University

of Embu Law School

LPR 204 Law of Evidence
Lecturer – Dr. K. I. Laibuta

Lecture Notes
Week 1

1.1 Scope of the Law of Evidence
The law of evidence is procedural in nature and scope. It prescribes the procedure by which,
and the circumstances in which, facts may be proved or disproved in civil and criminal
proceedings before a court or tribunal. It does not concern itself with the rights or
obligations of the parties, but sets out the procedure, mechanisms and rules by which the
courts will admit evidence. Laws may be classified into substantive and procedural laws. The
laws by which rights, duties and liabilities are defined are referred to as “substantive laws”,
such as the penal code (which defines offences and lays down the punishment for each
offence). The laws which prescribe the mode by which the application of the substantive law
is administered are referred to as “procedural law” (such as the Criminal Procedure Code
and the Civil Procedure Rules).

Procedural laws may be divided into –
(a) rules regulating various procedures to be followed in a court of law; and
(b) rules relating to the mode of the proof of the existence or otherwise of rights, duties and
liabilities, such as the Evidence Act.

The rules of evidence with which we are concerned are primarily applicable in the superior
and subordinate courts other than Kadhi’s court. Notably, not all national or arbitral
tribunals are bound by the rules of evidence.
Section 2(1) of the Evidence Act (Revised 2014), 1963 provides:
“This Act shall apply to all judicial proceedings in or before any court other than a Kadhi’s
Court, but not to proceedings before an arbitrator.”
Section 20(3) of the Arbitration act Revised 2012 (1995) provides:
“The power of the arbitral tribunal … includes the power to determine the admissibility,
relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence, and to determine at what point an
argument or submission in respect of any matter has been fairly and adequately put or
made.”

The law of evidence is a system of rules for ascertaining the contested questions of facts in
judicial inquiries. In other words, the law of evidence inquires into what facts go to
constitute a right or liability defined in substantive law.
Assigned Reading:
Kyalo Mbobu The Law and Practice of Evidence in Kenya 2nd edn (Law Africa Publishing (K) Ltd
2016) ch.1
Law of Evidence: Study Notes (posted in your portal)

1.2 Historical Development of the Law of Evidence
The rules of evidence, as we know them today, developed from the decisions of English
common law, through the system of judicial proceedings and stare decisis. Even though the
body of the law of evidence developed from common law judicial decisions, they differ in
application to civil and criminal cases.
Example:
The standard of proof in criminal cases was (and still is) “beyond all reasonable doubt,”
while in civil cases it was (and still is) “on a balance of probabilities.”

Attempts to consolidate and codify the law of evidence in England have not been successful
largely due to significant differences in the way the rules apply in civil and criminal
proceedings.

Although codification has been unsuccessful in England, it was done in India in 1872. The
result was the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The application of Indian laws in Kenya was by
means of various Orders in Council made by the colonial office in London.

The 1902 Order in Council, which established the High Court of Kenya, stated that the
jurisdiction of the court would be exercised in accordance with certain scheduled Indian
enactments and, in so far as this did not extend or apply, in conformity with the substance
of the English common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in force
in England as at 12th Augusts 1897. Among the scheduled Indian laws that were to apply to
Kenya under the 1902 Order in Council were –
(a) the Indian Penal Code;
(b) the Criminal Procedure Code;
(c) the Civil Procedure Code;
(d) the Evidence Act of 1872; and
(e) the Contract Act.

The Evidence Act of India was applied in Kenya until 10th December 1963 when the current
Evidence Act came into force.

1.3 Scope of the Rules of Evidence under the 1963 Act
The 1963 Act makes provision for –
(a) admissibility and relevance of evidence;
(b) proof of evidence;
(c) production and effect of evidence;
(d) witnesses – competence of witnesses, compellability and privileges of witnesses,
examination of witnesses, refreshment of memory and production of documents;
(e) improper admission and rejection of evidence;
(f) bankers’ books; and
(g) miscellaneous provisions – cessation of application of Indian Evidence Act.

Assigned Reading:
“Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources” by John H.
Langbein (posted in your portal)




University of Embu Law School
LPR 204 – The Law of Evidence I
Lecturer – Dr. K. I. Laibuta

Lecture 2 - Week 2

1. The Concept of Evidence

1.1 What is “Evidence”
The term “evidence” refers to that which is adduced by a party at a trial as a
means of establishing factual claims.

Evidence may be divided into four main categories:
(a) oral or testimonial evidence;
(b) documentary evidence;
(c) real evidence – things other than documents, such as a weapon
used in committing a crime; and
(d) demonstrative evidence.

Evidence is the means by which judges determine upon the facts in dispute, as
well as upon the law. Witnesses appear to give evidence as the judge regulates
the trial testimony of the witnesses. Such evidence may be written or
unwritten. The judge is guided by what is referred to as “the best evidence
rule.”

The Best Evidence Rule:
The best evidence rule is the legal principle that holds an original of a document
as superior evidence. The rule specifies that secondary evidence, such as a copy
or facsimile, will not be admissible if an original document exists and can be
obtained. In other words, the law requires the best evidence.

In summary, at least four possible conceptions of legal evidence are in
currency:
(a) as an object of sensory evidence;
(b) as a fact;
(c) as an inferential premise; and
(d) as that which counts as evidence in law.

What Counts as Evidence in Law?
Something is accepted by the court as evidence if –
(a) it is receivable as evidence in legal proceedings; and
(b) if it satisfies three basic conditions – relevance, materiality and
admissibility.

According to section 3(1) of the Evidence Act, Cap80 –
“evidence” denotes the means by which an alleged matter of fact, the truth of
which is submitted to investigation, is proved or disproved, and includes –
(a) statements by accused persons;
(b) admissions; and
(c) observations by the court in its judicial capacity.


1.2 Facts
According to section 3(1) of the act, facts include –
(a) anything, state of things, or relational things, capable of being
perceived by the senses; and
(b) any mental condition of which any person is conscious.

1.3 Facts in Issue

Means any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts,
the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability,
asserted or denied in any suit or proceedings, necessarily follows.

1.4 Proof, Probative Value and Weight of Evidence

Proof –
(a) the establishment of a fact by use of evidence;
(b) anything that can make a person believe that a fact or proposition
is true or false;
(c) proof differs from evidence – proof is a broad term
comprehending everything that may be adduced at a trial,
whereas evidence is a narrow term describing
certain types of proof that can be admitted at trial; and
(d) proof is by means of oral, documentary or real evidence.

Probative value – having the effect of proof, tending to prove, or actually
proving a fact in issue. It is the value that evidence has in proving or disproving
something.

Weight of Evidence – the believability or persuasiveness of evidence. It is the
measure of credible proof on one side of a dispute as compared with the
credible proof on the other side. The weight of evidence does not depend on
the number of witnesses, but on what the court is persuaded as true or untrue.

1.5 Relevance
“Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter
which requires proof.” –Lord Simon in DPP v Kilbourne 1973 AC p.729 at p.756.
Evidence is said to be relevant to a case if it has a direct connection to the facts
in issue, and can be used to prove or disprove any of those facts.
Relevance determines whether one fact is related to another, and the fact is
relevant to a case when it is related to the facts in issue.

1.6 Admissibility
The word “admissible” means “admissible in evidence” – section 3(1) of the
Act.
Evidence is admissible if it may be presented in court and the court will
consider that evidence in reaching its determination.
The general rule is that “all evidence that is sufficiently relevant to an issue
before the court is admissible and that all that is irrelevant or insufficiently
relevant, should be excluded.” – Cross and Tapper “Cross and Tapper on
Evidence” p64.

2. Categories of Evidence in Judicial Proceedings

(a) oral or testimonial evidence – the oral narration of a duly sworn
witness of fact perceived with the witness’s own senses;
(b) documentary evidence – evidence in the form of a recorded
document;
(c) real evidence – material objects or exhibits which are produced for
the court’s inspection;
 (d) circumstantial evidence – evidence of relevant facts from which
the existence and non-existence of facts in issue may be inferred;
(e) hearsay evidence – testimony given or repeated in court by a
person other than the one who perceived it.

Additional Reading Material
1. Mbobu, K. (2016) The Law and Practice of Evidence in Kenya, LawAfrica. Chapter 1
2. Ho, Hock Lai, "The Legal Concept of Evidence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2015 Edition)




University of Embu Law School
LPR 204 – The Law of Evidence I
Lecturer – Dr. K. I. Laibuta

Lecture 3 - Week Three

1. Relevance and Admissibility of Evidence

1.1 Meaning of Relevance

Definition–The term “relevance” refers to the degree of connection and probative value
between a fact that is given in evidence and the issue to be proved. “Relevance” may also
be defined as the tendency of a given item of evidence to prove or disprove one of the legal
elements of the case, or to have probative value to make one of the elements of the case
more likely or not.

“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would without the evidence.

In DPP v Kilbourne 1973 AC p729 at p756, the court stated:
“Evidence is relevant if it is logically probative or disprobative of some matter which requires
proof.”

According to Fitz James Stephen in Digest of the Law of Evidence 12th edn (London 1948)
article 1–
“Any two facts to which the concept is applied are so related to each other that according to
the common cause of events one either taken by itself or in connection with other facts
proves or renders probable the past, present or future existence or non-existence of the
other.”

According to Philip P. Durand in Evidence for Magistrates p1 para 7, relevance “denotes that
an item of evidence is closely connected to a fact in issue, as to render it more or less
probable and that it will help the court to determine whether the right, liability or disability
which one party claims to exist (and the other party denies), actually does exist, and if so, to
what extent.”

S5 of Cap80 prescribes general restrictions of admissibility of evidence. It provides:
“… no evidence shall be given in any suit or proceeding except evidence of the existence or
non-existence of a fact in issue, and of any other fact declared by any provision of this Act to
be relevant.”

According to S6, facts forming part of the same transaction are admissible in evidence. In
other words, “facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to
form part of the same transaction are relevant whether they occurred at the same time and
place or at different times and places.”

Likewise, facts causing or caused by other facts are admissible under S7. Accordingly, the
following facts are relevant:
(a) facts which are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise, of
relevant facts or facts in issue;
(b) facts which constitute the state of things under which facts in issue
happened; or
(c) facts which afforded an opportunity for their occurrence or transaction.

In addition to the foregoing, the following facts are relevant and admissible:
(a) facts relating to motive, preparation and conduct–S8.
According to S8(1), “any fact is relevant which shows or constitutes a motive or preparation
for any fact in issue or relevant fact.” The same applies to evidence of any conduct if such
conduct influences or is influenced by any fact in issue or relevant fact, whether it was
previous or subsequent thereto.
(b) explanatory or introductory facts are relevant and admissible.
(c) Statements and actions referring to common intention are relevant and admissible–
S10.
“Where there is reasonable ground to believe that two or more persons have conspired to
commit an offence or an actionable wrong, anything said, done or written by any one of
them in reference to their common intention, after the time when such intention was first
entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact as against each of the person believed to
be so conspiring …”
(d) Facts inconsistent with, or affecting probability of, other facts are relevant–S11.
Facts not otherwise relevant are relevant–
(i) if they are inconsistent with any facts in issue or relevant fact; or
(ii) if by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or
non-existence of any fact in issue or relevant fact highly probable or
improbable.
(e) Facts affecting quantum of damages in suits where damages are claimed–S12.
Any fact which will enable the court to determine the amount of damages which ought to be
awarded is relevant.
(f) Facts affecting the existence of right or custom are relevant in cases where the
existence of any right or custom is in question–S13.
(g) Facts showing the state of mind or feeling, such as intention, knowledge, good faith,
negligence, rashness, ill-will or good-will, are relevant in connection with the matter in issue
when the existence of any such state of mind or body or bodily feeling is in issue or
relevant–S14.
(h) Facts showing that an act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in each of
which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant–S15.
(i) Facts showing the course of business when there is a question whether a particular
act was done are relevant–S16.

In summary–
(a) evidence is relevant if it makes a fact in issue more or less probable;
 (b) evidence must be sufficiently relevant to be admissible; and
(c) courts are only concerned with relevant evidence.

1.2 Meaning of Admissibility

Admissibility of evidence in any proceeding is a matter of law reserved for determination by
the court. Admissible evidence refers to that evidence which a court will receive for the
purpose of determining the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.

According to Adrian Keane in The Modern Law of Evidence 4th edn at p26, all evidence of
sufficient relevance to prove or disprove a fact in issue is admissible so long as it is not
excluded under the exclusionary rules of evidence.

Wigwore on Evidence 3rd edn vol1 ss9 and 10 sets forth two propositions on admissibility:
(a) facts having probative value are admissible; and
(b) all facts having rational probative value are admissible, unless some specific
rules forbid.

1.3 General Rule as to Relevance and Admissibility of Evidence

As a general rule–
“all evidence that is sufficiently relevant to an issue before the court is admissible and that
all that is irrelevant, or insufficiently relevant, should be excluded.”
(Cross and Tapper on Evidence p64)

In Hollington v F. Hewthorn and Co. Ltd 1943 2 All ER p35 at p39, it was held:
“Nowadays, it is relevance and not competence that is the main consideration; and,
generally speaking, all evidence that is relevant to an issue is admissible, while all that is
irrelevant is excluded.”

The general rule that all relevant evidence is admissible is subject to numerous exceptions–
meaning that some relevant evidence might occasionally be inadmissible. These are:
(a) hearsay evidence;
 (b) opinion evidence;
(c) character evidence; and
(d) conduct on other occasions.

With regard to opinion evidence, witnesses are generally not allowed to inform the court of
the inferences they draw from facts perceived by them. They must confine their testimony
to an account of such facts.
See: Hollington v F. Hewthorn and Co. Ltd 1943 where Goddard LJ stated:
“It frequently happens that a bystander has a complete and full view of an accident; it is
beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything that he saw, he may not
express any opinion on whether either or both parties were negligent. The reason
commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide; but in truth it
is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion
is not. The well-recognised exception in the case of scientific or expert witnesses depends
on considerations which, for present purposes, are immaterial.”

With regard to character evidence, the general rule is that evidence that the accused is of
bad character is irrelevant. Likewise, evidence may not be given of a party’s misconduct on
other occasions if its sole purpose is to show that he is a person likely to have conducted
himself in the manner alleged by his adversary on the occasion under inquiry.





University of Embu Law School
LPR 204 – The Law of Evidence I
Lecturer – Dr. K. I. Laibuta

Lecture 4 - Week Four

1. Evidence Obtained by Illegal or Unfair Means

1.1 What Constitutes Illegal or Unfair Means

Evidence is said to be obtained by illegal or unfair means if it is obtained by any means or acts
that constitute an illegality or an unfair act. Examples of evidence obtained by illegal means
include evidence obtained against –
(a) the letter and spirit of the constitution;
(b) statute law;
(c) the general rules of international law; or
(d) principles of common law.

Evidence is also said to be obtained illegally where the process or method used to obtain it
contravenes the law. Examples include evidence obtained by –
(a) illegal searches and illegal seizures;
(b) deception;
(c) threat;
(d) inducement or bribery; or
 (e) trickery.

According to Blackwell in The Blackwell Companion to Law and Society Edited by Austin Sarat
2004, illegally obtained evidence is defined as–
“… evidence acquired by violating a person’s constitutional protection against illegal searches
and seizures; evidence obtained without a warrant or probable cause.”

Evidence qualifies to be illegally obtained if–
(a) a person’s fundamental rights as contained in the Constitution have been
violated;
(b) the rights are violated by conducting not only illegal searches but also illegal
seizures; and
(c) the evidence is obtained in the absence of a search warrant issued by a court, or
the search is carried out without any probable cause.

1.2 Constitutional Protection of the Fundamental Rights to Fair Hearing and

Privacy
Article 50(4) of the Constitution provides:
“Evidence obtained in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of
Rights shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or
would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice.”

Article 31 of the Constitution guarantees the right to privacy. Evidence obtained in breach of
this fundamental right is inadmissible in any proceeding. Article 31 provides:
“Every person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have–
(a) their person, home or property searched;
(b) their possessions seized;
(c) information relating to their family or private affairs unnecessarily required or
revealed; or
(d) the privacy of their communications infringed.

 1.3 The Evidence Act
The Evidence Act does not make provision prohibiting any person from obtaining evidence by
illegal or unfair means. On the other hand, the Act contains numerous provisions directing the
manner in which certain types of evidence should be dealt with.

Section 25 of the Act renders certain confessions or admissions inadmissible. A confession
comprises words or conduct, or a combination of words and conduct, from which, whether
taken alone or in conjunction with other facts proved, an inference may reasonably be drawn
that the person making it has committed an offence.

Such a confession or admission is not admissible by virtue of section 25A(1), and shall not be
proved as against such person unless it is made –
(a) in court before a judge or magistrate; or
(b) before a police officer (other than the investigating officer), being an officer not
below the rank of Inspector of Police, and a third party of the person’s choice.

Section 26 of the Act renders inadmissible confessions and admissions caused by inducement,
threat or promise. It provides:
“A confession or any admission of a fact tending to the proof of guilt made by an accused
person is not admissible in a criminal proceeding if the making of the confession or admission
appears to the court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having
reference to the charge against the accused person …”
Such a confession or admission must have been made –
(a) on inducement from or threat by a person of authority;
(b) on the belief that the accused would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a
temporary nature with reference to the proceeding against him.
However, such confession or admission is admissible if the impression created by such
inducement is removed.
According to section 29, no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against a person
accused of any offence unless such police officer is–
(a) of or above the rank of, or a rank equivalent to, Inspector; or
 (b) an administrative officer holding first or second class magisterial powers and
acting in the capacity of a police officer.

The general rule at common law is that illegally obtained evidence is admissible as long as it is
relevant and not prejudicial to the accused. However, the admissibility of this evidence is left to
the discretion of the court to exclude illegally obtained evidence by virtue of section 175 of the
Act. According to section 175, the improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not of itself
be ground for a retrial or for reversal of any decision in a case if it appears to the court before
which the objection is taken that–
(a) independently of the evidence objected to and admitted, there was sufficient
evidence to justify the decision; or
(b) that if the rejected evidence had been received it ought not to have varied the
decision.

1.4 The Criminal Procedure Code Cap75

Section 118 of the Criminal Procedure Code empowers courts to issue search warrants:
(a) where it is proved on oath to the court that anything upon, with or in respect of
which an offence has been committed, or anything which is necessary for the
conduct of an investigation into an offence, is, or is reasonably suspected to be,
in any place, building, ship, aircraft, vehicle, box or receptacle, the court or a
magistrate may by written warrant (called a search warrant) authorize a police
officer or a person named in the Desnover v. Leroux. 1 Minn. 17 (Gil. 1). search
warrant to search the place, building, ship, aircraft, vehicle, box or receptacle
(described in the warrant) for that thing; and
(b) if the thing be found, to seize it and take it before a court having jurisdiction to
be dealt with according to the law.

In order for a valid search warrant to issue, the following conditions must obtain:
(a) the court must be persuaded of the necessity to issue the warrant;
(b) the application for the warrant must be made on oath, i.e., on affidavit sworn by
the investigating officer;
(c) the grounds on which the warrant is sought must clearly set out the reasons for
believing that it is necessary, for the purpose of investigation, to search a
particular place or thing;
 (d) the search warrant shall be in writing;
(e) the name of the person or officer authorized to carry out the search shall be
named in the warrant;
(f) the place or thing to be searched shall be stated in the warrant; and
(g) if the thing to be searched is found, it shall be brought before a court of
competent jurisdiction to be dealt with in accordance with the law.

1.5 The National Police Service Act, 2011

Section 57(1) of the 2011 Act empowers the police to enter premises and stop vehicles without
a warrant. It provides:
“Subject to the Constitution, if a police officer has reasonable cause to believe–
(a) that anything necessary to the investigation of an alleged offence is in any
premises and that the delay caused by obtaining a warrant to enter and search
those premises would be likely to imperil the success of the investigation; or
(b) that any person in respect of whom a warrant of arrest is in force, or, who is
reasonably suspected of having committed a cognizable offence, is in any
premises,
the police officer may demand that the person residing in or in charge of such premises allow
him or her free entry thereto and afford him or her all reasonable facilities for a search of the
premises, and if, after notification of their authority and purpose, entry cannot without
unreasonable delay be so obtained, the officer may enter such premises, without warrant and
conduct the search, and may, if necessary in order to effect entry, break open any outer or
inner door or window or other part of such premises.”

Section 60(1) of the Act empowers police officers to conduct a search without warrant where:
(a) they reasonably believe that something used in the commission of a crime is
likely to be found in any place; and
(b) the delay occasioned by obtaining a search warrant under section 118 of the
Criminal Procedure Code will substantially prejudice such investigation.

In such a case, the officer may enter the premises in or which he or she suspects the thing to
be, search and take possession of the thing.

 2. Approaches to Dealing with Illegally Obtained Evidence
There are two approaches to dealing with illegally obtained evidence, Namely–

(a) mandatory inclusion; and

(b) mandatory exclusion.

2.1 The Approach in Mandatory Inclusion

Justice Crompton in R. v Leatham 1861 8 Cox CC p498 at p501 laid down the rule at common
law thus:
“… it matters not how you get it, if you steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence.”
Facts:
The defendant objected to the production of a letter against him that was obtained through his
answers given to the commissioners during an inquiry. He argued that such answers should not
be admissible as provided for in the Corruption Practices Prevention Act, 1884.
The Court of Queen’s Bench held:
Though the answers were not to be used against the defendant if the clue is given for other
evidence, the letters in the instant case which would prove the case, then the answers were
admissible.

In Kuruma v Queen 1955 AC p197, the appellant had been charged with the offence of being in
possession of rounds of ammunition contrary to Regulation 8A(1) (b) of the Emergency
Regulations, 1952. While walking through a roadblock, he was stopped by a police officer and,
upon being searched; he was found to be in possession of two rounds of ammunition and a
penknife. He was convicted by the lower court.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the evidence used against him was illegally obtained. The
appellate court ruled that the evidence was properly admitted. Lord Goddard CJ guided by the
finding in R. v Leatham, stated:
“In the lordships’ opinion, when it is the question of the admissibility of evidence, strictly it is
not whether the method by which it was obtained is tortuous but excusable, but whether, what
has been obtained is relevant to the issue being tried.”

Likewise, in Jeffrey v Black 1978 QB p490, the accused was arrested by police in his house. The
police officers improperly searched his house and found cannabis. The accused was charged
with being in possession of illegal drugs. In his defence, he argued that his house was searched
illegally because the police officers did not have a search warrant. The lower court agreed with
the accused’s argument but, on appeal by the prosecution, the appeal was allowed. The Court
of Appeal Held:
(a) the mere fact that evidence is obtained in an irregular fashion does not of itself
prevent the evidence from being relevant and admissible;
(b) Justices, as any other court, have the discretion of decline to allow any evidence
called by the prosecution if they think it would be unfair or oppressive to allow
it; and
(c) that the test whether evidence was admissible was whether it was relevant or
not, and not whether it had been properly obtained.

In civil cases, the position at common law regarding illegally obtained evidence is that the court
has the discretion to admit or reject, and further restrain the use of any information derived
from such evidence.
In Derby and Co. Ltd and others v Weldon and others 1990 3 All ER p672, the evidential
documents had been inadvertently disclosed.
Held:
“Where privileged documents belonging to one party to an action were inadvertently disclosed
to and inspected by the other side in circumstances such that the inspecting party must have
realized that a mistake had occurred but sought to take advantage of the inadvertent
disclosure, the court has power under its equitable jurisdiction to intervene and order the
inspecting party to return all copies of the privileged documents and to grant an injunction
restraining him from using information contained in or derived from the documents, even if it
was not completely obvious that the documents were privileged. Since the conduct of the
defendant’s solicitors made it plain that they were seeking to take advantage of an obvious
mistake, the court would order them to return all copies of the privileged documents which
they had obtained as a result of the mistake, including the three documents in issue.”

Notably, the only exception to this approach is where the evidence consists of a confession that
has been obtained on inducement, threat or promise.

In R. v Payne 1963 1 All ER p848, illegally obtained evidence was excluded, but the court
refused to be guided by it.
Facts: The defendant was taken to a police station following a road traffic accident. He was
asked whether he wanted to see a doctor, and he agreed. At no time had he been told that the
results of the examination might be used in evidence against him. It was not made clear to him
that the doctor would inquire on whether he was fit to drive. At the trial for drunk driving, the
doctor gave evidence that the accused was driving under the influence of alcohol, and he was
convicted. He appealed.

The appeal court quashed the conviction on the ground that, even though the evidence was
admissible, had the accused realized that the doctor would give evidence on the matter of
driving under the influence of alcohol, he might have refused to submit himself for
examination.

Refusing to be guided by this case, the court in King v R 1968 2 All ER p610 stated that there
was no evidence in the King’s case of oppressive conduct or trickery on the part of the police. In
this case, police obtained a search warrant to search a house belonging to one Joyce Cohen
looking for Ganja under the They read the warrant to Joyce Cohen but apart from Joyce Cohen,
there was the appellant in her house when the police came, but they Dangerous Drugs Act. Did
not read the warrant to the visitor. The police nonetheless searched the appellant and another
man in the house and they found the appellant with the drug. The appellant was tried and
convicted for possession of dangerous drugs, and he appealed arguing that the warrant was not
directly read to him and thus he was not legally searched.
Held: There was no way of interfering with the way in which the court exercised its discretion.
The court went further to say that this was not a case in which evidence had been obtained by
conduct which was reprehensible, suggesting that if the conduct had been reprehensible, the
court would have allowed the appeal.

2.2 The Approach in Mandatory Exclusion

Until 1914, courts in the United States upheld the position in common law jurisdictions where
all relevant evidence was considered admissible irrespective of the manner in which it was
obtained. However, the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibited illegal seizures
and searches. The Amendment states:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

In Weeks v US 232 US p383 1914, the defendant was indicted in nine counts for the unlawful
use of mail contrary to the provisions of the Criminal Code. Count seven, upon which he was
convicted, charged the defendant with the use of the mail for the purpose of transporting
certain coupons or tickets representing shares in a lottery or gift enterprise which violated the
Code. The evidence called showed that the defendant was arrested without a warrant in
Kansas, Missouri. While being arrested, other police officers went to the defendant’s house
and, being told by a neighbour where the key was kept, found it and went into the house. The
defendant’s house was searched and the police took possession of various papers and articles
found there, which were later turned over to the US Marshal. Later, the Marshal returned
without a search warrant and searched the defendant’s home and carried away certain letters
and envelops. The defendant petitioned for the return of the private papers, books and other
property, basing his argument on the 4th and 5th Amendments of the US Constitution.
Held: The letters in question were taken from the defendant’s house in direct violation of the
rights of the plaintiff, and that the refusal of the petition for the return of the letters was a
denial of the defendant’s constitutional rights.

Justice William R Day had this to say:
“If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offence, the protection of the Forth Amendment declaring his right to be
secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution.”

There are two exceptions to the mandatory exclusion approach:
(a) evidence seized by police officers relying on good faith on a search warrant is
admissible so that police officers, who carried out a search in reasonable reliance
on a warrant later found to be defective due to a magistrate’s error, should not
be denied the fruits of their search; and
(b) where the evidence was retrieved due to negligence regarding a government
database so long as the investigator relied on the database in good faith and that
the negligence was not pervasive.

Assigned Reading:
M C Getanda “Illegally Obtained Evidence: Which Way for Kenya Courts?” International Journal
of Liberal Arts and Social Science (December 2019) p60-66.




University of Embu Law School
LPR 204 – The Law of Evidence I
Lecturer – Dr. K. I. Laibuta

Lecture 5 - Week Five

1. The Doctrine of Res Gestae

1.1 The Concept and Scope of “Res Gestae”
Res Gestae is a Latin word, which means “things done.” This is a rule of the law of evidence
and is an exception to the hearsay rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. It refers to
a spontaneous declaration made by a person immediately after an event and before the
mind has an opportunity to conjure a false story. Res Gestae is a concept which, as a matter
of principle, is employed in the English system of administration of criminal justice whereby
a statement made immediately after the occurrence of an event under the influence of the
occurrence in order to characterize it and connecting therewith would be admissible

According to Wigmore, “… a frequent application of the phrase has been to the Hearsay
Exception for spontaneous exclamations, i.e. statements made during or after an affray, a
collision, or the like, used to prove the facts asserted in the statement”–Wigmore J. H. 1940
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE Vol VI 3rd Edn LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY pp1764-1768.

1.2 Scope of the Doctrine

The doctrine of Res Gestae finds expression in section 6 of the Evidence Act Cap80. Section
6 reads:
“Facts which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to form part of the
same transaction are relevant whether they occurred at the same time and place or at
different times and places.”

In Republic v Felix Munyao Kioko & 3 others 2017 eKLR, the accused were charged with the
murder of one Joseph Mulela Sendi. In her testimony, PW1–the deceased’s wife told the
court that, on the morning of the murder, she was called and went to see the deceased’s
body, which was lying on the roadside. She then returned to her house and, while there, a
girl called Winifred Muthikwa Nzyoka, who she did not know, called and informed her that
she wanted to tell her who had killed the deceased. The girl had also recorded a statement
with the police, but had since died. Counsel for the accused objected to the admission of the
widow’s testimony as regards the statement made by Winfred on the ground that it
amounted to hearsay evidence contrary to section 63 of the Act. A similar objection was
raised against PW3’s testimony to the effect that he had interviewed Winifred and recorded
her statement pointing to the accused as being responsible for the deceased’s death.

Section 63 of the Evidence Act which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the
Accused persons provides:
“(1) Oral evidence must in all cases be direct evidence.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, “direct evidence” means —
(a) with reference to a fact which could be seen, the evidence of a witness who says
he saw it;
(b) with reference to a fact which could be heard, the evidence of a witness who says
he heard it;
(c) with reference to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense or in any
other manner, the evidence of a witness who says he perceived it by that sense or in
that manner;
(d) with reference to an opinion or to the grounds on which that opinion is held, the
evidence of the person who holds that opinion or, as the case maybe, who holds it on
those grounds:
Provided that the opinion of an expert expressed in any treatise commonly offered for sale,
and the grounds on which such opinion is held, may be proved by the production of such
treatise if the author is dead or cannot be found, or has become incapable of giving
evidence, or cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay or expense which the
court regards as unreasonable.
(3) If oral evidence refers to the existence or condition of any material thing, other than a
document, the court may, if it thinks fit, require the production of such material thing for its
inspection”

The issue arose as to whether PW1’s and PW3’s testimonies in this regard were admissible in
evidence having regard to Winifred’s death. In her Ruling, the learned Judge observed:
“The evidence by PW1 and PW3 of the fact that they talked with Wilfred is to this extent
direct evidence and therefore cannot be excluded on account of section 63 of the Evidence
Act. It is the evidence of what Wilfred told them she saw or heard on the other hand that is
indirect evidence and is hearsay evidence.”

The Judge relied on the decision in Kinyatti v Republic 1985 KLR p562, where the Court of
Appeal laid down the rules on the admissibility of hearsay evidence. In that case, the Court
held that the rule against hearsay is that a statement other than one made by a person while
giving oral evidence in the proceedings is inadmissible as evidence of a stated fact. The
Court went on to hold that the evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who
is not called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the
object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not
hearsay and admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the
statement, but the fact that it was made . Accordingly, the evidence of the fact that the two
witnesses did talk with Wilfred is admissible on this account.

Kinyati v Republic affirmed the doctrine of Res Gestae. Where a statement made by an
observer or participant is admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings, if made on an
approximately contemporaneous occasion so as to exclude any possibility of its having been
concocted to the makers advantage, and regardless of whether or not he testifies at the
trial. Further, that such a statement may be proved as original evidence when–
(a) the fact that it was made as distinct from its truth is in issue whether or not it
was made;
(b) it is relevant to an issue regardless of whether it is true or not; or
(c) it affects the credit of a witness.

In her concluding words, the learned Judge observed:
“In the present application … the only requirement that I must satisfy myself to admit the
evidence as to the statements made by Winnifred is that the statements was made in
contemporaneous circumstances that exclude any possibility of concoction. I note in this
regard that the said statement was made to the PW1 and PW3 the next morning after the
killing of the deceased, and was therefore contemporaneous. In addition, the said Winnifred
also did record a statement with the police before her death. This in my view excludes any
possibility of concoction by witnesses as to what the said Winnifred said, and her statements
are therefore admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule.”

This Exception had its earliest illustration in Lord Holt’s ruling in Thompson v Trevanion, in
1693; so that the doctrine may be said to have been recognized before the phrase “res
gestae” came into use. Nevertheless, the development of this doctrine did not begin until
after Aveson v Kinnaird in 1805 when the phrase in question had begun to be freely used in
connection with it; and only since the middle of the 1800s has it been possible to say that
this Exception was firmly established–Wigmore J. H. 1940 p1768.

The principle is based on the experience that, under certain external circumstances of
physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the reflective
faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already
produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and
uncontrolled domination of the sensed, and during the brief period when considerations of
self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance
may be taken as particularly trustworthy (or, at least, as lacking the usual grounds of
untrustworthiness), and thus as expressing the real tenor of the speaker’s belief as to the
facts just observed by him; and may therefore be received as testimony to those facts–
Wigmore J. H. 1940 p1747 and Perry v Haritos 100 Conn. p476.

The statement of law in section 6 of the Evidence Act is what is usually known as Res Gestae.
The literal meaning of the word “res” is” everything that may form an object of rights and
includes an object, subject matter or accord.” Res Gestae has been described as a term of
protean significance, i.e. ever-changing, mutable or tending or able to change frequently or
easily, and that there have been many definitions of the term. No evidential problem is as
shrouded in doubt and confusion7 as is Res Gestae. The rule as to admissibility of evidence
known as the Res Gestae rule has been declared to be incapable of any precise definition and
it has been applied to so many different and unrelated situations that it has been said that
the difficulty of formulating a description of Res Gestae which will serve all circumstances
seems insurmountable.

In America an attempted definition of res gestae is that it consists of the “circumstances,
facts and declarations” which grow out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with it, and
serve to illustrate its character–Pinney v jones 1894 42 Am SR p209. The principle was
explained by Lord Normand in Teper v Reginam 1952 2 All ER p447 at p449 thus:
“Nevertheless the rule (Hearsay) admits of certain carefully safe-guarded and limited
exceptions, one of which is that the words may be proved when they form part of the res
gestae …. It appears to rest ultimately on two propositions–that human utterance is both a
fact and a means of communication, and that human action may be so interwoven with
words that the significance of the action cannot be understood without the correlative
words and the dissociation of the words from the action would impede the discovery of
truth”–Sarkar S. C. 2014 S.6 SARKAR LAW OF EVIDENCE vol I 18th Edn LexisNexis p288.

The principle of law expressed in section 6 of the Act enunciates the rule that declarations
which are contemporaneous or almost contemporaneous with the transaction in issue i.e.
the interval between two being so short and there being no opportunity for fabrication,
such a declaration would be admissible as Res Gestae. The doctrine embraces not only the
actual facts of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it, but the matters
immediately antecedent to and having a direct causal connection with it, as well as acts
immediately following it and so closely connected with it as to form in reality a part of the
occurrence. The rationale in making certain statement on fact admissible under Section 6 of
the Evidence Act is on account of the spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact
in relation to the fact in issue.

In R. v Premji Kurji 1940 EACA p58, it was held that statements, written or oral, of admissible
facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable
of giving evidence or whose attendance cannot be procured, or whose attendance cannot
be procured without an amount of delay or expense which in the circumstances of the case
appears to the court unreasonable, are themselves admissible–
(a) when the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death; or
(b) as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death,
in cases in which the cause of that person’s death comes into question.

Such statements are admissible whether the person who made them was or was not, at the
time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of
the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes in question.

In this case, the accused was charged with murder, the deceased had been killed with a
dagger, and there was evidence that the accused had been found standing over the
deceased body with a dagger dripping with blood. The prosecution adduced evidence that,
a few minutes before, the accused had been seen assaulting the deceased’s brother with a
dagger and he had uttered words to the effect that “I have finished with you, I am now
going to deal with your brother.” The question was whether this statement was admissible
as forming part of the transaction. Is that part of the same transaction as the murder.
Were the words uttered part of the same transaction. It was held that they were part of the
same transaction because when two acts of an accused person are so interwoven as to form
part of the same transaction, it is not proper to shut out evidence of one of the acts even
though it may involve introducing evidence of the commission of another offence.

2. Similar Fact Evidence

2.1 What is Similar Fact Evidence?
In the law of evidence, similar fact evidence establishes the conditions under which factual
evidence of past misconduct of an accused can be admitted at trial for the purpose of
inferring that the accused committed the offence in issue. Fo example, similar fact evidence
may be admitted to show that the accused undertook a system to defraud the victim. It can
also be used to negate the defence of innocent intent. However, such evidence cannot be
admitted in any case–

(a) where its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value; or

(b) if its use contravenes the general rule on character evidence.

Lord Herschell in Makin v AG for New South Wales 1894 AC p57 at p65 observed:

“It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence

tending to show that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than
those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion
that the accused is a person likely, from his criminal conduct or character, to
have committed the offence for which he is being tried. On the other hand,
the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to show the commission of
other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before
the jury; and it may be so relevant if it bears upon the question of whether the
acts alleged to constitute the crime charged in the indictment were designed
 or accidental, or to rebut a defence which would otherwise be open to the
accused.”

Evidence of previous or subsequent similar offences is inadmissible unless an accused

person expressly or by implication raised a defence of accident or such other defence open
to him.

In DPP v Christie 1924 24 Cox CC p249, Lord Molton observed that a judge in a given case has
the discretion to intimate to the prosecution that evidence of similar fact should not be
pressed because its probable prejudicial effect would be out of proportion to its evidential
value. In the determination of relevance of similar fact evidence, two things must be
considered:

(a) whether an act by the accused was intentional or accidental, or was done with
particular knowledge or intention; and the judge has discretion to exclude such
evidence if it merely tends to deepen suspicion against the accused and its prejudicial
effect outweighs its probative value; and

(b) section 15 of the Act is not applicable unless it is sought to be proved that the
act forms part of a series of similar occurrences.

Section 15 of the Act provides:

“When there is a question whether an act was accidental or intentional, or done with a
particular knowledge or intention, the fact that such act formed part of a series of similar
occurrences, in each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.”

Section 14 (3) provides:

“Where, upon the trial of a person accused of an offence, the previous commission by the
accused of an offence is relevant within the meaning of subsection (1), the previous
conviction of such person is also relevant.” Subsection (1) reads: “Facts showing the
existence of any state of mind, such as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence,
rashness, ill-will or good-will towards any particular person, or showing the existence of any
state of body or bodily feeling are relevant, and the existence of any such state of mind or
body or bodily feeling is in issue or relevant.”

In Makin and Makin v Attorney-General of New South Wales 1894 AC p57 (PC), the
defendants were charged with the murder of a baby. It was shown that the child’s mortal
remains were found buried in a shallow grave at the backyard of a house occupied by them.
The defendants had adopted this child from its mother in return fr a sum of money, stating
that they wished to bring it up because they had lost their own. The facts were consistent
with an allegation that the defendants had killed the child for the maintenance, but equally
were consistent with death by natural cause followed by an irregular burial. Evidence called
showed that the bodies of other babies, similarly adopted by the defendants, were found
buried in the yards of houses previously occupied by the defendants. The trial court held this
evidence to be admissible, and the defendants were convicted.

Admissible similar fact evidence may be categorized into three–

(a) evidence to establish the accused’s state of mind or motive;

(b) evidence to prove the identity of the perpetrator of an offence; and

(c) evidence to establish the commission of the act itself and rule out an accident
or innocent intent.

Assigned Reading

1. Republic v Felix Munyao Kioko & 3 others [2017] eKLR

2. Mbobu, K. (2016) The Law and Practice of Evidence in Kenya, LawAfrica, chapter 2

  
 
 
 
University  of  Embu  Law  School  
LPR  204  –  The  Law  of  Evidence  I  
Lecturer  –  Dr.  K.  I.  Laibuta  
 
Lecture  6    -­‐  Week  Six  
 

1. The Burden and Standard of Proof

1.1Introduction
The   term   "burden   of   proof"  may  be  defined  as   a   party's   duty   to   prove   a   disputed   assertion,  
charge   or   fact   in   issue,   and   includes   the   burden   of   production–providing   enough   evidence  
on   an   issue   so   that   the   court   or   tribunal   determines   it   rather   than   giving   a   peremptory   or  
directive  ruling,  such  as  a  directed  verdict.  The  burden  of  proof  differs  from  the  “standard  of  
proof”  or  burden  of  persuasion.  The  burden  of  proof  has  two  limbs:  
(a)   the  legal  burden;  and  
(b)   the  evidential  burden.  
 
The  legal  or  "persuasive  burden  of    proof"  or  "risk  of  non-­‐persuasion”  in  the  pleadings  refers  
to  the  obligation  on  a  party  to  prove  to  a  court  of  law,  the  truth  of  some  proposition  of  a  
fact   in   issue,   whether   by   a   preponderance   of   evidence   or   beyond   reasonable   doubt–Cross  
and  Tapper  on  Evidence  8th  edn  1995  p121.    
 
The   legal   burden   is   an   obligation   that   remains   on   a   single   party   for   the   duration   of   the   court  
proceeding.  It  is,  in  this  sense,  said  to  be  static  in  that  it  rests  only  on  one  party.  The  legal  
burden  of  proof  and  the  incidents  thereof  is  a  question  of  law.  The  legal  burden  or  burden  of  
persuasion   should   be   distinguished   from   the   evidential   burden,   the   burden   of   production,  
and  the  duty  of  producing  (or  going  forward  with  evidence),  which  is  an  obligation  that  may  
shift  between  parties  over  the  course  of  the  hearing  or  trial.  This  means  that  the  burden  of  
adducing  evidence  is  a  question  of  mixed  law  and  fact,  and  it  shifts  in  the  entire  course  of  
proceedings.  
 
The   term   burden   of   proof   refers   most   generally   to   the   obligation   of   a   party   to   prove   its  
allegations  at  trial  or  to  establish  the  facts  upon  a  particular  issue.  In  a  civil  case,  the  plaintiff  
sets   forth   its   allegations   in   a   complaint,   petition   or   other   pleading.   The   defendant   is   then  
required  to  file  a  responsive  pleading  denying  some  or  all  of  the  allegations  and  setting  forth  
any  affirmative  facts  in  defence.  Each  party  has  the  burden  of  proof  of  its  allegations  and,  
ultimately,   their   respective   cases   on   a   balance   of   probability.   In   a   criminal   case,   it   is   the  
prosecution   that   has   the   burden   of   proof   of   the   charge   against   the   accused   on   the   required  
standard,  i.e.  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  
 
The   general   rule   is   that   the   burden   of   proof   lies   on   the   party   who   avers   and   failure   to  
discharge   the   obligation   to   prove   the   facts   may   result   in   failure   in   the   whole   or   part   of  
litigation.  The  exceptions  to  this  rule  are:  
(a)   an  express  statutory  exception  where  Parliament  has  relieved  the  prosecution  
of  its  original  burden  and  placed  it  upon  the  accused,  for  instance,  in  cases  of  
strict  liability;  
(b)   an  implied  statutory  exception;  
(c)   defence   of   intoxication   or   insanity,   the   burden   of   whose   proof   lies   on   the  
accused  who  pleads  intoxication  or  insanity  in  defence  to  a  charge;  
(d)   in  civil  proceedings,     where  facts  in  issue  are  within  the  special  knowledge  of  
a  party  who  bears  the  burden  of  proving  or  disproving  them–S112  of  the  Act;  
(e)   where   a     party   denies   the   existence   of   a   state   of   affairs,   such   as   a   landlord-­‐
tenant  or  principal-­‐agent  relationship–S115;  
(f)   the  duty  to  disprove  ownership  lies  on  a  party  who  affirms  lack  thereof–S116;  
and  
(g)   the   burden   of   proving   the   good   faith   of   a   transaction   is   on   the   party   who   is   in  
a  position  of  active  confidence–S117.  
See:  Nyamweru  Kinyaboya  v  R.  1953  20  EACA  p192;  
Kamau  Njoroge  v  R.  1939  EACA  p135–on  the  defence  of  intoxication  and  insanity.  
 1.2 The Legal Burden.
The  burden  of  proof–Latin  onus  probandi–is  a  level  of  proof  that  a  party  seeking  to  prove  a  
fact   must   reach   before   it   is   accepted   in   a   court   of   law.   It   is   an   obligation   to   adduce   the  
evidence  of  a  fact.  In  a  criminal  case,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  prosecution  to  prove  the  
charge   against   the   accused.   This   has   been   referred   to   as   the   golden   thread   of   English  
common  law.  In  effect,  the  accused  is  not  required  to  prove  his  or  her  innocence  but,  rather,  
it  is  the  duty  of  the  prosecution  to  prove  his  or  her  guilt.  
 
S.  C.  Sarkar  in  Sakar’s  Law  of  Evidence  12th  edn  1971  at  p872  attributes  two  meanings  to  the  
term  “burden  of  proof”:  
(a)   a  matter  of  law  and  pleading;  and  
(b)   a  matter  of  adducing  evidence.  
 
The  court  in  Republic  v  Silas  Magongo  Onzere  alias  Fredrick  Namema  2017  eKLR  laid  down  
the   rule   on   the   burden   of   proof.   According   to   the   learned   Judge,   it   is   the   law   in   Kenya   as  
entrenched  in  the  Constitution  under  Article  50  (2)  (a)  that  an  accused  person  is  presumed  
to  be  innocent  until  the  contrary  is  proved.  Section  107(1)  of  the  evidence  Act  provides:  
“whoever  desires  any  court  to  give  judgement  as  to  any  right  or  liability  dependent  on  the  
existence  of  facts  which  he  asserts,  must  prove  that  those  facts  exist.”  
 
As   to   what   constitutes   the   burden   of   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt   the   case   of   Miller   v  
Minister  of  Pensions  [1947]  2  ALL  ER  372  –  373  lays  down  the  rule  thus  provides:  
“Proof  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  does  not  mean  proof  beyond  the  shadow  of  doubt.  The  
law   would   prevail   to   protect   the   community   if   it   admitted   fanciful   possibilities   to   deflect   the  
course  of  justice.”  
 
In  Woolmington  v  DPP  1935  All  ER    1  AC  p462,  the  accused  was  charged  with  the  murder  of  
his   wife.   He   pleaded   not   guilty   and   testified   that,   though   he   shot   his   wife,   the   shooting   was  
accidental.   The   trial   court   directed   the   jury   that   once   it   was   proved   and   admitted   that   the  
accused  shot  his  wife,  the  accused  bore  the  burden  of  disproving  malice  aforethought.  The  
accuse  was  convicted  and  he  appealed.    
 
On   appeal   to   the   House   of   Lords,   it   was   held   that   the   trial   court   misdirected   the   jury.   the  
House  of  Lords,  in  the  words  of  Lord  Sankey  LC,  enunciated  the  following  principle  of  law:  
“Throughout  the  web  of  English  criminal  law,  one  golden  thread  is  always  to  be  seen,  that  it  
is   the   duty   of   the   prosecution   to   prove   the   prisoner’s   guilt   subject   to   …   the   defence   of  
insanity  and  subject  to  any  statutory  exceptions.  No  matter  what  the  charge  or  where  the  
trial   the   principle   that   the   prosecution   must   prove   the   guilt   of   the   prisoner   is   part   of   English  
Common   Law,   and   no   attempt   to   whittle   it   down   can   be   entertained   …   It   is   the   duty   of   the  
prosecution   to   prove   beyond   reasonable   doubt   that   it   was   the   accused   who   was  
responsible.  If  at  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  there  exists  a  doubt  on  the  whole  of  the  case,  
created   by   evidence   given   by   either   the   prosecution   or   the   prisoner   as   to   whether   the  
prisoner   killed   the   deceased   with   a   malicious   intent,   the   prosecution   has   not   made   out   its  
case  and  the  prisoner  is  entitled  to  an  acquittal.”  
 

1.3 Legal Burden in Civil Cases

The   general   rule   is   that   the   legal   burden   in   civil   cases   lies   on   the   party   who   asserts   the  
affirmation   of   an   issue.   This   burden   is   fixed   at   the   beginning   of   the   trial   by   the   state   of  
pleadings   and   remains   unchanged   throughout   the   trial.   Thus,   the   legal   burden   lies   on   the  
party   who   substantially   asserts   the   affirmation   of   the   issue   and   not   upon   the   party   who  
denies  it.  This  rule  is  expressed  in  the  Latin  maxim  ei  incumbit  probation  que  decit,  non  quit  
negat.  This  legal  burden  goes  beyond  a  mere  denial  of  the  plaintiff’s  claim.  
Example:  
The  defendant  always  bears  the  burden  of  proof  of  the  defence  of  volenti  non  fit  injuria  or  
contributory   negligence.   In   the   case   of   breach   of   contract,   the   plaintiff   bears   the   legal  
burden   of   proving   the   contract,   its   breach   and   the   consequences   while   the   defendant   bears  
the  legal  burden  of  proving  the  defence  of  frustration  or  discharge,  if  any.  
 
The   only   exception   to   this   general   rule   arises   where   a   negative   assertion   is   an   essential  
aspect   of   the   plaintiff’s   claim.   In   Joseph   Constantine   Steamship   Line   v   Imperial   Smelting   Co.  
1942   AC   p154   HL,   the   plaintiffs   who   were   the   charterers   of   a   ship   claimed   damages   from   the  
owners  for  failure  to  load.  The  defendants  pleaded  that  the  contract  had  been  frustrated  by  
destruction   of   the   ship   owing   to   an   explosion   in   one   of   the   engines   whose   cause   was  
unclear.  
Held:   The   onus   of   proving   that   the   frustration   was   caused   by   the   defendant’s   default   lay  
upon  the  plaintiff  charterers.  The  Court  of  Appeal  reversed  this  decision  on  appeal,  but  on  
further  appeal  to  the  House  of  Lords,  the  trial  court’s  decision  was  upheld.  
 
The  House  of  Lords  Held:  
If   the   plaintiff   wished   to   prove   that   frustration   was   due   to   the   defendant’s   negligence,   then  
the  plaintiff  must  allege  it  and  prove  it.  
 

1.4 The Evidential Burden.

The  term  “legal  burden”  is  distinct  from  “evidential  burden.”  Legal  burden,  in  relation  to  a  
fact   or   matter,   means   the   burden   of   proving   the   existence   of   the   fact   or   matter.   On   the  
other   hand,   evidential   burden   means   the   burden   of   adducing   or   pointing   to   evidence   that  
suggests  a  reasonable  possibility  that  the  fact  or  matter  exists  or  does  not  exist.  
 
Evidential  burden  is  the  burden  to  adduce  sufficient  evidence  to  prove  a  particular  fact  in  
issue  in  a  proceeding  in  order  to  justify  a  finding  on  that  fact  in  favour  of  the  party  who  is  
under  the  obligation  –  Cross  and  Tapper  1995  p122.  Notably,  there  is  no  burden  of  proof  with  
regard  to  motive,  hostility  or  ill-­‐feeling  as  a  factor  in  criminal  cases.  The  intent  surrounding  
an  offense  is  nevertheless  crucial  to  the  elements  of  the  offense  in  a  charge  of  murder.  
However,  in  some  cases,  such  as  defamation  suits,  the  defamed  party  must  prove  actual  
malice.  
 
The  evidential  burden  is  considered  in  two  stages:  
(a)   at   the   beginning   of   the   proceedings   in   order   to   determine   which   party   begins  
the  suit;  and  
(b)   at   any   time   during   trial   to   determine   whether   enough   evidence   has   been  
adduced  in  support  of  an  asserted  fact  for  it  to  become  a  justiciable  issue.  
 

1.5 Evidential Burden in Criminal Cases

In   criminal   cases,   the   evidential   burden   will   shift   constantly   as   evidence   is   adduced   by   either  
side.  The  onus  of  discharging  this  burden  rests  upon  he  who  would  fail  if  no  evidence  at  all  
was   given   on   either   side.   For   example,   the   prosecution   is   required   by   law   to   establish   a  
prima  facie  case  or  a  case  sufficient  to  require  the  accused  to  enter  a  defence.  
 
Sarkar   defines   prima   facie   evidence   as   “…   evidence   which   if   accepted   appears   to   be  
sufficient  to  establish  a  fact  unless  rebutted  by  acceptable  evidence  to  the  contrary.  It  is  not  
conclusive.”  In  Ramanlal  T.  Bhatt  v  R.  1957  EA  p332,  the  court  explained  that  prima  facie  case  
means  “…  one  on  which  a  reasonable  tribunal  properly  directing  its  mind  to  the  law  and  the  
evidence  could  convict  if  no  explanation  is  offered  by  the  defence.”  
Held:   The   onus   rests   on   the   prosecution   to   prove   its   case   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and   a  
prima  facie  case  is  not  made  out  if  at  the  close  of  the  prosecution,  the  case  is  merely  one  
“which  on  full  consideration  might  possibly  be  thought  sufficient  to  sustain  a  conviction.  The  
question  whether  there  is  a  case  to  answer  cannot  depend  only  on  whether  there  is  some  
evidence   irrespective   of   its   credibility,   or   weight,   sufficient   to   put   the   accused   on   his  
defence.”  
 

1.6 Evidential Burden in Civil Cases

The  legal  burden  and  the  evidential  burden  in  civil  cases  are  closely  tied  together.  Whoever  
desires   any   court   to   give   judgment   as   to   any   legal   right   or   liability   dependent   on   the  
existence  of  facts  which  he  asserts,  must  prove  that  those  facts  exist.  In  other  words,  the  
party  who  alleges  a  fact  must  adduce  evidence  to  prove  it.  
 

1.7 Shifting the Burden of Proof.

The  burden  of  proof  shifts  only  in  so  far  as  the  burden  of  adducing  evidence  is  concerned.  
This   means   that   the   burden   of   establishing   a   case   remains,   throughout   the   entire   case,  
where   the   pleadings   originally   put   it.   However,   the   burden   of   adducing   evidence   is   the  
obligation   to   prove   a   particular   set   of   facts   and   it   shifts   between   the   prosecution   and   the  
defence  depending  on  how  each  side  introduces  its  evidence  against  the  other  party.  
Example:  
If  the  court  finds  that  the  prosecution  has  established  a  prima  facie  case  against  the  accused,  
the   burden   of   adducing   evidence   to   the   contrary   shifts   to   the   defence.   Likewise,   if   the  
defence   raises   the   question   of   an   alibi,   the   burden   of   disproving   the   alibi   shifts   to   the  
prosecution–Bernard   Maina   Mwaniki   v   R.   2010   eKLR.   The   person   raising   the   defence   does  
not  assume  any  responsibility  of  proving  it–S109  of  the  Act.  
 
According  to  S107.1  of  the  Evidence  Act,  “whoever  desires  any  court  to  give  judgment  as  to  
any  legal  right  or  liability  dependent  on  the  existence  of  facts  which  he  asserts  must  prove  
that  those  facts  exist.”  The  same  applies  to  proof  of  admissibility–S110.  
   

1.8 The Right to Begin.

In   a   criminal  trial,   the   prosecuting   attorney   presents   evidence   by   calling   witnesses   to   testify  
in  proof  of  the  charge  against  the  accused.  If  the  accused  is  put  on  his  defence  on  a  finding  
of  a  prima  facie  case,  he  has  the  opportunity  to  testify  and  call  witnesses  to  adduce  evidence  
in   his   defence.   The   judge   determines   what   evidence   and   testimony   are   admissible   under  
the  rules.   In   a   civil   case,   it   is   the   plaintiff   who   begins   to   present   his   evidence   to   prove   his  
claim.   The   defendant   then   adduces   evidence   in   his   defence.   The   same   process   is   adopted   in  
opening  addresses  where  the  parties  or  their  legal  counsel  address  the  court  on  what  they  
intend   to   present   in   support   of   their   respective   cases.   However,   this   sequence   is   reversed  
during  closing  submissions  as  they  sum  up  their  cases  on  matters  of  evidence  and  points  of  
law.  
 

1.9 Standard of Proof in Civil Cases.

The  standard   of   proof   in   civil   cases  is  proof  on   the   balance   of   probability.   The  Black’s   Law  
Dictionary  defines  “the  standard  of  proof”  as  “the  degree  or  level  of  proof  demanded  in  a  
specific  case  in  order  for  a  party  to  succeed.”  In  Ahmed  Mohammed  Noor  v  Abdi  Aziz  Osman  
2019  eKLR,  the  appellant  had  lent  a  sum  of  money  to  the  respondent.  His  suit  to  recover  was  
dismissed  by  the  trial  magistrate  on  the  grounds  that  the  Appellant  had  neither  laid  before  
the  Court  sufficient  evidence  nor  proved  that  he  had  advanced  to  the  Respondent  the  sum  
of   Kshs.   2,325,100.   The   court   disregarded   the   relevant   clauses   of   a   debt   settlement  
agreement   made   between   the   parties   and   determined   the   suit   against   the   weight   of  
evidence.   Allowing   the   appeal,   the   Judge   cited   section   107.1   of   the   Evidence   Act,   which  
provides:  
“Whoever  desires  any  court  to  give  judgment  as  to  any  legal  right  or  liability  dependent  on  
the   existence   of   facts   which   he   asserts   must   prove   that   those   facts   exist.”   The   Judge  
affirmed   the   principle   that   “a   written   contract   is   read,   understood   and   applied   by   what   it  
expressly  says.  Implication  is  out  of  question.”  According  to  him,  that  is  the  position  in  this  
case.   In   conclusion,   the   court   observed   that   the   Agreement   is   a   contract   between   the  
parties.   It   remains   valid   and   binding   unless   it   is   set   aside   for   undue   influence,   fraud   or  
collusion   or   other   vitiating   factor,   which   the   respondent   had   not   proved   on   trial.  
Accordingly,  the  appellant  had  proved  his  claim  on  a  balance  of  probability.  
 
In   Re   H–Minors   1996   AC   p563   at   p586,   Lord   Nicholls   explained   that   proof   on   a   balance   of  
probability  was  a  flexible  test.  According  to  him:  
"The   balance   of   probability   standard   means   that   a   court   is   satisfied   an   event   occurred   if   the  
court  considers  that,  on  the  evidence,  the  occurrence  of  the  event  was  more  likely  than  not.  
When   assessing   the   probabilities   the   court   will   have   in   mind   as   a   factor,   to   whatever   extent  
is  appropriate  in  the  particular  case,  that  the  more  serious  the  allegation  the  less  likely  it  is  
that  the  event  occurred  and,  hence,  the  stronger  should  be  the  evidence  before  the  court  
concludes   that   the   allegation   is   established   on   the   balance   of   probability.   Fraud   is   usually  
less   likely   than   negligence.   Deliberate   physical   injury   is   usually   less   likely   than   accidental  
physical   injury.   A   stepfather   is   usually   less   likely   to   have   repeatedly   raped   and   had   non-­‐
consensual  oral  sex  with  his  under  age  stepdaughter  than  on  some  occasion  to  have  lost  his  
temper  and  slapped  her.  Built  into  the  preponderance  of  probability  standard  is  a  generous  
degree   of   flexibility   in   respect   of   the   seriousness   of   the   allegation.   Although   the   result   is  
much  the  same,  this  does  not  mean  that  where  a  serious  allegation  is  in  issue  the  standard  
of  proof  required  is  higher.  It  means  only  that  the  inherent  probability  or  improbability  of  an  
event   is   itself   a   matter   to   be   taken   into   account   when   weighing   the   probabilities   and  
deciding   whether,   on   balance,   the   event   occurred.   The   more   improbable   the   event,   the  
stronger   must   be   the   evidence   that   it   did   occur   before,   on   the   balance   of   probability,   its  
occurrence  will  be  established."  
 

1.10 Standard of Proof in Criminal Cases.

In   criminal   cases   the   standard   of   proof   is   proof   beyond   any   reasonable   doubt.   In   election  
petitions   the   standard   of   proof   remains   higher   than   the   balance   of   probabilities   but   lower  
than   beyond   reasonable   doubt   and,   where   allegations   of   criminal   or   quasi-­‐criminal   nature  
are   made,   the   standard   of   proof   is   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt–Ahmed   Mohammed  
Noor  v  Abdi  Aziz  Osman  2019  eKLR.  
 
Proof   beyond  a  reasonable   doubt  is  proof  that   leaves   you   firmly   convinced   of   the  
defendant's   guilt.   There   are   very   few   things   in   this   world   that   we   know   with   absolute  
certainty,   and   in   criminal   cases,   the   law   does   not   require  proof  that   overcomes   every  
possible  doubt.   In   a   criminal   case,   the   prosecution   bears   the   burden   of   proving   that   the  
defendant   is   guilty  beyond  all  reasonable   doubt.   Reasonable   doubt   is   the   traditional,   and  
highest,   standard   of   proof   that   must   be   exceeded   to   secure   a   guilty   verdict   in   a   criminal  
case.  
 
The   phrase   “beyond   a   reasonable   doubt”   means   that   the   evidence   presented   and   the  
arguments   put   forward   by   the   prosecution   establish   the   defendant’s   guilt   so   clearly   that  
they  must  be  accepted  as  fact  by  any  rational  person.  If  the  judge  or  jury  has  a  reasonable  
doubt   about   the   defendant’s   guilt,   the   defendant   cannot   be   convicted.   Simply   put,  
reasonable   doubt   is   the   highest   standard   of   proof   used   in   any   court   of   law.   It   is   used  
exclusively   in   criminal   cases   because   a   criminal   conviction   could   deprive   the   defendant   of  
liberty   or   even   life.   The   standard   of   proof   beyond   a   reasonable   doubt   is   widely   accepted  
around   the   world.   The   concept   of   reasonable   doubt   is   imposed   only   on   criminal   cases  
because  the  consequences  of  a  conviction  are  severe.  As  has  often  been  said,  it  is  worse  to  
convict  an  innocent  person  than  to  let  a  guilty  person  go  free.  
 

1.11 Standard of Proof in proceedings that are neither civil nor

criminal.
In   such   cases,   the   standard   of   proof   is   higher   than   proof   on   a   balance   of   probability,   but  
lower   than   proof   beyond   reasonable   doubt.   In   Republic   v   Ahmad   Abolfathi   Mohammed   &  
another   2018   eKLR–which   address   the   issue   of   standard   of   proof   in   cases   of   contempt  
proceedings,  the  Supreme  Court  held:  
“In  our  view,  the  standard  of  proof  in  contempt  proceedings  must  be  higher  than  proof  
on  the  balance  of  probabilities,  almost  but  not  exactly,  beyond  reasonable  doubt  …  The  
standard  of  proof  beyond  reasonable  doubt  ought  to  be  left  where  it  belongs,  to  wit,  in  
criminal   cases.   It   is   not   safe   to   extend   it   to   an   offence   which   can   be   said   to   be   quasi-­‐
criminal  in  nature.”  

Assigned Reading:
♦ The  Evidence  Act  (Chapter  80  of  the  Laws  of  Kenya),  ss.  107-­‐119.  
♦ Kean,   A.   (1996)   The   Modern   Law   of   Evidence,   4th   Edition,   Butterworths,  
London,  pp.  66-­‐94.  
♦ Tapper,  C.  (2010)  Cross  &  Tapper  on  Evidence,  12th  Edition,  Oxford  University  
Press,  New  York,  pp.119-­‐154.  
♦ Mbobu,   K.   (2016)   The   Law   and   Practice   of   Evidence   in   Kenya,   LawAfrica.  
Chapter  5  
♦ Ajwang  v  Republic  [1983]  KLR  337.  
♦ Cheminigwa  v  R  [1956]  EACA  451.  
♦ DPP  v  Morgan  [1976]  A.C.  182  HL.  
♦ John  KiarieWaweru  v  Beth  Wambui  Mugo  &  2  Others  [2008]  eKLR.  
♦ Karugi&  Another  v  Kabiya&  3  Others  [1987]  KLR  347.  
♦ Kiarie  v  Republic  [1984]  KLR  739.  
♦ Kimani  v  Gikanga  [1965]  EA  735  (CA).  
♦ Kituu  v  Nzambi  [1984]  KLR  411.  
♦ Murimi  v  R  [1967]  EA  542.  
♦ Okero  v  Republic  [1981]  KLR  459.  
♦ Onalo  v  Ludeki&  2  Others  (No.3)  [2008]  3  KLR  (EP)  614.  
♦ Ryde  v  Bushel  [1967]  EA  817.  
♦ Waera  s/o  Madoya  v  R  [1962]  EA  783.  
♦ Wakelin  v  London  &  South  Western  Rly  [1886]  12  App  Cas  41  HL.  
♦ Woolmington  v  DPP[1935]  A.C.  462  HL.  
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idere
da  
competen
twi t
ness
 fortheprosec
utio
ninmostcas
es.Howe
ver,amental
ly
i
nfi
rmedperso
nisnotinc
ompetenttotes
tifyunl
esshei
sprev
entedbyhi
scond
iti
onfro
m
u
nders
tandi
ngtheque
stio
nsputtohi
ma n
dg i
vin
gratio
nal
ans
werstoth
em.

S
ecti
on125(
1)ofth
eEvide
nceActpro
vide
sthatal
lpers
onsshal
lbec
ompet
e n
tt ote
sti
fy,
unl
ess
t
hecour
tconsi
der
sthatth
eyarepre
ventedfr
omunde
rstan
din
gt h
eque
sti
onsputtothe
morfro
m
g
ivi
ngrat
ion
a l
ans
werstoth
osequ
esti
onsbyr
easo
nof–
(
a) t
end
ery
ear
s;
(
b) e
xtr
emeo
lda
ge;
or
(
c) d
ise
ase
,wh
eth
ero
fbo
dyo
rmi
nd,
ora
nys
imi
larc
aus
e.

Withreg
ardtochi
ldr
enoft e
ndery
ears,
thege
ne r
alrul
eisthatc
hil
drenofa
nyagecanbecal
le
dto
gi
vee vi
denc
e.Theircompeten
cedependsupo
nt hei
ru nde
rsta
ndin
g,nottheirag
e .Asfaras
co
mp e
tencyi
sconc
erned
, t
hesametes
tisappl
iedtochi
ldwit
ness
esasf o
radul
twit
nesses
–Se
eRe:
Powel
l20061CrAppRp 468and
 RvB2010EWCAC ri
mp 4.

1
.2De
ter
min
ingC
omp
ete
ncy

Atatri
al,
thej u
dgeormagis
tra
tewil
lde t
ermin
ewh et
herawitne
ssiscompetenttogi
veevidenc
e.
Anin
compete
n twitn
essisonewhoco
me swith
inoneoftheexcept
ionssetoutinsect
ion125
(1)of
th
eAct.Theexcepti
onsun
derthi
ssec
tionareeasytoes
tabl
is
h.Theyareenti
rel
ywi t
nessspe
cifi
c,
andt
hereshoul
db enopres
umptio
nsorprecon
cepti
ons.
Prov
idedthatthewitnesscanund
erstand
th
eq u
esti
onsp uttohimorherbybothparti
esa n
dp r
ovi
decoheren
ta nswers
,thenheors h
ei s
co
mpetent
.

Thi
sa s
s e
ssmentofcompeten
cyshoul
d,wh
ereappl
ica
ble
,takein
toacc
ountte
chni
queso
rmeasu
res
thatcanbeus
e dtoassi
stthewit
nesstogi
vehiso
rherevi
dence
,su
chastheuseofasi
gnl
ang
uage
in
terpretertoa s
sis
tad e
afwi t
ness,o
ro t
herint
erpre
terswhoassi
stwitne
s s
eswhodonot
under
standth
el a
nguageofthec
ourt.
Comp et
encysho
uldno
tbec o
nfusedwit
hcredi
bil
it
yorr el
iab
ili
ty.Atthestag
ewh enth
equesti
onof
competencyi
sb ei
ngdeci
dedupon,j
udgesormagi
str
at e
sa renotdecid
ingwhethe
rawi t
nessis,
or
willbe,te
ll
ingthetr
uthorgivi
ngaccu
rateevi
dence
.Qu est
ionsaboutcre
dib
ili
tyandrel
iab
ili
tygo
tot h
ewe i
ghtoftheevi
dence,
nottotheco
mpetenc
eo fthewitness

Thi
sapproachwasuphel
dbytheCo
urtofAppea
linRe F2
: 01
31WL Rp2143.
Inthi
scas
e,theCour
t
he
ldthatthejudg
e’srul
in
gwaswrongi
nla
wa sth
ee xer
cisecar
rie
doutbythejud
gewasnotafai
r
te
sto ft h
ewi tness
'compet
ency
.Thej ud
geh a
ds ubsti
tute
dt heissu
eo ftheinte
rpret
er'
s
di
ffic
ult
iesincommuni
cati
ngfort
hetestofwhetherthewitn
esscou
ldunder
standq
uest
ion
sa n
d
gi
veinte
ll
igi
b l
eanswers
.

nRvWa
I tts201
0EWC AC r
im182
4,itwasheldbytheCou
rtofAppealt
hatt
hec
ompete
ncytesti
s
s
ati
sfi
edifthewitne
ssisabletounder
standtheque
sti
onputtohimorhe
ran
dgiveans
wersto
t
hemwhic
hc a
nb eunder
stoo
d.Furt
hermore
,thosewhoarecomp
etenttogi
vee
vid
enceshou
ldbe
a
ssi
ste
dtodoso,fo
rexample,
withtheass
istan
ceofin
terme
diar
ies
.

TheCourtofAp p
ealinRvS ed20041WL Rp 3218
,hel
dth a
tt h
et e
s tofcompetencesetouti
n
se
ction5 3
–theequi
val
entofours e
cti
o n125
–didnotrequi
reawi tnesstou nd
erstandallth
e
qu
estionsputtoherandfora
llheranswerstobeunder
stood.
Itwa sama tte
rf orthejud
g et
o
dete
rminecompete
nce,t
aki
ngin
toaccou
n tt
hee f
fectofthewitne
ss'
sp er
formanc
ea sawhol
ea n
d
whetherther
ewasacommonan
dcomprehens
ibl
ethreadi
nherrespo
nsestotheques
tions.

2
.Co
mpe
lla
bil
ityo
fWi
tne
sse
s
2
.1I
ntr
odu
cti
on
Withr
egardt
ocompel
labi
li
ty,
awi t
ne s
s i
s 
compel
labl
e 
ifheorshemayl
awful
lybereq
uire
dtogi
ve
ev
iden
ce.Most 
witn
esses 
whoarec o
mp e
tentc a
nb ec ompe
ll
e dtogiv
ee vide
nceinj u
dic
ial
pr
ocee
ding
s.Awitnessissai
dt obec ompel
lab
leifheo rshema yl
awfu
ll
yb erequi
redtogi
ve
ev
iden
ceandbepun
ishedfo
rcont
emp tofcour
tforrefus
al.

I
npr
inc
ipl
e,ev
eryp
erso
nwhoi
scomp
ete
nttobeawitn
essiscompe
ll
abl
e.I
ncrimi
nalp
roc
eedi
ngs
,
t
hespo
useofthea
ccu
sedi
sgene
ral
lyc
omp
e t
entan
dc omp
e l
la
bleasawitne
ssforthedef
ense
.
Howeve
r,Ap ers
onc h
argedincrimi
nalproc
eedi
ngsisn o
tc ompe
tenttogiveevid
encei
nt h
e
pr
o c
eedi
ngsforth
ep ro
secuti
onwheth
erheist h
eo nl
yperso
n,orison
eo ftwoormorepe
rso
ns,
ch
argedinthep ro
ceedin
gs.Ontheo t
herhand,ac o-
acc
usedcano n
lygiv
ee vi
dencefo
rt h
e
pr
o s
ecu
tiono
nceheorsheceas
estobeaco-
accu
sed–f
orexampl
e,fol
lo
wingagu
ilt
yple
a.

Wherepro
secut
orsar
eo fthevi
ewthatawitn
es si
sunli
kel
ytoattendc
ourtvol
unt
ari
ly,
theycan
appl
yforawi t
nesss
ummo n
s.Awitn
esssummon
sc aneit
herrequ
ireapers
ont ogi
veevi
denceor
re
quir
eap er
sontopr
oducedoc
umen
tsneed
e da
se vi
dence.
Fai
lu
retoatte
ndcourti
nobed
ienc
et oa
wit
nesss
ummonsamoun
tstocont
emptofc
ourtforwhic
hthedefau
lti
ngwi
tnessmaybepu
nish
ed.

3
.Hi
stor
icald
evel
opmenta
ndCommonLa
wr ul
esont
hec
ompe
ten
cea
nd
c
ompel
lab
ili
tyofvar
iou
scate
gori
esofwit
nesse
s
3
.1I
ntr
odu
cti
on
Atcommonlaw,numer
ousrul
esoper
atedtodis
qual
ifyce
rtai
ncate
gor
iesofper
son
sfromgi
vin
g
evi
denc
e.The
s ec
lass
esofpers
onswer
enotco
nside
redasco
mpete
ntwit
ness
es.
Someoft
heser
ule
s
st
il
lappl
y.Other
shavefou
ndthei
rwayint
ooursta
tutebo
oks.

Thi
sse
cti
onh
igh
li
ght
sth
ede
vel
opme
nto
fth
eru
lesr
ela
tin
gtot
hec
omp
ete
ncea
ndc
omp
ell
abi
li
ty
of
—
(
a) n
on-
Chr
ist
ian
san
dat
hei
sts
;
(
b) p
art
ies&t
hei
rsp
ous
es;
(
c) p
ers
onsi
nte
res
tedi
nth
eou
tco
meo
fle
gal
pro
cee
din
gs,
and
(
d) c
onv
ict
s

3
.2No
n-C
hri
sti
ans&At
hei
sts
Atc o
mmo nlaw,theevid
e n
ceofn on-Chri
stia
n sandat h
eistswase xcl
udedbyv ir
tueoft h
e
req
uirementtha
twitne
ssestes
tifyonoathontheGospel
.Therul
ewa smodi
fiedi
nthe18thC
entur
y
torend
e revi
dencea
dducedbyNon-C
hris
tian
sa dmis
sib
le.Ontheothe
rh and
,athei
stswereal
lo
wed
totest
ifyf o
rthefi
rstti
mea ft
ert heAmendmentoftheEv i
denc
eAc tin186
9–S
eeAd ri
anKea
nat
p99.

I
nKenya,t
hemoder
nlawonoa
thsan
daffir
mati
onofwit
nes
ses
,whi
chhit
her
toren
der
ednon-
C
hri
sti
ansandAt
heis
tsi
nco
mpet
enttog
iveevi
denc
e,i
sseto
utins
ecti
on15oft
heOathsa
nd
S
tat
uto
ryDe
cla
rat
ion
sAc
tCa
p.1
5.Th
eAc
temp
owe
rsac
our
ttoa
dmi
nis
ter
–
(
a) a
noathtothos
ewi t
nes
seswhos
ubs
cri
bet
oar
eli
gio
usb
eli
ef,a
ndwh
oha
ven
o
o
bje
cti
ontot
akinga
noath
;or
(
b) asol
emnaff
irma
tio
nonat
hei
sts
,oront
hos
ewi
tne
sse
swh
o,f
orr
eli
gio
uso
rot
her
re
ason
,ar
eoppos
edtot
aki
nga
noath.

3
.3Pa
rti
es&t
hei
rSp
ous
es
Atcommonlaw,p
arti
estociv
ilpr
ocee
dingsanda
ccus
edpers
onsi
ncr
imin
alca
seswe r
econs
idere
das
i
ncompeten
tt otes
tifyinthei
rownc as
e .I
ncri
minalc
ase
s,thei
nco
mpetenceoftheaccu
sedto
te
stifywasjust
ifi
edonthegro
undsth
att he
rewasaris
kofbei
ngc
ompel
le
dt oin
cri
mina
tehimsel
f.

Thespo
useofapartyt
ocivi
lorcr
imi
nalpr
oce
edin
gswa
salsocon
sid
ereda
sinco
mp e
tenttotes
tif
y.
Itwasimmater
ialwhe
thertheevid
enceinqu
esti
onr
ela
tedt oeven
tswhic
ho c
curr
edb e
foreor
dur
ingthema r
riag
e.Theincomp
etenc
eo fspou
seswasj u
sti
fiedonint
era l
iat h
ef ol
lo
wing
ass
umptio
ns:
(
a) t
hespo
useofap
art
ytoj
udi
ci
alp
roc
eed
ing
sha
dani
nte
res
tint
heo
utc
omeo
fth
e
p
roc
eedi
ngs
;
(
b) as
pou
sewo
uldt
endt
obeb
ias
edi
nfa
voro
fth
eirma
rri
agema
te;
(
c) t
heh
ars
hne
sso
fco
mpe
ll
in
gas
pou
set
ogi
vee
vid
enc
eag
ain
stt
hei
rma
rri
agema
te;
(
d) al
lo
wingsp
ous
estotes
tif
yinc
ase
sin
vol
vi
ngt
hei
rma
rri
agema
teswo
uldd
ist
urb
mari
tal
har
mony;
and
(
e) t
heth
eoreti
calun
ityofth
esp
ous
es–
itb
ein
gas
sume
dth
att
heywe
reo
nea
ndt
he
s
ameper
sonor“o
nefle
sh”
.

As po
use’
sinco
mpete
ncesurv
ivedthedis
sol
utionofthemar
ria
geinsofarasthee v
ide
ncein
qu
e s
tio
nrela
tedtoeven
tswhic
hoccu
rreddur
ingthemar
ria
ge.
Thedis
abi
li
tyofpar
tiest
otest
ify
i
nlegalpr
oceed
ing
swasabo
li
shedbytheEvi
denceActo
f1851a
ndtheEvi
den
ceFu
rtherAmen
dment
Actof18
69.
Thed
isa
bil
it
yo fspo
use
stot
est
ifyi
nci
vilp
roc
eed
ing
swa
sab
oli
she
dbys
ect
ion1o
fth
eEv
ide
nce
Amen
dmentAct18
53.

Theru
leastothei
nco
mp e
tenceofs
pousestotes
tifyi
ncri
min
alpr
oce
edi
ngswa
smo
dif
iedb
ythe
Cr
imi
nalEvi
denc
eAct1 8
98,whic
hma d
ed is
tin
cti
onsbetwe
enthespo
useofth
eac
cuse
dpers
on
g
ivi
ngevi
denc
eforth
ed e
fenseandf
orthepros
ecuti
on.
Sec
tio
n1o ftheCrimin
a lEvi
denceAct1898UK,whi
chaddr
e s
sesthesamei s
sueasa d
dres
sedin
s
ecti
on127oftheKenyanEviden
ceAct,madetheacc
used
’sspous
ecompetent,b
utnotcompel
la
ble,
a
sawi t
nessfortheaccusedandforanypers
onjoi
ntl
ychar
g e
dwi t
htheaccused.
Statu
telawhas
s
inc
ec hang
edt he
 commo nlaw p
osit
ionthatt hespou
seo fa na c
cuse
dp er
sonwa sneith
er
a
 co
mpetent 
noracompel
lable
 witn
ess 
aga
insttheac
cus
ed,excep
tinafewe xcept
ion
alcas
es.

S
ect
ion1
27(
1)p
rov
ide
s:
“I
nc i
vil
p r
oceedi
ngsthepar
tiestothesu
it,
andthehusb
andorwifeofanyp a
rtytoth
esuit,
shal
l
becompetentwitne
sses.
”Subs
ectio
n2p r
ovi
desthat“i
ncri
minal
proceedi
ngs,ev
eryper
soncha
rged
withanoffence
,andthewifeorh
u sb
andofthepe
rsonchar
ged,
shall
b eacompeten
twitn
essfor
thedefenseateverysta
geofthep r
ocee
din
gs,wheth
ersuchpe
rsonischa
rgedalon
eorjoi
ntl
ywith
anyotherpers
on:Prov
idedtha
t–
(
i) t
hep
ers
onc
har
geds
hal
lno
tbec
all
eda
sawi
tne
ss,
exc
eptu
ponh
iso
wna
ppl
ic
ati
on;
(
ii
) s
aveaspr
ovi
dedi
nsubs
ecti
on(
3),
thewi
feo
rhusba
ndoft
hep
ersonc
har
gedsh
all
n
otbeca
ll
edasawit
nesse
xceptupo
nth
eappl
ic
atio
noft
heper
sonc
har
ged;
and
(
ii
i) t
hefai
lur
eofthepe
rso
nch
arged
,oroft
hewif
eorhus
ban
do ft
hatper
son
,tog
ive
e
vid
encesha
lln
otb
emadethes
ubjec
tofan
ycomme
ntbythepr
osec
uti
on.

Acc
ord
ingtosub
-sec
tio
n(3
),I
ncri
minalp
rocee
d i
ngs
,th
ewifeorh
usb
ando
fthepers
onch
arge
dshal
l
beaco
mp e
tentandco
mpel
labl
ewitn
essforthepro
secu
tio
norde
fens
ewith
outt
hecon
sentofs
uch
per
son
,inanyca
sewheres
uchper
sonischa
rged–
(
a) wi
tht
heo
ffe
nceo
fbi
gamy
;
(
b) wi
tho
ffe
nce
sun
dert
heS
exu
alOf
fen
cesAc
t;o
r
(
c) i
nr e
spectofana c
to romis
sionaffect
ingtheper
sonorprop
ert
yoft h
ewi feor
hu
sbandofsuchperso
n,ort h
ec hi
ldr
eno fei
therofthem,an
dnototh
erwise–
see
Republ
icvDa vi
dK ab
iri
thuNk aro
thi
a2 011eKL
R–wherethecou
rtadmitt
edt he
evi
denceofas po
useins u
pportoft hepros
ecu
tionca
sei nach
arg
ea gai
nsther
hu
sbandfort
hemurderofthei
rc h
il
d.

I
nth
iss
ect
ion,
“hu
sba
nd”an
d“wi
fe”meanr
espe
cti
vel
yth
ehu
sba
nda
ndwi
feo
fama
rri
age
,wh
eth
er
o
rno
tmono
gamous
,whi
chi
sbyl
awbind
ingd
uri
ng
t
hel
ife
timeofb
othp
art
iesu
nle
ssd
iss
olv
eda
cco
rdi
ngt
ola
w,a
ndi
ncl
ude
sama
rri
ageu
nde
rna
tiv
e
o
rtr
ibal
cust
om.
3
.4Pe
rso
nsI
nte
res
tedi
nth
eOu
tco
meo
fPr
oce
edi
ngs
Atco
mmonla
w,per
son
swh oh
adper
sonal
pecu
nia
ryorprop
riet
aryi
nte
resti
ntheout
comeofl
ega
l
pr
oce
edi
ngswer
einco
mpeten
ttotest
ifyins
uchproc
eedi
ngs
.Howe
ver,t
hela
wh a
ssincec
han
ged.
Se
cti
on1
25ofth
eEviden
ceActn
owsettl
esth
ema t
ter.

3
.5C
onv
ict
s
Atcommo
nla
w,p er
son
swhoh a
dp rev
ious
lybeencon
vic
tedandse
nten
cedforce
rtai
ninfa
mous
cr
imeswe
reno
tall
owedtotes
tify
.Theinc
ompeten
ceofcon
vic
tswasmo
dif
iedbyth
eCivi
lRigh
ts
Act1
828a
ndab
oli
shedb
ytheEvi
denceAct18
43.

As
sig
nedRe
adi
ng:
 TheEv
ide
nceAc
t(C
hap
ter8
0oft
heL
awso
fKe
nya
),s
s.1
24-
143
.
 Th ePri
vil
egesa
ndImmu
nit
iesAc
t(C
hap
ter1
79o
fth
eLa
wso
fKe
nya
),s
s.4a
nd5a
nd
s
t nd
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University  of  Embu  Law  School  
LPR  204  –  The  Law  of  Evidence  I  
Lecturer  –  Dr.  K.  I.  Laibuta  
Lecture  9    -­‐  Week  Eleven  

1. Proof of Facts Otherwise than by Evidence

1.1 Introduction
Facts  in  issue  in  judicial  proceedings  may,  in  certain  circumstances,  be  proved  without  the  need  
to  call  evidence.  Proof  of  facts  otherwise  than  by  evidence  may  be  by–  
(a)   judicial  notice;  
(b)   presumption;  
(c)   admission;  or  
(d)   estoppel.  
 

1.2 Judicial Notice

Judicial  notice  is  a  rule  in  the  law  of  evidence  that  allows  a  fact  to  be  introduced  into  evidence  if  
the  truth  of  that  fact  is  so  notorious  or  well  known,  or  so  authoritatively  attested,  that  it  cannot  
reasonably  be  doubted.  This  is  done  upon  the  request  of  the  party  seeking  to  rely  on  the  fact  at  
issue.  Judicial  notice  is  taken  upon  the  request  of  a  party  that  submits  the  fact.  Relevant  facts  
that   are   admitted   under  judicial   notice  are   accepted   by   the  Court  even   without   calling   a  
witness.   This   rule   is   often   used   for   the   simplest   and   obvious   facts   that   are   considered   to   be  
common  sense  and,  therefore,  need  not  be  proved  by  evidence.  
 
Why   is   judicial   notice   important?   Judicial   notice  is   the   most   underused   and   underappreciated  
form   of   evidence   available   to   trial   lawyers.   As   a   method   of   introducing   facts   into   evidence,  
judicial   notice  is   often   the   simplest   and   most   efficient   way   to   establish   facts   that  
are  essential  to  your  case,  and  it  usually  does  not  cost  anything.  Judicial  notice  is  an  exception  
to  the  rule  of  formal  proof  that  requires  parties  to  present  evidence  to  establish  all  facts  in  a  
trial.   It   permits   a   court   to   rely   upon   facts   that   are   not   supported   by   evidence   on   the   court  
record.   A   Judge   accept   something   as   fact   thereby   exempting   the   requirement   to   present  
evidence  to  establish  the  fact  where–  

(a)   the  fact  is  so  notorious  or  generally  accepted  as  not  to  be  the  subject  of  debate  
among  reasonable  persons;  or  

(b)   the  fact  is  capable  of  immediate  and  accurate  demonstration  by  resort  to  readily  
accessible  sources  of  indisputable  accuracy.  
 
A  judge  should  be  cautious  in  finding  facts  based  on  judicial  notice  since  they  are  not  proven  by  
evidence   under   oath   or   tested   by   cross-­‐examination.   The   strictness   and   scope   of   judicial   notice  
will  "vary  according  to  the  nature  of  the  issue  under  consideration"  
 
In   Jeneby   Mawira   v   Annwhiller   Mwende   Rugendo   &   another   2017   eKLR,   the   respondents  
submitted  that  the  court  should  take  judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  vehicles  carrying  Miraa  are  
notorious   for   over   speeding   and   that   on   that   basis   hinted   at   the   provisions   of  section   59  of  
the  Evidence  Act.  It  is  true  that  courts  of  law  can  be  called  upon  to  take  judicial  notice  of  certain  
facts  that  have  attained  some  notoriety  does  not  need  to  be  proved.  However,  evidence  must  
be  tendered  to  prove  that  the  fact  has  gained  sufficient  notoriety  for  the  court  to  take  judicial  
notice   of   the   same.     Furthermore,   where   negligence   is   contested   as   it   was   at   the   trial   in   this  
instance,  it  cannot  be  assumed.    The  Judge  found  that  the  respondents  contention  on  this  point  
was   moot   because   it   can   also   be   safely   argued   that   judicial   notice   of   the   fact   that   most  
motorcycles  in  Kenya  roads  are  carelessly  ridden  and  mostly  ridden  by  person  who  ether  have  
no  regards  to  traffic  rules  and  regulations  or  ignorant  of  the  same.  Accordingly,  the  Judge  found  
it  unsafe  to  make  assumptions  in  circumstances  such  as  obtains  in  this  case.  
 
Where  the  court,  of  its  own  motion,  takes  judicial  notice  of  a  fact,  natural  justice  requires  that  
the  judge  notify  counsel.  It  would  be  contrary  to  the  rules  of  natural  justice  for  a  judge  to  rely  
on  information  obtained  after  the  hearing  is  completed  without  disclosing  it  to  the  parties  and  
giving  them  the  opportunity  to  comment  or  address  him  on  the  matter.    It  can  be  dangerous  
and  potentially  unfair  to  take  judicial  notice  based  on  written  materials  only.  Likewise,  there  are  
inherent   dangers   in   taking   judicial   notice   of   social   matters   where   there   is   not   a   sufficient  
underlying  record.  In  establishing  a  basis  for  judicial  notice,  social  science  evidence  should  be  
presented  through  an  expert  witness  that  can  be  cross-­‐examined.    
 
In  the  event  of  an  error,  the  improper  taking  of  judicial  notice  is  reviewed  as  a  misapprehension  
of  evidence.  The  standard  of  review  for  social  and  legislative  facts  are  the  same  as  the  standard  
applied  to  any  other  type  of  findings  of  fact,  which  is  the  standard  of  "palpable  and  overriding  
error".  Legislative  facts  are  generalized  facts  that  are  unrelated  to  particular  parties,  in  contrast  
to   adjudicative   facts,   which   are   individualized   facts   related   to   the   circumstances   of   a   specific  
party.  
 
As  a  general  rule,  more  stringent  proof  should  be  required  for  "facts  that  are  close  to  the  center  
of   the   controversy   between   the   parties–whether   social,   legislative   or   adjudicative–as  
distinguished  from  background  facts  at  or  near  the  periphery.  Judicial  notice  of  legislative  and  
social   fact   should   be   treated   as   more   "elastic"   than   adjudicative   fact.   In   effect,   courts   should  
consider  whether  the  fact  would  be  accepted  as  not  being  subject  to  "reasonable  dispute"  by  
"reasonable  people  who  have  taken  the  trouble  to  inform  themselves  on  the  topic",  taking  into  
consideration  the  "purpose  for  which  it  is  to  be  used"  and  "keeping  in  mind  that  the  need  for  
reliability  and  trustworthiness"  the  closer  it  is  to  the  controversy".  
 
The   standard   "truth   seeking   procedures   are   not   usually   required   for   legislative   facts   except  
where   it   is   critical   to   a   judicial   determination.   When   deciding   whether   to   take   judicial   notice   of  
legislative  fact,  the  court  should  consider–  
(a)   whether  it  is  essential  to  the  case;  
(b)   whether  they  are  disputed;  and  
(c)   whether  it  would  be  impossible  or  costly  to  prove  them  by  conventional  means.  
 
Section   59   of   the   Evidence   Act   provides   that   “no   fact   of   which   the   court   shall   take   judicial  
notice  need  be  proved”.  Section  60(1)  mandates  courts  to  take  judicial  notice  of  the  following  
facts–  
(a)   all   written   laws,   and   all   laws,   rules   and   principles,   written   or   unwritten,   having  
the   force   of   law,   whether   in   force   or   having   such   force   as   aforesaid   before,   at   or  
after  the  commencement  of  this  Act,  in  any  part  of  Kenya;    
(b)   the   general   course   of   proceedings   and   privileges   of   Parliament,   but   not   the  
transactions  in  their  journals;    
(c)   Articles  of  War  for  the  Armed  Forces;    
(d)   the  public  seal  of  Kenya,  the  seals  of  all  the  courts  of  Kenya,  and  all  seals  which  
any  person  is  authorized  by  any  written  law  to  use;    
(e)   the  accession  to  office,  names,  titles,  functions  and  signatures  of  public  officers,  
if  the  fact  of  their  appointment  is  notified  in  the  Gazette;    
(f)   the  existence,  title  and  national  flag  of  every  State  and  Sovereign  recognized  by  
the  Government;    
(g)   natural   and   artificial   divisions   of   time,   and   geographical   divisions   of   the   world,  
and  public  holidays;    
(h)   the  extent  of  the  territories  comprised  in  the  Commonwealth;    
(i)   the  commencement,  continuance  and  termination  of  hostilities  between  
Kenya  and  any  other  State  or  body  of  persons;  
(j)   the   names   of   the   members   and   officers   of   the   court   and   of   their  
deputies,  subordinate  officers  and  assistants,  and  of  all  officers  acting  in  
 execution   of   its   process,   and   also   of   all   advocates   and   other   persons  
authorized  by  law  to  appear  or  act  before  it;  
(k)   the  rule  of  the  road  on  land  or  at  sea  or  in  the  air;  
(l)   the  ordinary  course  of  nature;  
(m)   the  meaning  of  English  words;  
(n)   all  matters  of  general  or  local  notoriety;  and  
(o)   all  other  matters  of  which  it  is  directed  by  any  written  law  to  take  judicial  notice.    
 
In  all  cases  specified  in  subsection  (1),  and  on  all  matters  of  public  history,  literature,  science  or  
art,  the  court  may  resort  for  its  aid  to  appropriate  books  or  documents  of  reference.  If  the  court  
is  called  upon  by  any  person  to  take  judicial  notice  of  any  fact,  it  may  refuse  to  do  so  unless  and  
until  such  person  produces  any  such  book  or  document  as  it  considers  necessary  to  enable  it  to  
do  so.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  foregoing  list  is  not  exhaustive.  
 

1.3 Judicial Notice of Customary Law

In  Ernest  Kinyanjui  Kimani  v  Muiru  Gikanga  and  Another  1965  EA  p735,  the  court  held  that  "…  
where   African   customary   law   is   neither   notorious   nor   documented   it   must   be   established   for  
the  courts  guidance  by  the  party  intending  to  rely  on  it."  
                   
In  this  case,  an  issue  arose  as  to  whether,  in  a  dispute  involving  customary  law,  the  customary  
law  should  be  taken  judicial  notice  of.    The  judges  were  of  the  opinion  that  the  party  who  seeks  
to   rely   on   the   custom   should   prove   that   customary   law   as   a   matter   of   fact   by   calling   expert  
witnesses.     This   is   because   of   the   difficulty   of   establishing   what   the   customary   law   is   at   any  
given  time  since  it  is  unwritten.  
 

In  Mule  Ndeti  v  Ngonyo  Sila  1997  eKLR,  the  Court  of  Appeal  observed:  

“This  appeal  lies  only  on  a  question  of  law  …  It  is  clear  from  the  record  that  the  incidents  and  
the  norms  relied  upon  by  the  Resident  Magistrate  to  create  a  valid  customary  law  divorce  were  
generalised   common   practices   which   had   no   bearing   to   the   issues   before   him.   They   were  
neither  based  on  positively  proved  facts  nor  were  they  shown  that  they  are  facts  of  which  we  
could  take  judicial  notice.  The  appellant  did  not  lay  the  foundation  for  his  case  and  neither  did  
he  call  sufficient  evidence  to  prove  it.”  
 
According  to  section  13  of  the  Evidence  Act,  where  the  existence  of  any  right  or  custom  is  in  
question,  the  following  facts  are  relevant:  
(a)   any  transaction  by  which  the  right  or  custom  in  question  was  created,  claimed,  
modified,   recognized,   asserted   or   denied,   or   which   was   inconsistent   with   its  
existence;  or  
(b)   particular   instances   in   which   the   right   or   custom   was   claimed,   recognized   or  
exercised,  or  in  which  its  exercise  was  disputed,  asserted  or  departed  from.  

2. Admissions, Presumptions and Estoppel

2.1 Admissions
Section  61  of  the  Act  provides  that  “no  fact  need  be  proved  in  any  civil  proceeding  which  the  
parties  thereto  or  their  agents  agree  to  admit  at  the  hearing,  or  which  before  the  hearing  they  
agree,  by  writing  under  their  hands,  to  admit,  or  which  by  any  rule  of  pleading  in  force  at  the  
time  they  are  deemed  to  have  admitted  by  their  pleadings:  Provided  that  the  court  may  in  its  
discretion   require   the   facts   admitted   to   be   proved   otherwise   than   by   such   admissions.”   The  
form  of  admission  may  be  –    
(a)   in  pleadings;  
(b)   in  writing  under  the  hand  of  the  parties  or  their  duly  authorised  agents;  or  
(c)   during  the  hearing  by  oral  or  documentary  evidence  adduced  in  the  proceeding.  
 
A   fact   which   is   admitted   is   not   in   issue,   and   the   court   need   not   hear   evidence   in   proof   thereof.  
The   duty   of   the   court   is   to   determine   facts   that   are   in   contention.   It   should   be   borne   in   mind   that  
every   allegation   of   fact   in   a   plaint   or   other   pleading,   if   not   denied   specifically   or   by   necessary  
implication,   or   stated   to   be   not   admitted   in   answer   to   the   pleading,   is   deemed   as   having   been  
admitted.  
 

2.2 Presumptions of Fact

Presumptions   are   inferences   that   a   court   may   draw,   could   draw   or   must   draw.     They   are  
devices   that   entitle   a   court   to   pronounce   on   a   particular   issue   notwithstanding   the   fact   that  
there   is   no   evidence   or   there   is   insufficient   evidence.   The   inference   that   the   court   may   draw  
may  be  affirmative  or  contradictory.  
 
A  presumption   of   fact  is   a  presumption  applied   by   logic,   aided   either   by   common   experience   or  
by  scientific  research,  to  the  exceptional  and  unique  facts  of  each  particular  case.  Presumptions  
may  confirm  the  existence  or  non-­‐existence  of  a  fact  in  issue  and  impact  on  the  parties’  burden  
of  proof  in  relation  to  that  issue.  There  are  3  categories  of  presumptions:  
(a)   rebuttable   presumptions   of   fact–inferences   that   may   be   drawn   upon   the  
establishment  of  a  basic  fact,  but  which  may  be  contradicted  by  evidence;  
(b)   rebuttable   presumptions   of   law–inferences   that   must   be   drawn   in   the   absence  
of   conclusive   evidence   to   the   contrary,   such   as   the   presumption   of   innocence,  
that  every  person  accused  of  a  criminal  offence  is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until  
proved  guilty;  
(c)   irrebuttable   presumptions   of   law–which   must   be   drawn   no   matter   how   much  
evidence  is  adduced  to  contradict  them    
 
Section   4(1)   of   the   Act   provides   that   “whenever   it   is   provided   by   law   that   the   court   may  
presume  a  fact,  it  may  either  regard  such  fact  as  proved,  unless  and  until  it  is  disproved,  or  may  
call  for  proof  of  it.”  According  to  subsection  (2),  whenever  it  is  directed  by  law  that  the  court  
shall   presume   a   fact,   it   shall   regard   such   fact   as   proved,   unless   and   until   it   is   disproved.  
Subsection  (3)  provides  that  when  one  fact  is  declared  by  law  to  be  conclusive  proof  of  another,  
the   court   shall,   on   proof   of   the   one   fact,   regard   the   other   as   proved,   and   shall   not   allow  
evidence  to  be  given  for  the  purpose  of  disproving  it.  Presumptions  are  tools  which  courts  use  
to  save  on  judicial  time  and  resources,  which  would  otherwise  be  wasted  in  taking  evidence  of  
incontestable  facts  or  points  of  law.  Examples  of  matters  that  courts  may  presume  include:  
(a)   the  authenticity  of  signatures  of  certain  public  officers  specified  in  section  77  of  
the  Act;  
(b)   the   genuineness   and   accuracy   of   certified   copies   of   foreign   judicial   records  
subject  to  compliance  with  the  conditions  set  out  in  section  92  of  the  Act;  
(c)   the  authorship  of  published  books,  maps  and  charts–section  93;  
(d)   the  correspondence  of  telegraphic  messages–section  94;  
(e)   the   authenticity   of   attestation,   stamping   and   execution   of   documents   not  
produced   in   compliance   with   notice   to   produce–section   95,   and   of   documents  
more  twenty  years  old–section  96;  
(f)   presumption  of  death  Where  it  is  proved  that  a  person  has  not  been  heard  of  for  
seven   years   by   those   who   might   be   expected   to   have   heard   of   him   if   he   were  
alive–section  118A;  
(g)   presumption   of   marriage   after   a   long   period   of   cohabitation   as   husband   and  
wife;  
(h)   the  existence  of  any  fact  which  the  court  thinks  likely  to  have  happened,  regard  
being  had  to  the  common  course  of  natural  events,  human  conduct  and  public  
 and  private  business,  in  their  relation  to  the  facts  of  the  particular  case–section  
119.  
 

2.3 Estoppel
2.3.1 The General Rule
Section  120  of  the  Evidence  Act  sets  up  the  general  rule  of  estoppel  and  provides:  
“When   one   person   has,   by   his   declaration,   act   or   omission,   intentionally   caused   or   permitted  
another   person   to   believe   a   thing   to   be   true   and   to   act   upon   such   belief,   neither   he   nor   his  
representative  shall  be  allowed,  in  any  suit  or  proceeding  between  himself  and  such  person  or  
his  representative,  to  deny  the  truth  of  that  thing.”  Examples  of  estoppel  include:  
(a)   estoppel   of   tenant   or   licensee   from   denying   that   the   landlord   or   licensor   of   such  
tenant   had   at   the   beginning   of   the   tenancy   or   license   a   title   to   or   right   of  
possession  of  such  immovable  property–section  121–estoppel  by  agreement;  
(b)   estoppel   of   acceptor   of   a   bill   of   exchange   from   denying   that   the   drawer   had  
authority  to  draw  such  bill–section  122;  
(c)   estoppel  of  a  bailee,  licensee  or  agent  from  denying  that  the  bailor,  principal  or  
licensor,   by   whom   any   goods   were   entrusted   to   any   of   them   respectively,   was  
entitled  to  those  goods  at  the  time  when  they  were  so  entrusted–section  123.  
 
The  rule  of  estoppel  is  an  exclusionary  rule  that  precludes  a  party  from  asserting  or  denying  a  
fact.  Its  effect  goes  to  the  root  of  admissibility  of  evidence  sought  to  be  adduced  by  prohibiting  
the  party  so  estopped  from  asserting  or  denying  his  or  her  prior  words  or  deed  on  which  the  
other  party  relied  to  their  detriment.  There  are  three  broad  types  of  estoppel:  
(a)   estoppel  by  record;  
(b)   estoppel   by   representation,   deed   or   agreement–persons   who   make   solemn  
assertions  or  engagements  under  seal  must  be  bound  by  those  engagements;  
(c)   estoppel  by  conduct;  and  
(d)   estoppel  by  negligence.  
 

2.3.2 Estoppel by Record

Estoppel  by  record  arises  mostly  out  of  judgments  and  is  predicated  on  the  premise  that,  as  a  
matter   of   public   policy,   there   should   be   an   end   to   litigation.     It   is   important   that   once   a   matter  
is  adjudicated  upon  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,  parties  do  not  live  in  fear  of  its  being  
subsequently   resurrected   and   retried.     After   a   judgment   has   been   pronounced   by   a   court   of  
competent   jurisdiction,   the   unsuccessful   party   cannot   challenge   this   judgment   by   raising   the  
same   point   in   another   action   against   the   successful   party.     The   prerequisites   for   estoppel   by  
record   is   that   the   matter   should   have   been   adjudicated   by   a   court   of   competent   jurisdiction,  
and  a  matter  adjudicated  upon  by  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  cannot  be  reopened.  In  civil  
proceedings,  estoppel  by  record  is  anchored  on  the  doctrine  of  Res  Judicata–sections  6  and  7  of  
the  Civil  Procedure  Act.  
 
The   term   “record”   refers   to   both   proceedings   and   judgment.   For   estoppel   by   record   to   arise,  
the  judgment  in  issue  has  to  be  impeachable.  In  effect,  estoppel  by  record  arises  when  an  issue  
of   fact   has   been   judicially   determined   with   finality   as   between   the   parties   by   a   court   of  
competent  jurisdiction  and  the  same  issues  are  raised  in  subsequent  proceedings  between  the  
same  parties.  For  the  purposes  of  Estoppel  by  Record  judgments  are  divided  into  –    
(a)   Judgments  in  rem  ;  and  
(b)   Judgments  in  personnam.  
 
A   judgment   in   rem   is   an   adjudication   on   the   status   of   a   person   or   a   thing.   Examples   of  
judgments   in   rem   include   judgments   in   divorce   proceedings,   probate   proceedings   and  
bankruptcy  proceedings.    Such  judgments  have  implications  for  the  status  of  persons  or  things–
see   44   (1)   of   the   Evidence   Act,   which   defines   judgments   in   rem.   Judgments   in   rem   are  
essentially  are  conclusive  proof  of  the  matters  they  adjudicate  upon  against  all  persons  in  the  
world.    Not  as  against  any  specified  persons,  but  absolutely  and,  as  between  the  parties  to  the  
suit,  it  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the  reasons  for  the  decision.  
 
Judgments   in   personam   are   those   that   do   not   fall   within   the   definition   in   section   44.   Such  
judgments   do   not   affect   the   status   of   person   or   thing.   Examples   include   judgments   involving  
contracts   or   torts.     They   are   conclusive   proof   as   to   the   matters   adjudicated   upon   and   the  
reasons   for   the   judgment   between   the   parties   to   the   proceedings.     They   do   not   bind   the   whole  
world  but  only  the  parties  to  the  proceedings.  
 
Judgments  in  rem  and  in  personam  give  rise  to  2  kinds  of  estoppels:  
(a)   cause   of   Action   Estoppel–once   a   claim   has   been   adjudicated   upon,   the   same  
parties   cannot   litigate   over   the   same   cause   of   action   in   subsequent   proceedings;  
and  
(b)   issue   Estoppel–which   applies   only   to   the   issues   raised   and   determined   in  
previous  proceedings.  
 
In   Conquer   v   Boot  1928   2   KB   p336,   it   was   established   that   a   claimant   cannot   proceed   against   a  
defendant   on   the   same   issue   in   a   dispute   determined   in   previous   litigation.   The   plaintiff   had  
obtained  judgment  on  a  course  of  action  arising  out  of  the  defendant’s  breach  of  a  warranty  to  
build  a  house  in  a  good  and  workman  like  manner.  It  was  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  estopped  
from   making   a   claim   for   subsequent   losses   because   he   had   already   been   paid   damages   on  
account   of   the   same   breach   of   warranty   which   he   had   suffered   subsequent   to   the   original  
litigation.  
 
Estoppel   is   both   a   rule   of   evidence   and   of   pleadings   in   the   sense   that   it   may   be   pleaded   or  
invoked  to  bar  the  admission  of  evidence  at  the  hearing–Law  v  Bourveries  1891  3  ch  p82.  It  is  
used   as   a   shield   and   not   as   a   sword   and   must,   whenever   intended   to   be   raised,   be   pleaded–
Moorgate   Mercantile   Co.   Ltd.   v   Twitchings   1977   AC   p890.   If   a   party   fails   to   raise   an   estoppel   in  
their  pleadings,  it  is  deemed  to  have  been  waived.  
 
The  case  of  Moorgate  Mercantile  Co.  Ltd.  v  Twitchings  arose  out  of  a  hire  purchase  agreement  
of   a   motor   car   due   to   the   perennial   failure   of   English   law   to   develop   a   proper   method   of  
charging   movable   property.   However,   the   hire   purchase   agreement   became   an   ingenious  
invention   which   proved   to   be   a   very   convenient   and   economically   stimulating   method   of  
financing   sales   of   chattels.   But   by   divorcing   ownership   (vested   in   a   finance   company)   from  
possession  (held  by  a  dealer  or  private  hirer),  by  permitting  the  latter  to  retain  documents  of  
title   without   any   endorsement   of   the   interest   of   others,   and   by   not   requiring   registration,   in   an  
accessible  register,  of  the  agreement,  it  lent  itself,  almost  ideally,  to  fraudulent  dispositions.  In  
order   to   reduce   these   risks   the   finance   companies   in   about   1938   devised   a   registration  
machinery  of  their  own,  through  a  company  called  Hire  Purchase  Information  Ltd.  (H.P.I.)  with  
which   the   great   majority   of   hire   purchase   agreements   were   registered:   but   the   system   was  
neither   compulsory   nor   universal,   and   there   were   some   transactions   which   escaped   it.   The  
Moorgate  case  was  one.  
 
The  appellant  finance  company,  as  owners,  let  a  motor  car  on  hire  purchase  to  one  McLorg.  It  
was   their   intention,   as   it   was   their   normal   practice,   to   register   the   agreement   with   H.P.I.   By  
some   failure,   which   has   not   been   identified,   but   which   on   the   probabilities   occurred   within   the  
appellants'   organisation,   the   agreement   was   not   registered.   Consequently   when   the  
respondent,   a   motor   dealer,   who   contemplated   buying   the   car   from   McLorg,   enquired   from  
H.P.I.  whether  there  was  any  hire  purchase  agreement  registered  or  recorded  against  the  car,  
McLorg  having  concealed  it,  he  received  a  negative  answer.  (Some  part  was  taken  in  this  matter  
by   the   respondent's   son,   but   was   accepted   that   he   acted   for   the   respondent   and   that   his  
enquiries   were   to   be   treated   as   made   on   behalf   of   the   respondent).   He   proceeded   with   the  
purchase   and   resold   the   car.   The   appellants,   learning   of   this,   sued   the   respondent   for   damages  
for   conversion   and   succeeded   in   the   county   court.   The   Court   of   Appeal,   however,   by   a   majority  
allowed  the  respondent's  appeal.  
 
In  the  words  of  Lord  Wilberforce,  “there  are  three  possible  bases  upon  which  the  respondent  
might  succeed  in  resisting  the  appellants'  claim.  The  first  is  by  reliance  upon  the  terms  of  the  
negative   answer   by   H.P.I.   to   his   enquiry.   If   the   respondent   can   succeed   in   showing   that   this  
amounted   to   a   representation   that   no   finance   company   member   of   H.P.I.   had   any   interest   in  
the  car  that  this  representation  was  made  by  H.P.I.  as  agent  for  the  appellants,  then,  since  he  
undoubtedly   relied   upon   the   answer,   he   could,   on   classical   principles,   raise   an   estoppel   against  
the  appellants.  In  plain  language,  the  appellants,  by  reason  of  the  representation  made  on  their  
behalf,   on   which   the   respondent   acted,   would   not   be   permitted   to   set   up   a   state   of   facts—
namely  that  they  owned  the  car—contrary  to  the  representation.”  

2.3.3 Estoppel by Conduct or Representation

To  raise  an  estoppel  under  this  head,  the  conduct  should  be  such  as  to  cause  or  permit  a  person  
to  believe  a  thing  to  be  true  and  the  person  must  have  acted  in  some  way  on  this  belief.  That  
person   must   have   acted   in   that   belief   either   in   doing   or   omitting   to   do   something   thereby  
altering   his   position   to   his   detriment.   In   Hopgood   v   Brown   1955   1   All   ER   p450,   the   Judge  
observed   that   where   one   person–the   representor–has   made   a   representation   to   another  
person–the  representee–in  words  or  by  acts  or  conduct,  or  being  under  a  duty  to  speak  or  act  
in  silence  or  inaction,  with  intention  actual  or  presumptive,  and  with  the  result  of  inducing  the  
representee  to  alter  his  position  to  his  detriment,  the  representor  in  any  litigation  which  may  
afterwards   take   place   between   him   and   the   representee,   is   estopped   as   against   the  
representee  from  making  or  attempting  to  establish  by  evidence  any  averment  substantially  at  
variance  with  his  former  representation  if  the  representee  at  the  proper  time  and  in  the  proper  
manner  objects  thereto.  Under  section  120,  one  need  not  have  acted  to  their  detriment;  it  is  
sufficient  that  they  acted.  
 
In  order  to  found  an  estoppel  by  conduct  or  representation–  
(a)   the  conduct  or  representation  must  be  willful  and  intended  to  be  acted  on;  
(b)   the  representation  must  be  clear  and  unambiguous;  
(c)   the  representation  must  be  one  of  fact  and  not  of  law;  
(d)   it  must  not  be  intended  to  sanction  something  prohibited  in  law–there  can  be  no  
estoppel   against   a   statute–an   estoppel   cannot   render   valid   something   which   the  
law  makes  invalid  or  override  the  specific  directions  of  the  law;  
(e)   where   one   is   under   a   duty   to   speak,   act   or   take   care,   but   makes   a   negligent  
statement,   that   person   will   be   estopped   from   denying   the   truth   of   their  
statement,  or  if  they  are  under  a  duty  to  act,  but  do  not  take  any  action,  they  are  
equally  estopped.  
 
2.3.4 Promissory Estoppel
Promissory  Estoppel  is  an  exception  to  the  general  rule.  It  deals  with  the  future  state  of  affairs  
and  occurs  where  a  person  makes  a  representation  to  another  about  the  state  of  their  future  
legal  relations  or  their  future  conduct,  and  the  other  person  acts  upon  the  representation.  In  
this  instance,  an  equitable  estoppel  arises  so  that  the  representor  is  estopped  from  denying  the  
representation.  
 
In  Central  London  Property  Trust  Ltd  V    High  Trees  House  Ltd  1947  KB  p134,  by  lease  under  seal  
dated  September  24th  1937,  the  Plaintiff  let  to  the  defendant  a  block  of  flats  for  a  term  of  99  
years  with  effect  from  29th  September  1937  at  a  rent  of  £2500  per  annum.  Owing  to  the  second  
world   war   in   the   early   part   of   the   1940’s,   only   a   few   of   the   flats   were   let,   and   it   became  
apparent   that   the   defendant   would   be   unable   to   pay   the   rent   reserved.   After   negotiations  
between  the  directors  of  the  two  companies  on  3rd  January  1940,  a  letter  was  written  by  the  
plaintiff   to   the   defendant   confirming   that   the   rent   for   the   premises   would   be   reduced   from  
£2500  to  £1250  essentially  by  half  as  from  the  beginning  of  the  term.  The  Defendant  paid  the  
reduced   rent.   By   the   beginning   of   1945,   all   flats   were   let   out   and,   in   September   1945,   the  
Plaintiff   wrote   to   the   Defendants   claiming   that   rent   was   payable   at   the   rate   of   £2500.  
Thereafter,  the  Plaintiff  initiated  some  friendly  proceedings  to  claim  the  difference  in  rent  for  
September   to   December   1945   quarter.   In   their   defence   the   defendants   pleaded   that   the  
agreement  for  the  reduction  of  rent  operated  for  the  whole  term  of  the  lease  and,  therefore,  
the   plaintiff   was   estopped   from   demanding   rent   at   the   higher   rate.   It   was   held   that   where  
parties  enter  into  an  arrangement  which  is  intended  to  create  legal  relations  between  them  and  
in   pursuance   thereof   one   party   makes   a   promise   to   the   other,   which   he   knows   will   be   acted  
upon,   and   which   in   fact   is   acted   upon   by   the   promisee,   the   court   will   treat   the   promise   as  
binding  on  the  promisor  to  the  extent  that  it  will  not  allow  him  to  act  inconsistently  with  it  even  
though  the  promise  may  not  be  supported  by  consideration  in  the  strict  sense.  The  effect  of  the  
arrangement  may  be  to  vary  the  terms  of  the  contract  under  seal  by  one  of  less  value.  
 
The  second  holding  was  that  the  arrangement  between  the  parties  in  1945  was  one  which  fell  
within  the  first  category,  i.e.  where  you  made  a  promise  and  were  bound  by  the  promise  and  so  
the   agreement   of   the   promise   was   bound   on   the   promise,   but   it   only   remained   operative   so  
long  as  the  conditions  giving  rise  to  it  continued  to  exist  and,  once  those  conditions  ceased  to  
exist  in  1945,  the  plaintiffs  were  entitled  to  recover  the  full  rent  claimed  at  the  rate  reserved  by  
the  lease  document.  
 
In  Crabb  v  Arun  District  Council  1976  1  Ch  p179,  the  plaintiff  owned  a  piece  of  land  which  had  
access  at  point  A  on  to  a  road  owned  by  the  defendants.  And  the  Plaintiff  also  had  a  right  of  
way  from  that  point  A  along  this  road.  To  enable  him  to  sell  his  land  in  two  parts,  the  plaintiff  
sought   from   the   defendant   a   second   access   point,   and   he   also   wanted   a   further   right   of   way  
from   point   B.   at   a   site   meeting   held   between   the   plaintiff,   his   architect   and   a   representative   of  
the  Defendant,  the  additional  point  B  was  agreed  to.  Subsequently,  the  defendants  fenced  the  
boundary   between   their   road   and   the   plaintiff’s   land   erecting   gates   at   B   and   A.   after   the  
Plaintiff  sold  part  of  his  land  together  with  the  right  of  access  at  A  and  also  going  with  the  right  
of   way   onto   the   road,   the   defendants   removed   the   gates   at   B   and   fenced   the   gaps,   which  
blocked  the  links  between  A  and  B.  The  Plaintiff  sued  for  a  declaration  and  injunction  claiming  
that   the   Defendants   were   estopped   by   their   conduct   from   denying   him   a   right   of   access   at   B  
and   a   right   of   way   along   the   road.   The   trial   court   held   that,   in   the   absence   of   a   definite  
assurance   by   the   defendant,   no   questions   of   estoppel   could   arise.   There   were   no   assurances  
that   he   would   forever   have   the   right   of   way   at   B.   Consequently,   the   plaintiff’s   action   was  
dismissed.  On  Appeal  by  the  plaintiff,  it  was  held  that:  
(a)   the   defendants   knowing   the   plaintiff’s   intention   to   sell   his   land   in   separate  
portions   by   their   representations   led   the   Plaintiff   to   believe   that   he   would   be  
granted  a  right  of  access  at  B  and  by  erecting  the  gate  and  failing  to  disabuse  him  
of  his  belief  encouraged  the  plaintiff  to  act  to  his  detriment;  
(b)   equity   should   be   satisfied   by   granting   the   plaintiff   a   right   of   access   at   B   and   a  
right  of  way  along  the  road;  
(c)   in   view   of   the   sterilization   of   the   plaintiff’s   land   for   a   considerable   period  
resulting   from   the   Defendant’s   acts,   the   right   should   be   granted   without   any  
payment  by  the  Plaintiff.  
 

2.3.5 Principles of Estoppel

(a)   estoppel  is  mutual  and  reciprocal,  and  binds  both  parties–a  stranger  to  the  transaction  
can  neither  take  advantage  of,  nor  be  bound  by,  the  Estoppel;  
(b)   estoppel  cannot  be  used  to  circumvent  the  law–one  cannot  invoke  estoppel  to  render  
an  invalid  act  valid  or  vice  versa;  
(c)   estoppels  must  be  certain–the  statement  which  forms  the  basis  of  an  estoppel  should  
be  precise,  clear  and  unambiguous,    and  should  not  be  capable  of  being  understood  in  
more   than   one   way–it   is   immaterial   whether   the   maker   of   the   statement   or   the  
representor  believes  it  to  be  true  or  false;  
(d)   the   representation   which   is   the   basis   of   an   estoppel   must   be   a   statement   or  
representation  of  fact  which  existed  in  the  past  or  is  existing  at  the  time  of  the  making  
of  the  statement  or  representation,  but  not  in  the  future;  and  
(e)   It  is  not  essential  that  intention  to  deceive  or  defraud  be  asserted  to  raise  an  estoppel.