THE PLASCO BUILDING

COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

A Preliminary Assessment
FEBRUARY 20, 2017
 T he Plasco Building fire, explosion,
and collapse incident in Tehran on
January 19, 2017, was a national tragedy
that will impact the country of Iran for
years to come.

Sixteen firefighters and 10 civilians were

killed.1 In addition to the loss of life, over
500 garment and other businesses had
much or all of their property destroyed,
nearly 3,000 workers had their employment
impacted, and the city of Tehran lost its
earliest-built, iconic high-rise.2

Architects & Engineers for 9/11

Truth, which represents more than
2,750 architects and engineers, is an
organization dedicated to finding the truth
about the destruction of the three World
Trade Center skyscrapers on September
11, 2001. Upon reviewing videos of the
Plasco Building collapse and observing
the improper rush to judgment about
what caused it, we determined that it was
our ethical responsibility to bring our
expertise to bear on this matter as well.

The goal of this report, therefore, is to

help the people of Iran in their effort to
understand the cause of this tragic incident.

Contributors
Roland Angle, PE
Daniel Barnum, FAIA
David Chandler
Tony Szamboti
Ted Walter
Youcef Seyyedi (Research Translator)

1 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Plasco-final-death-
toll_Fox-News.pdf
2 http://www.meinsurancereview.com/News/View-NewsLetter-Arti-
cle?id=38090&Type=MiddleEast
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1  Purpose and Recommendations....................................................... 2

1.2  Applying NFPA 921........................................................................... 3

1.3  Building Description.......................................................................... 5

1.4  Timeline and Event Summary........................................................... 6

2. EVIDENCE CONSISTENT WITH DEMOLITION

2.1 Explosions Before Collapse............................................................... 8

2.2 Explosions During Collapse............................................................. 10

2.3 Debris Field Pattern......................................................................... 12

2.4 Molten Metal.................................................................................... 12

Motives for Firesetting Behavior............................................................ 13

3. EVALUATING THE FIRE HYPOTHESIS

3.1 Inconsistency with the Data............................................................. 14

3.2 Fire-Induced Failure Improbable...................................................... 15

3.3 Accidental Blast-Induced Failure Improbable.................................. 15

AFTERWORD.......................................................................................... 16
 INTRODUCTION

The 15-story Plasco Building is seen on fire

prior to its collapse on January 19, 2017.

O
n January 19, 2017, the iconic 15-story Plasco Building likely hypothesis that investigators should pursue as they at-
in Tehran caught fire at around 8:00 AM local time (4:30 tempt to determine the cause of the building’s collapse.
GMT). After fighting the fires for a little over three hours, the
Tehran fire department believed that it had extinguished the On January 20, 2017, one day after the incident, Architects &
fires. Then, at around 11:20 AM, a series of explosions report- Engineers for 9/11 Truth (AE911Truth) issued a statement3 in
edly occurred inside the building. Within a few minutes of the which we cautioned against rushing to any conclusions and
first reported explosion, the building suffered a total collapse urged President Rouhani, Iranian authorities, and the people
over a period of about 15 seconds. of Iran to thoroughly investigate the possible use of explosives.

Based on the data we have collected and analyzed over the past
month, we can now recommend with a high degree of confi-
1.1 Purpose and dence that investigators should consider controlled demolition

Recommendations involving a combination of explosives and incendiaries as the

most likely hypothesis for the Plasco Building’s destruction.

The purpose of this report is to analyze the publicly available

data concerning the Plasco Building fire, explosion, and col-
3 http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tehran-building-col-
lapse incident and to provide a recommendation as to the most lapse-investigators-must-consider-explosives-says-architects--en-
gineers-for-911-truth-300394148.html

2  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

Under such a scenario, the fires that started at around 8:00 AM Explosion Investigations. Published by the U.S. National Fire
would have been set intentionally to create the false appearance Protection Association, NFPA 921 is the national guide for fire
that the building came down as a result of those fires. and explosion investigations in the United States.

Given this hypothesis, great care should be taken to follow the According to NFPA 921, it is “designed to assist individuals
scientific procedures outlined in NFPA 921 Chapter 23 (Explo- who are charged with the responsibility of investigating and
sions) and Chapter 24 (Incendiary Fires), cited in Section 1.2 analyzing fire and explosion incidents and rendering opinions
below. Those procedures should be combined with interviews as to the origin, cause, responsibility, or prevention of such
of individuals who had access to the building before reaching incidents, and the damage and injuries which arise from such
a final hypothesis. incidents.” It does so by providing “a systematic, working

We also recommend that fire or accidental explosions—or a framework or outline by which effective fire and explosion in-

combination of the two—not be ruled out while investigators vestigation and cause analysis can be accomplished.” Further,
continue to collect and analyze data. However, we have seen “It contains specific procedures to assist in the investigation
no evidence so far to suggest that the building collapsed due of fires and explosions…. Deviations from these procedures,
to either fire or accidental explosions. From a scientific stand- however, are not necessarily wrong or inferior but need to be
point, the fact that fires occurred and then a total collapse justified.”
occurred is not, by itself, a sufficient basis to make collapse
Because AE911Truth is not officially charged with investigating
due to fire the most likely hypothesis.
the Plasco Building incident and does not have access to the
scene, much of NFPA 921 will not apply to this report. How-

1.2 Applying NFPA 921 ever, this report will cite sections of NFPA 921 (shown below)
that can be applied in analyzing the publicly available data. It
To the extent possible and appropriate, this report will draw will also highlight sections of NFPA 921 that should be most
from the principles set forth in NPFA 921: Guide for Fire and relevant to investigators in Iran.

Relevant Sections of 4.3.4 Analyze the Data.

4.3.5 Develop a Hypothesis (Inductive Reasoning).
NFPA 921 4.3.6 Test the Hypothesis (Deductive Reasoning).

Chapter 4 Basic Methodology 4.3.7 Avoid Presumption. Until data have been collected,
no specific hypothesis can be reasonably formed or tested.
4.1 Nature of Fire Investigations. A fire or explosion investi- All investigations of fire and explosion incidents should be ap-
gation is a complex endeavor involving skill, technology, knowl- proached by the investigator without presumption . . . until the
edge, and science. The compilation of factual data, as well as use of the scientific method has yielded testable hypotheses,
an analysis of those facts, should be accomplished objectively, which cannot be disproved by rigorous testing.
truthfully, and without expectation bias, preconception, or prej-
udice…. With few exceptions, the proper methodology for a fire 4.3.8 Expectation Bias. Expectation bias is a well-estab-
or explosion investigation is to first determine and establish the lished phenomenon that occurs in scientific analysis when
origin(s), then investigate the cause: circumstances, conditions, investigator(s) reach a premature conclusion without having
or agencies that brought the ignition source, fuel, and oxidant examined or considered all of the relevant data. Instead of
together. collecting and examining all of the data in a logical and unbi-
ased manner to reach a scientifically reliable conclusion, the
4.3 Relating Fire Investigation to the Scientific Method. investigator(s) uses premature determination to dictate inves-
The scientific method is a principle of inquiry that forms a basis tigative processes, analyses, and, ultimately, conclusions, in
for legitimate scientific and engineering processes, including a way that is not scientifically valid. The introduction of ex-
fire incident investigation. It is applied using the following steps pectation bias into the investigation results in the use of only
outlined in 4.3.1 through 4.3.9. that data that supports this previously formed conclusion and
4.3.1 Recognize the Need. often results in the misinterpretation and/or the discarding of
data that does not support the original opinion. Investigators
4.3.2 Define the Problem.
are strongly cautioned to avoid expectation bias through prop-
4.3.3 Collect Data. er use of the scientific method.

3  n  ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS FOR 9/11 TRUTH

 4.3.9 Confirmation Bias. Different hypotheses may be com- countered most frequently by the fire investigator. These are
patible with the same data. When using the scientific meth- explosions involving vessels that contain liquids under pres-
od, testing of hypotheses should be designed to disprove the sure at temperatures above their atmospheric boiling points….
hypothesis (falsification of the hypothesis). Confirmation bias
23.2.2.1 A BLEVE frequently occurs when the temperature
occurs when the investigator instead tries to prove the hy-
of a liquid and vapor within a confining tank or vessel is
pothesis. This can result in failure to consider alternate hy-
raised by an exposure fire to the point where the increasing
potheses, or prematurely discounting seemingly contradictory
internal pressure can no longer be contained and the vessel
data without an appropriate assessment. A hypothesis can be
explodes.
said to be valid only when rigorous testing has failed to dis-
prove the hypothesis. 23.2.3 Chemical Explosions.
4.4 Basic Method of a Fire Investigation. Using the scientif- 23.2.3.1 In chemical explosions, the generation of the
ic method in most fire or explosion incidents should involve the overpressure is the result of exothermic reactions wherein
steps shown in 4.4.1 to 4.4.6. the fundamental chemical nature of the fuel is changed….
4.4.1 Receiving the Assignment 23.2.4 Electrical Explosions. High-energy electrical arcs
may generate sufficient heat to cause an explosion. The rapid
4.4.2 Preparing for the Investigation
heating of the surrounding gases results in a mechanical ex-
4.4.3 Conducting the Investigation plosion that may or may not cause a fire. The clap of thunder
4.4.4 Collecting and Preserving Evidence. Valuable accompanying a lightening bolt is an example of an electrical
physical evidence should be recognized, documented, proper- explosion effect. High-energy electrical arcs require high volt-
ly collected, and preserved for further testing and evaluation age and are not covered in this chapter.
or courtroom presentation. 23.3 Characterization of Explosion Damage. For descrip-
4.4.5 Analyzing the Incident. All collected and available tive and investigative purposes, it can be helpful to character-
data should be analyzed using the principles of the scientific ize incidents, particularly in structures, on the basis of the type
method…. of damage noted. The terms high-order damage and low-order
damage have been used by the fire investigation community to
4.4.6 Conclusions. Conclusions, which are final hypotheses, characterize explosion damage….
are drawn as a result of testing the hypotheses….
23.3.2 Low-Order Damage. Low-order damage is char-
Chapter 10 Building Fuel Gas Systems acterized by walls bulged out or laid down, virtually intact,
10.1 Introduction. Fuel gas systems are found in or near most next to the structure. Roofs may be lifted slightly and re-
dwelling, storage, commercial, or industrial structures. These turned to their approximate original position. Windows may
systems commonly provide fuel for environmental comfort, wa- be dislodged, sometimes without glass being broken. Debris
ter heating, cooking, and manufacturing processes. They can produced is generally large and is moved short distances.
also be fuel sources for fires and explosions in these struc- Low-order damage is produced when the blast load is suf-
tures…. ficient fail structural connections of large surfaces, such as
walls or roof, but insufficient to break up larger surfaces and
10.2 Fuel Gases. Fuel gases by definition include natural gas,
accelerate debris to significant velocities.
liquefied petroleum gas in the vapor phase only, liquefied pe-
troleum gas-air mixtures, manufactured gases, and mixtures of 23.3.3 High-Order Damage. High-order damage is char-
these gases, plus gas-air mixtures within the flammable range, acterized by shattering of the structure, producing small de-
with the fuel gas or the flammable components of a mixture bris pieces. Walls, roofs, and structural members are broken
being a commercially distributed product. The fuel gases most apart with some members splintered or shattered, and with
commonly encountered by the fire and explosion investigator will the building completely demolished. Debris is thrown consid-
be natural gas and commercial propane. erable distances, possibly hundreds of feet. High-order dam-
age is the result of relatively high blast loads.
Chapter 23 Explosions
23.12 Explosives. Explosives are any chemical compound,
23.2 Types of Explosions. There are two major types of explo-
mixture, or device, the primary purpose of which is to function
sions with which investigators are routinely involved: mechani-
by explosion. Explosives are categorized into two main types: low
cal and chemical, with several subtypes with these types. These
explosives and high explosives….
types are differentiated by the source or mechanism by which the
blast overpressure is produced. 23.14 Investigating the Explosion Scene.

23.2.1 Mechanical Explosions. A mechanical explosion is 23.14.3 Initial Scene Assessment.

the rupture of a closed container, cylinder, tank, boiler, or sim- 23.14.3.1 General. Once the explosion scene has been
ilar storage vessel resulting in the release of pressurized gas established, the investigator should make an initial assess-
or vapor. The pressure within the confining container, struc- ment of the type of incident with which he or she is dealing.
ture, or vessel is not due to a chemical reaction or change in
chemical composition of the substances in the container. 23.14.3.2 Identify Explosion or Fire. An early task in the
initial assessment is to determine whether the incident was
23.2.2 BLEVEs. The boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion a fire, explosion, or both. It may be a lengthy process to de-
(BLEVE) is the type of mechanical explosion that will be en- termine what type of event occurred and which came first.

4  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

 Often the evidence of an explosion is not obvious, for exam- fuel are identified, the means of ignition should be analyzed.
ple, where a weak explosion of a gaseous fuel is involved. 23.18 Analyze to Establish Cause.
23.14.3.5 Identify Type of Explosion. The investigators 23.18.1 General. Having identified the origin, fuel, and ig-
should identify the type of explosion involved (e.g., me- nition source, the investigator should analyze and determine
chanical, combustion, other chemical reaction, or BLEVE). what brought together the fuel and ignition at the origin. The
23.14.3.6 Identify Potential General Fuel Type. circumstances that brought these elements together at that
time and place are the cause….
23.14.3.6.1 The investigator should identify which types
of fuel were potentially available at the explosion scene 23.18.2 Time Line Analysis. Based on the background in-
by identifying the condition and location of utility services formation gathered (e.g., statements and logs), a sequence
including fuel gases, and sources of other fuels such as of events should be tabulated for the time both prior to the
ignitable dusts or liquids. explosion and during the explosion. Consistencies and incon-
sistencies with causation theories can then be examined and
23.14.3.6.2 The investigator should analyze the nature
a “best fit” hypothesis established.
of damage in comparison to the typical damage patterns
available from the following: 23.18.3 Damage Pattern Analysis. Various types of dam-
age patterns, principally debris and structural damage,
(1) Gases
should be documented for further analysis.
(2) Liquid vapors
Chapter 24 Incendiary Fires
(3) Dusts
24.1 Introduction. An incendiary fire is a fire that is deliberate-
(4) Explosives ly set with the intent to cause the fire to occur in an area where
(5) Backdrafts the fire should not be.

(6) BLEVEs 24.2 Incendiary Fires Indicators. There are a number of con-
ditions related to fire origin and spread that may provide physi-
23.16 Analyze Fuel Source. Once the origin or epicenter of cal evidence of an incendiary fire cause.
the explosion has been identified, the investigator should deter-
mine the fuel. This determination is made by a comparison of 24.2.4 Exotic Accelerants. Mixtures of fuels and Class 3
the nature and type of damage to the known available fuels at or Class 4 oxidizers (see NFPA 430, Code for the Storage of
the scene. Liquid and Solid Oxidizers) may produce an exceedingly hot
fire and may be used to start or accelerate a fire. Some of
23.16.1 All available fuel sources should be considered and these oxidizers, depending on various conditions, can self
eliminated until one fuel can be identified as meeting all of ignite and will cause the same type of fire growth. Thermite
the physical damage criteria as well as any other significant mixtures also produce exceedingly hot fires. Such accelerants
data. generally leave residues that may be visually or chemically
23.16.2 Chemical analysis of debris, soot, soil, or air samples identifiable. Presence of remains from the oxidizers does not
can be helpful in identifying the fuel. With explosives or liq- in itself constitute an intentionally set fire.
uid fuels, gas chromatography, mass spectroscopy, or other 24.2.4.1 Exotic accelerants have been hypothesized as
chemical tests of properly collected samples may be able to having been used to start or accelerate some rapidly grow-
identify their presence. ing fires and were referred to in these particular instanc-
23.16.4 Once a fuel is identified, the investigator should de- es as “high temperature accelerants” (HTA). Indicators of
termine its source. exotic accelerants include an exceedingly rapid rate of fire
growth, brilliant flares (particularly at the start of the fire),
23.17 Analyze Ignition Source. When the area of origin and
and melted steel or concrete.

1.3 Building Description width along the north and south faces and 22 meters in length
along the east and west faces. The south face was positioned
The Plasco Building was completed in 1962. It was a steel- adjacent to the street. The north face was connected to a four-
frame high-rise containing 15 stories above ground and two story-high by approximately 60-meter-long shopping mall, as
stories below ground.4 It was listed as 42 meters in height.5 shown in the photos below.
While no source seems to give the length and width, from
The south and north faces of the building used steel columns
photos it appears to have been approximately 20 meters in
with diagonals between them for lateral support at each story.
The east and west faces used steel columns with horizontal
4 Some reports say the Plasco Building had 17 stories while other braces tying them together for lateral support. As shown in
reports say it had 15 stories. Counting the stories visible in photo- the approximated plan view in Figure 2 below, the north and
graphs indicates it had 15 stories above ground. It reportedly had
south faces contained eleven bays and the east and west faces
basement floors, suggesting two stories below ground.
5 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plasco_Building contained twelve bays, with columns between each bay. Alto-

5  n  ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS FOR 9/11 TRUTH

 occasions that the building was unsafe due to the storage of
flammable materials throughout the building and the lack of
fire safety measures.6 There was no central heating system
in the building and each tenant had its own heating system,
reportedly fueled with gas or propane.

The building was owned by the Mostazafan Foundation, a

large, government-owned nonprofit entity with over 200,000
employees and 350 subsidiary and affiliate companies in nu-
Figure 1: South face (street side) of Figure 2: Approximated plan view
merous industries. It was originally constructed and owned
the Plasco Building in Tehran, Iran. showing 46 perimeter columns and by an Iranian Jewish businessman named Habib Elghanayan,
4 interior columns.
who was executed during the Islamic Revolution in 1979 after
being accused of spying on behalf of Israel.

1.4 Timeline and Event

Summary
The Plasco Building caught fire on the 9th floor at around 8:00
AM local time (4:30 GMT) on January 19, 2017.7 It was occupied
at the time by garment shop workers and tour guides leading
Figure 3: Aerial view of the building Figure 4: View of the four-story shop-
visitors through the building.8
during the fire on January 19, 2017, ping mall from the entrance to it at
showing the shopping mall at rear. the north side of the 15-story tower. Ten brigades were dispatched and fought the blaze for a little
over three hours.9 During that time the fires traveled upward
through the upper six stories. The fires did not travel to any
gether, there were 50 vertical columns. The north and south stories below the 9th floor.10 As reported by BBC Persian and
faces each contained 10 columns. The east and west faces by fire department spokesperson Jalal Maleki, the fire depart-
each contained 11 columns. In addition, there were four pe- ment believed it had successfully extinguished the fires.
rimeter corner columns and four large interior columns.
Kasra Naji, BBC Persian: “And then they did manage to
As shown in Figure 2 above, the corner columns and two put out the fire, or they thought they had. And then more
perimeter columns near the middle of each face were dou- firefighters went in. Even civilians, people who had busi-
ble the size of the other, thinner 34 perimeter columns. The nesses there, went in to check. And then suddenly the
double-sized perimeter columns near the middle of each face whole thing collapses again after the fire restarted.”11
appear to have been aligned with the four large interior core
columns, as shown in Figure 2. Jalal Maleki: “The extinguishing process was going pretty
well. We were at the end of our job. Everything was under
It is assumed that stair wells and elevators were congregated control, then all of a sudden, and unexpectedly, two or three
in the area in between the four interior columns. The shopping major explosions took place in the upper floors at intervals
mall was enterable from several points, including from the
interior of the tower on the tower’s north side, which shoppers
and retailers could access after entering the building at the
6  http://www.meinsurancereview.com/News/View-NewsLetter-Arti-
south-side street entrance.
cle?id=38090&Type=MiddleEast
7  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38675628
The two columns shown in Figure 4 above are the double-sized
8  http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iran-high-rise-20170119-story.
perimeter columns near the middle of the north face of the
html
tower. 9  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/19/high-rise-tow-
er-fire-iranian-capital-collapses/
The building was occupied primarily by garment businesses. 10  http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/19/middleeast/iran-tehran-building-
Large amounts of fabric were stored on the premises. Re- fire-collapse/
portedly, the building’s owners were warned on numerous 11  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38675628

6  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

 of two or three minutes.”12

Mr. Maleki went on to describe the nature of the first explosion

and the fire department’s decision to evacuate its personnel
from the building.

“The first explosion caused the massive destruction of the

building’s windows and soon after that under the order
of the chief administrator of the operation, we were to
evacuate the building. Because we found that this place had
substances and materials that are prone to explosion.”

Mr. Maleki’s account is corroborated by the account of fire-

fighter Saeid Kamani, who had been fighting the fires from a
fire truck crane, and who also heard smaller explosions prior
to the first large explosion.

“But where I was high up there, I would hear small explo-

sions and to my amazement, behind every one of the win-
dows there was a gas canister…. I can’t remember clearly,
but after the white smoke started coming out, there was a
massive explosion to the point that it shook me. And there,
after a couple of minutes, the fire returned…. After that they
ordered us to evacuate the building…. All of this that I’m
recounting took place in two or three minutes at most, and
suddenly the whole building started to shake and then I saw
that the building collapsed….”13
Figure 5: Firefighters are seen escaping through windows and climbing down
the side of the building after a large explosion prompted the fire department
One video appears to show either the smaller explosions to evacuate its personnel.
or the large explosion described in Mr. Kamani’s account.14
Meanwhile, the shaking of the building was corroborated by
an unnamed firefighter, who said the shaking occurred one on their windows. And our team got stuck behind these
minute before the complete collapse occurred. windows.”

“I was inside and suddenly I felt the building was shaking According to one BBC report, the north wall collapsed first,
and was about to collapse. We gathered colleagues and got which then brought down the rest of the structure.16 Unfortu-
out, and a minute later the building collapsed.”15 nately, there appear to be no publicly available videos showing
the north face during the collapse. Videos from the west,
According to Mr. Kamani’s account, some firefighters evacu- south, and east generally show the collapse initiating on the
ated through the stairwells while some, as is corroborated by south face with what appears to be an explosion around the
videos, were apparently forced to attempt their escape through 11th floor, followed by the roof caving in from the middle.17 As
the windows, in some cases unsuccessfully. shown in numerous videos, every part of the building fell to the
ground within about 15 seconds after the collapse initiated.18
“Some of the firemen came out through the stairwells and
some of them came out on the big ladders from the facade
of the building. And the most heart-wrenching scenes were
those shops on the 11th, 12th, and 13th floors that had fence

12  https://youtu.be/MEN8z7wQ8lQ 16  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38675628

13  https://youtu.be/qJmF-KxcQCw 17  https://youtu.be/_MgJTa7SDaY
14  https://youtu.be/gdcG0GX7rrk?t=28s 18  https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLUshF3H0xxH3WcOFW-
15  http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-38675628 zcSg_gmce0wrDolF

7  n  ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS FOR 9/11 TRUTH

 EVIDENCE CONSISTENT
WITH DEMOLITION

Expulsions are seen from the east at the

onset of the Plasco Building’s collapse.

T
he purpose of this chapter is to analyze the publicly AE911Truth has endeavored to adhere firmly to these princi-
available data—collected in the first month since the ples in preparing this report.
Plasco Building incident—that appear to be consistent with
the hypothesis that controlled demolition, involving a combi-
nation of explosives and incendiaries, was responsible for the 2.1 Explosions Before Collapse
Plasco Building’s collapse.
NFPA 921 advises that an early task in the initial assessment
As NFPA 921 advises (see Section 1.2), a fire or explosion in- of a fire or explosion incident is to determine whether the in-
vestigation is a complex endeavor. The compilation of factual cident was a fire, an explosion, or both. Based on eyewitness
data, as well as an analysis of those facts, should be accom- accounts, as well as subsequent public discourse in Iran
plished objectively, truthfully, and without expectation bias, concerning the cause of reported explosions, we have deter-
preconception, or prejudice. Expectation bias is a well-estab- mined it was a fire and explosion incident.
lished phenomenon that occurs in scientific analysis when
investigators reach a premature conclusion without having First, there appear to have been small, periodic explosions
examined or considered all of the relevant data. Investigators occurring over an extended period of time before the collapse.
are strongly cautioned to avoid expectation bias through the This is indicated by the account of Saeid Kamani, who had
proper use of the scientific method. been fighting the fires from a fire truck crane:

8  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

 “But where I was high up there, I would hear small ex- meeting all of the physical damage criteria as well as any oth-
plosions and to my amazement, behind every one of the er significant data.”
windows there was a gas canister.”
So far, no plausible fuel source other than explosives has
Second, there appears to have been a series of larger explo- been identified. Initially, a gas leak or gas tank explosion (i.e.,
sions that started a few minutes before the collapse. This is a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion or “BLEVE”) was
indicated by at least two eyewitness accounts and by video suspected. For example, “Mehdi Chamrun, the chairman of
evidence. Tehran City Council, claimed that the explosion that occurred
in the building was due to gasoline tanks in the upper floors.”4
Saeid Kamani: “I can’t remember clearly, but after the However, a National Iranian Gas Company spokesman sub-
white smoke started coming out, there was a massive ex- sequently advised that the building was not connected to the
plosion to the point that it shook me.” gas network,5 and the building’s board of trustees claimed
that there were no gas tanks in the upper floors.6 As a result,
Jalal Maleki (Fire Department Spokesman): “Everything government officials appear to have ruled out the hypothesis
was under control, then all of a sudden, and unexpectedly, of a gas-related BLEVE.7 8 We have been unable to find news
two or three explosions took place in the upper floors at reports about any other suspected fuel sources.
intervals of two or three minutes.”
Unfortunately, we have no further information on what fire
Also, in one video, there are apparent explosions emanating department spokesman Jalal Maleki was referring to when
from the northeast corner of the building around what appears he said, “Because we found that this place had substances
to be Floors 3 through 6.1 It is unclear if they are the smaller and materials that are prone to explosion.” The fire depart-
explosions described by Mr. Kamani or the larger explosions ment may have simply deduced that there were “substances
described by both Mr. Kamani and Mr. Maleki. In addition, nu- and materials that are prone to explosion,” or department
merous videos—in particular this one2—show what appears to personnel may have directly observed such substances and
be a large explosion emanating from the middle of the south materials.
face around the 11th floor immediately prior to the collapse.
It is also very important to note that because the fires burned
The occurrence of a large explosion immediately prior to
only on Floors 9 through 15, the explosions that occurred on
collapse is corroborated by another account from Mr. Maleki:
Floors 3 through 6 prior to the collapse had no apparent ignition
“The fire was about to be completely extinguished when all of
source other than explosives. This fact alone appears to rule out
a sudden an explosion took place in the upper floors and after
the hypothesis that the explosions were caused by fire.
a few seconds the whole building collapsed.”3
With regard to physical damage, the first large explosion, ac-
cording to Mr. Maleki, “caused the massive destruction of the
Cause
building’s windows.” Based on the fact that firefighters were
A valid hypothesis for the cause of the Plasco Building fire, attempting to escape through windows after the first large ex-
explosion, and collapse incident must explain the cause or plosion, it may be that the first large explosion destroyed the
causes of the explosions that occurred before the collapse. stairwells and elevators as well. Alternatively, severe fires and
smoke, perhaps caused by the explosion, may have prevented
In seeking to determine the cause of these explosions, we can
the firefighters from exiting through the stairwells.
look primarily to potential fuel sources known to exist in the
building, as well as to the physical damage produced by the If, given the temporal proximity of the larger explosions to the
explosions and to the characteristics of the explosions. We can collapse, we postulate that explosion-related damage directly
also look for consistency with other data discussed later in this contributed to the collapse, we can deduce that the explosions
chapter.

NFPA 921 advises, “All available fuel sources should be 4 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Chamrun-statement.pdf

considered and eliminated until one fuel can be identified as 5 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Plasco-Building-not-con-
nected-to-gas-supply-network.pdf
6 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Chamrun-statement.pdf
1 https://youtu.be/gdcG0GX7rrk?t=28s 7 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Qenaati-statement.pdf
2 https://youtu.be/0jz-GXXkxI8 8 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Masjed-Jamei-statement.
3 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Maleki-statement.pdf pdf

9  n  ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS FOR 9/11 TRUTH

resulted in high-order damage (see Section 1.2). NFPA 921 Four characteristics
advises that high-order damage “is the result of relatively high rule out the possibility
blast loads.” that these impulses
were produced by a
In terms of the explosions’ characteristics, we know there
single BLEVE or other
were multiple explosions. It was not a single explosion event.
spontaneous explosion,
Further, we know the larger explosions were powerful enough
or by collapsing floors:
that they were felt by firefighters both inside and outside the
building. Moreover, the explosions were powerful enough that
1. The occurrence of
the fire department believed they were capable of directly
seven impulses,
causing the collapse. For example, Mashregh News report-
as opposed to one,
ed fire department spokesman Jalal Maleki as saying, “The
rules out a single,
cause of the collapse were some severe explosions….”9 The
spontaneous explo-
explosions are also likely to have been responsible for the
sion.
shaking of the entire building that was reported by at least two
firefighters (see Section 1.4). Shaking prior to collapse is not 2. The intervals be-
consistent with a progressive collapse, where creaking, titling, tween the impulses
or sagging would instead be expected. are too short for the
impulses to have
been the result of
Audio Analysis
falling floors im- Figure 6: Audio analysis visualization.
Taking the analysis of explosion characteristics one step fur- pacting one anoth- Y-axis: audio frequency. X-axis: time
elapsed in the video.
ther, an audio analysis10 of the large explosion event immedi- er. For a single floor
ately prior to collapse—both captured in videos and reported to fall an estimated
by fire department spokesperson Jalal Maleki—in fact reveals 2.34 meters of head space, it would take .69 seconds, which
seven spikes or impulses that occurred within a period of .511 is longer than the total period in which all seven impulses
seconds. Table 1 below shows (1) the time of each impulse in
occurred.
the video, (2) the interval between each impulse, and (3) the
cumulative time elapsed since the first impulse. Figure 6 is a 3. The impulses are each too short in duration to be im-

visualization of the audio analysis. pact-generated noise. The impulses are more consistent
with explosive-generated noise.11
Table 1: Audio Impulses Detected in the Explosion Event Pre-
4. The pulses are too similar to each other in magnitude and
ceding Collapse
quality to be the result of separate spontaneous events.

Pulse Time Interval Accumulated The occurrence of seven separate impulses is consistent with
Occurred (seconds) Time (seconds) video of the south face taken directly from the south,12 which
1 2.144 0 does not show an explosion emanating from one point. Rather,
2 2.232 .088 .088 it shows a number of explosions emanating along the same
3 2.321 .089 .177 floor from the center of the south face to the east side of the
4 2.442 .121 .298 south face.

5 2.544 .102 .4
In summary, the data that have been collected to date regard-
6 2.589 .045 .445 ing possible fuel sources, actual physical damage, and the ex-
7 2.655 .066 .511 plosions’ characteristics suggest that explosives are the only
viable explanation put forward so far for the well-documented
9 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Some-big-bangs-caused- explosions that occurred before the collapse.
the-collapse-of-Plasco.pdf
10 The audio analysis application Photosounder was used to conduct
an analysis of the audio from this video: https://youtu.be/0jz-GXX- 11 Hansen, Colin: “Fundamentals of Acoustics,” (January 1951), p. 48.
kxI8. 12 https://youtu.be/_MgJTa7SDaY?t=58s

10  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

 Figure 7: Video taken from the
southeast.
https://youtu.be/XoyH_wYGpJ8

Figure 9: Video taken from the south. Figure 10: Video taken from the
Figure 8: Video taken from the east. https://youtu.be/_MgJTa7S- southwest closer to the building.
https://youtu.be/_MgJTa7SDaY DaY?t=58s https://youtu.be/jzB-QE8Emt0

down the eastern side. This isolated expulsion is followed by

Figure 11: Video taken from the a second isolated expulsion near the ground level, before the
southwest showing a flash. A further second series of expulsions runs down the western side of the
examination of the flashes in this
video is presented at south face.
https://youtu.be/SVZDtsl51dM.
Another video taken from the southwest, but further away from
the building (Figure 11), shows the second series of expulsions
2.2 Explosions During Collapse that ran down the south face. It also shows a less-pronounced
series of expulsions running down the southern side of the
Within one to two seconds after the final large, audible ex-
west face. It is likely this less-pronounced series of expulsions
plosion event that emanated from the south face around the
was caused by the same phenomena that was causing the se-
11th floor, other apparent explosions began to emanate from
ries of expulsions that ran down the western side of the south
various parts of the building as it underwent total collapse.
face.
Video taken from the southeast (Figure 7) shows two energet-
Also, this video shows what appear to be at least three flash-
ic plumes rapidly emanating from the south and east faces
es. A screenshot displaying the most visible flash is shown in
approximately two seconds before the roof began to cave in
Figure 11.
along the south face. Then, just as the roof began to cave in, we
see two series of expulsions run down the eastern side of the
As mentioned in Section 1.4, there appear to be no publicly
south face and down the middle of the east face, roughly below
available videos showing the north face during the collapse.
where the first energetic plumes occurred.
Video taken from the east, which provides a profile view of the
Video taken directly from the east (Figure 8) shows the same north face, does not show expulsions similar to those on the
series of expulsions running down the middle of the east face. east, south, and west faces.

Video taken directly from the south (Figure 9) shows the same
series of expulsions running down the eastern side of the
Cause
south face. That series of expulsions is then followed by a sim- Two causes of the observed expulsions that occurred during
ilar series of expulsions running down the opposite, western the collapse have been posited in discussions of the Plasco
side of the south face. Building incident. One hypothesis is that they were blasts as-
sociated with explosive charges that were being detonated in
Video taken from the southwest, much closer to the building order to destroy the building. The other hypothesis is that they
(Figure 10), shows the two separate series of expulsions that resulted from floor-wide air compression caused by pancak-
ran down the eastern and western sides of the south face. In ing floors.
this video we also see an isolated expulsion that occurs clos-
er to the bottom of the building on the western side—at the Several factors and characteristics of the expulsions cast
same time that the first series of expulsions begins to travel extreme doubt on the air compression hypothesis and make

11  n  ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS FOR 9/11 TRUTH

 successively pancaking floors, we would expect expulsions
x 102 to progress from one floor to the next downward. Also, we
mass A (t,y)
would not expect expulsions to occur on the same floor
seconds apart, because the first expulsion on a given floor
-1 would relieve the air pressure on that floor, preventing lat-
er expulsions from that floor.
-2
6. Finally, the event produced thick, energetic, rapidly form-
-3 ing plumes that are consistent with the plumes produced
y -4 during controlled demolitions, where large numbers of
explosive charges are detonated in a very short period of
-5 time. These plumes contain large quantities of pulverized
materials and expand rapidly due to the release of energy
-6
from the detonation of explosive charges.
-7 In summary, the data collected to date regarding the expul-
sions observed during the collapse and the occurrence of ex-
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 plosions prior to collapse suggest that these expulsions were
t explosions and that explosives are the only viable explanation
Figure 12: Map of east face expulsions. Y-axis: Location of expulsions put forward thus far.
relative to each other vertically. X-axis: time elapsed in the video
(https://youtu.be/_MgJTa7SDaY).

explosives the most likely hypothesis: 2.3 Debris Field Pattern

1. Due to the well-documented occurrence of explosions be- The debris field of the Plasco Building collapse was contained
fore collapse, it is more logical, given the observed expul- mostly inside its footprint, with the building’s west and south
sions, that explosions continued to occur during collapse. walls lying on top of the debris pile. This fact is illustrated in
The air compression hypothesis requires a scenario where numerous photographs (see the inside cover).
explosions occurred up to the point of collapse initiation
and then all phenomena ceased to be explosion-related. The debris was deposited into the building’s footprint because
the building’s core appears to have failed first, which then
2. The air compression hypothesis requires widespread
caused the walls to fall inward.
failures of floor connections to be rapidly occurring inside
the building with minimal deformation of the building’s This kind of failure and debris field is typical of the method of
exterior. From a structural standpoint, this scenario is ex- controlled demolition known as “implosion,” where core col-
ceedingly improbable. umns are removed first so that they pull inward on the exterior,
3. Each expulsion emanates rapidly and consists of a thick which prevents the exterior from falling outward and damag-
cloud of apparently already-pulverized material, often ac- ing adjacent structures. This kind of failure and debris field is
companied by intact pieces of debris traveling away from also highly atypical of natural building collapses, irrespective
the building at high speeds. of cause.
4. The expulsions emanate from point-like sources. In a
The debris field pattern is, therefore, another reason to con-
floor-wide air compression scenario, we would expect
sider controlled demolition the most likely hypothesis for the
compressed air to be pushed out more uniformly.
Plasco Building’s destruction.
5. A careful analysis of the series of expulsions that appear
to travel down the east face of the building in a somewhat
neat pattern reveals that, in fact, the expulsions occur in a
disorderly sequence. As shown in Figure 12, which maps
2.4 Molten Metal
the time and vertical location of each expulsion on the During the debris removal operation, the Iranian news media
east face, we see expulsions occurring high and low in the reported large amounts of molten metal being found in the
building, with no apparent order. We also see expulsions debris. The Mehr News Agency and Press TV wrote:
occurring seconds apart on the same floor. If the expul-
sions were caused by floor-wide air compression from “As the ruins removal process reaches final steps, excava-

12  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

 tors and mechanical equipment pull out a layer of molten
iron from the rubble. The volume of molten metal under-
neath goes beyond imagination….”13

“[T]he operation slowed down on Thursday as workers found

a large amount of molten metal gathered in the location,
spokesman for the crisis committee Jalal Maleki said.”14

Also, numerous videos show the observed molten metal being

dug up.15

Fires in open air cannot achieve temperatures above 1,800°F

(1,000°C). Iron and steel melt at approximately 2,750°F
(1,510°C). The fires that occurred in the Plasco Building,
therefore, cannot account for the observed molten metal.

NFPA 921 advises that melted steel or concrete is an indicator

of exotic accelerants. Therefore, at this time, the most plau-
sible explanation for the large amounts of molten metal ap-
pears to be a high-temperature incendiary such as thermite,
which, when ignited, produces temperatures around 4,500°F
(2,482°C). Thermite is composed of elemental aluminum and
iron oxide. When activated, the aluminum sucks the oxygen
out of the iron oxide in an extreme exothermic reaction, leav-
ing molten iron as a by-product.
Figure 13: An excavator scooping up molten metal from the scene of the
Plasco Building incident.
If the molten metal were created during the Plasco Building
incident, it could have remained in a molten state as a result
of being covered by gypsum and lightweight concrete, which
have low thermal conductivity. Calculations show the insula-
Motives for Firesetting Behavior
tion properties of lightweight concrete and gypsum would not
require a heavy thickness to keep the iron molten for days. In Chapter 24 of NFPA 921 advises fire investigators about rec-
addition, there appears to be no plausible scenario under which ognizing and investigating incendiary fires, which it defines as
the molten metal could have been created after the incident. fires that are set with the intent to cause the fire to occur in an
area where the fire should not be (see Section 1.2).
Controlled demolitions are usually accomplished without the
use of incendiaries. However, in a situation where the goal is One of several possible motives for firesetting behavior it out-
to conceal a controlled demolition, thermite would serve the lines is crime concealment. This category, it notes, “involves
purpose of weakening support columns and structural joints, firesetting that is a secondary or collateral criminal activity,
allowing for the minimal use of explosives and, therefore, min- perpetuated for the purpose of concealing the primary crimi-
imal noise generation. Thermite, or another exotic accelerant, nal activity.” The examples it gives are concealing a murder or
could also be used in such a scenario to help start the fires burglary, or destroying records or documents. But the crime
that were set as a cover for the controlled demolition. NFPA concealment motive also applies to the hypothesis presented
921 advises that such accelerants generally leave residues here, where the primary goal was to completely destroy the
that may be visually or chemically identifiable. Plasco Building for political or economic gain (also identified
in Chapter 24 of NFPA 921) and with the fires being set to
create the false appearance that the building came down as a
result of those fires.
13 http://en.mehrnews.com/news/123013/8th-firefighter-s-body-re-
covered-number-rises-to-10
14 http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2017/01/26/507841/Iran-Tehran-Plas-
co-fire-collapse-rescue
15 https://youtu.be/fJeQghFOe9E

13  n  ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS FOR 9/11 TRUTH

 EVALUATING THE FIRE
HYPOTHESIS

Limited to the top six stories, the Plasco Building’s fires

cannot account for the explosions on Floors 3 through 6.

T
he purpose of this chapter is to evaluate, based on the
currently available data, the feasibility of the hypothesis
Explosions Before Collapse
that fires and/or accidental explosions were responsible for As discussed in Sections 1.4 and 2.1, there were numerous
the destruction of the Plasco Building. It is important that we small and large explosions that occurred prior to collapse.
consider the fire hypothesis carefully—but that we be willing NFPA 921 advises that a BLEVE is the type of explosion encoun-
to evaluate it critically if it does not pass the first test of being tered most frequently by fire investigators. These are mechan-
consistent with the data collected to date. ical explosions (i.e., where the fundamental chemical nature of
the fuel is not changed) involving vessels that contain liquids
under pressure at temperatures above their atmospheric boil-
3.1 Inconsistency with the Data ing points.

In Sections 2.1 and 2.4, we summarized two categories of data BLEVEs involving the gas canisters that Plasco Building tenants
that open air fires are fundamentally incapable of accounting used as fuel for heating could possibly explain the smaller peri-
for: numerous small and large explosions that occurred prior to odic explosions that were observed by Saeid Kamani. However,
the collapse, and large amounts of molten metal in the debris. BLEVEs involving gas canisters cannot account for the larger
We will look at both in more detail below. explosions that occurred in the two to three minutes prior to
the collapse.

14  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

Explosions caused by gas leaks that are ignited by fires are stand. However, under a conservative assumption of a 2-to-1
sometimes capable of producing the amount of force apparently factor-of-safety ratio, virtually every column would need to be
associated with the large pre-collapse explosions in the build- heated to 650°C at the same time, losing 50% of its strength,
ing. But it has been reported that the Plasco Building was not to present the risk of a building-wide failure. This would be
connected to the gas network and there were no gas tanks in the difficult to accomplish even in a raging fire.
upper floors, where the explosions occurred (see Section 2.1).
But the fire in the Plasco Building was not raging shortly before
Also, as we established in Section 2.1, fires could not have been its collapse. The fire department believed that it had extin-
the ignition source for the explosions that occurred before the guished the fires. Although the fires appear to have reignited
collapse at the northeast corner on Floors 3 through 6, because after the first large explosion, videos show they did not cover a
the fires were limited to Floors 9 through 15. This fact alone large portion of the building.
appears to rule out the hypothesis that the explosions were
caused by fire. Finally, supposing there was sufficient heat to weaken certain
structural members by 50% and somehow induce a partial
collapse, it is highly improbable that a partial collapse would
Molten Metal lead to a total progressive collapse. As we know, there were no
As discussed in Section 2.4, large amounts of molten metal were fires below Floor 9. Therefore, the structural members below
found in the debris. Fires in open air cannot achieve temperatures Floor 8 would have maintained their full strength. It is virtually
above 1,800°F (1,000°C). Iron and steel melt at approximately impossible that the first partial collapse observed—the caving
2,750°F (1,510°C). The fires that occurred in the Plasco Building, in of the roof along the south face—would have triggered a
therefore, cannot account for the observed molten metal. progressive collapse of all the floors below. The bottom eight
floors would be expected to withstand partial collapse of the
At this time, there appears to be no plausible fire-related sce- floors above them.
nario where large amounts of molten metal found in the debris
could have been created during or after the incident.

3.3 Accidental Blast-Induced

3.2 Fire-Induced Failure Failure Improbable
Improbable Whereas fires have limited ability to cause a heat-induced fail-
ure, an accidental blast can be more capable of causing struc-
As mentioned above, the maximum temperature that open
tural members to fail. However, the hypothesis of an accidental
air fires can reach is around 1,800°F (1,000°C). However, even
blast-induced failure is unlikely due to some of the factors
reaching this temperature with a diffuse flame is very difficult.
discussed above and in previous chapters.
Thomas Eagar and Christopher Musso note, “Typically, diffuse
1. So far, no plausible fuel source other than explosives has
flames are fuel rich, meaning that the excess fuel molecules,
been identified.
which are unburned, must also be heated…. This fuel-rich
diffuse flame can reduce the temperature by up to a factor of 2. There was no apparent ignition source for the explosions
two again. This is why the temperatures in a residential fire are that occurred at the northeast corner on Floors 3 through 6
usually in the 500°C to 600°C range.” Meanwhile, Eagar and prior to the collapse. It is, therefore, quite implausible that
Musso note, “It is known that structural steel begins to soften these explosions were accidental.
around 425°C and loses about half of its strength at 650°C…. 3. A scenario involving accidental explosions does not account
Nearly every large building has a redundant design that allows for the large amounts of molten metal found in the debris.
for the loss of one primary structural member, such as a col- 4. Absent a single accidental explosion that destroys the
umn. However, when multiple members fail, the shifting loads entirety of the building, which was not observed, an acci-
eventually overstress the adjacent members and the collapse dental blast-induced failure is no more likely to trigger a
occurs like a row of dominoes falling down.”1 progressive collapse than a heat-induced failure.

In the case of the Plasco Building, we do not know the factor In summary, the hypothesis that fire and/or accidental explo-
of safety, i.e., how many times its load it was designed to with- sions were responsible for the destruction of the Plasco Build-
ing does not appear to pass the first test of being consistent
with the data collected to date. Nonetheless, the fire/accidental
explosion hypothesis should not be ruled out while investiga-
1 Eagar and Musso: “Why Did the World Trade Center Collapse?
Science, Engineering, and Speculation,” JOM (December 2001). tors continue to collect and analyze data.

15  n  ARCHITECTS & ENGINEERS FOR 9/11 TRUTH

AFTERWORD

A sexactly
of this report’s publication, which is
one month and one day after
As we noted in our January 20 statement,
it is often much more difficult to ascertain
the Plasco Building tragedy, a national the truth of an event after an explanation
commission has been appointed by for that event has been prematurely formed.
President Hassan Rouhani for the purpose We therefore urge the commission and the
of investigating the causes that led to the people of Iran to be fearless and vigilant in
fire and collapse and then issuing a report their search for the truth about this national
within two months of the incident (one tragedy that took the lives of 26 individuals.
month from now).

It is our sincere hope that the commission

will read and take seriously our analysis and
recommendations and that it will adhere
firmly to the principles of science-based fire
and explosion investigations, which, in the
United States, are codified in NFPA 921.

We are encouraged by the makeup of

the commission, which includes seven
apparently-renowned engineers, a political
scientist, a lawyer/political scientist, and an
insurance expert.

Immediately following the tragedy, there

was reportedly widespread suspicion in
Iran that the destruction of the building was
due to an intentional act of terrorism. In
the hours and days that followed, a number
of high-ranking officials made statements
dismissing those suspicions and alleging
that no evidence of a terrorism act had been
discovered.1 Based on the data collected so
far, those suspicions may have in fact been
well-founded.

1 http://www.ae911truth.org/images/PDFs/Minister-of-Intelli-
gence-Statement.pdf

16  n  THE PLASCO BUILDING COLLAPSE IN TEHRAN

2342 Shattuck Avenue, Suite 189
Berkeley, CA 94704