Technical Note:: Process and Guidewords For Procedural Hazops
Technical Note:: Process and Guidewords For Procedural Hazops
Technical note:
Process and
guidewords for
procedural HAZOPs
When organisations develop new processes or
procedures or revise existing ones, there is great
value in stress-testing the proposed new
arrangements to ensure they will work as intended,
and will not generate unintended adverse
consequences. Procedural HAZOPs provide one way
of doing this. This technical note outlines the process
we use for procedural HAZOPs and the guidewords
we recommend for such studies.
Version 4, 2018
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Contents
1 Background 3
5 Contact 8
Tables
Table 1: Guidewords for a procedural HAZOP 6
1 Background
The hazard and operability (HAZOP) process has been applied traditionally to
chemical, petrochemical and related processing plants and systems. There it is
used to investigate the causes, controls and consequences of events or
circumstances that might cause the system to function outside its designed
‘normal’ and ‘safe’ operating states.
Despite its origins in the chemical and petrochemical sector, the HAZOP process
works very well for all systems and processes, both technical and non-technical.
It is now applied in diverse range of applications such as software development,
procedure writing, contract development and organisational change.
The HAZOP process examines each of the critical properties of a system in turn.
It stresses each one by discussing what could cause that property to move
outside the envelope that is regarded as safe. This facilitates the specification
and design of controls that ensure the system never becomes ‘unsafe’. Unsafe
in this context means unacceptable in terms of performance when compared
with the organisation’s objectives.
their performance regularly once they are in place. Many organisations have
felt the adverse effects of procedures that have been poorly designed or poorly
implemented.
Risk management is concerned with adding value and providing the means for
managers to make confident and soundly based decisions. A HAZOP study is a
form of risk assessment that can be applied to procedures, whether they are
being designed, being implemented or already in place and working.
Like any form of risk assessment, the context for the procedure should be
established in terms of:
• Its purpose and how it is intended to contribute to the organisation’s
overall objectives
• Its scope of application
• The stakeholders associated with the procedure and their objectives
• The external and internal factors that might influence the procedure and
the way it works.
Establishing the context takes place before the risk assessment, and it only
involves a few people for a few hours. The outcomes should be recorded in a
briefing note for the HAZOP workshop participants.
Before the workshop, the procedure should be split into ‘key elements’ to
facilitate a comprehensive examination. Often the most appropriate key
Process and guidewords for
procedural HAZOPs elements are the steps in the procedure. The elements may be extended to
Commercial in confidence include the application of the procedure in different circumstances, supporting
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Participants
Conduct
Typically, a HAZOP workshop takes from two to four hours, depending on the
complexity of the procedure.
The workshop should start with a quick review and update to the statements in
the briefing note. The base guideword set shown in Table 1 below is then used
to prompt risk identification. The facilitator may choose to add guidewords that
are relevant for the organisation or the specific application.
The facilitator should help the team work through the guideword list and apply
each guideword to each of the key elements in turn. Some guidewords may be
irrelevant for some key elements and they can be omitted. In each case, the
team should discuss:
• What might cause the circumstances described by the guideword
• The nature and extent of the consequences if that situation occurred
• The controls in place to change the likelihood of that situation arising or the
consequences if it did arise
• Any further controls that would be required to treat the risk
• The priority for risk treatment action, using the organisation’s normal risk
rating process.
Outcomes
More radical solutions might involve greater automation rather than manual
processing, or even stopping the process or the procedural change if it were
judged that the risk remained too high.
All proposed risk treatment actions should be costed, and the costs should be
considered in the overall cost benefit analysis that is used to justify the
procedure or the procedural change. Where the costs and benefits are not
tangible or cannot be expressed easily in a single metric, such as dollars, then
qualitative cost benefit analysis should be applied.
5 Reference
The international standard IEC 61882-2016 Hazard and operability studies
(HAZOP studies) - Application guide describes the HAZOP process id detail, with
a focus on production and related technical systems. Procedural HAZOP follows
the same principles, with a slightly different focus.
6 Contact
If you would like further information about this topic please contact us. We will
endeavour to reply promptly.
Dr Dale F Cooper
[email protected]
Pauline Bosnich
[email protected]
Dr Stephen Grey
[email protected]
Process and guidewords for
procedural HAZOPs Grant Purdy
Commercial in confidence
[email protected]
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Geoff Raymond
[email protected]
Mike Wood
[email protected]