SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112381. March 20, 1995.]

ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN ,

petitioners, vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO
V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA
TAGHOY TIGOL, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioners.

Eriberto M. Suson for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PREJUDICIAL QUESTION; DEFINED. —

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its
resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To
justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP, A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN
A CASE FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI-SQUATTING LAW; CASE AT BAR. — In the
criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land
not belonging to them but to private respondent and against the latter's will.
As already noted, the information alleges that "without the knowledge and
consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession
of a portion of "her property" by building their houses thereon and "deprived
[her] of the use of a portion of her land to her damage and prejudice." Now
the ownership of the land in question is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now
pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapu-Lapu City. The resolution of this
question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners' criminal liability
for squatting. In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying
the civil case rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private
respondent and her husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in
common by the spouses and the petitioners as their inheritance from their
parents Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the
decision in that case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for
new trial, the point is that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the
question of ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-
owners of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting
because they are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as
are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family. Ownership is thus
the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil case, the
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 proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J : p

This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of

respondent Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners' oral motion for the suspension of
their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of the
Philippines v. Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as their
motion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772
otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law. The information alleges:
That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapu-lapu City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and
Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA
TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the said owner by occupying
or possessing a portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon
Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in
Agus, Lapu-lapu City, whereon they constructed their respective
residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said
accused have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to
her damage and prejudice because despite repeated demands the said
accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises above-mentioned. LLphil

Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the

ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another
case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed as Civil
Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus
Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of Lot
No. 3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT
No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among
them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita
Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by petitioners, three years before
May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them.
On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and
proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their
plea (not guilty) to the charge.
On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
but their motion was denied by the court in its order dated September 21,
1993. Hence, this petition.

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 The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot
No. 3635-B, which was pending in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case
against petitioners. LLpr

We hold that it is.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct
and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its
resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To
justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the
civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2
Rule 111, S. 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2)
essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. prcd

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a

piece of land not belonging to them but to private respondent and against
the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the
knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or
took possession of a portion of "h e r property" by building their houses
thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of a portion of her land to her damage
and prejudice."
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the
Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L
now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapu-Lapu City. The resolution,
therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners'
criminal liability for squatting.
In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil
case rendered a decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and
her husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in common by the
spouses and the petitioners as their inheritance from their parents Filomeno
and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the decision in that
case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point
is that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of
ownership, such resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the lot
in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are as
much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are the private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family. 3
Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of land can
be ejected from his property since the only issue in such a case is the right to
its physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can also be
prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law. prLL

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 The contention misses the essential point that the owner of a piece of
land can be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his property to
the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession. But in the case at
bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private
respondent claims the right to possession based on her claim of ownership.
Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the civil
case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be
suspended.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered
to SUSPEND the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question
of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with finality and
thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is
decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he should
dismiss the criminal case. LLpr

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. This is the lot on which it is alleged in the criminal case petitioners
constructed their houses against the will of the complainant Rosita Tigol and
in violation of the Anti-Squatting Law.
2. Librodo v. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303 (1982); Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA
441 (1988).
3. CIV. CODE, Art. 486.

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