43) Commission of Customs vs Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351

FACTS:
EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion
and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered
the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because allegedly none of the
shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45
(requiring a Central Bank license and a certificate authorizing the importation
or release of the subject good) for their release. The said circulars were
pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar
goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and Financial Agreement b/n the
Philippines and Japan then).
EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was
unconstitutional because the EO never concurred upon by the Senate. The
issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of
EST. The Commissioner appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the executive agreement sought to be implemented by EO 328 is
legal and valid, considering that the Senate has not concurred in the making of
said executive agreement
HELD:
YES. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the
approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding
through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by
Congress.
International agreements involving political issues or changes of national
policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent
character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements
embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or
lesstemporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
EO takes the form of executive agreement which is binding without the need
of Senate Vote.
44) Qatar vs. Bahrain. Jurisdiction, ICJ Rep.1994 112
FACTS:
The case between Qatar and Bahrain involved a longstanding territorial
sovereignty and maritime boundary dispute between the two gulf neighbors.
The two sides sought to mediate the dispute under the good offices of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia beginning in 1976. After those mediation efforts
failed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar filed before the
International Court of Justice an application instituting proceedings against
the State of Bahrain in respect of certain disputes between the two States
relating to "sovereignty over the Hawar islands, sovereign rights over the
shoals of Dibal and Qit'at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas
of the two States".
In this application, Qatar invoked as the basis for the court’s jurisdiction
several exchanges of letters during the mediation efforts as well as a
document headed “MINUTES” and signed by the ministers for foreign affairs
of Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia during their mediation efforts under the
good offices of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Qatar argued that these
exchanges of letters constituted international agreements and represented the
parties’ consent to the court’s jurisdiction over the entire dispute according to
a formula proposed by Bahrain to Qatar on October 26, 1988 and accepted by
Qatar in December 1990 (the Bahraini formula). However, Bahrain argued
that the exchanges did not constitute a legally binding instrument, and that
the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute absent its consent.
ISSUE:
WON the court has jurisdiction and admissibility of the application
HELD:
YES.  the Court found that the exchanges of letters between the King of Saudi
Arabia and the Amir of Qatar of 19 and 21 December 1987, and between the
King of Saudi Arabia and the Amir of Bahrain of 19 and 26 December 1987,
and the document headed "Minutes" and signed at Doha on 25 December
1990 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia,
were international agreements creating rights and obligations for the Parties;
and that, by the terms of those agreements, the Parties had undertaken to
submit to the Court the whole of the dispute between them, as circumscribed
by the Bahraini formula.
An international agreement creating rights and obligations can be constituted
by the signatories to the minutes of meetings and letters exchanged and
therefore binding. International agreements do not take a single form under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the Court has enforced this
rule in the past. In the case at bar, The Minutes stipulated commitments to
which the parties agreed, thereby creating rights and obligations in
international law.

45) USAFE Veterans Assoc. Inc. vs. The Treasurer of the Philippines
GR. No. L-10500, June 30, 1959
FACTS:
In 1941, foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Roosevelt called into service the
Armed Forces of the US and organized the military forces of the Philippine
Commonwealth. For the expenses to such incorporation, the Congress of the
US provided funds in its Appropriation Act of December 17, 1941. After the
war, of the millions transferred, there remained unexpended and
uncommitted funds in possession of the Philippine Armed Forces. The
Philippine Government, badly needing funds for its activities, President
Quirino, through Governor Miguel Cuaderno of the Central Bank proposed to
the corresponding officials of the U.S. Government the retention of the 35-
million dollars as a loan, and for its repayment in ten annual installments.
After protracted negotiations the deal was concluded, and the Romulo-Snyder
Agreement was signed in Washington on November 6, 1950, by the then
Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos P. Romulo, and the then
American Secretary of the Treasury, John W. Snyder.
The USAFFE Veterans Associations Inc.alleged in a complaint filed before the
Manila court of first instance that the money delivered to the U.S. to the
Armed Forces of the Philippine Island were straight payments for military
services; that the ownership thereof vested in the Philippine Government
upon delivery, and consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to
consider as a loan; and that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was void because
it was not binding on the Philippine Government for lack of authority of the
officers who concluded the same.
ISSUE:
WON the Romula-Snyder Agreement is valid absent ratification of the
Congress.
HELD:
YES. The Romula-Snyder Agreement was a purely executive act which the
President may validly enter by virtue of the authority granted to him under
existing law. Executive Agreements fall into two classes:
(1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external
relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may
be termed as presidential agreements and
(2) agreements entered in pursuant of acts of Congress, which have
been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements.
It is hereby maintained that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was legally and
validly entered to conform to the second category pursuant to Republic Act
No. 16, wherein Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the
President of the Philippines to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness
with the Government of the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities.
It is observed in this connection that from the point of view of the
international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers.

46. Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000

Fact:
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in
1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension
of the military bases agreement. On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate
rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security
which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.

On July 18, 1997, the United States panel met with the Philippine panel to
exchange notes on the complementing strategic interests of the United States
and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among
other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for
brevity).

On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent

Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.

Petitioners went to the Supreme Court to question the validity of the VFA as it
allege the following:

Issue:
Whether the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty and
deprived Philippine courts of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses
committed by US military personnel?

Held:
No, the VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States
troops and personnel visiting the Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to
govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights of the
United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal
jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of
equipment, materials and supplies. Philippine authorities shall have
jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to offenses committed
within the Philippines and punishable under the law of the Philippines.

47. Abaya vs. Ebdane, GR No. 167919, February 14, 2007

FACTS:

On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of

Public Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012.
It was approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution
recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract
for the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which
consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-
Viga road, with the length of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of
Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and
the Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and
between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of
their respective governments.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the loan agreement violates RA 9184.

HELD
 No: an exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive
agreement, which becomes binding through executive action without
the need of a vote by the Senate or Congress. Executive agreements
sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of
more formal documents denominated “agreements” or “protocols”.
 The fundamental principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda,
which is, in fact, embodied in Section 4 of RA 9184 as it provides that
“any treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the subject
matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a signatory
shall be observed,” the DPWH, as the executing agency of the projects
financed by Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, rightfully awarded the
contract for the implementation of civil works for the CP I project to
private respondent China Road & Bridge Corporation.
 Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have
common features and international law has applied basically the same
rules to all these instruments. These rules are the result of long practice
among the States, which have accepted them as binding norms in their
 mutual relations. Therefore, they are regarded as international
customary law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.

48. Akbayan vs Aquino, GR No. 170516, July 16, 2008

FACTS:
This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified
by the President with Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin,
customs procedures, paperless trading, trade in services, investment,
etc.

Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-

government organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought
via petition for mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the
full text of the JPEPA, including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes
thereto. Particularly, Congress through the House Committee are calling for
an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the same time, the Executive is refusing to
give them the said copies until the negotiation is completed.
Final text of JPEPA was made available on September 11, 2006,
respondents do not dispute that, at the time the petition was filed up to the
filing of petitioners' Reply - when the JPEPA was still being negotiated - the
initial drafts thereof were kept from public view.
ISSUE: Whether or not the refusal of the government to disclose the
docuiment bearing JPEPA negotiation violates their right to
information on matters of public concern.
HELD:
To be covered by the right to information, the information sought
must meet the threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
From the nature of the JPEPA, as in international trade agreement, it is
evident that the Japanese and Philippine offers submitted during the
negotiations towards its executions are matters of public concern.

It is established, however, that neither the right to information nor the

policy of full public disclosure is absolute, there being matters which, albeit of
public concern or interest, are recognized as privileged. The categories of
information that may be considered privileged includes matters of diplomatic
character and under negotiation and review.

The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as the text which is

subject to negotiations and legal review by the parties fall under the
exceptions to the right of access to information on matters of public concern
and policy of public disclosure. They come within the coverage of executive
privilege. At the time when the Committee was requesting for copies of such
documents, the negotiations were ongoing as they are still now and the text
of the proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to change. Considering
the status and nature of such documents then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with existing legal provisions and
settled jurisprudence.

Also, the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized

in this jurisdiction.
While the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential -
since there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is
approved" - the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published.

A ruling that Philippine offers in treaty negotiations should now be

open to public scrutiny would discourage future Philippine
representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations.
Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

49. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005

Facts:

J. Puno
Facts: This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the
Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed
copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the
Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which
shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression as defined in the Statute. The
Statute was opened for signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had
remained open for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000
through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel
the respondents the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs to transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for
ratification.
Issue: Whether or not the executive may be compelled to transmit the copy of the
treaty signed to the Senate for its concurrence under the constitution.
Held: No. In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s
sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the
President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs.
Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and
governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973
Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered
into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided:
Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties xxx.
Section 14 (1) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution stated:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa.
The participation of the legislative branch in the treatymaking process was deemed
essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By
requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the
President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance
necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification,
and exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted
for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not
essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually
assigns this task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are
provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other
negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of
the parties to submit a draft of the proposed treaty which, together with the
counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent negotiations. The
negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may
even collapse in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points
under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is
opened for signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating
the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but,
significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where
ratification of the treaty is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance
with the alternate, that is, each of the several negotiators is allowed to sign first on
the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of
ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and
to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to
their interests. It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny
and consent of a department of the government other than that which negotiated
them. x x x
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of
ratification, which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different
date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and
no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective
upon its signature. [emphasis supplied]
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine
representative with ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the
treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making
process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is
usually performed by the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission.
Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held
to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
Thus, Executive Order No. 459 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 25,
1997 provides the guidelines in the negotiation of international agreements and its
ratification. It mandates that after the treaty has been signed by the Philippine
representative, the same shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs.
The Department of Foreign Affairs shall then prepare the ratification papers and
forward the signed copy of the treaty to the President for ratification. After the
President has ratified the treaty, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the
same to the Senate for concurrence. Upon receipt of the concurrence of the Senate,
the Department of Foreign Affairs shall comply with the provisions of the treaty to
render it effective. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 459 reads:
Sec. 7. Domestic Requirements for the Entry into Force of a Treaty or an Executive
Agreement. The domestic requirements for the entry into force of a treaty or an
executive agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be as follows:
A. Executive Agreements.
i. All executive agreements shall be transmitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs
after their signing for the preparation of the ratification papers. The transmittal shall
include the highlights of the agreements and the benefits which will accrue to the
Philippines arising from them.
ii. The Department of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to the endorsement by the concerned
agency, shall transmit the agreements to the President of the Philippines for his
ratification. The original signed instrument of ratification shall then be returned to
the Department of Foreign Affairs for appropriate action.
B. Treaties.
i. All treaties, regardless of their designation, shall comply with the requirements
provided in subparagraphs 1 and 2, item A (Executive Agreements) of this Section. In
addition, the Department of Foreign Affairs shall submit the treaties to the Senate of
the Philippines for concurrence in the ratification by the President. A certified true
copy of the treaties, in such numbers as may be required by the Senate, together
with a certified true copy of the ratification instrument, shall accompany the
submission of the treaties to the Senate.
ii. Upon receipt of the concurrence by the Senate, the Department of Foreign Affairs
shall comply with the provision of the treaties in effecting their entry into force.
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and
international law to ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The
signature does not signify the final consent of the state to the treaty. It is the
ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute
itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by
which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State. By
ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by
the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative,
the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility
and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are
not inimical to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the
discretion even after the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative
whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If
that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile.
It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which
has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty,
but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and
not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified
in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in
the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate,
however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a
treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify
it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the
competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a
writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the
President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue
the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to
compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate

50. Tañada vs Angara, 272 SCRA 18

Facts:
Petitioners prayed for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the
concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
(WTO Agreement, for brevity) and for the prohibition of its implementation
and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices
concerned therewith.

They contended that WTO agreement violates the mandate of the 1987
Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods” as (1) the WTO requires the Philippines
“to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as
Filipinos and local products” and (2) that the WTO “intrudes, limits and/or
impairs” the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is ‘vested in the Congress of the Philippines.

Held:
No, the WTO agreement does not unduly limit, restrict, and impair the
Philippine sovereignty, particularly the legislative power granted by the
Philippine Constitution. The Senate was acting in the proper manner when it
concurred with the President’s ratification of the agreement.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade
without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact
they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members.
Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the
fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of
robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment,
Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a
policy of laissez faire.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

51. Santos III vs Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent

Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office
in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office
in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in
San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at
the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila.
Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he
had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be
wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC
Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the matter to conduct
judicial review.
HELD:

No. The Supreme Court ruled that they cannot rule over the matter for the SC
is bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention which was ratified by
the Senate. Until and unless there would be amendments to the Warsaw
Convention, the only remedy for Santos III is to sue in any of the places
indicated in the Convention such as in San Francisco, USA.

The SC cannot rule upon the constitutionality of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention. In the first place, it is a treaty which was a joint act by the
legislative and the executive. The presumption is that it was first carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given
the force of law in this country. In this case, Santos was not able to offer any
compelling argument to overcome the presumption.

52. Agustin v. Edu (G.R. No. L-49112)

February 2, 1979 | 88 SCRA 195

FACTS:

On December 2, 1974, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Letter of

Instruction (LOI) No. 229, which required all motor vehicles to secure early
warning devices (EWD) consisting of a pair of triangular, collapsible,
reflectorized plates in red and yellow to be purchased from the Land
Transportation Commission. The purposes of this LOI were to prevent
accidents caused by vehicular obstructions and to adhere to the road safety
standards outlined in the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals,
which the Philippines had ratified as per PD No. 207.

LOI No. 229 was later amended by LOI No. 479 issued on November 15, 1976.
Unlike before where owners of motor vehicles were required to purchase the
reflectorized plates from the Land Transportation Commission, LOI No. 479
now made it possible for said owners to buy early warning devices anywhere
so long as they adhere to the standards prescribed by the Land
Transportation Commissioner.

President Marcos issued a six-month suspension of said LOI, after which he

issued another LOI lifting its suspension. On August 29, 1978, Land
Transportation Commissioner Romeo Edu issued Memorandum Circular No.
32, which contained LTC Administrative Order No. 1 or the rules and
regulations in the implementation of LOI No. 229 as amended.

Leovilo Agustin, a private citizen and owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, filed
a petition before the SC, assailing the constitutionality of both LOI No. 229 as
amended and LTC Administrative Order No. 1. Among others, Agustin claimed
that LOI No. 229 was violative of the provisions and delegation of police
power, an oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, and
unconstitutional order that was contrary to the precepts of the New Society.
Pending its final resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
preventing agencies concerned from implementing both LOI No. 229 as
amended and LTC Administrative Order No. 1.

ISSUE:

Whether or not LOI No. 229 as amended violated the constitutional provision
on undue delegation of power.

HELD:

No, the Court ruled that LOI No. 229 as amended falls within the State's police
power, and President Marcos' issuance of the same was clearly an exercise of
such power. The intent of the law can be clearly seen in the “WHEREASes” of
the assailed LOI (to prevent accidents, safeguard the safety of the public, and
adhere to the State's commitment to public international law). The Court later
went on a lengthy discourse in defining what police power is:
 "Nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty." (Chief Justice Taney, US Supreme Court Chief Justice, 1847)
 "The State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons
and property could thus be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to achieve the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State."
(Calalang v. Williams)
 "The power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people." (Primicias
v. Fugoso)
 "Inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." (Justice Malcolm)
 "The totality of legislative power." (Morfe v. Mutuc)
 "A dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined,
rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare."

53 - Eremes Kookooritchkin v. Solicitor General,

G.R. No. L-1812, August 27, 1948
FACTS:

In August 1941, appellee-petitioner Kookooritchkin filed with the CFI of

Camarines Sur a petition for naturalization, supported by (a) the affidavits of
ex-Judge Jaime M. Reyes and Dr. Salvador Mariano, residents of Camarines
Sur, (b) his declaration of intention which was sworn in July 1940, and (c)
notice of hearing. The petition was filed in August 1941 but was not heard
until August 28 and Sept. 30, 1947 when appellee-petitioner presented his
evidence, since the province was invaded by the Japanese forces during WWI
and the case records had to be reconstituted after being destroyed during the
war.
 Appellant SolGen cross-examined appellee-petitioner’s witnesses but
did not file any opposition and did not present any evidence to controvert the
petition. The CFI granted the petition for naturalization, finding that appellee-
petitioner was a native-born Russian who grew up as a citizen of and was part
of the military of the defunct Imperial Russian Government under the Czars.
He had several stints while in military service before he joined the White
Russian Army at Vladivostok and fought against the Bolsheviks until 1922
when the latter force defeated the former. Refusing to join the Bolshevik
regime, he fled by sea to Shanghai, and eventually went to Manila as part of
the group of White Russians under Admiral Stark in March 1923. He finally
permanently resided in Iriga, Camarines Sur except during his stint in the
guerrilla force in Caramoan from 1942 to July 1945. The lower court also
made findings of the establishment of his family, employment, social life, his
ability to speak and write English and Bicol, his good moral character,
adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, and
being a stateless refugee belonging to no State.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not appellee-petitioner’s declaration of intention to
become a Filipino citizen was valid and sufficient basis for his
petition for naturalization;
2. Whether or not appellee-petitioner sufficiently established legal
residence in the Philippines and could speak and write any of the
principal Philippine languages; and
3. Whether or not appellee-petitioner was stateless refugee.

HELD:

1. Section 5 of the Revised Naturalization Law applies and provides that

“[n]o declaration shall be valid until entry for permanent residence has
been established and a certificate showing the date, place and manner of
his arrival has been issued.” While appellees-petitioner’s declaration
was reconstituted, the attached certificate referred to in the declaration
was not reconstituted. The SC ruled that the law does not state that the
certificate is essential to the validity of the declaration as the only
requirement is for the said certificate to be issued. There is the
uncontroverted fact of appellee-petitioner’s peaceful and continuous
residence in the Philippines for 25 years and statement in his
declaration that a certificate had been attached to the said declaration.
 Hence, appellees-petitioner’s declaration was valid under law in view of
other competent evidence showing the facts sought to be established
under the certificate that was not reconstituted.
2. Appellee-petitioner has sufficiently shown legal residence in the
Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years as required
by Section 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law. In addition, appellee-
petitioner had good command of both English and Bicol. While there
may be many standards out there, none was set in the law on the
required ability to speak and write any of the principal Philippine
languages. Appellee-petitioner got along well with his comrades during
his hazardous days in the guerrilla movement thus showing that he
satisfied the requirement of the law. There was also circumstantial
evidence that appellee petitioner also ought to know how to write Bicol,
which uses the same alphabet used in English and so widely used in the
Philippines. Given his good command of English as shown in his
testimony, appellee-petitioner could easily make use of the same
alphabet in the place where he had been residing for 25 years.

3. Appellant SolGen asserted that appellee-petitioner failed to show that

he lost his citizenship under the laws of Russia and that Russia granted
to Filipinos the same right to be naturalized citizens. However, the SC
still found that lower court did not err in finding appellee-petitioner as a
stateless refugee. Appellee-petitioner’s testimony that he is not a
Russian citizen and that he has no citizenship is uncontroverted. There
is also the well known ruthlessness of modern dictatorships giving rise
to a great number of stateless refugees or displaced persons, without
country or flag. The tyrannical intolerance of dictatorships to opposition
translates into beastly oppression, concentration camps and bloody
purges, such that it is only natural that those who flee to other countries
to escape such a situation, such as appellee-petitioner, lose all bonds of
attachments to their former fatherlands.

54 - MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971

Facts:
 On 13 March 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung, a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, was permitted to come into the Philippines for a period of one
month until 13 April 1961 through a non-immigrant visa. On the date of her
arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this
country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After
repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines
up to 13 February 1962.

On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her
bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of
her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary
injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or
Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or
sisters-in-law. The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she
is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same
law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien
woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot
be denied the same privilege. 

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both
substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it every time
she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a
right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is not
vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as
the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-
born Filipinos. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding
court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared
to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya
Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

55. USA vs Purganan & Crespo, GR No. 148571, September 24, 2002

FACTS:

This petition is a sequel to Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion. Pursuant to

the existing RP – US Extradition Treaty, the U.S. government, through
diplomatic channels, requested from the RP the extradition of Mark Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.

Pursuant to Sec. 5 of the P.D. No. 1069 (Extradition Law), DFA

transmitted the extradition request to DOJ. Jimenez was granted a TRO that
prohibited DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.
However, the validity of the TRO was assailed by the Secretary of Justice but
the petition was dismissed. DOJ was ordered to furnish Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting documents, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file a comment with supporting evidence.

Secretary of Justice filed for a Motion for Reconsideration and the Court
reversed its earlier decision. It held that Mark Jimenez was bereft of the right
to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
The resolution became final and executory.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the government of U.S. represented by

DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate petition for extradition alleging that
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Florida in connection with the charges against him.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondent (Mark Jimenez) is entitled to Notice and

Hearing before the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

2. Whether or not the respondent is entitled to bail?

3. Whether or not there has been a violation of due process on the part of
the respondent?

RULING:

1. Whether or not the respondent (Mark Jimenez) is entitled to Notice and

Hearing before the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?

No. Sec. 6 of P.D. 1069 (Extradition Law) uses the word “immediate” to
qualify the arrest of the accused. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no
longer be considered “immediate”.

In Ho. Vs. People, never was a judge required to go to the extent of

conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining the
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All that is
required was that the Judge must have sufficient supporting documents
upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least,
 upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of
probable cause.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal

action, where in Notice and Hearing, the innocence and guilt of the
accused is being determined as the issue of the case. While in
extradition proceeding, the issue is whether the extraditee is to be
disposed to the requesting country based on the probable cause of the
case.

2. Whether or not the respondent is entitled to bail?

No. The petitioner claims that there is no provision in the Philippine

Constitution granting the right to bail to a person who is the subject of
an extradition request and arrest warrant.

Sec. 13 of Art. 3 of the Philippine Constitution as well as Sec. 4 of Rule

114 of Rules of Court does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts does not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Presumption of innocence is not an issue in extradition proceedings,

therefore constitutional bail will not apply. That the offense on which
Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the U.S. courts that will
conduct the trial to prove his innocence or guilt.

3. Whether or not there has been a violation of due process on the part of
the respondent?

No. The respondent will be given a full opportunity to be heard

subsequently, when the extradition courts hears the petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process.

56. THE ASYLUM CASE (COLOMBIA V. PERU, 17 ILR 28, ICJ REPORTS
NOVEMBER 20, 1950)
FACTS:
 On October 3rd, 1948, a military rebellion broke out in Peru and proceedings
were instituted against Haya de la Torre for the instigation and direction of
that rebellion. Three months after the rebellion, Torre fled to the Colombian
Embassy in Lima, Peru.
He was sought out by the Peruvian authorities, but without success; and after
asylum had been granted to the refugee, the Colombian Ambassador in Lima
requested a safe-conduct to enable Haya de la Torre, whom he qualified as a
political offender, to leave the country. This was granted in accordance with
Article 2(2) of the Havana Convention on Asylum of 1928. Subsequently, the
Ambassador also stated Colombia had qualified Torre as a political refugee in
accordance with Article 2 Montevideo Convention on Political Asylum of 1933
(note the term refugee is not the same as the Refugee Convention of 1951).
The Government of Peru refused to accept the unilateral qualification and
refused to grant safe passage, claiming that Haya de la Torre had committed
common crimes and was not entitled to enjoy the benefits of asylum.
A diplomatic correspondence ensued which terminated in the signature, in
Lima, on August 31st. 1949, of an Act by which the two Governments agreed
to submit the case to the International Court of Justice.
ISSUE/S:
1: Is Colombia competent, as the country that grants asylum, to unilaterally
qualify the offence for the purpose of asylum under treaty law and
international law?
2: Is Peru, as the territorial State, bound to give a guarantee of safe passage?
3: Did Colombia violate Article 1 and 2(2) of the Convention on Asylum of
1928 (Havana Convention) when it granted asylum and is the continued
maintenance of asylum a violation of the treaty?

HELD:
Colombia was not entitled to qualify unilaterally and in a manner binding
upon Peru the nature of the offence.
It declared that the Government of Peru was not bound to deliver a safe-
conduct to the refugee.
The Court rejected by fifteen votes to one the Peruvian contention that Haya
de la Torre was accused of common crimes; the Court noted that the only
count against Haya de la Torre was that of military rebellion and military
rebellion was not, in itself, a common crime.
1: The court stated that in the normal course of granting diplomatic asylum a
diplomatic representative has the competence to make a provisional
qualification of the offence (for example, as a political PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW A.Y. 2016-2017 Atty. Ryan Mercader 2K 68 offence)
and the territorial State has the right to give consent to this qualification. In
the Torre’s case, Colombia has asserted, as the State granting asylum, that it is
competent to qualify the nature of the offence in a unilateral and definitive
manner that is binding on Peru. The court had to decide if such a decision was
binding on Peru either because of treaty law (in particular the Havana
Convention of 1928 and the Montevideo Convention of 1933), other principles
of international law or by way of regional or local custom.
2: The court held that there was no legal obligation on Peru to grant safe
passage either because of the Havana Convention or customary law. In the
case of the Havana Convention, a plain reading of Article 2 results in an
obligation on the territorial state (Peru) to grant safe passage only after it
requests the asylum granting State (Columbia) to send the person granted
asylum outside its national territory (Peru). In this case the Peruvian
government had not asked that Torre leave Peru. On the contrary, it contested
the legality of asylum granted to him and refused to grant safe conduct.
3: Article 1 of the Havana Convention states that “It is not permissible for
States to grant asylum… to persons accused or condemned for common
crimes… (such persons) shall be surrendered upon request of the local
government.” In other words, the person-seeking asylum must not be accused
of a common crime (for example, murder would constitute a common crime,
while a political offence would not). The accusations that are relevant are
those made before the granting of asylum. Torre’s accusation related to a
military rebellion, which the court concluded was not a common crime and as
such the granting of asylum complied with Article 1 of the Convention. Article
2 (2) of the Havana Convention states that “Asylum granted to political
offenders in legations, warships, military camps or military aircraft, shall be
respected to the extent in which allowed, as a right or through humanitarian
toleration, by the usages, the conventions or the laws of the country in which
granted and in accordance with the following provisions: First: Asylum may
not be granted except in urgent cases and for the period of time strictly
indispensable for the person who has sought asylum to ensure in some other
way his safety.” An essential pre-requisite for the granting of asylum is the
urgency or, in other words, the presence of “an imminent or persistence of a
danger for the person of the refugee”. The court held that the facts of the case,
including the 3 months that passed between the rebellion and the time when
asylum was sought, did not establish the urgency criteria in this case (pp. 20
-23). The court held: “In principle, it is inconceivable that the Havana
Convention could have intended the term “urgent cases” to include the danger
of regular prosecution to which the citizens of any country lay themselves
open by attacking the institutions of that country… In principle, asylum cannot
be opposed to the operation of justice.” In other words, Torre was accused of a
crime but he could not be tried in a court because Colombia granted him
asylum. The court held that “protection from the operation of regular legal
proceedings” was not justified under diplomatic asylum. Asylum may be
granted on “humanitarian grounds to protect political prisoners against the
violent and disorderly action of irresponsible sections of the population.” (for
example during a mob attack where PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW A.Y. 2016-
2017 Atty. Ryan Mercader 2K 69 the territorial State is unable to protect the
offender). Torre was not in such a situation at the time when he sought refuge
in the Colombian Embassy at Lima

57. US (North American Dredging Co) vs Mexico, General Claims

Commission, 1926

FACTS

On November 23, 1912, the North American Dredging Company of Texas, an

American corporation, entered into a contract with the Government of Mexico
for dredging at the port of Salina Cruz.

Article 18 of the subject contract states:

“The contractor and all persons who, as employees or in any other capacity,
may be engaged in the execution of the work under this contract either
directly or indirectly, shall be considered as Mexicans in all matters, within
the Republic of Mexico, concerning the execution of such work and the
fulfilment of this contract. They shall not claim, nor shall they have, with
regard to the interests and the business connected with this contract, any
other rights or means to enforce the same than those granted by the laws of
the Republic to Mexicans, nor shall they enjoy any other rights than those
established in favor of Mexicans. They are consequently deprived of any
rights as aliens, and under no conditions shall the intervention of foreign
diplomatic agents be permitted, in any matter related to this contract."
(This clause is termed as the “Calvo clause”)
The company, inconsistent with the Calvo clause, sought the aid of the
American government instead of enforcing their claim in accordance with the
laws of the Republic of Mexico.

Note: The reasons for the breach of contract presumably done by the Mexican
Government (since it was the company seeking claims for damages) was not
stated in the original text.

ISSUE of the CASE

1. Whether or not the Calvo clause precludes a state from exercising its
sovereign right to protect its citizens which may be found on a foreign
state.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

The commission does not hesitate to declare that there exists no inter-
national rule prohibiting the sovereign right of a nation to protect its
citizens abroad from being subject to any limitation whatsoever under any
circum-stances.

What Mexico has asked of the North American Dredging Company of Texas
as a condition for awarding it the contract which it sought is, "If all of the
means of enforcing your rights under this contract afforded by Mexican law,
even against the Mexican Government itself, are wide open to you, as they
are wide open to our own citizens, will you promise not to ignore them and
 not to call directly upon your own Government to intervene in your behalf in
connexion with any controversy, small or large, but seek redress under the
laws of Mexico through the authorities and tribunals furnished by Mexico
for your protection?" and the claimant, by subscribing to this contract and
seeking the benefits which were to accrue to him there-under, has
answered, "I promise".

Under the rules of international law may an alien lawfully make such a
promise? The Commission holds that he may, but at the same time holds of
that he can not deprive the government of his nation of its undoubted right
of applying international remedies to violations of international law
committed to his damage. Such government frequently has a larger interest
in maintaining the principles of international law than in recovering damage
for one of its citizens in a particular case, and manifestly such citizen can not
by contract tie in this respect the hands of his Government. But while any
attempt to so bind his Government is void, the Commission has not found
any generally recognized rule of positive international law which would give
to his Government the right to intervene to strike down a lawful contract, in
the terms set forth in the preceding paragraph 10, entered into by its citizen.

ICJ RULING:

The Commission decides that the case as presented is not within its
jurisdiction and the motion of the Mexican Agent to dismiss it is sustained and
the case is hereby dismissed without prejudice to the claimant to pursue his
remedies elsewhere or to seek remedies before this Commission for claims
ansing after the signing of the Treaty of September 8, 1923.

Case No. 58.

Count Folke Bernadotte, 1949 ICJ Rep. 147
FACTS:
As a consequence of the assassination in September 1948, in Jerusalem, of
Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, and other
members of the United Nations Mission to Palestine, the General Assembly
asked the Court whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an
international claim against the State responsible with a view to obtaining
reparation for damage caused to the Organization and to the victim. If this
question were answered in the affirmative, it was further asked in what
manner the action taken by the United Nations could be reconciled with such
rights as might be possessed by the State of which the victim was a national.

ISSUE:
Whether or not in the event of an agent of the United Nations in the
performance of his duties suffering injury in circumstances involving the
responsibility of a State, the United Nations, as an Organization, has the
capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible de jure or de
facto government.

HELD:
YES. In its Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, the Court held that the
Organization was intended to exercise functions and rights which could only
be explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international
personality and the capacity to operate upon the international plane. It
followed that the Organization had the capacity to bring a claim and to give it
the character of an international action for reparation for the damage that had
been caused to it. The Court further declared that the Organization can claim
reparation not only in respect of damage caused to itself, but also in respect of
damage suffered by the victim or persons entitled through him. Although,
according to the traditional rule, diplomatic protection had to be exercised by
the national State, the Organization should be regarded in international law as
possessing the powers which, even if they are not expressly stated in the
Charter, are conferred upon the Organization as being essential to the
discharge of its functions. The Organization may require to entrust its agents
with important missions in disturbed parts of the world. In such cases, it is
necessary that the agents should receive suitable support and protection.

The Court therefore found that the Organization has the capacity to claim
appropriate reparation, including also reparation for damage suffered by the
victim or by persons entitled through him. The risk of possible competition
between the Organization and the victim’s national State could be eliminated
either by means of a general convention or by a particular agreement in any
individual case.
59. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG VS HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLLALIA, JR.
GR NO. 153675, APRIL 19, 2007

FACTS:
The Republic of the Philippines and Hong Kong signed an agreement for the
surrender of Accused and Convicted Person, it took effect on June 20, 1997.
Private respondent Munoz, was charge before the Hong Kong Court with three
(3) counts of offense of accepting an advantage as agent and seven (7) counts
of conspiracy to defraud. The Hong Kong court issued a warrant of arrest
against Munoz.
The DOJ receive a request from the Hong Kong department of Justice for the
provisional arrest of Munoz. Which was forwarded to the NBI, likewise NBI
filed with the RTC of Manila an application for the provisional arrest of private
respondent. On September 23, 1999, RTC issued an Order of arrest against
Munoz, at the same day Munoz was arrested and detained by the NBI.
On November 22, 1999, Hong Kong filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for
extradition of Munoz. Likewise, Munoz filed a petition for bail, which was
denied by the judge Bernardo on the ground that there is no Philippine law
granting bail in extradition cases and Munoz is a high “Flight Risk”. The Case
re raffled to respondent Judge Olalia after Judge Bernardo inhibited himself
form the case. Respondent Judge then approve the bail, after a motion of
reconsideration was filed by Munoz.
Petitioner then filed an urgent motion to vacate the order of approving the
bail of Munoz, which the respondent judge denied. Hence the Petition to the
Supreme Court. Petitioner contends that the right to bail is solely in criminal
proceeding, and that there is nothing in the constitution or statutory law
providing that a potential extradite has a right to bail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not in extradite proceedings, the right of bail is allowed?
HELD:
Yes. Sec (2) of PD no. 1069 or the Philippine Extradition Law defines
extradition as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object
of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting
state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
directly against him or execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal
or criminal law of the requesting state or government. Extradition is the right
of foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused
or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction and the correlative
duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. This
extradition is not a criminal proceeding, but an administrative in character. Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and
to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. It may not be a criminal proceeding but it is characterized by: a)
The deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite and b) the
means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of
criminal law or the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused.
While extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for
bail, a right to due process under the Constitution. In the case at bar, Munoz
was detain on September 1999 to December 2001 or two (2) years without
being convicted of any crime. Such extended period of detention is a serious
deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged
deprivation of liberty that the petition for bail was granted. The time
honoured principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines
honor its obligation under Extradition Treaty, failure to comply with these
obligation is a set back in our foreign relation PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.Y. 2016-2017 Atty. Ryan Mercader 2K 223 and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligation, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s right
to life, liberty, and due process

60.
 61. Brownwell vs Sun Life, GR No. L-5731, June 22, 1954
FACTS:

Subject of this petition is the endowment policy which

insured Aihara and Gayapan and upon its maturity the proceeds
were payable to said insured. Brownell instituted this case to
compel Sun Life to comply with the demand to pay representing
the half of the proceeds of endowment policy and payable to one
Naogiro Aihara, a Japanese national. Such claim is based on
Section 5(b)
(2) of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States. Which
claim was approved and granted by the lower court ordering
SLACOC to pay herein petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not such Act is still binding despite the complete

independence of the Philippines from American government?

HELD:

Yes.

The extension of the Philippine Property Act of 1946 is

clearly implied from the acts of the President of the Philippines
and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, as well as by the enactment of
R.A. Nos. 7, 8 and 477.

62. TECHT V. HUGHES, 229 NY 222

Facts. Techt’s (D) dad who was an American citizen, died intestate in New
York. His daughter, Techt (D) had tied the knot with an Austro-Hungarian
citizen and under federal law at the time; she had lost her United States
citizenship as a result. The New York law allowed Techt (D) to take property
as inheritance if she were to be an alien friend. When the court established
this fact and that she could claim half the inheritance, her sister appealed on
the ground that she was entitled to the whole property because Techt (D) was
an alien enemy. The appeals court found Techt (D) to be an alien enemy at this
time because the U.S. was at war with Austria-Hungary in 1919. Techt (D0
however based her argument on the terms of the Treaty of 1848 between the
U.S. and Austria nationals of either state could take real property by descent.
Issue. Must the court decide whether the provision involved in a controversy
is inconsistent with national policy or safety in a situation whereby a treaty
between belligerents at war has not been denounced?

Held. (Cardozo, J.) Yes. The court must decide whether the provision involved
in a controversy is inconsistent with national policy or safety in a situation
whereby a treaty between belligerents at war has not been denounced. If a
treaty is in force, it implies that it is the supreme law of the land. There is
nothing incompatible with the policy of the government, safety of the nation,
or the maintenance of the war in the enforcement of this treaty, so as to
sustain Techt’s (D) title. Affirmed.

Discussion. The effect of war on the existing treaties of belligerents is an

unsettled area of the law and this was noted by the court.   Some have opined
that treaties end ipso facto at time of war. But in this case, the court found that
treaties end only to the extent that their execution is incompatible with the
war.

63. Filipinas v Christern G.R. No. L-2294 May 25, 1951

Facts:

Christern obtained from Filipinas a fire insurance policy of P1000,000,

covering merchandise contained in a building located at Binondo. During the
Japanese military occupation, the building and insured merchandise were
burned. The respondent its claim under the policy. The total loss suffered by
the respondent was fixed at P92,650.

The petitioner refused to pay the claim on the ground that the policy in favor
of the respondent had ceased to be in force on the date the U.S. declared war
on Germany with the respondent Corporation being controlled by German
subjects and the petitioner being a company under American jurisdiction
(though organized by Philippine laws) when the policy was issued on October
1, 1941. The petitioner, however, paid to the respondent the sum of P92,650
on April 19, 1943 under orders from the military government.

The insurer filed for a suit to recover the sum. The contention was that the
policy ceased to be effective because of the outbreak of the war and that the
payment made by the petitioner to the respondent corporation during the
Japanese military occupation was under pressure.

The tiral and the appellate courts dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals
claimed that a corporation is a citizen of the country or state by and under the
laws of which it was created or organized.
 
Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the policy in question became null and void upon the declaration of
war

HELD:

Yes. Petition granted.

The majority of the stockholders of the respondent corporation were German

subjects. The respondent became an enemy corporation upon the outbreak of
the war. The English and American cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals
have lost their force in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in Clark vs. Uebersee Finanz Korporation where the controls
test has been adopted.

Measures of blocking foreign funds, the so called freezing regulations, and

other administrative practice in the treatment of foreign-owned property in
the United States allowed to large degree the determination of enemy interest
in domestic corporations and thus the application of the control test. In Clark
vs. Uebersee, the court held that “The property of all foreign interest was
placed within the reach of the vesting power (of the Alien Property Custodian)
not to appropriate friendly or neutral assets but to reach enemy interest
which masqueraded under those innocent fronts. . . . The power of seizure and
vesting was extended to all property of any foreign country or national so that
no innocent appearing device could become a Trojan horse.”
The Philippine Insurance Law states that “anyone except a public enemy may
be insured.” It stands to reason that an insurance policy ceases to be allowable
as soon as an insured becomes a public enemy.

“All individuals therefore, who compose the belligerent powers, exist, as to

each other, in a state of utter exclusion, and are public enemies.”

Vance- “In the case of an ordinary fire policy, which grants insurance only
from year, or for some other specified term it is plain that when the parties
become alien enemies, the contractual tie is broken and the contractual rights
of the parties, so far as not vested, are lost.”

The respondent having become an enemy corporation on December 10, 1941,

the insurance policy issued in its favor on October 1, 1941, by the petitioner
had ceased to be valid and enforceable, and since the insured goods were
burned after December 10, 1941, and during the war, the respondent was not
entitled to any indemnity under said policy from the petitioner. The premium
must be returned for the sake of justice.

It results that the petitioner is entitled to recover the indemnity paid.

However, the petitioner will be entitled to recover only the equivalent of
P92,650 paid on April 19, 1943.

64. Laurel vs Misa, 77 Phil 856

FACTS:

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by Anastacio Laurel. He claims that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and consequently the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizen
thereto were then suspended; and that there was a change of sovereignty
over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE ABSOLUTE ALLEGIANCE OF A FILIPINO
CITIZEN TO THE GOVERNMENT BECOMES SUSPENDED
DURING ENEMY OCCUPATION.

HELD:

No. The absolute and permanent allegiance (Permanent allegiance is the

unending allegiance owed by citizens or subjects to their states. Generally, a
person who owes permanent allegiance to a state is called a national.) of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated (repealed) or severed by the
enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign
de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier. It remains vested in the
legitimate government. (Article II, section 1, of the Constitution provides that
"Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.")

What may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the
control and government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes
temporarily to the occupant. The political laws which prescribe the
reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and citizens, are
suspended in abeyance during military occupation.

65. REPUBLIC vs. LARA

FACTS
The land in question was occupied by the enemy forces during the later part
(1943) of the Japanese occupation. It was converted into a campsite and
airfield. The Japanese forces built concrete airstrips, concrete taxi-ways, dug-
outs, canals, concrete ramps, ditches, gravel roads, and air raid shelters. Upon
liberation, the United States Army took possession of the airfield; and on July
4, 1946, the air base was handed over by the U.S. government to the Armed
Forces of the Philippines. The Philippine Army then took steps to negotiate for
the purchase of the area for the purpose of constructing thereat a permanent
air base. A committee was appointed to make an appraisal of the parcels
covered; several land-owners sold their properties to the government at the
prices fixed by the Appraisal Committee. The extrajudicial negotiations,
however, fell through with respect to the greater majority of the land owners,
who did not want to accept the prices offered by the government.
A complaint for expropriation was filed by the Republic in the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, describing in detail the 187 parcels sought to be
expropriated.
The lower Court fixed the provisional value of the parcels in question at
P117,097.52, which amount the plaintiff deposited with the Philippine
National Bank to the credit of the City Treasurer of Lipa. As none of the
defendants questioned the purpose of the expropriation in their respective
answers, the lower Court appointed three commissioners to view the land,
hear the evidence, and ascertain the just and reasonable compensation for the
properties sought to be taken.
In the meantime, many of the defendants, with the approval of the Court,
made withdrawals from the provisional deposit made by the government.
The Republic of the Philippines as well as defendants Enrique Lara, et al.,
appealed this decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
The basic dispute naturally lies on the reasonable value of the lands sought to
be expropriated, with the question of the extent of damages and interest
payable to the defendants as a secondary issue.
One of the contentions of defendants-appellants is that they should be
compensated for the concrete air strips, runway, and taxi way built by the
Japanese Army on the ground that a belligerent occupant could not take
private property without compensation; that the Japanese forces were
possessors of their lands in bad faith; and that therefore, the improvements
constructed thereon by them should, under our civil law, belong to the owners
of the lands to which they are attached.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is under obligation to pay
indemnity for improvements made by the belligerent Japanese on private
properties they have occupied.
Whether or not a belligerent occupant could take private property without
compensation.
HELD
1. No. While the defendants-appellants remained the owners of their
respective lands, The Republic of the Philippines succeeded to the
ownership or possession of the constructions made thereon by the
enemy occupant for war purposes, unless the treaty of peace should
otherwise provide; and it is under no obligation to pay indemnity for
such constructions and improvements in these expropriation
proceedings. The rules of Civil Code concerning industrial accession
were not designed to regulate relations between private persons and a
sovereign belligerent, nor intended to apply to constructions made
exclusively for prosecuting a war, when military necessity is
temporarily paramount.

2. While art. 46 of the Hague Regulations provide that "private property

may not be confiscated", confiscation differs from the temporary use by
the enemy occupant of private land and buildings for all kinds of
purposes demanded by the necessities; thus, the U.S. War Department
Rules of Land Warfare of 1940 provide that —
the rule requiring respect for private property is not violated through
damage resulting from operations, movement, or combats of the army,
that is, real estate may be utilized for marches, campsites, construction
of trenches, etc. Buildings may be used for shelter for troops, the sick
and wounded, for animals, for reconnaisance, cover defense, etc. Fences,
woods, crops, buildings, etc. may be demolished, cut down, and
removed to clear a field of fire, to construct bridges, to furnish fuel if
imperatively needed for the army. (Quoted in Hyde, Int. Law, Vol. II, p.
1894)
Consequently, the Japanese occupant is not regarded as a possessor in
bad faith of the lands taken from the defendants-appellants and
converted into an airfield and campsite; its use thereof was merely
temporary, demanded by war necessities and exigencies.

66. CO Kim Cham vs Valdez Tan Keh (G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945)

FACTS:
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings in a civil case
which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the
proclamation issued by General MacArthur that “all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said
Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control” had the effect of invalidating
and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in
the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling
law granting such authority.

During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the

organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the
Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and
proceedings of the courts during a de facto government are good and valid.

1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings
of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are
good and valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in
his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to
occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is
one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We,
therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror,
for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his
possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of
such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are
derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world,
and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from
the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws
which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts
so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He,
nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure
either change the existing laws or make new ones.”
According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory
which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate
government of sovereignty, “does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the
effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his
competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a
political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect
during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same
time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good.

That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are
not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory
occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by
General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all
laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said
proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.

67. G.R. No. L-1870 February 27, 1948

ANTONIO C. OGNIR, Petitioner, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, Respondent.
FACTS
The petitioner was convicted by the General Court Martial appointed or convened during the year 1943 in
Lanao by Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District of Mindanao, and
sentenced to life imprisonment, for violation of the 93rd Article of War of the Philippine Army. He now
claims that his imprisonment is null and void because the said General Court-Martial was not legally
constituted, inasmuch as District Commander that appointed or convened it had no authority to do so, and
therefore the judgment of said court is null and void for want of jurisdiction. The court held that Col.
Wendel W. Fertig was not empowered by the President of the Commonwealth, or by General McArthur,
Supreme Commander of the U.S. Army in Southwest Pacific Area to appoint a General Court-Martial and
so hold that the judgment rendered by the General Court Martial is null and void, because said court was
not duly convened or appointed in accordance with law and therefore, had no jurisdiction to render said
sentence. A motion for reconsideration of our decision was filed in this case by the Judge Advocate
General of the Philippine Army and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres.
ISSUE
Whether or not the decision of the General Court-Martial which convicted the petitioner may be given the
same effects as the actuation of the civil courts during the Japanese occupation.
HELD
No. The contention that the proceedings of the General Court-Martial under consideration "may be given
effect as the actuation of de facto officers in the same manner as the pronouncement of Civil Tribunals set
up during the second Republic." is untenable; because there is no analogy between the decision of the
courts established by the Military Government or the so-called second Republic, and that of the General
Court-Martial which convicted the petitioner. The Courts of the Commonwealth legally constituted which
were continued during the so-called Philippine Republic, and the other courts during the Japanese
occupation were legally created by laws which, under the International Law, the military occupant had the
right to promulgate. While the said General Court-Martial was created or convened by an officer having
no power or authority to do so.