Argentine Airpower in the Falklands War: An Operational View

James S. Corum
USAF School of Advanced Airpower Studies

The Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982 is an especially notable one for airmen. The decisive battle
that determined the fate of the islands was fought in the air. In fact, the ground war was largely a
sideshow. If the Royal Navy had not been able to fend off Argentine air attacks and protected its
fleet, no British landings on the Falklands would have been possible. Without control of the air,
the large Argentine ground garrison, dependent upon a long-range airlift from the Argentine
mainland, would have been cut off and forced to surrender in any event.

The Falklands War pitted two modern and capable air forces and naval air arms against each
other. Indeed, Argentina’s air force was rated as the best in South America. It was Argentina’s
first war in over a century and was Argentina’s grand opportunity to step into the limelight as a
serious military power. It is notable that the Argentine air units bore the brunt of the battle for
the six-week war and inflicted serious damage and losses on UK forces, whose losses against the
large Argentine ground force were quite minor.

This article will examine the conduct of the Argentine air units in the Falklands War in reference
to their tactical and operational effectiveness. Several issues will be addressed including the
effect of strategic decisions made by the Argentine junta on the air operations, the problems of
command at the operational level and the effect that training, equipment and organization had
upon combat operations.

Phase 1: Argentina Occupies the Falklands. Argentine Air Force Readies for War April 2
to April 30

The act of sending a military force to occupy the Falklands Islands on 1 April 1982 was
apparently a spur of the moment decision taken by Argentina’s ruling military junta. The
Malvinas had been a festering problem ever since Britain had seized the islands (quite illegally)
in the 1830s. Negotiations between Argentina and Britain were in progress. However, the junta
feared that Britain would send a military garrison to the islands after an incident with an
Argentine fishing trawler in the also disputed South Georgia Islands.1 Seeing a window of
opportunity to act before the British sent a significant force to the Falklands, in March 1982 the
junta ordered the islands seized.

On 1 April 500 Argentine troops landed and quickly captured the 84-man garrison of Royal
Marines at Port Stanley, immediately renamed Puerto Argentino. At this point the junta
expected to open negotiations that would allow Britain the opportunity to cede sovereignty of the
islands. The Falklands was a small colony with a population of only a couple thousand hardy
sheepherders. It was, frankly, a British strategic liability and supporting the colony was a burden
for the British taxpayer. Yet, to the junta’s surprise, the UK responded with an ultimatum for
immediate Argentine withdrawal and the clear threat of war. When Argentina rejected the
demands of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the British government simply announced that
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the islands would be retaken by force and began a large-scale mobilization to organize a naval
task force and ground forces to invade the Falklands.

The Argentine government, although led by professional soldiers, thought of their seizure of the
Falklands as a political act and a diplomatic bargaining chip—not as an act of war. In fact, the
junta was so sure that Britain would accept their fiat accompli that no plans or special
preparations had been made to defend the islands or repel a British task force. With a powerful
British task force assembling to arrive in three- four weeks, the Argentine armed forces had to
cobble together a force and create a plan to defend the Falklands. It was truly a “come as you are
war”.

Command Arrangements

Faced with a war, the Junta set up a complicated command arrangement to direct combat
operations. A theater command (South Atlantic Theater of Operations- TOAS) was created
under Vice Admiral Juan Lombardo to command Argentine naval units and the Falklands
garrison. The army, air force and navy units deployed to the Falklands (which amounted to over
10,000 men by the end of April) were placed under the command of Brigadier General Mario
Benjamin Menendez. On 5 April the Air Force operational headquarters (Strategic Air
Command- TOAS) set up a special force called the Southern Air Force (Fuerza Aerea Sur-FAS)
under the command of Air Force Brigadier General Ernesto Horacio Crespo. General Crespo,
commander of the 4th air Brigade, was a highly experienced pilot and commander and was given
the pick of Argentina’s aerial strike forces with the primary mission of attacking the British fleet.
The air force was outside the authority of the theater command and reported directly to the Junta,
although it was supposed to coordinate its efforts with the other commands. It was not an
effective command arrangement for either conducting strategy or operations.2

Argentine Air Force/ Naval Air Arm

Argentina had, by the standards of a mid-sized power, a large , relatively modern and capable air
force. The Fuerza Aerea Argentina (FAA) possessed some front line aircraft equal to any in the
world--including Mirage III interceptors. The naval air arm was in the process of acquiring a
squadron of Super Etendard fighters from France. A decade before the FAA had acquired
Israeli-made Mirage 5 fighters (called Daggers), a mach 2 aircraft effective in both the air-to-air
or strike roles. The primary attack aircraft of both the FAA and navy were several dozen A-4
Skyhawks bought as surplus from the US Navy in 1972. The A-4s were old (built in the 1960s)
but still very capable. In 1982 they were still used by many air forces (the USMC aviation units
still had them) and were appreciated for their agility, toughness and accuracy as dive-bombers.
The latter was important as the FAA, unlike their opponents in the RAF and Fleet Air Arm, had
no capability to drop precision-guided bombs. All of the bombs dropped by the FAA in the war
were “dumb bombs” that needed pilot skill to hit the target.3

In addition, the FAA possessed 8 old Canberra bombers, a small transport force and several
squadrons of IA-58 Pucaras. The Pucara was the pride of the Argentine aircraft industry,
designed and manufactured in Argentina. It was a twin-engine turboprop attack aircraft built for
counterinsurgency work. It could mount a 30mm cannon and a variety of bombs. It was slow,
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but rugged and had the advantage being able to operate from small, rough airstrips. The Naval
Air Arm had some Aeromacchi 339 jet trainers, a small aircraft that could be configured as a
light strike fighter. The pilots of both the FAA and Naval Air Arm were well trained and the two
services had a good base infrastructure and ground units that could effectively repair and
maintain the aircraft.4

On paper the FAA looked formidable. However, a modern air force is an expensive proposition
and mid- sized and smaller nations are financially required to tailor their air forces to meet the
most probable threat. In the case of Argentina, the enemy was Chile (which also had a modern
and formidable air force), long a rival with Argentina. The two nations disputed the ownership
of the Beagle Channel at the tip of South America and Argentina and Chile had repeatedly gone
to the brink of war over the issue. In 1978 tensions with Chile had led to a full military alert in
Argentina. For decades, the FAA had been built up and trained in anticipation of war with Chile.
In such a war, the FAA would have flown fairly short-range missions from bases close to the
long land border with Chile. The strike aircraft of the FAA were well trained to provide close
support to ground troops.

The FAA had never considered the possibility of waging a major naval air campaign at
extremely long ranges. Moreover, the FAA had not contemplated fighting with a major NATO
power that had superior technology. The FAA had only 2 tanker aircraft (KC-130s) to serve the
whole air force and navy. While the FAA and Navy A-4 Skyhawks were equipped for aerial
refueling, the Mirage IIIs and Daggers were not, which dramatically reduced their ability as
strike aircraft or to perform fighter cover. Another problem was the lack of long-range
reconnaissance. The only aircraft capable for such a mission were two elderly Navy P-2
Neptune propeller planes. The FAA was also behind in such basics as navigation avionics. The
A-4s had been scheduled to receive the Omega 8 long distance navigation system but, as of April
1982, only one third of the aircraft had been modified. For the FAA the most serious deficiency
was in armament. The FAA’s primary air-to-air weapon was the French-made Matra 530
infrared air-to-air missile. It was a fine weapon for its time with a 6-mile range.5 However, as
an early generation air-to-air missile, it had a very narrow field of vision (30-40 degrees) and its
infrared sensor could only lock on if the fighter got directly behind an enemy. The Fleet Air
Arm and RAF Harriers that the FAA would fight could each carry four US-made AIM-9L
Sidewinder heat seeking missiles. The AIM-9Ls were a full generation ahead of the FAA’s
Matras. The British AIM-9 had a very wide field of vision (90-120 degrees) and a much more
sensitive infrared seeker that could lock on to the friction heat generated by the front of the
enemy aircraft in flight. In short, the Harrier pilots did not have to get directly behind their
opponents to fire a deadly shot, they could even engage the AIM-9s coming head-on.6

General Crespo quickly went to work organizing and preparing his strike force. With only a few
weeks he trained his force relentlessly. The Argentine Navy provided a modern Type 42
destroyer, with modern anti-aircraft missiles and radar systems similar to those mounted on the
Royal Navy vessels, for training exercises with the FAA Daggers and A-4s. The Skyhawks and
Daggers made simulated bombing runs against the destroyer while the warship simulated a
missile defense and made evasive maneuvers. The results were not heartening. The Navy
concluded that the FAA strike pilots were likely to suffer 50% losses while attacking modern
ship-borne air defense systems.
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While still training the Fuerza Area Sur was deployed to four air bases within range of the
Falklands. From South to North: Rio Grande (437nautical miles from Port Stanley) Grupo 6 De
Caza with 10 Daggers and the Navy’s 2nd fighter squadron with 4 Super Etendards and the 3rd
Fighter Squadron with 8 A-4Q Skyhawks; Rio Gallegos (500 miles from Port Stanley) Grupo 5
de Caza with 24 A-4Bs and Grupo 8 de Caza with 10 Mirage IIIs; San Julian with 10 Daggers of
Grupo 6 and Grupo 4 de Caza with 15 A-4Cs; Comodoro Rivadavia (over 500 miles from Port
Stanley) with a detachment of Mirage IIIs from Grupo 8 and 20 Pucaras of Grupo 4 de Ataque.
In addition, Grupo 2 de Bombardeo, up the coast at Trelew naval air base, had 8 Canberra
bombers available that could reach the Falklands.7 In all, the Fuerza Aerea Sur had
approximately 110 combat aircraft (including the Pucaras) based on the Argentine mainland with
an additional 12 naval strike aircraft available.

Throughout the campaign the Junta made strategic and operational decisions about defending the
Falklands without consulting the senior service commanders or, apparently, without and serious
study of the situation. Within days of the invasion it was clear that the British were going to
fight and the Junta started reinforcing the Falklands garrison. On April 9 the president and army
commander Lt. Gen Leopoldo Galtieri, without consulting the service staff or the officers
responsible for the defense of the Falklands, ordered the entire Xth Mechanized Brigade to the
islands. On the 22 of April, after visiting the Falklands, Galtieri ordered the army’s IIIrd Brigade
to the islands. By the end of the month of April over 10,000 Argentine defenders were spread
throughout the Falklands, with the largest force (7,000 men) on East Falkland Island (called
Soledad by the Argentines) in the vicinity of Port Stanley. The problem with reinforcing the
islands was complicated by a British naval blockade of the Falklands – enforced by the 3 nuclear
attack submarines the Royal Navy deployed to the South Atlantic. Argentina dared not send any
reinforcements or supplies by sea in the teeth of such a threat. Thus, from the start, the
Argentine forces in the Falklands were dependent upon airlift from the FAA.

The first problem was the length of the Port Stanley Airfield. The only hard surface, developed
airfield in the Falklands was the Port Stanley Airfield. It was a fairly short, 4,500 feet, suitable
for civilian turboprop transport planes and for aircraft such as the C-130 with its short field
capability. However, neither large civilian jet aircraft nor any of the military’s high performance
strike aircraft could operate from Port Stanley’s short runway. Thus, the whole of the Argentine
logistic and reinforcement effort centered on one small airfield.

The FAA had a small transport force of 7 C-130s and a few Fokker F-27 twin-engine light
transports. Every national airline aircraft that was capable of landing at Port Stanley was pressed
into service to ferry the troops and equipment that General Galtieri had blithely ordered to the
islands. The FAA transport force performed extremely well, given its limitations. Indeed, the
airlift effort of the FAA to support the forces in the Falklands lasted until virtually the last day of
the campaign. However, the limited transport force and the one small airfield drastically limited
the forces that could be sent to the islands. The Xth Mechanized Brigade was sent to the
Falklands without its artillery battalion or its vehicles. Virtually all of the army units deployed to
the islands (after the invasion virtually all came by air) were able to bring only light weapons and
vehicles – most of the equipment was left behind at home bases on the mainland.8
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A sizeable air force was also deployed to the Falklands to serve under the command of General
Menendez --and not under command of Fuerza Aerea Sur. Nineteen Army, Navy and Air Force
helicopters were sent to the Falklands, mostly to serve in the reconnaissance and trooplift roles.9
In April twenty-four Pucaras of the 3rd Attack Group were ordered to the islands. The Naval air
arm sent 6 Aeromachi 339 light strike aircraft and 6 T-34B Mentors. The Aeromachi jet aircraft
needed a hard-surface runway, so these were based at Port Stanley. The Pucaras, however, were
built to operate in rough conditions and most of these were sent to a small grass airstrip at Goose
Green – a miserable little field that turned into a quagmire after any rain. Some Pucaras, light
transports and the 6 T-34s were deployed to a tiny dirt strip on Pebble Island.

Phase 2- May 1-May 20 The Opening Battles

Air Operations: The First Day

The real opening shots of the war came on 1 May 1982. The first wave of the British invasion
force arrived in Falklands waters and took position approximately 70 nautical miles (nm) to the
east of Port Stanley. The British task force, under the command of Admiral John Woodward,
was built around two light carriers (HMS Hermes and HMS Invincible), over 20 destroyers and
frigates and a host of troopships and support vessels carrying a British brigade with full
equipment. The two carriers each carried a complement of Royal Navy Harrier jets and
helicopters. In all, the British first wave consisted of 65 ships protected by an array of modern
radars and dozens of anti-aircraft missile systems to include the new Sea Darts (effective to long
range and high altitudes), Sea Wolves (for low altitude threats) and an array of 20 and 40mm
guns for close in defense.10 However, the primary British strike and defense weapon throughout
most of the campaign was the Harrier force of 21 aircraft. The small Royal Navy Harrier force
would be soon reinforced by a further 14 RAF Harriers coming later carried on two large cargo
vessels, the Atlantic Conveyor and Atlantic Causeway, which had been modified with flight
decks for VTOL Harrier operations. An additional four Harriers were flown all the way from
Ascension Island, with numerous tanker refuelings, to reinforce the British late in the
campaign.11 The Harrier was a more modern aircraft than anything the FAA flew and, although
it had a short range, it could fly as a CAP (Combat Air Patrol) over the fleet for 40 minutes to an
hour, a significant time advantage over the Argentine attackers who had, at best, a few minutes
to find their targets and engage the enemy. During daylight hours, the Royal Navy tried to
maintain a CAP of two Harriers equipped with the very lethal AIM 9L Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles over the fleet. The small number of available Harriers made maintaining defensive
coverage of the fleet difficult and the best hope of the Argentines was to get their strike aircraft
at the fleet while the Harriers were diverted or on deck refueling.

The battle began before dawn when a long-range RAF Vulcan bomber, flying from the British
base at Ascension Island thousands of miles away, bombed the Port Stanley airfield, cratering the
runway and damaging some of the airfield support facilities. Shortly after 8 AM 10 Harriers,
armed with bombs and cannon, struck both the Goose Green and Port Stanley airfields in a low-
level bombing attack. A bomb struck one Pucara and the pilot and ground crew were killed. At
least two other Pucaras were damaged and the airfields received moderate damage. The
Argentine anti-aircraft fire was intense and the Argentine forces were cheered by the claim that
they had destroyed at least four of the Harriers that had attacked Port Stanley and that all four
 6

had all gone into the water. In fact, only one Harrier had received minor damage in the form of a
small 20mm shell hole, which was repaired in two hours. The bombardment of the Port Stanley
installations was joined by 3 British warships that stationed themselves six miles from the coast
and began shelling with their naval guns.12

The FAS, alerted to the British fleet in Falklands waters, began sending waves of strike aircraft
covered by interceptors to attack the British ships. The Fuerza Aerea Sur never had the option of
sending in a large strike force and use its advantage in numbers to overwhelm the British air
defenses. In order to carry a one-ton bombload (4-500lb or 2-1,000lb bombs) for 600 nautical
miles the Skyhawks needed aerial refueling. With only two air tankers for the entire force, the
FAS was restricted to sending small flights, usually four aircraft at a time. Each flight had to be
carefully planned and scheduled in order to make the required refueling rendezvous.13

While the Skyhawks and the Argentine Navy’s four Super Etendards were capable of air
refueling, the Daggers and the Mirages were not. Even with two 1,700 liter fuel drop tanks, the
Daggers and Mirages were flying at the absolute limit of their range. The fighters sent to engage
the Harrier CAP and cover for the strike aircraft would have no more than five minutes over the
target area (while the Harriers could loiter for an hour or so and could quickly refuel at the
nearby carriers). The range factor for the Argentines was further complicated by the British
tactic of keeping their fleet 70-100 nautical miles east or northeast of the Falkland Islands –
which added another 150-200 miles to the Argentine missions. Moreover, the Mach-2 Argentine
escort fighters, the Mirages and Daggers, dared not turn on their afterburners and employ their
enormous speed advantage against the subsonic British Harriers. If the Argentine fighters went
to mach speed they would consume so much fuel that they would not have enough to return to
base.

On 1 May almost all of the strike forces of the FAS were funneled into action. The first two
flights of fighters came in at medium altitude and failed to find the British force and had to turn
back. In the mid-afternoon the third flight of four Mirages sent to engage the Harriers found
their prey. The flight of two Harriers flying CAP outmaneuvered the Mirages and quickly
downed two with their Sidewinder missiles. A third Mirage used up too much fuel to return to
base and tried to crash land at the Port Stanley airfield. The Argentine air defenders mistook
their plane for an attacking British aircraft and shot down the Mirage, killing the pilot.

The three British warships (1 destroyer, 2 frigates) shelling Port Stanley were attacked by a flight
of Daggers dropping bombs and strafing the vessels with their cannon. This resulted in minor
damage to one vessel. However, the elated Argentine pilots reported that one ship had been
heavily damaged and that two others had received varying degrees of damage.

Late in the day a flight of Canberra bombers from Trelew Air Base tried to attack the British
ships shelling Port Stanley. Approaching from medium altitude they were picked up by British
radar and intercepted by the Harrier CAP. As the old, slow Canberras turned and ran one was
shot down by a Harrier Sidewinder and the other badly damaged by a Sea Dart missile and
limped back to base.
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The first day’s battle largely set the tone for the whole campaign. The Argentineans claimed a
triumph in damaging three ships and shooting down at least five Harriers. They also claimed
that they had repulsed a British landing attempt when several Royal Navy helicopters flying
towards the East Falkland Island turned around and headed back to the fleet. Heartened by their
perceived success, despite the loss of 5 aircraft and others damaged, the FAS prepared to mount
additional strikes.14

In reality, the day had gone very well for the British. The task force had lost no planes and
suffered only minor damage to one ship. The heliborne “invasion force” that was repelled was
actually a group of anti-submarine helicopters conducting a search for Argentine submarines in
Falklands waters. Throughout the campaign the Argentines fought largely in the dark. The FAS
had no means of conducting a battle damage assessment of their attacks and had to rely upon
notoriously inaccurate pilot and anti-aircraft gunner reports -- which consistently overestimated
the effect of both the Argentine defense and air strikes. On the other hand, the British Harriers
could carry out photo reconnaissance of Argentine forces in the Falklands at will. One must also
assume that the US provided their ally with satellite intelligence photos of Argentine airbases
that allowed the British to count and identify enemy aircraft on mainland runways.

One of the most serious problems for the FAS throughout the campaign was the lack of long
range reconnaissance assets. Unless the British fleet showed itself by moving close for a shore
bombardment, the Argentines had few means to locate the British ships. The FAS long-range
reconnaissance assets consisted of two elderly P-2 Neptunes whose radar could pick up ships at
more than 50 nautical miles. The other major Argentine intelligence asset was a very modern
Westinghouse AN/TPS-43F Radar and a supporting Cardion AN/TPS-44 Tactical Surveillance
Radar manned by Argentine Air Force crews and installed at Port Stanley. The Westinghouse
radar was a state of the art machine with a long range that could “see” over the horizon. The
very competent Argentine Air Force radar crew could often pick up the Royal Navy Harrier CAP
at over 40 miles and, by plotting Harrier flight patterns, could determine the approximate
location of the British fleet and carriers.15 However, the lack of reconnaissance assets combined
with the often poor weather found in late Autumn in the South Atlantic, meant that
approximately one third of the Argentine aircraft sent to strike the British in the course of the
campaign returned home without making any contact.

The greatest British weakness was the lack of long-range AEW (Aerial Early Warning) aircraft
that could identify enemy aircraft coming in at low altitude. When the Argentines flew at mid-to
high altitude, such as on the first day, they proved to be easy prey for the Harrier’s on-board
radar. However, the Harrier’s radar could not easily acquire enemy aircraft flying at low level.
For the rest of the campaign the FAS would exploit this British weakness and approach from
wave top level where their aircraft were very difficult to spot. This meant that the Argentines
would fly at normal altitudes of 20-30,000 feet out to sea and drop to wave top level (100-200
feet) for the last 100 nautical miles to and from the target. These were some of the most stressful
and dangerous missions in the history of aerial warfare.

The first Exocet Attack

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When the Argentines landed in the Falklands the Naval Air Arm was in the process of standing
up a new air squadron, the 2nd Escuadron, equipped with 14 Super Etendard fighters bought from
France. The Super Etendards were light strike fighters developed in the 1960s and soon to go
out of production in France. What made the Etendards significant was their configuration to
carry the state of the art Exocet anti-ship missile.16 The radar-guided Exocet was a large missile
that could be fired at long range, nearly 30 miles, and carried a 950lb warhead. It streaked along
at almost Mach 1 speed at very low level – just over the wavetops. Once it acquired its target, it
was very difficult to shoot down. If it struck its target, the result was likely to be devastating. Its
range made it an ideal standoff weapon and the strike aircraft was not required to close with the
enemy CAP. The best defense against the Exocet was to shoot large amounts of chaff (small
metal strips which simulate a false radar image) over the sea and away from other ships as a
decoy target.

The pilots for the 2nd Escuadrilla were trained in France in 1980-81 and were fully qualified with
the aircraft. However, when the Falklands Conflict began, only five of the Super Etendards and
5 Exocets had arrived from France. The Common Market nations and NATO immediately
initiated an arms embargo on Argentina and shipments of planes and missiles were halted from
France. The Argentine government tried desperately throughout the conflict to obtain more
Exocets on the world market but met with no success. Argentina would have to fight the war
with only five Etendards and Exocet missiles. Since spare parts for the Etendards were cut off
by the NATO arms embargo, the FAA decided to hold one of the five fighters in reserve and use
it for parts to support the remaining four aircraft.

The Exocet was a complicated and cranky weapon and the Argentines had no previous
experience with anti-ship missiles. In November 1981 Dassault Aviation, the builder of the
Super Etendard and a French government-owned corporation, sent a team of nine technicians to
the Argentine Navy along with some specialists from the French Aerospatiale company to
supervise the introduction of the Etendards and Exocets into Argentine service. The Argentines
had experienced a lot of trouble with fitting the Exocet launch system and rails to the Super
Etendards. Although France complied with the NATO/Common Market embargo on weapons to
Argentina, the French technical team in Argentina was not withdrawn. In fact, the French
technicians apparently continued to work on the aircraft and Exocets and successfully repaired
the malfunctioning launch systems. Without technical help and collusion from the government
of France, Britain’s NATO “ally”, it is improbable that Argentina would have been able to
employ its most devastating weapon against the British forces in the conflict.17

Action on 2-3 May

On May 2nd the decisive naval action of the war occurred when the nuclear attack sub HMS
Conqueror sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano outside the 200-mile exclusion zone
declared by the UK around the Falklands. The General Belgrano was equipped with ship-
mounted Exocets and the possibility of a sortie towards the British task force was taken seriously
enough that the British decided to torpedo the cruiser with a corresponding heavy loss of life.
From this point, the Argentines would not consider any further naval sorties and the Argentine
Navy’s one carrier remained in port. All hope of resupply by ship for the Falklands garrison was
ruled out and the Argentine forces remained completely dependent upon airlift.
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Poor weather around the Falklands on 2 May cancelled any air activity but on 4 May one of the
Neptune reconnaissance planes identified what they believed to be the British carrier HMS
Hermes east of Port Stanley. Two 2nd Escuadrilla Super Etendards, each armed with one Exocet,
took off for the long flight. At fairly long range the Etendards picked up not the HMS Hermes
but the Type 42 destroyer HMS Sheffield, stationed well out from the fleet for aerial warning and
defense (the Type 42 destroyers carried the new Sea Dart anti-aircraft missiles).18 The
Argentines fired both Exocets at fairly long range (some sources say the missiles were fired at an
extreme range of 30 miles, other sources say 7 miles). Once the missiles were fired, both aircraft
prudently went low and ran from the scene. One Exocet went astray but one found the target and
crippled the Sheffield and caused heavy casualties. The Sheffield was later abandoned and sank
under tow six days later. Ironically, the Argentines had no idea whether Exocet attack had
worked because of their lack of reconnaissance assets. However, the British policy of keeping
the press and public informed of casualties helped the Argentines. The Argentine High
Command learned within hours that the Sheffield had been crippled by an Exocet. Had the
British not announced the loss, the Argentines would have likely concluded that their Exocets
were still malfunctioning and called off further Exocet attacks.

Softening up the Falklands

From 1-20 May the British task force carried out a systematic campaign of bombing and shelling
Argentine installations and forces in the Falklands. British aircraft sank two small Argentine
ships, Port Stanley came under naval ship bombardment and British helicopters and Harriers
carried out air reconnaissance and dropped SAS teams to conduct reconnaissance behind enemy
lines. The first Harrier was lost to anti-aircraft fire on 4 May while attacking the airfield at Goose
Green. Both sides suffered losses due to weather. On 6 May, the British lost two Harriers from
the HMS Invincible when they collided in fog.19 On 15 May a brilliantly conducted raid by an
SAS unit destroyed 6 Pucaras, 6 T-34s and one Skyvan transport on the small airfield at Pebble
Island.20

Whenever the weather cooperated, Fuerza Aerea Sur sent flights of aircraft to hit the British task
force. However, the Argentine long-range reconnaissance assets were reduced to nil when the
two Neptunes were both taken out of service on 10 May for repairs. Basically the FAS had to
wait until the British showed themselves by moving in close to the islands for shore
bombardment for the strike aircraft to have a target. Since the British air defense in the form of
missiles and guns (not to mention the Harriers) was formidable, General Crespo tried a variety of
tactics to get at the British fleet. After the failure of high level attacks on 1 May, further
Argentine anti-ship missions were carried out at extreme low level in order to slip by the Harrier
CAP. Most of the Argentine strike missions were carried out in the late afternoon, when the
Argentine aircraft would have the setting sun at their backs. Another tactic employed by General
Crespo, with some success, was the creation of an improvised squadron of FAA and
commandeered civilian Learjets. The “Fenix” Squadron was based at Trelew, the Canberra
bomber base. The unarmed Learjets would fly out at high altitude in the general direction of the
British fleet in order to simulate an incoming Canberra raid. At a safe distance from the British
fleet, the Learjets would turn and run for home. General Crespo hoped, at best, the unarmed
Learjets would divert the British CAP and allow his Skyhawks and Daggers to get at the British
 10

fleet. At very least, the “Fenix” Squadron would force the British to constantly scramble their
Harriers and increase British pilot fatigue.21

On 12 May 12 FAS Skyhawks attacked the HMS Glasgow and HMS Brilliant while they were
bombarding Port Stanley. Sea Wolf missiles fired from the Brilliant took out two Skyhawks and
another crashed while taking evasive action. However, one of the Skyhawks put a 1,000lb bomb
into the Glasgow. Luckily for the British, the bomb did not explode and the badly damaged
Glasgow withdrew from the scene. Many of the Argentine bombs in the campaign failed to
explode when they hit the British ships, probably due to being dropped from such a low level
that the fuses had no time to arm.

On 18 May the second wave of the British invasion force arrived to join the fleet with more
warships, a second infantry brigade and 14 RAF Harriers carried on the Atlantic Conveyor.
Even with attrition, the British now had more than 30 Harriers available for fleet protection and
ground attack and were finally ready to land forces on East Falkland Island.

The Third Phase; The Landing at San Carlos Bay, 21-26 May

The British picked a landing site at San Carlos Bay at the other end of East Falkland Island from
Port Stanley. San Carlos Bay was chosen as the landing point because the bluffs and high hills
surrounding the bay would mask the landing ships from Exocet missile radars. Indeed, the
Exocet was the one weapons system that the British truly feared and the possibility of the
Argentines using their Exocets governed the whole conduct of British operations. The British hit
the Argentine airfields and installations in the Falklands hard with air strikes on the morning of
21 May and lost a Harrier and 2 Royal Marine Gazelle helicopters to ground fire. The
Argentines, now alerted to the British landing, sent virtually the whole air strength of FAS to
attack the British ships during the day-- about 75 aircraft. Staging in flights of 4, the Argentine
Skyhawks and Daggers dropped to a 100-foot altitude for the last 100 miles to San Carlos Bay.
While the high hills screened the British ships from Exocets, they also screened the Argentine
aircraft from detection until the last moment. The Argentine Daggers and Skyhawks popped up
over the hills and bore straight into the British ships. The British had dozens of air defense
missiles (Sea Wolves, Sea Darts, Sea Slugs, Sea Cats and shore-mounted Rapiers) as well as
numerous anti-aircraft guns to defend the ships. However, coming in at low level over the hills,
the British had no more than 20-30 seconds to spot and shoot down an Argentine fighters before
its bombs were dropped and the planes headed for home.

It was a terrific day of combat. The frigate HMS Ardent was damaged in an early attack and
sunk by a second Argentine attack late in the day. Four other ships were damaged (heavy
damage: HMS Antrim, moderate damage: HMS Brilliant, Argonaut and Broadsword) by
Argentine bombs, some of which mercifully did not explode. The Argentines paid a fearful price
on 21 May for their moderate success. The British downed nine FAS aircraft (5 Daggers, 4
Skyhawks). Of the Argentine air units based in the Falklands, 2 Pucaras and 2 helicopters were
shot down. As the British landing continued, the FAS mounted further strikes. On 23 May the
Frigate HMS Antelope was sunk by bombs from Skyhawks flying from Rio Gallegos. On 24
May four Grupo 4 Daggers encountered two Harriers, which destroyed three of them with
Sidewinders in moments. Another Dagger was lost that day while the landing ships Sir Galahad
 11

and Sir Lancelot both were damaged by unexploded bombs and the Sir Bedivere was slightly
damaged.

The 25th of May, Argentina’s Independence Day and greatest national holiday, saw a major air
effort mounted by the FAS. A second Exocet strike was mounted by the 2nd Escuadrilla at 4:30
PM and was aimed at the HMS Invincible stationed to the north of the landing site. As before,
one Exocet went astray, and was possibly shot down by British anti-aircraft fire. The second’s
radar, aimed at the Invincible but was diverted by large amounts of chaff and locked its radar on
the cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor- not protected by chaff. The Atlantic Conveyor was hit and
crippled (it later sank). As well as 12 dead, the British suffered the serious loss of 10 helicopters
on the Atlantic Conveyor that had not yet been unloaded. The loss of the helicopters, including
one heavy lift Chinook, made logistics for the Army much more difficult as the Falklands had
few roads and boggy terrain and the British Army relied upon helicopter lift for resupply.

The FAS lost three aircraft in the morning trying to get at the British fleet. However, in the
afternoon Skyhawks from Grupo put three bombs into the destroyer HMS Coventry, which sank
in half an hour. May 25th was the worst day for the British in the campaign. However, by this
point most of the two ground force brigades were ashore with their equipment and supplies and
ready to mount the final offensive against the Argentine ground forces.

Phase Four; May 26 to June 14

The British were well established ashore in the area of San Carlos Bay by the 26th of May and
were ready to begin their advance to roll up the Argentine Army positions. At this point in the
campaign there was little that the FAS could do to stop an inevitable British victory. Even if the
FAS had taken out one of the British carriers, the British could have (and in fact did) operate the
VTOL Harriers from rough landing grounds on the island. General Menendez had placed his
forces in an extended defense line occupying positions on high ground across the eastern end of
the island in order to defend Port Stanley. None of the Argentine battalion and regiment defense
posts was in a position to support the others. While the FAA’s airlift had been effective in
bringing 10,000 troops to garrison the Falklands, the available airlift had only been able to bring
a small number of vehicles and heavy weapons. The forces under Menendez had only 10 light
armored cars and a total of 159 vehicles of all types.22 Most of the artillery had been left behind
on the mainland and the Argentine troops had few ammunition reserves. The two well-armed
British brigades began their offensive on 28 May when they surrounded and forced the surrender
of the isolated Argentine garrison at Darwin. From then on, the British methodically rolled up
the Argentine Army, position by position, until the last forces were cornered in a perimeter
around Port Stanley by 8 June.

Although things were going badly for the Argentine forces and the air units had taken heavy
attrition, the morale and aggressiveness of the pilots flying against the British fleet remained
very high. One reason for the high morale in a tight spot is that the Argentine forces
continuously overestimated the damage and casualties that they had inflicted against the British
forces. The Argentine High Command announced, and apparently believed, that as of 25 may
they had sunk or disabled 19 British ships and shot down 14 of the Harriers. In fact, the British
had lost 5 ships sunk and three heavily damaged—less than half as much damage as the
 12

Argentines, without any accurate means of BDA (Battle Damage Assessment), claimed. Instead
of the 14 Harriers that the Argentine anti-aircraft crews had claimed, a total of only four had
been lost. With figures like these, it must have seemed to the Argentine Air Force that the Royal
Navy would have to soon withdraw in the face of such attrition.23 On 30 May the 2nd Escuadrilla
made their last Exocet attack followed up by a flight of Skyhawks with the carrier Invincible. As
the target. The Argentine forces to this day claim that they hit and crippled the Invincible with
both the Exocet and the Skyhawk bombs. Apparently, the Exocet was shot down by Royal Navy
anti-aircraft fire and the hulk of the Atlantic Conveyor was mistaken for the Invincible and
attacked by the Skyhawks. Despite Argentine claims, no damage came from the last Exocet
attack.24

At this point in the campaign the Harriers carried out numerous close air support missions in
support of the British troops. The 24 FAA Pucaras based in the Falklands had been steadily
whittled down by British strikes on the Port Stanley airfield and in air to air combat. However,
a few aircraft remained flyable at Port Stanley and these tried to carry out strikes against the
British army troops. The Pucaras were generally ineffectual and several were lost to British
ground fire, Harriers and portable antiaircraft missiles (Blowpipes). However, one Pucara scored
the only Argentine air to air kill of the war when it shot down a patrolling British helicopter with
its cannon. The FAS, although severely attritted, was still game for the fight and ready to strike
the British fleet whenever the weather was clear. On 8 June the troopships Sir Galahad and Sir
Tristram were unloading troops of the Welsh Guards at the port of Fitzroy, closer to Port
Stanley, when 5 Daggers from Grupo 6 and 5 Skyhawks from Grupo 5 came in over the
Falklands Sound. The frigate HMS Plymouth was covering the cargo vessels when the
Argentine fighters roared in. The Plymouth was damaged by cannon fire and hit by four
unexploded bombs as the Skyhawks put bombs into both the Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram. Both
ships caught fire and were abandoned, with 50 men killed on the Sir Galahad. Later that
afternoon 4 Grupo 4 Skyhawks caught the Landing vessel LCU F4 sailing from Goose Green to
Fitzroy with British vehicles. The vessel was quickly sunk with six killed. The Harrier CAP
caught up with the Skyhawks and promptly shot down three with Sidewinders.

The FAS played aggressively to the end. As ground resistance was collapsing in the Port Stanley
area, the Skyhawks of Grupo 5 and Canberras from Trelew attempted to fly close air support for
the embattled Argentine army. The CAS strikes were ineffectual but one Canberra was shot
down, probably by a Sea Dart. With little artillery left and no hope for relief, General Menendez
surrendered with over 8,000 men at Port Stanley on the 14th of June. The British had won the
war.

Conclusion

The Falklands War provides some important lessons for the conduct of a modern air war. The
British learned the importance of a long-range aerial early warning system to protect the fleet.
The Exocet attacks alerted all the world’s navies to the dangers of anti-ship missiles. Britain’s
20 air to air kills by Harriers carrying AIM- 9L Sidewinders illustrates the importance of keeping
a technological edge over the opponent in missile and guidance technology. Even a slight edge
(and the Sidewinders were more than a slight edge over the Matra 530s) can translate into
decisive air superiority.25
 13

For the Argentines it was less of an issue of learning lessons than it was in dealing with the
shame of defeat. The senior military leadership was guilty for a string of poor decisions that
resulted in the deaths of many brave and dedicated Argentine soldiers, airmen and sailors – men
who deserved far better leaders than they had. General Galtieri and the military junta had
blundered into a war without a plan or a strategy. From the start the junta’s strategy of seizing
the Falklands was delusional. Immediately after the Argentine seizure of the Falklands and the
British announced that they would mount a campaign to retake the islands, the Argentine
military contacted the US government and requested that the US provide Argentina with full
intelligence support in a conflict with Britain. When the US intelligence officials denied the
Argentine requests and pointed out that the US would stand by its British ally Argentine
leadership was dumbfounded.26 So convinced were they of the nobility of their cause they
simply assumed that the US and whole world would line up with Argentine national ambitions.
The Argentines felt bitter about the rebuff as the junta had never seriously considered that the US
would not wholeheartedly abandon its closest ally for an Argentine dictatorship.

Galtieri demonstrated a remarkable lack of understanding of modern military operations by

insisting that the Falklands would be defended by a large land force, largely composed of half-
trained conscripts, with few heavy weapons, cut off from sea supply and completely dependent
upon a tenuous airlift. Galtieri and most of the senior military leaders also seem to have had
little concept of the use of modern technology in war. For example, the Argentine Army and Air
Force could have lengthened the airstrip at Port Stanley by 2,000 feet and based its Skyhawks
and Daggers from the Falklands. The Argentines had, on the mainland, the engineers, the
equipment and the pierced steel planking needed that could have extended the runway in a week
or so.27 However, to get the engineers, materiel and equipment to Port Stanley would have
required most of the limited airlift capacity and Galtieri’s decision to defend the islands with
large ground forces eliminated this possibility. There was simply not enough airlift to consider
such an option, although professional air force and naval officers in the United States and Europe
thought in April 1982 that it was the obvious thing to do.

Vice Admiral Lombardo, the theater commander, does not come across much better than
General Galtieri as an operational commander and strategist. His decision to base a large air
force of 24 Pucaras, 6 Aeromacchi 339s and 6 T-34s in the Falklands is difficult for a
professional soldier to comprehend. What did he think that a force of light counterinsurgency
planes could do in an aerial environment full of Harriers with Sidewinders, British ships bristling
with the latest anti-aircraft missiles and ground forces armed with Rapier and Blowpipe anti-
aircraft missiles? It was an exceptionally lethal environment for aircraft designed for fairly
benign counterinsurgency environments. Many of the operations of the Falklands- based
Argentine air units have a touch of the “Charge of the Light Brigade” to them. The T-34
Mentors were basic training aircraft armed with a light machine gun and some rockets suitable
for artillery spotting. The Aeromacchis were also lightly armed and not suited for anti-shipping
strikes. However, this did not prevent one Navy Aeromacchi 339 from carrying out a valiant
pass with its cannon against the British fleet, slightly damaging one vessel. That was, in fact, the
total damage that the 36 fixed wing aircraft and 19 helicopters based in the Falklands inflicted
upon the British fleet. The T-34s flew a few reconnaissance missions and managed to survive by
 14

hiding in the clouds. The Pucaras fought valiantly but ineffectually and almost all were
destroyed or disabled by the end of the battle.

Another of Admiral Lombardo’s major operational decisions was to sortie the ancient (43 years
old) General Belgrano towards the British fleet with little defense against submarines. The
sinking of the General Belgrano was the greatest single loss of life in the war—and it
accomplished nothing except to force the Argentine Navy to remain safely in port for the rest of
the war.

General Menendez, the commander of the Falklands garrison, demonstrated a remarkably poor
grasp of the basics of the operational art. He deployed his poorly trained, poorly armed infantry
units into an overextended and badly-sited defense line. The British easily overran Menendez’s
positions one by one. Indeed, the miserable weather and the logistics problems caused the British
Army and Royal Marines brigades far more trouble than the Argentine Army. One is reminded
of General Galtieri. How did he ever think that half trained, lightly armed soldiers could hold
their own in battle against some of the best infantry in the world – the Gurkas, the Paratroop
Regiment, the Royal Marines? Apparently Galtieri and the junta felt that patriotism and valor
could overcome all of the military disadvantages.

Indeed, the only Argentine senior commander who demonstrated real competence and
professionalism in the Falklands War was the FAS commander General Crespo. Given the
technological inferiority of the Argentine Air Force and Naval Air Arm, the problems of range,
the lack of tankers and the lack of reconnaissance assets, Crespo did very well with the forces
available. He had three weeks to organize and train a strike force for a naval air campaign- a
form of operations that only his two small naval air units were trained for. He learned from his
mistakes—apparently the only Argentine senior commander who could do this. After May 1, he
avoided high altitude attacks and used the better tactic of coming in low. His improvised
“Fenix” squadron was an imaginative way of decoying the British CAP. The ability of his
headquarters to schedule refueling support and numerous air strikes in long distance operations
speaks to a high degree of professional competence and sound staff work.

The record of the FAS in the Falklands War is impressive. The pilots of the Skyhawk, Dagger,
Mirage and Etendard squadrons demonstrated remarkable piloting and navigation skills over the
six-week campaign. The low level attacks were exceptionally dangerous and stressful. One
flight of Skyhawks flew so low to get at the British fleet that, on the return flight, they had to
make instrument landings at their home base because their canopies were obscured by the salt
water spray. While the Argentine official historians continue to claim that the Argentine airmen
inflicted far more damage upon the British fleet than officially admitted, the documented record
of British losses is still impressive considering that the FAA had not been trained for anti-
shipping operations before the war The destroyers Sheffield and Coventry, the frigates Ardent,
Antelope, the support ship Atlantic Conveyor, the Landing ship Sir Galahad and the landing craft
LCU F4 were all sunk by Argentine bombs and Exocets. The destroyers Glasgow and Antrim,
the frigates Argonaut and Plymouth and Landing ship Sir Tristram all sustained heavy damage
and another six ships received minor damage. In all, the heaviest damage and casualties inflicted
upon the British task force was inflicted by Fuerza Aerea Sur. For that, the FAS paid a very
heavy price. The FAA’s Skyhawk force of Grupos 4 and 5 lost 19 aircraft in the war. The small
 15

naval Skyhawk squadron lost three aircraft. Grupo 8 lost 2 Mirages. Grupo 6 lost 11 of their 30
Daggers and 2 Canberras of the 2nd Bomber Squadron were lost. In all, during the course of
operations the FAS lost 41% of its aircraft to combat and operational accidents. This is an
astounding attrition rate, but morale and fighting spirit never broke down.

The FAA Transport Command also performed superbly. During April the small transport force
mobilized everything that could fly to airlift almost 8,000 troops and 5037 tons of supplies,
weapons, vehicles and fuel into the Falklands.28 Even after the arrival of the British fleet and the
proclamation of a full air blockade of the Falklands by the British, the transports kept flying into
Port Stanley by night bringing supplies and flying out the wounded. Right up to the last day of
the campaign FAA transports slipped past the British. These were also highly dangerous
operations and one C-130 transport was shot down by a Harrier sidewinder.

The Argentine Air Force antiaircraft gunners and radar operators performed their jobs bravely
and very competently throughout the campaign. Seven British aircraft, including 4 Harriers,
were lost to Argentine ground based air defenses.29 The FAA’s radar operators at Port Stanley
were Argentina’s only effective asset for locating British ships and planes. During the Skyhawk
and Dagger attacks the radar operators at Port Stanley monitored the Harrier movements and
warned Argentine aircraft of approaching Harriers. Several lives and planes of the FAS were
saved due to the excellent air monitoring of the radar crews at Port Stanley.

In short, the Argentine Air Force faced a great many disadvantages and did surprisingly well.
Old fashioned words like courage, gallantry, and honor are the only ones that fit the combat
performance of the Argentine Air Force and Naval Air personnel who fought in the war. While
the junta and most of the senior Argentine military leadership offers a model of how NOT to
wage war, the Argentine airmen provide a positive model of impressive competence at the
operational and tactical level of war.

1
For a general view of the Argentine claims to the Falklands see Mariano César Bartolomé, El Conflicto Del
Atlántico Sur, Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1996 see also Carlos Augusto Landaburu, La Guerra de las Malvinas,
Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1988.
 16

2
For an excellent overview of the Argentine Command arrangements and the problems they caused the Argentines
see Alejandro Corbacho, “Improvisation on the March: Argentine Command Structure and its impact on Land
Operations during the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982)”, A paper presented at the Society for Military History
Conference: Quantico VA April 2000
3
for a general history of Argentine units and aircraft in the war see the official history: Direccion de Estdios
Historicos, ed. Vcom Ruben Moro, Historia de la Fuerza Aerea Argentina, Tomo VI, Vols 1 and 2, Buenos Aires:
Ejercito Nacional, 1998
4
There are several books which provide details about the Argentine Air force TOE and aircraft. See Roy Braybook,
Battle for the Falklands; Air Forces, London: Osprey publishing, 1982; Salvador Mafe Huertas and Jesus Romero
Briasco, Argentine Air Forces in the Falklands Conflict, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1987. On the Argentine
Air Force training schools see Jose Antonio Bautista Castano, “La Escuela de Caza y Bombardeo Argentina”,
Revista de Aeronautica y Astronautica, Nov 2000, pp. 916-921. See pp. 916-917.
5
One of the best discussions of the weapons and technology employed in the Falklands War is found in Lon
Nordeen, Air Warfare in the Missile Age, Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1985 p. 191-206. See the
table on weapons employed on p 233.
6
Much of this information comes from the USAF Armaments Museum personnel, Eglin AFB FL.
7
Victor Flintam, Air Wars and Aircraft, New York: Facts on File, 1990 pp 372-373
8
See Corbacho
9
Enrique Mariano Ceballos and Jose Raul Buroni, La Medicina en la Guerra de Malvinas, Buenos Aires: Circulo
Militar, 1992, p. 23. This work is probably the best source for exact figures for all the army, navy and air force units
that were stationed in the Falklands.
10
The best general history of the war from the Argentine side is Comodoro Ruben Moro, Historia del Conflicto del
Atlantico Sur, Buenos Aires: Escuela Superior de Guerra Aerea, 1985. On British weapons systems see pp. 157-158
11
Capt. Joseph Udemi, “Modified to Meet the Need: British Aircraft in the Falklands”, Airpower Journal, Spring
1989, pp. 51-64 see p. 58
12
The whole issue of combat losses and damage is a very complex one. Both sides exaggerated the damage and
losses inflicted upon the other, with the Argentines having a greater degree of exaggeration. The following narrative
of combat actions and losses have been pieced together by the author from both the official Argentine histories and
reports. For the Argentines see Comodoro Ruben Moro’s works and, for the British, the official after action report,
The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, The Secretary of State for Defence, London Dec 1982. Both sides have
carefully documented their own losses and provided aircraft losses by circumstance, tail number, unit and pilot. I
have taken the account of each side per their own losses as the definitive one and have discounted claimed damage
for the opponent.
13
The two volumes of La Fuerza Area en Malvinas (1998) provides several examples of mission orders complete
with maps showing the tanker refueling plans for the FAS strikes. While short on operational narrative, the
Argentine Air Force official history offers a wealth of detail on the tactics of each air strike.
14
For an Argentine version of the May 1 battle see Comodoro D. Ruben Moro, Historia del Conflicto del Atlantico
Sur, Buenos Aires: Revista de la Superior de Guerra Aerea de la Fuerza Aerea Argentina, 1885, pp. 176-197
15
Udemi p. 60
16
On the Super Etendard see Christopher Chant, Super Etendard; Super Profile, Somerset: Winchmore Publishing,
1983
17
ibid pp 48-49
18
Moro, Historia del Conflicto… pp. 229-233
19
Braybrook p. 24
20
ibid. See also Tulio Soto, “The T-34C Turbo Mentor in the Malvinas”, Latin American Aviation Historical
Society Website, posted 2000
21
Moro, Historia del Conflicto…pp 229-230
22
Ceballos and Buroni, p. 22
23
On the Argentine claims see “The Argentine Gazette” Part 2, Translated in The Royal Air Force Air Power
Review, Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 2000. Pp. 87-108. See p. 95
24
For an Argentine version of this encounter see Moro, Historia del Conflicto.. pp. 416-427
25
The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, published by the British Defence Ministry in Dec. 1982 provides a
detailed (302 paragraphs) lessons-learned account of the Falklands War to serve as a basis for future military
doctrine and technology developments.
 17

26
Interview with Stephen Schwab, Retired CIA Latin America analyst, May 24 2001
27
Earl Tilford, “Air Power Lessons”, in Military Lessons of the Falklands War: Views from the United States, eds
Bruce Watson and Peter Dunn, Boulder; Westview Press, 1984, pp. 37-50. See pp. 38-39
28
Moro, Historia del Conflicto… p. 140
29
The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons Annex C. A further 14 British helicopters were lost when their parent
ships were sunk. A further 12 aircraft, including 4 Harriers, were lost to operational accidents.