
without the accidental body. All of these assertions are
universally true of all human beings at all times, in all places
and under all circumstances. In other words, here we find the
basis of anthropological essentialism in SAQ, which does not
agree with Sartre’s claim that “existence precedes essence.”
Not only are we essentially spiritual beings, but share the
same essential attributes:
This spiritual nature, which came into existence
through the bounty of the Divine Reality, is the union
of all perfections and appears through the breath of the
Holy Spirit. It is the divine perfections; it is light,
spirituality, guidance, exaltation, high aspiration,
justice, love, grace, kindness to all, philanthropy, the
essence of life. 334
Spirit is the source of our “perfections” with which to
overcome the imperfections of our physical nature which is
subject to “anger, jealousy, dispute, covetousness, avarice,
ignorance, prejudice, hatred, pride and tyranny.”335 According
to `Abdu’l-Bahá, our task and destiny is to perfect our human
existence by strengthening and developing the spiritual aspects
of our nature. This means that human beings share a universal
duty and destiny — a struggle to control our unruly animal
nature and make it work for the good of the soul and our
spiritual development. Both as individuals and collectives we
succeed in varying degrees in this process and sometimes slip
into complete failure.
As shown throughout SAQ, all of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s teachings
about philosophical anthropology is premised on our essential
identity as spiritual beings and the primacy of the soul over the
material body. This brings in its train a host of profound
consequences for the conduct of individual lives and the
management of society. For example, it enlarges our
perspective on what is meant by ‘doing good’ or ‘reducing
harm’ because we must not only consider the good of the body
but also the good of the soul. It will deeply affect education
policy in such areas as curriculum because questions of
Some Answered Questions 237

spiritual education cannot be circumvented or ignored

outright. Recognising the primacy of the spirit in our
constitution will also have effects on our personal and
collective scale of values which in turn affects decisions at
every level and at every turn. Most obviously this would affect
the operations of a consumer-driven economy or, at least, the
kind of products in demand, especially if large numbers of
people were to believe “[t]he rewards of this life are the virtues
and perfections which adorn the reality of man”336 and not the
acquisition of ‘things’ or material wealth. These rewards are
attainable both in the earthly life and in the next.
50. The Soul and Immortality

As already noted, the fact that the soul is a substance and

the body an accident is the basis for an ontological proof for
the immortality of the soul, which according to SAQ is “the
fundamental basis of the divine religions.”337 `Abdu’l-Bahá
refers not only to traditional religious traditions to establish
the immortality of the spirit — the Gospels and the Qur’án —
but also to logical proofs which we shall briefly examine. One
of these proofs is that, as just demonstrated, that the spirit or
substance is independent of the body or accident. The spirit,
He says, can see and hear without sense organs and even travel
as it does during sleep without any material means 338 ;
furthermore, the spirit is unaffected by the illnesses and
debilities of the body. 339 Because “the spirit is different from
the body”340 it continues to exist even when the body
disintegrates.
At this point it is apropos to note that not just the soul but
also the personality is independent of the body as well.
The personality of the rational soul is from its
beginning; it is not due to the instrumentality of the
body, but the state and the personality of the rational
soul may be strengthened in this world; it will make
progress and will attain to the degrees of perfection, or
it will remain in the lowest abyss of ignorance, veiled
and deprived from beholding the signs of God.341
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s wording here shows His awareness of a long-
standing subject of debate in the Athenian tradition, namely,
the origin of the individual personality. Since there exists an
essence shared by all humans, what is it that individualises us?
One answer is that individualization occurs through the
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 238

particular body we possess, i.e. matter is what individualises.

Another is that form, not matter, individualises, i.e. each thing
possesses a “haecceitas” or ‘this-ness’ that makes it the specific
thing it is. 342 As the foregoing quotation from SAQ shows,
`Abdu’l-Bahá plainly takes the latter view that the “personality
of the rational soul” exists from the start and does not depend
on the body to be. Experience in the world may strengthen the
personality but it can only actualise what is already potential
in it. This original personality is part of the innate character
that we all possess. The innate character willed discussed in
greater detail below.
Another proof of immortality is based on the premise
that no sign can come from a nonexisting thing — that
is to say, it is impossible that from absolute
nonexistence signs should appear — for the signs are the
consequence of an existence, and the consequence
depends upon the existence of the principle. 343
In other words, non-existent entities cannot produce results
i.e. cannot actualise potentials either in themselves or in
something else for the obvious reason that as non-existent they
have no potentials and they certainly cannot act as efficient
causes actualising potentials elsewhere because they do not
exist! However, after the death of the body, the human spirit
“persists and continues to act and to have power.”344 The
evidence offered is the “Kingdom of Christ”345 which continues
to exist and influence the world long after the death of Christ’s
body. For this to occur, the ‘Christ-spirit’ must continue to
exist in some form.
Along with the “logical proofs” `Abdu’l-Bahá also offers
what might be called a direct proof of immediate insight, such
as we have already discussed in the epistemology section of this
paper. If we open our “inner sight,” we shall need no discursive
proofs of immortality because we shall be able to apprehend
this fact immediately for ourselves.
But if the human spirit will rejoice and be attracted to
the Kingdom of God, if the inner sight becomes
opened, and the spiritual hearing strengthened, and the
spiritual feelings predominant, he will see the im-
mortality of the spirit as clearly as he sees the sun…346
Some Answered Questions 239

If we attain the right spiritual condition, we see truths such

as the immortality of the soul by immediate insight rather than
by discursive argument.
51. The Rational Soul

Another far-reaching attribute of human nature is the

possession of a rational soul:
The human spirit which distinguishes man from the
animal is the rational soul, and these two names — the
human spirit and the rational soul — designate one
thing. This spirit, which in the terminology of the phil-
osophers is the rational soul, embraces all beings…347
`Abdu’l-Bahá makes it clear that the rational soul
differentiates humanity from animals, and is, therefore, an
essential, i.e. defining characteristic of all human beings.
Individuals and cultures may not always make use of this
rational power to the same extent but it is universal, i.e. always
there whenever and wherever humans exist.
The first condition of perception in the world of
nature is the perception of the rational soul. In this
perception and in this power all men are sharers,
whether they be neglectful or vigilant, believers or
deniers. 348
This statement has far-reaching consequences because it means
that at least in principle, we possess a universal standard, an
‘Archimedean standpoint’ by which to evaluate individual and
collective action and beliefs. He himself does not hesitate to
apply it. For example, He dismisses the traditional Christian
account of original sin as “unreasonable and evidently
wrong”349 for various reasons. Similarly, in rejecting the
traditional Christian interpretation of the Trinity He states,
If it were otherwise [than his explanation], the
foundations of the Religion of God would rest upon
an illogical proposition which the mind could never
conceive, and how can the mind be forced to believe a
thing which it cannot conceive? A thing cannot be
grasped by the intelligence except when it is clothed in
an intelligible form; otherwise, it is but an effort of the
imagination. 350
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 240

Even religion must have rational foundations because, given

our nature as a “rational soul,” we cannot even “conceive” of
teachings which rest on “an illogical proposition.” If we
cannot “conceive” of an idea, how can we as rational beings,
believe? In other words, a belief must have a sufficient reason
that explains why it (or any other phenomenon) is what it is.
Otherwise the belief becomes problematical. Because of our
“rational souls” neither individuals nor cultures can accept
insufficient explanations which is why they all persons and
cultures develop various explanations for phenomena. The
form and details of these explanations may differ, but all are
attempts to satisfy the principle of sufficient reason.
52. Humankind’s Dual Nature

Unlike the lower level of being, humanity has a dual nature,

i.e. it is a composite of two natures:
Know that there are two natures in man: the physical
nature and the spiritual nature. The physical nature is
inherited from Adam, and the spiritual nature is
inherited from the Reality of the Word of God, which
is the spirituality of Christ. The physical nature is born
of Adam, but the spiritual nature is born from the
bounty of the Holy Spirit. The first is the source of all
imperfection; the second is the source of all
perfection. 351
The first noteworthy issue here is that this statement is
about humankind in general, i.e. it is a universal statement
about human nature. The two-part structure constitutes a
fundamental feature of what it means to be human at all times
and places, and in all cultures or stages of collective
development. There is no suggestion in SAQ (or anywhere else
in the Writings) that any exceptions exist or that our two-part
constitutional nature will change during the course of human
evolution on earth. Second, this duality is hierarchical, with the
spiritual part taking precedence over the physical or animal
nature which is associated with “imperfection.” The
Manifestations appear so that “men might be freed from the
imperfections of the physical nature and might become
possessed of the virtues of the spiritual nature.”352 Of course,
this is not to say that our physical aspect is of no value but
only that for it to function for our complete well-being it must
be properly subordinated by our spiritual higher nature. Here
Some Answered Questions 241

we see yet another confirmation of the hierarchical ontology at

work in SAQ.
53. Inherent Struggle Between Higher and Lower Natures

Third, it follows from `Abdu’l-Bahá’s statement that humans

are divided between a higher and lower nature and that we are
inherently conflicted beings always engaged in a struggle within
ourselves. Hence, we are often forced to choose between
following these two natures, between “imperfection” and
“perfection,” and since this make dualism constitutes our
nature, there is no way this struggle can be overcome
completely; it constitutes who and what we are. However, the
struggle between these two principles must not be seen as an
imperfection in itself; rather it is a necessary pre-condition for
our ethical existence, i.e. for us to attain increasing perfection
by means of free choice among real alternatives. To help us
make that choice is precisely the reason for the existence of
Manifestations if we choose to accept it. In other words, this
division between our two natures is the condition for
humankind’s ability to rise to greater heights of spiritual
development. Without it, any moral ascent is impossible.
Finally, this dual constitution reflects humankind’s two-fold
ontological position in creation.
Man is in the highest degree of materiality, and at the
beginning of spirituality — that is to say, he is the end
of imperfection and the beginning of perfection. He is
at the last degree of darkness, and at the beginning of
light; that is why it has been said that the condition of
man is the end of the night and the beginning of day,
meaning that he is the sum of all the degrees of
imperfection, and that he possesses the degrees of
perfection. He has the animal side as well as the angelic
side and the aim of an educator is to so train human
souls that their angelic aspect may overcome their
animal side. 353
Ontologically speaking, humanity occupies a dual station as
the apex of “materiality” but also as the “beginning of
spirituality” and this dual station reflects itself in our two
natures. We are the transition point from “materiality” to
spirituality and have attributes of both. This helps explain our
ethical ambiguity; because we are the “last degree of darkness”
we are capable of tremendous evil and because we are
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 242

“beginning of light” we are also capable of great good. No

individual, no collective and no culture have ever been able to
escape this fundamental ambiguity which is, therefore, also a
universal attribute of humankind.
54. The Purpose of Earthly Existence

The existence of this perpetual moral struggle within

humankind inevitably raises the question of what is the purpose
in requiring the human soul to go through the difficult phase of
bodily being. Here is one part of `Abdu’l-Bahá’s answer:
The wisdom of the appearance of the spirit in the body
is this: the human spirit is a Divine Trust, and it must
traverse all conditions, for its passage and movement
through the conditions of existence will be the means
of its acquiring perfections … 354
In other words, the purpose of physical existence is to help the
soul acquire “perfections,” i.e. to develop its inherent
capacities, accumulate experience and knowledge and, through
free choice, attain spiritual virtues. Without this passage
through physical being, there could be no real qualitative
growth, learning and maturation; we would remain
unactualised potentials and, therefore, not fully ourselves.
However, there is another, ontological and cosmic reason for
our bodily existence:
Besides this, it is necessary that the signs of the
perfection of the spirit should be apparent in this
world, so that the world of creation may bring forth
endless results, and this body may receive life and
manifest the divine bounties … If the rays and heat of
the sun did not shine upon the earth, the earth would be
uninhabited, without meaning; and its development
would be retarded. In the same way, if the perfections
of the spirit did not appear in this world, this world
would be unenlightened and absolutely brutal. By the
appearance of the spirit in the physical form, this
world is enlightened.355
In other words, humanity is the means by which the
“perfections of the spirit” appear in the material world and,
thereby, render it “enlightened.” Without this spiritual
enlightenment the world would be “absolutely brutal” (“nasty,
brutish and short” to borrow Hobbes’ phrase.) i.e. bereft of
Some Answered Questions 243

the virtues of knowledge and understanding, as well as

completely subject to the lowest animal impulses such as greed,
violence, lust, sloth or laziness and self-centeredness.
Humankind, therefore, is the agency through which a new,
transcendent spiritual dimension begins to play a role in the
material world by adding a new feature to the one-dimensional
material existence. At this point it is tempting to think of
Teilhard de Chardin’s theory of the noosphere as the
specifically human contribution to the evolution of the
material world. `Abdu’l-Bahá’s statements certainly are in
harmony with this line of thought. He says that without
humanity, the material universe would have no purpose for its
existence (recall our earlier discussion of teleology): “This world
is also in the condition of a fruit tree, and man is like the fruit;
without fruit the tree would be useless.”356 Like the fruit of a
tree, humankind is the noblest product of the material world,
and, for that reason, its raison d’etre. In other words, the
existence of humankind has a cosmological and evolutionary
function. From this perspective, humankind is not simply an
accidental development on the planet but rather a necessary
occurrence.
Humankind is able to be the spiritual enlightener of the
material world only because it exists both in materiality and
spirituality. We possess the necessary and sufficient material
conditions to attract the influence of the spirit in the same
way that a clear mirror is able to receive and reflect the sun.
these members, these elements, this composition, which
are found in the organism of man, are an attraction
and magnet for the spirit; it is certain that the spirit
will appear in it. So a mirror which is clear will
certainly attract the rays of the sun … when these
existing elements are gathered together according to the
natural order, and with perfect strength, they become a
magnet for the spirit, and the spirit will become
manifest in them with all its perfections.357
In other words, the physical constitution of human beings is
sufficiently complex and sensitive enough to “become a magnet
for the spirit” and allow the spirit to become manifest in the
material world. According to `Abdu’l-Bahá this course of
events is necessary because
the connection which exists between the reality of
things, whether they be spiritual or material, requires
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 244

that when the mirror is clear and faces the sun, the light
of the sun must become apparent in it. In the same
way, when the elements are arranged and combined in
the most glorious system, organization and manner,
the human spirit will appear and be manifest in them.
This is the decree of the Powerful, the Wise. 358
In this passage, `Abdu’l-Bahá draws our attention to a
fundamental cosmic law established by God in His design of
the universe. It is as much a law as the law of gravity or the
Boyle gas laws. This law forms a “connection” which joins all
aspects of reality into a single whole and is, thereby, a universal
connective principle that joins different ontological levels of
reality, in this case, the material and the spiritual.
We also observe a correspondence between the
Manifestation enlightening us spiritually, and we, in turn,
bringing signs of the spirit into the material realm. This is
confirmed when `Abdu’l-Bahá says,
As the spirit of man is the cause of the life of the body,
so the world is in the condition of the body, and man
is in the condition of the spirit. If there were no man,
the perfections of the spirit would not appear, and the
light of the mind would not be resplendent in this
world. This world would be like a body without a
soul.359
By means of its analogy of the “spirit of man” and the human
body, this passage suggests that humankind provides a soul for
the world of matter and, thereby, provides it with “life.” One
assumes that this means spiritual life inasmuch as it is
humankind which brings the “perfections of the spirit” and the
“light of the mind” into the world of matter.
All of the various attributes mentioned in the previous
discussion are universally applicable to human beings and are
not dependent on culture, ethnicity or any other external
factors. Different cultures may reflect the light of the spirit
differently, some more adequately than others and some, such
as Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Russia hardly at all. (Unless we are
willing to accept these examples, we cannot assent to the
unqualified proposition that all cultures reflect the spiritual
light equally.)
Some Answered Questions 245

55. Innate, Inherited and Acquired Character

Within our specifically human nature, there are three further

divisions: “the innate character, the inherited character and the
acquired character which is gained by education.”360 Of the
innate character, `Abdu’l-Bahá says
With regard to the innate character, although the
divine creation is purely good, yet the varieties of
natural qualities in man come from the difference of
degree; all are excellent, but they are more or less so,
according to the degree. So all mankind possess
intelligence and capacities, but the intelligence, the
capacity and the worthiness of men differ. 361
The innate character, which `Abdu’l-Bahá also calls the
“original nature”362 is that foundational essence that identifies
us as human and is made up of such “natural qualities” as
“intelligence” and other capacities. These are good in
themselves but not all people have them in the same degree. It is
worthwhile pointing out this innate character is universal,
possessed by “all mankind” i.e. identifies the human species
and, as `Abdu’l-Bahá says, distinguishes it from the animal. In
other words, this is a general species quality that does not yet
identify us as individuals.
The “inherited character” is the individual constitution
we inherit from our parents: “The variety of inherited
qualities comes from strength and weakness of
constitution — that is to say, when the two parents are
weak, the children will be weak.”363
(Of course, `Abdu’l-Bahá is speaking in ‘bell-curve’ generalities
here, since exceptions always exist; however, as Toynbee points
out, exceptions prove the rule.) This “inherited character” helps
to differentiate us as individuals since we all have one; with the
innate human character it forms “the capital of life”364 which
He also calls the “natural capacity”365 and which “God has given
equally to all mankind.”366 This “natural capacity” is inherently
good. Again we observe the universal nature of the structure of
human nature as presented by `Abdu’l-Bahá.
The “acquired character,” associated with “acquired
capacity,”367 is the third aspect of our specifically human
character. It is the result of education, and the choices we learn
to make as a result of our education. This is where we shape our
characters through the exercise of free will, above all guided by
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 246

the education provided by the Manifestations. Here is where

we acquire praiseworthy or blameworthy attributes: “One does
not criticize vicious people because of their innate capacities
and nature, but rather for their acquired capacities and
nature.”368
56. Free Will

The issue of “acquired character” brings us to one of the

most important topics in philosophical anthropology, namely
free will. This, too, is one of the constitutive aspects of our
human nature. According to `Abdu’l-Bahá,
Some things are subject to the free will of man, such as
justice, equity, tyranny and injustice, in other words,
good and evil actions … in the choice of good and bad
actions he is free, and he commits them according to
his own will.369
In other words, human beings are free in regards to our ethical
choices be they words, actions or attitudes; regardless of what
our circumstances are, we are always free to choose our
response. Ethically speaking, we all possess radical or complete
freedom by virtue of the inescapable fact that we are human.
As Sartre put it in Being and Nothingness, we are “condemned
to be free”370 whether we want to be or not. We can only
‘escape’ our freedom by living in “bad faith,” i.e. by self-
deceptively and/or hypocritically lying to ourselves that ‘we
have no choice.’ Ontologically, this freedom is based on the
fact that the spirit in itself is not subject to any of the
vicissitudes of material existence and thereby cannot use these
hardships.
This theme of radical ethical freedom brings with it the
consequence of radical responsibility for ourselves, for our
decision, words and actions. ‘Radical responsibility’ means
that we embrace our complete ethical freedom and, therefore,
abstain from seeking any excuses or justifications for our bad
actions in the circumstances of the external world nor do we
blame God for making us the kind of person we are, i.e. for our
innate and inherited character. That is the point of `Abdu’l-
Bahá’s Bible-based discussion about the mineral not having any
right to complain to God that it was not giving vegetable
perfections. Each state of being is perfect in its own degree
and “must strive after the perfections of [its] own degree.”371
That is all it can be responsible for because perfecting one’s
Some Answered Questions 247

own degree of being is all that one has the power to do.
However, within that purview human beings are completely
responsible. Obviously, this aspect of Bahá’í philosophical
anthropology has enormous implications for law and the
justice system, education and social policies.
While `Abdu’l-Bahá asserts our radical ethical freedom, He
also frankly and realistically recognises that
there are certain things to which man is forced and
compelled, such as sleep, death, sickness, decline of
power, injuries and misfortunes; these are not subject
to the will of man, and he is not responsible for them,
for he is compelled to endure them. 372
There are certain things we must do simply by virtue of
being alive, and there are other things we must do to deal with
various misfortunes and difficulties, over which we have no
control. Free will is not absolute, nor can we always shape
reality as we would like it to be by force of will. SAQ gives no
comfort to the belief that we can literally ‘make our own
reality’ as we choose. However, we incur no culpability for
these uncontrollable events themselves, but rather, we can incur
praise or blame by our response to them; we are, as `Abdu’l-
Bahá says, always free to take “good and bad action.”373
Finally, it should be noted that nothing in SAQ suggests
that free will is limited to one group, ethnicity, class or culture;
rather it is possessed universally by all human beings at all times
because it is a constitutional part of human nature. Nor is
there any insinuation that socio-economic conditions excuse
or justify destructive choices although reflection on these
conditions may help us understand how people came to take
destructive or self-destructive turns. Moreover, SAQ does not
seem to answer the question of whether or not poor material
conditions diminish ethical responsibility and the ability to
make free moral choices. These considerations, which clearly
affect law and justice, education and social policies will
require further study of the Writings.
57. Ethics
Although the ethical teachings of SAQ incorporate some
elements of other approaches to ethics, the foundations of the
ethical teachings promulgated in SAQ have deep affinities with
what is known as ‘virtue ethics.’ In general terms, virtue ethics
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 248

emphasise the acquisition of certain virtues and the subsequent

development of good character as the best foundation for
making ethical choices. This close relationship to virtue ethics,
is yet another sign of SAQ (and the Writings) belonging to the
Athenian tradition in philosophy especially with Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics. The virtue ethics tradition, was, of
course developed among the Jews, Christians and Muslims who
inherited Greek philosophical thought.
Before examining SAQ’s relationship to virtue ethics more
closely, it is helpful to examine its position in regards to other
approaches to ethics. One of the most famous and influential
is Kant’s deontological ethics according to which acts are right
or wrong independently of their consequences. 374 In other
words, consequences are not the only criteria by which to judge
an action; Deontological ethics emphasise knowing what our
duty is and carrying it out. Our personal motivation for doing
the act is essentially irrelevant as long as the right act is
properly carried out. For SAQ, deontological ethics are not so
much wrong as incomplete. We certainly have obligations to
God, for example — “to know [Him] and to worship [Him]” —
but `Abdu’l-Bahá makes it clear that mere outward action,
merely going through the motions, even if correct, is not
sufficient for humans to attain their highest possible moral
development. Speaking of those who do much good in the world
but have no knowledge of the divine teachings, He says,
Know that such actions, such efforts and such words
are praiseworthy and approved, and are the glory of
humanity. But these actions alone are not sufficient;
they are a body of the greatest loveliness, but without
spirit. 375
In other words, the motivations driving even right actions are
as important as the actions themselves. It is, after all, possible
to do outwardly good actions with bad intent or from bad
motives; we may tell a truth about someone — with the
intention of causing them harm. The character of the doer and
his spiritual condition are also relevant in judging an action.
Another problem with deontological ethics is that we have is
the question of how we know which acts are wrong or right.
Hence, deontological ethics are not wrong but rather
incomplete; what they tell is necessary but not sufficient for
complete human ethical development.
Some Answered Questions 249

SAQ also shows points of contact with consequentialism,

another major class of moral theories, which maintains that the
consequences of an action are the only basis for moral
judgment. Moral acts are those which have good consequences.
Sometimes consequentialism is described as ‘utilitarian’ ethics
because it judges actions strictly by outcomes. The obvious
problem with this approach is that it cannot define what we
mean by a ‘good consequence,’ which can vary widely not only
among individuals but also among societies and thus offers
little real guidance as to what constitutes ‘good consequences.’
What should be considered a good consequence? What should
not be — and how do arbitrate among conflicting ‘good’
consequences such as the public’s right to fly safely and the
privacy rights of the individual? Unlike consequentialism, SAQ
cannot agree that the value of an action depends solely on its
good or desirable outcomes. For example, a rigorous
programme of euthanizing the terminally ill and incurable
mentally handicapped may have numerous positive results but
such results alone would be a weak recommendation for action
on this score. There are obviously other factors to consider
such as the effect of an act on the character of those who
perform it. This shows that from SAQ’s point of view,
consequentialism is not wrong — good actions involve good
consequences in some way — but rather, it is incomplete.
SAQ can agree with consequentialism insofar as divinely
given virtues and teachings lead to positive outcomes for
humankind. Bad consequences are, after all, important reasons
to replace beliefs that encourage disunity and conflict with
beliefs that draw human beings together. The Manifestations
appear to give teachings that will lead to good consequences for
humanity. In SAQ, there is one apparent example of
consequentialism to consider. `Abdu’l-Bahá describes lying as
the “foundation of all evil,”376 but He says that a doctor may lie
to a patient to help the patient’s recovery, 377 adding
cryptically, “This is not blameworthy.”378 Does He mean the
action is good — or merely that in this special situation, it
should not be condemned, i.e. is permissible? From a
consequentialist viewpoint, He seems to be approving the
action or at least finding it acceptable and justifiable because
of its positive consequences for the patient. But is He giving us
permission to lie for other reasons we judge to be good? That,
of course, would open the door to all kinds of self-justifying
rationalisations and erode the value of the virtue of
truthfulness. `Abdu’l-Bahá words “Notwithstanding all this [the
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 250

evil of lying]”379 shows that He means this case to be seen as an

exception and not as a general guide to action.
(Despite first impressions, this is not an example of moral
relativism in SAQ. The action of lying is justified by reference
to a moral absolute, i.e. saving a life, which in itself is beyond
any relativist questioning at all.)

58. Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics are based on the belief that good action
requires the development of good character and that in turn
requires the acquisition of certain personal virtues. Only then
can we be prepared to make good ethical decisions and to live
well. Virtue ethics places great emphasis on motivation,
holding that truly good deeds can only come when we have good
motives. The basis of Bahá’í ethics as laid out in SAQ is that
our ethical task is to overcome the impulses of our lower,
animal nature and to acquire virtues by struggling to actualise
our higher, spiritual nature.
He [man] has the animal side as well as the angelic side,
and the aim of an educator is to so train human souls
that their angelic aspect may overcome their animal
side. Then if the divine power in man, which is his
essential perfection, overcomes the satanic power,
which is absolute imperfection, he becomes the most
excellent among the creatures; but if the satanic power
overcomes the divine power, he becomes the lowest of
the creatures. 380
The “satanic power” is the uncontrolled demands of our
physical or animal nature and these can lead us into evil. The
purpose of overcoming our animal aspects is that we might
acquire the eternal virtues that have been taught by the
Manifestations. These
foundations of the Religion of God, which are
spiritual and which are the virtues of humanity, cannot
be abrogated; they are irremovable and eternal, and are
renewed in the cycle of every Prophet.381
The reason why these virtues are eternal is because, as we shall
see in the section on philosophical anthropology, our human
nature is so formed by God as to need the fulfillment of certain
needs to achieve optimum growth. In other words, the virtues
reflect the needs of our divinely created, objectively real and
Some Answered Questions 251

universal human nature and develop our characters in a

positive way. For us to achieve optimum development, we need
faith, knowledge, certitude, justice, piety,
righteousness, trustworthiness, love of God,
benevolence, purity, detachment, humility, meekness,
patience and constancy. It shows mercy to the poor,
defends the oppressed, gives to the wretched and
uplifts the fallen … These divine qualities, these eternal
commandments, will never be abolished; nay, they will
last and remain established for ever and ever. These
virtues of humanity will be renewed in each of the
different cycles; for at the end of every cycle the
spiritual Law of God — that is to say, the human
virtues — disappears, and only the form subsists. 382
If the soul acquires these virtues, “it is the most noble of the
existing beings; and if it acquires vices, it becomes the most
degraded existence.”383 Virtue ethics do not just focus on the
action alone nor on its consequences, but rather place great
emphasis on the motive for which an action is done. To act
virtuously is not only to act properly from but to act properly
for good motives or “purity of heart.”
But the heavenly water and spirit, which are knowledge
and life, make the human heart good and pure; the heart
which receives a portion of the bounty of the Spirit
becomes sanctified, good and pure — that is to say, the
reality of man becomes purified and sanctified from
the impurities of the world of nature. These natural
impurities are evil qualities: anger, lust, worldliness,
pride, lying, hypocrisy, fraud, self-love, etc. 384
Purity of heart is necessary to do genuinely good deeds. As
we have seen, this purity of heart or good will is necessary so
that acts have more than mere good appearance:
The third virtue of humanity is the goodwill which is
the basis of good actions … for the goodwill is absolute
light; it is purified and sanctified from the impurities
of selfishness, of enmity, of deception. Now it may be
that a man performs an action which in appearance is
righteous, but which is dictated by covetousness. 385
However, to acquire purity of heart we must have “knowledge
of God”386 which is “the cause of spiritual progress and
attraction, and through it the perception of truth, the
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 252

exaltation of humanity, divine civilization, rightness of morals

and illumination are obtained.”387 This is the foundation of the
virtues we are to acquire. “If man has not this knowledge, He
will be separated from God, and when this separation exists,
good actions have not complete effect.”388
We also need the love of God:
The light of which shines in the lamp of the hearts of
those who know God; its brilliant rays illuminate the
horizon and give to man the life of the Kingdom. In
truth, the fruit of human existence is the love of God,
for this love is the spirit of life, and the eternal bounty.
If the love of God did not exist, the contingent world
would be in darkness … the hearts of men would be
dead, and deprived of the sensations of existence …
spiritual union would be lost … the light of unity
would not illuminate humanity … 389
Once we have attained knowledge and love of God, then we are
ready to acquire the other virtues that distinguish us from
animals. Because the virtues taught by the Manifestations, they
are in themselves the rewards we attain in this world: “The
rewards of this life are the virtues and perfections which adorn
the reality of man.”390 In other words, we need not wait for the
next life to reap the rewards of virtue, but may have these
rewards immediately in this life:
When they are delivered through the light of faith from
the darkness of these vices, and become illuminated
with the radiance of the sun of reality, and ennobled
with all the virtues, they esteem this the greatest
reward, and they know it to be the true paradise.391
It should be noted that the virtue ethics promulgated in
SAQ are completely incompatible with any version of
relativism or ethical subjectivism. In SAQ, we are not being
invited to a debate on whether or know faith, knowledge,
purity and detachment are virtues worth attaining — the fact
that they are is established implicitly by our universal human
nature and explicitly by the Manifestation Who is not seeking
our in-put on these issues. On the contrary, the Manifestation
proclaims these and other virtues He lists, as the virtues
necessary for each and every member of humankind whether we
know it or not. These values are objective, and a contrary
opinion on the importance of purity, for example is simply a
sign of error. Nor does SAQ accept ethical subjectivism, i.e.
Some Answered Questions 253

the belief that we make our own individual ethical codes in our
statements and actions and that a person is moral if his
actions match his words. This, of course, allows some very evil
actions to qualify as ‘moral’ if for no other reason than that
they are consistent with a statement of plans. Consistency and
sincerity are not sufficient to make an action moral. The ethics
of SAQ are, on the contrary, objective, not subjective ethics —
an individual’s personal views about these virtues are basically
irrelevant as to their necessity.
59. Progress

The concept of progress is foundational to SAQ’s

philosophical anthropology, ontology and onto-theology. In
fact, without the concept of progress, the very rationale for the
appearance of successive Manifestations, and with it, the
rationale for the Bahá’í revelation would vanish: “at the time of
the appearance of each Manifestation of God extraordinary
progress has occurred in the world of minds, thoughts and
spirits.”392 The whole purpose of consecutive Manifestations is
to ensure that humankind makes progress in “material, human
and spiritual”393 education and to help us achieve this goal, “we
need an educator who will be at the same time a material,
human and spiritual educator.”394 At this point the onto-
theological dimensions of SAQ’s teachings on progress become
clear in respect to the need for an “educator [who] must be
unquestionably and indubitably perfect in all respects and
distinguished above all men.”395 Without these supra-human
perfections He would be subject to all the same weaknesses as
other humans and would lack the ability to carry out His
mission.
According to SAQ, material education:
is concerned with the progress and development of the
body, through gaining its sustenance, its material
comfort and ease. This education is common to
animals and man. 396
Human education:
signifies civilization and progress — that is to say,
government, administration, charitable works, trades,
arts and handicrafts, sciences, great inventions and
discoveries and elaborate institutions, which are the
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 254

activities essential to man as distinguished from the

animal. 397
Human education includes progress in:
intelligence and thought in such a way that they may
attain complete development, so that knowledge and
science may increase, and the reality of things, the
mysteries of beings and the properties of existence may
be discovered; that, day by day, instructions,
inventions and institutions may be improved; and
from things perceptible to the senses conclusions as to
intellectual things may be deduced. 398
Spiritual education “is that of the Kingdom of God: it consists
in acquiring divine perfections, and this is true education; for
in this state man becomes the focus of divine blessings.”399
Spiritual education also exists “so that intelligence and
comprehension may penetrate the metaphysical world, and may
receive benefit from the sanctifying breeze of the Holy
Spirit”400 and so that human beings may become mirrors
reflecting the “attributes and names of God.”401
These passages make clear that `Abdu’l-Bahá sees humankind
making progress in its material, intellectual, social and
governmental aspects, as well as in spiritual existence. With the
arrival of the Manifestation, “universal progress appears in the
world of humanity.”402
Specifically, He praises the progress made with the
appearance of Bahá’u’lláh:
In this great century which is the cycle of Bahá’u’lláh,
what progress science and knowledge have made, how
many secrets of existence have been discovered, how
many great inventions have been brought to light and
are day by day multiplying in number. Before long,
material science and learning, as well as the knowledge
beholders will be amazed.403
In this passage we not only see the role of Bahá’u’lláh in human
progress, but we also have specific indications that ‘progress’
means more and better knowledge vis-à-vis the secrets that have
been “discovered,” more and better “great inventions,” and
new and amazing developments in “material science and
learning.” In other words, progress means improvement i.e. the
replacement of something that is inadequate by something that
Some Answered Questions 255

is more adequate, be it a procedure, a theory, belief or

understanding, a device and so on. A similar idea is evident in
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s remark that if we educate populations,
day by day knowledge and sciences would increase, the
understanding would be broadened, the sensibilities
developed, customs would become good, and morals
normal; in one word, in all these classes of perfections
there would be progress, and there would be fewer
crimes. 404
It is evident here that ‘progress’ does not merely mean ‘change’
or ‘difference’ but rather ‘improvement,’ ‘greater efficiency’,
‘greater adequacy’ of understanding and knowledge, and
enhanced “sensibilities.” This, of course, implies the currently
controversial proposition that if there is genuine progress then
the level of material, human and spiritual civilization attained
by previous civilizations and cultures were not as advanced as
that which will be achieved by civilization and culture in the era
inaugurated by Bahá’u’lláh. In other words, ‘progress’ as used
in SAQ involves the idea of advancement and improvement
beyond a previous stage of development that is incomplete or
less perfect than its successor.
An inescapable consequence of belief in progress is that
some civilizations and cultures are more advanced than others,
i.e. that not all are equal in their development of humankind’s
material, human and intellectual, and spiritual capacities.
`Abdu’l-Bahá certainly accepts this result, as is evident in His
references to “barbarian[]” cultures: “These Arab tribes were in
the lowest depths of savagery and barbarism, and in
comparison with them the savages of Africa and wild Indians
of America were as advanced as a Plato.”405 During the
twentieth century the Nazis, Fascists and Communists showed
how even materially and intellectually advanced individuals and
societies could retrogress into barbarism when spiritual
education is ignored or suppressed. Civilizations and cultures
can remain in or retrogress into lower states.
The doctrine of progress also shapes SAQ’s vision of the
after-life: “man can also make progress in perfections after
leaving this world.”406 This means that we may increase our
specifically human perfections in the next life but that we
cannot advance beyond our essential human nature to become
God or a Manifestation.407 `Abdu’l-Bahá illustrates this in the
following statement:
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 256

Look at this mineral. However far it may evolve, it only

evolves in its own condition; you cannot bring the
crystal to a state where it can attain to sight. This is
impossible. So the moon which is in the heavens,
however far it might evolve, could never become a
luminous sun, but in its own condition it has apogee
and perigee … It is true that coal could become a
diamond, but both are in the mineral condition, and
their component elements are the same. 408
Thus, progress is limited or bounded by the essential nature of
things, but is not bounded within the limits established by the
essential nature of a being. Here we observe a convergence
between SAQ’s ontological teachings regarding essence and its
teachings regarding spiritual progress after death.
60. Human Evolution
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s teachings on human progress include the
concept of human evolution over the last few million years.
However, there is an important caveat attached to His assent.
`Abdu’l-Bahá unequivocably rejects the notion that the human
species has evolved from an animal although He does not reject
that throughout our long history the human species has
changed accidental i.e. physical attributes and appeared in a
variety of forms. Of the suggestion that humankind was
initially an animal and that through progressive modifications
it became human, He says, “How puerile and unfounded is this
idea and this thought!”409 We may have changed our actualised
outward attributes but we have not changed our substance or
essence.
For man, from the beginning of the embryonic period
till he reaches the degree of maturity, goes through
different forms and appearances. His aspect, his form,
his appearance and color change; he passes from one
form to another, and from one appearance to another.
Nevertheless, from the beginning of the embryonic
period he is of the species of man — that is to say, an
embryo of a man and not of an animal; but this is not
at first apparent, but later it becomes visible and
evident.410
In other words, `Abdu’l-Bahá accepts the notion of humankind
having progressed through a long line of accidental changes in
different forms just like a human embryo in the womb.
Some Answered Questions 257

However, He disagrees with the interpretation of these

accidental changes as showing that there has been essential or
substantial alteration in the development of the human race. In
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s view, “his [man’s] species and essence undergo
no change”411 which is simply a particular application of His
general dictum that “the essence of things does not change.”412
Things may appear to change their essences over time as they
actualize their previously hidden potentials, but deeper
philosophical reflection shows that the essence and its
potentials remain stable. After all, a thing cannot change into
something for which it has no potential: a gumboot will not
become a live alligator. No matter what we do to and with the
gumboot, and no matter how different it looks and acts, none
of its transformations will involve anything for which it
doesn’t have potential in the first place. All its
transformations are potentially present, i.e. essentially present
from the first. Similarly, `Abdu’l-Bahá says
the embryo possesses from the first all perfections,
such as the spirit, the mind, the sight, the smell, the
taste — in one word, all the powers — but they are not
visible and become so only by degrees. 413
This is also what transpired in human history on the earth:
there were beings which outwardly resembled animals but they
carried within them the potentials of attaining spirit and
mind, although it took a long time to actualise these potentials.
“In the beginning of his formation the mind and spirit also
existed, but they were hidden; later they were manifested.”414
Because mind and spirit were not manifested and left no
outward signs of their existence does not mean that these
potentials did not exist; indeed, the fact that they are now
actualized proves they must have existed as unactualised
potentials. After all, as explained above, a thing cannot
actualise potentials it does not have. Thus, two seemingly
identical species may in fact be radically different if one
possesses the potentials for spirit and mind, and the other does
not, even though skeletal remains alone may not allow us to
distinguish them. Any attempt to draw conclusions solely on
the basis of outward form alone would obviously be going
beyond the available evidence. Consequently, there are good
ontologically based reasons for `Abdu’l-Bahá to say, “he [man]
is the embryo of the superior species, and not of the animal; his
species and essence undergo no change”415 and “Man was
always a distinct species, a man, not an animal.”416 Only our
actualised attributes and appearance have changed.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 258

As we have seen, `Abdu’l-Bahá frames His interpretation of

evolution on the philosophical analysis of reality in terms of
essence, attribute, accident, potential and actuality. Such
analysis, integral to the Athenian tradition, even applies to the
history of the earth itself.
the terrestrial globe from the beginning was created
with all its elements, substances, minerals, atoms and
organisms; but these only appeared by degrees: first the
mineral, then the plant, afterward the animal, and
finally man. But from the first these kinds and species
existed, but were undeveloped in the terrestrial globe,
and then appeared only gradually. 417
In other words, “from the beginning” the earth possessed in
potential “all its elements, substances, minerals, atoms and
organisms.” They were all potentially present and gradually
became actualised. However, each of these kinds of things and
species existed “from the first” and, therefore, did not require
that one kind or essence be transformed into another. Indeed,
that is impossible. Anything that exists on earth can exist only
because the potential for its development was there in the first
place. If there were no potential, how could it develop? How
could a gumboot become a live alligator?
`Abdu’l-Bahá’s argument is an inevitable consequence of the
explanatory framework of the Athenian tradition in philosophy
according to which “the essence of things does not change.”418
Each species — a word He uses to refer to different specific
kinds of plants or animals as well as humans — has its own
unique essence and the inherent hidden potentials which will be
actualized or externalised under different conditions. Hence
differences may arise as several instantiations of an essence
actualise different attributes under different circumstances;
outwardly, some of these differences may be dramatic.
Nonetheless, they are variant actualisations of the same
essence. If, for example, species A gives rise to species B, then
the potential for creating species B was already in species A.
Therefore, from the point of view of essences and potentials,
they are still one kind or essence or species, although they
actualise or manifest vastly different potentials. There has been
no change in the essence per se but there have been changes
insofar as different potentials have been actualized and
externalised.
Some Answered Questions 259

61. SAQ and Science

There is no question that `Abdu’l-Bahá’s views on human

evolution are in conflict with current scientific thought in
regards to the origins and history of humankind. However, this
does not necessarily undermine Bahá’u’lláh’s teaching that
science and religion should be in harmony unless one adopts the
view that religion must uncritically agree with science on all its
pronouncements at all times. Logically this is untenable for the
simple reason that science itself changes its views — sometime
profoundly — and no text, revealed or not, can adopt all the
successive scientific beliefs on a given subject without falling
into self-contradiction and, thereby, ceasing to be useful as a
guide. 419
Nor does SAQ lend itself to the suggestion that religion and
science are non-overlapping magisterial (NOMA) in which each
has its own specific area of competency which cannot conflict
because they deal with different topics.420 `Abdu’l-Bahá’s
critique of scientists’ interpretation of the data of evolution —
he does not challenge the data itself — shows that in His view,
science and religion are not separate compartments
hermetically sealed off from each other. Nor is there a firewall
between science and His ontological statements which are,
after all, statements about the nature of all reality, including
that which is studied by science. This applies particularly to
His proofs for the existence of God which most certainly have
implications for cosmology if for no other reason than that
such proofs suggest that all purely material explanations are
inherently incomplete. Thus, it seems clear that SAQ
exemplifies the dialogical approach to the harmony of religion
and science. In the dialogical approach, both sides are aware of
their own and the other’s inherent strengths and limitations
and engage in careful dialogue in the quest for truth; they feel
free to engage in mutual critique and recognise their
commonalities vis-à-vis methods (the use of reason, models,
paradigms, independent investigation), and presuppositions
about the nature of reality. They also concern themselves with
the “limit-questions”421 that science raises about the origins of
the universe, its intelligibility and order, the origin and nature
of natural law and appearance versus reality. These “limit
questions” are of mutual interest to science and religion. From
the dialogical perspective the harmony of religion and science
does not mean uncritical agreement of one with the other, but
of a mutual quest for a more adequate understanding of the
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 260

truth about reality. They work as partners in a process — which

is what both science and religion are — rather than make score-
sheets of agreements and disagreements.

Conclusion
This survey of SAQ has covered major subjects in ontology,
onto-theology, epistemology and philosophical anthropology.
From this survey, we have drawn three general conclusions.
First, SAQ’s ideas on these four foundational subject areas
are founded on and shaped by a consistent set of philosophical
ideas. In other words, SAQ is more than a random collection
of thoughts on various topics; instead it exemplifies a
consistent underlying philosophy vis-à-vis ontology, onto-
theology, epistemology and philosophical anthropology. In
these areas, SAQ lays down basic principles from which a
considerable portions of SAQ (and the other Writings) may be
deduced or to which they can be rationally related. Close
analysis shows the seemingly unconnected parts are joined at
an often implicit level by a coherent underlying philosophy.
Second, this underlying philosophy has significant
connections with the philosophy of the Athenian tradition, in
terms of language and terminology, concepts and use of
concepts, and the development of arguments. Of the available
philosophical traditions, SAQ is most consistent with the
Athenian tradition, both in its early and contemporary forms.
Like SAQ, this tradition analyses reality in terms of essences,
substances, accidents, potentials, actualities and four-fold
causality; accepts the existence of God, and emphasises
humankind’s special place in creation, as well as virtue ethics.
To say that the philosophy embedded in SAQ is most
consistent with the Athenian tradition is not to say that SAQ
(or the Writings) are limited by past versions of this tradition.
As shown most decisively in the work of Whitehead and his
followers, but also in the work of Marcel, de Chardin,
MacIntyre and Wild, as well as the developments in neo-
Thomism, the Athenian tradition is not only flexible but
capable of enormous, sometimes even radical, growth in new
directions. Being part of this tradition does not imprison
philosophy in the past but rather provides a philosophically
sound vessel with which to embark on voyages of exploration.
Some Answered Questions 261

Third, SAQ shows that the philosophy based on the Bahá’í

Writings in general and SAQ in particular, can be a coherent
and systematic basis for a dialogical (including critical)
relationship with other philosophical approaches, with science,
as well as with various intellectual disciplines. In other words,
the philosophy embedded throughout SAQ and the other
Writings represents a solid foundation from which Bahá’ís may
engage other systems of thought both appreciatively and
critically. It is, therefore, a valuable tool for inter-faith
dialogue, for teaching and for apologetics.

NOTES
1
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
2
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 7.
3
Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh, CVI, p. 213.
4
Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh, CVI, p. 213.
5
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 280.
6
For a detailed study of this view, see Ian Kluge, “The Aristotelian
Substratum of the Bahá’í Writings,” Lights of Irfán, Vol. IV, 2003.
Alastair McIntyre is a well-known example of a contemporary neo-
Aristotelian. It must be emphasised that it is not necessary to be a
Catholic to be a neo-Thomist, as illustrated by Mortimer Adler. We
should also recall that many Muslim philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Ibn
Rushd and Suhrawardi worked in the tradition begun by Plato, Aristotle
and Plotinus.
7
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, 3.
8
Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion.
9
Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great.
10
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
11
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
12
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
13
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
14
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
15
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278. Note, too, how
`Abdu’l-Bahá provides another guideline within which a Bahá’í
philosophy must work when he says it is “futile to deny” that the
existence of creation is an illusion compared to God’s absolute, non-
contingent existence.
16
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 280; emphasis added.
17
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 262

18
See Ian Kluge, “Postmodernism and the Bahá’í Writings,” Lights of Irfán
19
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 196.
20
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
21
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 3.
22
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
23
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 212-213.
24
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 281.
25
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208.
26
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208.
27
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208.
28
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 235.
29
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 189-190.
30
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
31
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 247; emphasis added.
32
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 178.
33
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 178-179; emphasis added.
34
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 130.
35
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 130.
36
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 130.
37
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 130-131.
38
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 131.
39
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 131.
40
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 131.
41
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 249; emphasis added.
42
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 212.
43
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 123.
44
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 245-246; emphasis added.
45
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p, 225.
46
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p, 225.
47
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p, 243.
48
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221.
49
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 178.
50
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 129; emphasis added.
51
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 78.
52
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 79.
53
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 178.
54
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 233.
55
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 179.
Some Answered Questions 263

56
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 146.
57
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221.
58
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157-158.
59
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 158; see also SAQ 252.
60
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
61
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208.
62
“Pantheism and Panentheism” by Charles Hartshorne in The
Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade, Vol. 11, p. 165-171. Both
Whitehead and his follower Hartshorne are panentheists.
63
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
64
“Pantheism and Panentheism” by Charles Hartshorne in The
Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. Mircea Eliade, Vol. 11, p. 166.
65
See “No thing have I perceived, except that I perceived God within it,
God before it, or God after it.” in Gleanings from the Writings of
Bahá’u’lláh, XC, p. 178, for further evidence on this issue.
66
New Scientist
67
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 179; emphasis added. See
also 100, 143, 163, 202, 208,
68
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 178; emphasis added.
69
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 280.
70
Aristotle, Physics, II, 7, 198 a, b.
71
Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 1, 1013 a, b.
72
John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, p. 300.
73
John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, p. 300.
74
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 280.
75
Aristotle, Physics, II, 7, 200b.
76
Aristotle, Physics, II, 7, 198a.
77
John Wild, Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, p. 302.
78
Abaham Edel, Aristotle and His Philosophy, p. 62. See also W.D. Ross,
Aristotle, p. 77 which supports Norris, Edel and Wild.
79
Henry B. Veatch, Aristotle: A Contemporary Appreciation, p. p. 48.
80
W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The One and the Many, p. 200.
81
W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The One and the Many, p. 201.
82
W. Norris Clarke, S.J., The One and the Many, p. 201.
83
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 181; emphasis added.
84
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 3; emphasis added.
85
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 181.
86
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 181.
87
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 3.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 264

88
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6; emphasis added.
89
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6.
90
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 89.
91
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 89.
92
Ted Honderich, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 384.
93
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 280.
94
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 283.
95
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 283.
96
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 241.
97
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 39.
98
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 48.
99
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 76.
100
Ted Honderich, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p. 887.
101
Ted Honderich, ed. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p. 887.
102
Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 264.
103
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 518-519.
104
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208-209; emphasis added.
105
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208-209.
106
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 129.
107
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 184.
108
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 235; emphasis added.
109
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 283.
110
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 295.
111
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 203.
112
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199; emphasis added.
113
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 196.
114
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 195-196.
115
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 222.
116
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 113.
117
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 5.
118
W. Norris Clarke, S.J. The Philosophical Approach to God, p. 59.
119
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 196.
120
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 197.
121
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 196.
122
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 196.
123
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 281.
124
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 281.
125
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 180.
Some Answered Questions 265

126
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 225.
127
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 180.
128
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 281.
129
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199.
130
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 217-218.
131
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 151.
132
[20.15] “Surely the hour is coming— I am about to make it manifest— so
that every soul may be rewarded as it strives:”
133
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199.
134
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199.
135
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199.
136
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199.
137
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 220.
138
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 239.
139
In Aristotle substance and essence are convertible terms. See Edel,
Aristotle and His Philosophy, p. 122. See also Ross, Aristotle, p. 162.
140
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 148.
141
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 146, 147, 148,
142
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 146.
143
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 148.
144
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 148.
145
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 146-147; emphasis added.
146
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 148; see also 147.
147
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 148; emphasis added.
148
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 5.
149
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 181.
150
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 5.
151
The argument from perfection is the fourth of Aquinas’ five proofs for
God in the Summa Theologica.
152
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6.
153
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 130.
154
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6.
155
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6.
156
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6.
157
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6.
158
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6.
159
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 177.
160
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 266

161
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 177.
162
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 263-264; emphasis added.
163
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 233.
164
Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day Is Come, p. 108.
165
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 2.
166
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 14.
167
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 14.
168
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 237.
169
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 233.
170
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 108.
171
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 108.
172
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 108.
173
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 239-240.
174
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 113.
175
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 113.
176
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 148.
177
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 148-149.
178
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 207; emphasis added.
179
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 156.
180
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 203.
181
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 202.
182
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 114.
183
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 113.
184
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 180; emphasis added. See
also SAQ p. 282.
185
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 173.
186
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 207.
187
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 4.
188
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147.
189
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 202-203.
190
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 205.
191
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 205.
192
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 207.
193
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 205.
194
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 205.
195
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 235.
196
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 235.
197
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 230.
Some Answered Questions 267

198
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 295.
199
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 203.
200
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147.
201
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 168.
202
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 222.
203
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 114.
204
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 152.
205
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 145.
206
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 154; emphasis added.
207
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 153.
208
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 9-10.
209
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 154.
210
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 152.
211
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p.116.
212
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 230.
213
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 230.
214
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 230.
215
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 154.
216
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 153.
217
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 151.
218
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 154.
219
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 152.
220
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 218-219; emphasis added.
221
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 154.
222
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157-158.
223
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 158.
224
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 154.
225
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 218.
226
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147.
227
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147.
228
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221.
229
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221.
230
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 222.
231
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221; emphasis added.
232
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
233
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 278.
234
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 217-218.
235
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 253.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 268

236
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 3.
237
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208.
238
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221; emphasis added.
239
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 144.
240
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 144.
241
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 251; see also 3, 9,
242
Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 264.
243
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 129.
244
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208; emphasis added.
245
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 220.
246
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 220.
247
See Ian Kluge, “Postmodernism and the Bahá’í Writings,” Lights of
Irfán, Vol. Nine, 2008.
248
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 298.
249
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 298.
250
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 299; emphasis added.
251
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 64.
252
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 145; emphasis added.
253
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 6; emphasis added.
254
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 108.
255
Descartes, Regulae, Rule III.
www.mtsu.edu/rbombard/RB/Spinoza/cnd.html. See also Philosophical
Meditations.
256
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 298.
257
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 298.
258
Meriam-Webster Dictionary, www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/liable
259
See Ian Kluge, “Relativism and the Bahá’í Writings.”
260
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 9; emphasis added.
261
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 64.
262
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 64.
263
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 163.
264
Shoghi Effendi, The Promised Day is Come, p. 108.
265
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208.
266
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 7.
267
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 73.
268
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p.8; italics added.
269
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208.
270
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 217.
Some Answered Questions 269

271
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 7.
272
See Ian Kluge, “Postmodernism and the Bahá’í Writings” (Lights of
Irfán Vol. 9, 2008) and “Relativism and the Bahá’í Writings.”
273
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 220.
274
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 220.
275
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 220; emphasis added.
276
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
277
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
278
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
279
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
280
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
281
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 158.
282
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 158.
283
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 158.
284
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 146.
285
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147.
286
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147
287
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147.
288
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 222.
289
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 221.
290
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 147.
291
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 250.
292
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 293-294; emphasis added.
293
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 293.
294
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 294.
295
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 209; emphasis added.
296
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 220.
297
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 253.
298
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 241.
299
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 241.
300
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 263.
301
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 156; emphasis added.
302
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 108.
303
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 229; see also 287.
304
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 144.
305
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 239.
306
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 242.
307
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 108.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 270

308
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
309
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 242.
310
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 228.
311
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 229.
312
Malebranche and Leibniz are the major western philosophers associated
with this doctrine; among early Muslim proponents were al-Ashari and
al-Ghazali.
313
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 209.
314
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 203.
315
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 218.
316
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 218.
317
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 171.
318
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 171.
319
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 157.
320
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 172.
321
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 172.
322
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 172.
323
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 172.
324
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 173.
325
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 173; emphasis added.
326
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 172.
327
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. xxiv.
328
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 184.
329
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 224; emphasis added.
330
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 119; emphasis added.
331
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 193.
332
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 189.
333
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 239.
334
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 118.
335
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 119.
336
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 223.
337
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 223.
338
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 229.
339
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 229.
340
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 229.
341
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 240; emphasis added.
342
In the Western tradition, the second view is most closely identified with
Duns Scotus, and the first with Thomas Aquinas.
Some Answered Questions 271

343
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 225.
344
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 225.
345
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 225.
346
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 225.
347
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 208; emphasis added.
348
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 217; emphasis added.
349
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 120.
350
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 115; emphasis added.
351
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 118.
352
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 118.
353
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 235.
354
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 200.
355
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 200.
356
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 201.
357
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 201.
358
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 201; emphasis added.
359
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 201.
360
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 212.
361
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 212.
362
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 212.
363
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 213.
364
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 215.
365
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 214.
366
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 214.
367
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 214.
368
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 214-215.
369
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 248.
370
Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 156.
371
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 249.
372
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 248.
373
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 248.
374
Ted Honderich, editor, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, p. 187.
375
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 300; emphasis added.
376
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 215.
377
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 215-216.
378
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 216.
379
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 215-216.
380
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 235-236; emphasis added.
Lights of ‘Irfán Book Ten 272

381
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 48; emphasis added.
382
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 47.
383
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 144.
384
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 92.
385
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 302.
386
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 300.
387
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 300; emphasis added.
388
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 238. emphasis added.
389
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 300-301; emphasis added.
390
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 223.
391
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 224.
392
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 163.
393
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 8.
394
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 8.
395
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 8; emphasis added.
396
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 8.
397
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 8.
398
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 9; emphasis added.
399
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 8.
400
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 9.
401
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 9.
402
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 74-75.
403
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 64.
404
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 272.
405
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 19. It would be curious to
know how Edward Said would respond to this and similar statements.
406
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 237.
407
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 230.
408
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 233-234.
409
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 184.
410
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 193; see also 194.
411
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 184.
412
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 100.
413
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199.
414
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 198.
415
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 184.
416
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 184.
417
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 199; emphasis added.
Some Answered Questions 273

418
`Abdu’l-Bahá, Some Answered Questions, p. 100.
419
For example, in the 1970’s scientific consensus was that the earth was
cooling not warming. Another example would be the reversal of the
view that neutrinos have no mass.
420
Stephen Jay Gould, “Nonoverlapping Magisteria,” Natural History,
March 1997.
421
Ian G Barbour, When Science Meets Religion, p.24.