RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND WRIT OF AMPARO

Constitutional Law 2 Report

Rights of the Accused

INTRODUCTION

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 13, Art. III
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

Sec. 14, Art. III

(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

DEFINITION OF “ACCUSED”
The accused is a person under investigation who is found probably guilty of the commission
of a crime. These persons have been arrested for or formally charged with a crime, and are
entitled to another set of rights in order for them to be heard in court before the judgment is
rendered.

ENUMERATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

1. Right to Criminal Due Process

Criminal due process is when the criminal procedures established by law are being
followed fairly and equally to all accused persons in proving criminal liability. A
procedure follows due process when it fully protects life, liberty, and property of the
accused by affording them procedures to be heard before being condemned, to be
informed of the charges against them and the evidence where the charges rest on,
and to have full opportunity to rebut it.

As such, the requisites of criminal due process are the following:

a. Accused is heard by a court of competent jurisdiction;
b. Accused is proceeded against under the orderly process of law;
c. Accused is given notice and opportunity to be heard; and

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d. Judgment rendered is within the authority of a constitutional law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.

[G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000.]
PUNO, J.

DOCTRINE: It has been held that it is inhuman to require an insane or imbecilic accused to make a
just defense for his life or liberty. To put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and
sentence them is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process of law..

FACTS: Roberto Estrada, accused-appellant, interrupted the sacrament of confirmation in the St.
John’s Cathedral in Dagupan City by sitting on the Bishop’s chair while the Bishop was giving his final
blessing. As such, the churchgoers signalled Rogelio Mararac, security guard of the cathedral, to
move Estrada away from the Bishop’s chair and the altar of the cathedral. Using his nightstick,
Rogelio Mararac tapped the accused-appellant to catch his attention. Suddenly, the
accused-appellant drew a knife from his back and began stabbing Mararac, then grabbed the
microphone and shouted, “Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can beat me here!)”. Thereafter, the
accused-appellant returned to the Bishop’s seat until the police came, whom he wrestled with until
the Chief Inspector subdued the accused-appellant. Meanwhile, Mararac died due to cardiac arrest
and hemorrhage caused by stab wounds.

The accused-appellant’s history of mental illness was brought to the court’s attention on the day of
arraignment. As such, the counsel moved for the suspension of the case, since his client could not
properly enter a plea due to his mental condition. However, instead of submitting the accused to a
mental examination, the presiding judge asked various questions to the accused, which he was able
to answer. His ability to answer was enough for the judge to conclude the sanity and fitness of the
accused to stand trial.

Moreover, motions filed by the counsel of the accused-appellant, leading to the accused-appellant’s
proof of insanity, were denied by the Court, despite the testimonies of physicians in the Department
of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital diagnosing him with "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid
Type-schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type”. These were the “Demurrer to Evidence”,
claiming that the accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his acts due to
unsound mind, and “Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination”
due to his unusual and uncomfortable behavior in the city jail with his inmates.

These actions by the court led to finding the accused-appellant guilty of murder with cruelty.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty despite clear and
convincing evidence on record, supporting his plea of insanity (YES)

RULING: Yes, the lower court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty without determining the
state of the accused-appellant’s mental health through a proper mental examination, and without
considering the clear and convincing evidence supporting his plea of insanity. According to the
Revised Penal Code and the Rules on Criminal Procedure, imbecility and insanity are circumstances
which exempt one from criminal liability, and are reasons to authorize the suspension of arraignment
and trial. In this case, the judge’s discretion in determining insanity was not equipped with the

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specialized knowledge of a psychiatrist or psychologist. Furthermore, the clear and incontrovertible

testimonies of medical experts in the Baguio General Hospital presented the mental illnesses
suffered by the accused-appellant.

Suspending the arraignment and trial due to insanity are valid, because the accused is unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto, depriving the Court of an
accurate, competent and fair trial. Requiring an insane accused to make a just defense deprives them
from a fair trial and due process of law. The societal goal of institutionalized retribution may be
frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot comprehend its
significance.

ISIDRO T. HILDAWA, petitioner, vs. MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, et al.,
respondents

[G.R. No. L-67766. August 14, 1986.]

RELOVA, J: Petitioners pray that a "preliminary injunction issue directing respondents to recall the
crime busters and restraining them from fielding police teams or any of this sort with
authority/license to kill and after hearing, declaring the order of respondents fielding crime busters
null and void and making the injunction permanent."

DOCTRINE: Due process of law requires that the accused must be heard in court of competent
jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within
the authority of a constitutional law.

FACTS:

Respondents denied the existence of an executive or administrative order authorizing secret

marshals or crime busters to shoot and disable suspected criminals. They are subject to the same law
as other peace officers. They do not enjoy any more immunity than are enjoyed by all law
enforcement officials. The formation and fielding of these special operation teams in Metro Manila, or
the crime busters as they are now known "was impelled by the proliferation of robbery/holdups and
other crimes against passengers of public conveyances."

Petitioners failed to present copies of the alleged executive or administrative order. They even
admitted in Court that they have not seen, much less, read one.

ISSUES: Whether or not special operations team formed to conduct a concentrated campaign
against criminal elements is violative of the Constitution

RULING:

There is nothing wrong in the creation and deployment of special operation teams to counter the
resurgence of criminality, as there is nothing wrong in the formation by the police of special
teams/squads to prevent the proliferation of vices, prostitution, drug addiction, pornography and the
like. That is the basic job of the Police. What is bad is if they kill these "criminals" because then they

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are not only law enforcers but also the prosecutors, the judges and the executioners.

Violence does not find support in a democratic society where the rule of law prevails. It is our way of
life that a man is entitled to due process which simply means that before he can be deprived of his
life, liberty or property, he must be given an opportunity to defend himself. Due process of law
requires that the accused must be heard in court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under
the orderly process of law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with
an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law.

Whenever a person suspected of a crime is killed under the circumstances alleged during the
hearing, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) should investigate to find out who the
assailant was and the reason for the death of the victim. It need not wait for a formal complaint to be
lodged by the relatives of the deceased.

GALMAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

[G.R. No. 72670. September 12, 1986]

DOCTRINE: Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. The courts would have no
reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to
subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and
committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or
the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics
and prejudice

FACTS:

On August 21, 1983, Senator Benigno Aquino was assassinated at the Manila International Airport.
Within a span of three hours, the military investigators reported that the man who shot Aquino was
Rolando Galman, a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in
turn. Thereafter, the outrage caused by the event constrained then President Marcos to create a Fact
Finding Board to investigate said assassination.

Both the majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version and that Ninoy's
assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. But the President
insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's assassin.

Thus, on November 1985, petitioners filed the present action alleging that respondents Tanodbayan
and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

Eventually, the Court created and appointed a three-member commission composed of retired SC
Justice Vasquez and retired Intermediate Appellate Court Justices German and Caguioa. The
commission, then, submitted its findings which are of follows:

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· The Office of the Tanodbayan originally viewed that all of the 26 named in the Agrava Board
majority report should all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the death of
Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman

· That President Marcos summoned specific members of the Tanodbayan upon learning the
impending filing of the said charge before the Sandiganbayan and that the Special Investigating
Panel having already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action

· That in said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his disagreement with the
recommendation but was convinced of the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so
that, after being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view of the
doctrine of double jeopardy

· That several accused be 'categorized,’ reducing some to mere accomplices and accessories in
order to be assured that not all of the accused would be denied bail during the trial

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused (YES)

RULING:

Yes. The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in
the Aquino-Galman murder cases.

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. Jurisdiction over cases should be
determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive, which could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. This criminal collusion
as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang
conference completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The
courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the
people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake

ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS
MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents.

[G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003.]

CALLEJO, SR., J: This is a petition for review on certiorari denying the motion for reconsideration of
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5, on the civil aspect
thereof and to allow her to present evidence thereon.

DOCTRINE: If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or
renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but
also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect

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of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due
process is thereby violated.

FACTS:

An Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena
Jaucian Timario. After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
with Leave of Court alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged. The prosecution
filed its comment/opposition to the petitioner's demurrer to evidence. The trial court rendered
judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the private
complainant the amount of the check as payment for her purchase.

Within the reglementary period therefore, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the
civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence, the court issued an
order denying the motion.

ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process as she was not given the opportunity
to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private respondent.

RULING: The petition is meritorious.

The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution
has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but also on the civil
aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not only on the
criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof.

When the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet adduced evidence both on
the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial judgment granting the
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the
petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private complainant to
adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their surrebuttal evidence.

The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an order
granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil.
However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner to
pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce
evidence thereon.

Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.

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2. Right to Bail
Bail is available to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the Court. The basis of the bail is the presumption of innocence on an
accused who should not be incarcerated at the outset and should be given the liberty
to prepare for their defense before the Court.

In order to be entitled to apply for bail, he must already be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. One is under the custody of the law either when he
has been arrested or has surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the court. They may
avail of it from the very moment of arrest up to the time of conviction by final
judgment.

However, those charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, when the evidence against them is strong, and those
military men who participated in a failed coup d’etat cannot avail of bail. At the same
time, bail becomes a matter of discretion of the Court, requiring a hearing and
opportunity for the prosecution to present its evidence.

Finally, in extradition proceedings, there is no provision prohibiting them from filing a

motion for bail, despite the fact that the extradition law does not provide for this grant
and bail being traditionally available in criminal proceedings only.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LUZVIMINDA S. VALDEZ and THE SANDIGANBAYAN
(FIFTH DIVISION), respondents.

[G.R. Nos. 216007-09. December 8, 2015.]

PERALTA, J: This special civil action for certiorari seeks to nullify and set aside the October 10, 2014
Resolution of public respondent Sandiganbayan Fifth Division.

DOCTRINE: Consistent with Miranda v. Tuliao, an affirmative relief may be obtained from the court
despite the accused being still at large. Except in petition for bail, custody of the law is not required
for the adjudication of reliefs sought by the defendant (such as a motion to set aside no bail
recommendation and to fix the amount of bail in this case) where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

FACTS:

The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit executed by Sheila S. VelmontePortal and Mylene T.
Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a
post-audit of the disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects
thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of private respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a
former mayor of Bacolod City.

Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official receipts, it was

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alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to claim/receive reimbursement
from the Government. The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of the
Ombudsman — Visayas received the joint affidavit, which was thereafter resolved adverse to Valdez.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half were for the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents under Articles 217 and 171, in relation to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail", Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of a
Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail. Due to the issuance and
release of a warrant of arrest, Valdez subsequently filed an Urgent Supplemental Motion to the
Motion to Set Aside No Bail Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail with Additional Prayer to
Recall/Lift Warrant of Arrest. Public respondent granted the motions of Valdez. It recalled the arrest
order.

In lieu thereof, a new arrest order was issued, fixing the bail for each offense charged in said cases in
the amount of P200,000.00. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter before the Court.

ISSUES: Whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to
bail as a matter of right.

RULING: We disagree.

Citing People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al., in relation to Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and Section
7, Rule 114 of the Rules, it was held that Mañalac, Jr. is not entitled to bail as a matter of right since he
is charged with a crime whose penalty is reclusion perpetua. To recall, the amounts involved in
Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of P22,000.00. We opined that the Sandiganbayan correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible
penalty.

At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00.
Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged and proved during the trial. For
purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to rule that the supposed crime committed is a
complex crime since it is only when the trial has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as
a means of committing malversation.

Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the constituent offenses, i.e., either
malversation or falsification, or worse, none of them, would be proven after a full-blown trial. It would
be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the same only after trial if it
turns out that there is no complex crime committed.

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),

AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

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[G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.]

BERSAMIN, J: Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to
assail and annul the resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), where he has been
charged with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively
denied his Motion to Fix Bail and his Motion for Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

DOCTRINE: The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of
the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the accused's propensity for flight or for causing
harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused
appears at trial.

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan
on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and
Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable
cause be found against him.

ISSUES: Whether or not Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right

RULING: The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption
of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right
to be released on bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any punishment
on the accused.

The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.

Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion. The general rule is, therefore, that any
person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.

Enrile's poor health justifies his admission to bail. We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to
Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor,
namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and
that he voluntarily surrendered. Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile's
averment on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the

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crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion perpetua, simply because the
determination, being primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, petitioner , vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 189122. March 17, 2010.]
CORONA, J.

DOCTRINE: In the exercise of that discretion [in the grant of bail pending appeal], the proper courts
are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the
accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.

FACTS:

Petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the RTC of Makati City for homicide and sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day to 12 years and one day. While appealing
his conviction to the Court of Appeals, he filed an application for admission to bail pending appeal,
citin his advanced age and health condition, and claiming that there is no risk or possibility of flight
on his part. The Court of Appeals denied his application, and ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an
ailing or aged detainee or prisoner. At the same time, the petitioner failed to show that he suffers
from an ailment that should be seriously considered in his application for bail.

The petitioner now questions the grave abuse of discretion in denying his application, considering
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court on bail when discretionary, seen below. He believes that
where the penalty imposed is more than 6 years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted.

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed
with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;

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(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)

ISSUE: W/N the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal means that bail should be
automatically granted when any of the circumstances mentioned in Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court are absent (NO)

RULING:

No, the theory of the petitioner does not hold, because bail is expressly discretionary following
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. What is contemplated is that the application for bail may be
denied, even if the circumstances under the said Section are absent. If those circumstances do exist,
then there is no other option but to deny bail pending appeal. Nonetheless, the non-existence of the
said circumstances does not automatically result in the grant of bail, because such finding will simply
authorize the court to use less stringent sound discretion when granting bail.

Notably, bail as a matter of discretion falls under the exceptions of bail as a matter of right. Section 3
of the same Rule states that all persons in custody shall, before conviction, be entitled to bail.
However, when an accused charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua, bail becomes discretionary.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T.

OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ
[G.R. No. 153675. April 19, 2007]

DOCTRINE: In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling in
Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.

FACTS:

Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court wherein, if convicted, he will
face a jail term of seven to fourteen years for each charge. Warrants of arrest were issued and, by
virtue of a final decree, the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong
Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case,
a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.

The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in
extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk.” Private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to conditions. Hence, the
instant petition.

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ISSUE: W/N a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail (YES)

RULING:

An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to
transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be a
necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be
reasonable. In here, Muñoz had been detained for over two years without having been convicted of
any crime.

In the case of Purganan, the majority ruled that a potential extraditee is not entitled to notice and
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. But in light of the recent developments in
international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human
rights, the Court departed from the ruling in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed
to post bail.

Also, while the Philippines’ extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the Constitution. Thus, the petition was denied and was remanded to the trial court.

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3. Right to be Presumed Innocent

Presumption of innocence in favor of the accused imposes upon the State to prove
that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt before reversing their innocence.
The accused must not be cloaked with prejudice of guilt until the State or the
prosecution has rightfully proven the accused’s guilt beyond reason.

The presumption of innocence comes to an end upon final conviction or when

overcomed by a quantum of evidence that is based on proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty
of guilt. In addition, conviction requires the existence of a crime and the identity of the
accused as the author of the crime.

Moreover, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw
its strength from the weakness of the defense. However, where the evidence
adduced by the parties is equally balanced, the scales must tip in favor of the accused
(equipoise rule).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLANDO FRAGO

[G.R. Nos. 104492-93. May 31, 1994]

DOCTRINE:
The prosecution cannot rely on their frailty to enhance its cause. The prosecution must draw its
strength from its own evidence. Only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been
committed by the person on trial should the sentence be for conviction

FACTS:

Orlando Frago was charged before the court with rape and attempted rape. For attempted rape, the
accused was acquitted on "reasonable doubt occasioned by lack of clear and convincing evidence
that the accused indeed performed against victim overt acts constituting commencement of the
commission of the crime of rape." Hence, in view of the acquittal of the accused in the case of
attempted rape, the Court reviewed victim’s conviction in the case for rape.

ISSUE: W/N the accused is liable for the crime of rape (NO)

RULING:

No. According to the Court, appellant's denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the prosecution
cannot rely on their frailty to enhance its cause. The prosecution must draw its strength from its own
evidence. As has been oft-repeated, every circumstance favoring the innocence of the accused must
be taken into account and the proof against him must survive the test of reason. Only when the
conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person on trial should the sentence

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be for conviction. Unfortunately for the prosecution, its evidence has miserably failed to pass that
conscience test.

In here, the rape victim’s identification of Frago was merely patterned after the identification made
by the victim of the attempted rape. Her testimony, standing alone, does not satisfy that quantum of
proof required to support a judgment of conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY GODOY, accused-appellant.

[G.R. Nos. 115908-09. December 6, 1995.]
REGALADO, J.

DOCTRINE: It must, however, be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating guilt
does not in itself destroy the presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption,
together with all of the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome
the presumption of innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the
defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.

FACTS:

Danny Godoy, accused-appellant, was charged with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal
detention by complainant Mia Taha, his student in Palawan National School.

According to the complainant, she was suddenly grabbed by the accused-appellant one night in the
boarding house of her cousin, and was raped by him thereafter. After the ordeal was done, she
walked back to her own boarding house with blood-stained clothes. The following afternoon, she was
constrained to go with the appellant to a hotel where she was constantly raped by the appellant.
Three days after, she was brought to the home of the appellant’s friend, and was raped three more
times. After two days, she was brought home by the appellant, because the appellant came to know
that the complainant had been reported as a missing person in the police blotter. Immediately
thereafter, Mia’s parents took her to the hospital where she was examined by a doctor who testified
that she had been participating in sexual intercourse, but could not say that there was force applied.
What transpired where corroborated by testimonies of the complainant, her mother, and the
physician.

On the other hand, the accused-appellant presented a different version. He alleged that he and the
complainant were lovers who were actively participating in sexual intercourse. He strongly denied
any sexual intercourse happening in the boarding house, he reported the whereabouts of the
complainant to her parents when they were in the hotel, and he posited that the complainant
escaped with the appellant on her own free will. These were all corroborated by highly credible
testimonies of several witnesses such as two teachers of the school, the owner of the house where
the two had an affair, the younger brother of the owner of the house, and an officer of the Municipal
Engineering Office. Despite these testimonies and other evidences presented to prove his innocence,
the appellant was charged with rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt (YES)

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RULING:

Yes, the trial court erred when the circumstances and evidence amply demonstrated and convinced
the SC that there was no rape and serious illegal detention. By the nature of the crime of rape,
conviction or acquittal depends on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony, which means that
the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt
to any material element, and the prosecution is unable to overcome the evidence, then the
prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, and the accused must be acquitted according to the presumption of innocence.

In the case, the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had sexual
congress with the complainant against her will with the use of force and intimidation, due to the
inconsistencies in dates, information, complainant’s behavior and complainant’s testimonies, and
lack of physical evidence to prove the element of force. On the other hand, the positive allegations of
appellant, corroborated by the witnesses, were never refuted by the complainant. Mere denials by the
complainant were bare, unexplained, and self-serving.

Finally, the trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumption that a young Filipina will
not charge a person with rape if it is not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more
paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise.
Where the evidence is weak, without any motive being disclosed by the evidence, the guilt of the
accused becomes open to a reasonable doubt and, hence, an acquittal is in order.

RE: CONVICTION OF JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 121,
CALOOCAN CITY IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS. Q-97-69655 to 56 FOR CHILD ABUSE
[A.M. No. 06-9-545-RTC. January 31, 2008.]

NACHURA, J: Before this Court is yet another administrative case confronting respondent Adoracion
G. Angeles (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 121, Caloocan City
(sala) filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) recommending that she be suspended
pending the outcome of this administrative case.

DOCTRINE: It must be remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating the guilt of the
accused does not in itself destroy the constitutional presumption of innocence unless the inculpating
presumption, together with all the evidence, or the lack of any evidence or explanation, proves the
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the accused's guilt is shown in this manner, the
presumption of innocence continues.

FACTS:

The RTC Quezon City rendered a Decision convicting respondent of violation of Republic Act (RA) No.
7610. The criminal cases are now on appeal before the Court
of Appeals. Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco of the Department of Justice (DOJ) inquired
to then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban whether it is possible for this Court, in the public
interest, motu proprio to order the immediate suspension of the respondent in view of the
aforementioned RTC Decision.

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This Court's Second Division approved all of these recommendations, thus, suspending respondent
from performing her judicial functions while awaiting the final resolution of her criminal cases or
until further orders from this Court. Respondent claimed that the suspension order was wielded
against her without affording her the opportunity to be heard since she was not furnished copies of
SSP.

Velasco's letter and OCA's Administrative Complaint. Moreover, respondent manifested that the two
criminal cases against her are on appeal before the CA and have, therefore, not yet attained finality.
As such, respondent still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence and her suspension
clashes with this presumption and is tantamount to a prejudgment of her guilt.

This Court lifted the suspension of respondent on the ground that the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Second Division, indeed failed to attach a copy of the OCA complaint to the copy of our resolution
sent to Judge Angeles.

ISSUES: Whether or not grounds exist to preventively suspend the respondent pending the
resolution of this administrative case

RULING:

We resolve the second issue in the negative. The Court cannot fully agree with the recommendation
of the OCA. By parity of reasoning, the fact of respondent's conviction by the RTC does not necessarily
warrant her suspension. We agree with respondent's argument that since her conviction of the crime
of child abuse is currently on appeal before the CA, the same has not yet attained finality. As such,
she still enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence.

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4. Right to be Heard and to Counsel

Right to be heard is essential in providing due process to an accused, for being heard
means that the accused can present their defense before being judged by the Court.
In a very broad sense, it can be understood to mean the totality of the rights
embodied in an adequate criminal procedural system.

Moreover, this right includes the right to be present at every stage of the trial from
arraignment to rendition of judgment, right to present evidence, right to be assisted
by counsel, and right to compulsory process.

On the other hand, right to counsel means the accused should be accorded with legal
assistance who will be extending their commitment to the cause of the accused. An
efficient and truly decisive legal assistance is needed, not just a perfunctory
representation for the accused. This is essential for the accused to be heard in Court,
because without proper legal assistance, the accused may not compose the best
defense to prove their innocence.

As such, the elements of the right to counsel are the following:

a. Court’s duty to inform the accused of right to counsel before being arraigned;
b. Court must ask him if he desires the services of counsel;
c. If the accused desires the services of counsel, then the Court must give him
one, unless the accused wishes to procure their own private counsel. The Court
must give him time to procure one.
d. If there is no lawyer available, the Court may appoint any person resident of the
province and of good repute for probity and ability.

UNITED STATES vs. ASH

[413 U.S. 300 (1973)]

DOCTRINE:

The Sixth Amendment does not grant an accused the right to have counsel present when the
Government conducts a post-indictment photographic display, containing a picture of the accused,
for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender. A pretrial event
constitutes a "critical stage" when the accused requires aid in coping with legal problems or help in
meeting his adversary. Since the accused is not present at the time of the photographic display and
asserts no right to be present, there is no possibility that he might be misled by his lack of familiarity
with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.

FACTS:

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Charles Ash Jr. was indicted for robbing the American Trust & Security Company in Washington, D.C.
Before his trial, almost three years after the robbery, an FBI agent and a prosecutor showed five color
mug shot photographs to potential witnesses to make sure they would be able to make an in-court
identification of Ash. Ash’s counsel was not present for this process. Some of these witnesses then
made in court identifications of Ash. Ash was convicted.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that Ash’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated because his attorney was not given the opportunity to be
present for the photo identifications before trial. The Court of Appeals opinion expressed doubt that
the in-court identifications could have happened without the prior photo identifications.

ISSUE: W/N the Sixth amendment grants the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by
the government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender
(NO)

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded
the case for further proceedings. The Court applied a historical interpretation of the right to counsel
and explained that expansion of the guarantee was warranted only when new contexts appeared
presenting the same dangers that gave birth to the right. The Court held that even if it were willing to
view the counsel guarantee in broad terms as a generalized protection of the adversary process, it
would be unwilling to go so far as to extend the right to a portion of the Government's
trial-preparation interviews with witnesses. The Court held that the U.S. Constitution did not grant
the right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the government for the purpose of
allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the offender.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,

CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES,
accused-appellants.
[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001.]

MELO, J: This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for
sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance
of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.

DOCTRINE: It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a
layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that " [r]ights may
be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law. (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines).

[T]he right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel. Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave
birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine.

[T]he absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants

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make them invalid.

FACTS:

Appellants were charged with qualified piracy in connection with the seizure of M/T Tabangao in
Batangas where the officers and crew were forced to sail to Singapore and transfer its loaded
petroleum products to another Vessel Navi Pride off the coast of Singapore. Appellants, except Hiong,
were represented by Tomas Posadas who was later found to be a nonlawyer. They were, however,
assisted by Atty. Abdul Basar who manifested that they were adopting the evidence adduced by
Posadas. Their extrajudicial statements
obtained without assistance of counsel were introduced as evidence for the
Prosecution.

The trial court found all appellants except Hiong to have acted in conspiracy. According to the trial
court, Hiong's act was not indispensable in the attack and seizure of the vessel. He was found guilty
as a mere accomplice.

ISSUES: What are the legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented
accused-appellants during the trial? What are the legal effects and implications of the absence of
counsel during the custodial investigation?

RULING:

The record reveals that a manifestation was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco,
and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they
were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the
trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer.

Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "upon motion, the accused may
be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly
protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the
sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of
accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas
Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure.

Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona
fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a valid waiver of rights has been made.

The absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants
make them invalid. The uncounseled extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall
be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

Wherefore, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the
Court hereby affirms the judgment of the trial court in toto.

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5. Right to be Informed
Right to be informed means that the accused must be adequately informed of the
facts that are imputed to them, so that they may be prepared for their defense
according to the facts provided.

However, under the variance doctrine, the accused may still be convicted of whatever
offense that was proved even if it was not specifically set in the Information, provided
it was included in what was charged.

ODON PECHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the

SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

[G.R. No. 111399. September 27, 1996.]

DAVIDE, JR., J: In our decision of 14 November 1994, we modified the appealed judgment of the
Sandiganbayan by holding the petitioner guilty of the complex crime of attempted
estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents.

DOCTRINE: On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof
for conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and
commercial documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim that he could not be
convicted of the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

FACTS:

The Court held that although the petitioner could not be convicted of the crime charged, viz.,
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended — because the said section penalizes only
consummated offenses and the offense charged in this case was not consummated — he could,
nevertheless, be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents, which is necessarily included in the crime charged.

Unable to accept our verdict, the petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration on the
ground that after having been acquitted of the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, a special law,
he could not be convicted anymore of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents, an offense punishable under the Revised Penal Code, a general law;
otherwise, the constitutional provision on double jeopardy would be violated.

The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the petitioner and asserts that the rule on double
jeopardy cannot be successfully invoked in this case. Nevertheless, the Office of the Solicitor General
joins the petitioner in the latter's plea for his acquittal, but for another ground, namely, insufficiency
of evidence.

In their respective memoranda, the petitioner and the Office of the Solicitor General are one in
asserting that the petitioner could not be convicted based entirely on circumstantial evidence
because of the failure of the prosecution to satisfy the requisites set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court.

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ISSUES: Whether the petitioner could be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of public and commercial documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III of
the Constitution on the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

RULING:

On the assumption that the prosecution's evidence had satisfied the quantum of proof for conviction
for the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's claim that he could not be convicted of the
said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an accused is the
actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
they being conclusions of law. An incorrect caption is not a fatal mistake. It follows then that an
accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged, is necessarily included in
the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and ACQUITTING petitioner
ODON PECHO of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and
commercial documents.

NOE S. ANDAYA, petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

[G.R. No. 168486. June 27, 2006.]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

DOCTRINE: It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in the
information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense because he is presumed to have
no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

An accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or

information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information
would be a violation of this constitutional right.

FACTS:

Petitioner Noe S. Andaya was elected president and general manager of the Armed Forces and Police
Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI), a non-stock and non-profit association authorized to
engage in savings and loan transactions. Petitioner sought to boost the lending capacity of its
members by setting up a Finder’s Fee program, where any officer, member or employee of AFPSLAI
would solicit an investment of not less than P100,000, and would be entitled to a finder’s fee
equivalent to one percent of the amount solicited. However, it was found that the Finder’s Fee
Program was being fraudulently implemented. This led to the petitioner being charged for estafa
through falsification of commercial documents.

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According to the prosecution, the petitioner disbursed P21,000.00 from the funds of the association
by making it appear that the amount was 1% finder’s fee of Diosdado Guilas, when no payment was
to be made by the association as finder’s fee. The Information alleged the following: (1) petitioner
caused it to appear in Disbursement Voucher No. 58380 that Diosdado Guillas was entitled to a
finder's fee from AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00 when in truth and in fact no finder's fee was
due to him; (2) the falsification was committed on Disbursement Voucher No. 58380; and (3) the
falsification caused damage to AFPSLAI in the amount of P21,000.00.

On the other hand, the petitioner presented the testimonies of Emerita Arevalo, secretary of the
petitioner, and of Ernesto Hernandez. These testimonies stated that the finder’s fee for the
P2,100,000.00 was solicited by Ernesto Hernandez from Rosario Mercader, and that Hernandez
insisted to place Guilas’ name instead of his so that it would not reflect in Hernandez’ income tax
return. On cross-examination, petitioner claimed that he merely approved the substitution of the
name of Hernandez with that of Guilas in the disbursement voucher upon the request of Hernandez.

As such, the trial court convicted the petitioner for falsification of private documents, instead of
falsification of commercial documents, following the facts stated above, and that these facts followed
the elements of falsification of private documents, and not of commercial documents.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be acquitted for the prosecution’s failure to allege the correct
information to charge the petitioner of the correct offense (falsification of private documents instead
of falsification of commercial documents). (YES)

RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court is convinced that the petitioner should be acquitted based on reasonable
doubt. The petitioner should have been convicted of falsification of private documents, had it been
alleged in the information. The prosecution failed to prove the third essential element of the crime
charged in the information. Thus, the petitioner should be acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.

The elements of falsification of commercial documents are the following: (1) that the offender is a
private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his official position;
(2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC, and, (3) that
the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document. However, in truth, the
AFPSLAI owed no such sum to Diosdado Guilas, but to Ernesto Hernandez. Considering that
Hernandez was able to solicit a P2,100,000.00 investment from Mercader, it follows that he was
entitled to receive the finder's fee in the amount of P21,000.00. AFPSLAI suffered no damage because
it really owed the P21,000.00 fee to Hernandez.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL GO CAOILI alias "BOY TAGALOG"

[G.R. No. 196342. August 8, 2017]

DOCTRINE: Pursuant to the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, the evidence proven must be for the offense charged.

FACTS:

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On October 23, 2005, accused Caoili sexually molested his daughter by kissing her lips, touching and
mashing her breast, inserting the fourth finger of his left hand into her vagina, and making a push
and pull movement into her vagina with such finger for 30 minutes. Thereafter, victim disclosed the
abuse to her school’s guidance counselor, the latter prompting the victim to report the act and to
undergo a medical examination. Thus, accused was charged with the crime of Rape by Sexual
Intercourse in violation of Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC as amended by R.A. No.
8353, and R.A. No. 7610.

ISSUE: W/N the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him was violated
(YES)

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,
the evidence proven must be for the offense charged. Meanwhile, the variance doctrine is the
conviction of an accused for a crime proved which is different from but necessarily included in the
crime charged. The Court disagrees with the OSG's argument that based on the variance doctrine,
Caoili can be convicted of rape by sexual assault because this offense is necessarily included in the
crime of rape through sexual intercourse.
In the present case, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A.
No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if
the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered
subsumed in the latter.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RAEL DELFIN, appellant.

[G.R. No. 201572. July 9, 2014.]

PEREZ, J: This is an appeal assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming, with
modification, the conviction of herein appellant Rael Delfin for murder. Suspected of killing Emilio
was the appellant.

DOCTRINE: Variance in the Date of the Commission of the Murder as Alleged in the Information and
as Established During the Trial Does Not Invalidate the Information

FACTS:

On the night of 27 September 2000, one Emilio Enriquez (Emilio) — a 51-year old fisherman from
Navotas City — was killed after being gunned down at a store just across his home. Suspected of
killing Emilio was the appellant. On 13 March 2001, the appellant was formally charged with the
murder of Emilio before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon. Appellant offered the alibi that he
was fishing on the seas of Bataan on the
date and time of the supposed shooting.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
murder. The CA rendered a Decision affirming the conviction of the appellant.

ISSUES: Whether or not the failure of the information to accurately allege the date of the commission

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of the murder violated his right to be properly informed of the charge against him and consequently
impaired his ability to prepare an intelligent defense thereon

RULING: We deny the appeal.

We sustain the validity of the information under which the appellant was tried, and convicted,
notwithstanding the variance in the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the
information and as established during the trial. In crimes where the date of commission is not a
material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or
certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an
accused, that the date of commission be approximated.

Despite their disparity as to the date of the alleged murder, we believe that there is no mistaking that
both the information and the evidence of the prosecution but pertain to one and the same offense
i.e., the murder of Emilio.

What clearly appears to this Court, on the other hand, is that the inaccurate allegation in the
information is simply the product of a mere clerical error. Hence, we sustain the information for
murder, under which the appellant was tried and convicted, as valid.

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6. Right to Speedy, Impartial and Public Trial

Right to speedy trial means that there should be no unwarranted, vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays in the criminal proceedings. This is to 1) prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration, 2) minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, 3)
limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired during trial. However, it is not
available when the right to speedy trial should result in clear denial of due process.

On the other hand, right to impartial trial imposes that the Court must not only
render a just, correct and impartial decision, but should also do so in a manner free
from suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality, and integrity. For example, a civilian
cannot be tried by a military court while civil courts are open and operating.

Finally, one has the right to public trial in order to prevent possible abuses which may
be committed against the accused. A public trial only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, and conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. The attendance at the trial is
open to all, irrespective of their relationship to the accused.

AURELIA CONDE vs. PABLO RIVERA and FEDERICO M. UNSON

[G.R. No. 21741. January 25, 1924]

DOCTRINE: Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.

FACTS:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has to respond to five information
for various crimes. Although she has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings on eight
different occasions, the cause was postponed, she has twice been required to come to the Supreme
Court for protection, and seems far away from a definite resolution even after more than one year has
passed from the time when the first information was filed.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial (YES)

RULING:
Yes. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right
to a speedy trial in order that if she is indeed innocent, she may go free.
Thus, the Court laid down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of
time, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the
information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

LEONARDO MAGAT , petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
[G.R. No. L-55801. August 30, 1982.]

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MELENCIO-HERRERA, J: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming
with modification the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch I, Olongapo City,
for Robbery, convicting petitioner-accused, Leonardo Magat, of said crime.

DOCTRINE: Applicable to this case is General Order No. 39, which gave Civil Courts concurrent
jurisdiction with Military Tribunals over crimes committed against tourists and transients, and
mandates that cases involving tourists be disposed of within 24 hours from the filing of the
complaint.

FACTS:

Petitioner-accused was charged with robbery for divesting an American businessman who came to
Olongapo as a tourist of his money. Within 24 hours after trial, where rebuttal and sur-rebuttal were
presented by the prosecution and the defense, respectively, the Court of First Instance rendered its
judgment of conviction.

ISSUES: Whether or not there was lack of due process because of the unusual speed with which the
Trial Court disposed of his case

RULING:

There is no question either that notwithstanding the number of times that he has been to this
country, the complainant is a "tourist" or one who travels from place to place for pleasure or culture.
As a "tourist" or a "transient, complainant falls within the coverage of General Order No. 12, as
amended."

Petitioner-accused was not denied procedural due process, because the unusual speed with which
the trial Court disposed of the case was in consonance with General Order No. 39. The guilt of
petitioner-accused had been sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt as complainant was
categorical in his identification of the accused and emphatic in his direct and active involvement in
the robbery.

Applicable to this case is General Order No. 39 amending General Order No. 12, dated September 30,
1972, which gave Civil Courts concurrent jurisdiction with Military Tribunals over crimes committed
against tourists and transients, and mandates that cases involving tourists be disposed of within 24
hours from the filing of the complaint.

Considering that explicit requirement, the Trial Court had no other alternative but to speed up trial.

FRANCISCO GUERRERO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Former Special Seventh
Division), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALABON, BRANCH 72, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 107211. June 28, 1996.]

PANGANIBAN, J: "Does the constitutional right to a speedy trial include the right to a prompt

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disposition and judgment?" This is the question posed before this Court in the instant petition for
review.

DOCTRINE: The right to speedy trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay without the participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified
postponements are sought which prolong the trial for unreasonable lengths of time.

FACTS:

The accused being then the pilot of noncommercial Aircraft operate, fly, pilot, maneuver and/or
conduct the flight of said aircraft from the airport at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija with four (4) passengers on
board, and while the said aircraft was already airborne after several minutes, the engine quitted twice
indicating that there was no more fuel, prompting the accused to make an emergency manner
landing on a fishpond which he executed in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner in the Piper
Camanche Owner's Handbook, and as a result of the improper execution of said emergency landing,
the aircraft's landing gear collided with a dike and trees near the fishpond in Malabon, Rizal, resulting
to the fatal injuries in three (3) passengers.

Due to several postponements filed by the petitioner, the prosecution was finally able to start
presenting its evidence on September 29, 1972 after petitioner entered his pleas of 'Not Guilty.' On
November 7, 1990, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial has
been violated. Presiding Judge denied the motion to dismiss and reset the retaking of the
testimonies. The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUES: Whether there was a violation of petitioner's constitutional right to speedy trial.

RULING:

The Constitution mandates dispatch not only in the trial stage but also in the disposition thereof,
warranting dismissals in case of violations thereof without the fault of the party concerned, not just
the accused. The case of Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr., laid down the guidelines in determining the
applicability of the "speedy disposition" formula: In the determination of whether or not the right to a
'speedy trial' has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other.
These are length, of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to assert it, and
prejudice caused by the delay.

In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation against his own right to
speedy disposition only when the respondent trial judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to
assume that he would have just continued to sleep on his right — a situation amounting to laches —
had the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of the records
and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the case.

Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and inasmuch as the
respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case on the merits due to the absence of
factual basis, the Court holds it proper and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain
(and the court to dispense) substantial justice in the premises.

The respondent trial court is directed to proceed with judicious dispatch in the retaking of

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testimonies and in concluding the case in accordance with law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUÑO, STATE
PROSECUTORS PETER L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners,
vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
[G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003.]
CALLEJO, SR. J.

Before the Court is the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 28, 2002,
remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination
of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against
the respondent and his co-accused with the said court.

DOCTRINE: The mere passage of time is not sufficient to establish a denial of a right to a speedy trial,
but a lengthy delay, which is presumptively prejudicial, triggers the examination of other factors to
determine whether rights have been violated.

While we have ruled that if an accused wants to exercise his constitutional right to a speedy trial, he
should ask, not for the dismissal, but for the trial of the case, however, the same cannot be expected
of the respondent. It would be ludicrous for him to ask for the trial of his cases when the same had
already been dismissed.

FACTS:

The Court ruled in the above mentioned resolution the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases
against Panfilo Lacson. The Court also ruled that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure may be given retroactive effect if its requirements for application are attendant. Seen
below is the cited rule:

Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with the
express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.

The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the
order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall become permanent
two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.

The petitioners contend that the said rule should not apply to the criminal cases, and that the
time-bar should not be applied retroactively. The petitioners maintain that the respondent did not
give his express content to the provisional dismissal, and that he did not file any motion to dismiss
the cases. Moreover, the heirs of the victims were not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said
cases. On the other hand, the respondent insists that he moved for the provisional dismissal and that
the heirs of the victims were given prior notices. Another view by the judges was that the

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respondent’s right to speedy trial had been violated due to the 26-month delay in the refiling of these
criminal cases due to the provisional dismissal.

ISSUE: W/N the right to speedy trial of the respondent was violated when there was a delay in the
refiling of the trial due to the provisional dismissal (NO)

RULING:

No, the right to speedy trial was not violated, since the cases and their trials themselves were
dismissed. Right to speedy trial is only availing when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
without just cause. In this case, this right is unavailing in the absence of any proceedings conducted
before, during, and after, trial. There is no precedent to say that even after the dismissal of the cases,
an accused may still invoke the constitutional guarantee.

HUBERT WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, HOSPICIO FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER

ESTRADA and MICHAEL GATCHALIAN, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE
HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Paranaque,
Branch 274 and LAURO VIZCONDE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127262. July 24, 1997.]

PUNO, J: Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals as well as its resolution insofar as it
denied the petition for the inhibition of respondent Judge Amelita G. Tolentino
pending before Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque.

DOCTRINE: A party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. This right
must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to
disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and
convincing evidence.

FACTS:

Petitioners were charged with rape with homicide for allegedly raping Carmela Vizconde, then killing
her, her mother and her sister. The case was raffled to Branch 274, RTC of Parañaque, presided by
respondent judge.

Prior to their arraignment, petitioner Webb and his co-accused, Gerardo Biong, had sought the
disqualification of respondent Judge for the various statements respondent judge allegedly gave to
the media that tended to compromise her impartiality.

ISSUES: Whether respondent judge should inhibit herself from hearing Criminal Case No. 95- 404 on
the ground of bias and prejudice

RULING:

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The Supreme Court ruled that in order to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice, the
movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. This, the petitioners failed to do. To
prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent Judge, petitioners harped on the alleged series of
adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions, which they
characterized as palpable errors. By themselves,

However, the rulings did not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify the respondent judge.
A perusal of the records revealed that petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic evidence to prove that
respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad faith in issuing the assailed rulings.

More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure
fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done — and that is the only way for the
judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion."

Petition dismissed for lack of merit.

BRACY V GRAMLEY
[520 U.S. 899 (1997)]

DOCTRINE:NDue process requires a fair trial before a judge without actual bias against the
defendant or an interest in the outcome of his particular case.

FACTS:

During Thomas J. Maloney's tenure as an Illinois judge, William Bracy was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death before him for a triple murder. Maloney was later convicted on federal charges of
taking bribes from criminal defendants. In his federal habeas petition, Bracy argued that, because he
had "fixed" other murder cases, Maloney had an interest in a conviction here to deflect suspicion.
Bracy contended that Maloney's interest violated the fair-trial guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District Court denied the claim, concluding that Bracy's
allegations contained insufficient specificity or good cause. In affirming, the Court of Appeals also
concluded that Bracy had not shown "good cause" for discovery to prove his claim.

ISSUE: W/N the accused was given an impartial trial (NO)

RULING:

No. Due process requires a fair trial before a judge without actual bias against the defendant or an
interest in the outcome of his particular case. The usual presumption that public officials have
properly discharged their official duties has been soundly rebutted here. Maloney's public trial and
conviction show that he was thoroughly corrupt.
Petitioner claims that Maloney's acceptance of bribes from criminal defendants not only rendered
him biased against the State in those cases, but also induced a compensatory bias against
defendants who did not bribe him, since he did not want to appear "soft" on criminal defendants.
Although he was not bribed in this case, Maloney "fixed" other murder cases during and around the
time of petitioner's trial. Petitioner contends that Maloney therefore had an interest in a conviction

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here to deflect suspicion that he was taking bribes in other cases, and that this interest violated the
fair trial guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN
[A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC. June 14, 2011.]

FACTS:

On November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual journalists from
various media entities, and members of the academe filed a petition before the Court seeking the
lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court proceedings, specifically on
the trial of the "Maguindanao Massacre."

ISSUE: W/N the trial should be broadcasted (PARTIALLY GRANTED)

RULING:

The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court
proceedings, subject to the guidelines enumerated.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges,
petitioners explained that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the right to a fair trial must
pass the "totality of circumstances" test, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible
to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial,
and that there must be allegation and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free
decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the
deprivation of the right to a fair trial.

One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from the earlier cases
is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases of the private
complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside the courtroom.

The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the
interested parties, whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough. What more if
the right itself commands that a reasonable number of the general public be allowed to witness the
proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open and
public trial.

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7. Right to Confrontation
Right to confrontation has a two-fold purpose: to afford the accused an opportunity to
test the testimony of the witness by cross-examination, and to allow the judge to
observe the behavior of the witness. What is contemplated here is the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness if desired. When there is a lack thereof, the testimonies and
affidavits of witnesses shall be inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROBERTO PIDO, accused-appellant.
[G.R. No. 92427. August 2, 1991.]

DAVIDE, JR., J: Rape is universally condemned as a most detestable crime. He who commits it mocks
and scorns, with demented outrage, a union which nature designs as a function of reproduction for
the perpetuation of humankind to be accomplished by a man and a woman through full consent
and mutual affection. Indeed, consent is the common origin of acts between man and woman, hence
rape is not presumed. However, once established, it must be severely and impartially punished.

DOCTRINE: Cross-examination is an indispensable instrument of criminal justice to give substance

and meaning to the Constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him and to
show that the presumption of innocence has remained steadfast and firm.

FACTS:

Teresita was awakened by an intruder, whom she identified to be the accused, kneeling on her left
side and strangling her on the neck with his left hand while his right hand was holding a sharp
bladed instrument. The accused placed himself on top of her, and with his left hand inserted his
penis into her genital organ. Shortly afterwards, Teresita felt that the accused reached his orgasm, put
on his underwear, and left through the window of the house. Teresita told Lydia that she was raped
by the accused.

The trial court characterized the testimony of the complainant that accused raped her as "positive
and categorical," and "clear, positive and convincing.”

ISSUES: Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant has been established beyond reasonable
doubt

RULING:

Due attention must be given to the cross-examination. It is the province of the latter to test the
credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehood or half-truth, uncover the truth which rehearsed
direct-examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies on
substantial matters which create reasonable doubt. In short, cross-examination is an indispensable
instrument of criminal justice to give substance and meaning to the Constitutional right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him and to show that the presumption of innocence has
remained steadfast and firm.

For failure of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused for the crime of rape as charged
beyond reasonable doubt, the decision of the trial court is hereby reversed and another is hereby

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entered ACQUITTING the accused Roberto R. Pido.

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO , petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL., respondents.
[G.R. No. 185527. July 18, 2012.]

PERLAS-BERNABE, J: Petitioners seek to nullify and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the Order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
27 and upheld the grant of the prosecution's motion to take the testimony of a witness by oral
depositions in Laos, Cambodia.

DOCTRINE: The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right
to preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot,
however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness'
absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right
to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.

FACTS:

Sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused defraud Highdone
Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping, in the following manner, to wit: all said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said Li Luen Ping
to the effect that they have chattels.

The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on
September 9, 2004. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. The
private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen Ping, alleging that
he was being treated for lung infection.

Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution
complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping. the RTC granted the
petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the
taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case. The CA
promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed
upon the MeTC.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in not finding that the deposition taking of the complaining witness
in Laos, Cambodia is an infringement of the constitutional right of the petitioners to confront the
said witness face to face

RULING: We rule in favor of petitioners.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially
in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet
the witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method

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of investigating facts " as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and
deportment while testifying.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same
court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness'
testimony is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused.

There is a great deal of difference between the face-to-face confrontation in a public criminal trial in
the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside
the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge.

The CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking the
deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order allowing the
deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the court where
the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.

Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. MARIA CRISTINA P.

SERGIO and JULIUS L. LACANILAO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 240053. October 9, 2019.]
HERNANDO, J.

FACTS:

Mary Jane Veloso was taken advantage by her neighbors respondents Sergio and Lacanilao, who
offered an overseas job for Mary Jane as a domestic helper in Indonesia. Sergio gave Mary Jane her
plane ticket and luggage to bring on her trip. However, upon arrival in the airport in Yogyakarta, she
was apprehended by the police officers for allegedly carrying 2.6 kilograms of heroin inside her
luggage. Thereafter, Mary Jane was convicted of drug trafficking, and was sentenced to death by
firing squad, scheduled 5 years after her sentence. Meanwhile, Sergio and Lacanilao were arrested by
the NBI for qualified trafficking of persons and illegal recruitment.

One month before her execution, representatives from the PDEA, PNP and DFA visited the prison in
Indonesia to interview Mary Jane Veloso, who executed a sinumpaang salaysay maintaining her
innocence and her narration of what transpired. On the basis of her affidavit, the Philippine
Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the execution, pursuant to the
ASEAN Mutual Legal Treaty, in order for her to present her case against Sergio and Lacanilao. The
following conditions were imposed by the Indonesian government:

1. Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta, Indonesia;

2. No cameras shall be allowed;
3. The lawyers of the parties shall not be present; and,
4. The questions to be propounded to Mary Jane shall be in writing.

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As such, the State filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Take the Testimony of Complainant by
Deposition upon Written Interrogatories”. Serio and Lacanilao objected to the motion, asserting that
the deposition should be made before and not during trial, and that the written method will violate
their right to confront the witness.

ISSUE: W/N Mary Jane’s testimonies may be validly acquired through deposition by written
interrogatories (YES)

RULING:

Yes, the Court finds that the extraordinary circumstances of Mary Jane Veloso’s case calls for the
method called for by the OSG and the Indonesian Government. In this case, Mary Jane’s
imprisonment denies her any opportunity to decide for herself to voluntarily appear and testify before
the trial court in the Philippines where the cases of the respondents were pending. By denying the
prosecution’s motion to take deposition by written interrogatories, the court in effect would silence
Mary Jane and deny her due process by presenting her case. Mary Jane's testimony, being the victim,
is vital in the prosecution of the pending criminal cases that were led against Sergio and Lacanilao.

On the right to confrontation, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the right to
confrontation, because although there is no opportunity to see the witness face-to-face the terms
and conditions laid by the trial court ensure that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine
Mary Jane. Sergio and Lacanilao will be required through their counsel to file their comment and
raise objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories, and will also have the
opportunity to read the answers of Mary Jane and submit their proposed cross interrogatory
questions. At the same time, the judge will be present during the conduct of the written
interrogatories so that they may observe the deportment of the witness.

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8. Right to Compulsory Process

The right to compulsory process assures the accused that they may compel the
production of evidence and the attendance of witnesses on his behalf in order for the
accused to be equipped for their defense. The accused may move the court for the
issuance of a subpoena to call for the attendance of persons involved in the case.

UNITED STATES V SCHEFFER

[523 U.S. 303 (1998)]

DOCTRINE: A defendant's interest in presenting evidence may need to accommodate other

legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Such rules do not abridge an accused's right to
present a defense so long as they are not "arbitrary" or "disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve." Moreover, the Court has found the exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally
arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.

FACTS:

A polygraph examination of respondent airman indicated, in the opinion of the Air Force examiner
administering the test, that there was “no deception” in respondent’s denial that he had used drugs
since enlisting. Urinalysis, however, revealed the presence of methamphetamine, and respondent
was tried by general court-martial for using that drug and for other offenses.

Relying on Military Rule of Evidence 707, which prohibits the use of polygraph results in court-martial
proceedings, the military judge refused Scheffer's request to admit his results into evidence. On
successive appeals, following his conviction on all charges, the Air Force Court of Appeals affirmed
but the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, finding the evidentiary exclusion to be
unconstitutional. The United States appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

ISSUE: W/N Military Rule of Evidence 707, excluding the admission of polygraph results into evidence,
violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to present a fair defense (NO)

RULING:

No. The Court held that Rule 707 was consistent with the legitimate interest of state and federal
authorities to admit only reliable evidence. In addition to Rule 707, the Court emphasized the poor
reliability of polygraph evidence as a whole.

The exclusion of evidence to be unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has

infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused, and that Rule 707 served several legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process. The rule was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate in promoting
these ends. Nor did it implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the airman to raise a constitutional
concern under the Court's precedents, and there was no consensus among jurisdictions that
polygraph evidence was reliable.

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9. Trials in Absentia
Trials may proceed despite the absence of the accused or the witness.

The following are the requisites to allow a trial to proceed in absentia of the accused:
a. Accused failed to appear for trial despite postponement and notice
b. Failure to appear is unjustified
c. After arraignment

Meanwhile, the following are the requisites to allow a trial to proceed in absentia of
the witness:
a. Witness is really material
b. He is guilty of no neglect in previously obtaining attendance of said witness
c. The witness will be available at the time desired
d. No similar evidence could be obtained.

REYNALDO H. JAYLO, WILLIAM VALENZONA and ANTONIO G. HABALO, petitioners, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HEIRS OF COL. ROLANDO
DE GUZMAN, FRANCO CALANOG and AVELINO MANGUERA, respondents

[G.R. Nos. 183152-54. January 21, 2015.]

SERENO, C.J: What are the repercussions of the failure of the accused to appear, without justifiable
cause, at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction? With the resolution of this singular issue, the
Court writes finis to the 24-year-old controversy before us.

DOCTRINE: The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his
bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If
the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him
shall be served at his last known address. In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his
Counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable
cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall
order his arrest.

FACTS:

Jaylo pointed his gun at De Guzman. Two other operatives instructed Calanog and Manguera to lie
face down on the ground and placed a foot on their backs while training a gun at them. The rest
cordoned the area. Later, a car with passengers Needham, US DEA country attaché Andrew Fenrich
(Fenrich), and two armed bodyguards moved out of the cordoned area. When the car was safely on
its way, Jaylo and his men shot De Guzman, Calanog, and Manguera. They waited 15 minutes for the
victims to bleed out and thereafter loaded them into the vehicles under the ruse of bringing them to
the hospital.

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The Elma Committee was tasked to conduct an investigation of all the facts and circumstances
surrounding the seizure of heroin and the shooting incident. The Committee recommended the
prosecution of Jaylo for the killing of De Guzman, Castro for that of Calanog, and Valenzona and
Habalo for that of Manguera.

The Sandiganbayan found Jaylo, Castro, Valenzona, and Habalo guilty of homicide. During the
promulgation of the Sandiganbayan's judgment, none of the accused appeared despite notice.

The court ruled that the 15-day period from the promulgation of the judgment had long lapsed
without any of the accused giving any justifiable cause for their absence during the promulgation.

ISSUES: Whether the conditions under Section 6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court do
not obtain in the instant case.

RULING:

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court provides that an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available against the said
judgment.

The Supreme Court merely laid down the rules on promulgation of a judgment of conviction done in
absentia in cases when the accused fails to surrender and explain his absence within 15 days from
promulgation. The Supreme Court can very well do this as the right to file a motion for
reconsideration under P.D. 1606 is not preclusive in character. Indeed, there is nothing in P.D. 1606
which prevents the Supreme Court from regulating the procedure for promulgation of decisions in
criminal cases done in absentia.

In this case, petitioners have just shown their lack of faith in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
not appearing before it for the promulgation of the judgment on their cases. Surely they cannot later
on expect to be allowed to invoke the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction to grant them relief from its
judgment of conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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Writ of Habeas Corpus

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Sec. 15, Art. III
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires it.

Sec. 18, Art. VII

The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law.

xxx

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.

DEFINITION
Writ of Habeas Corpus is issued by a Court commanding a person or authority to
produce the body of a prisoner being detained. The detainee should be presented at
a designated time and place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to
do, to submit to, and to receive whatever the Court or judge awarding the writ shall
consider on his behalf.

Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a
conscientious and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty
will not be further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes. Restraint of liberty is
not only in the form of physical restraint. It may involve restraint in movement,
abode, and speech.

AVAILABILITY
1. Involuntary restraint of liberty

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2. Voluntary restraint of liberty

3. Illegal arrest with supervening event when restraint of liberty is already by
virtue of the complaint or information
a. The issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the
detained person.
b. Filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the
accused is detained.
4. Where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the Court to
impose.
5. Remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO,

DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, petitioner , vs. WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP
BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA, TAGUIG CITY and all other persons acting on his behalf
and/or having custody of DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, respondents
[G.R. No. 197597. April 8, 2015.]
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Datukan Malang Salibo was mistakenly identified as Butukan S. Malang, one of the
accused of the 57 counts of murder in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. Malang had a
pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court. Salibo presented himself to the police with clear
evidence, such as his passport, boarding passes and other airline documents, that he was not in the
Philippines when the Maguindanao Massacre transpired. Unfortunately, the police apprehended
Salibo, tore off pages of his passport proving his alibi, and detained him for 13 days.

One month after he was detained, Salibo filed the Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus, questioning
the legality of his detention and deprivation of his liberty, maintaining that he is not the accused
Butukan S. Malang. Following the Return of the Writ to the RTC of Pasig City, the RTC found that
Salibo was not judicially charged under any resolution or information, and was not validly arrested as
there was no warrant of arrest or alias warrant of arrest against Salibo. As such, the trial court granted
Salibo’s petition for habeas corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision, finding that Salibo’s arrest and detention were made under a
valid information and warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus (YES)

RULING:

Yes, Salibo correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus, finding that he was not arrested
by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense, and that he was not restrained under a lawful
process or an order of a court. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of

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liberty. Its primary purpose is to inquire into the involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. In this case, Salibo proved beyond reasonable doubt that he is not
the accused Batukan S. Malang used his identification and airline documents, and that the police
officers had no probable cause to arrest the petitioner. Thus, the Petition for Habeas Corpus must be
granted.

Writ of Amparo

LEGAL BASES
Constitutional Provision: Sec. 5, Art. VIII
The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, xxx.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC The Rule on the Writ of Amparo -- Sec. 1. Petition.
The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

DEFINITION
Writ of Amparo determines responsibility or accountability for purposes of imposing
the appropriate remedies to address “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances”.

“Extralegal killings” are killings committed without due process of law, while
enforced disappearances are forms of arrest, detention or abduction carried out by
authorities, which refused to acknowledge the whereabouts of the person subject of
the amparo petition.

CONTENTS OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO

1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the
threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the
respondent may be described by an assumed appellation

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3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits
4. The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as
well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report
5. The actions and re-courses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible
for the threat, act or omission
6. The relief prayed for.

PROOF REQUIRED: SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners, vs. RAYMOND
MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents

[G.R. No. 180906. October 7, 2008.]

PUNO, C.J: While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind
secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The
constitution is an overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to
life, liberty and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court.

DOCTRINE:

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz.:

Section 1. Petition. — The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis
supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, Viz.: Sec. 17. Burden of
Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. — The parties shall establish their claims by substantial
evidence.

FACTS:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006,
several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the
residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they

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were not informed of the gathering.

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house. At past noon, several armed soldiers
wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him. They asked
him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The
armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was kicked on the
hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. The men forced
Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw
the faces of the soldiers who took him.

ISSUES: Whether the CA erred in giving full credit to the affidavit/testimony of herein respondent
Raymond Manalo; Whether or not the CA erred in granting the reliefs requested in the Amparo
Petition – requiring the petitioners to furnish the Manalo brothers and the CA with all the official and
unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken, confirm in writing the present places of Hilario and
Caigas, to produce all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed while in detention and to submit a list of medical
personnel who attended to the brothers while under military custody.

RULING:

There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. These people are directly
connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten
respondents' rights to life, liberty and security. The right to security of person is "freedom from fear".
The right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. The
right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty.

As to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question, petitioners' arguments
do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a
search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the
government, not a protection of the government from the demand of the people such as
respondents.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed
out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners
behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED.

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR, RAUL CASTAÑEDA, LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO V MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS

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[G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009]

DOCTRINE: The Writ of Amparo is a protective remedy against violations or threats of violation
against the rights to life, liberty and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the court's directive to police
agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual. It
does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.

The Court also highlighted the nature of the Writ of Amparo to stress that the unique situations that
call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address
these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary
court actions and proceedings.

FACTS:

Engr. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga

City. On October 30, 2007, he arrived at Jolo, Sulu and was assisted by his student Kunnong. He
checked in at ASY pension house. Thereafter, Engr. Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast
craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension
house with the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter was nowhere to be found anymore.

According to reliable information received by the respondent, Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police
intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in
an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups.

On December 2007, a month later the disappearance, respondent filed a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo.

The petitioners denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis' alleged abduction and argued
that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against
them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence.

ISSUE: W/N the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo will proper (YES)

RULING:

Yes. The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5 (c) to be complete in every detail in
stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim's rights. As in any other initiatory pleading, the
pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of the
nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may
not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to
kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may
purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance.

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The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component
parts, to determine if the required elements — namely, of the disappearance, the State or private
action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security — are present.

In the present case, the petition amply supplements the circumstances under which Tagitis suddenly
dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and thereafter was nowhere to be found
despite efforts to locate him. And that it clearly alleged how Tagitis' rights to life, liberty and security
were violated when he was "forcibly taken and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men
believed to be police intelligence operatives", and then taken "into custody by the respondents' police
intelligence operatives since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, . . . held
against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different terrorist
groups.”

Moreover, Section 5 (d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged
disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and results of the investigation.
Respondent's petition complied with the aforementioned requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the
petition specifies that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported Tagitis' disappearance to
the police authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had
disappeared.

Lastly, Section 5 (e) of the Amparo Rule is used to prevent the use of a petition as a means to "fish" for
evidence. Said section merely requires that the Amparo petitioner allege "the actions and recourses
taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission". The following allegations of the respondent's petition duly
outlined the actions she had taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her to file
her petition.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DIRECTOR/HEAD OF THE CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION AND DETECTION GROUP (CIDG), PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP),
petitioner, vs. REGINA N. CAYANAN AND SPO1 ROLANDO V. PASCUA, respondents .
[G.R. No. 181796. November 7, 2017.]
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Regina Cayanan filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that her husband, Pablo, was
being illegally detained by the Director of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of
the PNP; that a month before, a group of armed men led by SPO 1 Rolando Pascua forcibly arrested
Pablo Cayanan without any warrant of arrest, and had then detained hum at the office of the CIDG in
Camp Crame. Thereafter, the CIDG filed its return on the writ, denying having custody of Pablo
Cayanan. Following this, Regina Cayanan reiterated the same allegations as in the petition for habeas
corpus, but now sought for a writ of amparo.

The RTC granted the Writ of Amparo, and called the CIDG to continue the investigation on Pablo
Cayanan.

ISSUE: W/N sufficient evidence supported the grant of the writ of amparo (YES)

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RULING:

Yes, there was sufficient evidence to support the grant of the writ. Following Section 18 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, allegations that are proven by substantial evidence shall move the court to grant
the privilege of the writ. In this case, Regina Cayanan sufficiently executed an affidavit whereby an
eyewitness (Perez) detailed the events of the abduction of Pablo, while Pascua himself expressly
admitted the abduction of Pablo. Regina Cayanan also presented other witnesses to corroborate the
allegation on the occurrence of the abduction, and identified Pascua as the person leading the
abduction.

Additionally, the CIDG did not observe the required extraordinary diligence in their return of the writ,
wherein they were supposed to present lawful defenses to show that the CIDG did not violate or
threaten with violation the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party, and that actions
were taken to determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

EDITA T. BURGOS , petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES

ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN
BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL
OSCAR CALDERON, respondents.

[G.R. No. 183711. June 22, 2010.]

BRION, J: This CA decision dismissed the petitioner's petition for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus; denied the petitioner's motion to declare the respondents in contempt; and partially granted
the privilege of the Writ of Amparo in favor of the petitioner.

DOCTRINE: Under this mandate, the CHR is tasked to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings,
including field investigations — acting as the Court's directly commissioned agency for purposes of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

FACTS:

Jonas Joseph T. Burgos — a farmer advocate and a member of Kilusang Magbubukid sa Bulacan (a
chapter of the militant peasant organization Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) — was forcibly taken
and abducted by a group of four (4) men and a woman from the extension portion of Hapag Kainan
Restaurant, located at the ground Door of Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
The petitioner held a press conference and announced that her son Jonas was missing. That same
day, the petitioner sought confirmation from the guard if the person abducted was her son Jonas.
Upon subsequent police investigation and LTO verification, it was discovered that plate number TAB
194 was registered to a 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle owned by a certain Mauro B. Mudlong. Mudlong was
arrested and his 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was seized by the Philippine Army for transporting timber
without permit. Prior to Jonas' abduction, Mudlong's 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle remained impounded at
the 56th IB's Headquarters. Right after Jonas' abduction was made public, it was discovered that
plate number TAB 194 of this 1991 Isuzu XLT vehicle was missing, and the engine and other spare
parts were "cannibalized."

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The PNP-CIDG presented Emerito Lipio @ KA TIBO/KA CRIS, Marlon D. Manuel @ KA CARLO, and
Melissa Concepcion Reyes @ KA LISA/RAMIL to support the theory that elements of the New People's
Army (NPA) perpetrated the abduction of Jonas.
The CA found that the evidence the petitioner presented failed to establish her claimed direct
connection between the abductors of Jonas and the military.

ISSUES: Whether or not the failure of the PNP and AFP to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful
investigation and to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties is a fatal to the
grant of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo

RULING:

The PNP and the AFP have so far failed to conduct an exhaustive and meaningful investigation into
the disappearance of Jonas Burgos, and to exercise the extraordinary diligence (in the performance
of their duties) that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires. Because of these investigative
shortcomings, we cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation, using extraordinary
diligence, is undertaken.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, the Court RESOLVES to DIRECT
the Commission on Human Rights to conduct appropriate investigative proceedings, including field
investigations — acting as the Court's directly commissioned agency for purposes of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo. AUTHORIZE the Commission on Human Rights to conduct a comprehensive and
exhaustive investigation that extends to all aspects of the case (not limited to the specific directives
as outlined above), as the extraordinary measures the case may require under the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo.

The dismissal of the petitions for Contempt and for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is hereby AFFIRMED.

EDGARDO NAVIA, RUBEN DIO, and ANDREW BUISING vs. VIRGINIA PARDICO
[G.R. No. 184467. June 19, 2012]

DOCTRINE: For the protective writ of amparo to issue in enforced disappearance cases, allegation
and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown by the
required quantum of proof that their disappearance was carried out by, "or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, [the government] or a political organization, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge [the same or] give information on the fate or whereabouts of [said missing] persons."

FACTS:
On March 31, 2008, two uniformed guards arrived at the house of Lolita Lapore which was located in
Grand Royale Subdivision, Malolos City. The guards asked for Ben, one of Lolita’s sons, and invited
both sons to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft
of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision. Thereafter, the two were interviewed by Navia, the
supervisor of the security guards, along with his co-petitioners. Eventually, Lolita and Bong left the
security office but not before letting them sign a statement to the effect that the guards released
him without inflicting any harm or injury to him.

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The following day, Ben disappeared. Thus, his wife filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC
of Malolos City.

ISSUE: W/N the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo will proper (NO)

RULING:

No. The Court enumerated the elements of enforced or involuntary disappearances, as provided for in
R.A. No. 9851, viz: (a) be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty, (b) carried
out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, (c)
followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate
or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition, and, (d) that the intention for such
refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. “

In an Amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish
that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or
acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in
this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence
presented tends to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben's disappearance.
Moreover, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Malolos City and their
principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental
operation. State participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of
a missing person.

SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and DEPUTY DIRECTOR

REYNALDO O. ESMERALDA, petitioners, vs. MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, respondent.
[G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013.]
LEONEN, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Magtanggol Gatdula filed a petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of
Manila against the petitioners for them to cease and desist from framing Gatdula for the fake
ambush incident by filing bogus charges of frustrated murder against Gatdula. However, instead of
deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo summoned the petitioners to file an
Answer to the Issuance, instead of a Return. He ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda after the hearing, and that the memorandum of the petitioners will be sufficient to
serve as an Answer.

Thereafter, the RTC rendered a “decision” granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUE: W/N the “Decision” of the RTC is the final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo (NO)

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RULING:

No, the RTC erred in producing this “Decision”. Following the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the petition
for the writ is to be filed to the RTC, and the judge, after making an evaluation of the case, has the
option to issue the Writ of Amparo or dismiss the case. After the judge issues this, the respondents
are required to file a return as the responsive pleading to the petition in order to detail the actions
taken to determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party. Finally, the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege
includes availment of the entire procedure.

In this case, Judge Pampilo erred in committing the following procedural irregularities: filing of an
Answer, holding a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and filing of the Return,
requiring the memorandum from petitioners in lieu of an Answer, and “granting the privilege of the
writ of amparo”. A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be executed. It is
tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner.

Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY CARAM ,
petitioner, vs. Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B. CABRERA, and CELIA C.
YANGCO , respondents.

[G.R. No. 193652. August 5, 2014.]

VILLARAMA, JR., J: The RTC had dismissed petitioner's petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo
which petitioner filed in order for her to regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram
(Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD).

DOCTRINE: The Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements constituting "enforced
disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter's child without the
benefit of marriage.

Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the
DSWD. A local matching conference was held, Baby Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel
and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody
then commenced. Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption.

Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the RTC of Quezon City seeking to
obtain custody of Baby Julian. The RTC issued a Writ of Amparo commanding the four respondents
to produce the body of Baby Julian.

The RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo without prejudice to theAling of the
appropriate action in court. The RTC held that Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain

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custody of her child Baby Julian.

ISSUES: Whether a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental
authority and custody of a minor child

RULING: The Court rejects petitioner's contentions and denies the petition.

Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby
Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides,
she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.
There is therefore no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third
and fourth elements are missing.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the
exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a
ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of
the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned
basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

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Republic Act No. 9851: Philippine Act on Crimes Against

International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes
Against Humanity

RA 9851 was enacted on July 27, 2009 for the purpose of valuing the dignity of every
human person and guaranteeing their human rights, in accordance with
international law, including the Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Conventions
on the protection of victims of war and international humanitarian law. More
importantly, this law ensures that the most serious crimes in the international
community will not go unpunished, and their effective prosecution will be ensured.

ENUMERATION OF PUNISHABLE ACTS

1. War Crimes - willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury, extensive destruction of property not justified
by military necessity, willfully depriving a prisoner of war of their rights,
arbitrary deprotation, hostage taking, compelling prisoners of war to serve in
the forces of hostile power, and unjustifiable delay in repatriation
a. Serious Violations in the Four Geneva Conventions
i. Violence to life and person
ii. Committing outrages upon personal dignity
iii. Taking hostages
iv. Passing sentences and executions without previous judgment
b. Other Serious Violations of the Laws and Customs in Armed Conflict

2. Genocide
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and
e. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
f. It shall be unlawful for any person to directly and publicly incite others
to commit genocide.

3. Other Crimes Against Humanity - willful killing, extermination, enslavement,

arbitrary deportation, imprisonment and sever deprivation of liberty, torutyre,
rape and sexual violence, persecution against any identifiable group, enforced
disappearances, apartheid, and other inhumane acts of a similar character.

PROTECTION AND REPARATIONS TO VICTIMS AND WITNESSES

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The Philippine court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical
and physiological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so
doing, the court shall have regard to all relevant factors, including age, gender and
health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the crime
involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. The prosecutor shall
take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such
crimes.

The court shall follow the principles relating to the reparations to, or in respect of,
victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its
decision, the court may, either upon request or on its own motion in exceptional
circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and injury to, or
in respect of, victims and state the principles on which it is acting

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