epublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 181626               May 30, 2011

SANTIAGO PAERA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This resolves the petition for review 1 of the ruling2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City3 (RTC) finding petitioner Santiago Paera guilty of three counts of Grave
Threats, in violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera

(petitioner) allocated his constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal
tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land
located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by complainant
Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite
petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999,
petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecio’s access.

The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water
supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly
disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a
borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived.
What happened next is contested by the parties.

According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and
charged towards Indalecio, shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for
safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong (Diosetea) who had followed
him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter.
Instead of replying, petitioner shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I
don’t spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly
scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue
Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio,
he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him,
shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will crack open
your skull!").

According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily
inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no
choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to
scamper.
Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner was
the defense’s lone witness.

The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC) found
petitioner guilty as charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for each of the
three counts.4 The MCTC found the prosecution evidence sufficient to prove the elements
of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the Darongs’ persistent water tapping
contrary to petitioner’s directive "must have angered" petitioner, triggering his criminal
behavior.5 The MCTC rejected petitioner’s defense of denial as "self-serving and
uncorroborated."6

Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter’s finding on petitioner’s motive. The
RTC similarly found unconvincing petitioner’s denial in light of the "clear, direct, and
consistent" testimonies of the Darongs and other prosecution witnesses. 7

Hence, this appeal.

Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single
count of the "continued complex crime" of Grave Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the
dismissal of the case filed by Vicente as the latter’s failure to testify allegedly deprived
him of his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is
innocent of the charges for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in
lawful performance of duty, justifying circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11
of the RPC.8

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioner’s
concession of liability for the single count of the "continued complex crime" of Grave
Threats. The OSG, however, rejects petitioner’s prayer for the dismissal of Vicente’s
complaint, arguing that petitioner’s guilt was amply proven by the prosecution evidence,
not to mention that petitioner failed to raise this issue during trial. Further, the OSG finds
the claim of defense of stranger unavailing for lack of unlawful aggression on the part of
the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes the absence of regularity in petitioner’s performance
of duty to justify his conduct.9

The Issue

The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

The Ruling of the Court

We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.

Due Process Mischief in Raising

New Issues on Appeal

Although uncommented, petitioner’s adoption of new theories for the first time before this
Court has not escaped our attention. Elementary principles of due process forbid this
pernicious procedural strategy - it not only catches off-guard the opposing party, it also
denies judges the analytical benefit uniform theorizing affords. Thus, courts generally
refuse to pass upon freshly raised theories. 10 We would have applied this rule here were
it not for the fact that petitioner’s liberty is at stake and the OSG partially views his cause
with favor.

Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats

To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the
case to the concept of "continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single
crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution.11 To fix the penalty for his supposed single continued crime, petitioner invokes
the rule for complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC imposing the penalty for the most
serious crime, applied in its maximum period.

The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of
continued and complex crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong
amounting to a crime[.]" This felony is consummated "as soon as the threats come to the
knowledge of the person threatened." 12

Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner’s threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea
and crack open Vicente’s skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least)
homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were
consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his
threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three
individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal
liabilities.

Petitioner’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had
"a single mental resolution, a single impulse, and single intent" 13 to threaten the Darongs
assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente’s
presence near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. The records, however, belie
this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised to see
Indalecio as the latter was in seeing petitioner when they chanced upon each other near
the water tank. Similarly, petitioner came across Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio
who had scampered for safety. Lastly, petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while
running after Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner went to the water tank not to execute his
"single intent" to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate a suspected
water tap. Not having known in advance of the Darongs’ presence near the water tank at
the time in question, petitioner could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them
until shortly before he inadvertently came across each of them.

The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of "continued crime"

undergirded our ruling in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals.14 There, the accused, as here,
conceded liability to a lesser crime – one count of estafa, and not 124 as charged –
theorizing that his conduct was animated by a single fraudulent intent to divert deposits
over a period of several months. We rejected the claim –

15
 x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Similarly, petitioner’s intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm
arose only when he chanced upon each of his victims.
Indeed, petitioner’s theory holds water only if the facts are altered – that is, he threatened
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had this been
true, then petitioner’s liability for one count of Grave Threats would have rested on the
same basis grounding our rulings that the taking of six roosters 16 or 13 cows17 found at
the same place and taken at the same time results in the commission of only one count
of theft because –

[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but
only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one
crime. The act of taking the roosters [and heads of cattle] in the same place and on
the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of
their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.18 (Emphasis in the original)

Having disposed of petitioner’s theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to
extensively pass upon his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty
scheme. It suffices to state that under Article 48 of the RPC, complex crimes encompass
either (1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave offenses; or (2) an
offense which is a necessary means for committing another 19 and petitioner neither
performed a single act resulting in less or less grave crimes nor committed an offense as
a means of consummating another.

The Prosecution Proved the Commission

of Grave Threats Against Vicente

We find no reversible error in the RTC’s affirmance of the MCTC’s ruling, holding
petitioner liable for Grave Threats against Vicente. The prosecution’s evidence,
consisting of the testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two other corroborating
witnesses,20 indisputably show petitioner threatening Vicente with death. 21 Vicente’s
inability to take the stand, for documented medical reason, 22 does not detract from the
veracity and strength of the prosecution evidence. Petitioner’s claim of denial of his
constitutional right to confront witnesses is untenable as he had every opportunity to
cross-examine the four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the presentation of the
private complainant as condition for finding guilt for Grave Threats, especially if, as here,
there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its commission against the non-
testifying complainant. Significantly, petitioner did not raise Vicente’s non-appearance as
an issue during the trial, indicating that he saw nothing significant in the latter’s absence.

No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioner’s

Commission of Grave Threats

There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s claim of having acted to "defend[] and protect[]
the water rights of his constituents" in the lawful exercise of his office as punong
barangay.23 The defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, which
negates criminal liability of –

[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the
first and second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present
and that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil
motive.1avvphi1

requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives
such as revenge and resentment. 24 None of these requisites obtain here. Not one of the
Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties’ rights when petitioner
successively threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing
ordinary, peaceful acts – Indalecio was standing near the water tank, Diosetea was
walking towards Indalecio and Vicente was standing in the vegetable garden a few
meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent, inquiry on the
reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant.
As for the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that petitioner
acted with resentment, borne out of the Darongs’ repeated refusal to follow his water
distribution scheme, causing him to lose perspective and angrily threaten the Darongs
with bodily harm.

Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th
paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
office.25 Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of
basic services"26 when he barred the Darongs’ access to the communal water tank.
Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased
the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his
order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before
petitioner27 and his resort to any of them would have spared him from criminal liability. His
failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally immune official
conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services
justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November

2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.