MAGDA KING

A Guide to Heidegger's
Being and Time

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Edited by John Llewelyn

 A GUIDE TO
HEIDEGGER S
BEING AND TIME

MAGDA KING

Edited by
John Llewelyn

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

SUNY series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy
Dennis J Schmidt, editor
Published by
State University of New York Press, Albany

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

King, Magda.
A guide to Heidegger' s Being and time / by Magda King ; edited by John Llewelyn.
—
p. cm. (SUNY series in contemporary continental philosophy )
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7914-4799-5 ( he : alk. paper ) - ISBN 0-7914-4800-2 ( pbk. : alk. paper )
1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. Sein und Zeit. 2. Ontology. 3. Space and time. I.
Llewelyn, John, 1928- II. Title. III. Series.

B3279.H48 S46632
—
111 dc21
00-027620

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 To
A. K.
 CONTENTS

Editor' s Foreword XI11

Author’s Foreword XV 11

Acknowledgments XXI

Bibliography and Key to Abbreviations XXlll

PART ONE
What Is the Question?

Introductory 1

Exposition 5
1. A Formal Statement of the Question 5
2. A Provisional Explanation of “ Meaning” ( Sinn ):
The Theme of Being and Time Restated 6
3. Why Has Traditional Ontology Failed to Get to the
Root of the Problem of Being? 11
4. The Uniqueness of the Concept of Being: The Problem

into Heidegger’s Question

—
of Its Unity. Aristotle’s “ Unity of Analogy ” A Lead
15
5. How Is the New Inquiry into Being to Be Concretely
Worked Out ? Difficulties Arising from the Nature of
the Problem Itself 19

Vll
Vlll A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

PART TWO
Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

Introductory 25

I. The Being of Dasein 29

1. Existence, Everyday ness and Da-sein 29
( a ) Existence and Care, in Contrast with Reality 29
( b ) The Two Basic Ways of Existing: Owned or
Authentic and Disowned or Inauthentic
Existence. The Undifferentiated Modality of
Everydayness 40
( c ) The Ontological-Existential Terminology of
Being and Time 42
2. A Discussion of the Meaning of Da sein 47

IL The Worldishness of World 51

1. The Fundamental Existential Constitution of Da-sein:
Being-in-the-World. Heidegger’s Conception of World 51
2. The Theoretical and Practical Ways of Taking Care
of Things 65
3. The Ontic Basis of the Ontological Inquiry into
World: The Umwelt of Everyday Existence. The
Meaning of Umwelt 68

III. The Reality of Beings within the World 71

IV. Being-with-Others and Being-One’s-Self 75

1. The Basic Concept of Being-with 75
2. The Everyday Self and the “ They” 80
3. The Publicity of Everydayness 83
(a) Discourse and Language: Everyday Discourse
as Idle Talk 83
( b ) The Everyday Way of Seeing: Curiosity 86
( c ) Ambiguity 87
4. Falling and Thrownness 88

V. The Basic Mood of Dread ( Angst ) and the Being of

Da sein as Care 91
1. The Disclosure of Being through Dread 91
2. The Structure of Da-sein’s Being as Care 97
 Contents ix

VI. Truth, Being, and Existence: Heidegger s Existential

Interpretation of Truth 101

VII. The Concept of Phenomenology 109

VIII. A Preview of the Tasks and Problems of Division Two 119

PART THREE
Division Two of Being and Time : Da-sein and Temporality

Introductory 127

IX. The Articulation, Language, and Method of Division Two 131

1. The Articulation of Division Two 131
2. The Language of Division Two 132
( a) Timeishness 134
( b ) The Tenses of " To Be " 135
( c ) Heidegger’s Tautologies 136
( d ) Primordial Time ( Ursprüngliche Zeit ) 141
( e ) The “ Originality ” of an Ontological
Interpretation 142
3. The Method of Division Two 142

X. Daseins Possibility of Beinga-Whole and Being-toward -Death 145

1. Can Da-sein be Experienced as a Whole? 145
2. Experiencing the Death of Others 146
3. Incompleteness, End, and Wholeness 147
4. The Existential Analysis of Death in Contrast with all
Other Kinds of Interpretation 150
5. A Preliminary Sketch of the Existential Structure
of Death 151
6. Being-Toward-Death and Everydayness 153
7. Everyday Being Toward an End and the Full
Existential Concept of Death 155
8. The Existential Structure of an Owned, Authentic
Way of Being-Toward-Death 158

XI. Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 163

1. Conscience as the Call of Care 163
2. Understanding the Call and Owing 167
 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

3. Interpolation: Ground-Being and Nothing 175

4. Owing, Guilt, and Morality: The Authentic Hearing
of the Call of Conscience and the Existential Structure
of Owned or Authentic Existence 187

XII. Authentic Ability-to-Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the

Meaning of Care 201
1. Anticipatory Forward-Running Resoluteness as the
Authentic Way of Being-a-Whole 201
2. Justification of the Methodical Basis of the Existential
Analysis 207
3. Care and Selfhood 212
4. Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care 217
5. A Primordial Repetition of the Existential Analysis
Arising from the Temporality of Here-Being [ Da sein] 225

XIII. Temporality and Everydayness 229

1. The Temporality of Disciosedness in General 230
( a ) The Temporality of Understanding 230
( b ) The Temporality of Attunement 236
( c ) The Temporality of Falling 243
( d ) The Temporality of Discourse 252
2. The Temporality of Being-in- the-World and the
Problem of the Transcendence of the World 256
( a ) The Temporality of Circumspect Taking Care 257
( b ) The Temporal Meaning of the Way in Which
Circumspect Taking Care Becomes Modified
into the Theoretical Discovery of Things
Objectively Present in the World 261
( c) The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence
of the World 276
3. The Temporality of the Roominess Characteristic
of Here-Being 284
4. The Temporal Meaning of the Everydayness of
Here-Being 290

XIV. Temporality and Historicity 295

1. The Vulgar Understanding of History and the
Occurrence of Here-Being 300
2. The Essential Constitution of Historicity 302
3. The Historicity of Here-Being and World History 315
 Contents xi

XV. Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar

Concept of Time 327
1. The Incompleteness of the Foregoing Analysis of the
Temporality of Here-Being 327
2. The Temporality of Here-Being and the Taking Care
of Time 329
3. Time Taken Care of and Within-Timeness 336
4. Within-Timeness and the Genesis of the Vulgar
Concept of Time 343
5. The Contrast of the Existential and Ontological
Connection of Temporality, Here-Being, and
World-Time with Hegel’s Interpretation of the
Relation between Time and Spirit 349
( a) Hegel’ s Concept of Time 351
( b ) Hegel’ s Interpretation of the Connection
between Time and Spirit 356

XVI. Conclusion: An Attempt to Outline Heidegger’s Answer to the

Question Asked at the Beginning of Being and Time 363

Notes 369

Glossary of German Expressions 383

Index 387
 EDITOR S FOREWORD

Born in Budapest in 1910, Magda King was educated there, in Vienna

and at Edinburgh where she conducted seminars on the work of Mar-
tin Heidegger and contributed papers to philosophical journals. This
book is the most comprehensive and detailed commentary on both
divisions of his Being and Time . The chapters on Division One repro-
duced with certain changes here were published originally in 1964 by
the Macmillan Company, New York, and by Basil Blackwell, Oxford,
under the title Heidegger's Philosophy: A Guide to His Basic Thought . I
found that guide very helpful and have been told by many others that
they did too. What they and I liked especially was the directness with
which it indicates the nature and radicality of the change in our think-
ing that Heidegger was seeking to bring about. Magda King writes
with the precision that is possible only for the commentator who has
reread a text to the point of being able both to inhabit it and to see it
from the outside.
The papers that came to my attention after her death included
typescript studies of each of the chapters of Division Two of Being and
Time . Discovering that they were as refreshingly direct, as ingenious in
their renderings into English of Heidegger’s key words, and as com-
municative of surprise as were her earlier studies, I requested permis-
sion to edit a single volume in which her considerations of both divi-
sions would be contained. I thank Simon Sc Schuster, successors in this
regard to the Macmillan Company, New York, for generously granting
my request, and Blackwell for giving the project their blessing.
Although Magda King’s original guide was not the only one to
omit close examination of Division Two of Being and Time, this division
receives such attention in the new book. After the “ basics ” of Division

Xlll
XIV A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

One are presented in a manner suited to students who have not yet
made an extensive or intensive study of philosophy, the much longer
chapters in which she treats Division Two, while still untechnical, are
models of how to read and analyze paragraph by paragraph with the
slowness a great text deserves.
Heidegger's Philosophy was one of the earliest commentaries on
Being and Time to appear in English . Its composition was virtually com-
plete before the translation of Heidegger’s masterpiece by John Mac-
quarrie and Edward Robinson appeared. Since then the long-awaited
translation by Joan Stambaugh has come out. This is the translation I
reproduce in citations, but, where there is a difference, I elsewhere use
both it and the no less insightful renderings of key terms for which
Magda King argues and upon which her comments sometimes turn.
Her alternatives are recorded in the new glossary and index.
Perhaps the most controversial departure in the original guide
compared with the Macquarrie-Robinson and the Stambaugh transla-
tions was her willingness to countenance “ man ” as a rendering of
Da-sein provided it “ be remembered that man is a purely ontic term and
is incapable of bringing into play the ontological meaning of Da sein .”
That is what she says in the second part of the first chapter of Part Two
in defense of her willingness to use the word in this way and in spite of
her acknowledgment of the reason Heidegger gives in Sein und Zeit for
using the word Da-sein rather than Mensch— though it should be noted
that in some works composed after this one he seems ready to use
Mensch in places where he would formerly have written Da-sein . Magda
King notes further that the expression “ human being” has the draw-
back that “ it defines ‘being’ by the humanity of man, whereas Da-sein
asks us to do exactly the opposite.” In favor of using “ man ” she cites its
simplicity. In my judgment the disadvantages of its use, which she her-
self stresses, outweigh this virtue of simplicity. She appears to have
come around to this view herself by the time she undertook her com-
mentary on Division Two, for there she frequently uses the term
Da-sein . Her original objection to that solution was that “ although in
many ways the best,” it is exposed to “ the danger that Da-sein might
become merely a technical term in a Heideggerian terminology,
instead of being rethought and genuinely understood.” I believe that
her own exegeses forearm the reader so effectively against this danger
that to choose Da-sein is indeed the best solution. I have therefore
opted for the now standard practice she herself appears to have come
to favor and have as a consequence made substitutions where called for
in her treatment of Division One. It seems to me that the risk incurred
by using the word Da-sein is less serious than that run by frequent
 Editor's Foreword XV

recourse to “ man.” This does not mean that this familiar word has to
be eschewed altogether, so long as we keep her warning in mind. As for
her phrases “ man’s being-there” and “ man’s here-being, ” they express
admirably the ontic-ontological ambiguity on which Heidegger’ s work
turns, the original ambiguity or “ ontological difference” implicit in the
Greek word on.
Magda King welcomed and adopted many suggestions from the
first full English translation of Being and Time, for instance “ ownmost”
for Heidegger’ s eigenst , which is kept too in Joan Stambaugh’s transla-
tion . The present editor is in the fortunate position of being able to
draw on all three of these sources and others. He is of the opinion that
it is by ringing the changes judiciously through a range of available
offerings that the reader may be conducted between the extremes of
oversimplification and excessive artificiality toward a horizon where
the matter itself, the Sache selbst, is “ rethought and genuinely under-
stood.” An approach to this objective can be facilitated, or rather made
less difficult, if a neologism or paleonym can be hit upon that is unfa-
miliar without being too far-out. For example, Magda King’s “ spaceish ”
substitutes for “ spatial” a word that sounds strange enough to the Eng-
lish ear to make us think harder about what Heidegger might mean by
räumlich. It and “ timeish ” and “ worldish ” and “ published ” (for
öffentlich ) are to my mind and ear strokes of genius. She exploits the
same suffix in “ stand-offishness, ” her graphically concrete translation
of Abst ändigkeity for which Stambaugh and Macquarrie and Robinson
give the more Latinate “ distantiality.”
In his endeavor to refresh philosophy, Heidegger, like Hegel,
draws on the earthy roots of his language and dialect. So a promising
way of achieving this refreshment would be the exercise of translating
Being and Time into Anglo-Saxon. Or Welsh. Or Hebrew. For it is at the
Janus edge of the going over, the unstable instant of transition from
one linguistic field to another, that takes place the paradoxical hap-
pening of simultaneously being and not being at home that is regis-
tered in the word Unheimlichkeity one of the keys to Heidegger’s book.
This frontier can also be historical. On or near it perhaps teeters the
word dread . Although and because this was revived in certain Existen-
tialist applications of Heidegger, it has tended to get eclipsed in trans-
lations and discussions of his work by anxiety or by Angst left untrans-
lated. Alluding to A. E. Housman’s list of the physical symptoms that
accompanied his remembering a line of poetry, she remarks that “ it
might equally well be said that the first time one truly understands Hei-
degger’ s questions one knows it by a cold shiver running down one’ s
—
spine. ” That cold shiver the Schaudern that Goethe’s Faust declares to
XVI A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

—
be humankind’ s best part, Shakespeare’s “ dread bolted thunder ” can
be felt in the word dread. I have therefore respected Magda King’s pref-
erence for it, but without excluding the others. This is not the only
transcription by her that may provoke the disagreement she would
have seen as a manifestation of the alertness she wanted to encourage.
Whether or not her own lexical and philosophical alertness owes some-
thing to her having learned German and English as second and third
languages, I fancy no one will disagree that it is abundantly manifested
in this guide.
With a couple of exceptions for which she excuses herself, the
author deliberately abstains from discussing the secondary literature
already available to her. Her aim is the same as Heidegger’s: to bring
readers to experience a raw contact with the topic. Anyway, without
that accessibility how could readers be confident that they had reached
a position from which to judge the book, as of course it must and will
be judged, in light of other Heideggeriana? Texts additional to Being
and Time to which she does refer are listed in the bibliography, which
I have expanded by including information about recent editions, trans-
lations, and secondary literature. I have also expanded her notes and
the references given in her text by adding indications to this material
in them.
But it is above all in the sensitive intelligence with which its
author listens and responds to Heidegger’s own words that lies what I
consider to be the strength of this book. We can all think of philo-
sophical or other commentaries composed decades ago that retain
their power of illumination today, whatever scholarship has come up
with in the interim. I believe that A Guide to Heidegger's uBeing and
Time” has that classic quality and that generations of students of Hei-
degger will join with me in thanking State University of New York
Press, in particular Jane Bunker and Marilyn Semerad, and their phi -
losophy series editor Dennis Schmidt, for the professional manner in
which they have shown that my belief is shared.

JOHN LLEWELYN
 AUTHOR S FOREWORD

The studies contained in this volume are intended to help the reader
toward an understanding of Heidegger’ s philosophy as it is expressed
in Being and Time . Even the best translations cannot avoid a certain
distortion of the original text, imposing additional difficulties on
their readers. The main purpose of this book is to help such readers
over the greatest initial difficulties presented by Being and Time . Hei-
degger claims to have made a new departure in Greek-Western think-
ing by raising a radically new problem. What this problem is, and how
it differs from the central problem of traditional philosophy, is hard
to grasp and harder to explain; but it must be at least roughly
explained and understood before any detail of Heidegger’ s thought
can fall into place.
Accordingly, the first theme of this book is simply the question
Heidegger asks. The discussion of this question will at the same time
introduce readers to Being and Time in a general way and prepare them
for the second and main theme of this book: an exposition of those fea-
tures and problems of Being and Time which are both basic to its under-
standing and are usually found hardest to grasp, such as, to mention
only one example, Heidegger’ s conception of world. The first seven
studies will deal with problems basic to Being and Time as a whole, and
the eighth will give a preview of the special problems raised in Division
Two in preparation for the close investigation of that division which
follows. A concluding study will attempt to indicate Heidegger’s answer
to the question raised at the beginning of his inquiry.
The difficulty of Heidegger’s thought was for many years held to
be almost insuperable in the medium of a foreign language, especially
English. That this opinion is no longer so widely held can be seen both

XVII
XVlll A Guide to Heidegger' s Being and Time

from the rapidly increasing number of translations of Heidegger' s

works and from the interest of a growing readership. There are signs,
moreover, that as a thinker of our own age, Heidegger may be of inter-
est to many who do not claim to have a wide knowledge of traditional
metaphysics or whose concern with him may not be primarily philo-
sophical at all. Such readers have a certain advantage in bringing an
open mind to a new problem, but they also have special difficulties in
grappling with Heidegger. Every effort has been made to carry these
readers along in this work. Wherever possible, difficult ideas are
approached through concrete examples and illustrations. Care has
been taken to explain frequently used metaphysical terms, which are
elementary to the expert in philosophy, but may be unfamiliar to the
less well-prepared reader. Any unnecessary use of technical language
has been avoided and a simple, straightforward English aimed at.
Heidegger’s own key words present a special problem to trans-
lator and expositor alike, a problem that can never be entirely satis-
factorily or finally solved. As Heidegger rightly insists, every transla-
tion is in itself an interpretation. The English renderings of key
concepts which this work gives have grown entirely from its own
understanding of Heidegger’ s thought, and may differ considerably
from other translations. The first English version of Sein und Zeit
appeared only after the body of the present book had been com-
pleted, but as even a hasty comparison shows, there are many simi-
larities and many more divergencies in the rendering of Heidegger’s
key words. This is all to the good. Since in most cases the English
expression can only be an approximation to the German , it unavoid-
ably weights the original in one way or another. Something like a
standard English terminology of Heidegger’s concepts is not only an
impracticable aim , but would in advance rob his thought of its rich
possibilities and drive it into the narrow channel of only one possible
interpretation. For this reason , no effort was made to adapt the ter-
minology of this book to that of the translation of Being and Time
made by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, except where the
translators have found an especially felicitous way of expressing what
seems to me the primary meaning of a word , as for instance, in their
inspired translation of eigenst by “ ownmost.” This and several other
excellent renderings have been gratefully taken over, and the term
“ division ” for Abschnitt has also been adopted.
An exposition has the advantage of far greater freedom than is
permissible to a translation; it can not only paraphrase and expound a
concept at length, where necessary, but it is one of its positive tasks to
unfold all the implications enclosed in a key concept. Even so, when all
 Author's Foreiuord XIX

this has been done, the inadequacy of the English rendering is often
still so painfully felt that there is a constant temptation to go on using
the German original. With exception made for Da sein, this temptation
will be resisted in this work, on the principle that an inadequate Eng-
lish word is preferable to an unfamiliar foreign word, always provided
that it has been carefully explained how and where the English fails to
harmonize with the original. [German expressions are retained where
they occur in citations from Joan Stambaugh’ s translation. They have
also been added occasionally in brackets elsewhere. Ed.]
Heidegger’ s practice of putting into quotation marks, for no
apparent reason, such familiar words as subject, know, world , and the
like, although a minor difficulty, cannot be entirely disregarded. The
quotation marks indicate that these words are not to be taken at their
face value, either because they are used in a new sense or because they
are a loose way of speaking, not strictly appropriate to the matter
under discussion but unavoidable because they have grown from a long
habit of thought and are easily understandable to the reader.
Heidegger’ s practice will be applied in this book only within strict
limits. On the other hand, quotation marks will occasionally be used
for purely linguistic reasons. The word being, when it stands for the
substantive das Sein, may sometimes have to be distinguished from a
gerund or a present participle that belongs to the sentence construc-
tion. English is exceptional in that it does not have a noun form of the
infinitive to be, a peculiarity that can lead to confusion and obscurity
when the to be is the main theme of the inquiry. Many philosophical
works try to overcome this difficulty by spelling the gerund with a cap-
ital letter: Being. This practice, unfortunately, can lead to another con-
fusion: the mere sight of the word Being suggests the divine Being,
when what is meant is simply the humble to be. The verbal noun being
will therefore be spelled with the small initial letter, but it will stand in
quotation marks when any doubt could arise about its meaning.
Finally, two closely connected points must be briefly mentioned.
The first concerns the bibliography. Among Husserl’ s works only
those have been mentioned there to which either direct reference is
made or which were found to be especially helpful as a preparation for
Sein und Zeit . I have not discussed commentaries and critical works on
Heidegger, since to have done so would almost inevitably have raised
controversy and interfered with the main purpose of taking the reader
directly to Heidegger’s thought as that is presented in his own works.
For similar reasons, no attempt has been made at a critical
appraisal of Heidegger’s philosophy. Where criticisms and compar-
isons with other thinkers occur, these are incidental and subordinate to
XX A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

the positive task of helping the reader to a clear and firm grasp of Hei-
degger’s fundamental ideas. This is by no means easy, but once it is
done, it will put the reader in a position both to explore more deeply
Heidegger’s thought for himself and to form a fair judgment of its
power and original contribution to philosophy.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the Niemeyer Verlag for kind permission to quote and
translate passages from the original edition of Sein und, Zeit, copyright
by Max Niemeyer Verlag, Halle/Saale ( now Tü bingen ), 1927.
The manuscript has greatly benefited from my husband’s advice
and fruitful criticism; to him I owe deepest gratitude. I gladly take this
opportunity also to thank George Kay for his most generous and con-
structive help through many years; and Thorir Thordarson and Martin
Gray for their encouragement and support.

XXI
 BIBLIOGRAPHY AND
KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

( Abbreviations of titles as indicated are used in references made in the

text and notes. )

HEIDEGGER
BPP The Basic Problems of Phenomenology , trans. Albert Hofstadter ( Bloom-
ington: Indiana University Press, 1982 ).
BW Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, ed., David Farrell Krell ( New York:
Harper 8c Row, 1977 ).
BZ Der Begriff der Zeit (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1989 ).
CT The Concept of Time, trans. William McNeill (Oxford: Blackwell ,
1992 ).
DT Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund
( New York : Harper 8c Row, 1966).
EB Existence and Being, ed., Werner Brock ( London: Vision, 1949 ).
EGT Early Greek Thinking, trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi
( New York: Harper 8c Row, 1975 ).
EHD Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung ( Frankfurt: Klostermann ,1951 ).
G 4.
EM Einführung in die Metaphysik (Tü bingen: Niemeyer,1953). G40.
ER The Essence of Reasons, trans. Terrence Malick ( Evanston, Northwest-
ern University Press, 1969 ).

XXlil
XXIV A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

FCM The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude,

trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker ( Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1995).
FD Die Frage nach dem Ding ( Niemeyer: Tübingen, 1962 ). G41.
G Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe ( Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann,
1975- ).
GE Gelassenheit ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1959 ).
GM Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik : Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit ( Frank-
furt: Klostermann , 1983). G 29/ 30.
GP Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie ( Frankfurt: Klostermann,
1975). G 24.
HCT History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel
( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

HO Holzwege ( Frankfurt: Klostermann , 1950). G5.

HU Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit, mit einem Brief über den “ Humanis-
mus” {Bern: Francke, 1947 ).
ID Identität und Differenz ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1957 ).
ID( E) Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh ( New York: Harper 8c
Row, 1969 ).
IM An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim ( New York:
Doubleday, 1961).
KPM Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik ( Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951).
G3.
KPM( E ) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics , trans. Richard Taft ( Blooming-
ton: Indiana University Press, 1990).

OWL On the Way to Language , trans. Peter D. Hertz ( New York: Harper 8c
Row, 1971).
P Pathmarks, ed., William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1998).
PGZ Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs ( Frankfurt: Klostermann,
1979 ). G 20.
PLT Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter ( New York:
Harper 8c Row, 1971 ).
PR The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly ( Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991 ).
 Bibliography and Key to Abbreviations XXV

QCT The (Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William
Lovitt ( New York: Harper Sc Row, 1977 ).
SG Der Satz vom Grund ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1958). G10.
SZ Sein und Zeit , Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische
Forschung , VIII. ( Halle: Niemeyer, 1927 ). G 2. Being and Time , trans.
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson ( New York: Harper Sc Row,
Oxford: Blackwell , 1962 ). Trans. Joan Stambaugh ( Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1997 ).
US Unterwegs zur Sprache ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1960 ). G12.
VA Vorträge und Aufsätze ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1954 ).
W Wegmarken ( Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967). G9.
WCT What Is Called Thinking? trans. Fred D. Wieck and John Glenn Gray
( New York: Harper Sc Row, 1968).
WG Vom Wesen des Grundes ( Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1955 ).
WHD Was heisst Denken? (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1954 ). G8.
WM Was ist Metaphysik ? Mit Einleitung und Nachwort ( Frankfurt: Kloster-
mann , 1955).
WP -
Was ist das die Philosophie? ( Pfullingen: Neske , 1956 ).
1

WP( E ) What Is Philosophy? trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (Sch-
enectady: New College and University Press,1956 ).
WT What Is a Thing? trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch ( Chicago:
Henry Regnery, 1967 ).
ww Vom Wesen der Wahrheit ( Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1954 ).
ZS Zur Seinsfrage ( Frankfurt: Klostermann , 1956).

For details of the context and composition of Being and Time, see espe-
cially John van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King
( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994 ), and Theodore Kisiel,
The Genesis of Heidegger s “ Being and Time ” ( Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1993).

HUSSERL

Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge. Husserliana 1, ed. S. Strasser

(The Hague: Nijhoff , 1950 ).
Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology , trans. Dorion Cairns
( The Hague: Nijhoff , 1960 ).
XXVI A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phä nomenologischen Philosophie, I, ed. K.

Schuhmann, II, ed. M. Biemel, III , ed . M. Biemel. Husserliana 3, 4, 5
(The Hague: Nijhoff , 1950 Bd. 3, 1952 Bd. 4 Sc Bd. 5).
Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy ,
First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology , trans. Fred Ker-
sten (The Hague: Nijhoff , 1982 ).

Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy , Sec-

ond Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard
Roycewicz and André Schuwer ( Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989 ).
Logische Untersuchungen I and II , ed. Elmar Holenstein, Husserliana 18 (The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1975). Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay ( New
York: Humanities, 1970 ).
Vorlesungen zur Phä nomenologie des inneren Zeitbexvusstseins , ed. Rudolf Boehm ,
Husserliana 10 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966).
The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, trans. James S. Churchill (The
Hague: Nijhoff, 1964 ).
 PART ONE

What Is the Question?

INTRODUCTORY

The main body of Being and Time is preceded by two expository chap-
ters in which Heidegger explains the question of being as it is to be
raised and worked out in this fundamental inquiry. Everything that
—
belongs to Heidegger’s question its motive and aim, the method of
—
the investigation, and the conclusions at which it will arrive is set out
in these two chapters with meticulous care and a masterliness that can
only be appreciated after much study. And yet, twenty and thirty years
after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger still finds himself
obliged to correct misinterpretations of his fundamental work and to
point out confusions between his question of being and that raised by
traditional ontology.1
The difficulty of grasping a radically new problem is, of course,
well known to students of philosophy. In addition, Heidegger presents
his readers with unusual difficulties, the greatest of which is the frag-
mentary state of Being and Time itself. Divisions One and Two of Part
I were published in 1927 as the beginning of a much larger work , con-
sisting of two parts or halves, each containing three divisions. Heideg-
ger intended to conclude his own investigations of the problem of
being in Division Three, Part I, while the whole of Part II was to have

1
2 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

been a radical critique of traditional ontology. Of this monumental

work, the originally published two divisions are all we have. Perhaps
nothing can show the stature of Being and Time more impressively than
the fact that , in spite of its unfinished state, it is one of those rare
works whose importance can in no way be measured or foreseen.
Between 1927 and 1960 Heidegger published numerous other
works, some of which clearly belonged to Part II of Being and Time (see
especially Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics ) . On the whole, it may be
said that, except for a treatise on Aristotle’ s interpretation of time, the
ground assigned to Part II has been fully covered by Heidegger,
although not in the way in which it had been originally planned. In the
preface to the seventh German edition of Sein und Zeit (1953), Hei-
degger announced that the second half would definitely not be added
to the work.
This announcement still left open the question of the crucially
important Division Three of Part I, which was to have borne the sug-
gestive subtitle of “ Zeit und Sein ” ( “ Time and Being” ). The absence of
this division contributed more than any other single factor to the dif-
ficulty of the whole treatise. As far as one can judge, it was to have
brought not only the solution of Heidegger’s final problem, but also
the explicit and detailed answer to what might be called his penulti-
mate question. The absence of two sets of answers from Sein und Zeit
makes its central problem extremely difficult to grasp and even leaves
it open to doubt which of the questions raised by Heidegger is the
more fundamental.
In 1961, however, Heidegger delivered a lecture on “ Zeit und
Sein” at the University of Kiel, which was subsequently broadcast in
Germany. Despite this, great efforts are demanded from the reader to
grasp the central theme of Being and Time . Among its many difficul-
ties, the following call for mention here.
First, there is the special use of the word Sinn (sense, or mean-
ing), which enters importantly into Heidegger’s problem as it is for-
mulated in Sein und Zeit . This word is confusing and even positively
misleading to readers who are unfamiliar with phenomenology. This
difficulty, however, is comparatively easy to overcome.
Second, there is the confusion between Heidegger’s and the
metaphysical question of being. This difficulty is recurrent and not at
all easy to overcome.
Third, the failure to see that there is any difficulty at all. Our
familiarity with , and constant use of, the is and am and to be, make it
incomprehensible that anyone should find our ability to understand
these words astonishing and problematic. This difficulty is chronic and
 Part One: What Is the (Question? 3

hardest to overcome, because it is not primarily a matter of intellect

and thinking. A. E. Housman is reported to have said that the only way
in which he could recognize great poetry was by a certain feeling in his
stomach. It might equally well be said that the first time one truly
understands Heidegger’ s questions one knows it by a cold shiver run-
ning down one’s spine.
These difficulties will be specially kept in view in the exposition
of Heidegger’s central theme, which will be developed as follows.
In sections 1 and 2 the precise meaning of Heidegger’s question
is explained and illuminated by a discussion of the aims set in Part I of
Being and Time.
Section 3. A brief summary is given of Heidegger’s interpretation
of the question of being as it has been asked and worked out in tradi-
tional philosophy, in contrast to his own question.
Section 4. The unique nature of the concept of being, and the
attempted solutions of the problem of its unity, most notably by Aris-
totle, are discussed. This leads to a consideration of Heidegger’s own
attempt to solve the same problem.
Section 5. The concrete working out of Heidegger’s problem in
Being and Time is the main subject. The difficulties inherent in the
problem itself are discussed, concluding with a brief indication of the
place of Being and Time in Heidegger’s thought as a whole.
 EXPOSITION

1. A FORMAL STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION

Being and Time is an inquiry into the meaning of being ( Sinn von Sein ).
To this short formulation of his theme Heidegger frequently adds the
word überhaupt , which is difficult to translate precisely: the meaning of
being as such or in general is only an approximate statement of the full
theme ( Sinn von Sein überhaupt ). Fortunately, this difficulty need not
worry us unduly, since Heidegger does not insist on a single formula.
In an effort to make his problem concretely understandable he often
reduces it to a simple, informal question, as, for example: “ was heisst
‘Sein’?” (SZ, 26; also KPM, 202, G 3, 224, KPM( E), 153; ID, 21, ID( E ),
30). Almost literally translated, the phrase means What is called
“ being” ? Freely paraphrased, it might be rendered as What do we mean
by “ to be” ?
From these various formulations, the core of Heidegger’ s
question emerges with an apparent, not to say misleading, clarity
and simplicity. At first sight , we must confess, it is frankly disap-
pointing. Heidegger claims to give philosophy a new start , but it is
not at all evident where the newness of his question lies. It strikes
us rather as the revival of an old question that has gone out of fash-
ion . Even less does its fundamental character show itself on the sur-
face. It reminds us of the kind of problems that are usually dealt
with by logic, but most of all it sounds like a linguistic or a merely
verbal problem. Among all the doubts and misgivings aroused by a
formal statement of Heidegger’ s theme, the suspicion that he might
be concerned merely with the meaning of a word must evidently be
the first to be allayed.

5
6 Part One: What Is the Question?

"
2. A PROVISIONAL EXPLANATION OF MEANING ( SINN ):
THE THEME OF BEING AND TIME RESTATED
Heidegger' s special use of the term " meaning" ( Sinn ) was pointed out
already in our introductory remarks. Our present difficulty thus seems
to be purely terminological and should be capable of an easy solution:
we must simply find out how Heidegger defines the word “ meaning."
The matter, however, is not quite so simple, as can be readily seen when
the definition is actually given. Meaning, in Heidegger’s sense, is that
from which something is understandable as the thing it is. This defin-
ition, while perfectly correct, is for our purpose quite insufficient.
Heidegger’s terminology grows from a way of phenomenological think-
ing, which cannot be explained merely by defining words. Phenome-
nology will be made the subject of one of our later studies, but in the
meantime we must find a rough-and-ready way to understand Heideg-
ger’ s use of “ meaning.” This can be done by a concrete illustration.
Supposing in a strange town we ask what a certain building is, we
may be told that it is a theater. With this explanation the building has
—
explicitly come to our understanding as a theater that is, as the thing
it is. Supposing, however, that we are not familiar with theaters, we
must take a further step and have explained to us what a theater is. We
shall be told that it is a building intended for the production of plays.
Provided that we know at all what a play is, this particular building has
now become manifest in what it essentially is. When we understand
something as the thing it is, we have understood it in its essential being.
But where in all this is the meaning? Is it in our understanding of
the word “ theater?” No. Is it in this concrete thing, the theater itself ?
No. Is it perhaps in the explanation “ for the production of plays” ? The
“ for” shows that this thing, the theater, is in advance understood by ref-
erence to a purpose. Is that where we find the meaning? This comes
much nearer to Heidegger, but is not quite there yet. Meaning, accord-
ing to Heidegger, is that from which something is understandable as
the thing it is. From where can a thing like a theater be understood at
all? Only from a world of human existence.
Writing, producing, and appreciating plays is one of our distinc-
tively human possibilities, for the sake of which we have things like the-
aters. Only from a human world can a thing be understood as a theater.
That which makes such understanding possible, Heidegger says, is the
meaning. The meaning of the theater is the world to which it belongs.
The world of our own existence is the horizon in which our every-
day understanding moves, so that from it and in reference to it the
things we come across are intelligible to us as theaters, as buses, as
 Exposition 7

knives and forks; that is, as things that can be useful for some purpose.
The horizon of our world is primarily “ meaning-giving” ; it is a mean-
ing in which we constantly move as a matter of course, so that it usu-
ally remains implicit.
One way to make this implied meaning explicit is to turn away
from our everyday world and enter into the realm of one of the sci-
ences, say, theoretical physics. At one stroke, things like theaters,
buses, knives and forks, become “ meaningless.” The horizon from
which things are now understood is the substantiality of matter. Why
has such a startling change taken place? Because the horizon, in
which the physicist’ s understanding moves, has undergone a pro-
found modification. The world of human existence has become mod-
ified into a theoretical conception of material nature, articulated into
such categories or basic concepts as mass, motion, or energy. Since
this horizon alone is “ meaning-giving” for the physicist, anything
whatever that falls under his observation must show itself and can
only show itself as a complex motion of material bodies. This horizon
gives nothing from which things could even be questioned as to their
possible relevance to a purpose; their only possibility now is to show
themselves in their material properties as moving bodies in a space-
time continuum .
Let us sum up the results we have reached so far. Meaning is that
—
which enables us to understand things as the things they are that is, in
their essential being. The meaning does not originally lie in words, or
in things, but in the remarkable structure of our understanding itself.
We move in advance in a horizon of understanding, from which and in
reference to which the things we meet are intelligible to us as so and so
and as such and such. The world of our own existence is the horizon
from which we primarily understand things as relevant to a purpose.
This is capable of modifications, for example, into something like
“ nature.” From this horizon, things become understandable purely as
substantial bodies. The modifications in the horizon of our under-
standing enable us to understand things in different ways, but in each
case only in one or another of their possibilities.
What light does this throw on Heidegger’s theme? What is Hei-
degger aiming at when he asks: How is it at all possible for man [ Da-
sein] to understand being? From what horizon does he understand
being? What does being mean? These questions, as our discussion has
shown, are not three different questions, but are one and the same.
The horizon which makes it possible for us to understand being as
being is itself the meaning of being. What is this horizon? It is, as Being
and Time sets out to show, time. Already on the first page, Heidegger
8 Part One: What Is the (Question?

tells us that the provisional aim of his treatise is the interpretation of

time as the possible horizon of any understanding of being.
Why does Heidegger call this interpretation his provisional aim?
Presumably to indicate that, with its achievement, the tasks set to Being
and Time as a whole are by no means finished. Heidegger’s interpreta-
tion of time is completed in Division Two, except for the last crucial
steps, and these were to have been taken at the beginning of Division
Three. This was to have led to the final phase of Heidegger’s original
investigations: the temporal interpretation of the idea of being as such.
In the absence of Division Three, this final aim of Part I of
Being and Time would have remained impenetrably obscure had Hei-
degger not given some illuminating hints in his work entitled Vom
Wesen des Grundes ( The Essence of Reasons ), published in 1929. Here
Heidegger clearly indicates that the idea of being as such is to be
articulated into what- and how-being, something, nothing, and not-
ness ( Was- and Wiesein , Etwas, Nichts, and Nichtigkeit . WG, 52, W, 69,
G9, 173, ER, 125, P, 133).
This formula, bare as it is, and uncertain as its interpretation must
be, yet helps to define Heidegger’s central theme and deserves to be
carefully considered. It contains, in fact, the basic design of the new

— —
ontology that is to be founded that is, brought back to its source and
ground in Being and Time . The strangeness of Heidegger’s philosophi-
cal approach makes itself felt already in the concepts into which the idea
of being is articulated, among which the “ nothing” and the “ not” occupy
the most important place. This seems paradoxical indeed, for, to our
usual way of thinking, “ nothing” and “ notness” are the very opposite of
being. Our later studies will show, however, that these concepts receive
an entirely new interpretation in Heidegger’s thought, in the light of
which their central philosophical importance will become fully under -
standable. In the meantime, we shall turn to those articulations of the
idea of being that seem familiar and more within our immediate grasp.
The two closely connected articulations of what- and how-being
become much easier to comprehend when they are rephrased into
what-(a thing)-is and how-(it )-is. The being of things is manifest to us
in what they are, traditionally called the “ essence,” and in how they
—
are that is, whether they exist actually, or possibly, or necessarily. It
should be noted, however, that these traditional conceptions should
never be taken over unexamined and mechanically applied to Hei-
degger’s philosophy. The reason for this will gradually emerge in the
course of our studies. Meanwhile, a more urgent point to decide is
what we are to understand by the “ thing” whose being is articulated
into what and how.
 Exposition 9

In the primary and narrow sense, things are the concrete things
that are accessible to us through the senses and are capable of an inde-
pendent existence, such as mountains, stars, plants, and animals. These
things stand there, so to speak, on their own feet, and in so standing,
they are, they exist . Things in a very wide sense, however, can mean
anything at all: beings as such and as a whole, and things in this wide
sense constitute the sphere of philosophical inquiry. Within the realm
of beings as a whole, however, the concrete, sensible things have played
an eminently important part, so that nonsensible phenomena, like
mind, knowledge, and number, have tended to be understood in com-
parison with and in contrast to them. In other words, the reality ( Wirk -
lichkeit ) of one kind of thing has tended to be measured by the reality
of another kind of thing.
But if the fundamental problem of philosophy is to be raised in a
new way, not only the idea of being but also the idea of beings must be
reconsidered and defined. The third articulation of the idea of being
gives us the widest possible concept of beings as such: they are some-
thing and not nothing. A delusion, the meaning of a poem, God, hope,
thinking, seeming, becoming, and so on, are evidently something and
not nothing, although they are not concrete sensible things in the pri-
mary sense of the word. Starting from the idea of something, a “ real
thing” is no longer played off against an “ ideal thing” and the one mea-
sured by the other; both are set off against the nothing as the totally
other to all things, and understood in their most fundamental charac-
ter as “ not nothing.” Heidegger’s idea of being formulates the demand
that ontology must start from the widest and deepest of all distinctions:
the difference between something and nothing. With this start, the
problem of the nothing would be drawn into the very center of philos -
ophy; and this, Heidegger maintains, would be the first fruitful step
toward “ overcoming nihilism” ( EM, 155, IM, 170, G40, 212 ).
All this sounds intolerably paradoxical at present, because we do
not in the least know as yet what Heidegger means by the nothing. For
the same reason , it is hard to imagine that the nothing and the not can
have anything to do with time, and yet they must have, if Heidegger is
serious in announcing that the final aim of Being and Time is to unfold
the temporal meaning enclosed in the idea of being as such.
This culminating point of Heidegger’s investigations will unfor-
tunately remain obscure even at the end of our studies, since the whole
temporal analysis of the idea of being was to have been carried out in
Division Three. But, it will be asked , what of all the works Heidegger
has written since Being and Time? Is it possible that none of them
brings at least a partial solution to Heidegger’s final problem? One of
10 Part One: What Is the Question?

them does: the Einführung in die Metaphysik ( Introduction to Meta-

physics ). The lecture, delivered in 1935, on which this book is based, has
rightly been felt to be unique among all Heidegger’s works. Its true
theme, however, has often been only imperfectly understood. It brings,
it is true, the temporal interpretation of an idea of being, but not of
Heidegger’s own idea. The interpretation given is of a restricted con-
ception of being which has been central to metaphysical thinking: the
idea of substantial being.
What is the temporal meaning hidden in the idea of substantial-
ity? Heidegger formulates it as “ standing presentness” or “ persistent
presentness” ( ständige Anwesenheit ) (EM, 154, IM, 169, G40, 211). This
is the horizon into which traditional philosophy, unknown to itself,
looks out in advance, and with a view to which it determines, differ-
ently in different ages, what kind of things have “ true being” and which
are in comparison mere shadows. It is not an accident, for instance,
that Greek-Western thinking has ascribed an extraordinary dignity to
the formal sciences like logic and mathematics. The purely formal con-
cepts and their relations studied by these sciences preeminently satisfy
the idea of permanence and unchanging presence, which is the tem-
poral meaning of substantiality (SZ, 89ff., esp. 95-96 ). The fact that
the modern mathematical-theoretical sciences have grown from the
soil of Greek-Western philosophy, and from no other soil, testifies to
the hidden power of an idea of being which has carried and shaped the
course of our history. But the possibilities of this idea have now been
worked out. If the question of being has to be asked anew, this cannot
be a mere whim or even a “ stroke of genius” on the part of an indi-
vidual; it can only arise from historical necessity.
How is this question to be worked out in Being and Time? The
main stages can now be roughly delimited. The ultimate goal, as was
shown above, is the temporal interpretation of the idea of being as
—
such that is, of what- and how-being, something, nothing, and notness.
( Projected for Division Three.) This aim requires for its indispensable
basis the solution of a provisional or penultimate problem: How is it at
all possible for man to understand being? How is it that time is the
horizon from which being is understandable? How is time itself to be
interpreted? ( Completed in Division Two, except for the last crucial
steps, which were to have been taken at the beginning of Division
Three.) This problem, in turn, requires for its indispensable basis a pre-
liminary inquiry into the being of man as Da-sein. The task of this
investigation is to discover all the essential structures of man’s exis-
tence, thereby illuminating the way in which man understands both his
own being and the being of other beings ( completed in Division One ).
 Exposition 11

Having brought the broad outline of Heidegger’ s treatise into

focus, we can now summarize his question as follows. It is the question
of the inner possibility of our understanding of being and of the tem-
poral meaning enclosed in the idea of being as such. This is what Hei-
degger often calls the question of being as being, but the phrase is mis-
leading, because the central problem of traditional ontology is usually
defined in the same way. In view of the radical difference between the
two, would it be justified to change the definition of traditional ontol-
ogy to the one proposed by Heidegger? Is Heidegger’s claim that he is
—
providing a fundamental ontology that is, the foundation for all ontol-
ogy-^0 be upheld ? The problem of our understanding of being, Hei-
degger maintains, lies already in ail the questions philosophy can ask,
and lies in them in such a way that it cannot even be raised as a prob-
lem, let alone be solved, on the traditional soil. On what grounds does
Heidegger put forward such a thesis? Is there sufficient evidence to
make the thesis tenable, or should it be rejected as a dogmatic asser-
tion? These matters demand an examination of traditional philosophy,
whose nature and limits have so far been only briefly indicated.

3. WHY HAS TRADITIONAL ONTOLOGY FAILED TO GET

TO THE ROOT OF THE PROBLEM OF BEING?

The character and limits of Western philosophy are decisively deter-

mined by its Greek origins. The early Greek thinkers asked: What are
beings as beings? What are beings as a whole? In spite of many pro-
found changes in the course of Greek-Western thinking, the questions
it asks are still fundamentally the same as they were at the beginning,
or are derivations from them. Traditional ontology, Heidegger main-
tains, was and remains an inquiry into beings as beings, and not into
being as such.
Beings 2 is a rendering of the German word das Seiende. This is
Heidegger’ s translation of the essentially ambiguous Greek expression
to on, which can mean both being and beings ( ta onta ). Since in Hei-
degger’s translation the weight falls on the latter, it will usually be ren-
dered by “ beings, ” and sometimes also by “ things.” There are other
ways, in themselves better and clearer, of translating das Seiende for —
example, “ the existent,” “ the entity,” or “ entities.” These translations
are avoided here just because they are clearer. They cover over an ambi-
guity which Heidegger holds to be the very essence of metaphysical
thinking. Phrases like “ the being of the existent, ” or “ the being of enti-
ties, ” have a first-blush understandability that is entirely spurious. They
12 Part One: What Is the (Question?

hide the problem that the phrase “ the being of beings” wears, so to
speak, on its sleeve.
Ta onta means: that which is, the things that are. Formally, the
word beings approximates quite well to ta onta , but in English it is
applied mainly to living beings, and primarily to human beings. We
must now try to think this word in exactly the opposite way, because
the beings par excellence that traditional ontology has in view are not
the beings we ourselves are, but primarily things, in the sense of con-
crete sensible things. When Greek-Western philosophy speaks of to be ,
it thinks of the is of a thing; in other words, to be has come to mean pre-
dominantly the infinitive of is (EM, 70, IM, 77, G40, 98).
What do we mean when we say that a thing is (exists) ? We mean
that it is really there among the all of things, that it occurs, that it can
be found somewhere in the natural universe. When we talk of reality,
we mean primarily the actual presence of something among the total-
ity of beings. The reality of the res ( thing) in a very wide sense may be
called the central conception of being in traditional ontology. The
basic character of reality is substantiality. The seemingly irreconcilable
trends in our philosophical tradition spring mainly from varying inter-
pretations of what is meant by substance or what manner or class of
beings may properly be called substances.3 In ancient philosophy
alone, substance has been as variously defined as matter, as material
bodies, as essence, as number, as idea or form, as the indissoluble unity
of matter and form, not to speak of modern variations on the same
theme. Yet all these differences can be differentiated and all these
opposites opposed only on the ground of an underlying sameness: an
idea of being as substantial reality.
No matter how variously traditional ontology may define the sub-
stance, it always does so with a view to self-subsistence, self-mainte-
nance without recourse to other beings, unchanging presence as an
independent self. And just because independence and self-subsistence
are the basic characters of substantial being, its perfect embodiment
must be self-produced, or unproduced , uncaused, uncreated. Anything
that is brought into being is necessarily dependent, needs maintenance,
—
and is liable to pass away that is why perishable, finite beings cannot
satisfy the idea of the perfect substance.
Any problem that arises in traditional ontology is in advance
understood in the horizon of substantiality. But this idea of being, Hei-
degger maintains, is too narrow and restricted to be able to explain all
the ways and senses in which we can understand being. Above all, it is
incapable of explaining the distinctively and uniquely human way of
being. Man exists such that his being is manifest to him, and it is man-
 Exposition 13

ifest to him as his own. That is why each of us must say of himself: I am.
Being and Time will show that the whole meaning and structure of the
being we express by the am is totally different from the real existence
of a thing.
Once we begin to think about it, it must strike us as curious that
the infinitive to be should have drawn its meaning primarily from the is
of things, when the am would seem to be much nearer and more easily
comprehensible to us. Does Heidegger ascribe this strange feature of
our tradition to a lack of insight or deep thought on the part of meta-
physical thinkers? Far from it. He holds that the greatness of their
thought has been the distinction of Europe. Was, then, the question,
What are beings as beings? simply a wrong start, accidentally made and
perpetuated through two and a half thousand years? Historical deci-
sions, Heidegger maintains, do not come about by accident, but spring
from the basic possibilities of man’s existence, possibilities that are nei-
ther made by man, nor, on the other hand, are merely blindly and pas-
sively endured by him, as a thing may be thought to “ endure” the con-
tingencies that happen to it.
The tendency to interpret human being from the being of things
may be roughly and provisionally explained by one of the basic ways in
which man can and usually does exist: he loses himself to the things he
meets in his world. Owing to his fundamental tendency to give himself
away, to scatter himself among his makings and doings, man literally
finds himself “ there, ” among the things with which he is busy. Hence the
impression arises that to be means I am in exactly the same way as it does
when to be is applied to a thing. Thus the to be remains undifferentiated
and is applied in the vague, average sense of presentness and occurrence
to any beings that are accessible at all, including man himself.
It is from this average understanding of being that metaphysics
grows. The horizon from which being is understood does not become
explicit and its possible differentiations cannot become even a prob-
lem. What is differentiated is not being, but beings. Traditional philo-
sophical distinctions start from beings, defining and dividing them
into regions and classes according to their essence, their whatness.
Man himself is enrolled into the region of living beings, of animals,
among which , ontologically speaking, he subsequently remains ( HU,
65ff., W, 154ff., G9, 323ff ., P, 246-47, BW, 203ff.). Man is the animal
who speaks, who has a soul, reason, mind, spirit, self-consciousness,
who can think. The interpretation of man’s essence undergoes many
changes in Greek-Western ontology; what does not change is that man’ s
existence is in advance understood as the real occurrence of a peculiar
species among the all of beings.
14 Part One: What Is the Question?

It may be objected that Heidegger’s interpretation of the history

of Greek-Western philosophy is too extreme and one-sided. It may
apply to ancient ontology, but it seems to leave out of account the influ-
ence of Christian theology on a considerable period of Western
thought. There is a fundamental difference between the medieval and
the Greek interpretation of man. And when we come to the modern
era, has Descartes not radically reversed the Greek start with his “ I
think therefore I am” ?
Heidegger’s answer to these objections may be briefly indicated
as follows:

( a) The idea of the transcendence of man , that man reaches out

beyond sheer rationality, that he is more than merely an intelligent
animal, undoubtedly has its roots in Christian anthropology ( SZ,
49 ). But what is decisive for the question of being is that man’s exis-
tence never becomes an ontological problem. In Christian theology,
man has a preeminent place among all other beings by virtue of a
soul to be saved, but his existence is sufficiently explained by his
being an ens creatum, a creature in a created world. For purely onto-
logical problematics, the situation is not radically altered from the
antique period: “ to be created” is a Christian reinterpretation of
“ to be brought forth,” which is a basic character of being already
in Greek ontology.
(b ) In spite of the far-reaching change introduced into philosophy by
Descartes, Heidegger repudiates the claim that a fundamentally
new start is made with the “ I think therefore I am” (SZ, 89ff.).
Descartes uncritically takes over the medieval conception of being
as the substantiality of substance. He follows the Scholastic divi-
sion of substances into the infinite and finite substance, the ens
increatum and the ens creatum. Far from raising the question of
being in a radically new way, Descartes does not even attempt to
get to the root of the meaning enfolded in the idea of substantial-
ity, nor does it occur to him to ask whether the being of God or of
man can be appropriately determined by this idea.

The philosopher’s God, as Heidegger frequently points out, is

totally different from the God revealed in religious experience ( ID, 70,
ID( E), 71-72; WM, Einleitung, 20, W, 208, G9, 379, P, 287-88). God as
the uncreated being is a purely ontological concept. It is the perfect
embodiment of what is explicitly or implicidy meant by subtantiality:
an uncaused, self -subsistent being that needs nothing apart from itself
to remain constantly present as an unchanging self.
 Exposition 15

As against the most perfect, uncreated substance, created beings

can only be called substances in a relative sense. Even among them,
however two regions can be distinguished that are relatively indepen-
,
dent of production and maintenance: the res cogitans and the res
extensa, the thinking thing and the extended thing. Descartes thus
defines the essence of the created thing as extension on the one hand
and as “ I think ” on the other hand. The UI am ” is not only left unex-
amined, but is understood as a matter of course as the produced ( cre-
ated ) presence of the thinking thing. Broadly and roughly speaking, “ I
think therefore I am ” means: as the subject of the “ I think, ” I am indu-
bitably, necessarily present ( as the absolutely unshakable ground of
truth ) in my representations.4
Far from making a new beginning with the problem of being, the
modern age of science and technology brings to an unparalleled and
extreme unfolding the implications that lie already in the Greek start.
The extraordinary levelling down of everything to a uniform sameness
witnessed by modern man in every sphere of experience is explained
by Heidegger in the following way. In the latest stage of the modern
era, even the object, with its last specific what-character of extension,
disappears. A thing no longer manifests its being by standing face to
face with man as an object (Gegenstand ) present for a subject, but by
standing up to a thoroughgoing calculation, whereby its persistent
availability and producibility { Bestand ) is in advance made certain. It is
by no means an accident that logic and the mathematical-theoretical
sciences, with their formal-symbolic, nonvisual representation of
nature, now come to an unheard-of predominance. They are the execu-
tors of the idea of being as substantiality and objective presence, which
now reaches its apotheosis in reducing the what and how of things to
the persistence of a characterless product, whose being lies solely in its
calculable availability and disposability anywhere, at any time ( “ Die
Frage nach der Technik, ” VA, 13, “ The Question Concerning Technol-
ogy,” QCT, 3-4, BW, 284; WM, Nachwort,. 48, W, 104-105, G308-309,
EB, 387-88).5

4. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE CONCEPT OF BEING:

THE PROBLEM OF ITS UNITY.
ARISTOTLE S UNITY OF ANALOGY -
A LEAD INTO HEIDEGGER S QUESTION

The preceding discussions already indicate that logical methods of

analysis and definition cannot be appropriate to the new inquiry into
16 Part One: What Is the Question?

being. Logic has grown from the soil of traditional ontology; its meth-
ods, justifiable within certain limits, are applicable only to defining
beings (SZ, 3-4 ). But being is nothing like beings; it cannot be brought
to definiteness and clarity by having beings ascribed to it. As Aristotle
clearly saw, being is not the highest genus. The universality of the con-
cept of being is of a totally different order from the generality of those
concepts that gather beings into one class. While Aristotle’ s deep and
subtle reasoning cannot be entered upon here, its point can be graph-
ically illustrated as follows.
A genus, which through its subordinate species contains individ-
ual beings, can always be exemplified and thus brought to definiteness
and clarity. The genus animal, for instance, can always be explained by
pointing to a sheep or a horse. But to explain the concept of being, we
should vainly point to a horse or the sun , saying “ Look, that is what I
mean by is ” The very absurdity of this attempt shows the baffling char-
acter of our most universal concept. While everything that we can
know, feel, experience in any way is understandable to us in terms of
its being, being itself can in no way be explained from or by beings. Its
universality transcends, goes out beyond any possible beings or classes
of beings.
The uniqueness of being gives rise to the important philosophi-
cal problem: What constitutes the unity of this universal concept? The
unity of a genus, like animal, may be explained by the common char-
acter of the beings that fall under it, but this cannot be done with
being. And yet, all the ways and senses in which we use the term to be
have a recognizable and definite unity, and the philosophical task is to
explain how this unity is possible.
This is the problem Aristotle tried to solve with his teaching of
the analogous meanings of being. With this discovery, Heidegger
remarks on page 3 of Being and Time, “ Aristotle placed the problem of
being on a fundamentally new basis.” But even Aristotle, Heidegger
goes on to point out, failed to solve the problem of those “ catégorial
connections ” which he himself had raised; nor could the medieval
Schoolmen, who took over the doctrine of the unity of analogy, arrive
at any solution in principle.
Why does Heidegger draw attention so pointedly to this doc-
trine in the opening pages of Being and Time? What is it that Aristo-
tle and the Schoolmen failed to solve? Why must the whole problem
remain in principle insoluble within metaphysics itself ? The answer
to these questions must obviously throw a great deal of light not only
on traditional attempts, but on Heidegger’s own attempt to grapple
with the fundamental problems of philosophy. The whole matter,
 Exposition 17

therefore, is well worth considering, even though we can do so only

briefly and by way of illustrations.
The specific problem the Schoolmen tried to solve was how it was
possible to say “ God is ” and “ the world is, ” when there is an infinite dif-
ference between the being of the Creator and of the created world (SZ,
93). Following Aristotle’s teaching, the Schoolmen explained that the
word is does not mean exactly the same in every instance. God is
( exists ) in the primary and full sense of the word to be . The world is
only in a derivative sense, which is understood by analogy; that is, by
reference to the first and unqualified meaning of the term.
According to Aristotle, only “ substance” is ( exists ) in the primary
and independent sense of to be . Anything that belongs to a category

— —
other than substance for example, the category of quality, quantity,
state, or relation is said to be only in a qualified sense, being the qual-
ity, quantity, state, or relation of a substance. For example, the “ con-
crete and unique substance, ” the moon, which Aristotle holds to be
eternal and divine, is (exists ) in the primary and full sense of the word
be . But when we say “ The moon is white,” or “ The moon is eclipsed, ”
the meaning of the is has been qualified. The difference between the
subtance moon and its quality of whiteness or its state of being
eclipsed is evident: the whiteness could not exist by itself, whereas the
moon could very well change its color and yet remain substantially the
moon. Similarly, the eclipse has no separate existence apart from the
moon, whereas the moon remains identically the same without being
eclipsed. And yet, we do not speak ambiguously or improperly when
we ascribe being of a kind to quality, or state, or quantity, because in
these instances we do not mean by the word is the same as when we
speak of substance. We are using the term analogously, that is, by ref-
erence to its first and unqualified meaning.
Why does Heidegger draw attention to the importance of the
“ unity of analogy ” at the beginning of Being and Time? Because here is
the nearest approach that can be made from metaphysics toward a new
inquiry into being. Aristotle sees clearly that the problem cannot be
solved by dividing beings into genera and species, but that the “ to be”
itself must be articulable and modifiable. He sees further that the mod-
ifications can be explained by reference to a primary meaning. But even
Aristotle’s genius cannot leap out of an idea of being as being-a-sub-
stance, which determines traditional ontology from its start.
What is it, among other things, that the unity of analogy fails to
illuminate? It fails to illuminate the primary meaning of being. How is
it, Heidegger would ask, that “ to be ” must primarily mean “ to-be-sub-
stance” ? And why must substantiality mean self-subsistence, self-main-
18 Part One: What Is the Question?

tenance in unchanging identity? Are these basic characters of being

the arbitrary invention of philosophers? Or have they, on the con -
trary, been wrung from the phenomena themselves in the highest
efforts of thinking? If the latter is the case, as Heidegger holds it is,
then the question must at last be asked, How is it possible for us to
understand something like substantial-being at all? From where and in
reference to what is this primary meaning of being understood? Self-
subsistence, unchanging presence, persistence as an identical self in—
all this there lies a distinct reference to time. Time is the horizon in
which not only the traditional but any understanding whatever of
being in advance moves.
Until time is explicitly laid bare as that which makes our under-
standing of being as being possible, and until the original phenome-
non of time itself is properly explained, the problem of the unity of
being remains in principle insoluble. When, on the other hand, it has
been shown that all possible differentiations, not merely of beings
but of the to be itself , have indeed been drawn from time and can be
explained as modifications of and derivations from time , then this
ancient and troubling philosophical problem will have found a radi-
cal solution.
Traditional ontology draws its central idea of being from only
—
one mode of time the present, the now. The more persistently some-
thing is present, the more truly it is. “ The philosopher’ s God,” it can
now be seen, most perfectly satisfies this idea of being: to be ever-pre-
sent in unchanging self-sameness in an infinite succession of nows. By
a curious reflex action, this idea of being is turned back upon the time
from which it had been drawn. Time itself is conceived as something
that is, and its being is characterized as an infinite succession of now-
points of which only each present now is “ real.” The past is conceived
as a now that no longer is, the future as a now that is not yet. This
interpretation of time has maintained itself from the Greek period
down to our own day. It will be the task of Being and Time to show that
the infinite now-time, in which things come into being and pass away,
while it is a genuine time phenomenon, is not the original phenome-
non of time.
Where and how does the now-time of our philosophical tradition
become accessible? It is accessible in a preeminent presentation, which
has of old been called noein, the pure, nonsensuous apprehending of
the being of beings. This philosophical “ seeing” presents to itself
beings in respect of their pure presence. According to Heidegger, how-
ever, time is originally manifest to us not in what and how things are,
but in our own being, the I am, and this time is finite. The finite time
 Exposition 19

of our own existence, however, is too inexorable to disclose itself to a

mere harmless “ looking at it.” It is elementally and originally disclosed
in dread ( Angst ). The extraordinary importance of dread in Being and
Time does not make this work into an existentialistic Angst-Philosophie.
The importance of dread lies in its ontological function of disclosure.
The pure, nonsensuous apprehending, the noein, which has tradition-
ally been regarded as the one proper approach to the being of beings,
proves to be inadequate to the inquiry into being as being.

5. How Is THE NEW INQUIRY INTO BEING

TO BE CONCRETELY WORKED OUT? DIFFICULTIES
ARISING FROM THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM ITSELF

Our discussions so far have had the aim of bringing the central prob-
lem of Being and Time into focus. The solution proposed by Heidegger
has to some extent been indicated, not in the hope of making it under-
standable at this stage, but in order to illuminate the fundamental
nature of the problem itself and its departure from tradition. On the
other hand, the way in which Heidegger works out his theme has so far
been only briefly mentioned, and needs a somewhat fuller discussion.
The subtides of the two divisions we have of Being and Time seem
to suggest that this work is an ontological inquiry of the usual style into
the being of man. Division One is entided “ The Preparatory Funda-
mental Analysis of Da sein ” ; Division Two, “ Da-sein and Temporality.” 6
To all appearances, Being and Time sets out to repair the omission of
traditional ontology to inquire into man’s existence and not only into
his essence. If we follow the customary division of the all of beings into
—
great ontological regions the modern practice is to separate the
—
region “ nature” from the region “ mind” it seems perfectly appropri-
ate to call Being and Time a “ regional ontology of man, ” or, to use an
equivalent expression, to call it a “ philosophical anthropology.”
The only obstacle to such a reasonable interpretation is Heideg-
ger’s own, almost obstinate insistence that his treatise is not a regional
but a fundamental ontology ( KPM, 188ff., G3, 208ff., KPM( E), 142ff.).
Its sole aim is to show how an understanding of being is at all possible,
and why the being understood in it must have a temporal character.
The inquiry into man’s existence, Heidegger insists, is only the con-
crete way toward this aim. Why is this plain and unambiguous state-
ment yet so puzzling? Because it is by no means self-evident why Hei-
degger’s sole aim should make an analysis of all the essential structures
of man’s being necessary. Why cast the net so widely to catch a single
20 Part One: What Is the Question?

fish? To understand being, we are inclined to think, must surely belong

to man’s reason , or self-consciousness, or to whatever faculty of under-
standing he may be shown to possess. Why does Heidegger take such
an apparently circuitous way for working out his problem?
Because, according to Heidegger, man’ s understanding of being
is not an isolated faculty, nor merely a part of himself , but determines
through and through his whole way of being: man’ s way to be is to
understand. Man is so that in his concrete, factical existence his being
is manifest to him as I am . This unique character of man, that he exists
understandingly, is not confined merely to his thinking or cognitive
activities, but a priori determines all the ways in which he can be; for
instance, he cannot be even a body in the same way as a merely living
organism ( HU, 67, W, 155-56, G9, 324, P, 247, BW, 204-205).
It is man’s unique way of existing that metaphysical thinkers tried
to explain by ascribing his understanding of being to his soul, or rea-
son, or self-consciousness, or to whatever other interpretation of man’ s
essence they may have given. With such interpretation, however, man
— —
is broken into two, if not three, layers body, soul, and spirit so that an
explanation of his being becomes well-nigh impossible. What should be
the ontological character of this pieced-together man? Does he exist
really, or ideally, or partly one way and partly another way? Man, Hei-
degger insists, cannot exist ideally, as a disembodied spirit, as a pure I,
as an absolute consciousness, because, as we shall see later, his
“ thrownness” into a world a priori belongs to and helps to constitute
his “ spirituality.” Nor, on the other hand, can man exist merely really
like a stone, which is essentially hidden to itself in its being. Man’s way
to be is unique: it is as far removed from an ideal-being as it is from the
real-being of a thing. Even the living-being of the highest animals is
separated by an abyss from man’s way of existing ( HU, 69, W, 159, G9,
327, P, 249, BW, 207). Beings like plants and animals are not merely
real like stones: their way to be is to live. But they are wholly absorbed
in living, whereas man transcends, goes out beyond living; that is, to
him the finiteness of living is wholly disclosed, and this alone, as Being
and Time sets out to show, is what enables him to understand both him-
self and others in their being.
No animal as such , not even the highest, can treat a thing as the
thing it is. This way of understanding things, as far as we know, is the
unique distinction of man. But just because it is native to him, it usu-
ally remains unnoticed. In his ordinary, everyday existence, man lives
in a “ preontological, ” that is, implicit understanding of being as a mat-
ter of course. It seems the greatest commonplace to him that to the
merest glance a thing like a tree, for instance, should present itself as
 Exposition 21

something that is. He is usually too absorbed in his business with the
tree itself to notice the remarkable fact that if the is were missing from
the tree, not merely the word “ is ” would disappear, but also the tree as
tree. He might, it is true, be still aware of it in some other way which is
difficult for us even to imagine, but the tree could no longer present
itself as the thing it is, in its specific tree-being. Consequently, there
could be no such word as “ tree.” If the is were missing from our lan-
guage, there would be not a single other word and no language at all
( EM, 62, IM , 68, G 40, 87 ).
Since in his usual absorption in things, man constantly overlooks
that which enables him to exist as man , his unique understanding of
being, philosophy is needed to take being for its explicit and, accord-
ing to Heidegger, its only proper theme. At the same time, philosophy
can be nothing other than a radicalization of the vague, average under-
standing of being in which man always and already exists. “ The covert
judgments of common reason, ” and they alone, as Kant said, are “ the
business of philosophers” ( quoted by Heidegger on page 4 of Being and
Time and frequently elsewhere ). Accordingly, Heidegger chooses just
the ordinary, everyday manner of existence for the concrete basis of his
“ Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Da-sein ” ( Division One ). Its task
is not only to show what is essentially, a priori constitutive of man’s
average manner of being, but at the same time to explain the elemen-
tal trend toward the world that characterizes everyday existence. Only
when the self-disguise that lies in man’s lostness to his world has been
explicitly laid bare, can a more original and radical understanding of
being be made accessible for investigation ( Division Two ). Man’s way
to be is to understand being. This way of being is unique to man. Con-
sequently, all possible articulations in the idea of being must come to
light in the essential structures of man’ s existence, and it is only there
that they can come to light. Once this is clearly seen, it becomes evi-
dent that in examining how the whole man is, and how he wholly is,
Heidegger is far from taking a circuitous route to a distant goal. He is,
in a sense, at the goal already with the first step; that is, he is already
examining the possibilities enclosed in the idea of being as such. On
the other hand, it is true that in each of its phases the inquiry moves
into a deeper ontological level, so that while the whole of Being and
Time makes up the fundamental ontology, it is only in Division Three
that the fundamental ontology can come fully to itself.
Some of the most basic and most puzzling features of the detailed
working out of Heidegger’ s problem will be the theme of the series of
studies contained in this book. Formidable difficulties of thought and
language will be encountered by us there, but they are, in the last
22 Part One: What Is the Question?

resort, only the visible outcrop of far simpler, much more basic diffi-
culties that arise from the nature of the problem itself. To consider
these briefly is the immediate and final task of the present exposition
of Heidegger’s question.
The first difficulty is not peculiar to Heidegger, but characterizes
all ontological inquiry. It is a curious feature of Being and Time that
while it evidently addresses itself first and foremost to the philosophical
world, Heidegger by no means takes a genuine understanding of ontol-
ogy for granted. On the contrary, he constantly stresses the unique char-
acter of ontology: that its proper theme is being; that being is nothing
like beings or their real properties and qualities and cannot be derived
from our experience of them and, above all, that to realize all this is the
first indispensable step toward any philosophical understanding.
Heidegger’s frequent recurrence to this theme is so marked that
one would be inclined to ascribe it to some special circumstances con-
nected with Being and Time, were it not that the same tendency
becomes even more pronounced in Heidegger’ s later works. In these,
the reader is constantly invited not to accept on hearsay, or be content
with a merely verbal comprehension of the statement that being only
“ is” in the understanding and not in things, but to take his first step
into philosophy genuinely by experiencing for himself the impossibil-
ity of finding the is in any of the things that are concretely accessible
to him ( e.g., WHD, 107, WCT, 173-74 ).
Why is this step into philosophy so difficult to take? Partly
because being is much less easy to grasp than beings, but partly also
because experiencing things in terms of their being seems so natural
to us that it is as if it could not be otherwise. The tree, for instance, pre-
sents itself to the merest idle glance as something that is ; it seems to
bring its is along with itself. The impression is hard to eliminate that
the is somehow belongs to the tree just as much as its shape, its color,
the texture of its bark, the glossiness of its leaves. A little thought, how-
ever, will show that all these things are something; they belong to the
real of beings, so that we already understand them in terms of the are.
We may examine the tree further, we may even think of the things we
cannot directly experience, such as the processes of life going on in the
tree, growth, nutrition, chemical changes, and so on. But again, all
these things are something, they belong to beings, and not one of them
can give us the slightest hint or clue as to how we have come by the is
and the are. Only one thing is certain: being is not something in addi-
tion to beings, but is the way in which these beings come to our under-
standing. They themselves can therefore never explain how we have
come to understand them the way we do.
 Exposition 23

If the is can be found anywhere, it can evidently be found only in

ourselves. But when we turn to ourselves, what do we find ? Sensations,
—
thoughts, feelings, desires and these also are something, although not
in the same way as the tree. Strictly speaking, we should not talk of our
thoughts and feelings as though they were objects, but should say: I am
feeling so and so; I am thinking this or that; I am experiencing such
and such a sensation, and so forth. It turns out, then, that the am is
already understood in all that we can concretely grasp in ourselves, just
as much as the is is understood in the tree. The am, far from being
more easily cornered than the is, seems to be even more elusive. We
never seem to be able, as it were, to get “ behind ” it, but, on the con-
trary, it is there before us in every concrete experience of ourselves.
Our constant familiarity with the is and the am brings about a dif-
—
ficulty that has a special bearing on Heidegger’s problem the diffi-
culty of genuinely experiencing how strange and even uncanny it is that
we should understand ourselves and other beings in terms of the am
and the is. Without some such experience, Heidegger’s thought can
indeed be comprehended as an intellectual construction, but the philo-
sophic passion and excitement which are almost palpable in Being and
Time , and which alone could sustain the stupendous effort of thought
embodied in this work, remain strange and baffling.
The commonplace familiarity of our understanding of being not
only makes it hard to appreciate what Heidegger is “ worrying about, ”
but even raises a doubt whether his undertaking is not doomed to fail-
ure. Is it not hopeless to try to find out how our understanding of
being is possible, when it is so near us that we can never get away from
it? There is, according to Heidegger, one possibility: although being is
always manifest to us, we can experience it in a new way, when it sud -
denly loses its matter-of-course familiarity. It is dread that reveals the
commonplace in its utter strangeness and uncanniness. Dread singles
each man out and brings him elementally face to face with the that I
am. Hence the incomparable revelatory power of this basic mood and
its methodological importance to an inquiry that seeks to penetrate
through man’s being to the meaning of being as such.
But the that I am, as Heidegger insists, can only be understood by
a man in his own unique, factical existence. The remarKaDie ontologi-
cal “ circle-structure ” of man’s being, to which Heidegger repeatedly
draws attention, leads us to the inmost meaning of the problem of
being. On the one hand, the manifestness of being a priori determines
man’s whole way to be, enabling him first of all to exist as man, but, on
the other hand, being requires and needs the unique, factical existence
of a man for its manifestness. The “ circularity” of the problem of
24 Part One: What Is the (Question!

being, however, is totally different from the “ vicious circle ” which may
lie in a deductive proof . Nor must it be thought of as a geometrical cir-
cle. It is a circling whereby being and man circle round each other. The
circularity of its problem is not a secret weakness at the heart of phi-
losophy, but rather is its distinction. The task is not to avoid or sup-
press the circle, but to find the right way to get into it. The way found
by Heidegger in Being and Time has been briefly indicated: the
approach to being is made through the analysis of the being of man. If
we now ask whether there are other ways of “ getting into the circle, ”
the question aims at taking Being and Time out of the isolation in which
we have hitherto discussed it and showing its place in Heidegger’ s
thought as a whole.
The extraordinary difference between the two divisions we have
of Being and Time and Heidegger’s later works has been the subject of
much comment. The change is indeed startling enough to have given
rise to the opinion that there is a complete break between Being and
Time and other early works, and those that come after. The manifest
untenability of this view, however, soon led to the opposite extreme.
The tendency in recent years has been to minimize the difference and
ascribe it mainly to a change of theme, of style and language. While
this view is not unsound, it still fails to go to the heart of the matter.
What changes in Heidegger’s later works is his way of “ getting into the
circle.” Being is no longer approached through man’s understanding,
but rather it is man’ s understanding that is approached through the
manifestness of being. Only some such change could explain why so
fundamental a concept as the “ horizon of understanding” completely
disappears from Heidegger’s later thought ( GE, 38ff., DT, 64ff. ).
Through a lifetime of philosophical activity, embodied in a wide range
of works, Heidegger asks the same question, but he illuminates it by
different ways of circling the same circle.
 PART TWO
o§o

Basic Features and Problems

of Being and Time

INTRODUCTORY

The first question usually addressed to a work of such universal scope

as Heidegger’s is how its theme has been divided and articulated. This
question is of special importance in approaching Being and Time,
because, unless it is properly answered at the start, the whole treatise
remains incomprehensible. As a fundamental ontology, Being and Time
differs radically from other ontologies that divide the realm of beings
into regions and subregions. What is articulated in Being and Time is
not the all of beings, but man’ s [Da-sein’ s] way to be , and that means
at the same time his way to understand being, its articulation gives the
following threefold unity.
1. Da sein understands itself first and foremost in its own being. This
being is called by Heidegger existence ( Existenz ) . The full structure
of Da-sein’s being, whose difference from existence will be discussed
presently, receives the name of care ( Sorge ) .
2. Da-sein understands itself as being in a world. An understanding of
world is an essential, irreducible constituent of Da-sein’s way of

25
26 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

existing. The inquiry into the being of world goes hand in hand with
the analysis of Da-sein’s existence. The ontological structure of
world is called by Heidegger the worldishness or worldliness of
world ( die Weltlichkeit der Welt ) .1
3. An understanding of its own being in a world enables Da-sein to
meet other beings within the world and disclose them in their being.
Some of these beings are like himself; they are fellow men, whose
being has the same character of existence as his own. Some are
unlike himself; they are things in the strict sense of the word, and
their being has the character of reality (Vorhandenheit, Realit ät ) . The
inquiry into the being of other beings goes hand in hand with the
analysis of Da-sein’s own existence (self ) and of world.
As this short sketch already indicates, Heidegger unfolds his
theme, in its threefold articulation, as a single unity. It is true that he
may turn his attention specially now to Da-sein’s self, now to world, and
so on, but since these are in advance seen as articulations of a single
understanding of being, the highlighting of one does not plunge the
other two into darkness but brings them simultaneously to greater clar-
ity. Heidegger conducts his inquiry as the driver of a three-in-hand han-
dles his team, flicking now one horse, now another, but urging them
forward all the time as one single team.
Heidegger is well aware that his approach may lay him open to the
charge of being purely “ subjective.” Hence it is his constant concern to
correct such misapprehensions, by stressing that Da-sein’ s understand-
ing of his own being in a world is precisely what gives him access to
other beings and gives them the chance to show themselves in what and
how they are. It is important that the approach to things should be
appropriate to their way of being, so that they can show themselves gen-
uinely as they are. The most difficult among all beings to approach,
however, is Da-sein himself, owing to his tendency to cover over his
understanding of his own being by giving himself away to things.
Finding proper access both to Da-sein and to other beings, and
securing original evidence for every conclusion reached, is Heideg-
ger’s constant preoccupation throughout Being and Time . The method
he employs is one founded and developed by Husserl. Heidegger’s
method, in fact, is an application and adaptation of Husserl’ s phe-
nomenology to his own problems. But it should be pointed out straight-
away that this method is one of the grave difficulties of Being and Time
for those readers who are unfamiliar with Husserl’s work, even the
basic principles of which are hard to grasp. And just because they are,
a discussion of phenomenology has been deferred to the seventh chap-
 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time 27

ter of this part, though the logical order would require it to be placed
at the beginning.
One of the characteristics of Being and Time, owing largely to its
method, is the marked difference between Divisions One and Two,
and there is no doubt that if Division Three had been added to the
work, it would have proved different again from what has gone before.
The peculiar “ phasing” of the investigation poses a problem for anyone
writing a general introduction to Being and Time . At this stage, there-
fore, the present writer has deemed it best to set out Heidegger’ s prin-
cipal themes in separate studies. The series of studies contained in this
part are grouped as follows.

I. The Being of Da sein

The unique character of man’s or Da-sein’ s being is discussed in con-
trast to the being ( reality ) of things. The meaning of existence and care
is provisionally explained, and the conclusion is reached that Da-sein’s
being must be characterized as a finitely free being. The basic ways in
-
which Da sein is “ free” to exist are then examined. This is followed by
an explanation of the most important technical terminology of Being
and Time, concluding with a separate discussion of the meaning of Da -
sein and of its possible renderings in English.

II. The Worldishness of World

The fundamental structure of Da-sein’s being as being-in-the-world is
the subject. Because of its exceptional difficulty, Heidegger’s idea of
world is here treated at considerable length. Then follows a discussion
of theory and practice, and of the meaning of Umwelt .

ΙΠ. The Reality of Beings within the World

The reality of the beings Da-sein meets within his world will prove to
be understandable in two main ways: as substantial reality or objective
presence and as handy reality (Vorhandenheit and Zuhandenheit ) . These
are distinguished and explained.

IV. Being-ioith-Others and Being-One *s-Self

The self in relation to other selves, and the repercussions on one’s own
seif of being together with others in the world, are the themes
unfolded in this chapter. The inquiry leads to the exposition of the fun-
damentally “ falling” ( “ falling prey, ” “ entangled,” disowned ) way in
which Da-sein is himself mostly in his everyday existence.
28 A Guide to Heidegger' s Being and Time

V. The Basic Mood of Dread ( Angst ) and the Being of Da sein as Care
The culmination of Division One in the analysis of dread and in the
exposition of the structure of care is presented in a summarized form
and elucidated as far as possible.

VI . Truth,, Being and Existence

Heidegger’s existential interpretation of truth, and the way in which
existence and being essentially belong together with the phenomenon
of truth, are the subjects of this study.

VII. The Concept of Phenomenology

Heidegger’s explanation of the concept of phenomenology is summa-
rized and the importance of the phenomenological method for Being
and Time discussed. A few steps into Husserl’s phenomenology are taken,
and the point at which Heidegger diverges from Husserl is indicated.

VIII . A Preview of the Tasks and Problems of Division Two

A short outline is given of the theme and development of Division Two,
serving the twofold purpose of a preliminary introduction to more
detailed study to be made in Part III of this Guide, and of indicating the
perspective in which Division One must be seen to be fully understood.
 I
The Being of Dasein

1. EXISTENCE, EVERYDAYNESS AND DA-SEIN

( a ) Existence and Care, in Contrast with Reality

“ Da-sein exists.” This frequently repeated sentence is the hardest to
understand in the whole of Being and Time. Its difficulty has to be spe-
cially stressed at this point, not only because the sentence itself looks
simple, but because it might be thought that it should be understand-
able already on the basis of our preceding discussions. In fact, we are
still only slightly prepared for it. There is only one thing that is already
certain: the sentence cannot be a statement of fact. Different as a fun-
damental ontology may be from other ontologies, it must share with
them the general character of ontological statements. Their distinction
is that they do not tell us about facts, but about the way in which some-
thing must a priori, necessarily, be by virtue of its own essence. Hei-
degger’s sentence must conform to a general type, which may be for-
mulated as follows. Insofar as there is an X at all ( e .g., a material thing,
nature, space, number, language, etc. ), it must a priori , by essential
necessity, be in such and such a way, otherwise it could not be X .
Accordingly, “ Da-sein exists” tdls us that insofar as there is Da-sein at
all, it must by essential necessity be in the way of “ existence, ” otherwise
it could not be Da-sein.
The character of Heidegger’s sentence makes it clear that, in its
context, the term exist cannot have the usual meaning of real existence.

29
30 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

If it had, Heidegger would be saying nothing about the distinctively

human way of being, but would be giving us a pure tautology. Granted,
however, that Heidegger is really saying something essential about man
as Da sein, the term exist can only mean the unique way in which man
is: he is so that he understands himself in his being. To be in this way,
that is, to exist, is according to Heidegger the “ essence” of man.
The expressions to exist and existence are in Being and Time exclu-
sively reserved for man.2 The “ real existence” of beings other than man
is called by Heidegger “ real being” or “ objective presence” (Vorhanden-
sein ), and the structure of this mode of being is called “ reality” ( Real-
ität ) . The living-being of plants and animals is only occasionally differ-
entiated from the real-being of things, although Heidegger often
stresses the difference between them and urges the need for an ontol-
ogy of life. This task, however, cannot be taken in hand in Being and
Time y because it requires for its basis an already completed fundamen-
tal analysis of Da-sein. The full structure of Da-sein’s being would have
to be reduced and deprived of its uniquely “ existential ” features to
arrive at what must necessarily be, in order that merely-living-being
should be possible (SZ, 50).
The basic distinction drawn in Being and Time is thus between the
existence of Da-sein and the reality of beings that are not Da-sein. “ To
exist” and “ to be real” are the two main ways in which beings can be.
A real thing like a stone is in such a way that it is essentially hidden to
itself in its being. Its reality is characterized by a certain passivity, in the
sense that it is manifest only to us, but not to the stone itself. Hence
the stone is necessarily indifferent to its own being, or, more precisely,
it is in such a way that it is incapable even of indifference.
At the other end of the scale, Da-sein exists in an actively disclos-
ing way. The disclosure concerns first and foremost Da-sein himself: it
is its own being that Da-sein most originally understands. This under-
standing, moreover, does not belong to Da-sein in general, but belongs
to each Da-sein singly and uniquely. It is only in his own factical exis-
tence that a man can understand “ I myself am this man; this being is
minef The extreme individuation of Da-sein, that to each one his being
is manifest as my being, is an essential and therefore “ universal” char-
acter of existence. Da-sein is thrown into and delivered over to the
being which is his and which he has to be. His ability to be this being
is for him at stake ( es geht um ).
In the three words, es geht um> Heidegger gives us a first hint of
the peculiarly “ out-going” and “ fore-going” structure of existence, but,
as often happens, the hint is unavoidably lost in translation. The gen-
eral meaning of es geht um, “ it is at stake” or “ it is the issue, ” is certainly
 The Being of Dasein 31

intended by Heidegger. For Da-sein, it is his own being that is at stake.

But it is a distinction of Heidegger’s language that many of his key
words and phrases directly exhibit the thought to be conveyed and
carry the attention forward to other important ideas with which they
are closely connected. In the phrase we are considering, for instance,
the key word urn, “ for,” in advance refers us to the basic character of
existence as the original and primary Umwillen, “ for the sake of.” Since
for Da-sein his own being is at stake, his existence has the basic char-
acter of for the sake of. The connection, which Heidegger shows simply
and directly by the language itself, can only be established in transla-
tion by long and roundabout explanations. On the other hand, such
explanations can often be very helpful in introducing a new theme and
leading into the detailed analyses in which Heidegger painstakingly
works out his theme and brings the requisite evidence. Needless to say,
without a thorough study of the latter even the most correct compre-
hension of Heidegger’s key concepts hangs rootlessly in the air.
Our present discussion can conveniently take its start from the for
the sake of as the fundamental character of existence. What does for the
sake of imply? It undoubtedly suggests something like a purpose, an
aim, an end; and not merely a partial end, which may in turn be used
as means to some further end, but what is usually called an “ end in
itself.” Heidegger, however, does not have a specific end in view, which
may be either chosen by us or given to us, but seeks to explain, among
other things, how man must a priori be in order to be capable of con-
ceiving something like an end or aim at all. To understand this more
concretely, let us start from the familiar experience of pursuing some
definite aim and consider what is necessarily required to make this
experience possible.
The most obvious characteristic of an aim is that it cannot be a
fact, something that a man already is or has: according to common
experience, an aim is something that a man has “ before him, ” “ ahead
of him.” When a man sets himself a specific aim, for instance, of climb-
ing Mount Everest, he conceives it as a possibility that he may or may
not achieve sometime in the future. Until then, he lets this possibility
in advance determine all the steps he takes here and now: he under-
goes most rigorous training, exposes himself to hardship and danger,
bends his energies toward organizing his expedition, collecting the
—
equipment, and so forth and all this for the sake of a possibility that
may never be realized, and on whose outcome he stakes his life.
Remarkable as the pursuit and achievement of such an aim is, for
Heidegger it is even more remarkable how man must be to be capable
of conceiving something like an aim at all. For this, he must be able to
32 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

throw himself forward into a future, to discover as yet completely

“ nonexistent ” things and events and take his direction from them for
what should be done “ here and now.” Above all, he must be able to
understand himself not only in that I am, but in the possibility that I
can be ( e.g., I can be the Mount Everest climber ), and thus come
toward himself, so to speak, clad in his possibilities. In other words,
man must be able to transcend, to go out beyond himself as he already
is to the possibilities of his being, and it is this unique way of being that
Heidegger calls existing.
If man were merely real in every here and now, and his existence
were made up from a series of hops from now to now, he would be
incapable of disclosing possibilities, of understanding himself in his
own ability-to-be ( or potentiality-of-being, Seinkönnen), and so of con-
ceiving any aim or end at all. But more than that, the remarkable way
in which man exists in and from his possibilities is not merely inciden-
tally tacked onto his I am, but is the way in which man most essentially
is and understands himself. To be constandy ahead of, in advance of,
itself is the basic character of existence, and is made possible by the
“ fore-throw ” structure of understanding, which will be more fully dis-
cussed in the next chapter. The I am is primarily understood from the
fore-throw of an / can be ( I am able to be ); man as Da-sein exists pri-
marily from the future.
In the phrases “ it is at stake ” and “ for the sake of ’ Heidegger
gives us a first hint of how Da-sein is disclosed to itself in its possible-
being (I can be), and so brings us to the heart of the concept of exis-
tence, because it is in the disclosure of possibilities that the utmost
illumination of man’s own self is gathered. To exist as himself , more-
over, is not merely one of man’s possibilities among many others; it is
his truest or ownmost possibility . What Heidegger means by “ ownmost
possibility” ( eigenste M öglichkeit ) is, of course, still obscure, and it is in
the nature of such concepts that they can never be wrenched open all
at once or be fully penetrated in any single approach. All that is clear
at the moment is that the difficulty and problem of existence gathers
itself in the concept of possibility, and to clarify this must be our imme-
diate aim.
As soon as we begin to consider what is meant by possibility, we
are dismayed by the diffuseness and elusiveness of this concept. The
diffuseness shows itself in the many different ways and senses in which
the concept can be legitimately applied. First and most frequently, we
talk of possibilities in an empirical sense, meaning that this or that can
happen to a thing, or that such and such occurrences may or may not
take place. These possibilities are contingencies applicable, in Heideg-
 The Being of Dasein 33

ger’s sense, only to real beings ( things ). It is true that this and that can
also happen to Da-sein, but, just because for Da-sein its own being is at
stake, even the accidents that can befall it have quite a different mean-
ing from the contingencies that can happen to a thing. Further, we talk
—
of possibilities in the sense of potentialities for example, the poten-
tiality of a seed to grow into a tree, or the possibilities of Da-sein to
develop its inborn faculties and dispositions.
These factical possibilities, however, are obviously not what Hei-
degger has primarily in view in his inquiry. Let us turn, therefore, to
the philosophical meaning of possibility . Here again we find that the
term has a wide range. First, there is the empty, logical concept of pos-
—
sibility as the sheer thinkability of something that is, something can
be thought without contradiction or absurdity. Further, possibility is
one of the modalities or modal categories of being, in contrast to actu-
ality and necessity. Here possibility means what is only possible, but
need not be actual and is never necessary. Traditionally, possibility is
held to be “ lower” than actuality and necessity, whereas Heidegger
emphasizes that, as the ontological character of existence, possible-
being is “ higher” than any actuality (SZ, 143f.). Further, the essence,
the whatness of a thing, is traditionally also called possibility. The
essence is that which makes it possible for a thing to be as it is.
Possibility in the last-named sense is relevant also to Heidegger,
who calls it Ermöglichung. It is the constitutive “ power ” that “ empow-
ers,” “ enables, ” “ makes capable of. . . .” When Heidegger speaks of the
“ essence” (Wesen ) of Da-sein, he usually means possibility in the sense
just defined. Accordingly, the well-known statement that the “ essence”
of Da-sein lies in its existence (SZ, 42 ) does not mean, as some inter-
pretations would have it, that Da-sein first of all “ really exists ” ( really
occurs) and then proceeds to produce its own essence; that is, to make
itself into who it is by exercizing its freedom of choice. It means that
understanding itself in its own ability-to-be enables Da-sein to be Da-
sein in the most essential respect, namely in respect of its self.
Confusing as the many meanings of possibility already are, an
even greater difficulty arises from the elusiveness of this concept.
There is something quite ungraspable about a possibility, even when
we think of it in the most concrete sense as the possibility of some real
happening. The question is whether this ungraspability is due to some
failure in our thinking, or whether it lies in the very being of possibil-
ity itself. In what way can a possibility be at all?
To answer this question, let us consider an empirical possibility in
contrast to an empirical fact. Supposing on a journey we approach a
certain district and come on a scene of devastation caused by an earth-
34 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

quake the day before, the disaster comes to our understanding as a fact
which, having occurred, is and cannot be altered or undone. Now let
us suppose that we approach another district and find people fleeing
from it, because an earthquake had been predicted for the following
day. This earthquake obviously comes to our understanding in quite a
different way from the one we experienced as a fact. What and how is
this earthquake which is not yet, but is coming? It is not a fact; it is not
—
real; it does not “ exist ” at all; and yet it is as a possibility. The whole
being of this earthquake lies in our understanding it as a possibility, as
something that can be. The disaster that has already happened is a real
event, regardless of whether any man discovers it and understands it in
its reality. But an earthquake that has not yet happened, only is insofar
as there is man to discover it in its possible-being. Had the earthquake
tomorrow not been predicted, and it really happened, it would always
be discoverable as a fact, but never again as it is now, as a possibility
that bears down on us in its uncertainty and threat, not the less threat-
ening because it may not really happen after all.
Events that come toward us from the future evidently only are as
possibilities, as events that can be. The remarkable thing about them is
that their being is in advance determined by a not . The can be in itself
implies that it can also not be. It would be impossible for us to under-
stand the “ can ” unless we understood it as “ possibly not.” Even when
we are so certain of something that we say it must be, we are implying
that it cannot be otherwise, because the conditions are such that all
possibilities except one are impossible. It does not matter, therefore,
—
how some future event is disclosed for example, whether the earth-
quake is predicted by the strictest scientific calculation, or on empiri-
cal evidence, or by casting a horoscope. This determines only the
ground and degree of its certainty, or likelihood, but does not in the
least take away the not that in advance belongs to our understanding of
possibilities as such.
It is clear, therefore, that the disquieting elusiveness of possibili-
ties lies in their very being, and does not primarily arise from the
imperfection of our thinking or the uncertainty of our knowledge. But
if already an empirical possibility, such as we have discussed, is hard to
grasp, how much more so Heidegger’s interpretation of existence as
“ possible-being, ” ( potentiality-of-being, ability-to-be ). The manifold
implications of this concept are for the most part still obscure, but one
meaning at least is beginning to emerge: existence is that way of being
which is capable of going out beyond what is to what is not, and so dis-
closes not actual things or beings, but the possibility of beings, the being
of beings in the mode of possibility.
 The Being of Dasein 35

But how is such a remarkable thing possible that Da-sein can

understand the being of something that is not? Presumably only so that
the not in advance reveals itself in and with Da-sein’s own being. The
— —
key phrase, es geht um it is at stake gives us a first hint of how the not
is originally manifest to Da-sein. How could his own being be at stake
for Da-sein, unless it were in advance disclosed as a being he stands to
lose? Da-sein exists, that is, understands himself in his being from the
constant possibility that he can also not be. This harsh and forbidding
not is far from being a mere negativity, an “ empty nothing.” It is in the
highest sense positive. It enables Da-sein to understand the possibilities
of his own being and those of other beings. It is the source of possibil-
ity as such.
Understanding himself in the jeopardy of his being reveals to Da-
sein that the being he stands to lose is solely and singly his, and not
another’s. The not that can end his being threatens him alone in his
own ability to be, and so brings him into the uniqueness of a finite self.
To exist as himself is Da-sein’s oxvnmost possibility. It is most his own as
against his other possibilities of being with other beings. His ability to
be himself is disclosed from the utmost end of Da-sein’s being, and can-
not therefore be referred to any further “ end.” The possibility of his
own end, moreover, does not reveal itself to Da-sein as some indiffer-
ent “ fact,” but strikes at him in the heart of his being. Hence Da-sein’s
ability to be can never be the means to some end beyond itself, but is
for its own sake.
Accordingly, when Heidegger says that Da-sein exists for the sake
of himself, he is not advocating, as might easily be thought, a ruthless
selfishness, but is stating the ontological problem of who is and how
there can be a finite self. If in his concrete existence Da-sein is able to
understand something like a “ for your sake, ” “ for his sake,” “ for this
and that” at all, and so set himself specific aims and ends, it is only
because his own self is in advance disclosed to him in its finite possi-
bilities as the primary and original “ for the sake of ’ ( WG, 37, W,
53-54, G9, 157, ER, 85, P, 121-22).
Da-sein’s existence is thus at the opposite extreme from the real-
ity of a thing, which is such that it can neither care nor not care for its
own being. Da-sein not only cares, but, as Heidegger’s interpretation
will show, Da-sein’s being is care.
The concept of care, which is elucidated only at the end of Divi-
sion One ( chap. 6 ), is apt to lead to confusion and bewilderment. Why,
the reader may not unreasonably ask, does Heidegger first define Da-
sein’s being as existence, only to show in the end that it really is care?
To make matters even more difficult, the elaborate care-structure
36 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

worked out by Heidegger at the end of Division One refuses to show

the slightest resemblance to any care we may have concretely experi-
enced. It is, as Heidegger himself stresses, a purely ontological-tempo-
ral concept, whose meaning ( Sinn ) will be shown in Division Two to
be time.
The reason why the concept of care cannot be elucidated earlier
in the inquiry lies in the extraordinary complexity of Da-sein’s being,
which can be brought to light only gradually in the course of a long and
difficult analysis. Heidegger, it is true, announces already at the begin-
ning (SZ, 57 ) that the being of Da sein is to be interpreted as care. The
trouble is that this preliminary announcement, as well as all further ref-
erences to care in the course of Division One, remain ultimately incom-
prehensible without a much fuller explanation than Heidegger stops to
give. To alleviate the reader’s difficulties, we shall now attempt a pro-
visional sketch of what is meant by care, and especially of the relation
in which it stands to existence.
Care is Heidegger’s name for how the whole Da-sein is, and how
he wholly is. But Da-sein is in an extremely complex way, which can be
articulated into three main structures: existence ( self ), thrownness (fac-
ticity ), and fallenness ( or falling prey or entanglement). The first of
these three articulations of care we have already discussed: in existing,
Da-sein is constantly out beyond himself, throwing himself forward into
what is not, disclosing it as a possibility. This original disclosure is not
a conscious discovery or a thinking out of what might come, but lies in
the fore-throw or pro-jective structure of care, which Heidegger calls
understanding . The temporal meaning of this “ forwardness” or “ ahead-
of-itself-ness” of care is evidently the future. In Heidegger’s interpreta-
tion, the future will turn out to be the primary mode or ecstasis ( stand-
ing-out-of-itself ) of time.
But Da-sein can only be ahead of, beyond himself , insofar as he
already ¿5. Bringing his possibilities toward himself, he necessarily
comes back to himself as he already, in fact, is . The “ fact” of his being,
which Heidegger calls facticity, is revealed to Da-sein as his being
already here, thrown into a world, left to himself to be as he can in the
midst of beings upon which he is dependent. The whence and whither
of his being are hidden, but the fact “ that I am and have to be ” stares
him in the face in inexorable mysteriousness ( SZ, 136 ). The curious
phenomenal character of the l am is that it can never be grasped except
—
as l already aw that is, l am as having been.The time-character of Da-
sein’s thrownness is the past, the has-been or having-been.
Fallenness, or as it might be more fully paraphrased, “ falling prey
or captive to the world ” ( Verfallen) , is a trend toward the world which
 The Being of Da sein 37

is basic to Da-sein’ s being, and which has already been mentioned as

Da-sein’s tendency to give himself away to things, to scatter himself in
his occupations in company with other people, literally to disown him-
self. The ecstatic character of fallenness is the present.
A genuine understanding of this short sketch is not possible at
this stage. Its purpose is to show how the three main structures of Da-
—
sein’s being existence ( self ), thrownness ( facticity ) , and fallenness,
—
falling prey or entanglement are articulations of the original whole of
care, and not parts or components of which the whole is made up. And
—
care itself, it should be observed, is the unity of time future, past, and
present. Even so, this might be misleading were Heidegger’s interpre-
tation of time not kept in view, an interpretation designed to show that
Da sein does not merely exist “ in time ” like a thing, but “ originates,” or
“ brings himself to ripeness” as time { sich zeitigt ). Man himself exists as
time: when there is no man, there is no time.
But now, to return to the question of existence, just because it is

—
—
as care that Da-sein exists in such a complex and excentric way ahead
of himself, thrown back on to himself , losing himself we can legiti-
mately say that “ Da-sein exists,” meaning the whole of his being and
not merely a part of it. In the articulated whole of care, it is true, exis-
tence names only one strucure, but it is a structure in a whole which is
so originally one that any one of its articulations necessarily implies
the others. When we say “ Da-sein exists,” we are already saying, though
not explicitly expressing it, that he exists factically ( facticity, thrown-
ness), and that thus factically existing, he is already falling away from
himself to the things he meets within his world. Similarly, when we
speak of thrownness, we already imply that this thrown Da-sein is in the
way of existence, because only in coming back to himself in the possi-
bilities of his being can Da-sein find himself already thrown into a
world, and not merely occur in it like a thing. Similarly, when we speak
of falling or fallenness, we are already implying existence and thrown-
ness, for only a being who understands his being in a world can lose
himself to the things he meets within it. For a stone, it is impossible to
lose itself.
Nevertheless, it is not without reason that Heidegger says emphat-
ically “ Da-sein exists, ” rather than “ Da-sein is thrown ” or “ Da-sein is
falling away from himself.” In the articulated whole of care, existence
has a certain precedence, it plays a “ leading” role. In it is gathered the
most unique character of Da-sein’s being and the possibility of its
utmost illumination. As the “ fore going” way of care, existence may be
called in a preeminent sense the “ light” of Da-sein’s being. At the same
time, as Heidegger always emphasizes, Da-sein has an ontological cir-
38 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

cle-structure: the “ light” of existence is only possible to a thrown and

fallen being. The same thought is implied in one of the formal
announcements ( formale Anzeige ) that Heidegger gives of existence:
each Da sein “ ¿s always essentially ” his possibility. He “ does not merely
‘have’ that possibility only as a mere attribute of something objectively
present” (SZ, 42 ).
How is this cryptic sentence to be understood? A thing, accord-
ing to Heidegger, cannot be its possibility, but may in an imprecise way
be said to “ have” it. We say, for instance, that a meteorite “ has” the pos-
sibility of falling in space, of entering the earth’s atmosphere, becom-
ing overheated, exploding, and so on. As we have seen earlier, the
whole being of a possibility lies in its being disclosed as a possibility.
From where are the possibilities of the meteorite disclosable at all?
From its essence, its whatness, that is, its being a material thing. The
possibility of its motion, heat, divisibility, and so on, is manifest from
the properties of matter and not from its own unique being. The mete-
orite is only a sample of the possibilities of material things in general,
which do not in the least require the “ existence” of this particular mete-
orite for their disclosure.
With Da-sein, on the contrary, the factical existence of a unique
self is required to be its own possibility. The essence of Da-sein is to
understand his being as the possibility that is singly and uniquely his
own. This possibility cannot be disclosed by some “ Da-sein in general, ”
but only by a single Da-sein, to whom it is his own being that is at stake.
—
Each Da-sein, therefore, is his possibility only his own factical exis-
tence can manifest itself as the possibility that is uniquely his. The cir-
cle-structure of Da-sein’s being comes to evidence, and must do so,
whenever he is regarded in the light of his own essence and his
—
essence is centered in that “ forward-going” way of care that Heidegger
calls existence.
It is clear, therefore, that if Da-sein is to be explained fundamen-
tally, from the way of being distinctive of him, and not merely empiri-
cally, from some specific point of view, for instance, for medical or
sociological purposes, within the strict limits that such purposes pre-
scribe, the inquiry must in advance have the whole Da-sein in view in
his own unique existence. It cannot reduce Da-sein to something less
than he is in himself, and explain him from what he is, from his genus
and species, his environment and his society. On the contrary, the
inquiry will have to show, among other things, what are the ontological
conditions of the possibility that Da-sein can be social, and why it is
that a world not only essentially belongs to him , but that he tends to
lose himself to it.
 The Being of Dasein 39

But, it may be asked, is it not strange that Heidegger should con-

sider Da-sein’s tendency to lose himself so fundamental to him, when
at the same time he holds that to exist as himself is the very essence of
Da-sein? This strange inconsistency, however, will prove to be only
apparent when we turn to a topic that has not yet been touched upon,
namely the various possibilities that lie in existence itself. In develop-
ing this theme, we shall also come to understand more fully the state-
ments discussed above, that each Da-sein “ ¿s always essentially” his pos-
sibility. He “ does not merely ‘have’ that possibility only as a mere
attribute of something objectively present.” The theme to be consid-
ered now may be briefly summed up in the thesis that existence is in
itself a free way of being.
How is freedom to be understood in an ontological sense? It obvi-
—
ously cannot be what we usually mean by freedom for example, the
ability to choose this course of action rather than that, or to pursue this
end in preference to another one. All these “ freedoms,” all acts of will
aiming at achieving this end rather than that, already presuppose that
we understand the possible being of what is aimed at and that we can
direct ourselves to it as a “ for its sake.” For Heidegger, freedom means
the original disclosure of being, and in a preeminent sense our under-
standing of our own being as the primary for the sake of ( Umwillen; lit-
erally, for the will of ). This freedom is the original “ will” that brings
before itself its own possibilities as “ for the will of.” The disclosure of
the possibilities of his being sets Da-sein free for different ways of being
himself. It is, therefore, not a priori determined by the structure of
existence how a Da-sein’ s being is to be his. On the contrary, it enables
Da-sein to relate himself to his own ability-to-be in profoundly different
ways, and so leaves it open how each factical existence is a self. Exis-
tence is thus a free way of being, because the possibility of various mod-
ifications lies in its own structure.
But, as we have seen, all possibility, all can be , is in advance deter-
mined by a not . In transcending to his possibilities, Da-sein is free, but
always and only in the way in which he can be free, namely finitely. It
lies in the nature of finite freedom that, in giving possibilities, it at the
same time withdraws them. Each Da-sein is his possibility, but always
and only in one of the ways which are open to him. Da-sein cannot exist
in a vague generality, but only in one or another of its definite possi-
bilities. Each Da-sein is one of his possibilities, the others he is not. It
now begins to be faintly visible why notness and nothing enter so
importantly into Heidegger’s idea of being. This not which reveals itself
so inexorably to each Da-sein, makes possible and articulates through
and through his existence as a finitely free being .
40 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

For a proper approach to Being and Timef nothing could be more

helpful than to grasp, however roughly and provisionally, the idea of
a finitely free being. It is this idea that, in advance, guides and articu-
lates Heidegger’s whole inquiry and determines the way in which he
gets to grips with his subject. The essence of Da sein cannot be
defined by what he is, by the attributes and qualities of a rational ani-
mal, because Da sein is finitely free: his fundamental possibilities do
not lie somewhere outside himself but in his own being as care, which
is “ free ” to modify itself in certain basic ways. The essence of this
being lies in existence ( self ). How Da-sein is can therefore be defined
only by the basic modes or manners ( Seinsarten) in which it is possible
for him to exist, that is, to be a self. It is from Da-sein’s basic possibil-
ities that the inquiry must take its lead. Hence each division of Being
and Time is an analysis of Da-sein’ s being in a different mode of exis-
tence. What the basic possibilities of existence are will be the task of
the next section to consider.

( b ) The Two Basic Ways of Existing:

Owned or Authentic and Disowned or Inauthentic Existence.
The Undifferentiated Modality of Everydayness

Heidegger calls the two basic possibilities of existence Eigentlichkeit

and Uneigentlichkeit the usual translation of these terms being “ authen-
y

ticity” and “ inauthenticity.” This translation, while it is perfectly cor-

rect, shifts the weight of the German words from the center to the cir-
cumference. Their weight, as Heidegger explicitly says, lies in eigen,
which simply means own. Therefore, while not abandoning the usual
translation altogether, we shall speak of owned and disowned exis-
tence, or of being one’s own self and of being a disowned self. Since,
however, owned and disowned are very clumsy to use adverbially, we
shall occasionally resort to such phrases as “ to be a self properly ” or
“ not-properly, ” where “ properly” must be understood in the strictly lit-
eral sense of propriusy one’ s own.
The terminology adopted here, especially the word disowned ,
could easily be misleading if it were understood in the sense of an atti-
tude deliberately taken up or a course of action willfully pursued by Da-
sein toward himself. This would imply an interpretation of the self that
is completely alien to Heidegger. What does Heidegger mean when he
speaks of the self ? Does he mean that Da-sein first of all exists, and
then in addition he is or acquires something called a self ? No. Hei-
degger means that Da-sein is a self in existing, that is, in understanding
that “ I myself am this Da-sein; this being is miner How a Da-sein is him-
 The Being of Dasein 41

self is determined by the way in which he lets his being be his. No Da-
sein has freely chosen his being; he may not have wished it if he had
had any say in the matter; nonetheless, he can freely take over his being
as his own responsibility, he can turn to it face to face, letting it fully
disclose itself as singly and uniquely his. Existing in this way, Da-sein is
wholly his own self, according to the fullest possibility of his finite
being. Or he can turn away from himself, not letting his being fully dis-
close itself as his own, covering over its finiteness by throwing himself
into those “ endless ” possibilities that come to him from his world.
Existing in this way, Da-sein disowns the possibility of the utmost illu-
mination of which his being is capable and falls into the disguise that
characterizes his lostness to the world.
While these basic ways of existing are neither subconscious
“ mechanisms” nor conscious and deliberate “ attitudes, ” they definitely
imply something like a “ relation ” of Da-sein to himself. Heidegger, in
fact, frequently and explicitly speaks of the ways in which Da-sein can
“ relate himself’ ( sich verhalten ) to himself, and means: Da-sein bears
himself toward , holds himself in, stands fast in, the possibilities of his
being in one way or another, not primarily by thinking about them , but
by throwing himself into them as best he can. This “ relation ” is very
near to what we have in mind when we speak of the way in which a Da-
sein lives. It is in his “ way of living” that a Da-sein stabilizes himself as
the factical self he is, that he stands fast in the being he bears in his
thrownness as care.
But if each Da-sein’s being, regardless of how it is his, is yet essen-
tially his own, it might be reasonable to suppose that he would tend to
“ own ” his being, while a disowned existence would seem to be an
exceptional falling away from the average, the norm. Heidegger’s the-
-
sis, however, is that the opposite is the truth: Da sein’s fundamental
tendency is to turn away from himself to a self-forgetful absorption in
his occupations in company with other people. Before his existence can
be properly his own, Da-sein has usually to wrest it back from its lost-
ness to the world.
In the first place and for the most part ( zunächst und zumeist ), Da-
sein understands himself not from his own being, but from what other
people think. Instead of the utmost illumination of which he is capa-
ble, Da-sein exists in a sort of “ public disclosedness,” whose very pub-
licity is a way of covering over that each Da-sein’s being is singly his
own. In the first place and for the most part, this is the way in which
Da-sein is himself from day to day, his average day, his every day. Every-
dayness ( Allt äglichkeit ) is Heidegger’s name for the average, undiffer-
entiated way in which Da-sein exists over most of his lifetime, living
42 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

unto the day, taking for variety what the day brings, what chances and
events, what successes and failures come to him from his world. In his
everydayness, Da-sein is so decisively orientated toward the world that
the possibility of understanding himself from his own being remains
obscured. When Heidegger speaks of an “ indifferent” everydayness, he
does not mean that this mode of existence ceases to be care, or that Da-
sein no longer exists for the sake of himself, let alone that he exists nei-
ther in one definite way nor in another, but means that the difference
between an owned and disowned self does not come to light, it remains
undifferentiated.
For Heidegger’s “ Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Da-sein” it
is precisely this undifferentiated everydayness that is of utmost impor-
tance, because it constitutes the average manner of Da-sein’s being. But
even in this levelled-down uniformity, Da-sein still exists, he still under-
stands himself in his being. Da-sein can only be average in the way of
existence and not as an egg or an income is said to be average. Even in
the extremity of disownment, Da-sein can never become merely real like
a thing, or like an only-living-organism. His way of existing can be mod-
ified but can never become a different order of being.
The everyday mode of existence, just because it is nearest and
most familiar to us, has been consistently overlooked in philosophy,
and its ontological importance has not been realized. As Heidegger’s
inquiry will show, traditional ontology draws its idea of reality not from
the way it is originally manifest in Da-sein’s everyday ness, but from a
secondary and derivative modification of it. A remarkable feature of
Heidegger’s analysis of everyday existence is its aim to show the com-
plex and mysterious character of this most familiar way of Da-sein’s
being. It remains the leading theme throughout Division One, while
the owned way of existing becomes the main theme at the beginning
of Division Two, preparing the way for the interpretation of the fun-
damental temporality or “ timeishness ” ( Zeitlichkeit ) of Da-sein’s being.

( c ) The Ontological-Existential Terminology of Being and Time

Apart from Heidegger’s special key words, such as care , thrownness, and
worldishnessy there is the purely technical terminology of Being and Time
to be considered. The new theme of this work requires new terms,
some of which are parallel to those of traditional ontology, and some
of which are taken over from Husserl’s phenomenology, often with a
shift of meaning or emphasis. Among the latter, we have already come
across meaning ( Sinn ) and ontological structure ( Seinsstruktur ). We shall
now consider the following terms:
 The Being of Da sein 43

Ontological-existential ( Ontologisch-existenzial ). These two terms are

parallel. Understood in the strict sense, ontology should mean in Being
and Time only those inquiries that have for their theme the being of
beings other than man. This restricted meaning of ontology, however,
is not consistently adhered to by Heidegger, who often refers to his own
analyses as “ ontological,” when they should be called “ existential.” The
latter term applies only to man’ s being and to the inquiry that has
man’s being for its theme. This inquiry calls itself “ existential,” because
it takes its lead from the essence of man, which lies in his existence. Its
detailed analyses will show that each of the main structures of care
—
namely existence, facticity, and fallenness can be further analyzed into
—
essential constituents ( konstitutive Momente ). These are details in the
whole that cannot be detached from the whole, but can be discerned
and defined within it as essential to it and helping to make the whole
as it is. All the a priori constituents and characters of man’s being are
given the general name of “ existentials” by Heidegger. These require
further discussion.

Categories, Existentials ( Kategorien, Existenzialien ). These two terms are

parallel. Categories are those most general characters of being that can
—
be a priori predicated of things for example, things are of such and
such quality, quantity, so and so related, and so on. Categories are hence
often called “ ontological predicates.” This is the general philosophical
meaning of category, although the term has been variously interpreted
in the course of history, and the “ tables of categories” set up by differ-
ent thinkers have varied accordingly. It may be remembered, for
instance, that Aristotle includes time and place in his ten categories,
whereas in Kant’s transcendental philosophy time and space are taken
out of the class of categories altogether and receive a new meaning as
the a priori forms of intuition. For Heidegger, the decisive distinction
is that categories are the a priori characters of the being of things,
whereas existentials are the a priori characters of the being of Da-sein.
These two, categories and existentials, are called by Heidegger the two
main characters of being { Seinscharaktere ).
The new terminology introduced by Heidegger, however, is not
merely a convenient way of making fine distinctions; it is demanded by
the nature of Heidegger’s theme. This can be especially well demon-
strated by the difference between a category and an existential. A close
study of Being and Time shows that the existential characters of Da-sein
have an “ active ” form, and the catégorial characters of things a “ pas-
sive” form. This is not an accident but expresses the difference between
Da-sein and things . Da-sein in an active and transitive sense “ consti-
44 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

tutes” ( “ forms ” ) being, while the being of things is necessarily a “ con-

stituted ” being. Let us, for example, consider space. Da-sein is
—
“ spaceish” that is, he in an active way discloses space. The existential
constituents of Da-sein’s spaceishness are called by Heidegger “ de-dis-
tancing” or “ un-distancing” (entfernen, Entfernung ) that is, bringing
y

near, removing or diminishing distance; and “ directing” ( ausrichten),

that is, directing himself or something else toward . . . » taking a direc-
tion to or from. Undistancing and directing are existentials, which
show themselves as the categories of distantness ( nearness) and direct-
edness ( e.g., to the left, above, below, etc.) in the spatial characters of
a thing.
It is, however, not only spatially but also in many other ways that
Da-sein can relate himself or refer himself to things. The existential
character of self-relating or self-referring (Verweisung ) appears as the cat-
egory of relatedness or referredness, which defines the being of things.
Only when the difference between an existential and a category
has been grasped, does it become understandable what Heidegger
means by saying that the characters of Da-sein’ s being are not “ prop-
erties” but ways in which it is possible for him to be (SZ, 42 ).3 All exis-
tentials, such as undistancing, directing, self-referring, and the like, are
ways in which Da-sein is, whereas the corresponding categories show

—
—
themselves as properties and attributes that is, the spatial properties,
the attribute of relatedness, and so on whereby the being of things can
be determined.

Fundamental ontological -existential constitution ( Ontologische-existenziale

Grundverfassung or Seinsverfassung). The basic meaning of constitu-
tion ( Konstitution ) was indicated in the preceding section. The active
and transitive verb to constitute, to make upy to form, must be primarily
heard in the noun constitution. In Husserl’ s phenomenology the term
refers to those activities of transcendental consciousness that consti-
tute the essence, the whatness of beings in their familiar types. In other
words, these activities originally form the catégorial structure of the
great ontological regions, which are divided by Husserl into nature and
spirit, and subdivided into subregions such as material nature, animal-
ity, personal world , and intersubjectivity.
The original meaning of constitution necessarily implies a sec-
—
ond meaning namely an organized catégorial whole that defines the
—
essence of a region of beings and it is in this sense that Heidegger uses
the term Seinsverfassung . When the term is applied to Da-sein’s being,
Heidegger usually speaks of existenziale Verfassung, existential constitu-
tion. A similar meaning can be assigned to the term Grundverfassung,
 The Being of Da sein 45

basic or fundamental constitution, but it should be noted that a fun-

damental constitution need not necessarily be sufficient fully to define
the being under consideration.
This point will prove to be of some importance for under-
standing the role that the fundamental constitution of Da-sein ,
“ being-in-the-world,” plays in Being and Time . Since we are not yet in
a position to discuss this difficult structure and show how and where
it is deficient, let us try to understand the point in question by con-
sidering a more familiar example. If we think , for instance , of
nature, it is immediately evident that space must belong to its fun-
damental constitution, since material phenomena cannot show
themselves at all except as being “ in space.” Descartes, indeed, holds
extension to be the fundamental ontological character of material
nature. The question relevant to our discussion is this: Does the spa-
tial constitution of nature, fundamental as it is, sufficiently and fully
define its being? Evidently not, since it alone cannot explain the
essential “ materiality” of nature. As Husserl, for instance, points out,
the merely extended thing of Descartes could never be distinguished
from a phantom , a ghost of a thing ( Ideen II, 36-37, 40, Ideas II,
39-41). Materiality ( substantiality ) could never show itself if a thing
appeared solely in and by itself, unrelated to other things. Only in its
external relations can its materiality be constituted. The thing must
show itself as identifiably the same under changing conditions.
Something like interrelation ( causality ), which in turn already
implies time, must therefore belong to the caté gorial structure of
material nature as such.
The catégorial whole constitutive of the being of things charac-
terizes their mode of being as reality . The whole of existendais into
which the being of Da-sein can be articulated constitutes the existen-
tiality of existence.

A priori, earlier. Even in our simplest awareness of a thing there lies

already the disclosure of something like í t me, space, relation, and so
on. What already lies there in every experience as the condition of its
possibility is said to be a priori, “ earlier.” It is generally agreed that the

— —
business of philosophy that is, philosophy in the strict and not the
popular sense is to inquire into the a priori, but different thinkers
have given varying interpretations of how this concept is to be under-
stood. Heidegger understands it as “ fore-going and going-hand-in-
hand-with” experience ( vorgängig und mitgä ngig ). Roughly speaking,
this means that what is already there in experience as the condition of
its possibility does not lie somewhere apart from and in a time before
46 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

experience. On the other hand, it cannot be derived from or learned

by experience: it goes before experience, taking it by the hand and
leading it. Fore going to any experience is the existentiality of Da-sein’ s
existence, on the ground of which he is able to understand his own
being, and let other beings show themselves in their being.
Ontic -existentiell ( Ontisch-existenziell ). The adjective ontic is the coun-
terpart to ontological . It characterizes beings, not their being. Anything
that in any way “ exists” is ontic. The synonym for ontic is existent, the
word to be understood in the traditional sense of real existence, and
not in Heidegger’s special sense. Approximations to ontic are real, con-
crete?, empirical, given in experience . While these terms can be used for
ontic in certain contexts, they do not have nearly so wide a meaning.
Heidegger uses the word “ ontic” constantly, applying it to Da-sein as
well as to things.
Existentiell is only approximately parallel to ontic and has a much
more restricted meaning, applying only to Da-sein. Heidegger uses the
word existentiell primarily to characterize the understanding we each
have of our concrete existence and of all that belongs to it. For this, a
theoretical insight into the a priori existential structure of our exis-
tence is not in the least necessary. Da-sein may have no explicit philo-
sophical understanding of himself, or may interpret his own being as
reality. This does not prevent him from having a genuine and profound
existentiell understanding of himself. Conversely, a philosophical
insight does not guarantee that Da-sein is existentielly transparent to
himself in his concrete existence.
Summary . It may be found helpful to summarize Heidegger’s technical
terminology in the following schematic contrast:

existentiell is parallel to ontic

existential ( adj. ) ontological
existential ( noun ) category
existential structure catégorial structure
existential constitution ontological constitution
existentiality reality

It should be noted that Heidegger usually couples the terms as

existential-ontological and sometimes also existentiell-ontic. The addi-
tion of “ ontological” and “ ontic” does not alter the meaning of existen-
tial and existentiell , but serves to remind the reader that the inquiry is
not one of the traditional style: it is an existential ontology, which is
simply another name for fundamental ontology. It must also be stressed
 The Being of Da sein 47

once more that Heidegger frequently applies the simple terms ontolog-
ical and ontic to Da-sein. This practice will be followed in this book
when the long compound expressions would be too clumsy to use.

2. A DISCUSSION OF THE MEANING OF DASEIN

The question to be considered first is why Heidegger rejects the

word man { Mensch ) and adopts the term Da-sein. His reasons have
already been touched upon in previous discussions, so that it is suffi-
cient at this stage to recapitulate the relevant points.
(a ) Man is never a “ what.” The word man, considered from a logi-
cal grammatical point of view, is a collective noun like house, table , tree,
and so on. Nouns of this type gather concrete individuals into a class,
and the class indicates the whatness of its members. But man is never
a what. His essence (self ) lies in his existence. His existential constitu-
tion sets him free for different modes of being himself. How a man
exists can therefore never be determined by any whatness, and the
word man is inappropriate to the kind of being man is.
( b ) The being in which each man understands himself is his own.
The class name “ man,” more precisely defined, is the name of a
species of living beings, on a par with horse, sheep, and sparrow.
The concrete individuals that belong to a species are regarded as
cases or samples representing their species. But a man can never be
merely a case or a sample of the species man, because what makes it
possible for him to exist as man is not his species, but his under-
standing of himself in his being. For this reason , also, the word man
has to be rejected as inadequate.
The positive reason that led Heidegger to choose the term Da-sein
can be briefly indicated as follows: The fundamental characters of
man’s being are not properties and qualities, but ways in which it is
possible for him to be. Da-sein expresses being, and nothing else. It is a
translation into German of the word existentia , and its usual meaning
is simply real existence. Unfortunately, there is no expressive way in
which Da-sein can be translated into English, as an explanation of its
meaning and form will clearly show.
Purely linguistically considered, Da-sein is a compound of two
words, whose second component, sein, means simply to be or being. This
to be, since it expresses the being of a man , must be understood as the
infinitive of the am , and not of the is of a thing. The first component,
the Da , indicates a place, a here and there , and this is why in some
translations Da-sein is rendered by “ being-here ” and in others by
48 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

“ being- there.” In fact, Da is neither here nor there, but somewhere

between the two, for which we have no exact equivalent in English; it
is a much more open word than either “ here ” or “ there, ” and does not
have a definitely localized meaning.
Is there any way in which Da and Dasein can be at least approxi-
mately expressed in English? Perhaps the best approach to it can be
made by taking the phrases “ there is . . a n d “ there are . . for a start-
ing point. In these phrases, the “ there ” evidently does not mean a def-
inite place in which something occurs, but the whole phrase means the
“ thereness ” of something. If we take “ there-being” ( “ there to be” ) as
the infinitive of “ there is . . . , ” we arrive at the traditional meaning of
Dasein: real existence, the real “ thereness” of something.
But as for man, his there-being cannot mean merely the real
occurrence of man among the all of beings. On the other hand, Hei-
degger does not twist the original meaning of Dasein out of all recog-
nition: it does mean primarily the factical existence, the thereness of
man in a world. Only, this thereness has to be thought in Heidegger’s
sense as an event which brings the illumination of being into the world-
all, and does so because it is a disclosing way of being. The implications
suggested by Heidegger with the word Da sein may be unfolded in the
following way. When there is man, the “ there is . . .” happens; man’ s
factical existence ( his being-there) discloses thereness, as the thereness
of himself, the thereness of world, and the thereness of beings within
the world, some like himself and some unlike himself.
This interpretation of Dasein follows Heidegger’s own (SZ,
132ff. ), and far from saying too much, it does not nearly exhaust all
that Heidegger suggests with this simple and eloquent word. As far as
its English translation goes, the nearest approach that can be made is
probably “ there-being” or “ being-there.” But the shortcomings of this
expression are unhappily many. First and most importantly, it refuses
to be eloquent. Secondly, it cannot suggest all the meanings required.
And thirdly, it is a purely ontological term. While in Being and Time the
ontological meaning of Da sein, as the illuminated-disclosing thereness
of being, on the ground of which man exists as man, is undoubtedly by
far the most important, the word carries at the same time an ontic
meaning: it names the concrete beings we ourselves are. This, in fact,
is how Heidegger defines Da sein when he first introduces the concept
(SZ, 7). It is essentially a two-dimensional term, with an ontic-ontologi-
cal meaning.
It is not surprising that this key word presents a problem to every
translator and expositor of Being and Time. There seem to be three
alternatives open , the first of which is to construct an expression like
 The Being of Dasein 49

being-here or being-there. This solution has been rejected in this book,

for reasons already stated in the preceding paragraph. Secondly, the
German word Dasein or Dasein could be used in the English text. This
solution is in many ways the best, although it presents the danger that
Dasein might become merely a technical term in a Heideggerian ter-
minology, instead of being rethought and genuinely understood.
Thirdly, a familiar English expression, like human being or man could be
used, in spite of Heidegger’s objections to it. Of these two, human
being has the advantage of lending itself to the same ontic-ontological
use as Dasein: it could mean both a concrete human being and the
human way of being. This, however, is offset by several disadvantages,
first among them the weakness and lack of character of the expression
itself. Further, it defines “ being” by the humanity of man, whereas Da
sein asks us to do exactly the opposite, namely to understand man’s
humanity from his being.
But the decisive consideration is that “ human being” presents the
almost insoluble linguistic problem whether it should be referred to as
it or he or she. Human being, in an ontological sense, could only be
called it, whereas it goes against the grain in English to refer to a con-
crete human being in any other way but as he or she. The same diffi-
culty arises in English with any other two-dimensional expression,
which names both man and his being in the same breath.
After weighing up all these alternatives, the following solution
was adopted in this book. Where the ontological meaning of Dasein is
of exclusive or predominant importance, it will be expressed in a way
—
most suitable to the context for example, as factical existence, as
man’s being or being-there or occasionally even as being-here. Mostly,
however, preference will be given to the word Da sein. Very infrequently
the word man will be employed on account of its simplicity, although
Heidegger’s objections to it must always be borne in mind. Above all,
it must be remembered that man is a purely ontic term and is incapable
of bringing into play the ontological meaning of Dasein expressed, for
example, in the statement that Da-sein exists for the sake of himself.
 II
The Worldishness of World

1 . THE FUNDAMENTAL EXISTENTIAL CONSTITUTION OF DA-SEIN:

BEING-IN-THE-WORLD. HEIDEGGER S CONCEPTION OF WORLD

To exist as a self is Da-sein’s ownmost possibility, but not by any means

the only one fundamental to him. The possibility of relating himself to
other beings inseparably belongs to Da-sein’s existence. Da-sein is
indeed so essentially self-relating that his understanding of himself as
the primary for the sake of already gives him his bearings in a world. It
directs him in advance to the things he may meet as the means by which
something can be done in order to accomplish this or that. This, in turn,
may do service for some purpose, which may be directly or indirectly
for the sake of a possibility of his own existence. The whole complex of
“ by means o f . . . in order to . . . for . . .” springs from and leads back
to Da-sein’s own being, with which it is disclosed in an original unity.
This relational complex forms the coherence-structure of the world, or
more precisely, as will be explained presently, of the specific kind of
world that Heidegger takes to exemplify the idea of world as such. The
way in which Da-sein foregoingly refers himself to . . . , directs himself
toward . . > is the condition of the possibility that in his factical exis-
*

tence he never finds himself in a vacuum as an isolated self, but in the

midst of other beings in the coherent whole of a world. The original
disclosure of Da-sein’s own being in a relational-whole constitutes the
fundamental structure of his being as being-in-the-world.

51
52 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

The original, indivisible unity of being-in-the-world is taken by

Heidegger as the minimal basis on which Da-sein’s being can be
explained. In this fundamental constitution . . the-world ” does not
mean a real connection of real things , but characterizes the unique way
in which Da-sein understands himself: . . the-world ” is an existential-
ontological concept, which gives no information about any ontic world,
but formulates the problem of the possibility of world as such.
At the same time, as Heidegger constantly emphasizes, all onto-
logical concepts must have an ontic basis. If we, in our concrete exis-
tence, did not always and , as if it were by necessity, understand our-
selves “ in a world ,” the ontological inquiry would remain groundless.
The ontic concept of world from which Heidegger’ s analysis starts is
that of a world in which a factically existent Da-sein “ lives ” (SZ, 65).
Why Heidegger puts the word lives into quotation marks will become
clear later. For the moment, it is more important to note that Heideg-
ger takes for the basis of his inquiry the ordinary, workaday world of
everyday existence ( Umwelt ) . This eminently practical world, in which
things hang together as ends and means, is obviously very different
from any theoretical conception of “ world ” as a causally connected nat-
ural universe, as well as from the vaguer concept of a totality of beings,
which leaves the nature of the “ totality” completely undefined. All

— —
these ontic concepts of “ world” namely, nature, the natural universe,
the all of beings are decisively rejected by Heidegger, so much so that
when he uses the term world in any of these senses, he always writes it
in quotation marks.
Three different meanings of the term world have now been indi-
cated, and, since they must be clearly distinguished in Being and Time,
the following summary may be found helpful:

- - -
1. In the existential constitution of Da sein as being in the-world,
-
“ . . . the-world” characterizes the way in which Da sein exists. It is an
existential-ontological concept.
2. The ontic-existentiell concept of a world in which Da-sein “ lives, ”
and more specifically, the nearest workaday world of everyday exis-
tence ( Umwelt ) , forms the basis and starting point of Heidegger’ s
analysis. It is from this world that his concrete illustrations and
examples are drawn.
3. The “ world , ” always written in quotation marks in Being and Time,
means a real connection of real beings, usually understood as
nature, or the totality of beings, but sometimes also denoting a
more indeterminate whole of things, facts, people, etc., of which we
 The Worldishness of World 53

usually imagine the world to be “ made up.” It must be judged from

the context in which of these senses the “ world” is to be understood,
but in every case the quotation marks should be noted with care,
because they draw attention to concepts that not only diverge from
Heidegger’s, but no longer mean a world at all. According to Hei-
degger, the phenomenon of world can never be explained from con-
cepts like nature, the universe, the all of beings, etc., because they
themselves already presuppose an understanding of world.

On what grounds does Heidegger put forward such an unusual

thesis? Let us consider the concept of nature. Difficult as this may be
to define, it is evident that nature in the ontic sense is something that
is: it belongs to the realm of real beings. And even when nature is used
as an ontological-categorial concept, it can only mean the being, the
reality of actual or possible real beings as a whole. Whichever the case
may be, certain preconditions must be fulfilled before these real beings
can make themselves manifest as the beings they are. The first condi-
tion is obviously that they must in some way be accessible to Da-sein,
that Da-sein must be able to meet them in the same world in which he
already finds himself. To be able to do so, a world must already be dis-
closed, and can never be retrospectively “ made up” from the things
met within it.
The same consideration applies to the concept of a totality of
beings. In whatever way the “ totality” may be explained, one thing at
least is certain: the totality must have a radically different character
from a sum total, not only because no conceivable addition could ever
arrive at the “ total,” but because every single thing added together
would already have met us in the predisclosed whole of a world. It is
evident, therefore, that the world cannot consist of things, nor of
things and people added together, because understanding ourselves in
a world is the condition of the possibility that we can meet any kind of
beings at all. Least of all can the world itself have the character of a real
thing. When we ask What is world? we are already blocking the way to
a genuine understanding of this phenomenon, because with the “ what”
we are usually on the lookout for a thing or the essence of a thing. The
world is not a thing, but Da-sein himself is worldish. He is, at the bot-
tom of his being, world-disclosing, world-forming. Da-sein alone is such
that he foregoingly, a priori, understands his own being in a relation-
whole, in which and from which he can meet other beings and under-
stand them in their being.
The disclosure of world thus proves to be an essential constituent of
Da-sein’s understanding of being, and as such belongs to the central prob-
54 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

lem of Being and Time, namely, How is it possible for Da-sein to under-
stand being? What does being mean? The fundamental constitution of
being-in-the-world is not, as it is sometimes thought to be, an answer to
Heidegger’s question, but is a sharper and fuller formulation of the ques-
tion to be answered. In this formula, . . the-world” is a vast question
mark, whose meaning has been briefly indicated in the preceding para-
graph, but which must now be more fully explained as follows.
Da-sein , as the finite being he is, cannot himself make the beings
he needs, and cannot therefore know anything in advance of their real
qualities and properties, which are vital to him for his own existence.
Unable to create anything, Da-sein must be able to receive what is
already there, and not merely anyhow, in an unintelligible jumble of
impressions, but in such a way that these things become accessible as
the things they are, understandable in their being. This is only possible
if they can show themselves in a coherent whole, which is not merely
an empty frame, like an iron hoop holding a jumble of things together,
but is a whole that has a definite structure of its own, so that in it and
from it the multitude of beings are in advance understandable in an
articulated coherence.This structural whole ( world ), which Heidegger
will show to be a complex of references or relations, must enable Da-
sein to refer himself to other beings in a purposeful way, and, con-
versely, to relate them to himself in their relevance to and bearing upon
his own existence.
The articulated whole of a world, as was indicated above, is always
understood by us in advance, and cannot be retrospectively glued
together from any number of sense impressions and perceptions of
actual things, events, or people. On the contrary, if these perceptions
did not take place in a previously disclosed whole, any coherent and
intelligible experience would be impossible.
The disclosure of world necessarily goes before experience, and
one possible explanation is that the world must be “ formed ” in and
with Da-sein’s own being. Da-sein himself is “ world-forming, ” or, as it
may also be expressed, “ world-imaging” (weltbildend . WG, 39, W, 55,
G9, 158, ER, 89, P, 123). This “ world-image,” of course, must not be
thought of as a sort of advance copy of a flesh-and-blood world, but as
a wholly insubstantial horizon of meaning, a whole of reference in
which we always move with so much familiarity that we do not even
notice it. The ontological problem is to show and explain in detail how
Da-sein himself must be in order to be capable of “ fore-imaging” a
world to which experience has contributed nothing. This is the prob-
lem that Heidegger formulates with the fundamental constitution of
Da-sein as being-in-the-world. 1
 The Worldishness of World 55

How does Heidegger propose to solve his problem? What is the

basic thought that guides him? It may be summed up in the following
thesis. The very finiteness of Da-sein makes it both possible and nec-
essary for him to “ form” a world. It is because his own being is in
advance disclosed to him in its dependence that there lies in it already
a disclosing reference to the being of other beings.
This basic thought is clearly hinted at in the reference complex
“ by means o f . . . in order to . . . for . . .” that was briefly mentioned
in the first paragraph of this chapter.This complex is a simplification
of a much more elaborate structure worked out by Heidegger in his
world analysis (SZ, Div. One, chap. 3). For our purpose, which is not
to follow up the details of Heidegger’s analysis, but to get an insight
into his fundamental idea of world, it is sufficient to grasp that this
relational complex, only more elaborately articulated, forms the struc-
ture of world, and it is with its help that Da-sein in advance refers him-
self to , directs himself toward . . . , anything that might appear
within his horizon.
For the point we are considering, the “ by means of . . .” is espe-
cially illuminating: it is in itself a document of Da-sein’s finite being. If
Da-sein were a perfect substance, distinguished by independence and
self-maintenance without recourse to anything apart from itself, he
would not need to refer himself to a thing as the “ means by which. . . .”
More than that, it would be inexplicable how, as a perfectly self-con-
tained being, he could even understand that something might be need-
ful or useful for accomplishing something else.
It is because Da-sein’s being is disclosed to him in its jeopardy and
dependence that it must in advance refer him to the possibility of meet-
ing other beings and prescribe the ways in which they can bear on his
own existence, for example, by way of dangerousness, usefulness, harm-
fulness, and so on. To solve the problem of world, Heidegger must
show in detail how this disclosure takes place and what are those exis-
tential structures capable of performing the task of disclosure.
Of the basic structures that have a specifically disclosing func-
tion, Heidegger names three: Befindlichkeit , which may be rather inad-
equately rendered as “ attunement” ; Verstehen, understanding; and Rede,
discourse. The last will not enter into the discussion at present, and,
since it may easily confuse the reader, it should be noted that by “ dis-
course” Heidegger does not mean the ontic phenomenon of language,
but an existential structure that makes language possible.
The existential concept of Befindlichkeit cannot be adequately
expressed by any single English word. The common German phrase, Wie
befinden Sie sich? means: How do you feel? How are you? Sich befinden gen-
56 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

erally means how one is, how one feels. Important also is the core of the
word, sich finden, to find oneself. The whole expression may be explained
as follows: Da-sein is a priori so that his being manifests itself to him by
the way he feels; in feeling, he is brought to himself, he finds himself.
The ontic manifestations of Befindlichkeit are familiar to everyone as the
moods and feelings that constantly “ tune” Da-sein and “ tune him in ” to
other beings as a whole. To avoid having to coin some clumsy expression
for Befindlichkeit it is convenient to call it “ attunement.”
y

In Heidegger’s interpretation , attunement must on no account be

taken for a “ lower ” faculty which is at war with the “ higher ” faculty of
understanding. For one thing, neither attunement nor understanding
are faculties, but existentials, that is, ways of being. Each has its own
character and way of disclosing that is not only not opposed to the
other, but is in advance “ tuned in ” to the other. Attunement always has
its understanding; understanding is always attuned. Each has a specific
disclosing function in the whole of care.
The moods and feelings, which are apt to be dismissed by us as
accidental and meaningless, are ontologically of great importance,
because they originally bring Da-sein to himself as the factical self he
—
already is. Each mood reveals in a different way for example, in joy Da-
sein is manifest to himself as he who is enjoying himself, in depression
as he who is weighed down by a burden, and so on. Tuned by moods
and feelings, Da-sein finds himself in his thrown being, in the inex-
orable facticity “ that I am and have to be, ” delivered over to myself to
be as I can, dependent upon a world for my own existence.
Moods and feelings rise from Da-sein’s thrownness and bring him
face to face with it. By “ thrownness, ” Heidegger does not mean that
Da-sein is cast into the “ natural universe” by a blind force or an indif-
ferent fate, which immediately abandons him to his own devices, It
means that his own “ real” existence is manifest to Da-sein in the curi-
ous way that he can always and only find himself already here, and can
never get behind this already to let himself come freely into being. But
although he can never originate his being, yet he is “ delivered over to
himself ” : he has to take over his being as his. Da-sein’ s fundamental
impotence and dependence, that he cannot make and master his own
being, are originally and elementally revealed by attunement.
But moods and feelings tune Da-sein not as an isolated self; on
the contrary, they bring him to himself in such a way that he finds him-
self there, in the midst of other beings. With this “ in the midst of . . . , ”
Da-sein is already lifted into a world, surrounded by beings that are
always manifest in a certain wholeness. Why this is so cannot yet be
shown, but that it is so is not an accident; it lies in the structure of
 The Worldishness of World 57

attunement itself to refer Da sein to the possibility of other beings as a

whole. Moods and feelings, far from being “ inarticulate, ” have a dis-
tinctively articulated structure. This can best be demonstrated by Hei-
degger’s analysis of fear as a specific mode of attunement (SZ, § 30 ),
which we shall now consider as far as it is relevant to this discussion.
In the mood of fear, three main articulations can be distinguished:
“ fear of . . . ,” “ fear itself ’ ( fearing, being afraid ), and “ fear for. . . .”
In fear as “ fear of . . .” there lies already a disclosing reference to
other beings, which can approach from the world in the character of
the fearsome. Fear in advance refers itself to something definite,
whether it is another Da-sein, or a thing, or an event, which can
approach by way of a threat from a definite direction. It should be
observed that in fear as “ fear of . . .” there must already be disclosed
something like a relation-whole, something like a neighborhood, from
which some definite thing can approach as the fearsome.
“ Fear itself , ” the fearing ( being afraid ), discloses the fearsome by
opening itself to its fearfulness, by letting its threateningness strike
home. It is not that some future evil is first discovered as an objective
“ fact” and then feared, but fear itself discovers something in its fear-
someness. It is only because Da-sein himself is constantly tuned by
latent fear that he can “ in fact ” discover something as threatening. A
detached observation and investigation of an object could never find
out that it is fearful.
Existential attunement is the condition of the possibility of what
Heidegger calls Angänglichkeit . Angänglich means in the first place
approachable, capable of letting something come near. Angehen, as in
the phrase, es geht mich an, means: it is my business, it is my concern, it
touches me, it strikes me, moves me. On the ground of attunement, Da-
sein is approachable, concernible, touchable, strikable, capable of
being affected and moved by whatever may approach him from the
world. Da-sein could never be affected through the senses, if attune-
ment did not in advance throw him open to be affected in various ways;
for instance, something like resistance could never be discovered by the
sense of touch, if Da-sein were not in himelf already “ touchy.”
For Heidegger, affection and perception through the senses are
not primary, “ ultimate ” phenomena, but are founded in that is, —
—
require for their necessary foundation the more original phenome-
non of attunement. It is clear also that in Heidegger’s interpretation,
receptivity through the senses is not a pure receptivity, a mere passive
soaking up of what is given, but is grounded in the spontaneous activ-
ity of attunement, which throws Da-sein open and constantly keeps him
open to whatever may approach from the world .
58 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

The same thought is expressed by Heidegger in the phrases “ let-

ting be ” ( Seinlassen ) and “ letting meet” (.Begegnenlassen), which the
reader constantly meets in Being and Time and are often felt to be
obscure and confusing. These phrases imply that Da-sein’s finite being-
in-the-world is neither the creativeness of an infinite Being, who can
make actual, concrete beings, nor, on the other hand, is it the pure pas-
sivity of something made. It is a spontaneously active receiving of what
is already there, in the course of which things are set free in their being
( freigeben, Freigabe ); they are delivered from their hiddenness and given
the possibility to be disclosed in their being. This disclosure happens
when Da sein “ throws a world” over things, within which they can show
themselves as and for the things they are.
But, as far as our discussion has gone, it is still not clear how the
world itself is disclosed, or, to speak more precisely, how Da-sein’s own
being is manifest to him as being-in-the-world. It is true that in Hei-
degger’s hands a mere mood has already revealed more than would
have been thought possible, but so far, the “ wholeness” of a world has
always been presupposed. Let us now turn to fear as “ fear for . . .” to
see what further light it can throw on our problem, and whether
attunement, taken by itself , can make the disclosure of being-in-the-
world fully understandable.
Fear is always “ fear for. . . .” In being afraid, Da-sein is afraid for
himself. Da-sein is capable of fear, because in his being it is this being
itself which is at stake. The threat to his ability-to-be makes manifest to
Da-sein his deliverance over to himself. Even when the fear is not
directly and immediately for his own being, but for property and pos-
session, Da-sein still fears for himself, because his access to things, his
“ being near to things” essentially belong to his being-in-the-world. Sim-
ilarly, when Da-sein is afraid for someone else, he still fears also for
himself, being threatened in the most fundamental relational possibil-
ity of his existence, his being with others like himself ( Mitsein ).
What has this summary of Heidegger’s analysis of fear brought to
light? What and how does attunement disclose? It discloses Da-sein in his
existence (self ) as already thrown into a world, in the midst of other
beings, upon which he is dependent. Attunement not only throws Da-sein
open to the possible thereness ( thatness) of other beings, but different
moods in advance prescribe how their thereness can show itself: joy dis-
covers it as joyful, pleasure as pleasing, fear as fearsome, and so on.
Attunement is itself a way of being-in-the-world. It rises from the depth of
Da-sein’s thrownness and reveals, more elementally and far-reachingly
than any thinking can overtake, that he is and has to be, dependent upon
a world and being borne in upon by what might befall him from it.
 The Worldishness of World 59

But although attunement reveals elementally and far-reachingly,

it yet fails to illuminate fully the meaning of what it reveals. Attune-
ment itself constantly delivers Da sein over to the beings in the midst
of which he finds himself. In his thrownness, Da-sein falls captive to his
“ world ” ; he is enthralled and bemused by the things that are; he is
pressed in upon and hemmed in by them ( benommen ). To achieve free-
dom of movement and full illumination, Da-sein must somehow free
himself from his thralldom to what is, he must transcend beings as a
whole, among them first and foremost himself. But what is it to which
Da-sein can transcend? He transcends to the possibilities of his being.
Not from how he is, but from how he can be, does Da-sein become
transparent to himself as the thrown self he already is.
The disclosure of possibilities as possibilities is the achievement
of existential understanding. In Heidegger’s interpretation, under-
standing is not a cognitive faculty, like comprehending or explaining,
but is a basic way of existing. It is, in fact, nothing other than the “ fore-
structure” of care, whereby Da-sein is constantly before himself, ahead
of himself. Since understanding is a structure of the original whole of
care, it must necessarily be “ tuned ” by attunement. All the possibilities
of Da-sein’s being that understanding can disclose must hence be pos-
sibilities of a thrown and dependent being as disclosed by attunement.
Keeping this important thought in mind, let us now examine in greater
detail the “ fore-throw ” structure of understanding and see how it helps
to “ fore-form” the relational-whole of world.
Heidegger characterizes understanding as an Entwurf. Entwerfen
means to throw forth, to throw forward and away from oneself: to pro-
ject. Similarly, the noun Entwurf has the same meaning as a project,
something that has been thrown forward, projected. Entwurf in the
pregnant sense, however, does not mean just any kind of project, like
going for a picnic tomorrow, but means the ground plan, the first basic
design, the all-embracing conception that in advance encircles the
whole and so makes it possible for any details in it to “ hang together,”
to “ make sense.” Conversely, the fore-throw of an all-embracing whole
has its meaning in referring back to all that it embraces. This gives us
a clue to the essentially two-way structure of understanding: it throws
forward possibilities, but, at the same time, it holds out toward itself
what it has fore-thrown. This can be easily tested by us, simply by think-
ing of some possibilities we are planning to carry out. A little imagina-
tion will show that while we throw these possibilities forward , they at
the same time turn round and seem positively to look at us.
But the original possibilities which existential understanding
throws before and toward itself are not possibilities of empirical things
60 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

and happenings; they are the possibilities of Da-sein’s being as a whole.

They can be a whole only because they are in advance manifest from
the possibility of a not , which ends all his possibilities and thus in
advance closes them. The understanding of this not reveals to each Da-
sein his being as singly and solely his, and so brings him to himself in
the uniqueness of his finite self. But this self is already tuned by attune-
ment to find itself dependent upon a world in which and from which
the thereness of other beings presses in and bears upon itself. Hence
the possibilities of this self must necessarily be of existing-in- the-midst-
of . . . , existing-in- relation- to. . . . The fore- throw, in which attuned
understanding brings the whole of the possibilities of Da-sein’s thrown
being before itself, is the original happening of being-in-the-world.
In going out beyond all “ that ” and “ there, ” understanding throws
open the horizon of the possibilities of Da-sein’s being as the world, in
which Da sein can be a factical self among other beings. Understand-
ing thus throws a world over beings as a whole, among them Da-sein
himself as he already is ( Überwurf \ WG, 39, W, 55, 158, ER, 89, P, 123).
The horizon of world is transcendental. It in advance encompasses the
whole of Da-sein’ s being. Understanding thus opens up a distance
between the factical self Da-sein already is and the utmost limit of his
possibilities. Only from this distance to himself can Da-sein become
fully illuminated as a self that can be himself only and always as the
thrown self he already is, referred to beings he has not made and can-
not master, but with the essential difference that he can be this self
either in the mode of flight and covering over, or he can take over his
finite possibilities as fully and wholly his own.
It has now become possible to clear up a puzzling question that
the reader may already have asked himself: How can Da-sein “ disown”
himself to the world and yet exist for the sake of himself ? The world,
as interpreted by Heidegger, is not something apart from Da-sein, but
is Da-sein himself in the whole of his possibilities, which are essentially
relational. It is for the sake of these that Da-sein exists: the for the sake
of is the primary and basic character of world. It is from this horizon
that things are first opened up in their possibilities, that is, are under-
stood as the things they essentially are. The essence of things in our
ordinary, everyday world ( Umwelt ) is to be means to ends, because the
world-horizon that is primarily “ meaning-giving” has the basic charac-
ter of the for the sake of Da-sein’ s own existence.
It has now been shown that an attuned understanding is capable
of “ fore-forming” a world that not only precedes experience but is far
more than a vague , inarticulate wholeness. Attunement not only
throws Da-sein open to the being ( thatness ) of other beings, but in
 The Worldishness of World 61

—
advance prescribes how their being is discoverable for example, as
threatening, as joyful, or whatever. The understanding fore- throw of
Da-sein’s possibilities of being not only embraces them in advance as a
whole, but with the for the sake of gives a fore-image of how the things
discoverable within it can “ hang together,” how they can “ make sense.”
The relational complex of “ by means of . . . in order to . . . for . . • j

whereby Da-sein in advance refers himself to whatever may appear

within his horizon, is only possible in an original unity with the for the
sake of and constitutes the ontological structure, the worldishness of
Da-sein’s primary and basic world { Umwelt ) .
This structure, however, as Heidegger explicitly remarks (SZ, 65),
—
is modifiable into the worldishness of specific “ worlds ” that is, there
are other ways in which Da-sein can relate himself to beings as a whole.
It appears, then, that the ontological meaning of the relational struc-
ture of world has not yet been fully brought into view, and needs fur-
ther elucidation.
Heidegger interprets the essentially relational way in which Da-
sein understands his being as a signifying . The for the sake of signifies a
for, an in order to , a means by which . Understanding holds out the famil-
iar whole of these relations before and toward itself in an originally dis-
closed unity, and lets itself be referred by these relations themselves. In
his familiarity with these relations, Da-sein signifies to himself, gives
himself originally to understand how he is and can-be-in-the-world. The
relation-whole of this signifying is interpreted by Heidegger as signifi-
cance. The ontological structure of world, the worldishness of world as
such, is significance ( SZ, p. 87).
Heidegger’s interpretation of the ontological structure of world
-
as a significance whole makes it understandable that Da-sein’s primary
world can be modified into specific “ worlds, ” by taking other relational
complexes as “ significant.” Moreover, it completely justifies Heideg-
ger’s bald refusal to acknowledge any real connection of real things as
world in the genuine sense. The coherence of a world made possible
by an understanding of significance is of a totally different order from
the real connections of things that persist regardless of whether there
is Da-sein to discover them or not. If Da-sein disappears from the face
of the earth, things will not fly off into space but will go on gravitating
toward the earth , even though there is no one to discover and under-
stand something like gravity. But the significant reference complex “ by
means o f . . . in order to . . . for . . .” obviously cannot persist except
insofar as there is Da-sein who relates himself to things in this signify-
— —
ing way. Significance that is, world only “ is” in the understanding of
Da-sein , to whom his own being is disclosed as being-in-the-world.
62 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

The basic idea that guides Heidegger’s interpretation of world

was set out earlier in the thesis that the very finiteness of Da-sein makes
it both possible and necessary for him to form a world. It is because his
own being is disclosed to him in its dependence that there lies in it in
advance a disclosing reference to the being of other beings. This thesis
has now been elucidated in as much detail as the aim of this chapter
requires. Has the discussion brought us to the answer to Heidegger’s
question, How is it possible for Da-sein to understand being? Not yet.
Some important steps toward it have been taken. It has become evident
that the original disclosure of being must happen through attunement,
which reveals the “ that I am,” and that the “ fore-imagings ” of under-
standing must already be tuned by this disclosure. But as to the inner-
most possibility of these events, no explanation has yet been given, nor
can Heidegger be expected to give it until the end of his inquiry.
For the present, the most urgent task is to get a more concrete
grasp of what has emerged so far. This is all the more important
because Heidegger’s ideas are far removed from our accustomed ways
of thinking, and even when all due allowance has been made for the
remoteness of ontological interpretations, it may be rightly felt that
these must be relevant to our concrete experience or else be banished
into the sphere of abstract speculations. Is there any way in which Hei-
degger’s idea of world can be brought nearer to us? Are there any
obstacles that obscure its relevance to our experience and which can be
removed at this stage?
There is at least one obstacle that can be easily removed. This
lies in the strictness of Heidegger’s thought and language, essential to
philosophy but unnecessary to our everyday existence, as a result of
which we often fail to recognize in what Heidegger says the perfectly
-
familiar experience of our own being-in-the world. For instance, we
usually equate being with living, so that we rarely think or speak of
being in a world , but rather of living in, or staying in, or moving in a
world of a specific character. We do not, for example, say of a woman
that she is in her domestic world, but that she lives in it. What we
mean by this phrase is nevertheless one specific concretization of
being-in-the-world in Heidegger’s sense: the possibilities of this
woman’ s existence, we imply, are gathered up in family and home, on
which she habitually spends herself. She holds out these possibilities
before herself as the world in which she is at home. It is in and from
— —
these possibilities from her world that she understands herself in
relation to other beings; and, conversely, it is by reference to her world
that she understands other beings in their relevance to and bearing
upon her own existence.
 The Worldishness of World, 63

This example not only shows the connection between Heideg-

ger’s ontological idea of world and the world we “ live ” in but also helps
us to understand one of the most puzzling features of the expression
being-in-the-world . At first sight, the word in almost irresistibly suggests
a spatial relation, so that the image formed of the world is that of a vast
spatial container in which we occupy an insignificant spot. Heidegger
is well aware of this danger, and that is why on introducing the concept
of being-in-the-world his first concern is to discuss the meaning of the
“ in” (SZ, 54 ). The word, Heidegger explains, cannot have the same spa-
tial-categorial meaning as it has when we speak of an extended thing
being in an extended spatial container, “ as water is ‘in’ the glass, the
dress is ‘in’ the closet.” Da-sein cannot be “ in space” as an extended
thing but only in the way appropriate to himself as being-in-the-world:
he discloses space in relating himself to things by way of undistancing
them and directing them to. This existential spaceishness is only possi-
ble on the ground of, and as an essential constituent of, Da-sein’s fun-
damental worldishness. Something like space must, therefore, belong
to a world, but it is not primarily, let alone exclusively, constitutive of
world (SZ, Div. One, chap. 3, B and C ).
That the “ in ” does not have a spatial-categorial meaning was con-
cretely shown by our example. A woman does not live in her domestic
world by occupying space in it but by keeping herself to these familiar
possibilities of her existence. Similarly, we are not thinking of a spatial
relation when we say of a man that he moves in the artistic world or
that he is at home in the society world. What Heidegger, in a strictly
ontological sense, calls “ being-in ” is concretely experienced by us as
“ living-in,” or “ moving-in,” or “ being-at-home-in.” All these phrases
express the same meaning: staying near-to . . . , being-familiar-with
in-habiting ( both in the sense of habituation and dwelling) . . . a world
of this or that specific character.
Why is it that the world we “ live” in is familiar to us always in this
or that specific way? Because our possibilities are essentially finite, not
only in the sense that they are in fact limited, but because possibilities
in themselves have a not-character. These finite possibilities, moreover,
are manifest to each one of us as the possibilities of my being; the world
is therefore always essentially my world.
But does this mean that each Da-sein is locked into a world of his
own from which he may never truly get across to another Da-sein’s
world? Any such thought is obviously alien to Heidegger, to whom the
world itself is nothing but the reference-whole in which Da-sein under-
stands himself among other beings. Insofar as these other beings are
fellow men, they also are-in- the-world in the same way as himself. Da-
64 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

sein is not only not locked into a world of his own, but the world is his
in such a way that he in advance shares it with others like himself .
Da-sein’ s relation to other Da-seins is shown by Heidegger to be
fundamentally different from his relation to things. Being-with others
like himself ( Mitsein ) belongs directly to Da-sein’s existence (self ) and
helps to constitute its world-forming character, whereas his being-near-
to things ( Sein-bei ) is founded upon his thrownness and factical depen-
dence on a world. Da-sein cannot be with things in a mutually shared
world, because things are only inner worldly ( innerweltlich ) ; they are dis-
coverable within the world , but are unable to disclose their own being
in a world.
When Heidegger speaks of “ world ” ( nature) in quotation marks,
he usually means purely an ontic connection of things, because beings
who exist as Da-sein can never merely occur in nature like things, which
have the character of reality. The fundamental difference between the
way Da-sein relates himself to fellow existences and the way in which he
refers himself to things also helps to explain why Heidegger cannot
work out both relations at the same time in his world-analysis (SZ, Div.
One, chap. 3). The theme of fellow existences is introduced into the
analysis only briefly; its detailed elucidation is left over to a subsequent
chapter ( Div. One, chap. 4 ). The ontological structure of world is
worked out by Heidegger exclusively from the relation-complex ( “ by
means of . . .” etc. ) whereby Da-sein refers himself to things. Following
Heidegger’s own trend, the theme of Da-sein’s everyday self in relation
to other selves will be dealt with separately in this book, after the dis-
cussion of world and of the reality of things within the world has been
concluded ( Part II, chap. 4 of this book ).
Accordingly, we will at this stage confine our attention to Da-
sein’s being-near- to things, or, as it may also be expressed, his staying-
close-to the “ world ” { Sein-bei ). How are Da-sein’s dealings with things
characterized by Heidegger? Since Da-sein inhabits the world by way of
care, each of his fundamental relations must have a specific care-char-
acter: he is near to things by “ taking care” of them { besorgen ) . “ Taking
care” is an existential-ontological term whose meaning may be
explained as follows. A basic way in which Da-sein inhabits his world is
to reckon with things , to take account of things. With Da-sein’ s factical
existence, his taking care of things splits itself up into an extraordinary
variety of ways, of which Heidegger gives a long list of examples: “ to
have to do with something, to produce, order and take care of some-
thing, to use something, to give something up and let it get lost, to
undertake, to accomplish , to find out, to ask about, to observe, to speak
about, to undermine . . .” (SZ, 56 ). Among the deficient modes of tak-
 The Worldishness of World 65

ing care, Heidegger mentions desisting from something, neglecting ( an

opportunity ), taking a rest, and so on.
Da-sein is near to things primarily in a practical way by using and
handling them . A deficiency of careful ( care- taking ) having-to-do-with
things makes possible an important modification whereby Da-sein’s
primarily practical approach becomes modified into the only-looking-
at things of theory. Although theory, just as much as practice, is a tak-
ing care of things, the theoretical approach represents a profound
modification of Da-sein’s original understanding of reality, whose con-
sequences are so far-reaching that it requires a discussion on its own
( see the next section of this chapter ).
Before going on to consider theory and practice, however, the
main conclusions reached so far may be briefly summarized as follows.
The world is not a thing, nor does it consist of things. The coher-
ent whole of a world cannot be explained from the real connections of
real beings but only from the way in which Da-sein a priori understands
his own being in the whole of its possibilities. These possibilities belong
to a finite and dependent being and are hence necessarily relational.
They are disclosed by attuned understanding in anticipation of possible
other beings. The articulated reference-whole (significance-whole ), in
which and from which Da-sein in advance refers himself to any possible
beings he might meet, constitutes the ontological structure, the world-
ishness of world. It enables Da-sein a priori to understand the being of
other beings and is disclosed in co-original unity with Da-sein’s own
being as the primary for the sake of . On the ground of his fundamental
constitution of being-in-the-world, a world essentially belongs to Da-sein
and its basic character is therefore the for the sake of. This prescribes
the significance-structure of Da-sein’s nearest everyday world in which
he takes care of things primarily in a practical way by using and having-
to-do-with them. This original way of taking care of things is capable of
being modified into a theoretical only-looking-at things. In view of the
predominantly, if not exclusively, theoretical approach of Greek-West-
ern philosophy and of the positive sciences that have sprung from it,
leading ultimately to the present Atomic Age, Heidegger’ s elucidations
of this problem have a much wider than purely philosophical interest.

2. THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL WAYS

OF TAKING CARE OF THINGS

What does Heidegger mean when he characterizes theory as an “ only-

looking-at” things? Negatively, it
must be remarked that the “ only ”
66 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

should not be understood in a derogatory sense, although it must be

confessed that Heidegger’s language would sometimes almost justify
such an interpretation. Taken in a strict sense, however, the “ only ” has
a purely ontological meaning. It indicates that something that origi-
nally belonged to Da-sein’s approach to things has been stripped off,
leaving the “ only-looking” as the dominant and supposedly the only
appropriate way to approach them.
What is it that disappears when Da-sein’s practical having- to-do-
with things turns into theory? Is it the making and doing which now
give place to observation and thinking? Or is it that the sense of touch
and the other senses drop into the background, leaving the sense of
vision the predominant role it has undoubtedly played in Greek-West-
ern thinking? There is certainly some truth in these suggestions, but in
themselves they cannot explain the difference between theory and
practice. As Heidegger points out, it is not even possible to draw a
clean demarcation line between “ doing” and “ thinking, ” between
“ touching and handling” and “ only-looking-at ” (SZ, 358). A purely prac-
tical man, say a small-scale craftsman, may be doing nothing, only look-
ing at his workshop, thinking of the work to be done the next day, the
materials to be bought, and so on. This looking and thinking are yet
purely practical. A theoretician, on the other hand, still uses his tools,
paper and pen, if nothing else, not to speak of the elaborate manipu-
lation of instruments that may go into an experiment; yet this doing
and handling stand in the service of theory. Heidegger takes great care
to emphasize these points, but he still insists on calling theory an only-
looking. What is missing from this approach to things, and, in the first
place, in what way is theory a “ looking” at all?
Theory, Heidegger explains in the lecture “ Wissenschaft und Besin-
nung ( “ Science and Reflection ” ) comes from the Greek theôreô and
originally means a reverential gazing upon the pure aspect in which a
thing shows itself. “ Aspect, ” in this connection , is to be understood in
the Greek sense of the eidos, idea, the form in which something shows
—
what it is its essential being. Theory in the highest philosophical sense
means a gazing upon the truth, which takes the truth into its keeping
and guards it ( VA, 53, QCT, 164 ).
Theory thus turns out to be the same as, or closely akin to, the
apprehending, the “ seeing, ” which has of old been called noein, the
pure, nonsensuous apprehension of beings in their being. This has
been traditionally regarded as the only proper ontological approach to
things. Why, then, is it an “ only-seeing” ? What is missing from it that
makes it radically different from the practical way of “ seeing” things?
It is nothing less than the world. The things that are originally under-
 The Worldishness of World 67

stood as belonging to a world and having their place within it are now
stripped of their boundaries; they no longer meet Da-sein in the hori-
zon of the primary for the sake of\ but in an indifferent world-all, a nat-
ural universe, where they occur in space as purely substantial bodies.
Theory is an only-looking which strips things of their world-character
and objectivizes them into mere material substances to be found some-
where in an indifferent universal space (SZ, 358ff.; also 112 ).
The incalculable importance of this fundamental modification in
Da-sein’s understanding of things is that it is from things as mere sub-
stances that Greek-Western philosophy takes its start. The conse-
quences of this start for Western science and technology are a con-
stantly recurring theme in Heidegger’s later works and deserve serious
study. In Being and Time, however, the ontological theme predomi-
nates, and this is our concern at present.
What are the philosophical consequences of the theoretical start
from things as pure substances? The first and most decisive conse-
quence is that the world, in Heidegger’s sense, is passed over from the
beginning and cannot become even a problem. Nature, the all of
beings, is substituted for the genuine phenomenon of world, giving
rise to perennial problems of cognition and knowledge, for whose solu-
tion countless “ theories of knowledge” have been constructed.
Traditional problems of cognition, Heidegger points out, have
their source in an insufficient interpretation of Da-sein’s being (SZ,
59ff.). The puzzle which hosts of theories of knowledge set out to
explain is how a supposedly isolated self, a subject, can get out from his
“ inner sphere” to an object, the “ world ” outside himself. But, as Hei-
degger shows, the completely unjustifiable assumption on which all
these theories are based is that Da-sein is first of all a “ worldless sub-
ject” who has subsequently to transcend himself in order to take up a
relation to his object, the “ world.” In Heidegger’s interpretation, on
the contrary, Da-sein is never worldless, and the world is not an object
to which he has to “ get out.” Da-sein is such that his own being is in
advance manifest to him in a significant reference-whole ( world ), in
which and from which he directs himself toward . . . , relates himself
to . . . whatever specific beings he may meet. Only this a priori world-
ishness of Da-sein makes it possible for him to “ take up relations” to
things in a secondary and derivative way, for example, in explicitly
investigating and explaining them, in widening and developing knowl-
edge in various directions, and so on.
It is the world-forming character of man’s being that is presup-
posed in all theories of knowledge which take their start from the “ sub-
ject-object relation ” as the supposed “ ultimate ” that cannot be further
68 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

elucidated. According to Heidegger, on the contrary, it is precisely this

“ subject-object relation ” that demands a fundamental inquiry, so that
its inner possibility can be brought to light. All problems of cognition
lead back to the existential constitution of Da-sein as being-in-the-world
from which they originally spring and on the basis of which alone they
can be solved . A deeper inquiry, it is true, will reveal that even this fun-
damental constitution is insufficient fully to define Da-sein’s being, but
it is the structure from which the analysis and interpretation must start.
Accordingly, the whole of Division One of Being and Time, except
for one introductory chapter, consists of an analysis of the fundamen-
tal constitution of Da-sein as being-in- the-world, leading toward an
exposition of Da-sein’s being as care. It has already been shown, how-
ever, that Da-sein never is-in-the-world in a vague generality but exists
always in one or another of the definite modes or manners ( Seinsarten)
possible for him. In the first place and for the most part, Da-sein exists
in the everyday manner of taking care of his “ world.” The full theme
of Division One can therefore be defined as being-in- the-world in the
mode of everydayness. The ontic world from which Heidegger’s analy-
sis starts is the nearest workaday world of everyday existence ( Umwelt ),
and this now requires some further consideration.

3. THE ONTIC BASIS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO WORLD:

THE UMWELT OF EVERYDAY EXISTENCE. THE MEANING OF UMWELT

The term Umwelt, together with two other key words, Umgang and
Umsicht, has so essential a meaning in Heidegger’s world-analysis that
it well deserves a short discussion on its own.
It is not by accident that each of these key words begins with Um .
This word is already familiar to us as the for of for the sake of . A second
meaning of Urn now appears for the first time: it indicates the spatial
relation of round-aboutness, nearness, in the sense of immediate sur-
roundings. From what we have learned so far, it is evident that for Hei-
degger the primary meaning of Urn is for, but, since something like
space essentially belongs to a world, the secondary meaning of round-
aboutness must also prove to be relevant.
We shall first consider Umwelt in its secondary meaning, because
this is how in ordinary usage the word is generally understood. Accord-
ingly, Umwelt means a world that is round -about us, a world that is near-
est, first at hand. There is no appropriate single word in English for
Umwelt . For most purposes, it can be quite adequately rendered by
“ environment, ” but this rendering will not be adopted here. Owing to
 The Worldishness of World 69

its biological and sociological flavor, “ environment” seems alien to

Heidegger’s thought and might perhaps with advantage be reserved for
an ontology of life, where the “ world” of plants and animals could fit-
tingly be called environment or surroundings.
One suggestion that Heidegger undoubtedly intends to convey
with Umwelt is of a world that is closest and most familiar to Da-sein, a
world in which he in the first place and for the most part lives. We shall
paraphrase Umwelt by “ surrounding world, ” with the sense of “ the first
and nearest world.” It becomes immediately evident how excellently
Heidegger’s “ exemplary ” world has been chosen; it is, in a sense, a uni-
versal world , since no matter in what age or society, or under what par-
ticular conditions Da-sein may live, he cannot, as it were, bypass a
world that is first and nearest to him.
For his own illustrations, it is true, Heidegger goes by preference
to the world of the small-scale craftsman, but this is only because a
small workshop is peculiarly suitable for demonstrating all the essen-
tial feaures of Da-sein’s everyday world. For instance, the reference
complex of “ by means of . . . in order to . . . for . . .” can be vividly
shown by the use of tools on the work in progress; “ nature” enters as
the source of materials needed for the work; the “ others” are also there
as the merchant who delivers the materials or the customer for whom
the clothes, the shoes, and so on, are “ made to measure” ; with the oth-
ers, the common, public world is also indicated. For purposes of illus-
tration, the little world of the craftsman could hardly be bettered; but
it would be a complete misunderstanding to think that Heidegger has
only this specific type of world in mind. All that essentially belongs to
Da-sein’s nearest world must be the same regardless of class or age or
social-economic developments; its significance-structure must be the
same regardless of whether anything is produced in it or not: we only
need to think, for instance, of the world of the “ idle rich ” or of the bed-
ridden invalid.
There is, moreover, a definite way in which Da-sein in his everyday
existence inhabits his world, and this is what Heidegger calls Umgang:
Da-sein goes about the world and goes about his business with the
things he meets within it. Umgang basically means the practical, using
and handling way of taking care of things, whose difference from a the-
oretical only-looking-at things has already been indicated. It must not be
thought, however, that the practical having-to-do-with things is blind: it
has its own way of “ seeing, ” that is, of understanding, which Heidegger
calls Umsicht , meaning literally, looking around , circumspection.
Having taken the Urn in its spatial sense, the three key words have
now come into view as: the world round -about us ( the first and nearest
70 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

world ); going about the world and about our practical business with
things; looking around, circumspection. Suggestive as all this is in itself,
what Heidegger intends to say comes fully to light only when we turn
to the Um in its primary sense of for.
Da-sein’s first and nearest world is evidently the for-world, in the
strict sense that the form, the “ how ” of its coherence is given by the for
the sake of his own existence. This prescribes the character of signifi-
cance, the specific for-worldishness of the everyday world, by the rela-
tional complex “ by means o f . . . in order to . . . for. . . .” Da-sein inhab-
its his nearest for-world by going about his business in it: his going
about is for something, whether the something is directly for his own
sake, or for the sake of others or whether it is in order to achieve some-
thing else to be taken care of. Da-sein’s going about his business for
something is in advance guided by a circumspect for-sight, which dis-
covers what things are for, under what circumstances they can be used
as means. What circumspect for-sight has “ its eye on ” in advance is the
primary world-form of for the sake of with which the whole significance-
structure of “ by means o f . . . in order to” is disclosed in an original,
indivisible unity. With the concept of circumspect for-sight, Heidegger
gives an existential-ontological explanation of what is familiar to us as
common sense. The Da-sein of common sense sees things in advance
in the light of their possible utility, harmfulness, relevance, or irrele-
vance to circumstances. The commonsense view is only possible on the
basis of an existential understanding, which fore-throws the possibili-
ties of Da-sein’s existence as his world, in the “ light” of which alone the
possibilities of things in their relevance to . . . , their bearing upon . . .
this or that situation become understandable.
But now the inevitable question arises. Is this everyday under-
standing of things not merely “ subjective” ? Is the only-looking of the-
ory not truer, because it is more “ objective” ? These questions will be
dealt with in the next chapter, where the reality of beings within the
world will be our theme.
 Ill
The Reality of Beings
within the World

The preceding chapters have already shown that reality has a much
more restricted meaning in Being and Time than in traditional ontolo-
gies. Not only Da-sein’s being is taken out of the sphere of reality but
also all existential phenomena, such as, for instance, time and world.
These only “ are” when a disclosure of being happens. There is one phe-
nomenon of a rather ambiguous character, however, which requires
some consideration, and this is language. The existential foundation of
language is, indeed, obvious, and yet it is readily overlooked. The rea-
son is that the words of a language can be collected and preserved in
books, in which they acquire a certain reality within the world; they
become accessible just like things. Hence one can get the impression
that language consists of word-things to which meanings are added.
The truth , according to Heidegger’s interpretation, is exactly the oppo-
site: Da-sein’s factical existence discloses world as a significance-whole
that can be articulated into those “ significances ” for which words grow
(SZ, § 34, esp.161).
The sphere of reality is thus restricted by Heidegger to those
—
beings that are independent of a disclosure of being for example,
plants, animals, the earth, the seas and the stars. All these real things,
with their ontic properties and connections, are independent of the
disclosure that happens with Da-sein’s existence. They are there,
regardless of whether they are discovered or not. Their being, their

71
72 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

reality, on the other hand, is only understandable to Da sein and can

never be independent of his existence.
But, as we have seen, things can be approached and discovered in
different ways. The two main possibilities we have considered are the
practical and the theoretical approach, and of these two, Heidegger
maintains, the practical is primary, while the theoretical is secondary
and derivative. Things are originally discovered and understood in
their reality by the circumspect for-sight of everyday care. This discov-
ers things not as mere substances that happen to be there in a univer-
sal space but as utensils that are handily there within the world. Real-
ity thus shows itself in the first place not as the substantial presence of
indifferent things but as the handy presence of useful things. The onto-
logical character of the things that meet us within the everyday world
is handiness ( Zuhandenheit ).
But, it may be objected, even granted that Heidegger is right in
saying that we first understand the reality of things as handiness,
these things must already be there in nature before Da-sein ever comes
on the scene. Are metaphysics and the sciences, each in its own way,
not objectively truer, do they not come nearer to things as they are in
themselves, just because they understand them in their substantial
reality? Is handiness, after all , not merely a subjective coloring we
impose on things?
These objections may be briefly answered in the following way. It
is certainly true, Heidegger would say, that things must already be
there for us to find, otherwise we could never find them. But this is not
the point in question. The point is how it is possible for us to under-
stand the “ being there” of things at all. We primarily understand that
things are handily there, not for any accidental or arbitrary reasons,
but because they can become accessible in their being only within a
world. Everyday care understands the being of things from their rele-
vance (.Bewandtnis) to a world, and this is the way in which they can be
discovered as they are “ in themselves.” It is quite erroneous to think
that handiness is a “ subjective coloring” we cast over things: it is a
mode of being prescribed by the significance-structure of world, which
enables us to understand things as they are “ in themselves.” Our every-
day having-to-do-with things could never decree the apple tree to be
handy if it were not “ in itself ’ handy, at hand, and if its fruit were not
“ in itself ’ handy for eating. It is only from long tradition and habit of
thought that we almost automatically dismiss what we call “ merely sub-
—
jective” as untrue. If we could not discover things “ subjectively ” if we
—
could not let them touch us, concern us, be relevant to us we could not
discover them at all.
 The Reality of Beings within the World 73

Only on the basis of the already discovered handiness of things

does their merely substantial presence become accessible. The change
from the one to the other comes about by a break in the intimate, com-
pletely taken-for-granted reference complex, from which things are
understood as things for. . . . Owing to this break , Da-sein takes a new
look at things, which now show themselves as merely substantial things
of such and such qualities and properties. It is only now that the mere
whatness of things comes to the surface and hides what they are for.
With this change, things are cut off from the for the sake of by reference
to which they were originally understood as utensils. They “ fall out of
the world, ” they become unworlded ( entweltlicht ), and now present
themselves as mere products of nature occurring in an indifferent uni-
versal space (SZ, § 16 and § 69). The traditional idea of being, drawn
from this secondary mode of reality, may therefore be called substantial
reality or objective presence as against the handy reality of things that
belong to a world ( Vorhandenheit, as against Zuhandenheit ) .
That this is how we in fact, though not in theory, understand the
things we use in our everyday world is shown by our propensity to

— —
ascribe all kinds of “ values” to them. The simplest utensil a knife, for
instance cannot be grasped in its being as a merely substantial thing.
The knife is essentially “ more” than a material body of such and such
properties, of such and such appearance, size, and weight. It is this
“ more” we try to explain when we ascribe a “ usefulness value” to the
knife. What happens, in fact, is that, standing, as we do, in a long onto-
logical tradition, we unquestioningly take it for granted that the knife
is merely substantially real, thereby covering over our original under-
standing of its being as relevant to . . . , handy for. . . . We first strip the
thing bare of what belongs to it as a utensil, then try to restore what we
have taken away by adding to it a value.
But, it may be asked, does Heidegger’s interpretation not apply
only to manmade utensils? These, admittedly, are “ more” than mere
substances, but what about the material bodies that are simply there in
nature? These also, according to Heidegger, are originally understood
by us in their handy-being. What, for instance, could be more handily
there than the sun, and what could be less manmade? It is not primar-
ily our labor that makes things into utensils; it is the significance-struc-
ture of our world that enables us to understand things as utensils. Only
on the ground of this understanding are we able to improve on what
we find, and so make tools that are even handier, even more “ valuable”
for some specific purpose.
As to the philosophical concept of values, and the elaborate the-
ories of values that have been worked out in the modern era of phi-
74 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

losophy, these are considered by Heidegger to be highly questionable

and rootless phenomena. They have arisen because the existential con-
stitution of being-in- the-world, on the ground of which Da-sein in
advance understands the things he meets as “ valuable” handy for
—
something has been completely overlooked. Once the original whole
—
of being-in-the-world has been passed over, philosophy finds itself com-
pelled to try to glue it together from bits and pieces, by superimposing
values on the substances that have fallen out from the significance-
whole of a world, just as it is obliged to construct ingenious theories to
explain the commerce between a supposedly worldless subject and a
cognized “ world .”
Why is it that in Greek-Western thinking so fundamental a struc-
ture as being-in-the-world has been overlooked, and with it the primary
ontological character of things as handy reality has been consistently
missed? It cannot be an accident, nor a failure on the part of the great
thinkers of this tradition. The reason lies in the fundamental “ fallen-
ness ” or “ falling” of Da-sein’s being, whereby he is whirled away from
himself to the things within the world. Instead of interpreting them
from his understanding of being-in-the-world , Da-sein tries to under-
stand his own being from their reality.
The elemental trend toward the “ world ” which carries Da-sein
away from himself cannot fail at the same time to affect the relation
most essential to him: his being with other Da-seins in a mutually
shared world. The radical difference between being-with others and
being-near-to things was pointed out already in earlier discussions, and
our next task is to examine in some detail Heidegger’s ideas on this
important theme.
 IV
Being-with-Others
and Being-One’s-Self

1 . THE BASIC CONCEPT OF BEING-WITH

Da-sein is able to relate himself to his fellow men only because his own
being is in advance disclosed to him as being-with. This fundamental
structure of Da-sein’s self is the existential foundation of all that we
usually speak of under the title of personal relations and human soci-
ety. If, as a matter of common experience, Da-sein constantly enters
into all kinds of associations with other men, this is not the result of
the “ fact” that he is not the only one of his kind in the world, but the
other way round: he can recognize others like himself in the world and
enter into relations with them because his own being is disclosed to
him as being-with. When there are “ in fact” no others, when Da-sein is
alone, he does not thereby cease to-be-with others, and this funda-
mental character of his being manifests itself with peculiar intensity in
his loneliness, in his missing the others. Even when Da-sein thinks he
does not need the others, when he withdraws from them and has noth-
ing to do with them, this is still only possible as a privative mode of
being-with.
To our usual way of thinking, it seems the most obvious fact that
Da-sein can understand others in their being, both as like himself and
as other than himself. Ontologically, this fact is a problem that is nei-
ther obvious nor easy to explain. In Husserl’s phenomenological

75
76 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

school, to which at one time Heidegger belonged, the solution of this

problem was thought to lie in “ empathy ” ( Einfühlung ), literally: “ feeling
oneself into another.” Heidegger rejects this solution, because it
assumes that the other is “ analogous” to oneself, is a “ double ” of one-
self , and leaves unexplained precisely the most difficult problem: How
is it possible that this “ double” of myself is yet manifest to me as the
“ other ” ? (SZ, 124ff. ).
This is the problem to which Heidegger offers the solution of
being-with. Just as Da-sein is never a worldless subject, but in advance
refers himself to the possible presence of things within a world, so he
is never an isolated, otherless “ I , ” but in advance understands himself
as I-myself-with-( possible other selves ). The “ with” already refers him
to the other as a self; that is , as one who exists in the same way as he
himself and yet is the “ other ” with whom he can be together in the
same world.
The basic structure of being-with cannot be reduced to or
explained from anything else. The articulated whole of being-myself-
with-( another-self ) cannot be melted down into an “ inarticulate, ” iso-
lated “ I, ” which then somehow finds its way to another, equally isolated
“ I.” Da-sein does not have to find his way to another Da-sein, because
with the disclosure of his own being as being-with, the being of others
is already disclosed and understood. It is true that in everyday being-
together-with-others, this primary understanding of the other, as well
as of oneself , is often covered over and distorted, so that to know each
other requires a “ getting-to-know-one-another.” Necessary and unavoid-
able as such special and explicit efforts may be to disclose oneself to
another self, they do not originally constitute being-together-with-one-
another but are only possible on the ground of the primary being-with.
Being-with others is a basic structure of each Da-sein’s self, for the
sake of which he exists: Da-sein therefore exists essentially for the sake
of others. He understands them in advance as the selves who are in the
world in the same way as himself: their being has the same character
of for the sake of as his own. On the ground of the irreducible with-struc-
ture of his being, Da-sein is essentially with-worldish. His world is in
advance a world he shares with others; his being-in-the-world is in itself
a being-with-others-in-the-world.
But just because being-with is a fundamental constituent of Da-
sein’s own self, it can be modified according to the basic possibilities
of existence; that is, Da-sein can be with others in an “ owned ” ( “ authen-
tic ” ) or a “ disowned ” ( “ inauthentic” ) way. These possibilities are first
hinted at by Heidegger when he introduces the concept of “ solicitude ”
“ concern-for, ” or “ care-for, ” ( Fürsorge ) as the way of care appropriate to
 Being-with-Others and Being-One’s-Self 77

being-with other existences in a mutually shared world (SZ, 12 Iff. )· The

meaning of this specific way of care has now to be briefly considered.
“ Care-for” is a literal translation of Heidegger’s word Fü rsorge and
is adopted here to preserve the connection with care and taking-care,
but the German word, it should be noted, has a range of meaning
which is much better conveyed by solicitude. Another way to suggest the
general meaning of Fürsorge would be to render it by charity ( caritas ).
Social charitable institutions, Heidegger remarks immediately after
introducing his concept of Fürsorge, are grounded in the existential
care-for, and the need for them is made urgent by the deficient and
indifferent ways in which Da seins care for each other in much of their
everyday being-together. Passing-by-on-the-other-side and being-of-no-
concern-to-each-other are the indifferent modes in which everyday
care-for usually keeps itself. But, it should be observed, even the most
indifferent way of being-with others is still another order of being from
the simultaneous occurrence of a number of objects together.
As to the positive modes of caring-for, Heidegger shows that
there are two extreme possibilities; and in these, the owned or authen-
tic and disowned or inauthentic way of being-with others comes to
light. (SZ, 122 ). On introducing this topic, Heidegger treats it with a
brevity that seems surprising, until it is realized that it cannot be made
genuinely understandable without the interpretation of owned exis-
tence which is to follow some two hundred pages later.
In the first of its positive modes, care-for, so to speak, “ jumps in”
( einspringt ) for the other; it takes the “ care ” off the other, usually by tak-
ing care of things for him. In so doing, however, it throws the other out
of his place by stepping in in his stead, so that the other takes over
ready-made what he should have taken care of for himself. In such car-
ing-for, the other can easily become dependent and dominated in so
unobtrusive a fashion that it may often pass unnoticed by him. This
mode of caring-for is widespread in everyday being-together and con-
cerns primarily the handy things that have to be taken care of.
In its second positive mode, care-for, so to speak, “ jumps ahead”
( vorausspringt ) of the other in his ability to be himself, not to take the
“ care” off him but to give it back to him properly, as his own. Such car-
ing-for is not primarily concerned with what the other does but with
his existence as a self, and it may help to make him transparent to him-
self in his own being as care.
Between these two extremes, there is a wide range of varied and
mixed modes of caring-for, whose discussion , as many readers of Being
and Time note with some regret, is not essential to Heidegger’s central
theme and is consequently passed over. Instead , Heidegger turns to
78 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

give a brief indication of the way of “ seeing, ” of understanding, by

which care-for is guided. Parallel to the circumspect for-sight ( Umsicht )
which guides everyday taking-care, care-for has its own ways of “ see-
ing” ; these are called by Heidegger Rücksicht and Nachsicht .
The usual meaning of Rücksicht is considerateness, or, if the “ see-
ing Sicht ) is to be emphasized, it might be rendered as a considerate
” (
regard for someone. Nachsicht is excellently rendered in the Macquarrie
and Robinson translation of Being and Time as forbearanceBoth these
concepts are highly suggestive and could be interpreted in several ways,
especially since Heidegger gives no further explanation of their precise
meaning. There are, however, some illuminating comments on Rück -
sicht , and its extreme deficiency, ruthlessness, to be found in Heideg-
ger’s essay on Anaximander (HO, 331ff., G5, 359ff., EGT, 46ff.), but to
discuss these would lead us too far away from our theme.
The interpretation to be given here keeps in view that the con-
cepts under consideration are analogous to Um-sicht, for-sight. The first
component of Rücksicht means “ back-” ; Rücksicht therefore means an
understanding that lies in looking back. What does this understanding
look back on? On thrownness and dependence upon a world that has
to be taken care of. But thrownness is in itself a thrownness-with and
for other; the world has to be taken care of with and for the other. This
“ back-looking” understanding is evidently the guide of the “ jumping-
in ” mode of caring-for.
-
Nach means after, toward, to. Nachsicht is accordingly an under-
standing that lies in looking toward or to something. What does this
understanding look to? To the possibility of being a self, for the sake of
which Da sein bears his being as care. But to be a self is only possible
with another self. Da sein thus bears care for the other self; in looking
to this, he may help the other to bear his own self as care. This for-
bearing looking-to the other self is evidently the guide of the “ jumping-
ahead ” way of caring-for.
Both these ways of “ seeing” are capable of a wide range of modi-
fications, of which the ruthless disregard of the other’s thrownness is
an extreme form of deficiency. The indifferent mode of forbearance is
called by Heidegger Nachsehen. This is not a looking-to, but an over-
looking of the other self, a taking-no-notice-of-it; it is not genuine for-
bearance, but an uncaring toleration, which largely guides the indif-
ferent modes of everyday being-together.
Ultimately, however, all modes of being-together, whether gen-
uine or not genuine, whether they spring from an owned or disowned
existence, are made possible by the structure of being-with, which is
constitutive of each Da-sein’s self and which cannot be ironed out so as
 Beingwith-Others and Being-One *s-Self 79

to leave an undifferentiated identity called an “ I.” It is because tradi-

tional philosophy has always had a worldless, otherless “ I” in view that
it has been forced to interpret the essence of Da-sein, his self, as though
it were a substance: a recognizable identity which underlies (is present
to ) a constantly changing stream of experience.
As against the traditional attempts to explain the self with the
help of an idea of being drawn from the reality of things, Heidegger
takes the idea of being-with-others-in-the-world as the only basis from
which an ontological analysis of Da-sein can even start. This funda-
mental constitution is not merely a rigid framework, but it itself deter-
mines the way in which Da-sein is together with others, and even the
way in which he himself is a self. In the first place and for the most
part, Da-sein is captivated and taken in by his world ( benommen ). Hence
it comes about that his first meetings with others have a predominantly
worldish character: the others meet him in their occupations in the
world, of which he himself is also taking care. How does this meeting
concretely take place and how does it determine the way in which both
the others and one’s own self first become understandable?
In his everyday existence, Da-sein stays predominantly in his near-
est world, in which the others are also busy in their care-taking world-
ishness. The others are there not merely accidentally, and in addition
to what one does with things, but are there in one’s occupations from
the start, as, for example, the customer for whom the clothes and shoes
are “ made to measure,” as the merchant who delivers the materials for
the work, as the friend who gave a present of the book one reads; the
field along which one walks shows itself as owned by so and so,
decendy cultivated by him, and so on (SZ, ll 7f.).
The others meet us not only in our “ private” occupations but also
in the common with-world; for example, in the use of public means of
communications, in undertakings which take care in common of the
mutually shared world, as in the upkeep of the facilities provided by a
community, and so forth. To an overwhelming extent, everyday being-
together does not get beyond the business pursued in common and
beyond the average understanding of the others and of oneself which
grows from what they do and from what oneself does in the world.
In his average everydayness, Da-sein finds the others in their care-
taking being-in-the-world and finds himself among them as taking care
with them (SZ, 118). Far from being an encapsulated I who has to go
“ out ” of himself to another I, Da-sein first finds even himself in com- .
ing back to himself from “ out there, ” where he is busy taking care of
the world among the others. In this common absorption in the world,
the “ I myself ’ is not even clearly differentiated from all the other
80 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

selves; the others are those among whom I also am , among whom I also
find myself. In his self-forgetful everydayness, Da-sein is in the first
place and for the most part not himself.
What does Heidegger mean by the startling announcement that,
in his everyday existence, Da-sein is not himself ? Negatively, he clearly
cannot mean that Da-sein suddenly loses his I-character and ceases to
be a self altogether; he can only mean that Da-sein exists as a self in one
of the definite ways that are open to him. How this way of not-being-
oneself is to be positively understood will become clear in the next sec-
tion , where we shall consider Heidegger’s answer to the question Who
is the self of everydayness?

2. THE EVERYDAY SELF AND THE THEY

The most salient point that has emerged from Heidegger’s analysis can
be briefly stated as follows. In the everyday world, the others meet us
as what they are in their makings and doings: “ They are what they do”
(SZ, 126 ).
What Heidegger emphatically says in the sentence “ They are what
they do ” seems at first sight easy to understand. When someone asks
us “ Who is so and so? ” we almost automatically reply, “ He is a surgeon,
a businessman , a student of philosophy,” or whatever. But, when we
come to think of it, is this habit easy to explain just because it is famil-
iar ? Is it so “ natural ” that the self each Da-sein is should be manifest to
us from his profession ? How is it possible for us to characterize Da-
sein ’s self from what he does? This is the question Heidegger goes on
to answer in the paragraph which immediately follows the sentence
—
“ They are what they do” a short paragraph that is not only the deci-
sive step taken in the present analysis but is one of the key passages of
Being and Time, and, as such , is not fully comprehensible where it
stands. It is only about halfway through Division Two that this passage
will retrospectively come to clarity. Meantime, let us see how far we can
understand at present the existential-ontological explanation Heideg-
ger gives of “ who’s who ” in the everyday world.
In the first place , how does Da-sein understand himself as a self
at all? Primarily, as has been shown in our discussion of existence , from
the possibilities of his being. These are originally manifest from the pos-
sibility of a not , which belongs to each Da-sein singly and uniquely. In
the finiteness of his being, each Da-sein is sheerly uninterchangeable;
no one can stand in for him there , no one can take his being off him
and bear it for him. But in everyday being-together, Da-sein turns away
 Being-with-Others and Being-One's-Self 81

from the possibility that is most his own and understands himself from
his worldish possibilities among other selves. In his everydayness, Da-
sein in advance measures his own self by what the others are and have,
by what they have achieved and failed to achieve in the world. He thus
understands himself in his difference from the others by the distance
that separates his own possibilities from theirs. “ Being-with-one-
another is, unknown to itself, disquieted by the care about this dis-
tance” (SZ, 126 ). Everyone measures his distance and so “ stands off ” as
himself from the others. This existential “ distantiality ” or “ stand-off-
ishness ” ( Abst ändigeit ) can concretize itself in many different ways. It is
there, for instance, in the care to catch up with the others, to “ do as the
Joneses do.” Or it may manifest itself in the opposite way, in going all
out to consolidate some privilege or advantage one has gained and so
keep the others down in their possibilities. All kinds of social distinc-
tions, whereby Da-sein understands his own existence by his distance
from others in class, race, education, and income are grounded in the
existential stand-offishness, which means: in the first place and for the
most part, Da-sein understands his existence by “ standing off ” from the
others and not by the genuine possibilities that lie in the uniqueness of
his finite self. In his everydayness, Da-sein looks away from the true dis-
tance, the limit of his finite being, from which alone he can become
truly transparent as the self he is, and measures his self in advance by
his distance from what the others are and do.
This existential stand-offishness implies that in everyday exis-
tence Da-sein draws the possibilities of his being from what is pre-
scribed and decided on by others. He is thus delivered over to the sub-
servience of domination ( Botmässigleit ) by the others and disburdened
of the being that is singly and solely his. In everyday being- together, Da-
sein is not himself; the others have taken his being away from him (SZ,
126 ). But who are the others? They are not this one or that one, not
anybody or the sum of all: “ they ” are just “ people, ” the people of whom
we say “ people think so, ” and “ people don’ t wear that any more.” We
call them “ they” and “ people ” to hide that we essentially belong to
them, not by what we in fact think and do but in being as we are, mea-
suring the possibilities of our own existence from what “ they ” say one
can be and do.
Since in everyday being- together, “ they, ” the others , are not any
definite others, they are essentially interchangeable; anyone can stand
in for everybody else , anybody can represent and substitute anyone
else, almost like a thing which can just as well represent its genus and
species as any other thing. With this, the ontological character of Da-
sein’s being, which is always singly and uniquely my being, comes into
82 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

a mode of not-being in the sense that it is not itself according to its own-
most possibility. This is the strictly ontological meaning of Heidegger’s
thesis that, in his everyday being-in-the-world, it is not Da-sein himself
who is there, but it is “ they,” people, who are there, oneself among them.
In the first place and for the most part, the who of everydayness, the
everyday self, is the “ they” ( Das Man ) .
Because of their interchangeability, it is in principle impossible to
pin down who “ they ” are to any definite persons. It is precisely in their
inconspicuousness that “ they ” exercise a dictatorship that can never be
brought home to anyone, so that no one can be made responsible for
it. There are many social-historical forms in which the dictatorship of
“ them” can concretize itself. It would be a complete misundersanding
of the existential-ontological idea of a “ they-self ’ to think that it applies
only to modern society in some specific political-social forms. If Hei-
degger is right at all in saying that to exist as a they-self is one of the
possibilities of Da-sein’s finitely free being, then this possibility is open
to Da-sein by virtue of his own being and not by the accident of this or
that form of society.
Indeed , no specific oppression is needed to establish the power
of “ them, ” because the tendency to level down and average out the dis-
tinctiveness of each self is there already in being-together-in-the-world.
The reduction to uniformity happens simply in taking care of a mutu-
ally shared world; in using its public facilities, newspapers, entertain-
ments, and the like. Here everybody is like everybody else. The exis-
tential tendency to average out and level down all differences is
commented on by Heidegger in the words: “ Overnight, everything pri-
mordial is flattened down as something long since known. Everything
gained by a struggle becomes something to be manipulated. Every mys-
tery loses its power ” (SZ, 127).
Heidegger goes on to explain how and why this happens. Stand-
offishness, averaging-out and levelling-down constitute the “ publicity”
{ Öffentlichkeit ) of an average understanding of being. This public under-
standing in advance leads and determines all explanations of self and
world, not because it goes deeply into things but, on the contrary,
because it is insensitive to differences of genuineness and niveau. In this
average, public understanding, everything becomes accessible and com-
monplace, and no one is responsible for having made it so. It is “ they ”
who have understood and decided how things must be. “ They” thus dis-
burden everyday existence of responsibility, for “ they ” are strictly speak-
ing nobody who could be taken to account for anything said and done; it
is always the “ others ” who have said and done so. In everyday being-
together, “ Everyone is the other and no one is himself ’ (SZ, 128).
 Being-with-Others and Being-One ’s-Self 83

It is in “ them,” who are nobody, that the everyday self finds its
first stability ( Ständigleit ): it stands as not-itself. This “ standing, ” of
course, is not the sheer lastingness of a thing. Although scattering him-
self into a they-self, Da-sein can never become a pure “ what” ; even to-
be-not-himself and nobody is still only possible to a self.
“ They ” must therefore never be thought of as a genus of which
each everyday self is a sample, but as a basic way in which Da-sein can
exist as a self . It is for the sake of the they-self that Da-sein in the first
place and for the most part exists. This primary for the sake of articulates
the significance - whole of the world in which Da-sein lives and pre-
scribes the average possibilities of being-in-the-world. But just because
these possibilities are understood from what “ they ” are and do, the
everyday self covers over its own unique character. It is from the aver-
age, public understanding of being that traditional ontology took its
start and has been consistently misled by it to ascribe to Da-sein’s
essence, his self, the ontological character of a substance.
The “ owned ” self of a resolutely disclosed existence is not a dif-
ferent order of being, not some exception or genius that hovers over
“ them, ” but is a modification of “ them, ” a resolute gathering of one’s
self from its scatteredness into a they-self. “ They ” are a fundamental
existential and not some ontic quality of Da-sein produced by external
conditions. Even less are “ they, ” as is often thought, a contemptible fig-
ure of ridicule, although, it must be confessed , Heidegger’s language
in speaking of the they-self would sometimes almost justify such a con-
clusion. As against this, Heidegger’s own ontological tendency must be
held fast. Properly considered, indeed, “ they ” are far from ridiculous,
but a more shattering document of man’s finite being than the
“ owned ” self of a resolutely disclosed existence can ever be.

3. THE PUBLICITY OF EVERYDAYNESS

( a ) Discourse and Language: Everyday Discourse as Idle Talk
The theme of the present discussion is the publicness or public dis-
closedness of everyday being-together, insofar as it is constituted by dis-
course and language. It has already been mentioned that, in Heideg-
ger’s interpretation , discourse ( Rede ) is a fundamental existential which
is co-original with attunement and understanding. These latter have in
themselves a definite and intricate structure, so that the being dis-
closed by them is always already articulated. What is understandable is
therefore always expressly articulable. Discourse, as an existential, is
the articulation of understandability: of existence and fellow-existence,
84 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

of the significance-whole of world and of the being of beings within the

world. Hearing, listening, and being silent essentially belong to speech
and make up its full ontological structure. Da-sein hears not because he
has ears; he has these organs of hearing because by virtue of his own
being he is a hearer. Hearing, listening, and being silent are existential
possibilities that belong to Da-sein as a speaker. A stone cannot speak
and therefore cannot be silent.
On the ground of his existential constitution , the factically exist-
ing Da-sein always “ speaks out, ” and it is this “ spoken out ” speech that
Heidegger interprets as the ontic phenomenon of language. It may well
be seen from this that the actual languages we have cannot be those
“ ultimates ” for Heidegger from which all explanations have to start. To
suppose that they are is all the less feasible because each language
already hides in itself one definite interpretation { Auslegung ) of what it
articulates, an interpretation which is usually so unobtrusive that it
remains unnoticed. Thus, for instance, each language loosens up the
significance-whole of world into “ significances, ” which explain in a spe-
cific way the everyday world in which Da-sein is together with “ them, ”
the others.
In everyday being-together, the spoken-out discourse, language,
has the character of a communicating talk, whose function is to share
with the listener the disclosedness of the things talked about. The lis-
tener himself is thus brought into a disclosing relation to the things
that are the subject matter of the talk.
Since, however, language itself already gives a certain explanation
of the world , it is in itself understandable. In everyday talking-together,
there is a strong tendency on the part of the listener, not so much to
bring himself into a genuinely disclosing relation to the things talked
—
of that is, to understand them for himself from the things themselves
as rather to understand the talk itself. This is possible because both the
—
talker and the listener already understand the language in the same
average way.
With the omission of going back to the things themselves,
whose disclosedness is the soil from which language grows, there is
a constant danger that language, solely by virtue of its own poten-
tialities, uproots itself. What is shared is not the primary and imme-
diate disclosure of self and world but an average understanding of
the talk itself . Everyday being- together moves largely in a mutual
talking- together and in repeating and handing on what has been
said. In the course of this the talk loses, or has perhaps never gained ,
a genuinely disclosing relation to being and beings. The unique gift
of speech , “ of gifts the most dangerous ” ( Hölderlin ) , can itself
 Being-with Others and Being-One’s-Self
- 85

become the medium for uprooting Da sein from his primary under-
standing of existence and his nearness to things.
Discourse has thus always the possibility of becoming what Hei-
degger calls Gerede, a word for which we have many approximations,
none of which hits the target clean in the center. Chatter, gossip, idle
talk, groundless talk, bottomless talk, hearsay, all hover on the circum-
ference. “ Hearsay, ” although it is not a translation of Gerede, can per-
haps best convey what Heidegger means, but because it is a literal
translation of Hörensagen, a word Heidegger uses several times in Being
and Time, we shall follow the widespread practice of translating Gerede
as “ idle talk ” ; it is the kind of talk that hears, that is, understands what
is said, then passes on ( says on ) what has been learned by hearing with-
out “ getting to the bottom” of what the talk is about.2 Writing, as a
mode of communicating discourse, can bring a further uprooting into
everyday existence. Like genuine talk, so genuine writing can degener-
ate into an idle scribbling ( Geschreibe ), which is not so much a “ hear-say”
as a “ read-say,” feeding itself on what has already been written and
passing it on as a supposed contribution toward keeping the dis-
closedness of world open. “ The average understanding of the reader
will never be able to decide what has been drawn from primordial
sources with a struggle, and how much is just gossip” (SZ, 169 ).
Groundless hearsay or idle talk thus helps to “ publish ” an average
explanation of existence and world in everyday being-together. It offers
the possibility of understanding everything without going into any-
thing. It develops an average understandability to which nothing
remains hidden, so that it in advance hinders and closes a deeper and
more genuine approach to things. It is in itself a disguising and cover-
ing-over, although, as Heidegger emphatically points out, there is no
intention in it to deceive or falsify. Idle talk, simply by omitting to dis-
cover things in themselves, is a falsification of speech in the genuine
sense, whose whole function is to be discovering, that is, to be true,
according to Heidegger’ s interpretation of truth, as we shall see in a
later chapter.
All of us grow up in and draw our first understanding of things
from the average explanation of being and beings “ published” by
everyday hearsay. Much that is useful is learned from hearsay, the com-
mon basis on which, and from which, and against which , all genuine
understanding and communicating and rediscovering take place. No
Da-sein can ever keep himself “ untouched and unseduced ” by the
explanations made public in hearsay (SZ, 169). It decides in advance
—
even the possibilities of attunement that is, of the basic way in which
Da-sein lets the world touch him , concern him . “ They ” have always
86 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

already prescribed what one sees and how one feels about the world
and oneself.
In everyday being-together, whose openness is essentially consti-
tuted by hearsay, Da-sein’s existence is cut off from its primary rela-
tions to itself, to fellow existences and to the world. Its roots are slack-
ened and it sways uncannily in its hold on the disclosedness of self and
world ( Schwebe ) . Yet, even the uncanniness of this swaying is hidden by
the self-assurance and bland matter-of-courseness of an everyday
understanding (SZ, 170 ).

( b ) The Everyday Way of Seeing: Curiosity

Among the different ways of “ seeing, ” that is, of understanding, by

which our specific “ cares ” are guided, we have come across two: care-for
others is guided by a considerate looking-back on thrownness and a for-
bearing looking-to the self ( Rücksicht and Nachsicht ), while everyday tak-
ing-care of things is guided by circumspect for-sight ( Umsicht ). The lat-
ter, as we have seen, can modify itself to a theoretical only-looking-at
things. In everyday being-together, however, circumspect for-sight has
another possibility of modification or, perhaps it would be more correct
to say, of degeneration. Just as genuine talk can degenerate into idle
talk, so the circumspect for-sight of everyday care can degenerate into
idle curiosity. This is called by Heidegger Neugier, an expressive word in
common use, which literally means greed for the new. This curiosity is
in the strictest sense of the word “ idle, ” because it arises when everyday
existence has nothing more at hand that needs to be taken care of. The
care of circumspect for-sight to discover and bring near the handy
things to be attended to now detaches itself from its proper task and
becomes the care of looking around, merely for the sake of looking.
The idleness of curiosity must on no account be confused with
the leisureliness of a theoretical “ only-looking,” which stays with things
in order to understand them, and which, in the highest sense, is an
admiring gazing on beings in their pure essence. The curiosity of cir-
cumspect for-sight which has broken free of its proper boundaries is
exactly the opposite. It roams far and wide out into the world, not in
order to understand things but simply to see how they look. In this
greed for novelty lies the care of everyday existence to provide itself
constantly with new possibilities of delivering itself over to the world.
As against the leisureliness of a “ theoretical ” staying with things,
the idleness of curiosity is characterized by a constant jumping off
from the new to the still newer. Curiosity is a not-lingering with things,
that gives itself always fresh opportunities for scattering and distract-
 Being-with-Others and Being-One’s-Self 87

ing itself and leads to a new uprooting of man’s being as being-in. It

will be remembered that “ being-in ” means dwelling-in . . . , staying-
near- to . . . , in habiting . . . a world familiar to us in this or that way.
The not-staying and self-scattering of curiosity drives Da-sein’s being-in
to a loss of dwelling ( Aufenthaltslosigkeit ).
Idle talk and roaming curiosity are not merely two different ways
of everyday being-together, but one drags the other with it. They
decide together what one must have seen and heard. Idle talk leaves
nothing unexplained, curiosity nothing undiscovered, and so they offer
to everyday existence the guarantee for a supposed genuineness and
vitality of “ living.” This supposition brings to light a third phenome-
non constitutive of the public disclosedness of everydayness (SZ, 173).

( c ) Ambiguity

The ambiguity that characterizes everyday being-together spreads not

only over the explanation of world and of the things within it but, most
importantly, over the possibilities of one’s own existence together with
other existences. It is not only that the all-knowingness of idle talk and
curiosity makes it impossible to distinguish what is genuinely known
from what is not, but it also publishes in advance what is to happen and
what can and will be achieved. The broadcasting in advance of what
can be done is usually a good enough reason not to throw oneself into
the necessarily slow business of actually carrying it out. Supposing
someone does carry out something, then the ambiguity of idle talk and
curiosity has already taken care that the achievement, the moment it is
finally realized , looks already obsolete. The ambiguous “ fore-knowing”
and “ fore-seeing” of all possibilities make out that the action and the
actual achievement are something belated and secondary. Conse-
quently, people are as a rule misguided as to what are, and what are
not, the genuine possibilities of their factical existence.
The ambiguous openness ( disclosedness ) of being-in-the-world
spreads itself over the way in which people are together in their every-
day business and social intercourse. This has often the character of a
tense and secretive watching and questioning of one another. “ Under
the mask of the for-one-another, the against one another is at play ” (SZ,
175). But Heidegger immediately goes on to add that the ambiguity
does not spring from an intention to deceive, nor is it primarily pro-
duced by the insincerity of individuals; it lies already in a thrown being- .
together in a world.
The three constitutive characters of public disclosedness idle
—
talk, curiosity, and ambiguity show an ontological connection with
—
88 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

each other that points to a basic mode of Da-sein’s being. This is ana-
lyzed by Heidegger just before the opening of the sixth and last chap-
ter of Division One. The place of this analysis, which is entitled “ Falling
and Thrownness,” already indicates its methodological importance to
the whole first division of Being and Time, providing, as it will turn out,
the basis for the exposition of Da-sein’s being as care.

4. FALLING AND THROWNNESS

The phenomena of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity have brought

-
into view a peculiar “ movement” in Da sein’ s being, which is called by
Heidegger Verfallen . This concept has so far been usually alluded to in
this book as fallenness, in order to avoid presenting the reader with a
puzzle until the time came when it could be explained. Now it is
becoming evident that what Heidegger means by this concept is not a
fallen state of Da sein, fallen perhaps from a state of grace into cor-
ruption , but the movement of falling. This movement, moreover, is not
one of the accidents that can befall Da-sein in his factical existence but
-
is one of the basic ways in which Da-sein can-be-in the-world: in the way
of disowning himself. This event cannot be explained as the result of
external causes and circumstances but only as a positive possibility of
being-in-the-world, which in its finite freedom can move away from
itself, can disown the utmost illumination of which it is capable.
But if being-in-the-world essentially tends to “ move away,” to “ err
away ” from itself, and this cannot be ascribed to any extraneous
causes, then the temptation to “ err ” must lie in the very structure of
being-in-the-world itself. Indeed, as Heidegger proceeds to show (SZ,
177) , the temptation is there already in the fore-throw structure of
understanding. Its specific function , it will be remembered, is to bring
before and toward itself the whole of the possibilities of being, to
which being-with-others-in- the-world essentially belongs. Accordingly,
understanding constantly throws out before and toward itself possibil-
ities of being-with “ them ” in the way of idle talk and boundless curios-
ity. Purely and simply by its own fore- throw of possibilities, under-
standing constantly tempts itself to stray away, it literally seduces itself
(leads itself off ) to seek its own fulfillment in the explanations of self
and world made public by “ them.” Being-in- the-world, as essentially
constituted by understanding, is thus in itself “ seductive ” or “ tempt-
ing” (versucherisch ).
But why does understanding seduce itself to seek its possibilities
among “ them ” ? Because “ their ” self-assured all-knowingness reassures
 Being-with-Others and Being-One’s-Self 89

it of the fullest and most genuine possibility of being-in- the-world. The

care of understanding, which in its own nature is a looking-out for pos-
sibilities, is thus offered the calm reassurance { Beruhigung, “ tranquil-
lizing” ) that “ they ” hold the secret of the true life , that is, of one’s own-
most possibility for being-in- the-world.
The calm of this reassurance, however, does not bring being-in-
the-world to a haven of peace, but, on the contrary, it increases the
impetus of the fall. Tempting itself to err away from its own genuine
possibilities, which can become transparent only in a single self, under-
standing tends to uproot itself further and further, until it becomes
estranged or alienated from itself { Entfremdung ). Among the many pos-
sible concretizations of self-estrangement, some of which are especially
acutely felt in our own age, Heidegger singles out as an example the
opinion that
understanding the most foreign cultures and “ synthesizing” them with
our own may lead to the thorough and first genuine enlightenment of
Da-sein about itself. Versatile curiosity and restlessly knowing it all mas-
querade as a universal understanding of Da-sein. [. . .] When Da-sein,
tranquillized and “ understanding” everything, thus compares itself with
everything, it drifts towards an alienation in which its ownmost poten-
tiality for being-in-the-world is concealed. (SZ, 178)

This alienation, however, as Heidegger emphasizes, does not

mean that Da-sein is “ in fact” torn away from himself, but, on the con-
trary, he is driven into the extremest self-analysis and self-interpreta-
tions of all kinds in which he finally “ catches ” himself , that is, becomes
completely caught and entangled in himself { Verfängnis ). But far from
genuinely finding himself in this entanglement, it finally closes all pos-
sibilities for an understanding that springs genuinely from his own self.
In this seductively reassuring, estrangingly entangling way of being-in-
the-world, Da-sein so to speak casts his moorings and plunges away
from himself, not to fall into some abyss which is not himself, but to fall
into the disowned way of being himself { Absturz ).
The movement in Da-sein’s own being constantly drags him away
from the fore-throw of genuine possibilities and drags him into the
opinion that “ they ” dispose of the fullness of life. The constant “ drag-
ging away from . . .” and “ dragging toward and into . . finally reveals
the movement of falling as a whirl or eddying { Wirbel ).
The steps of Heidegger’s analysis, briefly summarized in the pre-
ceding paragraphs, have so far clearly followed from the initial step,
namely from the fore-throw of possibilities, whereby understanding
constantly leads itself astray. But now Heidegger proceeds to take a
90 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

new step whose connection with what has gone before is not at all evi-
dent and seems even to contradict it. The whirling movement of the
fall, Heidegger says, characterizes not only the existential constitution
of being-in-the-world but at the same time makes manifest the “ throw ”
of thrownness. Da-sein’s thrownness is never a finished fact, which hap-
pens once at birth and is then left behind: as long as Da sein in fact
exists, he “ remains in the throw, ” which whirls him away into disown-
ment to “ them ” ( SZ, 179 ).
But how is it, we ask ourselves, that the “ falling, ” which was first
explained from the fore-throw of understanding, suddenly turns out to
arise from the “ throw ” of thrownness? How do these two hang
together? Presumably, the connection would be clear if we understood
exactly what Heidegger means by saying that Da sein “ remains in the
throw, ” but this suggestive phrase fails to convey any precise meaning
at the moment. Or is it perhaps wrong to take it for granted that the
phrase must have a precise meaning? Should it not be regarded rather
as a figure of speech, suggestive, and inevitably blurred at the edges?
This would go against all that we have come to know of Heidegger’s
thought, a thought that is incomparably strict and translucently clear,
provided, of course, that the grave difficulties of penetrating to it are
overcome, and even more, that the clarity proper to an inquiry into
being is not expected to be of the same kind as the clarity proper to a
mathematical theorem or to a report of a football match. On the basis
of what our previous discussions have shown, we can confidently
expect that Da sein “ remains in the throw ” in a strict and precisely
understandable sense that will come to light when all that is most basic
to Heidegger’s thought has been brought into view. Much of it still
remains to be discovered. The next chapter, while it cannot take us the
whole way, will take us an important step nearer to clarifying the con-
nection between the fore-throw of understanding and the throw of
thrownness.
 V
The Basic Mood of Dread (Angst )
and the Being of Da-sein as Care

1. THE DISCLOSURE OF BEING THROUGH DREAD

Heidegger’s analysis of “ falling” or “ falling prey ” as the disowned way

of being-in- the-world, brings him to the climax of Division One. Its last
chapter has the central task of elucidating the originally whole struc-
ture of Da-sein’s being as care. The extraordinary difficulty of this task
will be best appreciated by those readers who have already grappled
with the full text of Being and Time . The complexity of Da-sein’ s being,
as it is brought to light by Heidegger in Division One, is considerable.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Heidegger should announce that in
order to penetrate to the phenomenon of care, an approach to Da-sein
must be found through which his being will become accessible in a cer-
tain simplified way (SZ, 182 ). Nor is it surprising that Da-sein is to be
brought face to face with his being in the mood of dread, for the most
original and most far-reaching possibility of disclosure lies in attune-
ment, of which dread will prove to be a preeminent mode. What is sur-
prising is that Heidegger should propose to take for the basis of his
analysis the falling, the disowned or inauthentic way of being-in-the-
world. The proposal to confront Da-sein with himself in a way of exist-
ing in which he turns away from himself seems strange indeed, until
the reasons for it are explained by Heidegger. These may be briefly
indicated as follows.

91
92 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

Disowned existence, as a movement “ away from . . . makes

manifest a threat from which Da sein flees. Although the threat is not
fully faced , yet it is there, disclosed in the very recoil from it. This
threat, as Heidegger’s analysis will show, is revealed by dread, on the
ground of which Da-sein flees from himself into his occupations with
things within the world. The preceding inquiry has shown , however,
that the flight of disowned existence is not an occasional, isolated act,
but a basic way in which Da-sein is-in- the-world. This implies that
dread also cannot be an occasional, isolated experience, but must con-
stantly tune Da-sein and reveal to him a threat to his existence. Dread
is the basic mood that lies at the ground of Da-sein’s being, although
it rarely rises to the surface and few of us might recognize it as fully
and explicitly experienced by us. Nonetheless, the threat it reveals is
attested precisely by Da-sein’s flight from it, so that the disowned way
of existing may very well serve as a basis from which Heidegger’s
analysis can start.
Heidegger’s first concern is to distinguish sharply dread from
fear, which is evidently akin to it and yet radically different. Fear as
“ fear of . . .” always discovers some definite threat approaching from a
definite direction in an already disclosed neighborhood. The whereof
of fear, the fearsome, has the character of some handy thing or real
thing or another Da-sein approaching from the world. But in disowned
existence, it is from himself that Da-sein turns away. The threat cannot
come from beings within the world, because it is precisely to these that
he flees. The threat revealed by dread cannot therefore strike at Da-
sein from this or that definite direction , from this or that definite
thing, but strikes at him solely from himself. It is not beings within the
world that dread dreads, but being-in-the world as such.
The whereof of dread, the dreadsome, is being-in the-world as
such. This thesis is put by Heidegger at the head of the main body of
his analysis, to be substantiated in detail by what follows. The first step
Heidegger takes is to consider the wholly indefinite character of what
dread dreads. How does this differ from the definiteness of a fearsome
thing discovered by fear ? The difference is not one of degree: the
dreadsome is totally other than any possible thing can be. It is not as
though dread as “ dread of . . .” merely left it vague and uncertain what
particular things were to be dreaded: dread ( Angst ) makes manifest that
things as such are wholly irrelevant to it.

Nothing of that which is at hand and objectively present within the

world , functions as what Angst is anxious about. The totality of relevance
discovered within the world of things at hand and objectively present is
 The Basic Mood of Dread ( Angst ) and the Being of Da-sein as Care 93

completely without importance. It collapses. The world has the character

of complete, insignificance. In Angst we do not encounter this or that
thing which , as threatening, could be relevant. ( SZ, 186 )

This short passage from Heidegger’ s analysis of dread already

shows that here we are face to face with something which cannot be
fully understood by even the most serious and sustained effort of think-
—
ing naturally so, since the way in which a mood reveals is completely
different from any thinking about it. But, if Heidegger is right in say-
ing that a genuine experience of dread is rare, it seems that most of us
are doomed not to understand this central piece of the first division of
Being and Time. Is there not, we ask, some experience common to us
which could at least give us a hint of what Heidegger is analyzing here?
Perhaps we could get a hint of it by considering what the things,
which Heidegger says “ collapse ” or “ shrivel up” in dread , normally
mean to us. They are primarily the useful and indispensable things “ by
means of which ” we can do this and that. But it is not only that we can
do this and that with things; they are also primarily what we can do
something about. No matter how fearsome a thing is, we may not be
totally helpless before it; we can at least try to run away or try to do
something, as we say, to help.
But the dreadsome must evidently be of a nature we cannot do
anything about. Most of us experience in one way or another, at one
time or another, the total impotence and helplessness of “ I can do
nothing to help, ” in the face of which the things we can do something
about shrink into utter insignificance and irrelevance.
The unique power of dread lies precisely in bringing things into
the mood of total insignificance, and so making manifest that the
dreadsome is not a thing, it is not of the character of any beings at all:
it is nothing. Consequently, it cannot be found anywhere within the
world, it cannot approach from any definite place or direction in a cer-
tain neighborhood. The dreadsome is nowhere and nothing. But, as
Heidegger goes on to point out, the nowhere and nothing are not mere
nothings: in them lies the disclosure of place itself, of world itself.
This passage, it may be said without exaggeration, is a key to Hei-
degger’s whole thought, provided that it is understood precisely and
not in a vague, general way. Let us first consider what Heidegger
means when he says that the nowhere of dread discloses place itself. In
our everyday experience, a place is a definite here and a there where
we ourselves and things are at a certain distance and in a definable
direction from each other. But in every definite here and there some-
thing like a where, or more precisely, whereness, must already be
94 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

understood. In order to fix the place of a thing “ over there” at such and
such a distance and in this or that direction from us, we must be able
to relate ourselves to it, so to speak, in a “ whereish ” fashion. What
enables us to do so is the disclosure of whereness ( place ) itself. This
happens directly and elementally in the nowhere of dread. The
nowhere does not arise from thinking of all possible places together
and then negating them. On the contrary, the very indefiniteness of
the nowhere brings to light purely the where, or more exactly, the
whereness solely by itself. It is only because whereness is always mani-
fest to us that we can and must relate ourselves to the things we meet
by giving them a definite where, a place. Far from being a negation of
all possible places, the nowhere is the possibility of place. It makes pos-
sible the discovery of the place and space that essentially belong to and
help to constitute the world.
The world itself is directly revealed in the nothing of dread. This
nothing is not an absolute, total nothing, nor is it an absence or nega-
tion of all things, but the sheer other to things as such. It is only
because we in advance look beyond things to the nothing revealed in
dread that things can and must show themselves to us as a whole, as
things and not nothing. Only from the disclosed whole of things can any
single thing stand out and show that it stands in itself as the thing it is.
The solid, stable standing-in-itself of a tree, a house, a mountain is pre-
cisely what we mean when we point to it and say It really is there, it
really exists.
Heidegger’s interpretation of dread complements his earlier
world-analysis. In working out the worldishness of world, Heidegger
showed how the world is as a coherent reference-whole in which Da sein
understands himself among other beings. This understanding is only
possible if beings are given the chance to show themselves in their bod-
ily presence, in what is traditionally called their real existence. It is pri-
marily the function of attunement to disclose the presence of beings as
a whole. Each mood, it was said earlier, lifts Da-sein into the midst of
beings, which are always manifest in a certain wholeness. How and why
this is so could not be explained earlier, because it is only in his analy-
sis of dread that Heidegger takes up this problem and offers his solu-
tion of it. It is the nothing of dread that opens up the horizon from
which and against which beings stand out as a whole. Far from being a
negation of all things, the nothing is the possibility of things: it gives
things the possibility to show themselves as they are in themselves. This
possibility, in Heidegger’s interpretation , is the world itself.
Hence the world cannot be a thing, a reality that exists indepen-
dently: the world is only a fundamental way in which Da-sein himself
 The Basic Mood of Dread ( Angst ) and the Being of Dasein as Care 95

exists. When, therefore, dread brings Da-sein face to face with the world
itself, it brings him directly before his own being as being-in-the-world.
What dread dreads, the dreadsome, is being-in the-world itself (SZ, 187).
The revelation of Da-sein’s own being in dread does not happen
in a thinking and judging and making propositions about an object to
be dreaded , but in the way proper to attunement. Dreading itself
reveals to Da -sein elementally and purely his thrown being-in-the-world.
As a mode of attunement, dread is at the same time “ dread
for. . . T h i s cannot be for a definite possibility of a factical existence,
which threatened by this or that definite thing or event. Any such
is
definite threat is in advance excluded by the nature of dread itself.

What Angst is anxious for is being-in-the-world itself. In Angst, the things

at hand in the surrounding world sink away, and so do innerworldly
beings in general. The “ world” can offer nothing more, nor can the
-
Mitda sein of others. Thus Angst takes away from Da-sein the possibility
of understanding itself, falling prey, in terms of the “ world” and the
public way of being interpreted. It throws Da-sein back upon that for
which it is anxious, its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-world.
Angst individuates Da-sein to its ownmost being-in-the-world which, as
understanding, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Thus along
with that for which it is anxious, Angst discloses Da-sein as being-possible,
and indeed as what can be individualized in individuation or its own
accord. (SZ, 187-88)

The passage just quoted, and what follows immediately after, will
prove to be of central importance to the inquiry into the “ owned ” way
of existing to be carried out in Division Two of Being and Time . It is
dread as “ dread for . . . ,” as Heidegger points out, which makes mani-
fest to Da-sein his freedom for being his own self as a possibility. The pre-
eminent revealing power of dread lies in bringing Da-sein before the
finite freedom of his being-in-the-world, as the same being into which
he is already thrown and delivered.
With the exposition of the full structure of dread, Heidegger has
brought its strange and unique character into view. What dread dreads
is a thrown being-in-the-world. This has proved to be the same as what
dread is for. the ability-to-be-in-the-world. But not only that. As Hei-
degger emphatically points out, the sameness extends even over
dreading itself , which, as an attunement, is a fundamental way of
being-in-the-world. The sameness of the disclosing with the disclosed
world, to our usual way of thinking, appears to be something in the
nature of an empty tautology, a “ going round in a circle ” that can pro-
duce no results. Ontologically, however, it is precisely the sameness
96 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

that is pointed out by Heidegger to be of utmost importance. Dread

reveals Da-sein’s being purely and wholly in itself as a thrown possi-
bility of being-in-the-world. It is true that the function of every mood
is to disclose Da-sein’ s being in all its essential articulations, as exis-
tence ( self ), world, and being-in ( dwelling in , inhabiting . . . ). But
while other moods refer Da sein to beings other than himself , dread
detaches him from them and brings him purely to himself as a single
being-in- the-world.
But the uniqueness of this mood, it might be thought, is perhaps
only “ read into it ” by ontological interpretation. To prevent such a sus-
picion from arising, Heidegger calls to testimony the explanation of
dread given by everyday common sense, which , as Heidegger often
says, no one would accuse of any hankerings after philosophy. How
does everyday experience explain this mood ? In dread , it is commonly
said, “ one feels uncanny.” The German word for uncanny, unheimlich,
literally means unhomely . The seriousness of the discussion that Hei-
degger goes on to devote to this word indicates that what may seem to
be merely an afterthought to the analysis of dread will later prove to be
its very core. What does Heidegger show as coming to light in this com-
monly attested feeling of uncanniness?
First, it is the peculiar character of indefiniteness, the nothing
and nowhere of the dreadsome that is expressed by the uncanny . But at
the same time, the uncanny is the unhomely , the not-being-at-home. The
everyday familiarity with and at-homeness in the world is suddenly bro-
ken in dread . The usually taken-for-granted at-homeness comes into
the existential mode of not-at-home. This brings into view what it really
is from which the disowned way of being-in- the-world flees. It flees from
the uncanny not-at-homeness that lies at the ground of a thrown being-
in-the-world. It flees to the reassured at-homeness made public in the
explanations given by “ them.” This flight, however, has been shown to
be not merely accidental and occasional; it is constant and basic. This
means that “ Tranquillized, familiar being-in-the-world is a mode of the
uncanniness of Da-sein, not the other way around. Not-being-at-home
must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial phe-
nomenon ’ (SZ, 189).
In view of the extraordinary power and penetration of Heideg-
ger’s analysis of dread, which may absorb the reader’s whole attention,
it must be stressed that the conclusion just quoted is its most important
result for Heidegger’s central question, How is it possible for Da-sein
to understand being? What does being mean ? It is already beginning to
emerge that the manifestness of the not is most fundamental to our
understanding of being, and so to our existence as Da-sein. The not , it
 The Basic Mood of Dread ( Angst ) and the Being of Dasein as Care 97

now appears, is not originally disclosed by understanding as Da-sein’ s

ultimate possibility: it is revealed from the beginning by dread which
already tunes all fore-throw of the possibilities of a finite being. Da-sein
is not finite because he does not “ in fact ” last forever. In this sense, a
stone or a tree are equally finite, whereas Heidegger means by finite-
ness the fundamental and unique character of Da-sein’ s being. Da-sein
exists finitely because dread in advance reveals to him a not in his impo-
tent and uncanny not-at-homeness. This not is said to each Da-sein
alone, and only in hearing it can he understand “ that I already am.”
This understanding, into which a latent dread constantly tunes Da-sein,
is nothing else than the throw of thrownness. As soon as and as long
as Da-sein factually exists, he “ remains in the throw.”
These reflections, while they do no more than unfold some of
the implications of Heidegger’s analysis of dread , do in fact run far
ahead of what can come explicitly into view at the end of Division One.
Our present aim is only to understand the basic trend of Heidegger’s
thought, whereas Heidegger himself has to give the strictest evidence
for every step he takes. This makes the unfolding of his main theme
necessarily slow and laborious. Even the concept of care that Heideg-
ger is able to work out at the end of Division One is still a provisional
concept, showing the ontological structure of only the disowned
(falling) way of being-in-the-world. It is, one might say, the “ disowned”
care of being. Its main articulations into existence (self ), thrownness
(facticity ), and fallenness have already been discussed by us above ( Part
Two, chap. I, sec. 1, subsec. a ). Much of what was then obscure has
since become clear. At this stage, therefore, a short discussion of the
concept of care will be sufficient for our purpose.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF DA-SEIN S BEING AS CARE

In approaching the climax of Heidegger’s “ Preparatory Fundamental

Analysis,” it is helpful to remind ourselves of two points. The first is
that the word man gives only the ontic meaning of the essentially two-
dimensional, ontic-ontological term Da-sein. Taken in its primary and
most important ontological sense, Da-sein means the disclosed there-
ness of being. When, therefore, Heidegger says that the being of Da-
sein is care, he does not mean only that the original whole of man’s
being, which we express simply by saying “ I am , ” is to be interpreted as
care. He means at the same time, and much more importantly, that
being can only be there as care; only as a factically existing being-in-the-
world ( care ) does the illumination of being happen.
98 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

This brings us to the second point to remember. If care is the

name for the “ actual ” thereness of being, it must be the originating
source, the gathering place, of any understanding whatever of being. It
stands to reason, then, that care must have an extremely complex struc-
ture; and this is expressed by Heidegger in the formula “ being-ahead-
of-itself-in-already-being-in ( the-world ) as being- together-with ( inner-
worldly beings encountered ) ” (SZ, 192 ).
Since even this formidable concept of care will later prove to be
incomplete, the first point to clarify is what is still missing from it. This
—
can best be done by recalling the idea of being as such that is, what-
and how-being, something, nothing, and notness. As we have seen, the
what- and how-being of things, and things as such, something, are dis-
closed from the world and are clearly accounted for in the care for-
mula. The mysterious nothing has proved to be the world itself. On the
other hand, the notness that most fundamentally determines Da-sein’s
existence cannot yet be made explicit in the present formula. That is
why in the course of his further investigations Heidegger will have to
complete and reformulate the concept of care in a new way.
Let us now examine the complicated structure with which Hei-
degger presents us at the end of Division One. It is so unlike any care
we have ever experienced that it always remains strange and hard to
-
grasp: ahead-of-itself-in-aiready-being in ( the world ) as being-together-
with ( innerworldly beings encountered ). At first sight, the whole for-
mula looks extremely clumsy and alienates with its abundance of
hyphens and its parentheses. More attentively considered, however, it
will be seen to gather into itself in the most compact way possible all
that Heidegger’s inquiry has so far shown to be fundamental to Da-
sein’s being-in- the-world. The “ ahead-of-itself ” obviously indicates the
ontological character of existence. On the ground of the fore-throw of
-
possibilities, Da sein is never merely here and now like a thing, but is
constantly out beyond himself, relating himself, in the first place, not
to other beings, but to his own ability- to-be. This way of being, in
strictly ontological terms, is a being toward an ability-to-be: Da-sein con-
stantly relates himself to, bears himself toward, a possibility of his exis-
tence in a definite way. Since the care-structure we are considering at
present is that of disowned existence, the “ self ’ which care is “ ahead
of ’ is always the scattered they-self.
But, it will be remembered, the evidence on which Heidegger is
basing this interpretation was gained from the phenomenon of dread .
How and where did dread show the “ ahead-of-itself ’ structure of care?
In what dread dreads for, namely for Da-sein’s ownmost ability-to-be. At
the same time , dread brought elementally into view that the ability- to-
 The Basic Mood of Dread (Angst ) and the Being of Da sein as Care 99

be is only possible to a being already thrown into a world. The whereof

of dread, the dreadsome, showed itself as a thrown being-in-the-world.
The “ already ” expresses the inexorable facticity of thrownness, the
impotence to undo the “ that I already am.” The meaning of the whole
phrase “ already-being-in “ may be summed up as follows. Da-sein
dwells in the world in such a way that his own dwelling manifests itself
to him always as an already accomplished fact ; he can never go behind
the “ already” to originate his own being.
But, it will be noticed, “ the world ” now stands in parentheses.
The reason is that care, in the strict sense, is the structure of what
would traditionally be called the “ real existence” of Da-sein, whereas
the world is only an existential character of his being. If Heidegger
were writing an ontology of the traditional style, the world would func-
tion as a category defining Da-sein’ s being.
Similarly, “ innerworldly beings encountered ” also stands in
parentheses, but for a different reason. These beings are not Da-sein
himself, nor are they purely ontological structures like the ahead -of,
already-being-in , and being-together- with . They are concrete, ontic
beings that must be distinguished from the strictly ontological con-
cept of care, to which they nevertheless essentially belong: the struc-
ture of being-together- with directly refers Da-sein to other beings
within the world.
It is to these beings that Da-sein constantly flees on the ground of
a hidden and latent dread. In the concept of care we are considering,
the being-together-with ( innerworldly beings encountered ) means the
fundamentally falling way in which Da-sein loses himself in his occu-
pations with things. In this mode of existing, Da-sein’s being-with oth-
ers like himself has a predominantly worldish character. Hence the
“ innerworldly beings encountered ” imply other existences as well as
things. It may be noted that the structure of being-with others is not
made explicit by Heidegger: it is implied both in the “ ahead-of-itself ”
and in “ already-being-in.”
But apart from leaving the “ being-with ” others implied, Heideg-
ger’s formulation of care shows with unparalleled compactness the dis-
closure of self, world, and beings within the world as it is made possi-
ble by the structure of Da-sein’s being. The philosophical significance
of the concept of care is difficult to grasp at a glance. This is one rea-
son why the last chapter of Division One does not close immediately
after the exposition of care, but goes on to show how the perennial
problems of philosophy gather themselves in Da-sein’s being as care as
the “ place” of their origin. In Greek-Western ontology, these problems
were posed and their solution attempted on far too narrow a base,
100 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

leading to such senseless problems as the demand for “ proving” the

reality of the “ external world.” But, as Heidegger is now able to show,
all disclosure of reality and world is grounded in and made possible by
Da-sein’s being as care, which it is senseless to try to “ prove” to itself.
Above all, it is only now that Heidegger can turn to the most fun-
damental and central problem of all philosophy, the problem of truth.
In the course of Division One, this central problem has been dis-
cussed only incidentally, lacking the basis on which it could become
the main theme of interpretation. With the exposition of care, the
required basis has been gained. Accordingly, Heidegger now turns to
give an existential interpretation of truth, which it will be our next
task to consider. Strange as this will seem in comparison with the log-
ical theories of truth to which we are accustomed, Heidegger claims
that it is no more than the interpretation demanded by the oldest
insights into truth that were once alive in our philosophical tradition
but now lie buried under logic.
 VI
Truth, Being, and Existence:
Heidegger’s Existential
Interpretation of Truth

The oldest name for truth in Greek-Western philosophy is alêtheia. For

Heidegger, the central meaning of alêtheia lies in lêthê: hiddenness,
concealment, coveredness, veiledness. The a- has a privative function.
The whole word can be faithfully rendered in English by expressions
like un-hiddenness, un-concealment, dis closure, dis-covery, re velation.
Although the elemental Greek experience of truth as a violent and
uncanny spoliation , whereby things are wrenched from hiddenness and
brought out into the light to show themselves as the things they are, has
long since been neutralized and made harmless by theoretical defini-
tions of truth, a reflection of the original insight still lingers in the
English words no less than in the Greek alêtheia.
The sense in which truth is to be understood in Being and Time is
unhiddenness, disclosure, and discovery. This makes it immediately evi-
dent that the whole treatise, even when it does not mention the word,
—
is an inquiry into truth necessarily so, because truth and being belong
together. The disclosure of being that happens in and with Da-sein’s
being as care is the original phenomenon of truth itself. This original
truth, often called by Heidegger ontological truth, is the condition of the
possibility of all ontic truth; that is, of the discovery of beings within the
world in various ways and degrees of explicitness and exactness.

101
102 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

According to Heidegger’s interpretation, truth is not some reality

that hovers over and apart from Da-sein but is the fundamental event
that happens with Da-sein’ s disclosing way of being. “ To be true,” for
Heidegger, primarily means “ to be disclosing, ” and this is the basic way
in which Da-sein exists. The truth of owned existence will prove to be
the most original phenomenon of truth , but this cannot be shown until
the inquiry has been carried a stage further in Division Two. Co-origi-
nal with the disclosure of Da-sein’s own being in a world is the discov-
ery of beings within the world. These beings are “ true” in a secondary
sense: they are not discovering, but discovered , and thus able to show
themselves as and for the beings they are. A proposition, statement, or
judgment is true insofar as it discovers things, takes them out of hid -
denness, and lets them be seen in and from themselves. But whereas
traditional philosophy has for so long regarded the proposition as the
primary locus of truth, Heidegger shows it to be a far-off derivative of
original truth, whose “ locus” is the existential constitution of Da-sein’s
being as care. The essence of propositional truth has traditionally been
thought to lie in the correspondence of the proposition or judgment
with the state of affairs that is judged to obtain. Heidegger does not
reject this theory as wrong or false; his aim is to demonstrate its deriv-
ative character (SZ, 223ff., also WW, 7 ff., W, 75ff., G9, I 79ff , P, 137ff,
*

BW, 119ff.).
At first sight, it might seem to be a mild kind of criticism of the
traditional definition of truth to say merely that it is derivative. But,
it must be remembered, Heidegger is not talking about just any kind
of study; he is talking of philosophy, whose business is to go to the
original source. In its sphere, any derivation is in itself a de-genera-
tion. How is the derivative propositional truth, which Heidegger
holds to have usurped a dominant place in philosophy, further eluci -
dated by him ?
Propositions, statements, judgments, or pronouncements of any
kind are ontic phenomena that belong to language. Language, as Hei-
degger’s previous inquiries have shown, requires for its foundation
existential discourse [ Rede ) , which has been defined as the articulation
of understandability. The function of communicating pronounce-
ments is to share the already disclosed being-in, self , world, and beings
within the world with the listener and so bring him into a disclosing
relation to the things talked about. Among the many possible kinds
and modes of pronouncements, the propositions that logical theories
of truth have in view are far from being primary. This is interestingly
shown by Heidegger in a simple but illuminating example. He com-
pares the everyday pronouncement “ The hammer is too heavy” with
 Truth, Being, and Existence 103

the theoretical-physical proposition “ The hammer is heavy.” Between

these two pronouncements, there is literally a world of difference. In
the first, the discoveredness ( truth ) of the hammer is in advance
understood from the workaday world. In the second, the world in
which Da-sein lives has disappeared: this massive thing, the hammer,
is now only-looked-at from the horizon of the substantiality of sub-
stantial bodies, which can be defined , among other things, by mass
( weight ) ( SZ, Sec. 69 b ). The proposition par excellence that tradi-
tional logic has in view is of the second type. Its truth is clearly several
stages removed from the original discoveredness of things as handy
utensils, not to speak of its derivative character insofar as it necessar-
ily rests on existential-ontological foundations that make the discovery
of things first of all possible.
The proposition can be communicated both in speech and writ-
ing preserved , handed down, and handed round. It thus acquires a cer-
,
tain handy reality within the world. It is there when it is needed and
relieves us of the trouble of bringing ourselves into a primarily disclos-
ing relation to things themselves. It is only now that the possibility of
everyday hearsaying idle talk becomes fully understandable. It lies in
the nature of propositions that they preserve the discoveredness
( truth ) of things and so maintain, albeit in a secondary and derived
way, a certain disclosing relation to the things themselves.
As Heidegger’s previous analysis has shown, there is a tendency
in the hearsay of everyday idle talk to let the handy proposition entirely
take over and carry the function of disclosing and discovering, which
it does by preserving the “ discoveredness of. . .” this and that. So it
comes about that when the need arises to demonstrate the truth of
something, that is, when recourse is had to things themselves to attest
that they are such and such, what they are compared with are the
propositions whose “ property ” truth has become. If what the handy
proposition says is found to agree with, to correspond with, how the
real thing shows itself to be, then the proposition is confirmed as being
“ really” true. In accordance with the basic trend of traditional ontol-
ogy, the whole of the relation “ proposition-corresponding-with-real
thing” is understood to be something “ real.” The truth, which is
thought to be the distinctive “ property” of the proposition , itself
acquires the character of reality, and its original “ locus ” in the existen-
tial structure of Da-sein’s being is forgotten .
In Heidegger’s interpretation, however, truth cannot exist some-
where by itself like a thing, and cannot have the ontological character
of reality. Truth , as disclosing and discovering, can only be when and
as long as Da-sein factically exists. Understood in this way, it may be
104 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

said that truth is “ relative ” to Da-sein’s being. But does this “ relativity”
mean that truth is delivered over to the arbitrary invention of a subject
and to the fallibility of his thinking? This is far from what Heidegger
intends to say. Original truth as the disclosure of being, Heidegger
says, a priori determines Da-sein’s being through and through. His own
way of being is the last thing Da-sein could ever invent or think out for
himself. Truth is anything but the achievement of a subject or a prod-
uct of his thinking faculties; it is the existential structure of care that is
in advance so “ organized, ” so “ laid on,” as to make Da-sein open both
to himself and to other beings. If Da-sein is able to discover any truth
by his own efforts, this is only possible for him because he himself is let
into the original happening of truth, for which he is used and needed,
and only in being so used and needed is he able to exist as Da sein ( GE,
34ff., 59ff., DT, 62ff., 8 Iff.). It is not Da-sein who disposes of truth,
rather is it truth that disposes of Da-sein.
Just because truth is not the property or invention of Da-sein, it
in advance assigns to him the way and direction in which disclosing
and discovering can proceed. For instance, as we saw earlier, the artic-
ulated significance-whole of world ( ontological truth ) already pre-
scribes definite ways in which the things discoverable within it can
“ hang together, ” can “ make sense.” The predisclosed whole of signifi-
cance itself directs Da-sein toward . . . , refers him to . . . , other beings
in certain ways, and so enables Da-sein to take his direction from . . • >
to keep himself right by . . . , the things themselves that meet him
within his world. The discovery of things ( ontic truth ) is not arbitrary
and lawless, because it is in advance directed to bind itself to the things
themselves. This is why ontic truth must prove and verify itself in and
by the things that it brings to light.
Since, however, all the ways in which Da-sein exists are grounded
in his finite freedom, in his disclosing relation to things, he can omit
verification, he can refuse to let them show themselves as they are in
themselves, he can force them into horizons of explanation that are
completely alien to them. The seemingly obvious principle that, in an
explicit inquiry into any specific kind of beings, the way of approach ,
the method of investigation and verification, must be drawn from their
way of being and not from some preconceived notion of scientific
truth, is frequently stressed by Heidegger, who is never afraid of saying
the “ obvious” where it is necessary. In view of the widespread desire
today to approximate every explanation to the exactness of mathemat-
ics, Heidegger lays emphasis on the following points.
1. The exactness of cognition is not necessarily synonymous with
essential truth. For instance, the measurements of time and space in
 Truth, Being, and Existence 105

our everyday world are ludicrously inaccurate compared with the sci-
entific measurements of events that happen to substances in an indif-
ferent universal space (SZ, § 23). Nevertheless, statements like “ It’s a
stone’s throw away,” or, “ You can walk there in half an hour, ” are defi-
nitely understandable and perfectly appropriate to a world inhabited
by everyday care. The paths on which Da-sein carefully goes about his
business are different every day, but it is precisely in this way that the
“ real world ” is originally discovered and is truly at hand. It is , therefore,
not a priori certain that when we have exactly measured, say, the dis-
tance of the sun from the earth, and measured the sun itself as a com-
plex of moving particles, we have understood it more truly than when
everyday care discovers its handiness for warmth and light, for growth
and life.
2. The prevalent tendency to regard the exactness of mathemat-
ics as the standard for the strictness of scientific truth is vigorously con-
tested by Heidegger. Exactness, he maintains, is not synonymous with
strictness (SZ, § 32, esp. 153). Mathematics is not stricter than history,
it is only more exact, and it can be so only because the existential foun-
dations relevant to it are much narrower than those required for his-
tory. As for philosophy itself , the strictness of thought it demands can-
not be approached by any ontic science, yet its findings are in principle
not susceptible of the kind of proof and demonstration that are possi-
ble to the ontic sciences. Its method and mode of verification, as we
shall see in the next chapter on phenomenology, must be drawn from
the unique nature of its own subject matter.
Since philosophy concerns itself with being, whose disclosure is
truth itself, Heidegger assigns to philosophy the highest place among
all explicit, “ thematic ” inquiries into truth. At the same time, he vig-
orously insists that no philosophy can in principle claim to be absolute
or the only possible one. Like all explanation and interpretation, it is
one of the finite possibilities of Da-sein’s existence, and as such it
stands at the same time in truth and in untruth.
As a factically existing being-in-the-world, Da-sein stands co-origi-
nally in truth and untruth. Just as the disclosing way of existence can-
not be of Da-sein’s own making, so the possibility of hiding, erring, and
covering over cannot originally be in Da-sein’s own power. Da-sein errs,
not only and not primarily because his intellect is fallible and he can-
not in fact know everything, but because hiddenness and concealment
essentially belong to the event of unhiddenness and disclosure. It is
paradoxical, and yet understandable, that the most original truth lies
precisely in revealing the hidden as hidden. It is the recoil from this
abyss of truth that sends Da-sein back to beings, at the same time
106 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

whirling him away from himself to the things within his world. Da sein
errs away from himself, not by a conscious or subconscious act of self-
deception , nor even aware of a desire to cover over the finiteness of
existence, but because it belongs to his thrown and falling way of being.
Untruth as hiddenness, erring, and covering over originally belongs
together with truth as unhiddenness, disclosure, and discovery; the two
are one and the same event.
The existential interpretation of truth , Heidegger maintains, is
the necessary interpretation of the insight into truth that lies in our
oldest philosophical tradition and is expressed in the word alë theia.
The goddess of truth leads Parmenides before the ways of discovery
and concealment, between which the thinker has to choose by under-
standingly distinguishing the two and deciding for one. This means
that Da sein stands co-originally in truth and untruth. The same tradi-
tion, moreover, has always brought together truth and being. Par-
menides said: to gar auto noein estin te kai einai ( Fragment 5, quoted in
SZ, 212, and very often in Heidegger’s later works), “ The same namely
are apprehending and being.” Although this oldest insight into the
essence of truth begins to be covered over already in Greek philosophy,
it reasserts itself at its end with Aristotle, who can still identify truth
with being and beings, calling the latter “ the unhidden, ” “ the self-show-
ing> »> « the true.”
The logical definitions of truth that later become dominant in
Western philosophy also have their roots in Greek thought. The theory
of propositional truth is an offspring of the traditional inquiry into
beings as beings and has its rightness and validity concerning the def-
inition of the substantial being of things. This truth, however, is not
only limited and derivative but is not the most important kind of truth.
Far more important to us than a correct cognition of things is the
openness or pretence that concerns our own existence, on the basis of
which we make our vital decisions and which determines the genuine-
ness of our relations with other human beings ( WW, 22f., W, 196f., G9,
196f., P, 150f., BW, 135f.).
But it is not enough merely to define the limits of logic and its
truth, nor is it enough to go back to an older tradition and revive it.
The alë theia has not merely to be rediscovered , but has to be more orig-
inally understood than was possible at the beginning ( US, 134, G12,
126-27, OWL, 39 ). The hiddenness at the heart of the alë theia,
although elementally experienced, did not become a problem for
Greek thought. Attention turned not to the remarkable event that the
unhiddenness had happened, but to what had come to light through
this event: beings as beings. Truth, as a coming to light from conceal-
 Truth, Being, and Existence 107

ment, has been thought to belong to being. In Heidegger’ s interpreta-

tion, it is rather the other way round: being belongs to the event of
truth, which happens with the existence of Da-sein. Truth, being, and
existence are a single event, to which original untruth, as hiddenness
and erring, essentially belongs.
Finally, one point may be raised and briefly considered: the con-
crete bearing of Heidegger’s interpretation of truth on his own
inquiry. It has clearly emerged from the preceding discussions that, in
a fundamental analysis of Da-sein’ s being, the truth of existence has to
be wrested from the covering over that characterizes the everyday and
disowned way of existing. Hence the urgency of finding the right
approach to Da-sein and the proper method whereby the existential
analysis can proceed. The importance of the phenomenological
method for Being and Time is evident on every page. It is no exaggera-
tion on Heidegger’s part when he writes that his investigations “ would
not have been possible without the foundation laid by Edmund
Husserl” (SZ, 38).
 VII
The Concept of Phenomenology

Husserl’s pure or transcendental phenomenology must be sharply dis -

tinguished from all other methods or disciplines that bear the same
name.1 In a general sense, phenomenology means the study of the
forms in which something appears or manifests itself, in contrast to
studies that seek to explain things, say, from their causal relations, or
from evolutionary processes, and the like. The method of phenome -
nology is sometimes characterized as ‘‘descriptive,” but this is consid-
ered by Heidegger to be tautologous, since the concept of phenome -
nology, properly understood, already implies description.
In § 7 of the introduction to Being and Time, under the title “ The
Double Task in Working Out the Question of Being,” Heidegger gives
a preliminary concept of phenomenology, leaving the full concept to
be elucidated in Division Three. Because this division is missing, Hei -
degger’s discussion of phenomenology remains not only short but also
incomplete. It is, moreover, restricted to Heidegger’s own aims and
needs. His interpretation of phenomenology as primarily a method
that prescribes only how an investigation is to be carried out, but not
what is to be investigated, would be contested by the most distinguished
exponents of Husserl’ s thought, and above all by Husserl himself.
Heidegger introduces his discussion of phenomenology by
explaining Husserl’s well-known maxim “ Zu den Sachen selbst Γ\ “ To
the things themselves!” The “ things” referred to in this maxim , as we
shall see presently, are not concrete, material things, but the “ phe-

109
110 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

nomena ” themselves. The maxim formulates the demand that no

time- honored concepts or theories, however well proven they may
seem to be, must be taken over and made the starting point of some
constructed evidence. Only phenomena that have been originally
brought to light and been directly demonstrated as “ self-evident ” can
satisfy the phenomenological demand for truth and claim to hold a
place in the investigation.
After this first, broad characterization of the method, Heidegger
proceeds to examine in detail the two components of the concept of
phenomenology: phenomenon and logos . To begin with , phenomenon is
a word that has been used in so many senses both in philosophy and
outside it that a strict, unambiguous definition of its meaning has
become necessary.
The Greek word phainomenon means the manifest, the self-show-
ing. Heidegger defines the basic meaning of phenomenon as “ what
shows itself in itself.” The Greeks occasionally identified the phainom-
ena with ta onta , things, beings. There are, however, various ways in
which things can show themselves; it is even possible that they show
themselves as they are not , but only seem to be. Seeming is a self-show-
ing in which things look as if they were such and such, but are not truly
so. Seeming is thus a privative modification of phenomenon. Only the
positive and original meaning of phenomenon, however, is to be admit-
ted into its definition: that which shows itself in itself.
Both phenomenon, in the strict sense, and seeming , as its privation,
must be distinguished from other ways in which things can appear.
“ Appearing” and “ appearance, ” come from adparere , to come forward,
—
to show oneself that is, originally they mean the same as “ phenome-
non.” This is why “ appearing” and “ appearance” ( Erscheinung ) are
—
often used to define “ phenomenon” a practice that can lead to hope
less confusion in view of the manifold and ambiguous meanings of
-
“ appearance.” A symptom, for instance a feverish flush on the patient’s
face, appears, shows itself, but in so doing it points away from itself to
something else, to a disturbance in the organism. The disturbance, the
illness, is often said to “ appear ” in the symptom, and yet the illness
does not in the strict sense appear at all, it merely announces itself in
and through the symptom. All signs, symptoms, symbols, or indica-
tions of any kind, in which something announces itself without directly
appearing, must be distinguished from phenomena in the strictly
defined sense if confusion is to be avoided .
The situation is further complicated by yet another sense in
which “ appearance” { Erscheinung ) can be understood. It can mean an
emanation of something that itself remains essentially hidden. In this
 The Concept of Phenomenology 111

case, “ appearance ” means an effect, a product, which indicates a pro-

ducer, but in such a way that in showing itself it constantly conceals the
true being of the producer: it is a “ mere appearance.” Kant uses the
term Erscheinung in a twofold sense. In his thought, the word means in
the first place simply “ the objects of empirical intuition.” But these
—
appearing, self-showing objects phenomena in the original and gen-
—
uine sense are at the same time emanations of something that essen-
—
tially hides itself in them they are “ mere appearances.”
Without going into still further complications mentioned by Hei-
degger, it is abundantly clear that his definition of the phenomenon as
that which shows itself in itself is both necessary and right. It is, how-
ever, as Heidegger immediately points out, only a purely formal con-
cept of phenomenon. The formal concept can be deformalized by
determining what are to be taken for phenomena par excellence. One
such possible deformalization has already been mentioned with Kant’s
“ objects of empirical intuition.” These objects are phenomena in the
strict and genuine sense; they satisfy what Heidegger calls the “ vulgar
concept of phenomenon.”
The phenomena which phenomenology seeks to bring to light,
on the other hand, are of an entirely different order. Before they are
concretely defined, however, Heidegger examines the second compo-
nent of phenomenology, the logos. In the history of philosophy, the
logos has been interpreted in widely different senses, as speech, reason,
proposition, judgment, concept, definition, ground, relation. Heideg-
ger renders the logos in its basic meaning of discourse { Rede ) but warns
that this translation can only justify itself when it has been shown what
discourse itself means.
Aristotle explains the function of discourse as apophainesthai: to
make manifest that which is spoken of { De interpretation, chaps. 1-6,
Metaphysics, Z, chap. 4, Nicomachean Ethics, chap. 6 ). The inner connec-
tion of phenomenon with apophainesthai jumps to the eye. The speak-
ing phainesthai lets something be seen, shows something; apo . . . , from
itself. That is: insofar as the speaking is genuine, it draws what it says
from that which is spoken of. Speech is a demonstration, not in the
derived sense of reasoning and proving; it demonstrates in the original
sense, it points to . . . , it directly lets something be seen. This “ demon-
strative” way of making manifest, however, is not the character of every
form of speech. Begging for something, for instance, also makes man-
ifest, but in a different way.
Since the function of the logos as apophansis is to show something,
it can have the form of a synthesis. But synthesis does not mean a con-
necting of ideas, a manipulating of psychical events. The “ syn ” has a
112 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

purely apophantic meaning: it lets something be seen in its togetherness

with something, it shows something as something. 2
The generally accepted view that Aristotle assigns truth to the
logos proposition, judgment) as its original locus, Heidegger points out,
(
is quite unjustified, because it overlooks that Aristotle is thinking of the
logos in contrast to a more original way of discovering, of being true: the
aisthêsis and noein. The aisthesis , the simple, sensuous perception of
beings, always discovers, insofar as it aims at something that is genuinely
accessible only through it and for it. Thus, vision always discovers color,
hearing discovers sound , and so on . In the purest and most original
sense true, that is , always discovering, so that it can never cover over, is
the noein,. the pure “ seeing” of beings in their simple essential being.
This seeing can never be false, never cover over, although it can remain
an un-seeing, inadequate to fulfill its disclosing function.
The possibility of falsehood arises with the synthesis-structure of
the logos. When the showing of something is no longer simple and
direct, but has to have recourse to something else and show the thing
as something ( e.g., the hammer as heavy ), then a covering over
becomes possible. The propositional truth is only the opposite of this
—
covering over a distant offspring of original truth.
The meaning of logos has now been sufficiently elucidated for a
formal definition of phenomenology. Logos says: to let something be
seen from itself. Phenomenon says: that which shows itself in itself. Tak-
ing the two together, phenomenology means: to let that which shows
itself in itself be seen from itself. The concept of phenomenology, Hei-
degger says, is different from other sciences to which it bears an out-
ward resemblance, such as theology, biology, and sociology: the sci-
ences of God, of life, of human community. These latter name the
subject matter that is to be investigated. Phenomenology, on the other
hand, only names the way in which the matters to be investigated are
to be brought to “ show themselves, ” and this way has already been indi-
cated by the maxim “ To the things themselves!”
But what are the “ things” that phenomenology lets us see?
What are, for it, the phenomena par excellence? They are not the
real things we meet within the world, which are always directly acces-
sible to us and do not need a difficult and intricate method to bring
them to light. The phenomena of phenomenology must be such that
they are usually half-hidden , disguised , or forgotten , so that they in
themselves demand a special approach . These phenomena are not
beings but the being of beings. What phenomenology shows is
always “ being, ” its structures and characters, its meaning, its possi-
ble modifications and derivations. Phenomenology is the method,
 The Concept of Phenomenology 113

the way, in which being, the subject matter of ontology, can be

approached and brought to self-showing.
Just because being and its structures are usually half-hidden, or
covered over, or disguised, the phenomena have to be wrested from the
objects of phenomenology. Hence the proper method is needed to
secure the starting point of an analysis, the access to the phenomena
themselves and the penetration through the prevailing disguises, the
most dangerous of which, according to Heidegger, are those ossified
concepts within a system that claim to be crystal clear, self-evident, and
requiring no further justification.
Since being is always the being of some kind of beings, these
beings themselves must first of all be secured in the mode of approach
proper to them. This is a preparatory, prephenomenological step that
is indispensable for the analysis proper. Here the phenomena in the
vulgar sense, the concrete, ontic beings, become relevant. They are the
“ exemplary beings,” the prephenomenological soil for the inquiry
whose proper theme is being.
The prephenomenological soil of Being and Time is, of course,
first and foremost man himself in his concrete existence. But the aim
of Being and Time, as has been repeatedly said, is not merely to produce
a regional ontology of man. Its method is entirely adapted to its own
aim as a fundamental ( existential ) ontology, and is sometimes called
“ hermeneutic phenomenology” to distinguish it from the same
method applied to other philosophical purposes.
Those readers to whom phenomenology has so far been per-
haps hardly more than a name will no doubt look for some more
detailed explanations from Heidegger as to what his method is and
how it works. In the course of unfolding his theme, especially when
the inquiry enters into a new phase ( e .g., at the beginning of the
interpretation of time, SZ , § 63), Heidegger does in fact stop to
explain in detail the methodological steps about to be taken. Hei-
degger’s elucidations of his method are always important and illumi-
nating, but they do not, of course, aim at giving a simple, overall pic -
ture of phenomenology. The broad principles laid down in the
“ Exposition, ” on the other hand, are too general to be of much prac-
tical help to the reader who does not have at least an elementary
knowledge of phenomenology. Such knowledge, although not explic-
itly demanded by Heidegger, is in fact required to make his treatise
fully comprehensible. Without it, the peculiarly phenomenological
way of “ seeing, ” whereby such ungraspable phenomena as being and
the structures of being are brought to “ show themselves, ” remains a
constant puzzle to the reader.
114 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

At this point, therefore, we shall turn away from Being and Time
and attempt to take a few steps toward Husserl’s thought. This diver-
sion is necessary not only for a better understanding of phenomenol-
ogy, but, above all, for indicating the point at which Heidegger radi-
cally departs from Husserl. This departure has a profound influence
on the style of Being and Time, many of whose passages are incompre-
hensible without some insight into the controversial issues within the
phenomenological movement itself.
The divergence between the two thinkers shows itself already in
the concept of intentionality, which is the starting point and guiding
principle of Husserl’s thought. This concept can perhaps be best
approached from the formal definition of phenomenon: that which
shows itself in itself. Taken by itself, a phenomenon is evidently incom-
plete: the self-showing needs something to which it can show itself. The
“ something” which the phenomenon needs as the place of its appear-
ing is thought by Husserl to be transcendental consciousness. This
must not be confused with empirical consciousness, which is accessible
to us in simple reflection, and which is the sphere studied by the

——
empirical science of psychology. Consciousness which must always be
understood as transcendental consciousness is in turn dependent on
—
the phenomenon, since it is its very essence to be consciousness o f . . .
that is, it always goes out for an object, it aims at something, it means
something, it intends something. This basic character of consciousness
is called by Husserl “ intentionality.” In his thought, especially in later
years, “ intentional ” and “ transcendental” tend to become the same.
The unique and peculiar character of consciousness is that the phe-
nomena, the objects which it intends, are constituted by its own activi-
ties in respect of whatness ( essence, “ meaning” ) and in respect of that -
ness ( existence in the traditional sense).
It will be immediately evident to the reader that the disclosure of
being that Husserl ascribes to consciousness belongs to the existential
way of being in Heidegger’s thought. The difference is not a matter of
terminology: it is radical, and all the sharper because of the common
ground between the two thinkers. Both agree that the metaphysical
start from beings is not fundamental enough , and that the home
ground of philosophy can only be the transcendental ground where
the disclosure of being happens. Further, they are in complete agree-
ment that the “ place of the transcendental” cannot be simply one of
the realities among other realities in the world , but that the “ transcen -
dental subject” must exist in a totally different way from the merely real
object. It is at this point that the two thinkers radically diverge. Hei-
degger strikes out on his own interpretation of the “ transcendental
 The Concept of Phenomenology 115

subject.” Each thinker works out his problem in so different a way that,
in spite of many similarities and in spite of Heidegger’s incalculable
debt to Husserl, a comparison between their thought is difficult to
make. Perhaps the best way to indicate the difference is to look a little
more closely at Husserl’s problem and the way in which he sets out to
solve it.
The task of philosophy, as Husserl sees it, is to unfold all the
implications that lie enclosed in the intentional structure of conscious-
ness. The first indispensable requirement for accomplishing this task is
to develop a reliable method for gaining access to consciousness itself ,
a method that will enable us to “ see ” the immensely complicated con-
tents and activities of consciousness just as immediately as we see the
“ real word” in an act of sense perception.
A sense perception is, of course, itself an act of consciousness.
But all our naive awareness of the real world is already, as it were, an
end product of the activities of pure consciousness. These activities lie
“ anonymously” in all our empirical experience, both of things and of
ourselves as the concrete beings we are. Husserl therefore proceeds to
suspend , to “ put into brackets, ” to put out of action, everything that we
normally accept ready-made from consciousness, and so to turn the
phenomenological “ eye ” to consciousness itself. The method proceeds
step by step, by way of a series of “ reductions, ” one of which is called
the “ phenomenological reduction.” In this, the reality of the world, as
it is naively experienced by us, is suspended, put out of action, not
because the reality is in the least doubtful or uncertain but because it
is a product of consciousness, and the aim is to get those activities into
view which first of all constitute this reality.
What is it, then, that Husserl suspends in the phenomenological
reduction? Nothing less than the is. But not only the ¿5 of things is sus-
pended; the am must also be put out of action, because what we
naively experience in the I am , is the “ empirical subject, ” the concrete
beings we are in the real world. The am is no less a ready-made prod-
uct of transcendental consciousness than the is of a thing, and must
therefore be neutralized to get the contents of consciousness itself
purely into focus.
But, it may be asked, does Husserl intend to say that everything
in the world , ourselves included, is a sort of invention, a figment of
imagination on the part of consciousness? Any such thought is as alien
to Husserl as it is to Heidegger. It is not real beings that are constituted
by consciousness, but their being in respect of what and how. This
achievement of consciousness, moreover, is so little arbitrary that it
proceeds by the strictest laws, to discover which is part of the task of
116 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

phenomenology. Nor does consciousness simply invent the what and

how of things, but is dependent on receiving the “ stuff ’ ( Greek: hylê )
on which it can go to work. The first problem, indeed, phenomenology
has to solve is how consciousness can receive the “ stuff ’ it needs in
order to be able to work on it.
This problem is much more puzzling than it might seem to be at
first sight. Let us consider a real thing; for example, a red apple. A
moment’s thought will show that “ this red apple ” is totally different
from “ my awareness of this red apple.” The real apple is solid, hard,
of such and such a color and shape, extended in space, and so on. My
awareness of the apple, on the contrary, is neither solid, nor hard, nor
colored, nor shaped, nor extended in space in any way. It is evident
that this real apple, with its real qualities and properties, can never
bodily “ get into ” my consciousness, and yet must be able to present
itself to it as real, as rounded, as red, as solid, and so on. How is this
presentation possible?
It is possible through sensations, or sense data ( hyletic data),
which themselves are of the nature of consciousness and present its
activities with the “ stuff ’ it works on. As Husserl’s careful and detailed
analyses show, these sensations or sense data are already in themselves
extremely complex: they are fluid, they shade off, are variable, are
accompanied by an escort of potential sensations. These manifold and
variable sense data, however, would in themselves remain meaningless
if they were not caught up by the so-called noetic ( from nous ) activities
of consciousness, which explain their meaning ( Sinn ) by assigning to
—
them the appropriate formal categories for example, substance, qual-
ity, and the like. The noetic activities thus explain the sense data for
what they are, for example, as the color of a material thing. In other
words, they constitute the whatness, the essence of the object present
to, intended by, consciousness. But the “ what” already implies being
( existence, thatness) of some sort: this is determined by the so-called
thetic activities of conciousness, which set the mode of being of the
object as, for instance, “ certainly there, ” as well as its time-character,
for instance, as “ actual, now, present.” These manifold and complex
activities, in a process of continuous synthesis, bring forth the unified,
identical “ noema, ” the “ intended,” the “ meant” object itself in its what-
ness and thatness. The noema is, of course, not the material thing
itself, which could never be “ produced ” by consciousness; it is the way
in which a material thing can be present to consciousness.
Even this oversimplified sketch will certainly suggest to the reader
some similarities with Kant, just as Husserl’s “ reduction ” may have
reminded him of Descartes’s method. To give Husserl’ s comments on
 The Concept of Phenomenology 117

these resemblances in a few words: Descartes was the first to turn

toward the sphere of transcendental subjectivity ( consciousness ), but
he got stuck halfway. He did not develop his method nearly radically
enough ( i.e., he suspended the reality of the world, but not the I am ) .
His “ thinking subject” remained a merely empirical subject, who exists
in exactly the same way as the extended object, so that it is precisely
the transcendental achievement of subjectivity that is left unexplained.
Kant, on the other hand, penetrated further than perhaps any other
thinker into transcendental consciousness but without fully realizing
the peculiar nature of the “ promised land” he had entered, which he
could not therefore fully explore; nor could he develop the necessary
method for its exploration. Kant’s great achievement is the achieve-
ment of the intuitive leap of genius, which could not complete the
arduous, painstaking, and enormously extensive tasks involved in a sys-
tematic exploration of consciousness.
One of the first tasks of phenomenology must be to analyze all
the essential components, structures, and functions of consciousness
itself. In its first phase, this inquiry has necessarily the character of a
so-called static analysis. For the purpose of study, it must bring con-
sciousness, which is essentially a Heraclitean flux, to a standstill. This
freezing of a temporal event into immobility, while indispensable, is
artificial, and must be complemented by a genetic analysis of con-
sciousness, whose task is to show the generation of its activities in time,
and the generation of time itself in consciousness.
This rough sketch of only a small corner of Husserl’s phenome-
nology is all that can be given here without going altogether beyond
the bounds set to this discussion. Seen in comparison with Husserl, the
parallels in Heidegger’s thought are as striking as the differences; it is
as if a landslide had occurred, shifting everything onto another plane.
Nevertheless, it is precisely by venturing his own interpretation of
“ transcendental subjectivity, ” and by adapting phenomenology to the
needs of his own question, that Heidegger most dramatically shows the
potentialities of Husserl’s method. The whole of Being and Time is a
demonstration of phenomenology at work. It strikes the reader at once
with its air of vigor and self-reliance, which is in no small measure due
to the demand for original experience and self-evidence made by phe-
nomenology. No method, of course, can produce genius, but where the
two meet, the results are bound to be out of the ordinary. Heidegger
can cut through centuries of encrusted and seemingly unchallengeable
“ truths” by asking one simple question about them. At the same time,
as our exposition of Heidegger’s basic thought has already shown , he
is not out to destroy tradition. Heidegger is very far from declaring the
118 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

whole of metaphysics to have been one vast mistake, arising from an

ambiguous use of language. He shows how and why metaphysics had
to be as it is, why its language had to be ambiguous, and where the lim-
its of its truth lie. A further, perhaps incidental, but nonetheless
delightful result of phenomenological thinking is that it brings alive
those technical terms and concepts into which the original insights of
past thinkers have hardened, by showing how and from where they had
originally been drawn. As to Heidegger’s own concepts, they are not
abstract generalizations; they explain by making explicit what already
shows itself, and the only way to understand them is for each one to see
for himself what they are “ letting him see.” 3
 VIII
A Preview of the
Tasks and Problems of Division Two

The preceding exposition of Heidegger’s leading themes has moved

mainly on the level of the “ Preparatory Fundamental Analysis.” The
difficulties of bringing Division Two into the framework of a general
introduction to Being and Time have already been mentioned. Not only
does Heidegger’s inquiry enter into a new phase, but the intricacy of
this division calls for a much more closely knit study than has been
made in this book of Division One. Before moving to that more
detailed study of Division Two a short outline of the course Heideg-
ger’s inquiry takes in that division and an indication of the answer
toward which it strives will be given in this concluding chapter of the
second part of our guide. Its aim is not only to give an introductory sur-
vey of how Heidegger goes on to develop his main theme, but primar-
ily to indicate the perspective in which alone the fundamental ideas
and problems raised in Division One can be fully understood.
An extraordinarily important feature of a phenomenological
inquiry is its point of departure. How and where does the new phase
of Being and Time set in? It can only set in at the result achieved by the
“ Preparatory Fundamental Analysis” : the exposition of man’s being as
care. The incompleteness of the formulation that Heidegger can give
to this concept on the basis of his preparatory investigations begins to
show itself already on the last page of Division One. The complexity of
the care-structure leads Heidegger to ask whether the results so far

119
120 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

reached are radical enough. Have they penetrated to the last intelligi-
ble ground of the unity and wholeness of Da-sein’s being? Has the
whole of Da-sein’s being been brought into view at all? Evidently not.
Being-in-the-world is, after all , ended by death and begun, at the other
“ end, ” by birth , whereas the “ Preparatory Fundamental Analysis ” has
considered only the everyday happening “ in between.” Moreover, it is
the essential character of Da-sein that to each one his being is manifest
as mine. This is the ground of the possibility of owned and disowned
existence; but the “ Preparatory Fundamental Analysis ” has only
brought the average and disowned way of existing into phenomeno-
logical view. The incompleteness of the first phase of the inquiry has
to be remedied before it can be shown that time is the deepest origi-
native ground of the wholeness of Da-sein’s being as care, and thus the
meaning of being as such.
The starting point of Division Two proves to be the question as
to how the whole Da-sein is and how he wholly is. It is the question of
the extremest possibilities of Da-sein’s existence, in contrast to his
everyday mode of being. These extreme possibilities appear to lie, on
the one hand, in the two “ ends” of being-in-the-world that constitute its
wholeness, and, on the other hand , in owned existence, constituting
the way in which Da-sein can be wholly himself, according to his own-
most possibility. The question of wholeness and owned existence, how-
ever, is nothing other than the problem of a finitely free being.
But no sooner is this problem formulated than grave difficulties
begin to present themselves. In the first place, how can Da-sein be a
whole at all? Certainly not as a sum, or a thing, or even as a merely liv-
ing being is a whole. Da-sein can only be a whole in the way of care,
whose essence lies in its disclosing character. The task facing the exis-
tential analysis, therefore, is to show whether and how Da-sein can dis-
close to himself the whole of his being.
This task, however, seems at first sight to be impossible to accom-
plish, not for accidental but for essential reasons. We seem to be able
to get direct evidence only of the fact of the birth and death of others.
As to his own being, Da-sein cannot get behind his own thrownness, he
can only find himself already there as a thrown fact; while, at the other
end, in experiencing his own death, he already ceases to be.
These peculiar difficulties make necessary a completely different
approach to the problem from the one used in Division One. There the
existential-ontological problem was approached from the existentiell-
ontic basis of the factically existing Da-sein; here the method has to be
reversed. The first task is to find out whether it is existentially possible
for Da-sein to be a whole at all, in the way proper to his own being.
 A Preview of the Tasks and Problems of Division Two 121

This task is completed by Heidegger in a series of detailed and

closely integrated analyses, which lead to the conclusion that Da-sein
cannot be made into a whole by having an end tacked on to his exis-
tence in death , but that his being is in itself a being- toward-an-end; as
soon as and as long as a Da-sein is, he already exists in and from the
disclosed possibility of the end of his existence , to which he relates
himself in this or that definite way.
How is death, as the disclosed end of Da-sein’s being , to be char-
acterized existentially? It is the extreme possibility of the sheer ¿rapos-
sibility of being-anymore. This possibility can never be transcended by
the fore- throw of further possibilities; it is sheerly unrelational, being
singly and uniquely each Da-sein’s own; and it is certain, though indef-
inite as to the “ when.” Care thus reveals its ontological character of a
being-thrown-into-death , as Da-sein’s extremest possibility.

— —
This existential-ontological concept of death so far, it is only a
concept now demands an examination of whether a disclosure of
death is ontologically possible. It is possible, as Heidegger proceeds to
show, to an understanding which opens itself to a constant threat that
rises from the ground of Da-sein’s being, his thrownness into his
“ there.” This threat is elementally revealed in the basic mood of dread.
Understanding runs forward to this threat, fully disclosing it as the
extreme possibility of not-being-able- to-be-there-anymore. The disclo-
sure of death is thus seen to be ontologically possible on the basis of
attunement ( mood ) and forward-running understanding.
But all this is, so far, merely an ontological construction and
remains worthless unless Da-sein himself, in his ontic existence, con-
firms that the disclosure which has been postulated is possible in con-
crete experience. Where can such confirmation be found? Heidegger
finds it in what is usually called “ the voice of conscience.” That this
“ voice ” cannot be found as an observable “ fact ” by an objectively ori-
entated investigation, that its “ reality ” cannot be proved, does not
make it meaningless for the existential inquiry; on the contrary, it
shows that in conscience we have a genuine and original existential
phenomenon.
The task now is to analyze and interpret existentially the con-
crete, well-attested experience of conscience. Differently as this may be
understood and explained by each Da-sein, there is general agreement
that it is a voice that has something to say to oneself. It is, therefore,
completely in accord with experience when Heidegger sees the onto-
logical function of conscience in disclosing something, in giving some-
thing to understand, not to Da-sein in general , but to a Da-sein singly
and individually.
122 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

All the stranger is Heidegger’s interpretation of conscience as the

call of care and of what this call gives man to understand. To mitigate
its strangeness, it must be emphasized that Heidegger’s interpretation
is neither psychological, nor ethical-moral, nor religious, but existen-
tial-ontological. Its task is not to find out what circumstances may bring
about an experience of conscience, or how its voice is heard and under-
stood by each Da sein , but to show how Da-sein must a priori be, that
is, how he must be manifest to himself in his being, so that in his facti-
cal existence he can hear a voice of conscience at all, and can under-
stand himself convicted of a debt ( Schuld ) , or summoned to fulfill some
obligation he owes.
According to common experience, conscience discloses some-
thing like a debt . Like the English word, the German Schuld has a wide
range of meaning: guilt, sin, owing a debt or a duty, being indebted,
being responsible for ( guilty of ) some deficiency or harm. After ana-
lyzing the concept of debt, Heidegger comes to the conclusion that a
not is essentially implied in it. What conscience gives to understand
has, in a formal-existential sense , an essential not-character, it is nichtig,
it is determined by a not.
The central problem, therefore, is how this not is disclosed to Da-
sein, so as to make it possible for him to be convicted of a debt or of
an owing of any kind. This is only possible, as Heidegger shows,
because Da-sein is fore-goingly revealed to himself as owing his being.
He can never go behind his thrownness and let himself come, of his
own accord , into being. Not as thrown by himself but only as a thrown
fact can Da-sein ever find himself already there. It is to this not that care
calls Da-sein back from his scatteredness into the they-self and from his
lostness to things, giving him to understand that he owes it to take over
his being and be the impotent { not-potent, woi-determined ) ground of
an impossibility ( the possibility of noi-being-able-to-be-anymore ).
Strictly ontologically, Da-sein’s being as care must be defined as being
the noi-determined ground of a noiness, as “ being the ( null ) ground of
a nullity” ( Das ( nichtige ) Grund -sein einer Nichtigkeit , SZ, 285 ).
In this new formulation of care, the “ being-the-ground, ” or
“ ground-being” { Grund -sein ) comprehends in itself the whole provi-
sional care-structure worked out at the end of Division One. This, how-
ever, cannot be shown in detail in the present short preview of Division
Two. We must follow up, instead , Heidegger’s interpretation of con-
science, for, so far, the full phenomenon of conscience has not yet
come into view. If conscience is the call of care, then hearing this call
essentially belongs to it. And how does Da-sein hear this call? Simply
by being wanting-to-have-conscience { Gewissen-haben-wollen ) , by being
 A Preview of the Tasks and Problems of Division Two 123

willing to be called back to his thrown self and summoned forward to

his utmost possibility of not-being. Resolutely disclosed to himself from
the ground of his being in the possibility of his end is the way in which
Da-sein can exist wholly as an owned self.
The phenomena of conscience and owing not only provide Hei-
degger with the required ontic-existentiell basis for his inquiry, but
show at the same time that the two apparently separate problems of
how Da-sein can be a whole properly, and how he can exist as an owned
self, are one and the same. Existing in the resolute disclosure of his
thrown being-toward-an-end is the way in which Da-sein can-be-a-whole
properly, that is, in the way appropriate to his own being ( eigentliches
Ganzseinkönnen ) .
Although the exhaustive inquiry into wholeness, end, death, and
conscience may be regarded as only preparatory to Heidegger’s time-
interpretation, it is important enough to occupy almost exactly half of
the more than two hundred pages of Division Two. There is good rea-
son to think that its importance does not become fully explicit in this
division. The phenomenon of conscience and the new formulation of
care prepare the ground for finding the answer to the question, How
is it possible for man to understand being? Although Heidegger does
not expressly say so, the internal evidence compellingly points to the
conclusion that here is the basis from which Division Three would have
to start.
The immediate function of the long preparatory inquiry, how-
ever, is to lead up to the second half of Division Two. What contribu-
tion has it made to this most important part of what we have of Being
and Time? What problem has it solved and what problem has it raised?
It has solved the problem of the extreme possibilities of Da-sein’s
being. In so doing, however, it has shown that the structure of care is
even more complex than had been suspected, comprehending in itself
the phenomena of death, conscience, and owing. This increased com-
plexity makes it all the more urgent to lay bare the ontological mean-
ing ( Sinn ) from which the unity of the whole care-structure becomes
understandable.
—
The meaning of care the most original and fundamental form of
—
its unity is time . Its exposition needs for its basis the fully unfolded
structure of care, because the phenomenon of time can be originally
experienced only in owned existence. The care of everyday existence is,
of course, also grounded in time, but the time that shows itself there is
not the original phenomenon but a disowned modification of it.
Heidegger introduces his time-interpretation through the exis-
tential structure of death. How is it possible that Da-sein can under-
124 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

stand himself, whether in an owned or a disowned way, in the utmost

possibility of his existence? This is possible only if Da-sein is such that
he can come toward himself in his possibilities at all. The coming, in
which Da-sein comes toward himself in his ownmost possibility, is the
original phenomenon of the future ( Zu-kunft : coming-toward, or com-
ing- to, SZ, 325). But Da-sein can only come toward himself in his pos-
sibilities insofar as he already is; that is, is as having-been. The original
coming-toward himself is thus in itself a coming-back-to the thrown self
that Da-sein is as having-been. The coming-back-to is the original phe-
nomenon of the “ has-been ” or “ having-been ” ( Gewesen ) which springs
in a certain way from the future. Coming- toward himself in his possi-
bilities as back- to the thrown self he is as having-been, Da-sein is at the
same time meeting beings within the world: this is only possible inso-
far as Da-sein is able to present them to himself (gegenwärtigen). The pre-
sent is an offspring of the future and past.
The primary ecstasis (standing-out-of-itself ) of time is the future.
The ecstatic unity of future, past, and present is called by Heidegger
“ timeishness ” or “ temporality ” ( Zeitlichkeit ). Timeishness is not ( i.e., it
is not the presentness of a thing) , but brings itself to ripeness. It brings
itself to ripeness in bringing forth possible modes of itself as time, in
the threefold unity of future, past, and present. Original time is the
time of owned existence which comes toward itself from the end that
closes all other possibilities. Original time is thus itself closed: it is
finite time.
As against the original, finite time of owned existence, how does
it stand with the time of everydayness? It is from this existential phe-
nomenon, Heidegger tells us, that the vulgar concept of time is drawn.
Losing himself to his world, Da-sein understands himself not from his
own utmost possibility, but from his makings and doings in company
with other people, from the successes and failures he expects or fears.
In the first place and for the most part, Da-sein comes toward himself
in his worldish possibilities. The time that shows itself in this mode of
existing is not a Da-sein’s own, it is the public time, or, more precisely,
the published time of the they-self. It belongs to anybody and nobody;
that is why it is endless. The traditional concept of time as an in-finite
succession of now-points is derived from the disowned time of dis-
owned existence, levelled down and deprived of its ecstatic character,
until the original phenomenon becomes well-nigh unrecognizable.
From Heidegger’s interpretation of Da-sein’s being as “ existent
timeishness ” grow the manifold and complex tasks that occupy the sec-
ond half of Division Two. These require a close study, as indeed does
Heidegger’s whole time-analysis, of which only the first few steps have
 A Preview of the Tasks and Problems of Division Two 125

been roughly indicated here. By way of preparation let us summarize

the main problems whose solution is assigned by Heidegger to the
three long chapters ( chaps. 4-6 ) that compose the second half of Divi-
sion Two.
The first task facing Heidegger is to show that the wholeness and

—
—
unity of all the main structures of care that is, existence, facticity, and
falling are only possible on the ground of Da-sein’s timeishness. All
the essential findings of the “ Preparatory Fundamental Analysis ” are
once more analyzed and interpreted in terms of time. The timeishness
of understanding and attunement, of falling and of the everyday tak-
ing care of things, of the fundamental constitution of being-in-the-
world and the temporal-horizontal structure of world, and many other
themes are worked out by Heidegger in a long chapter entitled “ Tem-
porality and Everydayness” ( chap. 4 ).
The next chapter begins with an analysis of the owned self and its
ontological interpretation. This leads to an existential exposition of his-
tory from the “ happening” of owned existence, illuminating, at the
same time, the possibility of a genuine being-with others which springs
from one’ s own self. The problem of the first “ end” of Da-sein’s being,
its beginning with birth , which seems to have been unduly neglected in
favor of its ultimate end, now reemerges with the important theme of
taking over one’ s thrownness and historical heritage as one’s own.
While in the context of Being and Time the existential interpretation of
history stands primarily in the service of Heidegger’s fundamental
ontology, it has undoubtedly a wider than purely philosophical interest
and is considered by many readers as the central piece in Division Two.
In the sixth and final chapter, Heidegger takes up the problem of
the vulgar concept of time, the world-time in which things come into
being and pass away and in which the happenings within the world take
place. As against the views expounded by some modern philosophers
( e.g., Bergson ), Heidegger interprets world- time as a perfectly genuine
time-phenomenon, grounded in Da-sein’s everyday being-with others
and taking care of things. One of the tasks of this chapter is to show in
detail how the concept of a featureless, “ unecstatic ” time has been
derived from the “ significant” time of the worldishness of everyday
care. Parallel to Division One, where Heidegger sets off his existential
interpretation of world against Descartes’s “ extended world, ” he now
sets off the connection between timeishness, man’s factical existence,
and world-time, against Hegel’s interpretation of the relation between
time and spirit.
In the last short section of Division Two ( § 83), which is the last
section of Being and Time as we have it, Heidegger comes back once
126 Part Two: Basic Features and Problems of Being and Time

more to the central theme of the whole fundamental ontology: the

question of the meaning of being as such. Up to the point reached in
the inquiry, the question still awaits an answer. The last page of Being
and Time moves to its close with a series of questions. “ How is the dis-
closive understanding of being belonging to Da-sein possible at all?”
(SZ, 437). This question will be answered by laying bare the horizon
from which something like being becomes understandable. The origi-
nal whole of Da-sein’s existential-ontological constitution is grounded
in timeishness. This is where the possibility of an understanding of
being must be sought. Heidegger brings the division to an end by ask-
ing: “ Is there a way leading from primordial time to the meaning of
being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being? ” (SZ, 437).
 PART THREE

Division Two of Being and Time:

Da-sein and Temporality

INTRODUCTORY

Heidegger’s first concern is to survey the “ hermeneutic situation, ” that

is, the conditions required by the interpretation, as it stands at the
beginning of Division Two. This proves to be insufficient not only for
the ultimate interpretation of temporality as the meaning of being in
general but even for working out the timeish structure of Da sein’ s
being as the meaning of care. Since the results so far reached are not
radical enough, Heidegger’s first task will be to make good the twofold
deficiency of the present hermeneutic situation .
The first deficiency was already indicated in the last chapter of
Division One. It lies in the almost complete obscurity of owned exis-
tence. This came into view only for a moment in the analysis of dread;
both its existential structure and its concretization in a factical exis-
tence remain to be demonstrated in detail.
The second deficiency is perhaps even more serious. The whole
of Da-sein’ s being has not yet come into focus at all. The Preparatory
Fundamental Analysis considered Da-sein only as he exists every day
between birth and death. These extreme “ ends” have so far been left

127
128 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

out of consideration altogether. The omission is all the more serious

because the beginning and end of being-in-the-world are not mere inci-
dents that have nothing to do with what happens “ in between ” them ;
on the contrary, they constantly reach into and determine the whole of
care. Da sein as care is this beginning and this end, as well as the “ in
between.” It remains to be shown in detail that care is in fact capable
—
of carrying Da-sein’s extremest possibilities in contrast to his average,
—
everyday mode of being in itself. Until this is done, the thesis that care
-
is the original whole of Da sein’ s being remains an empty assertion.
The problem of Da-sein’ s wholeness and of his ability to be his
own self, will take up nearly half of Division Two. It may well be asked
why Heidegger added this preparatory half to Division Two, when its
subject matter would seem to assign it to Division One. A close study
of the subject, however, will reveal that it belongs much more imme-
diately to the problem of time than to that of everyday being-in-the-
world. Everyday being-in-the world draws Da-sein away from himself
and turns him to his worldish relations to other beings; hence the
problem of space comes to the fore already in the third chapter of
Division One. Something like place and space evidently belongs to Da-
sein’s worldishness. The world-time, however, in which things are and
move, change and endure, will turn out to spring from a more origi-
nal primordial time. This is the horizon from which being, in any way
in which it is understandable ( “ meaningfull ” ) at all, manifests itself.
All explicit interpretations of beings must ultimately originate in this
horizon of time, and hence the formal concept of being as such, with
all its possible articulations and modifications, must have a temporal
meaning. It is evident therefore that the more original primordial
time must be the hinge on which Being and Time “ turns round ” to
Time and Being.
The absence of the solutions that Time and Being ( Division
Three) promised to bring vitally affects the interpretation of Division
Two. It cannot look forward to the answers from which the obscurity
of unanswered questions could be, as Heidegger intended, retrospec-
tively cleared up. What is even more important, the very problem
raised by Being and Time remains obscure, for it is in the nature of phi-
losophy, in contrast to science, that the solutions it offers never leave
its problems behind , but only show them in their perennially prob-
lematic character. It is not surprising that in later years Heidegger fre-
quently has occasion to refer to the lack of comprehension that the
problem raised in Being and Time met with in the philosophical world,
and to ascribe the main reason for it to the decision to hold back Divi-
sion Three from publication. Whether Heidegger’s reasons for this
 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time 129

decision can be regarded as adequate or inadequate will be considered

in our penultimate chapter.
Our most immediate concern is how to overcome, as far as pos-
sible, the obscurities of Division Two. The first step the present inter-
pretation proposes to take is to make explicit how far Heidegger car-
ries the exposition of specific problems and where he breaks them off.
This negative side of the interpretation is important because it will pre-
vent the illusion of conclusiveness and finality from arising, when in
fact not one specific problem raised in Being and Time is carried to a
conclusion. On the positive side, however, the interpretation will go
beyond what the text explicitly says and suggest what solution may be
intended by Heidegger, or is at least compatible with his thought, pro-
vided that sufficient evidence is available for doing so. Supplementary
evidence will be drawn mainly, though not exclusively, from two short
works that immediately follow Being and Time ( WG and EM ) and that
are generally considered to belong immediately to its problematic.
 IX
The Articulation, Language,
and Method of Division Two

1 . THE ARTICULATION OF DIVISION TWO

The theme and development of Division Two was briefly outlined in

chapter 8 of this guide. Our present aim is to single out some impor-
tant details for further discussion.
One such detail is the unusually long preparatory part of Division
Two, which cuts the division into two nearly equal halves. To be quite
precise, the first part covers ninety-four pages, while the second part,
which carries the main theme, is only eighteen pages longer. Moreover,
the relevance of the long introduction to the main theme is not at all
easy to see. As a result, the reader who comes to it unprepared often
-
works through its ninety four pages with a growing impatience and irri-
tation . What, he asks himself, has all this to do with temporality? What
possible bearing can conscience, owing, ground , opened existence, and
so on, have on the problem of time? Consequently, the first thing he
may rightly demand from an exposition is to be shown that these phe -
nomena are in fact connected with Da-sein’ s timeish way of existing
and with the time that springs from it.
Let us approach this problem in a seemingly round-about way.
Let us first ask a preliminary question. Why is it, we ask, that time, the
most fundamental character that unifies and defines all being, enters
so late into Heidegger's inquiry? Why is it that in his world-analysis

131
132 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

( Div. One, chap. 1), where an exhaustive discussion is devoted to space,

we do not hear a word about time? This omission is all the more
strange because in our usual thinking we tend to couple space with
time. We talk about the spatiotemporal universe as a matter of course.
The events of nature obviously happen in space and time. Both are
equally fundamental for defining how things are and move, change
and endure. Why is it, then, that in Heidegger’ s existential analysis
space and time are set so far apart?
The reason is that Heidegger is not concerned with describing
events in space and time, but with the origin of these phenomena in
the existential constitution of our being. The existential origin of space
clearly lies in our worldishness. The world wherein we dwell and stay
near to things has in itself an essentially “ whereish ” character. But is
not time also fundamental to world ? Certainly it is, but the world is not
fundamental enough to originate time. Its place of origin does not pri-
marily lie in our relation to other beings, but in our nearness to our-
selves. Timeishness is the most fundamental way in which a finite exis-
tence comes near to and affects himself, in which he brings himself to
himself. This is why it cannot be made explicit in the first division of
Being and Time, where Da-sein’ s existence is investigated only in the
mode of falling away from himself to the world. Before the phenome-
non of time can be made explicit, its place of origin in Da-sein’ s rela-
tion to himself must be fully laid bare.
This is the task carried out in the long preparatory part of Divi-
sion Two. Attentively examined , its analyses of the extremities of birth
and death, and of the call of conscience to a resolute existence in these
extreme possibilities, all strive toward the sole end: to bring man back
to himself from his lostness to the world. They thus clear the source
and ground from which time springs. Once this is clearly seen, the rel-
evance and necessity of the introductory part of Division Two no
longer stands in doubt.

2. THE LANGUAGE OF DIVISION TWO

The aim of this section is not to list all the new terms we shall meet
in Division Two, but to select a few important ones for preliminary
study. But before coming to them , a word must be said about some
concepts already familiar to us from Division One. There is some-
times a new emphasis, a slight shift in their meaning as they enter
into the differently orientated inquiry of Division Two. This does not
call for a new German terminology, for Heidegger’ s concepts are in
 The Articulation, Language, and Method of Division Two 133

advance so chosen that they cover the whole range of meaning

required of them. Unfortunately, the range of the English transla-
tions rarely coincides with that of the original. Hence the terms most
suitable for Division One may not always be the best for Division Two
and may have to be reconsidered.
Two cases in point may be mentioned. The first is the Da of Da-
sein. It can best be expressed by “ there” in Division One , whose main
theme is Da-sein in his worldish existence, in which he finds himself
“ there” among the things in his world. Division Two , on the contrary,
takes owned existence for its main theme. In this way of being, Da-sein
no longer understands himself from the world , but relates himself to
the world from his own resolutely disclosed self. In this context, the Da
can be more appropriately expressed by “ here.”
The second case arises from the difficult concepts of das Man
and Man-selbst . The German man has a range of meaning that we can-
not express in a single word: people, they, one, and the passive voice
( e.g., man sagt , it is said ) are possible ways of translating it. Before
deciding which of these might be most suitable for Division Two , let us
briefly recall what it is we want to express. According to Heidegger, Da-
sein can exist as not properly himself , a possibility arising from his
being-with-others in the same world. In his everydayness, Da-sein is
mostly not himself, but one-of-them, one-of -the-others ( das Man ). It is they,
the others, who explain and make public how people commonly exist,
oneself -among-them (.Man-selbst ).
The composite expressions are introduced here to show that Hei-
degger’ s German das Man comprehends in itself both “ one ” and
“ them ” in an organic unity, impossible to express in a single English
word. The translator is forced to choose between several inadequate
alternatives. Much can be said in favor of “ one” and “ oneself , ” in spite
of their regrettable ambiguity, for in English “ being oneself ’ usually
—
means “ being one’s own self ’ exactly the opposite of Heidegger’s
meaning. In the first division, however, “ they” seems to be the better
choice, for there the stress undoubtedly falls on the constitutive func-
tion of “ them, ” of “ people.” In the second division, the emphasis shifts.
The pull toward the owned self becomes so strong that it affects even
the disowned self. In fact, it is only in contrast to owned existence and
in the face of the extremity of death that the “ oneself ’ emerges from
its obscurity among “ them ” and begins to distinguish itself from “ peo-
ple, ” from “ others, ” at all. In Division Two, many passages clearly
demand the use of “ one ” and “ oneself , ” while others clearly insist on
the use of “ them , ” and sometimes of “ people.” All these expressions
will be used in accordance with the demands of the text.
134 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Other terms familiar from Division One which may need rethink-
ing will be discussed as they occur in the text. We shall now proceed to
examine some new concepts of Division Two. The discussion does not
aim merely at giving a dictionary definition of them, but at showing
something of the direction in which Heidegger’s thought moves. It will
at the same time give us an opportunity to gather up the results
reached in previous studies. As Heidegger always reminds his readers,
these must be firmly kept in mind in the new phase of the inquiry.

( a ) Timeishness

Although this term has already been repeatedly used, no attempt has
so far been made to justify it as a translation of Heidegger’s Zeitlichkeit .
Considering that it is the central concept of Division Two, a smoother
rendering into English would certainly have been desirable. “ Timeli-
ness ” had to be ruled out as completely unsuitable, but “ temporality”
provided a possible alternative. In spite of several points in its favor,
the word has not been adopted here, because Heidegger has assigned
a definite role to it: the “ temporality of being” ( Temporalität des Seins )
was to have been elucidated in Division Three. There is both a con-
nection and a difference between the timeish way in which man exists
and the temporal character of being as such. To show this in an easily
surveyed form, two tables are set out below.
Figure 9.1 shows the main modes of being with which we have
become familiar in Division One, figure 9.2 the distinctive time-char-
acter that belongs to each.
Students of German philosophy may find it useful to recall that
Realit ät generally means the pure thereness ( existentia ) of things; that
is, its usual meaning is very near to Heidegger’s Vorhandenheit . The dif -
-
ferentiation between handy reality and substantial reality, at handness
or objective presence at hand, it must be remembered, came into phi -
losophy only with Heidegger’s Being and Time. The originality of his
analyses has led to a tendency greatly to overstress the importance of
“ handy reality” in Heidegger’s thought as a whole . For Heidegger him-
self, the philosophical importance of everyday utensils lies solely in
their belonging to a world, so that the reference-structure of world can
be directly demonstrated from their handy-being. This was not possi-
ble when the start was made from the substantial reality of mere sub-
stances, the common practice in Western philosophy.
For students of Kant it is especially important to note that the
German use of Realität as pure thereness ( existentia ) is comparatively
modern. As Heidegger points out, Kant himself still uses Realit ät in its
 The Articulation, Language, and Method of Division Two 135

FIGURE 9.1

Existenz (existence)

Realitä t ( reality) Sein überhaupt

( being as such )
A
Zuhandenheit Vorhandenheit
( handy reality ) ( substantial
reality )

FIGURE 9.2

Zeitlichkeit ( timeishness)
the time-character peculiar
to existence

<r- Temporalität
( temporality)
Innerzeitigkeit ( within-timeishness ) the time-character
the time-character peculiar to peculiar to being
reality as such

medieval sense of whatness, essence, or, to use Kant’s term, concept

( KPM, 84, G3, 86-87, KPM( E ), 59; FD, 164-65, WT, 212-13; W, 296,
G9, 469, P, 355). Kant’s famous thesis that “ Being is obviously not a real
predicate ” ( Critique of Pure Reason, A 598, B 626) thus means that when
we ascribe being (existentia ) to things, we are saying nothing about what
the thing is. For instance, the whatness of a merely possible spoon is
exactly the same as that of an actually existing spoon.
These tables show that the two main ways in which actual, concrete
— —
beings can be namely existence and reality are unified and determined
by their specific timeishness. Being as such, on the other hand, is not a
way in which concrete beings are, but a purely formal concept of being.
Its “ temporal” character can therefore only be a purely formal concept
of time. Hence it seems that timeishness is a better rendering of
Zeitlichkeit, in spite of the admitted awkwardness of the expression.
( b ) The Tenses of “ To Be”
A difficulty far more serious than the clumsiness of single terms arises
from the grammatical structure of English and German. In English,
136 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

the perfect of to be is formed with the auxiliary verb to have. In German,

the corresponding tense is formed with to be. What has this to do with
Heidegger’s inquiry into being and time? Simply this: if our existence
is fundamentally timeish, this must in some way always be understood
by us and articulated in our language. Without any philosophy, without
any Heidegger, we are always saying “ I shall be” and ‘T have been,” and
we understand as a matter of course our future-being and our past-
being in these words. How we can understand something like a future
and a past, and how these basic modes of time originally manifest
themselves in our existence, are questions we do not normally ask. For
Heidegger, however, these questions are central. It is in their discussion
that the grammatical difference mentioned above will prove to be an
insuperable difficulty. No amount of ingenuity can transform our “ I
have been ” into “ I am been ” ( Ich bin gewesen ). We are forced to resort
to circumlocutions like “ I am as having been.” This is obviously a much
less telling way of saying that the “ past-being” expressed in the “ been ”
is not something passed away, gone away from me, but that I am con-
stantly “ present ” to myself only in and from having been. To show even
more vividly how I am my own “ past, ” Heidegger even goes to the
length of making a present participle out of the “ been ” ( gewesend ).
Ludicrous and impossible as it would be in English to say “ I am been-
ing, ” in German the construction is entirely natural and immediately
understandable. Some of the opaqueness the reader must expect in
Heidegger’s time-analysis arises from the unalterable fact that German
is pliable in a different way from English.

( c ) Heidegger's Tautologies

Next we may take a characteristic expression of Heidegger’s: Zeitlichkeit

zeitigt sich . The unusually long discussion that follows in Being and Time
is not devoted solely to this phrase, but to the whole problem that it
represents. This problem does not concern Heidegger alone , but the
whole of philosophy. It is this: how can we speak of being in an appro-
priate way, when being is totally “ other” than beings? If we rightly say
of a tree that “ it is,” can we claim equal rightness for “ being is ” ? The
—
“ is” means being; we might as well say “ the is is ” obviously a flagrant
tautology. An equally embarrassing situation arises when we try to
speak of the characters of being. How are these to be distinguished
from those ontic characteristics that belong to beings? In our usual
descriptions of a person, for example, we say that he is fair, raw-boned,
slow in thinking, and the like. But we also say “ man is temporal.” We
are compelled to employ the same form of speech when the meaning
 The Articulation, Language, and Method of Division Two 137

is totally different. The sentence “ Man is temporal ” does not predicate

an ontic characteristic of man; it means that he exists in a timeish way.
It does not describe what certain beings are, but how existence is, how
being is.
This whole problem is touched upon by Heidegger when he
warns his readers that timeishness ( Zeitlichkeit ) does not belong to the
order of beings, and therefore all “ is” should be kept away from it.
“ Zeitlichkeit,” Heidegger says, “ is” not, but “ zeitigt sich” (SZ, 328). Zeiti -
gen means to bring to ripeness, to mature, to let arise, to bring forth.
As we shall see later, what timeishness brings forth is not beings, but
purely and solely various modes of itself. Long before we come to
understand precisely what this means, we can and do notice something
peculiar about the phrase “ die Zeitlichkeit zeitigt sich? Both the noun
and the verb have Zeit , time, at their root. What we have before us is
evidently a tautology, which unfortunately is lost in translation. It might
just be possible to say “ timeishness timeifies, ” and the meaning would
not be very far off Heidegger’s, but the expression is too forced to be
used, except perhaps in extremity. ( In their translation of Being and
Time Macquarrie and Robinson have been somewhat more successful.
They have adopted “ temporality ” for Zeitlichkeit, which enables them to
say “ temporality temporalizes.” )1
Helpful as a well-turned translation undoubtedly would be, the
really important thing is to understand why Heidegger deliberately
adopts a tautology where it could be avoided. Is it out of a childish
delight in playing with words? Or is there a sober, well-founded reason
for it? Certainly there is. Heidegger thinks that meaningful tautology is
the only way in which we can express that being is not something, but
the sheer “ other” to all beings. It may be asked, however, what in fact
this “ other ” can be? If it is not something, not anything, must it not be
nothing? Indeed, Heidegger maintains like Hegel, only for quite dif -
ferent reasons, that being and nothing are the same. All the more
important for us to remember that this “ nothing” is not a total,
absolute hiddenness. It must be manifest to us in its own way, otherwise
we could not even say “ it is nothing.” How the nothing “ is ” can be
expressed with precision only in a tautological way: the nothing
negates ( das Nichts nichtet . WM, 34, W, 11, G9, 114, P, 90, BW, 105, EB,
369). Similarly formed phrases can be found scattered throughout Hei-
degger’s works, such as: “ the world worlds” ( die Welt weitet ) , “ place
places ” ( der Raum räumt ) , “ speech ( language ) speaks” ( die Sprache
spricht ) , and so on.
Although these tautologies are introduced here for the first time,
they are not altogether strange to us. Especially the phrase “ the noth-
138 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

ing negates” strikes a familiar note, because what it says is so basic to

Heidegger’s thought that, in a different form , it had to be considered
already in our study of Division One. A fuller explanation of this
phrase will therefore give us the best chance of seeing that the tau-
tologies quoted above are in fact eminently meaningful.
If Heidegger rightly maintains that being and nothing are the
same, then the first task must be to show that the nothing negates in
—
such a way as to make something that is, beings as such, understandable
in their being. This happening is possible only because the negation dif-
ferentiates between nothing and something: Nothing not Something,
and conversely, Something not Nothing. The capital letters are intro-
duced here solely to emphasize the differentiating function of the nega-
tion ( the not ). It holds the nothing and something apart, so that from the
difference between them each can show itself, the nothing as nothing,
the something as something. At the same time, the difference holds
them together in their sheer “ otherness,” for the nothing can only show
itself as the other to something, as the “ not something, ” while the some-
thing can only show itself as the other to nothing, as the “ not nothing.”
This difference, however, is what we familiarly call the difference
between being and beings. For when we assert of something that “ it is, ”
the “ is” means purely that the something has become manifest in and
as itself. This is possible only because the something can show itself in
its difference from nothing, as “ not nothing.” This reflection enables
us to see in what sense being and nothing are the same, and in what
sense we may rightly distinguish between them. When we consider
—
being purely with regard to beings that is, as the manifestness of
—
beings in and as themselves then we rightly speak of the being of
beings. But when we consider being purely with regard to its possibil-
ity, then indeed being and nothing are the same.
At this point, however, a doubt may arise. If both nothing and
something can only appear from the difference between them, does
Heidegger rightly insist that the nothing negates? Would it not be
equally true to say that the something negates? This thought proves to
be untenable as soon as we realize that something can never disclose
nothing. All the beings in the world can never make the nothing under-
standable. The possibility lies only the other way: the nothing must be
disclosed to us in advance, and only from it can something come to
light as something, beings as beings.
Metaphysics, on the other hand , starts from beings. Its basic
question, “ What are beings as beings? ” Heidegger rightly insists, can
never radically formulate, let alone solve, the problem of being, for
beings can never explain being, something the nothing.
 The Articulation, Language, and Method of Division Two 139

Heidegger’ s tautological way of expressing how the nothing “ is,”

has so far proved to be not only meaningful but eminently precise: the
nothing negates by introducing the first differentiation between noth-
ing and something, being and beings. In so doing, however, it in
advance drives beings on to the same plane: they must and can only
show themselves as beings, not nothing. The nothing negates by unify-
ing beings into a whole. That is why Heidegger usually speaks of beings
in the whole ( das Seiende im Ganzen), and not, as would seem more nat-
ural to us, of beings as a whole.
Hence when there are beings like ourselves in whose existence an
understanding of being becomes a fact, we must necessarily find our-
selves amidst beings in the whole. Moreover, we do not merely indif-
ferently occur among other beings, but are in advance referred to
them. The nothing repels us and so turns and directs us toward beings.
This repelling and referring is grounded in a negation as denial and
withdrawal. The nothing denies us any further progress, it utterly for-
bids any further penetration into itself. The nothing denies itself as
“ something” we can grasp and hold on to; it withdraws itself from us
as a ground we can stand on. In this denial of penetrability and ground
lies the initial thrust that throws us into a world, referring us to beings
that we can grasp and hold on to, among which we can find firm
ground. The nothing negates as the inner possibility and necessity of
world, which essentially belongs to our being. When we ask about the
“ world itself, ” we are asking precisely about the last intelligible ground
of its possibility and necessity.
But the world of a factical existence , as we know from Divi-
sion One, has a richly differentiated structure and is altogether a
highly defined phenomenon. Has this anything to do with the cen-
tral event that the nothing negates? We may say in anticipation that
it has, although it cannot yet be shown how and why. As the fol-
lowing study will try to show, the nothing negates in certain defi-
nite ways , and all these ways have the character of notness, that is,
of denial and withdrawal. The nothing gives us no ground to stand
on , no place to stay in, no time for further possibilities. As we shall
see, in these various ways of negating, denying, and withholding,
lies the ultimate disclosure of these irreducible characters time —
—
the most fundamental among them whereby we can articulate and
define being.
What we do know already is that the world, as a highly articulated
and defined phenomenon, has a unique function in the disclosure of
being. This function is that only in and from the world can any con-
crete beings meet us and be distinguished according to what they are
140 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

and how they are. The articulations of “ what ” and “ how ” were first
brought to our attention by Heidegger’s idea of being: what- and how-
being, something, nothing, and notness. The something, or more pre-
cisely, to-be-something, can be further differentiated into how-to-be
and what-to-be. But, as we can now see more clearly, all these articula-
tions of being are still only empty, formal concepts, devoid of any real
content. To enable us to fill these empty forms with concrete content
that is, to enable us to find ourselves among other beings and so dis-
—
tinguish ourselves from them , our own mode of being from theirs is
the unique function of world. It is the uniqueness of world that finds
—
expression in the phrase “ the world worlds.”
Heidegger’s tautologies, which at first seemed forced or mean-
ingless, have now proved to be highly appropriate to those phenomena
that belong to the disclosure of being. These are not an absolute noth-
ing, nor, on the other hand, can they “ be” in the same way as beings
are. Each of these phenomena, moreover, has a distinctive and unique
function in unifying, articulating, and defining being, which cannot be
replaced by anything else. They are identical only with themselves; they
are the strictly understood “ identities.” But there is still a further point
that Heidegger expresses by his tautologies. This can best be exempli-
fied by the last two tautologies, which were mentioned above but which
we have not yet discussed.
Heidegger says der Raum räumt, “ place places.” First of all a word
must be said about the English rendering, for it could be objected to
on the ground that Raum means space, while the German for place is
Ort or Platz . Nevertheless, the paraphrase comes as near as possible to
Heidegger’s meaning, because the everyday world, where something
like space first becomes accessible to us, has primarily a place-charac-
ter. This is very different both from the levelled-down space of a theo-
retically defined nature, and from the formal space accessible to a pure
intuition ( looking-at ). What a geometrician “ looks at” are not things in
space, but purely space itself and its properties. The everyday world, on
the other hand, is primarily “ placeish, ” for the essential reason that our
being-in-the-world is a staying-in , a dwelling-in. Hence the world, as the
wherein of our everyday staying and dwelling, is familiar to us as the
dwelling place, the home.
Granted, then, that the phrase “ place places” comes close to Hei-
degger’s meaning, what does it tell us? It tells us that only because some-
thing like place belongs to the disclosure of being can we understand
ourselves as occupying a place in a world and direct things to their
places within it. Place itself, as a character of being, “ gives ” us place, that
is, makes the discovery of place and space first of all possible.
 The Articulation, Language, and Method of Division Two 141

Similarly, it is speech that articulates our understanding of being

and brings it to word in language. Primarily, therefore, it is language
that speaks, and we speak only because we are in advance called into
voicing the disclosedness of being. Language is not a tool, not an
instrument of the subject, not a human invention. It is the other way
round: we can be human only because the gathering and preserving of
truth in language is our uniquely human vocation.
Let us sum up briefly what has emerged from our discussion of
Heidegger’s tautologies. First, they are called for by the phenomena
themselves, insofar as these belong to being and cannot therefore “ be ”
in the same way as beings. Second, each of these phenomena has a dis-
tinctive and unique function that can best be expressed in a tautology.
Third, the tautologies impress on us that these phenomena, although
they manifest themselves only in our existence, are not the arbitrary
invention of a subject or in any way the product of our “ subjectivity.”
The whole of this discussion arose from the still obscure phrase
“ timeishness brings itself to ripeness” ( “ timeifies, ” “ temporalizés ” ). Its
aim was to prepare an understanding for this phrase when we meet it
in the text of Division Two. At the same time, it helped to clarify the
problem of how being “ is, ” and to carry forward the exposition of the
central problem of the “ nothing.”

( d ) Primordial Time ( Urspr ü ngliche Zeit )

Heidegger calls the timeishness of owned existence “ primordial” or “ orig-

inal” time. In Heidegger’s usage, ursprünglich has a twofold meaning.
First, it is applied to what originates, what gives rise to something.
Second, it is applied to something that springs straight from the origin
and remains near its source. Accordingly, owned existence originates
the time that remains near its source in the finiteness of man’s being.
In contrast to this, disowned existence originates the time that falls
away, runs away from its finite origin, giving rise to the vulgar concept
of an infinite now-time.
How all this happens will gradually come to light in Division
Two. What can be usefully done at this point is to remove the misgiv-
ings we all feel in the face of an interpretation that denies an “ objec-
tive existence ” to time and explains it as a “ subjective, ” that is, an exis-
tential phenomenon. It is interesting to note that in his introduction to
the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason Kant points to this dif-
ficulty as the stumbling block that even his most attentive readers
found hardest to surmount. The difficulty can be simply stated as fol-
lows. The natural universe, we would argue, was there long before man
142 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

and presumably will be there long after man has disappeared; it is com-
pletely independent of him. But how can the universe endure and
change except in time? If time were merely our “ subjective ” way of
apprehending, unifying, and ordering events, the independent exis-
tence of an “ objective world ” would be completely inexplicable.
This difficulty arises, in the last resort, from our tendency to con-
fuse being with beings. Let us ask once more, What does it mean that
a thing, for instance, that tree over there, is ( exists)? It means that it is
manifest to us precisely as that tree, a thing completely independent of
us, a thing in its own right. Hence when no man exists and an under-
standing of being is no longer possible, the tree itself will not cease to
endure and change, but it will no longer have the chance of manifesting
itself as enduring and changing, that is, as being in time. The objec-
tions to an existential interpretation of time prove to be untenable
when time is understood as a fundamental character that defines
being, and being means the manifestness of beings in and as themselves.

( e ) The " Originality " of an Ontological Interpretation

In introducing Division Two Heidegger explains that he is not yet
ready to interpret the meaning of being as such, or even able at this
stage to interpret the meaning of Da-sein’s being ( care), because the
analysis carried out in Division One lacks originality . If we understood
“ originality ” in the vague sense of “ novelty, ” the professed lack of it
would indeed be surprising. As things are, Heidegger clearly means
that Division One has not yet penetrated deeply enough into the struc-
ture of care. In order to do so, the inquiry must show that care is capa-
ble of explaining the whole of Da-sein’s being, from its beginning with
birth to its ending with death. Further, the concept of care must be
—
able to explain the unity of Da-sein’s being that is, how such very dif -
ferent ways of existing as owned and disowned existence can both orig-
inate in and receive their possibility from the one basic structure of
care. When all this has been shown, Heidegger’s existential inquiry will
have gained the required “ originality.”

3. THE METHOD OF DIVISION TWO

The phenomenological demand for evidence puts Heidegger’s powers

to a severe test in Division Two. Its very subject matter seems to deny
any concrete foothold to the inquiry. To take only one example, Hei-
degger’s task is to work out the difference between the owned and the
disowned ( falling ) ways of existing. This difference is not of the same
 The Articulation, Language, and Method of Division Two 143

order as, say, the psychological one between timidity and aggressive-
ness, introversion and extroversion, and so on. These psychological dis-
positions can well be documented by characteristic modes of behavior.
The basic ways of existing, on the contrary, can never be so concretely
demonstrated . It is doubtful whether in any specific instance we can
know with any certainty in what way Da-sein exists.
How, then , does Heidegger set about his task ? His main foothold
lies in those characters of everyday existence that have already been
analyzed and secured in Division One. In this way of existing, as has
been shown, Da-sein falls away from himself by fleeing from a threat that
constantly pursues him. Owned existence, therefore, must lie in a res-
olute turning toward the threat that overtly or covertly determines Da-
sein’s being. The basic characters of owned existence can be shown by
going counter to the trend dominant in the falling way of existing, some-
what on the principle that by going against the stream we are bound to
arrive at the source.
This method, it may be remembered, is first employed in the
exposition of Da-sein’ s being as care ( Div. One, chap. 6 ). There it is
deeply impressive because it is based on the elemental experience of
dread. If it becomes less impressive in the analysis of owned existence,
the weakness lies not so much in the method as in the basis from which
Heidegger is compelled to start. In working out the existential concept
of death, for instance, much emphasis is laid on the everyday tendency
to explain away death by making it into a fact like other facts. What
troubles us is whether it is the whole truth, whether Heidegger is not
forced to underplay everyday existence in order to show how owned
existence must be.
On the other hand, it must be recognized that the basis on which
the inquiry must rest is strictly prescribed by Heidegger’s aim. The aim
is to explain the meaning of being by penetrating to the inmost possi-
bility of our understanding of being. All the ways in which we can expe-
rience ourselves, other beings, and things in general, are in advance
determined by that understanding. The ground of its possibility can
therefore only lie in our being itself and not in any circumstances extra-
neous to it. The solid facts and conditions in which other kinds of
inquiries can find a firm footing are not only irrelevant but inadmissi-
ble to Heidegger’s. All his evidence must be drawn purely from Da-
sein’s existence and how this is manifest in his understanding.
A few words have to be said about the method to be adopted for
the exposition of Division Two. Generally speaking, the importance of
following the development of the main argument cannot be over-
stressed. This implies a corresponding firmness in passing over details
144 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

of great interest that are not absolutely essential to the main move-
ment. This principle of exposition, however, is greatly affected and
modified by the overriding consideration that Being and Time is an
unfinished work that demands unusual methods. The normal and sim-
ple way would be to take the reader through to the end, then come
back to those difficulties and obscure passages that can be illuminated
only from the end. Since the absence of Division Three makes this
impossible, the expositor is forced to devise ways of mitigating its
absence as far as possible. The method adopted in this guide is to pay
special attention to those central themes that Heidegger leaves half fin-
ished in Division Two, obviously intending to complete their interpre-
tation in the third division. These will be discussed in great detail and,
where it is possible, suggestions will be made about their final place
and function in the solution of Heidegger’s ultimate problem.
 X
Dasein’ s Possibility of Being-a-Whole
and Being-toward -Death

1 . CAN DA-SEIN BE EXPERIENCED AS A WHOLE?

At the end of Division One, Heidegger formulated the unity of exis-

tence, facticity, and falling in the single concept of care. According to
this, Da-sein is ahead-of-himself-already-being-in ( a world ) as being-
together-with or being-near-to ( beings met within the world). The pri-
mary structure of care, the “ ahead-of-himself ” now raises the doubt
-
whether Da sein can ever be a whole in the sense of having reached
completeness. The “ ahead-of-himself ” seems to say clearly that Da-sein,
as long as he factically exists, is essentially “ beyond ” himself as he
already is. Existing for the sake of himself, he constantly relates himself
to his possibilities, to what he is not yet but can become. Even when Da-
sein is sunk in hopelessness, when he expects nothing more from “ life,”
when he is ready for anything, he is still not cut off from his possibili-
ties. Hopelessness, despair, and disillusionment are specific ways in
which Da-sein can relate himself to his possibilities. His ability to
become what he is not yet belongs so essentially to his being that when
he is no longer “ ahead of himself , ” he is no longer here at all. The
moment there is nothing more “ lacking” or “ missing” from his being-
in-the-world, he has already ceased to be. His ontic existence in a world
can then no longer be experienced and so the necessary basis for an
existential interpretation cannot be secured.

145
146 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Nevertheless, the problem of Da-sein’s wholeness must not yet be

given up as hopeless. It is possible that what appears to be the essential
“ unwholeness” of care arises from a notion of completeness and end
which may be appropriate to things, or even to other living beings, but
not to Da-sein. Two problems have therefore to be examined. First,
whether Da-sein can indeed be a whole in his ontic, factical existence, and
how his wholeness can be understood from his end in death. Second, how
Da-sein’s “ end ” and “ wholeness” are themselves existentially constituted.

2. EXPERIENCING THE DEATH OF OTHERS

The wholeness Da-sein reaches in death is the transition to his no-

more-being-here. Death itself denies him the possibility of experienc-
ing this transition and understanding it from his own experience. But
although this is his situation with regard to himself , all the more
impressive and deeply experienced is the death of others. Since Da-sein
is essentially in a world with others, does death not become “ subjec-
tively” accessible through them? Can the death of others not provide
the phenomenal basis for ontological interpretation?
The death of another is undoubtedly his end and the transition
to his no-longer-being-in-the-world. For those who are left behind, how-
ever, he has not totally vanished. His body is still with them in their
world. It is taken care of and honored in funeral rites and the cult of
the burial ground. Even in death, Da-sein is “ more ” than a material
thing or the lifeless body of a merely living being. The bereaved stay
with him in sorrowful remembrance and care for him in reverence. But
in such remembering and staying with the dead, the dead person him -
self is no longer factually in “ our world.” Experience of another’s death
reveals it as a loss suffered by those who are left behind, not as the loss
of his being suffered by the dead himself.
A careful analysis shows that another’s death is incapable of pro-
viding the genuine experience on which alone an ontological interpre-
tation could be based. What this interpretation wants to get into view
is solely the death of the dying, his coming to the end of his being, not
the affliction this brings to others, nor the way he may still be with
them in this world.
The attempt to find a substitute for a genuine experience has
failed because it has overlooked the way of being that distinguishes Da-
sein from other beings. It is assumed that a Da-sein could be substi-
tuted and replaced by another, so that what he could not experience in
himself could become accessible in and through another.
 Da sein s Possibility of Being-a-Whole and Being-toward -Death 147

In the everyday world, it is true, one Da sein can and often must
substitute for another. In the business of taking care of the world , one
is what one does. The interchangeability of one with another in a mutu-
ally undertaken making and doing is not only possible, but is constitu-
tive of the everyday self. But all substitution fails when it comes to
dying. A Da-sein can die for another, but this does not in the least
relieve the other of his dying. Each Da-sein must take his death upon
himself. It is his utmost possibility in which his sheer ability to be is at
stake ( es geht um ). Death is a purely existential phenomenon, consti-
tuted by existence and mineness. Existence is the being that is manifest
to each of us as mine. This being that is mine is for me constantly at
stake. Death is only as the end of my existence; it is essentially my dying.
It can therefore never be a happening, a within-worldish occurrence.
That is why the substitution of another’s death for mine had to fail.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the preceding analysis is not nega-
tive. shows positively that the wholeness constituted by “ ending” in
It
death is an existential phenomenon. It can be explained only from the
existential structure of an existence, which is essentially my existence. If
the “ end ” itself is to be appropriately grasped, it can only be done in
an existential concept of death. Concepts of “ end ” and “ wholeness”
drawn from other modes of being are incapable of explaining the end-
ing of an existence. Even the extinction of life in a purely living being
must be distinguished from the existential phenomenon of death.

3. INCOMPLETENESS, END, AND WHOLENESS

The principal results of the preceding analyses are summed up by Hei-

degger in three points: 1. An “ unwholeness” essentially belongs to Da -
sein, insofar as he is not yet what he can become. The not-yet indicates
something like a constant “ lack ” in his existence. 2. The not-yet is elim-
inated only when Da-sein himself comes to his end. This has the char-
acter of a no-longer-being-here, i.e. of a sudden and total overturning
of his mode of being. 3. His coming to an end is a way of being in
which each Da-sein is sheerly uninterchangeable.
Further analysis will reveal, however, that some of the interpreta-
tions that first suggested themselves are not tenable. To begin with ,
does the not-yet that belongs to existence truly imply the “ lack ” of
something that can be fetched from elsewhere outside Da-sein himself ?
Can this “ something” be gradually added to him so that his incom-
pleteness is, by and by, filled up? This sort of completing belongs only
to things that are made up of parts; for example, a required amount of
148 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

money is not yet put together. The money at hand is not sufficient to
pay a debt. The amount still lacking is not simply nonexistent: it is a
handy thing in the mode of unhandiness. When it becomes available
and the whole sum is put together, it still retains the character of hand-
iness. Da-sein, on the other hand, is not “ all together” when his not-yet
has been completely “ filled up.” On the contrary, he is then no longer
here at all. Clearly, Da-sein cannot be made into a whole like a handy
thing whose wholeness is the sum of parts.
But even among things, the not-yet may indicate different ways of
incompleteness. The moon, for example , is not yet full. With the grad-
ual withdrawal of the covering shadow, the not-yet diminishes until the
moon is full. But obviously, the full moon has been there all along, and
the not-yet-full applies only to our perception , not to the moon itself.
As for Da-sein, however, his not-yet is not only inaccessible to percep-
tion, it is not yet “ there” at all.
The problem of Da-sein’s wholeness is whether he himself can be
his not-yet, that is, be what he becomes. A comparison must therefore
be drawn with other living beings, to which a “ becoming” evidently
belongs. An unripe fruit, for example, goes toward its ripeness. That it
is not-yet can in no way be added to it from outside. The fruit itself
brings itself to ripeness. This “ bringing itself ’ is the way of its being. If
the not-yet-ripe fruit could not of itself come to ripeness, nothing out-
side it could ever eliminate its not-yet. In contrast to this, the incom-
plete sum can only be completed by having parts brought to it. Accord-
ing to its own way of being, the sum is totally indifferent to what is still
lacking from it, or more precisely, it can neither care nor not care for
its own completeness. The fruit, on the contrary, cannot be indifferent
toward its ripeness, for only in ripening can it be unripe. The not-yet is
already drawn into its being. Similarly, Da-sein is, as long as he is,
already his not-yet.1
But although the comparison with the fruit has brought out
essential similarities, there are also important differences that arise
from the “ end ” that constitutes the wholeness. Ripeness as an end is
not analogous to death as an end. In ripeness the fruit fulfils itself.
Death, on the other hand, does not necessarily mean that Da-sein has
come to the end of his specific possibilities. Da-sein may die unfulfilled
long after he has reached and passed the maturity possible for him.
End does not necessarily imply fulfilment. In what sense, then, can
dying be understood as an ending?
Things can end in different ways, according to their specific ways
of being. The rain ends: it stops, it vanishes. The road ends: it stops,
but it does not vanish. On the contrary, its end shows the road to be
 Daseins Possibility of Being-a-Whole and Being-toward-Death 149

precisely this one and no other. Then again, end may mean being fin-
ished: with the last stroke of the brush, the painting is finished. The
bread is at an end: it is used up , no longer available as a handy thing.
Dying is not an ending in any of these senses. In death Da-sein is
neither fulfilled, nor has simply vanished, nor is finished, nor at an
end like a handy thing that is no longer available. For just as Da-sein is
constantly his not-yet, so he is always already his end. Ending as dying
does not mean that Da-sein is at an end, but that he is to ( or toward )
an end ( Sein zum Ende ). Death is a way of being that Da-sein takes over
as soon as he is. “ As soon as a human being is born , he is old enough
to die right away ” (SZ, 245 ).
The obscurity of Heidegger’s Sein zum Ende , later to be defined
as Sein zum Tode , is aggravated by the difficulty of rendering it into
English The exact translation , “ being to the end,” and “ being to
.
death, ” must remain ambiguous ( and even misleading ) until its mean-
ing can be more fully grasped. The alternative rendering of “ being
toward an end ” ( “ being toward death” ) is less exact but perhaps less
misleading, and can be used with advantage in many contexts.
At the present stage, nothing could be gained from further verbal
explanations. Heidegger’ s own phrase, though verbally clearer, is
hardly less obscure than the translation. It cannot be more at the
moment than an empty formula, a statement of the problem: How can
man be his end ? How can his wholeness be constituted by his end? This
new formulation of the problem nevertheless represents an important
turning point in Heidegger’ s inquiry. It closes the first stage of a ten-
tative approach. The attempt to grasp Da-sein’s wholeness by starting
from his possibilities, from what he is not yet but can become, has
ended in failure, for Da-sein cannot become a whole by having bits and
pieces added to him. It is now clear that if Da-sein can be a whole at all,
he can be so only from his end. All his other possibilities which lie
before his death can be understood only from the ultimate possibility
of his end.
The direction of the inquiry must therefore be entirely reversed.
It must start from the end that constitutes the wholeness. How strange
and radical the course that Heidegger now proposes to take is best seen
from the fact that Da-sein’s beginning in birth has so far not even been
considered. What would seem to us the natural course to take, to start
from the beginning, is tacitly passed over by Heidegger. The implica-
tion is that even the beginning, the birth, can be understood only by
coming back to it from the end.
The results of the inquiry alone can show whether the course on
which Heidegger sets out is justified . What has been shown so far is
150 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

that Da-sein’ s end in death and the wholeness constituted by it cannot

be explained except from his own way of being. The inquiry is thus
compelled to turn to the fundamental structure of care for guidance.
Nothing else can offer a basis for the solution of the problem, assum-
ing that it is soluble at all.

4. THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS OF DEATH IN

CONTRAST WITH ALL OTHER KINDS OF INTERPRETATION

The existential analysis of death is preceded by a short preparatory sec-

tion. Its task is to make explicit what this analysis aims at and what does
not belong to its sphere, and so to contrast it with other inquiries into
the same phenomena.
First and most obviously, death is investigated by those ontic sci-
—
ences which concern themselves with life biology, physiology, medi-
cine, psychology, and so on. Death in the widest sense is a phenome-
non of life. Living must be understood as a way of being to which a
being-in-the-world belongs.2 Its ontology must start from an ontology of
Da-sein and proceed by a privative ( reductive ) method. Da-sein himself
can be regarded purely as a living being, and enrolled into the plant
and animal world. His death may then form part of the subject matter
of those sciences for which the end of life, its connection with growth
and procreation, its causes and ways, and so on, is a relevant study.
In all such ontic inquiries, however, definite ideas of life and
death are already at work. These must be existentially analyzed and
interpreted. A first step is to make a strict distinction between the var-
ious ways in which life can end. A purely living being ends in perishing
( Verenden ). Da-sein himself has an ontic-physiological end, which may
be called “ decease ” ( Ableben ). Dying in the strict existential sense, on
the other hand, must be understood as the way of being in which Da-
sein is to his end. Accordingly, Da-sein never perishes, and he can cease
to live ( decease ) only as long as he is dying. The medical-biological
investigation of decease can be ontologically relevant, but only if the
basic existential analysis of death has first been secured. Or must all ill-
ness and death be regarded as primarily existential phenomena, even
from the medical point of view?
Furthermore , the existential interpretation of death goes
before all biographical-historical and anthropological- psychological
investigations. All of these necessarily presuppose a definite concept
of death. It is revealing that psychological studies of the problem of
death , anthropological investigations of primitive death cults, and
 Dasein's Possibility of Being-a-Whole and Being-toward- Death 151

so on , usually throw far more light on the life of the living than on
the death of the dying.
But just because of its ontological precedence, the interpretation
of death as the “ end ” of being-in-the-world does not and cannot make
any ontic decisions about what happens “ after death,” whether a higher
or lower way of being is then possible, whether Da-sein lives on or some
kind of immortality is possible for him. It is as much outside the sphere
of an ontological interpretation to come to ontic decisions about a
“ world beyond ” as it is to come to such ontic decisions about this pre-
sent world . It remains entirely “ this worldly” in the strict sense that it
interprets death solely insofar as it constantly stands before and
reaches into the factical existence in the world.
Finally, the sphere proper to an existential analysis of death
excludes questions which Heidegger sums up under the title of a
“ metaphysics of death.” Such questions are, for example, how death
“ came into the world, ” and what meaning it has in the all of beings as
evil and suffering. Metaphysical deliberation about these questions
already presupposes not only an existential concept of death, but also
an ontological understanding of the all of beings, and especially of evil
and negativity.
From an ontic point of view, the results of the following analysis
will show the peculiar formality and emptiness that characterizes all
ontological interpretations. On the other hand , the rich and complex
structure of the” end ” as the preeminent possibility of existence will
come all the more sharply to light. The urgent problem facing the
analysis is how to guard against arbitrary and preconceived ideas of
death. It proposes to meet this danger by keeping in view how death
concretely reaches into Da-sein’s everyday existence, whose essential
characters have been analyzed and secured in the first division.

5 . A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE

EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF DEATH

Dying as a way of being is grounded in care. Care is the unity of Da-

sein’s existence ( ahead-of-himself ), facticity ( already-being-in-the-
world ), and falling ( being-near-to-things ). These fundamental charac-
ters of Da-sein’s being, as the present analysis will show, come most
sharply to light in death.
The preceding inquiry has conclusively established that in being
ahead-of -himself ( not yet ), Da-sein is not “ lacking” in anything that
could be added to him from outside. His utmost not-yet has the char-
152 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

acter of something to which Da-sein relates himself { sich verhält ) . Here

Heidegger gives us a first hint of how the obscure phrase “ being to ( or
toward ) an end ” should be understood. The “ to ” or “ toward ” indicates
a relation: Da-sein constantly bears himself toward, brings himself
before , a possibility of his being which is its utmost. In English, we
might simply say that Da-sein constantly comes face to face with his
end. The ultimate not-yet has the character of something that stands
before man ( Bevorstand ).
This, however, is not a precise enough definition of death , for
—
many other possibilities can “ stand before us” for example, the
rebuilding of a house, the arrival of a friend. These are handy or real
things, or other existences. In a different way, a journey may stand
before us, or a showdown with others, or the renunciation of some-
thing we ourselves could be, possibilities of our own that are
grounded in our being together with others. None of these is com-
parable with death.
The positive characterization of death , which Heidegger now
proceeds to give, is so important that it will be rendered almost in
full in the next three paragraphs, with the addition of a few explana-
tory remarks.
When it comes to dying, it has already been shown, each Da-sein
is sheerly uninterchangeable. In death, therefore, each Da-sein stands
before himself in the possibility that is most his own. It is his sheer
being-in-the-world that is at stake. His death is the possibility of his no-
more- being-here. This belongs solely to his own self and refers him
wholly to his own ability-to-be. Standing before himself in this way, all
his relations to other beings are loosened. His ownmost, unrelational

— —
possibility is at the same time his utmost. Da-sein cannot pass that is,
outstrip, outdistance the possibility of death in his own abilitv-to-be.
Death is the possibility of the sheer impossibility of being-able-to-be-
here. Death thus reveals itself as the ownmost, unrelational, unover-
takeable possibility. As such, it stands before Da-sein in a preeminent
way. It is existentially possible only because Da-sein is disclosed to him-
self in the way of being ahead-of-himself. This primary structure of care
concretizes itself most originally in a being toward death as the pre-
eminent possibility of existence.
This ownmost, unrelational, and impassable possibility, however,
is not acquired by Da-sein incidentally in the course of his being. On
the contrary, when Da-sein exists, he is already thrown into this possi-
bility. That he is delivered over to death is not in the first place a mat-
ter of an explicit or theoretical knowledge, but reveals itself more orig-
inally and penetratingly in the mood of dread . The dread of death is
 Dasein's Possibility of Being-a-Whole and Being-toward -Death 153

dread of Da-sein’s ownmost, unrelational , and impassable possibility.

The “ whereof ’ of dread is being-in-the-world itself. The “ for” of dread
is the sheer ability-to-be-in- the-world. Fear and dread, as Heidegger has
already shown in Division One, are not the same. A distinction must be
sharply drawn between fear of the ontic, biological “ end of life”
( decease), and dread as the basic mood which discloses that Da-sein as
a thrown being exists to his end. The existential concept of dying can
now be more fully defined as a thrown way of being toward an utmost,
unrelational, unovertakable possibility. As such, it is radically different
both from a pure vanishing and a mere perishing, as well as from a
ceasing to live.
Coming face to face with death is not an occasional “ attitude” in
certain individuals, but essentially belongs to Da-sein’s thrownness,
which reveals itself in attunement (feeling, mood ). Attunement dis-
closes always in this or that definite way. Hence a factical existence can
relate himself to his death in different ways. The fact that many do not
“ know ” about death is no proof that Da-sein does not universally relate
himself to it, but only that in fleeing from it, he usually hides it from
himself. Da-sein factually dies as long as he exists, but mostly in the
everyday way of falling captive to his “ world.” His absorbed occupation
with things reveals the flight from his uncanny not-at-homeness, that
is, from his being toward death. This being is constituted by existence,
facticity, and falling. The ontological possibility of death is grounded
in Da-sein’s being as care.
But if a being toward death originally belongs to care, then it
must manifest itself already in everyday existence, albeit in a disowned
way. The connection between death and care, which has so far been
outlined only in a preliminary way, must be confirmed by its first con-
cretization in Da-sein’s everydayness.

6. BEING-TOWARD-DEATH AND EVERYDAYNESS

The average, everyday self is constituted in the publicity of being-with-

others in the same world (SZ, Div. One, chaps. 4 and 5 B; and see above
Part Two, chap. 4, sec. 1). “ They, ” the others, find an explanation for
everything and “ publish ” it in idle talk. All explanation is drawn from
and founded upon an attuned understanding. The problem now to be
examined is this: How does the attuned understanding that underlies
everyday idle talk disclose a being toward death ? How does the every-
day self relate to its ownmost, unrelational, impassable possibility?
Which mood discloses to it its thrownness unto death and in what way?
154 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

In everyday being-together, death is “ known ” as a constantly

occurring event. Friends and acquaintances die. People die daily and
hourly. Death is a familiar happening within the world. “ They ” have
already found an explanation for it. In talking about death, they say:
one oneself also dies some day, but in the meantime, one is still spared.
The everyday saying “ one dies ” unmistakably reveals how “ one ” is
toward death. In such talk, death is understood as an indefinite some-
thing that must come from somewhere, but for oneself it is not yet here
and therefore not yet threatening. Under cover of “ one dies” everybody
else and one oneself can indulge in the illusion that death strikes at
“ one, ” and not at myself. Death is thus levelled down to a within-world-
ish occurrence that happens to people but does not belong to any Da-
sein as his own, for the “ one ” of everydayness is nobody.
The ambiguity that characterizes everyday explanations twists
death into one of the “ realities ” of the world and so conceals its true
character as the ownmost, unrelational, impassable possibility. In this
way, it helps to seduce Da-sein into losing himself precisely in his ownmost
self by covering over the possibility that preeminently belongs to him.
The evasive concealment of death goes so far that the nearest
friends of the “ dying” often persuade him that he is going to escape
death and return to the reassured everydayness of his worldish occu-
pations. Such talk is meant to console the “ dying, ” but it does just as
much for the “ consolers ” themselves. They thus help the “ dying” to
hide from himself the possibility that is most his own and provide a
constant reassurance about death.3 And when it comes to an actual
decease, the public must be as little incommoded by it as possible. The
death of others is not infrequently looked upon as a social inconve-
nience, which should not be inflicted on the public.
The publicity of everydayness tacitly regulates the way in which
“ one ” has to relate himself to death and prescribes the mood that
should determine “ one’ s” attitude to it. The mere “ thinking about
death ” is already branded as cowardly fear and a morbid escape from
the world. The everyday self suppresses the courage to dread death .
Dread brings Da-sein before himself as delivered over to his last possi-
bility. The publicity of everydayness turns this dread into the fear of a
coming occurrence. Ambiguously disguised as fear, it is then explained
as a weakness which a self-assured existence must not know. The
proper mood is decreed to be an indifferent calm in the face of the
“ fact” that one dies. Such “ superior ” indifference estranges Da-sein
from his utmost, unrelational ability-to-be.
Seductiveness, reassurance, and estrangement, are characters of
Da-sein’s falling way of being. The falling being toward death is a con-
 Da sein’s Possibility of Being a-Whole and Being-toward -Death 155

stant flight from it. But the flight itself testifies that even the everyday
self is a thrown being into death. Even in his average everydayness, his
ownmost ability-to-be-in- the-world is constantly at stake for Da sein ,
albeit in the mode of an imperturbable indifference toward the utmost
possibility of his existence.
A more penetrating interpretation of the everyday evasion of
death will bring more sharply into view what it is from which Da-sein
flees. This method was first employed by Heidegger in the analysis of
dread (SZ, 184; see above Part Two, chap. 5, sec. 1). This will put the
inquiry into a position to define the full existential concept of death.

7. EVERYDAY BEING TOWARD AN END

AND THE FULL EXISTENTIAL CONCEPT OF DEATH

The positive results of the inquiry carried out so far may now be
summed up. Death as the end of Da-sein has been formally defined as
the ownmost, unrelational, impassable possibility. In his factical being,
Da-sein brings himself before this possibility as the sheer impossibility
of existing. In his everydayness, Da-sein relates himself to this possibil-
ity by concealing and evading it.
Two important points still remain to be elucidated. The first is
how the certainty, the inescapability of death reveals itself. The second
is whether it is possible for Da-sein not merely to relate himself to his
death in the evasive, everyday way, but properly to free it as his own.
The theme of the present section is the certainty of death. In
the everyday saying, “ Death comes to us all , ” something like a cer-
tainty is already admitted. The question is, however, whether the
admission is adequate to the way in which death is certain. This ques -
tion makes a short examination of certainty and of the criterion of its
adequacy necessary.
Certainty evidently belongs to truth . In the existential interpreta-
tion, “ to be true” has a twofold meaning. Primarily it means “ to be dis-
closing and discovering, ” which is the basic character of existence. I am
disclosed to myself and am discovering things within the world. The
thing itself , insofar as it is discovered , is true in a secondary sense. Cer-
tainty has the same twofold meaning. Primarily, it is I myself who am
certain , and secondarily, the discovered ( true) thing is certain.
The primary meaning of certainty is defined by Heidegger as Für-
wahrhalten , to hold something for true. The excellence of this expres-
sion can be appreciated only when it is carefully thought over. I hold, I
keep, something for true when I can hold myself to it; I do not vacillate
156 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

and tumble about in this truth as I do in a baseless opinion , for the

thing itself is discovered in such a way that it gives me a firm hold, it
binds me to itself. An eminent mode of certainty, according to Hei-
degger, is conviction ( Überzeugung). This seems at first sight surprising,
because in ordinary use the word often means merely a strongly held
personal opinion , but Heidegger interprets it in the opposite way: I am
convinced of something when I let myself be overcome, vanquished
( convincere ) solely by the testimony ( witness, Zeugnis ) of the discovered
thing itself and let it wholly determine my discovering relation to it.
A certainty is adequate, therefore, when it is grounded in the dis-
covered ( true ) thing itself and the discovering relation to it is appro-
priate to the thing in question. According to the differences among
beings and the varying intentions, direction , and range of our investi-
gations, the ways of truth and the certainty adequate to them are vari-
able. For the present Heidegger is concerned solely with the way in
which we are certain of death. This will turn out in the end to be a pre-
eminent certainty of our being-here.
In his everyday ness, Da-sein covers over the preeminent possibil-
ity his being. Covering over, concealing ( untruth ) originally belongs
of
to the disclosing way of existing. The certainty that belongs to the con-
cealing ( untrue ) way of being toward death is not an uncertainty, a
doubt, but an inappropriate way of being certain. If one understands
death as an event within the world, then the certainty that belongs to
such events is inappropriate to the way death “ is.”
They say: it is certain that death comes. But in order to be certain
of death, not “ they,” not “ one, ” but each Da-sein himself must be cer-
tain of his own dying. What is the basis, the evidence for the everyday
certainty of death ? It is not merely hearsay, for one experiences daily
the death of others. Death is undeniably a “ fact of experience.” But as
this “ fact of experience, ” death ( decease) has merely an “ empirical”
certainty. As far as one knows, everyone dies.
Death is in the highest degree probable, but, to a cautiously “ crit-
ical” view, it lacks the absolute, apodeictic certainty that distinguishes
certain theoretical truths.
The “ merely ” empirical certainty of decease as an occurrence,
however, does not decide about the certainty of death. The actual
decease of others may provide the occasion on which Da-sein in the
first place becomes aware of the “ fact ” of death, but from such expe-
rience he cannot become certain of death as it is. Even the everyday
self, however, is at bottom differently certain of his death from the
way certainty of death is admitted in public talk. It is precisely this
“ difference ” that is evaded and covered over. But the evasion itself
 Da-sein’s Possibility of Being-a -Whole and Being-toward - Death 157

testifies to what it evades, namely the certainty of the ownmost,

impassable possibility of existence.
They say that death comes certainly, but in the meantime, not yet.
The “ but ” whittles away the certainty of death . “ In the meantime, not
yet” refers the everyday self to the urgency of the business that “ in the
meantime” can still be taken care of. Death is pushed off and away to
a “ sometime later” whose probability depends on the “ average expec-
tation ” of life. In this way, the everyday self covers over the certainty
peculiar to death , namely that it is at any moment possible. The indefi-
niteness of the “ when ” of death goes hand in hand with its certainty.
Everyday being toward death evades the indefiniteness, not by calcu-
lating when decease might take place, but by pushing in front of it the
definite, calculable urgencies and possibilities of everyday care.4
The full existential concept of death may therefore be defined as
follows. Death as the end of Da-sein is the ownmost, unrelational, cer-
tain and indefinite , impassable possibility of his existence. In the exis-
tential sense, death is not a “ fact, ” an occurrence within the world;
there is death only in the being of a Da-sein to his end , which in one
way or another is constantly disclosed to him.
Dying is a way of being in which Da-sein can be a whole. Already
the everyday flight from death shows that the end that concludes and
determines Da-sein’s wholeness is nothing to which Da-sein comes only
at the end of his life in decease. Even everyday Da-sein ¿5 to his end —
that is, comes constantly to grips with it, albeit only “ flightily.” The
uttermost not-yet of his self, before which all his other possibilities are
piled up, is always already drawn into his being. The not-yet lies in the
primary constitution of care, according to which Da-sein is constantly
ahead-of-himself. At first, it raised the doubt whether Da-sein could be
a whole at all. But now it has turned out that, far from preventing the
wholeness of a factical existence, the not-yet makes the wholeness of his
being toward an end first of all possible.
As a thrown being-in-the-world, Da-sein is already delivered over
to his death and relates himself to it in a definite way. The everyday eva-
sion is a disowned being toward death. Although disownment is the way
in which Da-sein for the most part exists, it need not necessarily and
always be so.
But can Da-sein understand his ownmost possibility properly , that is,
be toward his end in the way of owned existence? Until this question is
worked out and answered, the existential interpretation remains deficient..
Owned existence is a possibility of a factically existing Da-sein. This must
be ontologically explainable from the structure of care. To work out this
explanation is the task of the last section of the present chapter.
158 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

8. THE EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF AN

OWNED , AUTHENTIC WAY OF BEING-TOWARD- DEATH
Heidegger introduces his analysis by stressing the methodological dif-
ficulty of his task. Is it not a “ fantastic undertaking, ” he asks, to outline
the existential structure of a proper, authentic, owned being toward
death, when perhaps in fact no Da-sein ever exists in this way, or if he
does, it must remain hidden to others? Must such a questionable “ struc-
ture” not remain an arbitrarily invented construction?
Fortunately, there are two phenomenally secured resources on
which the present interpretation can draw. First, the existential concept
of death has been fixed. Second, the disowned way of being toward
death has been characterized. This shows privatively how an owned
existence does not relate himself to his end: he cannot evade it, he can-
not cover it over in flight and ambiguously explain it. How, then, must a
proper understanding of death be constituted ?
Understanding is the way in which Da-sein is toward his possibili-
ties. “ Being toward a possibility ” can mean being out for something
possible, seeking it, in order to bring about its realization. In everyday
taking care, we are constantly out for possible things. In all making and
doing and producing there lies the tendency to destroy the possibility
of the possible handy or real thing by leading it over into actuality.
It is evident that being toward death as a possibility cannot
mean that we are out for it . For one thing, death is nothing real or
handy. For another thing, in bringing about the “ actuality ” of
decease, we would pull the ground from under our feet for being
toward death as a possibility.5 It follows from this that we cannot
relate ourselves properly to death by dwelling on its possibility, by
thinking about how and when it might become “ actual.” Such brood-
ing over death weakens its possibility-character by wishing to make it
into something calculable and disposable. A genuine understanding
of death, on the contrary, must disclose it as a possibility , must make
it explicitly its own as a possibility , and must hold it out before itself
and endure it as a possibility .
Such an understanding of possibilities would seem to lie in
expecting them. A tense expectancy undilutedly discloses the possible
in its “ whether it comes or not, or whether it comes after all.” But , on
a closer view, expecting the possible proves to be similar to being out
for it. The possible is in advance understood from the actual and in
relation to it, namely how and when it might become realizable. Even
in expecting, one jumps away from the possible, takes a firm foothold
in the actual and is essentially waiting for it.
 Daseins Possibility of Being-a-Whole and Being-toward -Death 159

The proper way to understand death, on the other hand, is to run

ahead to it as a possibility ( Vorlaufen in die M öglichkeit ) . Before consid-
ering how Heidegger develops the concept of “ running ahead ” or “ run-
ning forward, ” or “ anticipation, ” we may note that it is not essentially
new. Understanding, as Division One has shown, discloses possibilities
by throwing them forward and throwing itself into them. It is this “ for-
ward movement ” of existence that is formally espressed in the “ ahead-
of ” structure of care. There, however, it is still left entirely open
whether Da sein can be ahead-of-himself in different ways, and if he
can, how these ways may be constituted. What Heidegger now sets out
to show is that running ahead is the extremest way in which Da sein can
be ahead-of-himself, and hence it alone is capable of fully disclosing his
extremest possibility.
In running ahead to this possibility, it becomes “ greater and greater,”
that is, it reveals itself as something which knows no measure at all, no
more or less, but means the possibility of the measureless impossibility
of existence. Essentially, this possibility offers no support for becoming
intent on something, for “ spelling out ” the real thing that is possible and
so forgetting its possibility. As anticipation of possibility, being-toward-
death first makes this possible and sets it free as possibility. (SZ, 262 )

In this important paragraph Heidegger has shown that a preem-

inent understanding is required to disclose Da-sein’s preeminent possi-
bility and so makes it first of all possible. What does this mean? That
unlike real things, which are there independently of our discovering
them, a possibility stands before us as a possibility only insofar as it is
disclosed and understood. Running ahead discloses the utmost possi-
-
bility and gives it to Da sein to understand as his own. To stand before
-
himself in his utmost, ownmost ability to-be, however, is nothing other
than to exist as his own self.
Running ahead thus makes possible the owned way of existing
and so sets Da-sein free for his finite freedom. The freedom of a finite
being lies in the different ways in which he can relate himself to his
finiteness. Disowned being toward death is one way in which Da-sein
can and usually does bear his finiteness. Running ahead gives Da-sein
to understand that he can free himself from his lostness to ’ them” and
4

exist primarily from the utmost possibility of his own self. Only when
it becomes transparent to him that this is something he can do and
could always have done, does his lostness in the everyday “ oneself ’
among “ them ” become fully manifest.
But Da-sein’s ownmost possibility is at the same time unrela-
tional . Running ahead to it gives Da-sein to understand that he must
160 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

take it over solely from himself. Death does not merely indifferently
belong to each Da-sein, but claims him singly. It individuates Da-sein
into a single self , and makes it manifest that all caring for others and
taking care of things fails when it is his own sheer ability-to-be that is
at stake. But the failure of these ways of being-in- the-world to support
Da-sein in the face of death does not cut them off from himself, for
they are an essential condition of existence as such. Da-sein exists fully
as his own self only insofar as in being-with others and being-near-to
things, he throws himself primarily into his ownmost ability-to-be, and
not into the possibilities of oneself in the everyday world.
The ownmost, unrelational possibility is impassable. It stands
before Da-sein as the extremest possibility of his existence. Running
ahead to death does not evade its impassability, but “ sets it free for it, ”
that is, opens itself to be moved and affected by it, suffers itself to be
struck to the core by it. When Heidegger speaks of a “ passionate anx-
ious freedom for death ” (SZ, 266 ), he is not thinking of a quickly evap-
orating emotion of enthusiasm, but of a soberly steadfast, suffering
openness to an end that cannot be surpassed by the forethrow of fur-
ther possibilities. This alone can set Da-sein free from his dependence
on those chance possibilities that lie before his utmost possibility, by
enabling him genuinely to understand them as finite, and to let him
choose his own from among them, instead of letting others prescribe
the average possibilities for the everyday “ oneself.”
The extreme possibility of existence to give itself up shatters all
rigid insistence on what has already been reached and achieved, and so
saves Da-sein from the danger of falling behind himself and “ becoming
too old for his victories ( Nietzsche )” (SZ, 264 ). Free for his ownmost

— —
possibilities, which are determined from the end that is, are under-
stood as finite Da-sein will not misunderstand the possibilities of oth-
ers which are overtaking his own or try to force them back into the lim-
its of his own. Death as the unrelational, impassable possibility
individuates Da-sein into a single self only to make him understanding
toward others in their ability-to-be.6 Since running ahead to the utmost
possibility at the same time discloses all other possibilities that lie
before it, it in advance encompasses the whole of a Da-sein’ s existence;
that is, it enables Da-sein to be a whole in his factical existence.
The ownmost, unrelational, impassable possibility is certain. The
way to be certain of it is determined by the corresponding truth ( dis-
— —
closedness ). Da-sein holds death for true is certain of it by running
ahead to it as his ownmost ability-to-be. He himself makes the certainty
possible for himself, and what enables him to do so is the anticipatory
forward-running way of existence. The certainty of death cannot be cal-
 Da sein’s Possibility of Being-a-Whole and Being-toward-Death 161

culated from statistics of actually occurring deceases. It belongs to a

totally different order of truth from the disclosedness of things or from
the formal objects accessible to a pure intuition (looking-at ). The certainty
— —
of death death is only and always as my own is far more original than
those, for in it I am certain of my own being-in- the-world. It demands not
merely one definite disclosing relation to things, but the whole of Da-sein
in the fullness of an owned existence. Only by running ahead to death can
he make certain of his ownmost being in its unovertakable wholeness.
The certain possibility of existence is indefinite. How can this con-
stantly certain possibility be disclosed in such a way that it remains con-
standy indefinite when it will become an impossibility? In running ahead
to his indefinitely certain death, Da-sein opens himself to a constant threat
which rises from his thrownness into his “ here.” This is existentially pos-
sible because all understanding is attuned. Moods and feelings bring Da-
sein before the thrownness of his “ that-he-is-here.” The mood which is
capable of keeping open the sheer threat rising from his ownmost single
being is dread. In dread, Da-sein finds himself face to face with the noth-
ing of the possible impossibility of existence. Dread is dread for the abil-
ity-to-be of a factical existence already thrown into death. Because run-
ning ahead individuates Da-sein into a single self and in this singleness
makes him certain of his whole ability- to-be, the basic mood of dread
essentially belongs to his understanding of himself from his ground.
In this paragraph, Heidegger has shown that the preeminent
understanding that lies in running ahead, and the preeminent attune-
ment that is concretely experienced in dread belong together and con-
stitute the possibility of an owned existence . Dread, no less than run-
ning ahead or anticipation, individuates Da-sein into a single self by
bringing him back to himself from his lostness to things. Both bring
Da-sein before the nothing of his possible inability-to-be. Even in the
absence of Division Three, we can be reasonably certain that in this
extremest disclosure lies the answer to Heidegger’ s question, How is it
possible for Da-sein to understand being?
These implications, however, are at this point only hinted at by
Heidegger and are, in fact, not fully worked out even at the end of Divi-
sion Two. The analysis so far carried out is only sufficient to show the
existential structure of an owned being toward death, which is summed
up by Heidegger as follows:

Anticipation reveals to Da-sein its lostness in the they-self and brings it face to
face with the possibility to be itself primarily unsupported by concern taking
care of things, but to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death
which is free of the illusions of the they , factical, and certain of itself (SZ, 266 )
162 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

—
The existential structure of anticipation or running ahead that
—
is, of an owned way of being toward death shows that it is ontologically
possible for Da-sein to be a whole. It should, therefore, be possible for
a factically existing Da-sein to be “ in fact” a whole. And yet, the work-
ing out of this existentially possible wholeness remains a fantastic
assumption until its concretization in an ontic existence has been
demonstrated. Does any Da-sein in fact ever throw himself into an
owned being toward death ? Does he in fact bear witness to his ability to
do so? Does he ever demand it from himself that he ought to exist
wholly as himself ?
These questions already indicate the theme and task of the next
chapter. They also suggest that quite apart from Heidegger’s principal
theme, this second chapter of Division Two should be of unusual inter-
est, since in it Heidegger must lay bare the ontological source and
ground of ethics and morality. While our freedom lies in our under-
standing of possibility as such ( I can be, I am able to be) this is obvi-
ously not sufficient to explain what we usually call “ moral freedom.”
For this, we must be able to understand not only that “ I can be this way
or that,” but also to understand that “ I ought to be this way and not
that,” and be able freely to submit or not submit ourselves to the
implied demand. Further, it is evident that the demand must be made
by ourselves to ourselves, for no externally imposed command could
make the free submission to an “ I ought ” possible.
 XI
Witness to an Owned Existence
and Authentic Resolution

1 . CONSCIENCE AS THE CALL OF CARE

Since owned existence is an essential possibility of Da-sein as Da-sein,

it cannot be the result of extraneous circumstances or of favorable
influences, but his own being as care must be capable of showing him
his everyday lostness and of calling him back to his own self. This emi-
nent “ showing” or “ witnessing” happens in conscience. Heidegger’s
first task is to determine which are the existential phenomena in whose
sphere conscience belongs. Guidance is given by the ontic experience
of conscience as a “ voice” that has something to say to us : it discloses
something, it gives us something to understand. Conscience thus
belongs among the phenomena which disclose to us our hereness.
These phenomena are attunement, understanding, and discourse or
Rede. The fact that conscience manifests itself as a voice indicates that
it is a mode of discourse.
As an existential constituent of Da-sein’s being, discourse articu-
lates what is understandable. It enables us expressly to articulate an
already disclosed significance-whole and so to explain it and make it
explicitly our own. Existential discourse “ comes to word , ” it “ voices
itself ’ in our ontic languages. The concrete “ voicing” of speech, how-
ever, important as it is in being-together and in public communication ,
is not always essential. Silence is also a mode of speech , and it is the

163
164 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

preeminent mode in which conscience speaks to us. This does not con-
flict with the everyday experience of it as a “ voice, ” because what is
really meant by the “ voice ” is not an audible sound, but its function of
giving us something to understand.
There is indeed no need for conscience to be generally audible,
because it does not speak to mankind at large, but solely to myself. It is
purely the self of the everyday “ oneself, ” bemused by the noise of pub-
lic talk, whom conscience calls . The demanding and summoning char-
acter of conscience is pregnantly expressed by Heidegger when he
speaks of it as a call, rather than as an indeterminate voice.
Whom conscience calls is indubitably a Da sein in his own single self.
What he does and who he is in the publicity of the everyday world is mer-
cilessly ignored and passed over by the call. Just as dread overturns the
relevance-whole of things into complete irrelevance, so conscience pushes
the vanity of “ one’s” public position into total insignificance. It thus
deprives Da-sein of his habitual hiding place and brings him to himself.
But what is it that conscience calls to the self ? Strictly speaking,
Heidegger maintains: nothing. The call gives no information about
worldish affairs, has no objective facts to relate. The self who has been
called is not told about anything, but is summoned to himself. Accord-
ing to the existential interpretation, the primary and proper task of
conscience is not to tell us what we are to do, but how we are to be .
As a summons, conscience calls Da-sein forward into the possi-
bility of his own self. Hence it is that the call need not bring itself to
word and sound. “ Conscience speaks solely and constantly in the mode
of silence ” (SZ, 273). It thus forces Da-sein into the “ reticent stillness”
of himself. The absence of words does not mean that the call is vague
and incomprehensible, but that it demands a different kind of “ hear-
— —
ing” that is, understanding from communicating talk.
But, it may be asked, does the wordlessness of the “ silent call ” not
imply that it is a deficient kind of discourse compared to, say, a fully
expressed logical proposition? On the contrary, Heidegger implies that
it is more fundamental than any logical proposition can be. In one of
his later works, he calls language “ the sounding of stillness ” ( das Geläut
der Stille . US, 30, G12, 27, PLT, 207 ). The stillness in which conscience
speaks is the most fundamental and original speech: it is the way in
which Da -sein calls himself from the depth of his being.
But is it not premature to decide that in conscience Da-sein calls
himselfi Where is the phenomenal evidence to show that the caller and
the called are the same ? What are the phenomenal characteristics of
the caller that would make Heidegger’s interpretation at least a possi-
ble one, even if it could not be proved to be the only possible one?
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 165

In the first place, Heidegger points out, the caller is characterized

by the same indefinability in worldish terms as the called. This seem-
ingly negative character has a positive meaning for Heidegger. It indi-
cates that the caller fulfils himself purely in calling and wishes to keep
all curious and importunate examination away from himself. But does
this not mean that to question who the caller is must be inappropriate
to the very nature of conscience? It is certainly inappropriate, Heideg-
ger says, in the case of an ontic-existentiell hearing of the call. An
“ introverted ” self-analysis is the last thing conscience demands from us,
because it only weakens the proper response to its call. But things are
different for an existential-ontological inquiry. Its task is to discover
how Da sein himself must be in order to be able to experience a sum-
mons to himself at all.
Beyond his essential indefiniteness, what further characteristics of
the caller are accessible? Without any doubt, each of us experiences the
call as coming from myself, and not from anyone else who is with me in
the world. This shows that the caller and called may be ( though need
not necessarily be ) one and the same. At the same time, it indicates that
they must nonetheless be in some way differentiated. Must the calling
self not be differently “ here” from the self who is called? Is it not Da-sein
in his extreme possibility who calls the lost self of everydayness?
Before coming to a final decision on this point, let us consider
the third characteristic of the caller. This seems in a way to contradict
the preceding one, for just as certainly as the call comes from me, it is
neither planned nor decided upon by me. “ ‘It’ calls, against our expec-
tations and even against our will. . . . The call comes from me, and yet
over me” (SZ, 275).
This characteristic is undoubtedly the strangest feature of con-
science: the summoning of Da-sein to the most fundamental decisions
he can make, cannot itself be decided upon or disposed of by Da-sein
himself. It is this phenomenal feature of the call, Heidegger points out,
that has given rise to the most divergent interpretations. On the one
hand, conscience has been explained as the manifestation of a strange
power, of God , which reaches into Da-sein’s existence. At the other
extreme, the “ reality” of conscience has been denied and the whole
phenomenon has been “ explained away” as merely psychological or
even biological. The latter attempt finds its support in the implicit, but
all the more dogmatic ontological assumption that what is “ in fact”
there, must be substantially real, and what cannot be proved to be sub-
stantially real ( vorhanden) , cannot exist at all.
Both extremes of a theological and a scientific explanation are
rejected by Heidegger on the ground that neither takes sufficient
166 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

account of Da-sein’s existential-ontological constitution. If Da-sein’s

being as care is in itself capable of originating the call of conscience,
then there is no ontological need to go outside for an explanation , nor
is there any justification for denying conscience just because its factic-
ity cannot be proved in the same way as the fact of a substantial thing.
How does Heidegger proceed to show that the call can indeed
originate in care? He has recourse to the suggestion that was made ear-
lier; namely that Da sein as caller is “ here” in a different way from Da-
sein as the called. As the called, Da-sein is here in the mode of a falling
being-in-the-world , who disowns himself to “ them ,” the others. The
caller is the same Da-sein, but in the mode of an uncanny not-being-at-
home-in-the-world, dreading the nothing of world into which he has
been thrown in the dread for his single ability-to-be. Da-sein calls him-
self from the deepest ground of his radical singleness, in which he
faces the naked “ being that has to be as it is and can be” (SZ, 276 ). The
caller is unfamiliar to the everyday self lost in the noise and talk of the
varied business of the world. Something like a strange voice, coming
from a single self thrown into the nothing of world , the call has no use-
ful information to give about worldish affairs. “ But what should Da-sein
even report from the uncanniness of its thrown being? What else
remains for it than its own potentiality-of-being revealed in Angst? How
else should it call than by summoning to this potentiality-of-being
about which it is solely concerned ?” (SZ, 277).
The call must speak in the uncanny mode of silence, since it has
nothing to report that could be communicated in public talk. On the
contrary, it calls Da-sein back from such talk into the reticent stillness
of his existence. The certainty with which this silent voice nonetheless
addresses itself to myself arises from the fact that in his radical single-
ness each Da-sein is sheerly unmistakable to himself. It is clear, there-
fore, that conscience in its very nature does not disclose an “ ideal of
existence” that is universally valid for everyone, but discloses to each
Da-sein his single, concrete situation, which he is summoned to take
over as his own. This is why the existential analysis must resist any
attempt to formulate a universal ideal existence (SZ, 266, 279 ); such an
attempt would go against the meaning of conscience. On the other
hand, the definition of the concrete possibilities of an individual exis-
tence is equally outside its sphere, for these are necessarily varied and
always in part determined by the specific world in which a Da-sein lives.
The task of the existential analysis is purely to show what are the con-
ditions of the possibility that Da-sein can exist in the way he does; so,
in the present instance, how it is possible that he can be called by con-
science at all.
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 167

How has the preceding discussion helped to solve the problem

whether conscience can be explained from care? It has brought to light
that what conscience “ gives to understand ” is nothing but care itself in
the mode of its possible authenticity.

Conscience reveals itself as the call of care: the caller is Da-sein, anxious in
thrownness ( in its already-being-in . . .) about its potentiality-of-being.
The one summoned is also Da-sein, called forth to its ownmost poten-
tiality-of-being ( its being-ahead-of-itself . . .). And what is called forth by
the summons is Da-sein, out of falling prey to the they ( already-being-
together-with-the-world-taken-care-of . . .). The call of conscience, that is,
conscience itself, has its ontological possibility in the fact that Da-sein is
care in the ground of its being. (SZ, 277-78)

The analysis has now brought to light that the full structure, or
more precisely, movement of conscience, is that of a forward -calling
recall ( vorrufender Rückruf ) . It calls from the depth of thrownness forward
into the utmost possibilities of existence and calls Da-sein from his
everyday lostness back to his own thrown self. This circling movement
belongs to the call of care, because care itself, in its whole structure,
has the same “ circularity.”
The existential interpretation of conscience will, of course, be
unacceptable not only to the scientific, but even more to the theolog-
ical explanations of the same phenomenon. With regard to the latter,
it must be borne in mind that Heidegger neither asks nor answers the
ontic question of who conferred on Da-sein his way of existing. An
indispensable precondition for asking such a question is that we must
already understand being. To find out how such an understanding is
at all possible is Heidegger’ s sole concern. This fundamental-ontolog-
ical aim is dominant in the whole analysis of conscience, and will
come to special prominence in the next section. Its task will be to
determine the existential meaning of the Schuld ( debt, guilt, owing ),
which is universally heard and understood in every concrete experi-
ence of conscience.

2. UNDERSTANDING THE CALL AND OWING

In ordinary usage, Schuld , Schuldigsein , and various composite phrases

that can be formed from them, generally carry the idea of owing a
debt, of being under an obligation, of being at fault or culpable, of
being guilty of ( the cause of ) some deficiency or harm. The everyday
sense of the word will usually be rendered here by “ debt” or “ guilt.” Its
168 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

existential sense, on the other hand, will be expressed by the ethically

more neutral word of owing . Heidegger himself keeps the ambivalence
of Schuld constantly in play, the ethical concept of guilt providing an
overtone to the existential concept of owing. This is quite deliberate,
for in his interpretation the ontological condition of the possibility of
“ moral guilt” will turn out to lie in the existential “ owing.”
What can be meant by an existential concept of owing is, of
course, still obscure. It cannot be merely a general term for the differ-
ent kinds of debt, failing, and guilt familiar to us in everyday experi-
ence, but means an “ owing” that lies already in our own being. Before
I can load myself with guilt by specific acts of commission and omis-
sion, lam owing already insofar as I simply am. Otherwise, I could never
understand that I am owing something to someone in my factical being
together with him . The existential analysis must bring to clarity the
original meaning of the owing that makes its appearance as a “ predi-
cate” of the “ I am.”
The familiar concepts of debt and guilt, on the other hand, are
drawn from everyday explanations of existence and cannot function as
the last criteria for the existential interpretation because they are deriv-
ative and arise from an understanding to which a proper ontological
approach is foreign . Nonetheless, even a misexplanation can give a
pointer to an original phenomenon, and that is why the ontological
interpretation of phenomena like owing, conscience, and death must
start from what everyday commonsense says about them.
What guidance do the vulgar concepts of debt and guilt give us
toward the existential concept of owing? In the first place, debt is
understood as an owing that arises by withholding or taking away from
someone something to which he has a claim , by not fulfilling a demand
in the sphere of a mutual taking care of things. In so doing, one can
become culpable of an offence against a public rule or requirement
and punishable by law.
In the idea of being culpable or guilty of something ( schuld sein
an ) there lies further the idea of being the ground and origin of some-
thing. This meaning is expressed in English by “ owing to” ; for example,
owing to me ( because of me ), another has been led astray, damaged , or
even broken in his existence. This kind of moral guilt is summed up by
Heidegger in a very condensed formal definition, which may be
explained as follows: 1. To be the ground ( cause, origin ) of a deficiency
in the existence of another. 2. The ground itself is deemed to be defec-
tive through the deficiency caused in the other. 3. The ( moral ) defec-
tiveness of the ground has the character of the nonfulfilment of a
demand made on Da-sein in his being- together with others.
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 169

It must be observed that Heidegger’s definition of the everyday

concept of moral guilt is questionable in several respects. For one
thing, it suggests, without explicitly saying so, that the defectiveness of
the “ ground ” is usually accounted for by the actual damage or harm
caused. This, however, runs counter both to common sense and law,
not to speak of religious-ethical teaching. The “ moral defect” is gener-
ally considered to lie in the “ ground ” itself, in the intention of evil,
prior to and regardless of the actual damage caused. Heidegger further
suggests that the “ moral demands” are usually conceived as rules or
norms that somehow exist in and by themselves like things, and are
imposed on Da-sein from outside. But does this do justice either to
everyday understanding or to traditional ethics? Conceptions of a sub-
stantially existing norm or standard, laid on as a yardstick to measure
Da-sein *s conduct, have undoubtedly been and are widely held. But
they are by no means the only ones, as is shown by Kant’s idea of
morality as a free self-submission to a self-given moral law. Even every-
day understanding is not as crudely uncomprehending in ethical
respects as Heidegger makes out, following what may well be no more
than an ancient philosophical prejudice. It is perfectly true, of course,
that everyday understanding is neither capable of nor intent upon giv-
ing a philosophical explanation of its ethical insights. These may be,
nonetheless, perfectly genuine and penetrating. Heidegger asserts, on
the other hand, that they are entirely drawn from a calculating taking-
care of things in whose horizon morality becomes a balance sheet of
deeds that ought or ought not to be performed and a settling of
accounts in respect to mutual demands and obligations. Hence the way
in which everyday existence relates himself to conscience, Heidegger
alleges, is to bargain and negotiate with it. But, we ask, is this a full
“ phenomenal” characterization of the everyday experience of con-
science? Is it not rather a one-sided and distorted caricature of it? A
“ bargaining” with conscience is certainly familiar to all of us, but it is
by no means a constant or necessary concomitant of the experience.
Even less is it blindly accepted as right and appropriate. On the con-
trary, the everyday talk of “ paying conscience money ” clearly shows
that it is rejected by common sense itself. It knows, far better than Hei-
degger would allow, the difference between manipulating things and
ethical conduct. Heidegger deals with the practical and ethical sphere
in precisely the same way as he dealt with the everyday understanding
of death . But while he may be perfectly right in saying that the latter
arises from a fleeing and disguising way of being unto death, he seems
to forget that the practical ethical question What ought I to do? cannot
be evaded; it presses on us too constantly and urgently in everyday exis-
170 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

tence. In this sphere, common understanding can hardly be as obtuse

as Heidegger, admittedly in company with many other philosophers,
tries to make out.
Nonetheless, Heidegger takes two pointers toward the existential
concept of schuldig from the much-despised everyday concepts of debt
and guilt. These concepts show, in the first place, a definite not-char-
acter or negativity. So, for instance, the everyday notion of debt has its
not-character insofar as it means a denying or withholding of some-
thing from someone. Similarly, the concept of moral guilt shows a neg-
ativity insofar as it means a deficiency, a not-fulfilling of a demand or
a law. In the second place, the notion of moral guilt implies the idea
of being the ground ( cause, origin ) of something which is itself defi-
cient, that is, is determined by a not . Heidegger therefore defines the
formal-existential concept of schuldig as “ being-the-ground of a being
—
which is determined by a not that is, being the ground of a nullity ”
( Grundsein einer Nichtigkeit . SZ, 288).
The existential concept of schuldig can be approximately expressed
by the word owing. “ To be owing ( to)” expresses in the first place that
something is denied to and withheld from Da-sein’s being, apart from
and prior to any nonfulfilment of a demand made on him. This manifest
denial and withholding is constitutive of the finiteness of Da-sein’s exis-
tence. A completely self-sufficient being, a “ perfect substance,” could not
possibly “ be owing to” anything in any respect. In the second place, the
“ owing” expresses that Da-sein himself is the ground, not only of his own
free actions and decisions, but above all of his own becoming. It is owing
to how Da-sein already is that he can and must throw himself forward into
his possibilities and so exist as the ground of himself. Da-sein’s ability-to-
be ( coming-to-be ) has, in turn, its own ground-character since it is for its
sake ( owing to it, on account of it ) that Da-sein as care is constantly ahead-
-
of-himself. As the original for its own sake, Da sein’s ability-to-be is in turn
determined by a not, which reveals itself in the extremest way In the pos-
sibility of not-being-here-anymore. This possibility is the complete with-
drawal of Da-sein’s own being-here, which thus reveals itself as a being
sheerly determined by a negativity. To be the wo¿-determined ground of
a negativity is Da-sein’s being as care.
It is evident that the existential concept of owing is not a simple
category of causality. It expresses the manifold ways in which the
—
“ nothing negates ” denies and forbids, withdraws and withholds in —
Da-sein’s being as care, which has at the same time the character of
“ ground.” The existential owing permeates the whole of care in its
essential articulations of facticity ( thrownness ), existence ( forethrow ),
and falling.
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 171

The first and deepest manifestation of owing lies in Da-sein’s

thrownness. Thrownness means that Da-sein has not brought himself
into his being; he can only find himself already here. He can never go
back behind the fact of thrownness so that he could originate his “ hav-
ing to be as he is and can be” from his own self . Da-sein is thus revealed
as impotent to be the ground of himself: he owes the very being which
is handed out to him as his own. Although Heidegger does not make it
explicit, it is clear that Da-sein “ owes ” both in an ontic and an ontolog-
ical sense. Just as he can never bring himself forth as a concrete, ontic
self, so he is powerless to confer on himself his disclosing way of exist-
ing. But “ Because it has not laid the ground itself , it rests on the weight
of it, which mood reveals to it as a burden” (SZ, 284 ). This weight can
never be shaken off or left behind, for solely as the thrown being he
already is can Da-sein exist as the ground of his own coming-to-be.

And how is this thrown ground? Only by projecting itself upon the pos-
sibilities into which it is thrown. The self, which as such has to lay the
ground of itself, can never gain power over the ground , and yet it has to
take over being the ground in existing. Being its own thrown ground is
the potentiality-of-being about which care is concerned. (SZ, 284 )

-
Da sein thus constantly lags behind his possibilities, not only and
not primarily because in fact he cannot realize all of them, but because
as the not-self-originated or not-self-grounded ground he is already
behind the possibility of being his own ground. “ Da-sein is never exis-
tent before its ground, but only from it and as it ” (SZ, 284 ). His begin-
ning thus manifests itself to Da-sein from a nothing of himself, that is,
from his never having been here before his thrownness. This accom-
plished fact, however, in itself discloses the possibility of not-being-
-
here. When, therefore, Da sein dreadingly runs forward to the possi-
bility of death , he is not disclosing anything “ new” to himself, but only
lets the possibility into which he is already thrown “ stand ” before him
as a possibility, in the full clarity of its certainty and unchangeability.
The deepest owing manifest in one’ s finite being is “ never to gain
power over one’s ownmost being from the ground up” (SZ, 284 ).
It must be noted that in the short passage we have been consid-
ering, the word never recurs three times, twice in italics. This cannot be
passed over as an accident, but must be taken as a hint that the nega-
tivity which permeates care as the not-self-grounded ground comes to
light in an eminent way in the never . The hint, however, is not further
elucidated by Heidegger when he sums up the owing character of Da-
sein’s thrownness as follows:
172 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Being a self Da sein is the thrown being as self. Not through itself, but
released to itself from the ground in order to be as this ground . Dasein is
not itself the ground of its being, because the ground first arises from its
own project , but as a self , it is the being of its ground. (SZ , 284-85)

The positive ground-character of owing therefore lies in Da-sein’s

existence as a factical self. But this selfhood must not be understood as

—
—
the enduring self-sameness of a substance that “ underlies” lies to the
ground of changing qualities nor of a subject that maintains itself in a
recognizable identity and is thus constandy “ present ” to a changing
stream of experience. Da-sein’s selfhood is constituted by the way he
exists, by the way he throws himself forward to his possibilities, in
which he understands himself. Since, however, the structure of care is
“ free” to modify itself in two basic ways, Da-sein constantly stands in
one or another of his possibilities:

Da-sein [. . .] is constantly not other possibilities and has relinquished

them in its existentiell project. As thrown , the project is not only deter-
mined by the nullity of being the ground but is itself as project essentially
null. Again , this definition by no means signifies the ontic property of
being “ unsuccessful” or “ of no value” but an existential constituent of
the structure of being of projecting. This nullity belongs to the being-
free of Da-sein for its existentiell possibilities. But freedom is only in the
choice of the one, that is, in bearing the fact of not having chosen and
not being able also to choose the others. (SZ, 285)

This passage repeats, only a little more fully, what was already
said in the analysis of dread. Da-sein’s “ free-being for the freedom of
choosing and taking hold of himself ’ is ontologically grounded in the
modifiable structure of care. This can concretize itself only in the defi-
nite choice of one possibility and the renouncing of the other. And it
is only because Da-sein is in the first place choicelessly thrown into the
negativity of ¿¿¿sownment that conscience calls him back to his freedom
for his utmost, outmost possibility. Since conscience essentially belongs
to Da-sein , not to follow its call, not to decide, is in itself a choice. Da-
sein’s freedom to decide in itself necessitates a choice. It is the seal of
its finiteness that freedom can only and must bind itself to one end and
renounce the other. Only this finite freedom can make something like
necessitation, bindingness, and responsibility at all understandable.
According to the existential interpretation , morality requires the
whole of Da-sein’ s being for its ontological foundation. Da-sein as care
is the not-determined , not-self-grounded ground of a negativity. Only
a being who is manifest to himself as determined by a denial and with-
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 173

holding can understand that in his factical existence he may be “ owing”

something. Only because Da-sein is the ground of his own becoming in
such a way that he understands himself in his possibilities, can he
demand from himself that he ought to exist in this way and not that.
Only this can enable him to bind himself to a freely chosen way of
being as a responsible self. The existential roots of morality thus reach
down to the deepest depth and most far-reaching disclosing structures
of care. It is Heidegger’ s great merit, in contrast to modern positivist
tendencies, to show that the disclosure ( truth ) that makes morality pos-
sible is even more fundamental and original than the discovery ( truth )
that makes our cognition of things possible. The dogmatic positivistic
assumption that the reality of things is the only “ true ” being about
which “ meaningful” statements can be made, must relegate the far
more profound questions concerning how I ought to be to the sphere
of “ mere” emotions, which, equally dogmatically, are assumed to have
nothing whatever to do with truth. Heidegger, to be sure, also says that
conscience makes no “ statements,” but for exactly the opposite reason:
it calls in the uncanny mode of silence, because it is the most originally
disclosing mode of speech possible.
On the other hand , it may be asked whether, in taking back the
phenomena of conscience and owing to their ontological foundation,
Heidegger has not lost sight of morality altogether. For, we may won-
der, where is the specifically “ moral ” character of conscience unless it
gives us some direction or guidance to what is good or bad. Nowhere
does Heidegger’s interpretation give us the slightest hint of how good
and evil may be distinguished and decided upon. Since the “ good ” is
thought to have the character of “ for its own sake,” it may be that the
possibilities of Da-sein’s existence as the original “ for the sake of ” are
intended to give us a hint of the source from which our ideas of the
good are drawn. But if this is Heidegger’s intention, he nowhere makes
it explicit. This problem will be further commented on later, when we
will be in a better position to see whether Heidegger has any more to
contribute to questions of ethics.
For the present, we turn back to our central preoccupation with
the fundamental-ontological problem of Being and Time. The interpre-
tation of conscience and owing has taken some vital steps toward the
solution of this problem. But just as the analysis of dread in Division
One breaks off at a vital point, so the present analysis stops tantaliz-
ingly short of where it undoubtedly intends to lead us. To mention only
one matter, the eminent way in which negativity, nullity, and the noth-
ing come to light in the never remains a bare hint, which, in the absence
of Division Three, leaves us wondering whether the never might not be
174 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

the hinge on which the question of Being and Time turns round to the
question of Time and Being. Heidegger himself is fully aware of the
host of unanswered questions he has raised in the present analysis, for
he explicitly draws attention to its incompleteness.

Still, the ontological meaning of the notness of this existential nullity

remains obscure. But that is true also of the ontological essence of the not
in general. Of course, ontology and logic have expected much of the not ,
and thus at times made its possibilities visible without revealing it itself
ontologically. Ontology found the not and used it. But is it then so self-
evident that every not means a negativum in the sense of a lack? Does its
positivity get exhausted by its constituting the “ transition ” ? Why does
every dialectic take refuge in negation, without grounding it itself dialec-
tically, without even being able to locate it as a problem? Has anyone ever
made the ontological origin of notness a problem at all, or, before that,
even looked for the conditions on the basis of which the problem of the
not and its notness and the possibility of this notness could be raised?
And where else should they be found than in a thematic clarification of the
meaning of being in general ? (SZ, 285-86 )

This unposed question of traditional philosophy is explicitly

answered by Heidegger’s lecture “ What Is Metaphysics?” which we
shall briefly consider in the next section. According to it, all negativ-
ity and no-saying, down to the last logical not , is grounded in the noth-
ing originally disclosed by dread. The above paragraph gives notice,
however, that this whole complex problem can only be clarified from
the meaning of being as such, from the temporal character of being.
(This compels us to wonder once more whether the never is not meant
to give us a hint as to how the nothing becomes “ meaningful” to us. )
Unfortunately, the lecture gives us no hint of any temporal meaning
of negativity.
Even more incomplete than the present exposition of negativity
is Heidegger’s elucidation of ground and ground-being. How precisely,
we must ask, do care as the not-determined ground-being and the pre-
viously worked-out care-structure hang together ? Is the one somehow
superimposed on the other? If not, how is the connection to be envis-
aged? And if the self is not to be understood as a constantly underlying
self-sameness, how is its “ constancy ” and “ self-standingness” and
“ ground-being” to be positively understood? These questions, it is true,
will be taken up later in Division Two, but without their essential con-
nections being brought sharply enough into focus. This is one of the
main reasons why the important chapter 5 on Da-sein’s “ historicity”
(G< eschichtlichkeit ) remains as obscure as it is. Its connection with self-
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 175

standingness and ground-being may be unnoticed by the most careful

readers. Even a distinguished interpreter like Beda Allemann remarks
that chapter 5 is “ pushed in between the temporal analyses” of chap-
ters 3, 4, and 6 of Division Two. “ It is methodologically only loosely
connected with the other chapters. . . . The whole ( fifth ) chapter
appears as an excursus, whose theme, it is true, is most closely linked
up with the aim of the investigation, without however necessarily
belonging to the sequence of the explication of Da-sein’s temporality.” 1
As against this view, it may already be pointed out that it is Da-
sein’s owing, his not-being-self-grounded , which refers him to other
beings among which he can take root, gain a stand (stability and conti-
nuity ), and so come to rest on a “ ground ” which carries and holds him.
One way in which Da sein brings himself to a stand is in delivering over
to himself his tradition. This is constitutive of his “ historical-being.” Its
time-structure and event-character are not loosely connected with the
elucidation of the whole time-character of care, but are central to it.
This, however, remains obscure unless the connection between owing,
ground, and self-standingness is grasped in advance. In the present
exposition we have arrived at one of those points where Heidegger
brings the investigation to the verge of a most important explanation,
only to break it off before it becomes truly understandable. Following
the method adopted in this book, this is where the interpretation must
step in and try to make explicit what the fragment of Being and Time
leaves unsaid.

3. INTERPOLATION: GROUND-BEING AND NOTHING

Shortly after the publication of Being and Time , when its completion
was still fully envisaged by Heidegger, two short but important works
appeared: “ What Is Metaphysics? ” ( WM, 1929 ) and “ On the Essence of
Ground ” ( WG, 1929 ). The first takes up the problem of negativity, left
unfinished in the section above, while the second elucidates the “ being
of ground.” Although both these short works still fall far short of
accomplishing the task assigned to Division Three, they carry their
problems an important step further forward than Division Two. The
separateness of these two works, however, is in itself a pitfall. Both deal
with the structurally indivisible transcendence of Da-sein’ s being, the
first in the direction of thrownness, the second in the direction of fore-
throw ( possibility ).
Let us first consider briefly the lecture, “ What Is Metaphysics?” It
repeats, although from a different starting- point, the main steps taken
176 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

in the analysis of dread in Division One. The phenomenological

description of dread is much less detailed, and takes us in a few hasty
steps to the point where beings as a whole, ourselves among them, sink
away into complete insignificance, and we are overcome by an uncanny
not-at-homeness. In the withdrawal and gliding away of beings, we are
left with no hold. What is left and overcomes us is only this “ no.” In this
“ no, ” dread has made manifest the nothing.
So far, no addition has been made to the former analysis of
dread , except perhaps that the lecture lays even greater stress on the
circumstance that the nothing is disclosed not in and by itself, but
together with ( at one with ) the sinking away beings as a whole. From
here, however, Heidegger proceeds to take a new step.
In dread lies a shrinking back from . . . , which, of course, is no longer a
flight, but a mesmerized stillness. This back from . . . takes its origin
from the nothing. It ( the nothing) does not attract to itself , but is essen-
tially repelling. The repulsion from itself , however, is as such the relega-
tion to the sinking-away beings as a whole, which the nothing lets glide
away. ( WM , 34 , W, 11, G9, 114, P, 90, BW, 105, EB, 369 )

The cardinal point in this passage is that our “ shrinking away

from . . or “ back from . . takes its origin from the nothing. This posi-
tive repulsion by the nothing originates the movement or, more pre-
cisely, the movedness { Bewegtheit ) of Da-sein’s being as the thrown fore-
throw. The repulsion is nothing other than the throw of thrownness.
Is the positiveness of negativity exhausted by its forming the tran-
sition in dialectics? This question was asked in Heidegger’ s analysis of
conscience and owing. The question now receives an answer: The noth-
ing disclosed in dread is in the highest sense “ positive, ” for its repul-
sion throws us into our forethrowing way of being.
But how can the nothing press in upon us in such a “ positive”
way? Heidegger does not explicitly say, but this need not prevent us
from trying to unfold the implications of his thought. In confronting
us with the nothing, dread brings us to an impassable limit which for-
bids us any further penetration into our having been thrown. The
nothing repels us not by putting any obstacles in our way but by offer-
ing us “ nothing” that we could hold on to and know; it totally denies
us any access to itself. This denial and forbiddance of the nothing is the
repulsion that refers us to beings as those which we can know and
among which we can stand on a firm ground. This “ repulsing relega-
tion to beings as a whole ” is the very essence of the nothing, its “ negat-
ing.” It is not we who “ deduce ” the nothing from beings by negating
them as a whole. According to Heidegger, the opposite is the truth: all
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 177

our negativity and no-saying is possible to us only because the nothing

of beings is originally revealed and experienced in dread. The nothing
itself “ negates.”

The negating is not just any occurrence, but as a repulsing relegation to

the sinking-away beings as a whole it makes manifest these beings in their
—
full, previously hidden strangeness as the sheer other to the nothing.
In the clear night of the nothing of dread first arises the openness
—
of beings as such: that they are beings and not nothing. What is an addi-
tion in our speech , “ and not nothing,” is however not a subsequent expla-
nation, but makes foregoingly possible the manifestness of beings as
such ; the essence of the originally negating nothing lies in this: it brings
here-being, Da sein, first of all before beings as such .
Only on the ground of the original manifestness of the nothing
can human Da sein turn toward and become familiar with beings inso- ,

far, however, as Da-sein essentially relates himself to beings that he is not

and to the being he himself is, in his Da-sein as such he comes always
already from the manifest nothing.
Da-sein means: being held out into the nothing.
Holding himself out into the nothing, Da-sein is always already
beyond beings as a whole. This being out beyond beings is what we call
transcendence. Did Da-sein not transcend at the ground of his being, did
he not in advance hold himself out into the nothing, he could never
relate himself to beings, hence not even to himself.
Without original manifestness of the nothing, no self-being and no
freedom.
With this, the answer to the question concerning the nothing has
been gained. The nothing is neither an object nor any being at all. The
nothing neither occurs by itself nor side by side with beings to which as it
were it hangs on. The nothing makes possible the manifestness of beings
as such for human here-being. The nothing does not in the first place give
us an opposite concept to beings, but belongs originally to being itself. In
the being of beings happens the negating of the nothing. ( WM, 34-35, W,
11-12, G9, 114-15, P, 90-91, BW, 105-106, EB, 369-70)

This passage has been quoted at length because it brings the most
explicit answer Heidegger gives anywhere to the central question of
Being and Time: How is an understanding of being at all possible to Da-
sein ? The answer, however, is by no means complete nor is it detailed
enough to be without serious difficulties and obscurities. It does not
explain, for instance, how dread individuates Da-sein and brings him
singly before the nothing, and how this is revealed as the nothing of
himself. The whole stress of the present passage falls on how the noth-
ing makes manifest beings as a whole ( das Seiende im Ganzen, literally:
beings in the whole ). Beings show themselves “ in the whole” from their
178 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

sheer otherness to the nothing. Against the nothing, any possible

beings are in advance driven together into a unity, into a wholeness,
from which they must show themselves as beings, not nothing. The
“ not” of the “ not nothing” expresses the manifest difference between
beings and nothing. In understanding this difference, we understand
that beings are. The disclosure of the nothing in dread as the sheer
“ other” to beings is therefore the disclosure of being as the that -to-be.
According to Heidegger, Da-sein alone exists in such a way as to
be brought directly face to face with the nothing. This implies that
— —
being itself the original disclosure of being must necessarily be finite.
While beings can exist in and by themselves, their being, that is, their
difference from the nothing, can manifest itself only when there are
beings like Da-sein who hold themselves out into the nothing in their
finite here-being. That Da-sein directly confronts the nothing of him-
self is his finiteness. His “ that I am ” is therefore a radically different
way of being from the “ that they are” of other kinds of beings. They do
not directly face the nothing of themselves; it is we who hold them out
into their possible nothingness, from which they become manifest as
the beings they are. It is evident, therefore, that the being of beings,
that is, the ontological difference, requires the mediation of Da-sein’s
being-in-the-world for its disclosure. It is at this point that the incom-
pleteness of “ What Is Metaphysics?” becomes obvious. It tells us only
of the transcendence that happens in dread, and of the “ throw” initi-
ated by the nothing as a repulsion or relegation to beings as a whole.
This, however, forms a single, indivisible unity with the “ forethrow, ”
the transcendence to possibilities. The, whole of transendence consti-
tutes the structure of being-in-the-world, which mediates between the
original disclosure of being ( nothing) in dread and the being of beings
—
within the world. This problem the problem of the ontological differ-
—
ence is dealt with in the essay “ On the Essence of Ground.” Its essen-
tial connection with “ What Is Metaphysics? ” is somewhat obscured by
the historical recollection with which Heidegger introduces the prob-
lem of “ ground .” We will not follow up the whole of Heidegger’ s elu-
cidations, but will try to see in what way “ ground-being” is the same as
being-in-the-world , and first of all, how the forethrow of possibilities
—
the transcendence to world forms an indivisible unity with the
—
“ throw ” of the nothing.
As we have seen , the repulsion of the nothing throws Da-sein into
the midst of beings as a whole. His thrownness concretely manifests
itself in attunement. Except for the basic mood of dread , attunement
turns Da-sein toward beings and throws him open to them in different
ways, while at the same time it brings him back to himself , since in
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 179

every feeling Da-sein “ feels himself , ” and thus feeling, finds himself in
the midst of beings. Attunement constitutes the “ world-openness” of
Da-sein’s here-being. But, as “ On the Essence of Ground ” proceeds to
elucidate, it does not constitute the whole world-structure, for in his
thrownness Da-sein is entirely thronged about and pressed in upon by
beings; he lacks any distance to them from which they could become
fully understandable in what they are. Even Da-sein himself cannot
come to full clarity as the self he is unless he can open up a distance to
himself as he already is. This distance, this free dimension of move-
ment, is opened up by the forethrow of the possibilities of how he can
be in the midst of beings. In this, Da-sein once more transcends, goes
out beyond beings as a whole, among them first and foremost himself.
The forethrow of the whole of his possibilities of being is the original
opening up of world.
Now, how does this forethrow form a structural unity with the
throw of thrownness? The throw initiated by the nothing does not
come to a standstill when Da-sein finds that be is already here; it elic-
its the forethrow by driving beyond all “ that” and “ here.” It is the con-
stant threat of the nothing which duly drives Da-sein into going out
beyond what already is by an anticipating projection of what can be. In
dreadingly facing the nothing, he dreads for his own ability-to-be. The
anticipating forethrow of his possibilities is therefore for the sake of him-
self. The world as the whole of his possibilities of being has therefore
the primary and basic character of the for the sake of ( Umwillen ).
At this point, it is helpful to remind ourselves that the German
Umwillen literally means “ for the will of.” This makes it more explicit
that the understanding forethrow of possibilities is originally not a the-
oretical thinking out of what can be or might be, but a “ willing” going
out for it.
This is, of course, perfectly familiar to us from experience. What
makes Heidegger’a talk of the “ forethrow ” strange is only that we do
not ordinarily consider the ontological conditions which make our
daily decisions possible. What lies, for instance, in the decision of my
buying a certain house next year? “ I will buy this house ” means that I
throw this specific possibility ahead of myself without, however, letting
go of it: I hold it out before and toward myself <25 a possibility. But what
is it precisely that is thrown forward in my willing to buy this house?
Obviously, I cannot bodily remove this house or myself into a still non-
realized possibility; what I throw forward is my possible being in relation
to the possible being of this house a year hence. This makes it clear that
all understanding anticipation of possibilities transcends , oversteps
beings as a whole as they are “ here and now.” On the other hand, it is
180 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

also dear that this whole transcendence to possibilities is grounded in

and made possible by the original disclosure of being from the noth-
ing as the sheer “ other” to beings. Were being not already manifest as
the that-to-be, it could never be thrown forward as the can-be.
Now what is it precisely that is “ willed ” in my “ willing” to buy this
house? Not this handy thing, the house itself, which stands there “ in
itself ” independently of my willing, but my possible relation to it. This
possibility, however, is not “ there ” in itself like a thing, but is formed
only in and by my “ willing” it, by my “ being out for it.” Further, I am
not out for the house for its own sake, but as a place for living in; hand-
iness of the house is constituted precisely by its being for something
else than itself. The specific “ what for” of the house, its “ essence, ”
becomes understandable only from the dependent “ for the sake of ” liv-
ing in it. Since our existence is an “ owing” staying and dwelling in a
world, it in advance refers us to such things that may prove to be suit-
able for dwelling places. It is therefore, from the forethrow of possibil-
ities that the beings disclosed as a whole in thrownness become differ-
entiable in what they are, and we ourselves come to clarity both in our
connectedness with and dependence upon them , and in our essential
difference from them.
The whole structure of being-in-the-world is thus constituted by
thrownness into the midst of beings as a whole and the forethrow of
possibilities. But what is it, Heidegger asks, which in its own nature
forms the for the sake of as such? It cannot be a specific “ act of will, ” but
is freedom itself.

The transcendence to world is freedom itself. Accordingly, freedom does

not butt into the “ for the sake of ” as something like a substantial value
—
or aim which is there in and by itself, but freedom holds out as freedom
the “ for the sake oP toward itself. In this transcending holding-out the
—
“ for the sake of ” toward itself man’s here-being comes to pass, so that in
his existence he can be essentially bound to himself, that is, can be a free
self. Herein , however, freedom at once reveals itself as the source of
bindingness and obligation. Freedom alone can let a world rule and world in
man’ s being-here. A world is never, but worlds. ( WG , 43-44, W, 59-60, G9,
163-64, ER, 102-103, P, 126)

The tautological phrase “ the world worlds ” impresses on us that

the world is not of the same order as beings, nor is it the totality of
beings, but is a pure ontological horizon constantly “ formed” by the
forethrow of Da-sein’s possibilities of being. These are, essentially:
being-with others like himself, being-near-to things, and being himself.
All specific, “ provisional ” possibilities, however, are in advance encom-
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 181

passed by the ultimate possibility of death as the sheer impossibility of

being-here-anymore. In this impossibility lies the extreme negativity of
Da-sein’s owing-being; but whereas the nothing of dread reveals itself
as the sheer other to beings ( das Nicht-Seiende ), it negates in death as the
other to being, as not-being ( Nichtsein ). This impassable not- to-be not
only brings all forethrow to a stand, but turns the forward-movement
of Da-sein’ s being back upon itself. In the extreme negativity of death
there lies once more a “ positive ” repulsion , which throws Da-sein back
upon himself and directs him to existence within the limits of his fac-
tical being-in-the-world. The movement of “ back- to-himself ” initiated
by the impenetrable nothing of death will prove to be, as we shall see
presently, the movement of “ primordial time.”
The freedom ( transcendence ) that “ forethrows ” a world as the
whole of Da-sein’s possibilities, is thus essentially finite. The “ binding-
ness” that it makes possible is not an accidental addition to it, but
belongs to its finite structure. Not only is the for the sake of which free-
dom holds out before itself for the sake of being-here- to-the-end, but
even in every provisional possibility freedom must “ end ” itself , that is,
direct itself to an end in which it gathers itself , brings itself to a stand,
finds a firm hold to which it binds itself. Without this self-gathering,
self-binding nature of freedom, Da-sein could never steadfastly endure
against the onrush of change in his factical being-in-the-world.
The finite structure of freedom, however, remains opaque in the
essay “ On the Essence of Ground.” Even less explicit is the temporal
meaning of ground as standing and staying, a self -gathered enduring
or constancy. The latter is hinted at only in a single remark that is eas-
ily passed over unnoticed by even the most attentive reader. Once it is
realized that freedom ( transcendence ) is a going out for an end ( for the
sake of ) in which it gathers itself , brings itself to a stand, while ground
has the temporal character of standingness, constancy, enduringness,
gatheredness, the connection between the two becomes evident at a
stroke. It may now be appreciated why Heidegger maintains that free-
dom is not merely one specific kind of “ ground ” or “ cause, ” as in
Kant’s thought, where the spontaneity of free-will is contrasted with the
causality of nature. According to Heidegger, freedom is the “ origin ” of
ground as such ( WG, 44, W, 60, G9, 165, ER, 104 , P, 127). This means
that something like ground or cause could not be understandable at all
without the disclosure that happens in the transcendence of being-in-
the-world.

— —
The “ original ” that is, the originating relation of freedom to
ground is called by Heidegger “ grounding, ” ( Gründen ). This is scat-
tered into three specific ways: 1. grounding as founding ( Stiften ) ; 2.
182 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

grounding as taking ground or gaining ground ( Bodennehmen ); 3.

grounding as proving or accounting for { Begründen ). This threefold
scattering or strewing of ground is not accidental but corresponds to
— —
the three modes of time future, past, and present for transcendence
( freedom ) itself is rooted in the timeish structure of care.
The first grounding is nothing other than the “ founding” of
world in the fore throw of the for the sake of as such . The horizon of pos-
sibilities formed in and by transcending freedom opens up the dis-
tance between how Da-sein already is and how he can be. This distance
is the dimension of “ free play” ( Spielraum ) in which a free existence can
hold himself. It gives Da-sein not only the dimension into which he can
advance at all, but in holding out the for the sake of before him , it gives
him a direction and end ( the ground, the reason for ) to which he can
keep himself. Thus the transcending of beings, of what already is, is not
a blind, directionless stumbling forward into “ unbounded ” possibilities
of being, but is in advance guided by the for the sake of as the primary
“ ground ” ( reason for ).
Furthermore, the forethrow of possibilities is in advance
grounded in thrownness. Attunement makes manifest to Da-sein his
“ that I am” in the midst of beings which surround him, press in on him,
occupy him , and tune him through and through. Da-sein’ s attuned
finding himself among beings belongs essentially to his transcending
way of being; it constitutes the “ soil,” the firm base for all forethrow.
In belonging among beings as a whole, freedom “ takes ground,” gains
a firm stand , so that human Da-sein gains a steady foothold in the fact
of what already is and has been. Facticity and possibility constitute the
single structural whole of transcendence as freedom.
In facticity, however, there lies an essential denial or withdrawal
of certain definite possibilities; for example Da-sein has been thrown
into one definite “ historical situation,” and so on. The indefiniteness
that essentially belongs to the possibilities of Da-sein’s existence has
been limited by facticity, which has always already decided for a this
and not that, a so and not otherwise. This withdrawing and limiting
function of facticity is overreached and exceeded by possibilities,
which are in their nature “ richer ” than what is already possessed. In the
essential interplay between facticity and possibility there is thus a con-
stant tension and discrepancy. From this tension springs the question
Why? Why this and not that? Why so and not otherwise? Why anything
at all and not rather nothing? With these questions, Da-sein addresses
himself to making manifest beings in themselves, that is, to ontic truth.
In all these questions, however, there lies already the foregoing under-
—
standing of what-being, how-being, and being ( nothing ) ontological
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 183

truth, which makes all ontic truth first of all possible. This under-
standing of being is formed and articulated in transcendence. It gives
the foregoing answer, the first and last “ ground ” ( reason ) to all why-
questions. Transcendence is thus in itself a “ ground-giving,” for in it is
revealed being, which is the ultimate ground and origin of the why-
question we ask in the ontic discovery of beings. The transcendental
origin of the “ why” in advance directs Da-sein to ask beings to “ prove
themselves, ” to “ give an account of themselves, ” by showing the
“ ground, ” or “ cause” for being as they are. In being “ proved ” and
“ accounted for, ” beings come to stand on a firm ground ; their well-
founded truth is stable and holds good, it can be counted on and relied
upon amidst the pressure of uncertainty and change. But just because
all ontic “ proving” and “ giving the reason for ” springs from the free-
dom of Da-sein’s finite transcendence, he can also throw evidence to
the wind, he can suppress the demand for justification and proof , or
distort and disguise it ( WG, 48-49, W, 64-65, G9, 169-70, ER, 114-15,
P, 130-31).
The preceding interpretation of freedom as a threefold ground-
ing has made it much more explicit than the rest of the essay does that
in all grounding there lies the tendency to hold and stabilize, to gather
and bind into a steadfast enduringness. This interpretation , far from
being arbitrary, only follows up the easily overlooked hint the essay
itself gives us. At this point , Heidegger himself raises the question of
whether the three very different ways of grounding have not been arbi-
trarily brought together under the title of “ ground.” Do they have any-
thing more in common than an “ artificial and playful community of
the sound of words? Or are the three ways of grounding at least in one
— —
respect although each in a different way identical? ” Indeed they are;
though, as Heidegger hastens to add, their common meaning cannot
be elucidated on the “ level” of the present treatise. Nevertheless, Hei-
degger proceeds to give us a brief but invaluable hint: each of the three
ways of grounding springs from “ the care of endurance and stability”
( .Beständigkeit und Bestand , WG, 51, W, 67, G9, 171, ER, 122, P, 132 ).
It is important to note that the core of both of Heidegger’s words
comes from stehen, to stand. In an ontological- temporal sense, “ to
stand ” means both the “ standing- there, ” the immediate presence ( exis-
tentia ) of something, and its “ staying in presentness, ” its constancy,
enduringness as itself. It is easy to see that these are the basic charac-
ters of the traditional idea of the substance, or what is for Heidegger
the same thing, of the subject. “ Standing presentness” { ständige Anwesen-
heit ) is, according to Heidegger, the temporal meaning of the central
concept of being in traditional ontology ( EM , 154 , G 40, 211, IM, 168) .
184 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Basic to the idea of substantiality ( ousia ) is an enduring self-sameness,

an identity that maintains itself through movement and change and so
—
“ underlies” that is, lies to the ground of and is constantly present in-
all alteration and becoming. This traditional idea of being, as we can
now see, has its existential origin in the freedom ( transcendence ) of
Da-sein’s being-in-the-world.
But just because Da-sein’s being-in- the-world is care, he cannot
“ stand as himself ’ merely in the indifferent duration of a self-same sub-
stance or subject. His “ self-standingness ” is constituted by the whole
transcending movement of care as the thrown forethrow. His thrown-
ness into his “ here” already throws him forward into the ultimate pos-
sibility of not-being-here; he stands as already stretched out between
the extreme limits of his being, which throw him forward and back
upon himself. The “ care of endurance and stability” is therefore not of
a sheer changeless duration but of a self-gathered steadfastness in the
movement of a thrown being. All the three ways in which freedom is a
“ grounding, ” as we can now see more clearly, are ways in which care
gathers and limits itself, finds a hold and steadiness in the movement
of its finiteness.
The traditional idea of substantiality, on the other hand, has
grown from a question of being which, according to Heidegger, is not
original and fundamental enough and which, in the course of history,
has run further and further away from its source. Heideggéf ’ a well-
known attacks on the idea of “ substance, ” most particularly in the “ sec-
ond phase” of his thought, are directed especially against its degener-
ate and impoverished form in the modern age of technology, which has
reduced the being of beings to a sheer calculable persistence for a cal-
culating-representing subject. The bitterness of Heidegger’a attacks
may indeed easily give rise to the impression that he wants to “ elimi-
nate” all notions of “ standingness ” and “ presentness” from the idea of
being. This impression, however, must be treated with great caution,
for neither Heidegger nor any other thinker has the power to “ elimi-
nate” what belongs to being itself; he can only try to lead it back to its
origin and show it within its proper limits.
Something like constancy and self-standingness, however, evi-
dently belongs to being, for it alone can make beings identifiable in
what they are. The identifiability of beings, according to Heidegger’s
own interpretation, belongs to the disclosing function of world. This
can be unambiguously documented by the following passage.

“ Da-sein transcends ” means: he is in the essence of his being world-form-

ing [ weltbildend ], and that in several senses: he lets a world come to pass,
 Witness to an Owned. Existence and Authentic Resolution 185

and with the world gives himself an original view (image, Bild ) , which is
not itself grasped, but which nonetheless functions as a pre-view [ Vor-
bild ] of all manifest beings, among which each existing Da-sein himself
belongs. ( WG, 39, W, 55, G9, 158, ER, 89, P, 123)

This sentence is not only obscure, but is surprising, for until now
we have heard only that the world is “ formed ” by the forethrow of the
for the sake of the possibilities of Da-sein’s being. But now this sentence-
—
obscure as it may be in all other respects clearly tells us that the world
itself gives us a kind of “ pre-view, ” an “ original image ” of beings, from
which they become recognizable as beings. How this happens, Hei-
degger does not explain. A certain pointer, however, may be found in
Heidegger’s Rant-interpretation, especially of the “ transcendental
object” and of the principle of the “ anticipations of perception ” ( KPM,
113ff., G 3, 121ff., KPM( E ) , 82ff; FD, 167ff., G 41, 217ff., WT, 214ff.).
Since, however, Kant’s thought moves in the dimension, albeit tran-
scendental dimension, of subjectivity-objectivity, its interpretation
must on no account be directly identified with Heidegger’ s own
thought. Nonetheless, with due precautions and reservations, we can
take a hint from it to explain the above passage in the following way.
In the forethrow of the for the sake of freedom gives itself a direc-
tion in which to advance, and at the same time, gathers itself , brings
itself to a stand in an “ end.” Every near and far “ aim” forms a kind of
limit within the direction of advance, but at the same time indicates the
possibility of further advance. So, for instance, my intention to buy a
house forms a provisional limit, but it already invites further progress
in the same direction; for example, planning how to furnish the house
after buying it. All forethrow of such provisional, “ realizable ” ends,
however, is in advance encompassed by the ultimate possibility of not-
-
being-here-anymore. This not to-be stands before us as a constant and
impassable limit to any further advance. In forming an unchanging,
impenetrable horizon to all our coming and going, it gives us an orig-
inal “ view ” of an impenetrable, standing “ something.” It is only
because we always already have an impassable horizon in view as a
“ something” that resists us that we can recognize and identify a con-
crete something as something when it meets us within the world.
Although this interpretation cannot be “ proved ” to correspond
to Heidegger’ s intentions, it can be at least indirectly confirmed. In
his analysis of dread , Heidegger calls the world the most original, pri-
mordial “ something” (SZ, 187 ). Since the world as a pure horizon cer-
tainly cannot “ originate ” concrete, ontic beings in the sense of “ pro-
ducing” them , it can only give us an “ image ” from which they become
186 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

understandable as the beings they are. This is only possible if the

horizon itself shows itself in its constancy and standingness as the
original “ something.”
A further confirmation for this interpretation may be found in
Heidegger’ s “ idea of being as such ( what- and how-being, something,
nothing, and negativity ) ” ( WG, 52, W, 69, G9, 175, ER, 125, P, 133).
This “ idea of being” is evidently the same as the “ clarified concept of
being” to which repeated reference is made in Being and Time, and
which was to have been finally “ clarified ” in Division Three. What is
immediately striking in it is the apparent incongruity of the “ some-
thing.” What can the “ something” be if it is not a formal concept of
beings as such? But if it is a concept of beings, what business does it
have in the idea of being as such?
It would certainly have no business there if it were merely an ontic
concept, a generalization abstracted from the concrete beings that hap-
pen to be accessible to us. Its only justification to be in the “ idea of
being” at all is that it is not an ontic but an ontological concept which
in advance lies in all our meeting with concrete beings, and makes
them first of all understandable as the “ self-standing” beings they are.
How has this interpolation helped to clarify Heidegger’s elucida-
tions of “ owing” ? It has shown that “ ground-being ” and being-in-the-
world are the same, insofar as care is the care of stabilizing its own
movement as the thrown forethrow. Further, it has unfolded the “ pos-
itive ” function of the nothing which makes Da-sein’s being as care pos-
sible. What has not come into view so far is the emphatic recurrence
of the never, which we have noted in Heidegger’s elucidation of Da-
sein’s owing being. On this point, unfortunately, Heidegger gives us no
help at all. Nonetheless, we have every justification to think that if the
never has a real significance in the context, it must have an important
bearing on both the constitutive characters of “ owing,” namely on its
negativity and its “ standingness,” which has turned out to be the tem-
poral meaning of ground.
Nothing could be more obvious than the negative character of
the never , for it sheerly denies us any “ when.” Yet just as the nothing
does not “ annihilate ” beings, but brings them to light in their sheer
“ otherness, ” so the never does not annihilate time, but brings the sheer
“ whenness ” purely to light. And just as we cannot “ deduce ” the noth-
ing from beings, it is even more impossible to “ deduce ” the never from
the usual concept of time as an endless succession of nows. To do this,
we would have to think of time as a whole and then negate it ; but since
the “ flow of nows ” is beginningless and endless, it is in principle impos-
sible to think of it as a whole. Indeed , as soon as we begin to consider
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 187

the never, we are led to the surprising conclusion that it cannot be

explained from the usual conception of an endless, “ linear ” time at all,
but must belong to a more original time.
Further, is not the never something like a “ standing” time? Does
it not show the “ standing of its self ’ in a much more original way than
the constantly present “ now ” in an endless succession of indifferent
nows? The never does not give us an “ image” of an indifferent,
unchanging presence, but brings instantly home to us unchangeability
itself . It is the never that gives us originally to understand our
unchangeable impotence to be the origin and master of our own here-
being. It has, therefore, the same repelling character as the nothing. It
totally repels any attempt to go “ past it” or “ beyond it, ” and so turns us
to the definite “ when ” of our factical staying in the world. It is precisely
the unmovability of the never that “ moves” us to grasp our factical,
finite, measurable possibilities. The never itself is immeasurable in the
same way as the nothing: it keeps our finite “ measuring” sheerly away
from itself.
As even these few reflections show, the never must indeed have
an important bearing on the problem of Da-sein’s owing-being as the
not-determined ground of a negativity. The fact that Heidegger does
not elucidate it any further in the course of his analysis of temporality
in Division Two seems to indicate that a special role was reserved for
it; perhaps it was intended to be the hinge on which Being and Time
“ turns round ” to Time and Being.

4. OWING, GUILT, AND MORALITY:

THE AUTHENTIC HEARING OF THE CALL OF CONSCIENCE AND THE
EXISTENTIAL STRUCTURE OF OWNED OR AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE

The “ free will ” that is the precondition of Da-sein’s “ moral self ” has now
been shown to lie in the transcending structure of being-in-the-world.
The finite freedom of this transcendence forms and articulates the man-
—
ifold ways in which Da-sein “ owes ” that is, is the not-determined ground
of a negativity. The “ owing being” to which conscience summons Da-sein
has therefore a positive ground-character, which makes possible a
responsible decision and is at the same time permeated with negativity,
which in advance refers Da-sein to others than himself, as those to whom
he is “ owing.” The finite freedom of this positive-negative ground-being
is the existential condition of the possibility of the moral “ good” and
“ bad ,” that is, of morality as such and of the concrete forms morality can
take in Da-sein’s factical being-in-the-world (SZ, 286 ).
188 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

How the various forms of morality arise and how Da sein gains
a concrete insight into the being of the good and bad are problems to
which Heidegger takes up a strikingly evasive position. He merely
repudiates the traditional concepts of the “ good ” and of “ values, ” as
well as the concept of the bad as a “ privation of the good, ” on the
ground that they have been drawn from the traditional idea of being
as substantial reality ( Vorhandenheit ) . But any positive indication of
how good and bad may be distinguished is remarkably lacking in Being
and Time . It leaves it open to us to suppose that the “ good ” comes to
light with the original disclosure of being, which “ throws” us into our
being-in- the- world, and that is why the possibility of being-in -the-world
has the basic character of the for the sake of . But in this disclosure, the
nothing “ negates ” in the extremest way, and this, presumably, brings
the “ bad ” cooriginally to light. These suppositions seem to be con-
firmed by Heidegger’s “ Letter on ‘Humanism’ ” published twenty
years after Being and Time, assuming that we can identify what Hei-
degger calls the Heile, the wholesome, the healing, the holy, with the
source of the “ good,” and the Grimmige, the grim, with the source of
the “ bad ” ( HU, 112ff., W, 189ff., G9, 359ff., P, 272ff., BW, 237ff.). But
even if we can justifiably draw on this later work for explaining what
Being and Time leaves unsaid, it still gives us nothing more precise than
the widest of generalizations. Just because the for the sake of being-in-
the-world comprehends in itself all the ways in which Da-sein can fac-
tually be, and these ways are capable of a wide range of modifications,
we need a much more precise guidance as to which of these ways we
ought to bind ourselves to as “ good” and which we are to reject as
“ bad.” According to the “ Letter on ‘Humanism’ , ” insofar as Da-sein
— —
ek-sists “ stands out into the truth of being” being itself allots to him
those “ directions ” (Weisungen) that must become law and rule for him
-
( HU, 114, W, 191-92, G9, 360-61, P, 274, BW, 238 39 ). Here Hei-
degger himself admits the necessity for “ law and rule, ” which mani-
fests itself in Da-sein’ s being as the “ care of standingness and stabil-
ity. ” He contradicts himself , therefore, when in his analysis of
conscience he rejects the demands for concrete ethical “ norms and
rules,” which , Heidegger here says, arise from an everyday under-
standing, incapable of anything more than business dealings, and
which demands a handy rule and norm in the mutual settling of
accounts and obligations ( SZ, 288, 292ff. ). But, on Heidegger’s own
showing, the necessity of rules and laws does not arise merely from
disowned existence and its supposed incomprehension, but from the
original “ directions” of being itself, which “ directs ” us to bind our-
selves to something that holds and steadies us.
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 189

In view of the fundamental-ontological aim of Being and Time, it

is true, we cannot demand from it a fully worked out “ ethics ” any more
than a “ physics.” But what we can demand from it is to show us the
bridge on which we can cross from the original disclosure of being, as
the ultimate foundation of morality, to the concrete ethical principles
that are binding on us in our factical existence. It is this bridge that is
so strikingly lacking in Being and Time.
Even Heidegger’s later works show the same reluctance to enter
concretely into the problem of ethics, which leads him into renewed
contradictions. So, for instance, in the “ Letter on ‘Humanism’, ” Hei-
degger seeks to justify his own negative position by referring to the
early Greek thinkers, who also knew no philosophical discipline called
“ ethics,” and yet were anything but “ unethical.” As an illustration, Hei-
degger quotes a story about Heraclitus, who, on being found by visit-
ing strangers warming himself in front of a baking oven, encouraged
them to enter with the words, “ Also here the gods are present” ( HU,
107ff., W, 185ff., G9, 355ff., P, 269ff., BW, 233ff.). But this story, far
from supporting Heidegger’s position, only shows up its weakness. It is
just because the present technical age, as Heidegger himself stresses, is
characterized by a growing rootlessness and a complete absence of “ the
God,” that even the most makeshift norms and rules of conduct must
be carefully nurtured and preserved ( HU, 105, W, 183-84, G9, 353-54,
P, 268, BW, 231-32 ).
But, it may be asked, does Heidegger not give us in Being and
Time at least one example of a positive ethical decision? If conscience
calls Da sein back from his disownment and summons him to take over
his existence as his own, this cannot be a merely abstract, theoretical
disclosure, but is a call to the most basic ethical decision Da sein is
capable of making. Indeed, Heidegger himself explicitly acknowledges
that his ontological interpretation of existence is based on a definite
ontic conception of owned existence, on “ a factical ideal of Da-sein.”
This fact, moreover, has a positive necessity, considering that it is Da-
sein’s being that is the thematic subject of the inquiry (SZ, 310 ). It can
be easily understood why, from the philosophical point of view, owned
existence must be the “ highest, ” the “ worthiest ” way of being: because
in it Da-sein most completely fulfills his “ essence,” his “ destiny” of exist-
ing as the “ place” in which the disclosure of being, that is, original
truth, concretizes itself. Standing-in- the-truth has of old been the philo-
sophical “ ideal ” of the highest kind of “ life.”
As against this ideal the self -disguising flight of everyday exis-
tence into disownment to “ them ” must necessarily be a lower and less
worthy way of existing. But, here again , Heidegger constricts himself
190 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

into contradictions, for instead of acknowledging this necessity, he

explicitly disclaims any intention of a “ moralizing criticism” of every-
day Da-sein (SZ, 167). The disclaimer notwithstanding, we must main-
tain that Heidegger is in fact making a concrete ethical distinction
between owned and disowned existence; the very tone of rejection and
contempt in which he speaks of the disowned “ oneself ’ ( Man-selbst ) is
itself an ethical indictment. The fact that Heidegger makes such ethi-
cal judgments is in itself perfectly in order, and indeed unavoidable;
what is objectionable is that it leads him into a onesided and tenden-
tious representation of the everyday self and his understanding. Prac-
tically all the examples selected by Heidegger show everyday being-
together as a scene of, at best, indifference, at worst, backbiting,
malice, and cowardice, not to speak of the exaggerated lack of com-
prehension Heidegger ascribes to the common understanding. While
Heidegger’s illustrations cannot be rejected as untrue, they certainly
present only one side of the picture. Nowhere does the onesidedness
of Heidegger’s presentation come more jarringly to the fore than in his
descriptions of the everyday experience and understanding of con-
science. Let us consider briefly a few points from the “ criticisms”
which, according to Heidegger, may be raised against the existential
interpretation from the side of everyday experience.
In the first place, the objection might be made that the essential
interpretation makes no distinction either between the “ reprimand-
ing” and the “ warning” conscience, or between the “ good ” and “ bad ”
conscience. Heidegger first considers the last objection, pointing out
—
that in all interpretations conscience is primarily “ bad ” a sign that
conscience is to be understood as something like a “ being guilty”
( owing). But how is this “ being guilty” to be understood.

The “ experience of conscience” turns up after the deed has been done
or left undone. The voice follows up the transgression and points back
to the event through which Da-sein has burdened itself with guilt. If con-
science makes known a “ being guilty, ” this cannot occur as a summons
to . . . , but as a pointing that reminds us of the guilt incurred. (SZ, 290 )

In this interpretation, Heidegger observes, the whole experience

of conscience is presented as a series of occurrences which take place
one after the other, so that the “ voice” has its own “ place ” after the
event. What Heidegger has in view here is the time-structure of real
happenings, which occur as a sequence in a linear, one-dimensional
now-time. This time-structure, however, is not the original one of care,
in which Da-sein is constantly ahead-of-himself in such a way that he at
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 191

the same time is turned back toward his thrownness. How does Hei-
degger explain the undoubted experience of the “ voice ” as following
the deed ? He maintains that the actual guilty deed is only the occasion
for hearing the call, for wakening the conscience that sleeps. The
everyday explanation, however, does not get the full existential phe-
nomenon into view, but stops halfway when it sees only a series of hap-
penings one after the other. Conscience, to be sure, calls back, but
beyond the committed deed back to the original owing-being which
lies in Da-sein’s thrownness. At the same time, it calls him forward to
the ability-to-be-owing of his existence, which he is summoned to take
over as his own. It is only as this forward-calling recall that conscience
shows the original structure of care.
As against Heidegger’ s criticism of the everyday interpretation
of conscience as existentially insufficient, we may ask whether he
himself gets the whole ontic-existentiell experience into view. We must
answer No, because the “ voice” does not merely castigate us for a
committed deed; it calls for something like restitution and a firm res-
olution to become better in the future. The call for restitution and
resolution to change ourselves essentially belongs to a genuine and
full experience of conscience. Both common understanding and reli-
gious-ethical teaching reject an experience which is a mere, often self-
indulgent, wallowing in remorse, and insist that the proper “ hearing”
of the voice lies in how we act on it. This will turn out to be not vastly
different from Heidegger’ s own interpretation of the “ authentic”
hearing of the call. Furthermore, when the whole ontic-existentiell
phenomenon of conscience is taken into account, as a call for a
repenting and restituting resolution, its “ structure ” turns out to be
nothing other than a forward -calling recall. It is only because Hei-
degger takes hold of merely a fragment of the genuine experience
that he can find it to be so deficient in comparison with the existen-
tial interpretation. Similarly, his criticism of the “ warning” con-
science as being merely a reference to some future deed will not hold
water, because it again ignores the full phenomenon. He does not ask
how conscience “ warns” and how it alone can warn. It can warn solely
by bringing us to ourselves as we already are and have been and by
accusing us of being already guilty of and responsible for intending
evil. Here again the forward -calling recall structure of conscience
comes to light, as indeed it must do in every concrete experience, if
Heidegger’s existential interpretation is true and not merely an arbi-
trary invention.
One fundamental difference between existentiell experience and
the existential interpretation must certainly be admitted. The latter
192 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

aims at exposing the last ontological foundations that make the con-
crete experience first of all possible. The former have no such inten-
tion , and it is questionable whether it can be rightly accused of short-
comings because of this. The proper sphere of everyday understanding
is the concrete situation and the action it demands. This seems to be a
much truer reason for its preoccupation with “ what ought I to do? ”
than its incapability, as Heidegger avers, to comprehend anything
beyond a businesslike taking care of things. Besides, here again Hei-
degger contradicts what he himself says elsewhere. In his analysis of
everyday being-together, he showed that Da-sein’s caring-for other exis-
tences has a completely different character from his taking care of
things. While the latter is guided by Umsicht , a circumspection that dis-
covers what things are for, the former is guided by Rücksicht, a consid-
erate regard for the other’s thrownness , and by Nachsicht , a forbearing
looking-after the other as a self (SZ, 123). These ways of “ seeing” of
—
understanding which guide Da-sein’s relations to other selves, must be
—
alive already in his everyday existence and must disclose to him in some
way that his “ dealings” with other existences are different from his
makings and doings with things. Insufficient and even wrong as the
explicit explanations given by everyday understanding may be from the
existential-ontological point of view, there is no evidence to show that
it cannot distinguish at all Da-sein’s relation to himself and to other
selves from his relation to things. And the further question arises
whether everyday understanding can be justifiably criticized for its
ontological shortcomings when its own proper sphere lies in the con-
crete situation. Heidegger himself seems to feel that some kind of dis-
tinction is necessary, for at the end of his criticisms he suddenly adds
that the existential insufficiency of the everyday understanding of con-
science is no judgment on the existentiell “ moral quality ” of the self who
holds himself to it.

Just as existence is not necessarily and directly jeopardized by an onto-

logically insufficient understanding of conscience, the existentiell under-
standing of the call is not guaranteed by an existentially adequate inter-
pretation of conscience either. Seriousness is no less possible in the
vulgar experience of conscience than is a lack of seriousness in a more
primordial understanding of conscience. (SZ, 295)

The clear distinction Heidegger draws in this paragraph, though

somewhat belated , will prove to be helpful when we come to consider
the precise nature of the change that is brought about by an authentic
hearing, that is, understanding of the call. In what does this authentic
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 193

understanding lie? Before answering this question, Heidegger pro-

ceeds to gather up the results of the whole preceding investigation.
The following paragraph is the final summary of what conscience gives
Da-sein to understand and how it gives him to understand it.

The call is the call of care. Being guilty constitutes the being that we call
care. Da-sein stands primordially together with itself in uncanniness.
Uncanniness brings this being face to face with its undisguised nullity,
which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In
that Da-sein as care is concerned about its being, it calls itself as a they
that has factically fallen prey, and calls itself from its uncanniness to its
potentiality-of-being. The summons calls back by calling forth: forth to
the possibility of taking over in existence the thrown being that it is, back
to the thrownness in order to understand it as the null ground that it has
to take up into existence. The calling back in which conscience calls forth
—
gives Da-sein to understand that Da-sein itself as the null ground of its
—
null project , standing in the possibility of its being must bring itself
back to itself from its lostness in the they, and this means that it is guilty
[ owing ]. (SZ, 286-87 )

It will be noticed that in this paragraph Heidegger refers twice

to the “ standing” of Da-sein. As the preceding interpolation has
shown, this “ standing” is the basic temporal character of “ being the
ground.” What , then, does it mean that in his not-at-homeness, Da-
sein stands primordially together with himself ? It means that the
authentic way in which Da-sein “ grounds himself ’ and grows firm roots
in his thrownness is not by turning away from it and disowning him-
self to other beings, but by steadfastly enduring its threatening nega-
tivity as belonging to his own self and setting it free for its possibili-
ties. And how does Da-sein authentically “ stand ” in the possibility of
his being? Not by “ standing off ’ from others and measuring himself
by the distance that separates his possibilities from theirs, but by
opening up the distance between himself and his own utmost possi-
bility, which reveals his extremest “ guilt ” or “ owing.” Only this can
give him the final certainty of himself and the end that can steadily
guide him in the choice of the “ realizable ” possibilities of his single
being-in-the-world.
The cited paragraph first defines what conscience is and what it
calls. It then tells us how it calls: it does not inform Da-sein of his owing-
being as of an indifferent fact, which he can acknowledge or ignore,
but calls to him that he shall, that he owes it to bring himself back from
his lostness, and so to gather himself , to come to “ stand in himself ’ as
his own ground .
194 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

It would seem, then, that in summoning Da-sein to a decision

about how he is to be, conscience itself gives him his first “ ought.”
Although Heidegger does not explicitly say this, the “ ought ” is clearly
implied in the “ zur ückholen soll, ” “ must bring ( himself ) back , ” for the
German “ sollen ” expresses our “ ought.” This is the justification for
translating the “ schuldig ist, ” which follows the “ soil ” as an explanation
of it, by “ he owes it, ” instead of by [as in the translation cited here] the
—
more usual “ he is guilty” a rendering that can be fitted into the con-
text only with the greatest difficulty. But apart from the always dis-
putable translation of a somewhat ambiguous text, it is evident that
conscience must bring Da-sein before the original “ must ” or “ ought, ”
and this for two reasons. First, because conscience does not merely
inform Da-sein of his owing-being, but summons him , demands from
him to take it over for himself. It is in this demanding character of the
call that the “ ought” lies. Second, because the proper understanding of
the call cannot lie merely in cognizing “ what ” it says, but lies in a deci-
sion. This decision first of all enables Da-sein to exist as a fully moral
being, whose “ I ought” springs from his own self and not from a half-
hearted submission to what is prescribed for him by others. Without
this response to the summons of conscience, Da-sein cannot become
even properly “ guilty” in his factical existence, for he has failed to
accept full responsibility for his not-self-given self. Only when his abo-
—
riginal, inalienable “ guilty ” that is, the negativity of his finiteness has
been accepted, can he be authentically good or bad within the limits of
—
his finiteness.

Then the correct hearing of the summons is tantamount to understand-

ing oneself in one’s oummost potentiality-of-being, that is, in projecting
oneself upon one’s ownmost authentic potentiality for becoming guilty.
When Da-sein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibil-
ity, this includes its becoming free for the call: its readiness for the poten-
tiality-of-being summoned. Understanding the call, Da-sein listens to its
ownmost possibility of existence. It has chosen itself. (SZ, 287 )

This is the first time that something like a concrete choice, an “ I

will, ” becomes explicit in Being and Time . In view of the controversial
question of whether there is a radical change or only a development
between Heidegger’s “ early ” and “ late” thought , it is helpful to note
that already in Being and Time the first ontic choice, the most basic
concretization of Da-sein’s freedom , is an answer to a call which Da-
sein cannot choose and dispose of . This is emphasized by Heidegger
when he proceeds to unfold the meaning of the authentic response to
the call:
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 195

Understanding the call is choosing, but it is not a choosing of con-

science, which as such cannot be chosen . What is chosen is having a con-
science as being free for one’s ownmost being-guilty [owing]. Under-
standing the summons means: wanting to have a conscience. (SZ, 288)

This passage makes explicit what was already remarked in pass-

ing; namely that the decision, the choice, is not something in addition
to and subsequent to a “ theoretical ” understanding of the call, but that
the understanding is in itself the choosing, the “ willing.” This “ willing
understanding” is indeed nothing other than the concretization in an —
—
authentic way of the freedom which transcends to a world and a “ will-
ing going out for ” the possibilities of existence.
At this stage, an important point must be briefly mentioned. In
the modern metaphysics of subjectivity, the will-character of being has
come to ever greater predominance, from Kant onward through Ger-
man idealism and Nietzsche to its final embodiment in the present age
of technology, whose naked “ will ” to unlimited control and mastery
over beings as a whole has become unmistakable . In view of this dom-
inant trend, it cannot be sufficiently emphasized that in Heidegger’s
thought the “ will-character ” of man’s transcendence ( freedom ) to
world is not the “ ultimate, ” but is itself grounded in the throw of the
nothing which throws him into his forethrowing way of being. Insofar,
therefore, as his transcendence to world is a “ willing” going out beyond
beings as a whole, it is itself made possible by a throw that does not
have a will-character.
But if the ontological will-character of care is not its dominant
and ultimate constituent, even less is it subject to any ontic choice on
Da-sein’s part, for his own being is the last thing he can will or dispose
of. This is what is meant by Heidegger when he points out that con-
—
science itself cannot be chosen for it belongs to Da-sein’s being as
care. Da sein can only be willing to have conscience. The “ having”
implies a holding, a keeping; an authentic understanding of conscience
does not let go of its call as though it were a mere occurrence, but
keeps itself in constant readiness , is steadfastly willing to be called for-
ward to the owing which lies in his own existence. This readiness to be
summoned to himself, however, represents phenomenally the owned
way of existing. Its ontic possibility has now been attested by conscience,
to which an authentic hearing of the call essentially belongs.
In his willingness to have conscience, Da-sein’s here-being is dis-
closed in a preeminent way. Disclosedness ( truth ) , however, is the most
fundamental essential character of care. The disclosedness which lies
in an authentic understanding of the call is constituted by the fore-
196 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

throw of Da-sein’ s ownmost possibility of owing, by the basic mood of

dread which reveals the not-at-homeness from which care calls, and by
the silence in which it calls as the original mode of speech. The call
“ comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness and calls Da-sein thus
summoned back to the stillness of itself ’ (SZ, 296 ). He who is willing
to have conscience understands the call appropriately in a reticent
—
silence. This eminent, authentic disclosure of his being-there the reti-
—
cent, dreading self forethrow to his ownmost owing-being is called by
Heidegger “ resoluteness” ( Entschlossenheit ). More precisely, Heideg-
ger’ s word means both resoluteness and utmost disclosedness. The
ambivalence is essential, for it expresses that the authentic mode of
care is the most original truth of existence, and that this can concretize
itself only in the resolute choice on the part of a factically existing Da-
sein. The truth of his own existence is not a distant and hidden piece
of knowledge which he has to find through long researches and intel-
lectual efforts; on the contrary, it is given to him by conscience. What
is demanded from each Da-sein is the resoluteness to open himself to
the call, to let himself be told of himself.
This interpretation of resoluteness makes a clear distinction, a
distinction unfortunately not explicitly made by Heidegger in this con-
—
nection between an existentiell-ontic and an existential-ontological
understanding. According to our interpretation, a resolute hearing of
the call requires only the former, which, of course, always includes an
implicit, untheoretical understanding of being. This can be perfectly
genuine and sufficient without any explicit, theoretical-ontological
insight. The latter is the business of the philosopher, and philosophy is
always the concern of the comparatively few. Owned existence, on the
other hand, is the possibility of Da-sein as Da-sein; it would be absurd
to suppose that it depended on any specific theoretical interests, nor
does Heidegger’s analysis in the least lead to such a conclusion. But the
height of absurdity would be to assume that a specific existential phi-
—
losophy is the precondition of owned existence an assumption which
nonetheless seems to be tacitly made by numerous existentialistic writ-
ers, who appear to imagine that a “ philosophizing” about choice, self,
nothingness, and so on, no matter how facile and half-baked it may be
and often is, is the hallmark of an authentic self.
Heidegger’ s elucidation of owned existence is sober and bare in
the extreme , and almost inevitably, something of an anticlimax. There
is no outward drama in turning from disownment to the most “ pri-
mordial truth of existence, ” nothing that could be depicted as a star-
tling happening . Heidegger’ s first concern is to recall to his readers
what precisely is to be understood by the “ truth of existence.” As has
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 197

already been shown in Division One, truth in the existential sense is

not primarily a quality of judgments ( propositions ) , nor of any spe-
cific ways in which Da-sein relates himself to beings ( e.g., as in a theo-
retical-scientific approach to them ), but is primarily a fundamental
character of being-in-the-worid itself. The constitutive moments of
this structure, namely the world, the being-in , and the self as the “ I
am, ” are cooriginally disclosed by an attuned-articulating understand-
ing. From the significant reference-whole of the world, Da-sein already
refers himself to the things which meet him within it. These things are
originally discovered in their interconnected relevance, their handi-
ness for this and that. The significance-structure of the world is,
indeed, nothing but the understanding anticipation ( forethrow ) of
how the beings to be met within it can be related both to each other
and to Da-sein’s existence. The for the sake of Da-sein’ s own existence is
the ultimate ground from which the whole significant chain of refer-
ences spring and to which they lead back. The possibilities of finding
shelter, livelihood, and advancement, for the sake of which Da-sein is
constantly ahead-of -himself, are in the first place guided by “ one’s ”
lostness among “ them, ” who have always already decided about these
average possibilities of existing in the mutually shared “ world” upon
which each Da-sein is dependent.
Now, what happens when the lost “ oneself ’ is summoned by con-
science and the call is resolutely answered ? Apparently, nothing hap-
pens; the factical world in which Da-sein lives is not changed , his daily
occupations, his circle of friends and acquaintances are not exchanged
for others, and yet his care- taking being-near-to things and his caring-
for being-with others are now primarily determined not by the possi-
bilities prescribed by “ them, ” but from the resolutely grasped possibil-
ities of his own self.
Resoluteness as authentic self-being does not cut Da-sein off from
his world, does not isolate him from others, but, on the contrary, first
of all enables him genuinely to-be-in- the-world . The resoluteness to
himself makes it possible for Da-sein to “ let the others be” in their own
existence and to help to disclose it to them in a “ liberating” caring for
them which “ leaps ahead” of them ( vorspringend-befreiende Fürsorge ).
The resoluteness of an owned existence can become the “ conscience”
of others. The authentic being- together-with-others can only spring
from owned existence, and not, as Heidegger remarks with his usual
acerbity, from the “ ambiguous and jealous stipulations and talkative
fraternizing in the they and in what they wants to undertake” (SZ, 298).
While no one would dispute the insufficiency and lack of gen-
uineness of the kind of “ stipulations” or agreements Heidegger has
198 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

evidently in mind, the crucial question is whether there is anything

better that could concretely take their place. An absolutely free , “ pre-
suppositionless” meeting with others, unbounded by any mutually
accepted standards, is impossible, not only as a matter of fact, but
because freedom itself is finite; on Heidegger’ s own showing, it is not
only grounded in thrownness, but has to bring itself to a “ stand ” by
gathering itself in a binding end. If an authentic being-together is con-
—
cretely possible and if it is not, it cannot be a genuine possibility at
—
all, but is a mere ontological invention it can be imagined only as a
resolutely free self-submission to a mutually binding end. What such
an end could be and how it could be conceived at all if each Da sein
exists primarily for the sake of himself, is of course a big question.
Would an authentic being-together not require an end which each
accepts as greater than himself ? Short of that, would the kind of
mutual agreements Heidegger derides not be the best that could be
aimed at in practice?
In the important problem of how to bridge the gulf between the-
oretical “ insights” and the ways to their concrete achievement, Hei-
degger leaves us without any definite guidance. It cannot be urged in
excuse that his own interest is purely theoretical in these matters; on
the contrary, he is very well aware that the whole idea of owned exis-
tence, and with it, of an “ authentic morality, ” is nothing without its
possible concretization. Indeed, the whole inquiry into conscience has
been conducted for the express purpose of “ attesting” owned exis-
tence as a factical possibility of Da-sein. The construction of an
abstract “ resolute existence ” could claim no place in Being and Time.
That is why Heidegger emphasizes that resoluteness “ exists ” only as a
“ self-fore throwing resolution, ” a concrete act of resolve. This concrete
resolution is not merely the acceptance of ready-made and recom-
mended possibilities, but is the forethrow and determination of the
factical possibility an existence chooses for his own. What is chosen
cannot therefore be prescribed and defined in advance. On the other
hand, the choice is never entirely unbounded and directionless: its
sphere and range is ontologically prescribed by existentiality itself as
a thrown ability- to-be in the way of a care- taking caring-for. Its ontic
range, in turn , is limited by the specific world into which a factical
existence has been thrown.
Uncertain as it is what Heidegger really thinks about an authen-
tic being- together, he leaves us in no doubt on one point: even resolute
existence can never escape from “ them ” and “ their ” world. Disclosed
to himself in his “ here, ” Da-sein stands cooriginally in truth and
untruth. The untruth of erring and disguising is not simply left behind,
 Witness to an Owned Existence and Authentic Resolution 199

but is first of all recognized and resolutely taken over as essentially

belonging to Da-sein’s falling being. The “ irresoluteness” of everyday
existence, which delivers Da sein over to the ambiguous explanations
of “ them , ” always remains in dominance, although it may not be able
to assail a resolute self. Nonetheless, he remains always dependent on
“ them ” and “ their” world, just because his own possibilities which are
disclosed and determined by resolution , must necessarily be drawn
from the factical world of his thrownness. It is precisely a resolute exis-
tence who becomes wholly transparent to himself in his limitation. He
does not withdraw himself from “ reality, ” but first of all discovers what
is factically possible and grasps it as his ownmost ability-to-be among
“ them.” By contrast, the irresolutely disowned existence drifts along
with the opportunities publicly offered by “ them, ” never truly deciding
for himself on the possibilities that are to be his own.
The existential phenomenon of a resolutely disclosed “ hereness ”
is called by Heidegger the “ situation.” In a brief discussion of this phe-
nomenon, Heidegger points out that there is a “ spatial ” meaning in
“ situation, ” just as there is in the “ here” of being-here. This is rather
surprising, because the spatial reference is not what we would pri-
marily or predominantly think of in a “ situation.” Heidegger, however,
takes this opportunity to remind his hearers that Da-sein is never
merely “ in space” in the same way as an extended thing, but “ gives
himself space ” ( einräumen ) or, one might say, “ allocates himself a
place, ” by reference to the things of which he is taking care. As Divi-
sion One has shown, the significant reference-whole of the world has
an essentially “ spaceish ” character constituted by an orientating-bring-
ing-near of things. The existential “ spaceishness” of Da-sein’ s “ here-
ness” is grounded in the disclosure of his being-in- the-world. The “ sit-
uation” is nothing but the resolutely disclosed “ here” of a factical
existence an authentic self is “ resolved” to be. To the disowned “ one-
self, ” on the other hand, his situation is closed; he knows only the
“ general position ” in which be loses himself to the next-best “ oppor-
tunities ” and fills up his existence by calculating what might “ fall to
him ” from circumstances.
It has become clear, Heidegger proceeds to say, that the call of
conscience is not merely critical and negative, nor does it hold out an
empty “ ideal of existence” before Da-sein , but positively calls him for-
ward into his situation. Further, it is clear that the authentic hearing of
the call does not merely “ cognize ” the situation, but brings itself to
—
stand resolutely in it that is, it is already “ acting.” The reason Heideg-
ger usually avoids contrasting “ action ” and “ practice ” with “ theory” is
that these distinctions are not ultimate; both are grounded in care. The
200 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

most detached, theoretical investigation is no less a careful taking-

account of things than is the grossest manual working with them. To
contrast the resolute “ action ” of owned existence with a “ theoretical
attitude ” would, therefore, be completely misleading. Resoluteness is
nothing but the authentic mode of care, which concretizes itself in a
resolutely grasped “ situation.”
It would be idle to pretend, however, that the existential concept
of the “ situation ” has now come to full clarity. Especially puzzling is
Heidegger’s initial emphasis on its “ spatial ” meaning, which seems to
have little to do with the concrete situation of a resolutely owned exis-
tence. It may well be that Heidegger intended to develop this theme
later on, for instance, by showing that the world as the familiar
dwelling-place of man’s everyday staying and dwelling is originally dis-
closed by the dreading not-at-homeness in which the situation of a res-
olute existence has its foundations. If such was Heidegger’s intention,
however, it is certainly not worked out in Division Two.
The present chapter has brought us a first delineation of owned
existence which conscience summons Da-sein to become. So far, the
owned self remains something of a shadow beside the vulgar vigor of
“ them.” Only when Heidegger begins his time-interpretation as the
“ meaning of care” will the authentic self come fully into his own.
Before that, the essential connection between resoluteness and the
anticipatory forward-running understanding of death will have to be
worked out in detail. This will be the first task of the next chapter.
 XII
Authentic Ability-to-Be-a-Whole and
Temporality as the Meaning of Care

The decisive task of the present chapter is to take a step that Heidegger
calls grund-legend .This step will “ lay the ground ” for all that has so far been
brought to light by the existential analysis. The “ ground” to be laid the
—
temporal constitution of care is “ ground” in the sense that it makes the
—
unity of care originally possible. On no account must it be understood as
a “ producing cause,” a causa efficiens. Before this decisive step can be taken,
certain problems that have an immediate bearing on it must still be eluci-
dated. The first of these is the inner connection between resoluteness and
anticipatory running forward into death. A forward-running resoluteness
will prove to be the concretization of the authentic mode of care, in which
its temporal structure first becomes phenomenally accessible. This is why
its elucidation has been deferred to the present chapter instead of being
carried out in the preceding one, where it may seem logically to belong.
The second problem to be dealt with is the methodical basis of the whole
existential analysis. The third is the ontological constitution of the self.
These preparatory discussions will now be considered in turn.

1. ANTICIPATORY FORWARD-RUNNING RESOLUTENESS

AS THE AUTHENTIC WAY OF BEING-A-WHOLE

Chapter 1 of Division Two showed that Da-sein can be a whole in an

authentic being unto death. This is constituted by running forward

201
202 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

unto death as the ownmost, unrelational, impassable, certain , and yet

indefinite possibility of existence. As the extreme possibility of the
impossibility of being-here-anymore, death in advance closes Da-sein’s
ability- to-be and thus constitutes its wholeness. All this, however,
remains a purely ontological construction , whose possible concretiza-
tion in a factical existence must still be attested. This attestation is sat-
isfactorily achieved if it can be shown that the resoluteness of an owned
existence in its own nature tends to become a forward-running resolute-
ness. The tendency can already be seen in a general way when it is con-
sidered that resoluteness means the readiness of a factical existence to
take over his owing-being wholly as his own . This “ owing, ” however,
determines Da-sein’s being as care from beginning to end; it is pre-
cisely in the extreme negativity of death that this “ owing” character of
care comes fully to light. An authentic existence, therefore, must res-
olutely take over his own being unto death . This happens in a forward-
running resolution, which modalizes the whole structure of the owned
way of existing.
The call of conscience reveals Da-sein’s lostness among “ them” by
calling him back to his own ability- to-be-himself. Da-sein becomes
wholly transparent in his own ability-to-be only in resolutely taking over
his being unto death as his ownmost possibility.
The call of conscience ignores all Da-sein’s “ worldish ” achieve-
ments and his position among others. It singles him out and individu-
ates him into his own owing-being. His singleness strikes most sharply
into his conscience when a forward- running resoluteness discloses
death as his ownmost, unrelational possibility.
The “ owing” to which a resolute existence is constantly ready to
be summoned goes before every factical indebtedness and stays after its
annulment. The constancy of his owing becomes wholly manifest only
from the possibility that is sheerly impassable for each existence. In res-
olutely running forward into death , Da-sein has taken his “ owing”
wholly into his own existence, for no further “ owing” can then over-
take him.
The phenomenon of resoluteness has brought the investigation
before the most original truth of existence. It may not be superfluous to
remark that the truth of existence is not equivalent to the truth of
being, for the latter means all the ways and modes in which being can
disclose itself at all, whereas the former means the specific way in
which we understand and relate ourselves to our own ability- to-be.
Although care is the “ place” where the disclosure of being as such con-
cretely happens, this does not mean that Da-sein’ s own existence
exhausts the whole of the truth of being.
 Authentic Ability-to-íf e-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 2 OS

For the present, however, the truth of existence is Heidegger’s espe-

cial problem , as may well be seen from the length of the analysis
devoted to it. Since this is one of the trickiest passages in Being and
Time, we shall go over it step by step.
The analysis is introduced by the sentence “ Resolute, Da sein is
revealed to itself in its actual factical potentiality-of-being in such a
way that it itself is this revealing and being revealed ” (SZ, 307). This
sentence reemphasizes the peculiar nature of our understanding our
own existence. This understanding is not a “ faculty ” we possess in
addition to existing, but is the way in which we exist. We ourselves are
this understanding and our own being is the understood. Existential
concepts and existential analysis are nothing but an explicit bringing-
—
into-word and explaining of this “ revealing revealedness” of the truth
of existence.
Ail truth , however, as chapter 1 of Division Two echoed, has a
corresponding certainty. The original truth of existence demands a
correspondingly original certainty. Now, how does resoluteness reveal
existence? “ It gives itself the actual factical situation and brings itself
into that situation ” (SZ, 307). The situation is not a ready-made mixture
of conditions and opportunities that are “ there ” and merely await cog-
nition; it is the understanding forethrow of my possibilities in the par-
ticular world into which I have been thrown. In the forethrowing open-
ing up of its own possibilities, resoluteness “ gives ” itself the situation.
This “ giving, ” however, is not the theoretical thinking out of a plan that
might be carried out or pushed aside; the resolute choice of definite
—
possibilities is in itself an active throwing oneself that is, “ bringing
oneself ” into them. The owned way of existing, far from being a with-
drawal and estrangement from the world, is an active taking-hold of a
fully revealed “ hereness,” of a situation in a world.
In its very nature, however, a situation cannot be calculated in
advance like the calculable , self-same presence of a substantial thing;
the situation can be disclosed only in a free, previously undefined, but
nonetheless definable resolution.
What , then, does the certainty belonging to such resoluteness mean? This cer-
tainty must hold itself in what is disclosed in resolution. But this means
that it simply cannot become rigid about the situation, but must under-
stand that the resolution must be kept free and open for the actual facti-
cal possibility in accordance with its own meaning as a disclosure. The
certainty of the resolution means keeping oneself free for the possibility of
taking it back , a possibility that is always factically necessary. This hold-
ing-for-true in resoluteness ( as the truth of existence ), however, by no
means lets us fall back into irresoluteness. On the contrary, this holding-
204 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

for-true, as a resolute holding oneself free for taking back , is the authen-
tic resoluteness to retrieve itself But thus one’s very lostness in irresolute-
ness is existentially undermined. The holding-for-true that belongs to
resoluteness tends, in accordance with its meaning, toward constantly
keeping itself free, that is, to keep itself free for the whole potentiality-of-
being of Da-sein. This constant certainty is guaranteed to resoluteness
only in such a way that it relates to that possibility of which it can be
absolutely certain. In its death, Da-sein must absolutely “ take itself back.”
Constantly certain of this, that is, anticipating, resoluteness gains its
authentic and whole certainty. (SZ, 307-308)

This paragraph has been quoted at length because it gives rise to

new perplexities each time it is read. Only one obvious point emerges
from it with any clarity; namely that resoluteness must keep itself open
to changing factical possibilities. But, apart from the consideration
that Heidegger would hardly waste a long paragraph on stating such a
banality, the point by no means exhausts the meaning of the passage.
To understand it at all, the precise meaning of certainty must first of
all be recalled. Certainty means, primarily, to be certain. I am certain of
something when I hold it for true; that is, when I can hold myself in its
truth, can stay in it, can be constantly bound by it. Now, what resolute-
ness must be certain of is not the true ( discovered ) presence of an
object, but the revealedness of existence, revealed precisely by res-
oluteness itself. This certainty is gained by resoluteness not by clinging
to a momentary situation “ here and now, ” but by revealing existence
wholly to its end. It is only by running forward to the certain possibil-
ity of not-being-able-to-be-here-anymore that the “ I-am-able-to-be-here”
itself is eminently revealed. This certainty, moreover, is not the momen-
tary conviction of existence in the “ moment ” of dying, but holds and
-
binds Da sein constantly and over the whole of his existence. It reveals
the whole of Da-sein’s being by throwing him back on to his thrown-
ness. The resolute taking-over of existence lets itself be called back to
its not-self -chosen ground in thrownness. Resoluteness is the constant
readiness to be dreadingly brought before the throw of the nothing
that originally reveals the “ that I am.” Resoluteness brings itself back
again to the original revelation that happens in this throw and brings
the throw back into a factical existence by freely choosing to be this
thrown being.
The certain truth of existence, for which resoluteness “ holds itself
free, ” is thus the very opposite of the certain, actual presence of a sub-
stantial thing. Resoluteness follows the movement of the call of care as
a forward-calling recall: forward, into the certain possibility of not-
being- here-anymore, from which the “ I am here ” becomes certain, and
 Authentic Ability-to-Re-a -Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 205

back, to the nothing of a not-self-grounded self, which throws him into

his factical being-in-the- world. Only in running forward to the extreme
limit of its ability-to-be-here, can resoluteness gain the authentic cer-
tainty of a whole existence.
Some of the deepest obscurity of our passage has now been lifted.
It gains further clarity, however, when it is contrasted with Descartes’s
cogito ergo sum, a contrast that Heidegger almost certainly, though only
implicitly, intends to draw. The Cartesian conception of truth as the
certainty of representation (Vorstellung ), Heidegger maintains, domi-
nates the modern age even where it is apparently refuted. The certainty
of this truth lies in the always calculable representability of an object
by a subject. The cogito ergo sum is the absolute, unshakable ground of
this truth. But what guarantees the unshakability, the indubitable cer-
tainty of the ground itself ? It is the at all times necessary presence ( am )
of the thinking-representing subject ( I ) in all his representations ( I
think ). The presentness of the subject ( I am ) can be absolutely and
always counted upon ( calculated ) in every I think. With this, however,
the meaning of the “ I am ” is perverted into the calculable self-sameness
and persistent presentness of a substance. The certainty of the Carte-
sian “ I am ” is not drawn from the original truth ( disclosedness ) of exis-
tence, but from an objectivized, always presentable and present, think-
ing thing. The temporal structure of a forward-running coming-back- to
is totally lost in the calculable presentness of a persistently present sub-
ject. Me cogitare^me esse, according to Heidegger, is the basic equation
of the modern age, on which all truth is to be based ( HO, 100, G5, 109,
QCT, 150 ). The indubitable presentness and presentability of the esse
in every cogitatio, however, is not the certainty appropriate to the orig-
inal truth of existence. The unshakable foundation of the modern con-
ception of truth is itself lacking an original foundation.
The perversion of existence into a wholly different mode of being
(substantiality ), however, is not an accident but arises from the irres-
oluteness of a fleeing-concealing disownment. Da-sein stands coorigi-
nally in truth and untruth. It is precisely the forward-running resolute-
ness that gives an owned existence the original certainty of
concealment, for without an authentic disclosure the concealment of a
disowned way of being could not be discovered. Da-sein’s lostness into
the irresoluteness of “ them ” rises from the ground of his being and can
never be completely overcome. Forward- running resoluteness, there-
fore, holds itself open to the constant possibility of concealment, of
which it is certain.
It may not be superfluous to emphasize once more that the con-
cealment Heidegger has in mind is not a conscious and deliberate self-
206 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

disguise and self-deception. It springs from the negativity that perme-

ates Da-sein’s owing-being. One important way in which this negativity
concretizes itself is the essential indefiniteness of Da-sein’s ability-to-be.
The indefiniteness can define itself in a resolution for a particular sit-
uation, but it can never be eliminated. It reveals itself wholly in an
authentic being unto death. A resolute running-forward brings itself
before the possibility that is constantly certain and yet indefinite as to
when it will turn into the impossibility. In resolutely disclosing the
indefiniteness of his extreme situation, an existence wins his authentic
ability-to-be-a-whole.
The indefiniteness of the “ when ” of death is originally revealed
in dread . Resoluteness endeavors to demand from itself the courage to
dread. It removes all disguise from the deliveredness of Da-sein to him-
self. The nothing before which dread brings Da-sein reveals the nega-
tivity that determines his here-being from the ground (SZ, 308).
The analysis has now shown the tendency that lies in resoluteness
itself to be modalized by an authentic being unto death. It is authenti-
cally and wholly what it can be only as a forward-running resoluteness.
And conversely, the authentic being unto death finds its ontic-existen-
tiell concretization in forward -running resoluteness . Until now, it could
only pass for an ontological construction . Now, however, its concrete
possibility has been attested by resoluteness as the authentic mode of
itself . At the same time, a forward-running resoluteness is the existen-
tiell possibility of an authentic being-a-whole. The ontological problem
of Da-sein’s wholeness is not merely a theoretical-methodical problem,
as it appeared to be at the beginning. The way the problem of whole-
ness was raised in chapter 1 of Division Two is justified only because it
is grounded in an ontic possibility of a factical existence.
The phenomenal demonstration of a way of being in which Da-

— —
sein can bring himself before and to himself can be authentically a
whole may nonetheless be far removed from the everyday, common-
sense understanding of existence. This, however, is no proof that it is
not a genuine , concrete possibility of a factical existence. Heidegger
rejects any suggestion that an understanding that grows from a falling
mode of being can be the judge of its own authentic possibilities. On
the other hand , Heidegger does not deny that a factical “ ideal ” of
owned existence underlies the whole existential-ontological analysis.
On the contrary, he stresses that

not only is this fact one that must not be denied and we are forced to
grant ; it must be understood in its positive necessity , in terms of the the-
matic object of our inquiry. Philosophy will never seek to deny its
 Authentic Ability -to-Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 207

“ presuppositions, ” but neither may it merely admit them. It conceives

them and develops with more and more penetration both the presup-
positions themselves and that for which they are presuppositions. This
is the function that the methodical considerations now demanded of
us have. (SZ, 310 )

2. JUSTIFICATION OF THEMETHODICAL BASIS

OF THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS
Heidegger must now make explicit the evidence on which the whole exis-
tential analysis is based and justify its method. This justification is all the
more urgent because the “ violence” of Heidegger’s method has by now
become unmistakable. Since the disowned mode of care itself covers
over the original, authentic mode of Da-sein’s being, the existential inter-
pretation is compelled to execute a countermovement against this trend
inherent in care. It must try to conquer Da-sein’s being from and against
its own self-disguise. How can such a “ violent” method be justified?
To a greater or lesser extent, Heidegger points out, all interpre-
tation is “ violent,” because the understanding that unfolds itself in it
has a forethrowing ( projecting) structure. But just because all interpre-
tation necessarily sustains itself in and from an anticipatingly projected
horizon ( meaning ), it must be all the more securely guided and regu-
lated . Leaving other kinds of interpretations aside, from where does an
ontological projection draw the evidence for its appropriateness? Onto-
logical interpretation projects the already “ given ” beings on to their
being, whose structure is to be explained in explicit concepts. But
where are the indicators that point the way to being? More specifically,
what are the pointers that guide and regulate the steps of the existen-
tial interpretation of care?
The evidence to which Heidegger now has recourse is nothing
new, but a summing up of what has already, though more incidentally,
appeared in the course of the investigation. The existential interpreta-
tion draws its evidence from the self-interpretation that essentially
belongs to Da-sein’s being. All that Da sein is and does is infused with
an understanding of his own being. His own care- taking being-near- to
things, for instance, is always in sight together with his circumspect dis-
covery of them. In all factical existentiell possibilities, existence itself is
at least implicitly understood and in some way explained. An ontolog-
ical explanation of Da-sein’s being is therefore already prepared by the
way Da sein is.
Nonetheless, how does Da-sein’ s usually untheoretical, “ preonto-
logical ” self-explanation lead the conception of an authentic existence?
208 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Who is to say what makes an existence “ authentic” ? As far as Da-sein’s

ontic existence is concerned, Heidegger disclaims any pretensions to
setting up an “ ideal ” that would be binding and obligatory on every-
one. As far as the existential interpretation is concerned, on the other
hand, he claims that it is entirely justified in basing itself on those exis-
tentiell possibilities that are most properly Da-sein’s own. For Da sein
is essentially his ability-to-be and free for his ownmost possibilities, or
exists in unfreedom against them. The interpretation is bound to take
the ontic ways in which Da sein can exist and project them on to their
ontological possibility. And if Da sein usually explains himself from his
lostness to things, then his authentic possibilities, discovered by mov-
ing counter to his lostness, first of all brings the “ undisguised phe-
nomenal content” of his being fully to light (SZ, 313).
It may be objected at this point that Heidegger does not really jus-
tify his interpretation of owned existence, because the distinction
between owned and disowned existence is already presupposed in the
justification. But Heidegger is perfectly well aware of this. Such “ pre-
suppositions, ” as we shall see below, are precisely the “ projections”
essential to an interpretation. The important point is whether their
choice has been properly guided or whether it is arbitrary and acci-
dental. There is nothing arbitrary, Heidegger claims, in the stress that
falls on the forward-running resoluteness that constitutes “ owned exis-
tence,” since Da-sein himself demands it from himself from the ground
of his being. The way in which Da-sein relates himself to his eminent
possibility in death has not been assigned a central role by accident,
but because being-in-the-world has no higher instance of its ability-to-
be than death.
But granted all this, the existential interpretation of these phe -
nomena has not been justified. On the contrary, it becomes more and
more evident that a “ presupposed ” idea of existence as such has
guided the whole interpretation. Even the first steps of the analysis of
everydayness were already regulated by a “ preconceived” notion of
existence. Otherwise it could not have been said that Da-sein “ falls ”
into disownment, so that his “ ownmost” possibilities must be wrested
from his self-disguise. What has guided the first projection of the idea
of existence?
Our formal indication of the idea of existence was guided by the under-
standing of being in Da-sein itself. Without any ontological transparency,
it was, after all, revealed that I myself am always the being which we call
Da-sein , as the potentiality-of-being that is concerned to be this being.
Da-sein understands itself as being-in-the-world, although without suffi-
cient ontological definiteness. Thus existing, it encounters beings of the
 Authentic Ability -to- Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 209

kind of being of things at hand and objectively present. No matter how

far removed from an ontological concept the distinction between exis-
tence and reality may be, even if Da sein initially understands existence
as reality, Da-sein is not just objectively present, but has always already
understood itself however mythical or magical its interpretations may be.
For otherwise, Da-sein would not “ live” in a myth and would not take
heed of its magic in rites and cults. The idea of existence which we have
posited gives us an outline of the formal structure of the understanding
of Da-sein in general, and does so in a way that is not binding from an
existentiell point of view. (SZ, 313)

This idea guided the whole preparatory analysis up to the first

conceptual formulation of care, which, in turn , provided the basis for
an explicit ontological distinction between existence and reality. But
how could these two different modes of being be distinguished from
each other unless an idea of being in general or as such were already
“ presupposed ” ? Indeed even a bare, formal idea of existence must
already “ presuppose ” an idea of being as such ( Sein überhaupt ), in
whose horizon alone it can be differentiated from and contrasted
with reality.
Here Heidegger touches on a paradox that must be constantly
kept in view. On the one hand, being manifests itself only in care, but
on the other hand, the range of its manifestness is “ immeasurably”
wider than merely Da-sein’s own being. It must be so if being becomes
understandable to us from the “ immeasurable” nothing. Its repulsion
in advance refers us to beings as a whole, that is, throws us into our
being-in-the-world. Together with ourselves, the nothing must make
manifest all other beings as not nothing, as beings that are. The disclo-
sure of being in advance reaches beyond ourselves, although its con -
crete happening takes place only in our own being as care.
But if both existence and reality already presuppose an idea of
being as such, should the latter not be the first to be clarified? The clar-
ification could be achieved through the concrete analysis of Da-sein’s
understanding of being. This, however, demands a prior interpretation
of Da-sein’s being guided by the idea of existence. Is it not obvious,
then, that the whole fundamental ontological problem goes round in a
circle? The idea of existence and of being as such are first “ presup-
posed,” and Da-sein’s being is interpreted in the light of this “ presup-
position” in order to win from it in the end the idea of being as such.
The circular movement of the fundamental ontology is indeed
much more obvious than that of many a “ deductive proof ” where it is
subtly disguised. But, as Heidegger points out, the existential analysis
has a totally different character from a deduction that starts from an
210 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

axiom or a premise and proceeds by logical rules to prove further

propositions from it. The charge of a “ circle in proof ’ cannot apply at
all to the existential analysis, because it does not start from an axiom
that we have “ pro-posited ” ( angesetzt ) , but from the way in which we our-
selves are. Nor does the analysis “ deduce” propositions about Da-sein,
but proceeds to lay bare what must already lie at the ground of our
being. The “ presupposed ” idea of existence is an understanding-antic-
ipating projection of Da-sein’s ontological constitution. This under-
standing is then unfolded in such a way that it lets Da-sein himself have
the last say whether the formal outline of his projected constitution is
appropriate to him or not. In no other way can beings of any kind be
made accessible in respect of their being. The so-called circularity to
which objections may be raised is nothing less than the fundamental
structure of care. Da-sein as care is constantly ahead-of-himself. In the
existentiell forethrow of his possibilities he has always already pro-
jected, if only preontologically, existence and being in general. It is the
“ forethrowing” structure of care that lies in every explicit “ presupposi-
tion ” of the existential analysis.

But the “ charge of circularity ” itself comes from a kind of being of Da-
sein. Something like projecting, especially ontological projecting, neces-
sarily remains foreign for the common sense of our heedful absorption
in the they because common sense barricades itself against it “ in princi-
ple.” Whether “ theoretically” or “ practically,” common sense only takes
care of beings that are in view of its circumspection. What is distinctive
about common sense is that it thinks it experiences only “ factual” beings
in order to be able to rid itself of its understanding of being. It fails to
recognize that beings can be “ factually ” experienced only when being
has already been understood, although not conceptualized. Common
sense misunderstands understanding. And for this reason it must neces-
sarily proclaim as “ violent” anything lying beyond the scope of its under-
standing as well as any move in that direction. (SZ, 315)

In the circular structure of care lies the possibility of any under-

standing of being whatever. The fundamental ontology must therefore
“ aim at leaping into this ‘circle’ primordially and completely, so that
even at the beginning of our analysis of Da-sein we make sure that we
have a complete view of the circular being of Da-sein ” (SZ, 318). Previ-
ous ontologies of Da-sein, Heidegger implies, have fallen short pre-
cisely because they have failed to “ presuppose ” the whole of his being
in its peculiarly “ circling” movement. They have started from an all too
meager worldless “ I ” and proceeded to procure for it an “ object, ” with
an ontologically groundless relation to the object. Or where “ life ” is
 Authentic Ability-to-Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 211

made the theme of the inquiry, it is not enough to take account of

death merely occasionally. As for the practice of restricting the inquiry
first to a “ theoretical subject,” later to be amplified on the “ practical
side” by a tagged-on ethics, this is branded by Heidegger as to “ artifi -
cially and dogmatically cut out” the original subject matter, which is the
whole of Da-sein’ s being.
By way of contrast, the existential analysis has put its preparatory
effort into securing the authentic wholeness of Da-sein’s being. With
the working-out of forward-running resoluteness, the previous inade-
quacy of the hermeneutic ( interpretatory ) situation has been overcome
and the methodical requirements for a further progress of the investi-
gation are now fulfilled.
Heidegger closes his reflections on method with an important
paragraph in which he reminds us that forward-running resoluteness
brought us to the phenomenon of the original and authentic truth. In
Division One, however, it was shown that the everyday understanding
of being covers over original truth insofar as it understands being only
in the sense of substantial reality (Vorhandenheit ). Truth and being,
however, belong so inseparably together that the revelation of original
truth must at the same time modify our understanding of being. The
authentic truth of forward-running resoluteness must vouchsafe us the
understanding of the being of Da sein and of being as such. The pos-
sibility of this understanding is what the existential analysis seeks to
discover. Its “ ontological truth” is grounded in an original existentiell
truth, whereas the latter does not necessarily need the former . This last
remark of Heidegger’s, apart from its methodological importance,
should remove any lingering doubt whether an authentic existence is
dependent on an explicit philosophical understanding. As we said in
the last chapter, an existence can be perfectly “ authentic” in Heideg-
ger’s sense without any philosophy. Finally, we shall glance at the sec-
ond-last sentence of this closing paragraph, because it is so ambigu-
ously constructed that it may easily lead to serious misunderstandings.
“ The most primordial and basic existential truth, for which the prob-
lematic of fundamental ontology strives in preparing the question of
being in general is the disclosure of the meaning of being of care” (SZ, 316 ).
The most obvious way to read this sentence is that the “ problem-
atic of fundamental ontology ” is merely preparatory to the “ question
of being in general.” According to this reading, the temporal analysis
of being in general or as such, which was to have been carried out in
Division Three, would be something different from the fundamental
ontology of the first two divisions. This, however, is quite untenable,
for the temporal interpretation of being as such is the very goal of the
212 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

fundamental ontology; it is the concrete answer to the “ question of

being” as it is raised and worked out in Being and Time. To get the
meaning of Heidegger’s awkwardly phrased sentence, it may be para-
phrased in the following way: The most original, ground-laying exis-
tential truth that the fundamental-ontological problematic strives to
reach is the disclosedness of the ontological meaning of care. This
( namely the temporal meaning of care ) is preparatory to the question
of being as such ( namely to the question of the temporal meaning of
being as such ).

3. CARE AND SELFHOOD

The section immediately preceding the first steps of the temporal

analysis deals with the problem of the self. Why does Heidegger assign
a place of such methodological importance precisely to this problem?
There are two reasons. Firstly, the self will prove to play an eminent
part in the succeeding investigations, especially in the interpretation of
Da-sein’s “ historical-being.” Secondly, and more immediately, it leads
directly to the problem that the temporal analysis is designed to solve,
namely the problem of what makes the unity of care possible.
The first two chapters of Division Two have made us aware of the
increasing complexity of the structure of care, which has been shown
to comprehend in itself the phenomena of death, conscience, and
owing. The original unity of this complex whole has by now become an
urgent problem. Heidegger, it is true, has stressed from the start that
care is an “ original whole” and not an aggregate put together from
existence, facticity, and so on. But the wholeness of care has not yet
been followed back to its foundations; the ground of its unity still
remains to be demonstrated.
-
Is the “ ground” of this unity not self evident? The complex
modes and possibilities of care, after all, do not exist in and by them-
selves, but only as possible ways in which concrete beings are. It is I
myself who exist as care; it is / who exist in the various ways and possi-
bilities of my being. “ The Τ’, ” Heidegger remarks, “ seems to ‘hold
together’ the totality of the structural whole. The T and the ‘self have
been conceived for a long time in the ‘ontology’ of this being as the
supporting ground (substance or subject ) ” (SZ, 317).
It is only with reservations, we must observe, that Heidegger
introduces the notion that the “ I” “ holds together” the structure of
care. It “ seems” to do so, Heidegger says, implying that a thorough
examination is needed before a decision can be reached. Until now, the
 Authentic Ability-to-Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 213

existential-ontological problem of the self has not been raised in a pos-

itive way. Division One showed only negatively that the “ who, ”
the” self ” of everyday ness, is not the authentic “ I myself, ” but the dis-
owned one-self-among-others. Even this disowned one self, however,
could not be ontologically grasped with the help of the categories of
substance ( Vorhandenheit ).The phenomenon of the self is compre-
hended already in care , which cannot be “ constructed ” from the cate-
gories of reality. The ontological problem of selfhood lies in the exis-
tential “ connection ” between care and self.
According to the method outlined in the last section , the exis-
tential interpretation of selfhood takes its “ natural ” start from the self-
explanation of everyday existence. Da sein expresses himself “ about
-
himself ’ in his “ I saying.” The “ I” means only myself and nothing fur-
ther. Hence the content of this expression has been held to be
absolutely simple. In its simplicity, the “ I ” does not define other things,
it is not itself a predicate, but is the “ absolute subject.” The “ subject”
that is pronounced in every I-saying is always found to maintain itself
—
as the self-same that is, it underlies { substare ) , lies to the ground of con-
—
tinuously changing experiences and further, it is conscious of its own
numerical identity at different times; it is what the old “ rational psy-
chology ” defined as a “ person.”
The characteristics of “ simplicity,” “ substantiality,” and “ personality,”
which Kant, for example, takes as the foundation for his doctrine “ The
Paralogisms of Pure Reason ” ( Critique of Pure Reason, A 348ff.), arise
from a genuine “ prephenomenological” experience. The question
remains whether what was experienced in such a way ontically may be
interpreted ontologically with the aid of the “ categories” mentioned.
(SZ, 318)

Kant himself, Heidegger points out in the important passage

which now follows, although he repudiates the ontic theses about a
“ soul-substance ” that have been derived from the phenomenal content
of the I-saying, fails to reach a proper ontological interpretation of self-
hood. On the contrary, “ he does, after all, slip back into the same inap-
propriate ontology of the substantial whose ontic foundations he theo-
retically rejected for the I ” (SZ, 318-319) . In support of this
contention, Heidegger now proceeds to give a short summary of the
Kantian analysis of the “ I think.”

The “ I ” is a bare consciousness that accompanies all concepts. In the I,

nothing more is represented [ vorgestellt ] than a transcendental subject of
thoughts. “ Consciousness in itself ( is) not a representation . . . , but a
214 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

form of representation in general” [ Critique of Pure Reason, B 404 ]. The

“ I think ” is the “ form of apperception that adheres to every experience
and precedes it ” [A 354 ]. (SZ 319 )

The phenomenal content of the “ I,” Heidegger concedes, is

rightly fixed by Kant as “ I think, ” or, “ if the relation of the ‘practical
—
person’ to ‘intelligence’ is also considered in the expression T act.’ ” 1
Saying I must be grasped in Kant’ s sense as saying I think . The “ I ” of
the res cogitans is called by Kant the “ logical subject.” By this he means
that the “ I ” is the subject of logical activity, of “ connecting.” All con-
necting is “ I connect.” The “ I ” already lies at the ground of
( hypokeimenon ) all connecting and relating. Hence it is “ consciousness
in itself ” and not a representation or perception, but rather the “ form”
—
of it that is, it is the formal structure of representation or perception
as such. This formal structure makes all representation or perception
and perceived first of all possible. The “ I ” as the form of perceiving
and as “ logical subject” mean the same thing (SZ, 319 ).
Heidegger finds two positive results in Kant’s analysis: first, it
shows the impossibility of an ontic derivation of the “ I” from a sub-
stance, and second , it fixes the phenomenal content of the “ I” in the “ I
think.” Nonetheless, the “ I” is still conceived in an inappropriate sense.
For, Heidegger says, coming to the crux of the matter,

the ontological concept of the subject does not characterize the selfhood of
the I qua self but the sameness and constancy of something always already objec-
tively present [ Vorhandenes ] . The being of the I is understood as the real-
ity of the res cogitans . (SZ, 320 )

But why is it, Heidegger asks, that Kant could not exploit his gen-
uine start from the “ I think” and had to fall back into the inappropri-
ate ontology of the substantial? The answer to this question makes
explicit the steps that lead from Kant’s transcendental analysis of Da-
sein’s “ inner nature” to the existential analysis of Being and Time. Hei -
degger begins his answer by pointing out that the full phenomenal con-
tent of the “ I ” is not merely “ I think, ” but “ I think something.” To be
sure, Kant also sees perfectly clearly that the “ I ” is constantly related to
its representations and is nothing without them. For Kant, however,
these representations are the “ empirical” that are “ accompanied” by
the “ Γ; they are the “ appearances” to which the I “ hangs on.” Kant fails
to explain the manner of this “ accompanying ” and “ hanging on, ” but
it is dear that he understands them as a constant “ being present
together ” of the I with its representations. This means, however, that
the being of the I and the being of the represented are not in principle
 -
Authentic Ability-to Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 215

distinguished; that is, the being of the I is understood as the present-

ness of a substance.
But it is not only that Kant failed to fix the full content of the I as
“ I think something” ; more importantly still , he did not see what must
be ontologically already “ presupposed ” in the “ I think something.” For
if the “ something” is understood to mean “ beings within the world, ”
then the “ something” necessarily presupposes a world , and precisely
this phenomenon helps to determine the fundamental constitution of
the “ I, ” if it is to be able to “ think something.”
With the ontological “ presupposition ” of world, which is
demanded by the “ I think something” as a necessary condition of its
own possibility, Heidegger can now fix the full phenomenal content of
the everyday saying-I: this “ I” means the concrete being I am as “ I-am-
in-a-world.” It is because Kant did not see the phenomenon of world as
an essential constituent of Da-sein’s own self , Heidegger maintains,
that he had to keep away the “ empirical” perceptions from the a priori
content of the “ I think.” This, however, must lead to a restriction of the
I to an isolated subject that “ accompanies” perceptions in an ontologi-
cally undefined way (SZ, 321).2 “ In saying-I, Dasein expresses itself as
being-in-the-world ” (SZ, 321). The everyday self-interpretation, however,
tends to understand itself from a care- taking preoccupation with
beings within the world, so that the basic structure of being-in-the-
world is constantly covered over. Da-sein usually flees from himself into
being one-of-them. Thus it is not my own self that speaks in the “ nat-
ural” saying-I, but the lost one self. In the variety of everyday happen-
ings and in chasing after things to be taken care of, the self of the self-
forgetful “ I-take-care ” appears in a simple, indefinitely empty, constant
self-sameness. In the everyday world one is what one takes care of. Thus
the problem of the self is in advance forced into the inappropriate cat-
égorial horizon of “ what one is, ” of an unchangingly present self-thing
in the stream of changing events and experiences.
By now it has become unmistakable that Heidegger’s elucida-
tions of the self circle round the problem of its temporal structure,
although this remains at the present stage necessarily implicit. Hei-
degger does not diverge from the traditional view that the self has the
character of ground; the question is only and always how the ground-
being of the self must be interpreted. As the interpolation in the last
chapter showed, the temporal meaning of ground lies in its “ stand-
ingness” ( Best ändigkeit ) . In other words, ground means being in the
mode of continuity, standing, steadiness, enduringness. The different
ways of “ grounding, ” in which our being-in- the- world “ “ steadies
itself, ” “ gains a firm stand ” in thrownness and forethrow, all spring
216 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

from the “ care of stability and constancy.” The traditional notions of

substance and subject are certainly, if only implicitly, derived from this
temporal meaning of “ ground,” but they explain it as a duration, a
permanence in presentness. This, however, as Heidegger constantly
impresses on us, is not the way in which the self “ stands.” It is not that
the self lacks continuity and endurance, but these have a character of
their own that can be explained only from the whole structure of care.
For every saying-I as “ I-am-( already )-in-a-world ” cooriginally implies “ I-
am- near-to” the handy things that meet me within the world, and “ I-
am-ahead-of-myself.” I am the being who is concerned for my own
ability-to-be, for the sake of which I constantly throw myself forward
to my possibilities. In every ontic saying-I the whole of care voices itself ,
though mostly in the falling mode of I-take-care ( of things). The most
frequent and loudest “ saying-I ” comes from the disowned oneself , who
evades his authentic ability- to-be. In this mode of being, however, I
“ stand ” as not-myself ( Unselbstst ändigkeit ).
The selfhood of an authentic self cannot be explained from the
disowned not-I, but only from an authentic ability-to-be, from a for-
ward-running resoluteness. Its existential structure is constitutive of the
authentic mode of care . This alone can explain the “ standingness of the
self ’ { Selbstst ändigkeit ) in the twofold character of an enduring steadfast-
ness ( best ändige Standfestigkeit ) . To put this in terms that are more famil-
iar: the continuing identity of ourselves of which we are aware through
all the movement and change of our whole existence is to be inter-
preted from the temporal structure of care.
Closely connected with the problem of a self-maintaining iden-
tity is what traditional philosophy has formulated with the title of
“ independence, ” “ being-in-itself ” ( Ansichsein). Independence has
always been a basic character of substantial being, although the pre -
cise meaning of “ independence” may vary greatly according to what is
to be independent from what or from whom. This problem is not
explicitly raised in the present section, but is clearly implied in Hei-
degger’s expressions “ Selbstst ändigkeit ” and “ Unselbstständigkeit, ”
which have the secondary meaning of “ independence ” and “ lack of
independence ” respectively. Although this problem is not made
explicit, Heidegger presumably intends to suggest that it has its place
in the present ontological context. How peculiar and difficult this
problem is may be judged when we remember that it is precisely in his
single, dreading being-unto-death that Da-sein becomes originally
—
manifest to himself in his “ owing” that is, as a not-self-grounded
ground. Further, it is the originally revealed nothing of himself that
throws Da-sein into a world , refers him to beings as a whole as depen-
 Authentic Abüity-to-Be-a -Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 217

dent upon them . Is there, then, any sense in asking whether Da-sein
-
can be “ independent, ” whether he can “ stand in-himself ” in a way

— —
appropriate to his being? If there is and Heidegger seems to suggest
that there is then the question can concern only the different ways in
which Da-sein is capable of “ standing as a self.” The authentic way in
which he “ stands as himself ’ is in the singleness of a silent, dread-dis-
posed resoluteness. A resolutely owned self does not constantly say “ I,
I, I . . . but “ ‘¿5 ’ in reticence the thrown being that it can authenti-
cally be” (SZ, 323 ). This self provides the “ primordial phenomenal
basis for the question of the being of the T ” (SZ, 323).
What, then, is the decisive result reached in the present elucida-
tion of the self ? It has shown that the tentatively raised notion that the
“Γ “ holds” the structural whole of care “ together” must be given up
once and for all, and that care cannot be stuck together with the glue
of an ontic “ I” and “ self, ” but on the contrary, the “ standingness” of
the self can only be explained from the existentiality of care. The full
structural content of care must also explain how and why an irresolute
falling into a not-self essentially belongs to it.
This means, however, that the problem of the original unity of
care still remains unanswered. On the other hand, the full phenome-
nal content of care has now been laid bare. The investigation can now
proceed to the problem of its unity. Its solution lies in the concrete
interpretation of the meaning of care.

4. TEMPORALITY AS THE ONTOLOGICAL MEANING OF CARE

“ Meaning, ” according to Heidegger, is that “ in which the intelligibility

of something keeps itself ’ (SZ, 324 ). The unity of the complex struc -
ture of care must now be made explicitly understandable from tempo -
rality. Up to now the unity of thrownness ( facticity ), forethrow ( exis-
tence), and falling has always been asserted, but has not yet been led
back to the ground of its possibility. However, if temporality is to be
exposed as this “ ground, ” it evidently cannot mean the “ being-in-time”
of a thing that comes into being, endures and passes away. Da-sein’s
being cannot grow into a unity “ in ” time or “ with ” time, as though
there were first thrownness, then forethrow, then falling away to beings
within the world . The unity of care can be envisaged only as an inter-
play in which thrownness, forethrow, and falling mutually affect and
illuminate each other. The tendency of the preceding two chapters has
unmistakably been to stress that it is the possibility of death which,
openly or disguisedly, affects and illuminates the whole of care in a pre-
218 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

eminent way. Indubitable as this may be in our ontic experience, its

ontological possibility most urgently demands an explanation , because
death is incomparably different from our everyday possibilities. The
—
latter finding a home , a means of livelihood , and so on are antici- —
pated by us as “ realizable, ” and are thus in advance drawn back into
our here-being as things or happenings that will some day become
“ actual.” Death , on the other hand, is in no way “ realizable.” If care as
a being-unto-death had the character of reality, we would have to say:
death is “ real” only as long as it remains a possibility; its “ actuality ” is
the sheer impossibility of being-here at all . How, then, can precisely this
possibility affect all that we are and have been in a preeminent way?
Only in that we can let it constantly come toward us, that is, approach
and affect us in its constant coming nearer. We let our extremest pos-
sibility come toward us by holding it out before and toward ourselves
as coming. The coming, in which a factical existence lets-himself-come-
to-himself in his ownmost possibility, is the “ primordial phenomenon
of the future” (SZ, 325).
The German word for “ future,” Zukunft, literally means “ coming
to ” or “ coming toward.” In English, the transition from “ coming” to
“ future” cannot be nearly so effortlessly made, nor can we be constantly
reminded by an ambivalent word like Zukunft that the familiar concept
of a “ future- time ” originally springs from the “ primordial future.” How
the vulgar concept of time is derived from original time, that is, from
the temporality of care, will be shown in the sixth chapter of Division
Two. For the present, it is sufficient to note that in the derivative con-
—
cept of time the future itself is conceived as “ coming” the future as the
“ now” which has not yet become “ real,” but which will be when it has
arrived into the present now. The “ primordial future,” on the other
hand, is the coming in which Da sein as care comes-to-himself in the
extremest possibility of his existence. The coming is authentic when the
possibility is resolutely disclosed in running forward to it.
The forward-running anticipatory resoluteness, however, modi-
fies not only the way in which Da sein exists, but rebounds back into
and affects his thrownness. The authentic disclosure of his utmost pos-
sibility as coming brings Da sein understanding back to his hereness as
^
it has always already been. The resolute taking over of his owing-being
means: he authentically is the thrown ground which he has already
been. This, however, is possible only because each factical existence is
his own “ has been.”

Only because Da-sein in general is as I ¿zra-having-been , can it come futu-

rally toward itself in such a way that it comes-back . Authentically futural ,
 Authentic Ability-to-Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 219

Da-sein is authentically having- been . Anticipation of the most extreme

and ownmost possibility comes back understanding to one’s ownmost
^
having-been . Da-sein can be authentically having-been only because it is
futural. In a way, having-been arises from the future. (SZ, 326 )

The difficulty of this passage is unavoidably aggravated by the trans-

lation into English. As we have already noted , Heidegger has the advan-
tage of being able to say Ich bin gewesen, literally, “ I am been, ” instead of “ I
have been.” The German “ I am been ” expresses concisely and directly that
Da-sein is his own “ been, ” whereas in English we have to use the round-
about and confusing phrase “ I am-{as )-hav ing-been.” Gewesenheit , literally,
“ beenness, ” will henceforth be used by Heidegger to denote the “ primor-
dial past ” that belongs to the temporal structure of care, while the usual
word Vergangenheit , literally “ goneness,” will be reserved for the past in
which things were, or happenings within the world took place. No matter
what Da-sein may have forgotten of his “ past,” his thrownness can never
be “ gone” from him, for as long as he factually exists, he is always “ pre-
sent” to himself as already having been. Further, he is as having-been only
as long as he is coming, for when he no longer comes-to-himself from his
ultimate possibility, he is no longer here at all.
The primordial or original past, the has- or having-been, Hei-
degger says, springs in a way from the future ( coming ). Although we
are given no explanation in what certain way the past springs from the
future, it clearly cannot be in any way “ produced ” by the future. What
Heidegger presumably means is this: were the forethrow of our possi-
bilities infinitely open, we would be constantly streaming away beyond
ourselves. It is only because the “ forward” movement of care is halted
by the impassable possibility of death that its movement is turned back
upon itself. This streaming back upon itself of care is the “ coming” that
illuminates the having-been and first of all opens it up as the dimen-
sion to which we can come back. Without the coming of the original
future there could be no coming back to the past.
The forward-running resoluteness at the same time discloses Da-
sein’s situation, that is, brings him authentically into his “ here.” He
actively grasps his situation as his own by circumspectly taking care of
the things that are handily present within the world. The discovery of
the things present ( das Anwesende ) within the world is only possible in
a presenting of these beings ( Gegenwärtigen ) . Only as a. presenting can res-
oluteness let the things come undisguisedly face to face with itself
which it actively grasps ( takes care of ) in a factical situation.
In coming- toward and back- to itself , resoluteness brings itself pre-
sentingly into the situation. The having-been springs from the coming
220 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

in such a way that the having-been coming ( gewesende Zukunft, literally:

“ beening coming” ) releases the present from itself. The unity of the
having-been-presenting-coming is the phenomenon which Heidegger
calls “ temporality.”

Only because Da-sein is determined as temporality does it make possible

for itself the authentic potentiality-of-being-a-whole of anticipatory res-
oluteness which we characterized. Temporality reveals itself as the meaning
of authentic care.
The phenomenal content of this meaning, drawn from the consti-
tution of being of anticipatory resoluteness, fulfills the significance of
the term temporality. (SZ, 326)

This passage is expressly designed to warn us not to ascribe

already familiar concepts of time to the “ authentic temporality ” of
care. Especially the vulgar concepts of a “ future, ” “ past, ” and “ pre-
sent” are to be rigorously kept away. These concepts, although they
are genuine time-phenomena, spring from the disowned temporality
of care, and will be discussed only when the authentic phenomenon
has been further exposed and made more secure than it is as yet. Sim-
ilarly, all concepts of a “ subjective” and “ objective, ” or an “ imma-
nent” and “ transcendent” time must be put aside , because they are
based on an a prior distinction between “ being-a-subject ” and “ being-
an-object,” a distinction which the existential interpretation of Da-
sein’ s being as care is designed to overcome by leading it back to a
more fundamental origin.
But there is a further implication of the above passage, although
it is not stressed by Heidegger in the present context. The passage
shows a remarkable reciprocity, or perhaps better, an interpenetration
between care and temporality. While temporality is to make under-
standable the articulated unity of care, it is only through and as care
that temporality itself becomes accessible and understandable. They
mutually illuminate and define each other. This is why even the first
definition of care in Division One could not do without the “ ahead-of ”
and the “ already,” both of which have an evident temporal meaning.
-
The “ ahead-of-itself ” { Sich vorweg ) , indicates a “ before ” ( vor ). The
“ before ” could mean a “ not-yet-now, but later, ” while the “ already”
could mean a “ no( t )-more-now, but earlier.” If, however, this were the
meaning of the “ ahead ” ( before ) and the “ already,” then care would be
conceived as a thing which occurs and has a duration “ in time, ” and
which, moreover, is earlier and later, not-more and not-yet at the same
time. Since this is impossible, the temporal characters of care must evi-
dently have a different meaning. As Heidegger says:
 Authentic Ability-to-Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 221

The “ before” [ vor ] and “ ahead of ” [vorweg] indicate the future that first
makes possible in general the fact that Da-sein can be in such a way that
it is concerned about its potentiality-of-being. The self -project grounded
in the “ for the sake of itself ” in the future is an essential quality of exis-
tentiality. Its primary meaning is the future. (SZ, 327 )

This passage is ambiguous and misleading because it could easily

be taken to mean that the forethrow ( projecting ) structure of care is
“ grounded ” in the “ coming. ” This, however, would be possible only if
care had, as it were, a ready-made future before itself , into which its fore-
throw would proceed; but this is precisely the interpretation that Hei-
degger expressly repudiates. What he attempts to show, on the contrary,
is how the concept of a future that we accept “ ready-made” originates in
Da-sein’s coming-to-himself in the possibilities of his being. Those, how-
ever, must be thrown forward as the being that can come to him, other-
wise it would be incomprehensible how a dimension could be opened
up in which a “ coming” could take place. As far as we can see, therefore,
the “ coming” cannot be envisaged as in any way “ prior” to the fore-
throw. It seems rather that the forward-to and coming-( back )-to are cor-
relative movements that form a single structural whole. On the other
hand, it is perfectly well understandable that the “ for the sake of itself ”
character of existentiality is “ grounded” in the coming. If we supposed
that the forethrow simply ended in the disclosure of possibilities, with-
out their coming nearer to us, touching and affecting us, our here-being
could not be a concern for our ability-to-be. Indeed, it would be impos-
sible to distinguish the possibilities of our own being from those of
other beings. According to our interpretation, therefore, it is not the
forethrow structure of care that is “ grounded ” in the coming, but only
the “ for the sake of itself ’ character of existentiality.
Just as the “ ahead-of-itself ’ does not mean a future in which care
is “ not-yet” but eventually “ will be,” so the “ already ” of “ already-being-
in ” (-the-world ) does not mean a past in which care is “ no( t )-more.” The
“ already ” is the existential-temporal character of a being who, insofar
as he is at all , finds himself already thrown into his being. As long as Da-
sein exists, he can never observe himself coming-into-being “ in ” time
or “ with” time, in which he is already partially gone; he can only find
himself as a thrown fact.
In attunement Da-sein is invaded by itself as the being that it still is and
already was, that is, that it constantly is as having been. The primary exis-
tential meaning of facticity lies in the having-been. The formulation of
the structure of care indicates the temporal meaning of existentiality and
facticity with the expressions “ before” and “ already.” (SZ, 328)
222 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

The third constitutive moment of care, the being-together-with or

near-to ( things within the world ) , on the other hand, remains without
a corresponding indication of its temporal meaning. The reason for
this is that in the authentic mode of care the “ presenting” remains
“ enclosed ” ( eingeschlossen ) in the coming and having-been, in contrast
to the disowned “ present” which, as we shall see later, seeks to “ run
away” from ( entlaufen ) the original coming and having-been of care and
seeks to exhaust itself in the presenting of beings within the world.
This “ run-away ” presenting, will turn out to be the primary temporal
meaning of falling. A resolutely disclosed existence, on the other hand,
brings himself back to himself from his fallenness, “ in order to be all
the more authentically ‘there' for the disclosed situation in the
‘Moment' [ Augenblick ]” (SZ, 328 ).
The authentic “ presenting” is called by Heidegger the moment or
instant, Augenblick . Literally, however, Augenblick means a glance of the
eye, “ the moment of vision, ” as Macquarrie and Robinson render it.
The “ instant vision ” of what meets us in the situation remains
“ enclosed ” or “ held in ” the temporality of authentic care. Although
Heidegger does not further explain how or why it is so, we may remem-
ber that death was shown earlier to be the certain possibility which is
indefinite as to its “ when ” ; it is at every instant [ Augenblick ) possible. A
resolutely grasped existence does not seek to “ run away ” from the cer-
tain coming of this possibility, but remains open to its possible arrival
at any instant. Hence his meeting with the beings “ present ” in his situ-
ation has the character of an instant readiness for them.

Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity, and falling

prey and thus constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of
care. The factors of care are not pieced together cumulatively, any more
than temporality has first been put together out of future, past, and pre-
sent “ in the course of time.” Temporality “ is” not in a being at all. It is
not, but rather temporalizes itself. (SZ, 328).

Temporality temporalizes itself [ zeitigt sich ). Sich zeitigen means to

bring itself to ripeness. We have already come across such tautological
expressions as “ the world worlds” and “ the nothing negates.” Such tau-
tologies are not only eminently meaningful, but are perhaps the only
precise and appropriate way we have of saying how the “ is is.” Being
evidently cannot “ be ” in the same way as beings are, but, on the other
hand, it is not an absolute nothing. Even the nothing “ is ” insofar as it
negates. Temporality, as the ground-structure of care, “ is ” not but
“ temporalizes itself.” Why we are nonetheless forced to say, for
—
instance, “ temporality is the meaning of care , ” or “ temporality is —
 Authentic Ability-to-Be-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 223

defined in such and such a way, ” Heidegger promises to make under-

standable from “ the clarified idea of being and the ‘is’ as such ” (SZ,
328). In the absence of Division Three, this promise is not fulfilled.
What the present division will show in detail are the different ways in
which temporality can temporalize itself. These make it possible that
Da sein can exist in different ways, above all in the basic modes of
owned and disowned existence.
Future, having-been, and present, show the phenomenal characters of
“ toward itself, ” “ back to,” “ letting something be encountered.” The phe-
nomena of toward . . . , to . . . , together with . . . reveal temporality as
the ekstatikon par excellence. Temporality is the primordial uoutside of itself ’ in
and for itself Thus we call the phenomenon of future, having-been, and
present, the ecstases of temporality. Temporality is not, prior to this, a
being that first emerges from itself; its essence is temporalization in the
unity of the ecstases. (SZ, 328-29 )

The difficulty of this passage is not to be mitigated, nor can Hei-

degger be reasonably blamed for what is, after all, the ungraspable
nature of time itself. We must await Heidegger’s further analyses to make
the ecstatic unity of temporality more concretely understandable. One
thing, however, is already evident. The three ecstases of temporality cor-
respond to, or are correlative to the different directions in which Da-sein
as care transcends himself: in the direction of his being as thrown ( that
I am ), of his being as a possibility ( I will be) , and of the being of beings
within the world. The ecstatic “ standing-out-of-itself ’ of temporality is
Da-sein’s self transcendence as it faces and comes back upon itself. The
ecstases of temporality thus bring the different modalities of being dis-
closed in transcendence nearer to each other, let them affect each other.
It is only in this turning toward and back upon itself of transcendence
that being becomes truly “ meaningful, ” understandable.
One of the reasons why the “ outside-itself ” character of tempo-
rality is so hard to grasp is that in the “ vulgar concept” of time it is pre-
cisely this ecstatic character of time that is levelled down to a unifor-
mity. This levelling-down process will turn out to be analogous to the
modification of the “ significant ” space of the everyday world, where
“ space” has the character of a “ place for” this or that thing, into a fea-
tureless, homogeneous three-dimensional space of nature. Similarly,
the “ significant ” world-time, which essentially belongs to everyday care
as a presenting being-near-to things, can be leveled down to the begin-
ningless, endless now-time. If the vulgar concept of time can be
demonstrated as nonoriginal and derived from care in the mode of dis-
ownment, then the authentic and original temporality of care in the
224 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

mode of forward-running and resoluteness may be aptly called original

or primordial time.
The levelled-down “ unecstatic” character of the vulgar concept of
time expresses itself in the predominance of the present, the now. The
future and the past are understood only as modes of the present; they
are, one might say, the “ absent ” present as the not-more-now and the
not-yet-now. Among the two ways in which the present can be “ absent,”
moreover, we would be inclined to give more weight to the past than to
the future, for the past seems to be more “ real” to us than the future.
Heidegger’s interpretation of original time differs strikingly from the
traditional concept insofar as its primary mode or ecstasis is the future (SZ,
329). As we can already see, this is not an arbitrary invention of Hei-
degger’s, but arises from the existential interpretation of Da-sein’s being
—
as care: it is in the running-forward the transcending to the utmost,
—
impassable possibility of not-being-here-anymore that the turning-back
upon itself of transcendence first becomes phenomenally accessible.
Once it is firmly grasped that the original “ future” is the coming-
to-himself of an existence in the possibility of his end, it becomes “ obvi-
ous” that this future is finite. It is the primary ecstasis of a temporality
that belongs to care as a thrown being-unto-death. Da-sein does not
merely “ have ” an end at which he ceases to be, but “ exists finitely , ” “ exists
endingly” (SZ, 329). But, Heidegger asks, “ ‘does time not go on?’ And
can there not be an unlimited number of things that still lie ‘in the
future’ and arrive from it? ” (SZ, 330 ).
These questions, although they are to be answered in the affir-
mative, do not in the least refute the finiteness of the original coming,
for they do not refer to it at all. Heidegger has so far not even raised
the question of what can happen “ in a time that goes on, ” or what sort
of future and coming may be possible in that time; he has so far
restricted himself to showing how the “ coming” of this future itself and
as such is to be determined.

Its finititude does not primarily mean a stopping, but is a characteristic

of temporalizing itself. The primordial and authentic future is the
toward-oneself, toward oneself existing as the possibility of a nullity not-
to-be-bypassed. The ecstatic quality of the primordial future lies precisely
in the fact that it closes the potentiality-of-being, that is, the future is
itself closed and as such makes possible the resolute existentiell under-
standing of nullity. Primordial and authentic coming-toward-oneself is
the meaning of existing in one’s ownmost nullity. (SZ, 330 )

As we have already pointed out, the derivation of the nonprimor-

dial, endless time from the primordial temporality of care will be
 Authentic A bility -to-íf e-a-Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 225

explained in the last chapter of this division. It must now be emphasized

that the order of explanation cannot be reversed. Primordial time cannot
be explained from the derivative time that springs from it. With regard to
the former, Heidegger has so far established the following theses:

Time is primordial as the temporalizing of temporality, and makes pos-

sible the constitution of the structure of care. Temporality is essentially
ecstatic. Temporality temporalizes itself primordially out of the future.
Primordial time is finite. (SZ, 331 )

The results so far achieved, however, are only the first steps in the
temporal analysis of care. The tasks to be taken in hand in the next
three chapters are briefly outlined by Heidegger in the next section.

5. A PRIMORDIAL REPETITION OF THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYSIS

ARISING FROM THE TEMPORALITY OF HERE-BEING [DA-SEIN ]

If temporality is the meaning of care, its “ constitutive power ” must be

confirmed by all the fundamental structures and characters of care
that the existential analysis has brought to light. The fundamental char-
acter of care central to all Heidegger’s analyses is its disclosedness.
This is constituted by understanding, attunement, speech, and falling.
The temporal structure of these disclosing existentials must now be
shown in detail, both in the mode of owned and disowned existence.
Their analysis will lead to an understanding of the care-taking being-in-
the-world and of the temporal meaning of an average, indifferent
everydayness, which formed the starting-point of the Preparatory Fun-
damental Analysis in Division One.
It is interesting to remind ourselves once again that the order Hei-
degger follows in the next chapters is almost exactly the reverse of the
course he has taken in the first division. There he began with the expo-
sition of being-in-the-world followed by the detailed analysis of its con-
stitutive moments, world, self, being-in. The reason for this was that
the indivisible unity of being-in-the-world had first to be secured even
at the risk of appearing dogmatic or arbitrary. Now, however, the inner
possibility of this unity is beginning to come to light. The first task now
is to show that the whole of temporality lies in every single structure of
care, for instance, that understanding is not grounded purely and
solely in the “ coming, ” nor attunement purely and solely in the “ hav-
ing-been , ” and so forth, but in the whole ecstatic unity of temporality.
These detailed analyses will then lead on to the whole of care as a fac-
tually existing being-in-the-world.
226 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

The interpolation in the previous chapter has shown that being-

in- the-world has the basic character of “ ground, ” and that the tempo-
ral meaning of ground is constancy and self -standingness. Temporal-
ity, on the other hand, is the way in which Da-sein lets the various
modes and possibilities of his being approach and affect himself . The
temporal structure of the “ self-standingness” of existence constitutes
the steadfastness, continuity, and “ span ” or “ stretchedness” of Da-sein’s
being. As a not-self-grounded ground, Da-sein stabilizes himself in his
factical being-in- the-world on the ground of “ tradition ” ; that is, in dis-
closing and making his own the possibilities of existences who have-
been-here. The temporal “ happening” of a self-standing being-in-the-
world will prove to be constitutive of Da-sein’s historicity
[ Geschichtlichkeit ). In contrast to the authentic historicity of a resolute
existence, everydayness will turn out to be the inauthentic way in which
man is “ historical” ( historisch ).
Through the analyses of everydayness and historicity, original
time will become graspable as the condition of the possibility and
necessity of the everyday experience of time.
Da-sein expends itself primarily for itself as a being that is concerned about
its own being, whether explicitly or not. Initially and for the most part ,
care is circumspect taking care of things. Expending itself for the sake
of itself , Da-sein “ uses itself up.” Using itself up, Da-sein uses itself , that
is, its time. Using its time, it reckons with it. Taking care of things, which
is circumspect and reckoning, initially discovers time and develops a
measurement of time. Measurement of time is constitutive for being-in-
the-world. Measuring its time, the discovering of circumspection which
takes care of things lets what it discovers at hand and objectively present
be encountered in time. Innerwordly beings thus become accessible as
“ existing in time.” We shall call the temporal quality of innerworldly
-
beings “ within time-ness.” The “ time” initially found therein ontically
becomes the basis for the development of the vulgar and traditional
concept of time. But time as within-time-ness arises from an essential
kind of temporalization of primordial temporality. This origin means
that the time “ in which ” objectively present things come into being and
pass away is a genuine phenomenon of time; it is not an externalization
of a “ qualitative time ” into space, as Bergson’s interpretation of time —
which is ontologically completely indeterminate and insufficient would
have it. (SZ , 333 ) *
—
Since the present section lays down only the program to be
worked out in Division Two, we shall not anticipate Heidegger’s
detailed analyses by commenting on the above paragraph. It is suffi-
cient at this stage to note that the three main themes of the next three
 Authentic Ability -to-Re-a -Whole and Temporality as the Meaning of Care 227

chapters will be the temporality of everydayness, of historicity, and in-

timeness. These will give us an insight into the extraordinary com-
plexities of an original ontology of Da sein.

As being-in- the-world, Dasein exists factically together with beings

encountered within the world. Thus the being of Da sein gets its com-
prehensive ontological transparency only in the horizon of the clarified
being of beings unlike Da sein ; that is, even of what is not at hand and
not objectively present, but only “ subsists.” But if the variations of being
are to be interpreted for everything of which we say that it is , we need
beforehand a sufficiently clarified idea of being in general. As long as we
have not reached this, the retrieve of the temporal analysis of Da sein will
remain incomplete and marred by lack of clarity, not to speak extensively
of the factual difficulties. The existential-temporal analysis of Da-sein
requires in its turn a new retrieve in the context of a fundamental dis-
cussion of the concept of being. (SZ, 333)

This last paragraph is especially significant because it no longer

deals with Division Two, but gives us a long-term glimpse of the prob-
lems that Division Three will have to solve. It seems to hint that the
scope of the first two divisions, dealing as they do with the existence
of Da-sein and the reality of real beings, does not exhaust the whole
range of being, for among the things of which we say “ it is, ” there are
such as are neither handy nor substantial but only “ subsist” { besteht ).
Unfortunately, Heidegger nowhere gives us a hint of what kind of
things he has in mind. Could we say, for instance, that nature in the
ontic sense “ subsists.” Certainly, nature is neither an individual handy
or substantial thing, yet the “ only subsists ” seems inappropriate to it. It
is regrettable that Heidegger gives us no guidance on this point that
would have shed some light on the scope of Division Three.
 XIII
Temporality and Everydayness

Heidegger introduces the present chapter by reminding us of the

multiplicity of phenomena the Preparatory Fundamental Analysis
has made accessible. Such multiplicity is positively demanded by the
disclosing character of here-being, for “ the ontological origin of the
being of Da-sein is not ‘less’ than that which arises from it, but
exceeds it in power from the beginning. Any ‘arising’ [ Entspringen\
in the field of ontology is degeneration ” ( SZ, 334 ). These reflec-
tions are not introduced by Heidegger incidentally, but to forestall
the erroneous expectation that the temporal analysis is going to
reduce the complexity of care to a last, uniform building brick. In
its efforts to reach the “ ultimate, ” philosophy has only too often
been misled to search for a simple, undifferentiated building block
from which the whole of reality could be constructed. The aim of
the following analysis is not to dissolve all existential phenomena
into temporality, or to “ deduce ” or “ derive ” them from time, but to
show that their complexity could not be an original whole except on
the basis of the ecstatic unity of temporality. The penetration to the
ontological “ origin ” of care , moreover, must not be expected “ to
arrive at things which are ontically self-evident for the ‘common
understanding,’ but rather it is precisely this that opens up the
questionability of everything” (SZ, 334 ). What could be more obvi-
ous, for instance , then the everydayness with which the existential
analysis started ? It is, however, precisely this obvious phenomenon

229
230 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

that will emerge at the end of this chapter as a central and most
puzzling problem, which will direct the inquiry to the question of
history and historicity.

1. THE TEMPORALITY OF DISCLOSEDNESS IN GENERAL

Resoluteness represents the authentic disclosedness of care. Resolutely

existing, Da sein is authentically “ here” to himself and to the beings
that meet him in his situation. The constitutive moments of disclosed-
ness are attunement, understanding, falling, and speech. The unity of
these existentials was stressed already in Division One. Understanding
is always attuned; attunement always has its understanding. Attuned
understanding articulates itself in speech. The attuned-articulating
understanding has the character of “ falling, ” of losing itself to the
“ world.” Da-sein’ s predominantly falling way of existing has its own
characteristic way of understanding, of feeling, of explaining. The
explanation of an average being-together-in-the-world is “ published” in
everday idle talk and hearsay . These complex constituents of the dis-
closedness ( truth ) of existence will now be shown to form a structural
unity, because each of them leads back to the one temporality.

( a ) The Temporality of Understanding

Understanding (Verstehen) is first discussed in detail in the fifth chapter of
Division One. It is there that Da-sein’s being first comes into view as the
thrown forethrow. Thrown into his “ here, ” Da sein essentially throws him-
self forward to his ability-to-be-here. This forethrowing way of being is what
Heidegger calls “ existential understanding.” Understanding discloses to
Da-sein his own being-here as a possibility. The mode (ecstasis) of tempo-
rality in which understanding is primarily grounded is the primordial
future. Here-being’s ( Da-sein’s) future is its coming-to-itself (advancing-to-
itself ) in such a way that it holds out its own possible here-being before and
toward itself as the end to which its “ coming” is in advance directed. The
essentially “ futural” character of here-being is formally expressed in the
first constitutive moment of care, the ahead-of-itself. Care is authentically
ahead-of-itself in running forward to the ownmost, utmost, impassable
possibility of being-here. The authentic future makes possible a resolute
understanding of existence wholly to its end. In the first place and for the
—
most part, however, Da-sein exists “ irresolutely” that is, remains closed to
himself in his utmost ability-to-be. This irresolute understanding is
grounded in an inauthentic future. How is this to be defined and how does
it modify the whole structure of temporality?
 Temporality and Everydayness 231

The inauthentic future becomes accessible through the everyday,

care-taking being-in-the-world. In this way of existing, Da-sein under-
stands himself primarily from what he takes care of. The disowned
understanding throws itself into the needful and urgent business of
everyday occupations. These, however, are undertaken for the sake of Da-
sein’s own ability-to-be-here, so that even in its lostness to the world,
here-being is still “ futural ” in the sense of coming-to-itself. Now, how-
ever, “ Da-sein does not come-toward-itself primarily in its ownmost,
nonrelational potentiality-of-being, but it awaits this heedfully in terms
of that which what is taken care of produces or denies. Da-sein comes toward
itself in terms of what is taken care of. The inauthentic future has the
character of awaiting \Gewärtigens\’ (SZ, 337).
The German “ gewärtigen,” it may be remarked, has a much more
positive undertone than the English “ awaiting” and “ waiting for.” It implies
readiness and preparedness for something that can be counted upon. Fur-
ther, It must always be remembered that what this awaiting “ comes toward ”
is not primarily happenings within the world, but here-being itself in its
everyday ability-to-be-in-the-world. The inauthentic future is still “ my
future,” although I now approach my possible here-being in a round-about
way through the success or failure of my makings and doings. So, for
instance, “ my future” may be threatened by the possible failure of a busi-
ness venture in which I have heavily invested, or it may look rosy because
I can count upon a steady advancement in my profession, and so on. In all
such ontic-existentiell projections of “ my future” my own possible here-
being is clearly “ awaited, ” although this awaiting may be well-nigh forgot-
ten in a distracted preoccupation with the happenings I hopefully or fear-
fully await. In the ontological-existential order, however, here-being’s
“ awaiting” or advancing-to-itself has an essential priority, for it first of all
forms and holds out to itself a horizon of foreseeability as such, from
which something can be counted on to approach at all. Hence Heidegger
says: “ Awaiting must always already have disclosed the horizon and scope
in terms of which something can be expected. Expecting is a mode of the
future founded in awaiting [the future] that temporalizes itself authentically as
anticipation. Thus a more primordial being-toward-death lies in anticipa-
tion than in the heedful expecdng of it.” (SZ, 337 ).
Let us sum up briefly the results reached so far. Understanding
in all its modes is primarily grounded in the future. The resolute under-
standing of owned existence is made possible by here-being’s running-
foward to its ownmost possibility of not-being- here-anymore. The irres-
olute understanding of disowned existence is grounded in an awaiting
in which here-being comes- to-itself in its worldish possibilities. The
awaiting can modify itself further into an expecting.
232 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Both the authentic and inauthentic future are modes ( ecstases ) of

“ primordial time,” that is, belong to the unity of future, past, and pre-
sent of the one temporality of care.
It follows from this that understanding cannot be purely and sim-
ply “ futural, ” but that it must be cooriginally constituted by a past and
a present. The inauthentic present will prove to be the primary mean-
ing of the falling way of existing in which Da sein “ irresolutely” loses
himself to the beings whose presence within the world is disclosed in
and to his “ presenting.” The inauthentic present will be more fully dis-
closed in connection with the temporality of falling (see subsection c of
this chapter ). At this point, it is sufficient to recall that the unity of here-
being’s past and future (its having-been-coming-to-itself ) “ lets the pre-
sent out of itself ’ ( aus sich entlässt ). The operative words in this phrase
are the “ aus sich,” the “ out of itself.” They indicate that whereas the
original past and future are here-being’s removal (ecstasis ) to itself its
presence as a “ presenting of . . . is a turning away from itself and a
turning to “ another” over against itself. In its “ presenting of . . . ,” here-
being brings itself face to face with a vis-à-vis. This is why Heidegger
now says that here-being’s present is a “ Gegen-wart,” a looking out for a
“ gegen, ” for something opposite to itself. This, however, raises a diffi-
cult problem. How can a “ presenting” in this sense belong a priori to
here-being, when it can neither create the concrete beings it might
encounter, nor has it the power to command their presence within the
world? This problem is not explicitly resolved in Division Two, but for-
tunately we can draw on Heidegger’s interpretation of Kant to throw a
light on it ( especially KPM, § 16, § 25 and § 34 ). According to this inter-
.
pretation, a “ presenting of . . ” can very well belong a priori to the tem-
porality of care, because the “ gegen,” the vis-à-vis for which it “ looks
out,” is not in the first place any concrete beings at all, but a “ nothing,”
a “ nonentity.” This “ nothing, ” however, is not an absolute nothing, but
a pure horizon formed in the presenting itself as something that faces,
that stands over against it. Thus here-being a priori gives itself its own
“ gegen” by forming a horizon that looks back at it, presents itself to it.
This horizon of pure presentness anticipatingly awaits the concrete
beings which , in reference to it, become recognizable and understand-
able as independent, self-standing “ presences.”
In contrast to the inauthentic present of a disowned, self-scat-
tered existence, how is the authentic present to be characterized ? This
belongs to the forward-running future of a resolutely disclosed exis-
tence, which brings itself face to face with its own factical “ here.” The
resolution that discloses here-being’s “ situation ” as its own not only
brings it back from its scatteredness among the things taken care of,
 Temporality and Everydayness 233

but its “ presenting” is held by the authentic future and past; that is, it
does not “ fall out of ” and “ run away from ” the finite time of care. The
authentic present is called by Heidegger “ Augenblick,” which is ordi-
narily translated by “ moment ” or “ instant.” As already remarked, the
literal meaning of “ Augenblick ” brings us much nearer to what Hei-
degger intends to say: Augenblick means the “ glance of the eye, ” which
instantly discloses here-being’s situation; it is an active “ ecstasis,” that
is, removal of here-being to the possibilities and circumstances which
face it in its hereness without losing itself to them. The authentic pre-
sent may be called an “ instant attending to . . .” or, briefly, an instant.
The original meaning of instare , standing-in, should remind us that
this mode of presenting “ stands in, ” is “ held by ” the authentic future
and past of care. To help keep this in mind we shall therefore use both
the term moment and the term instant .
The existentiell phenomenon of the moment or instant, Hei-
degger points out in a footnote ( SZ, 338), was most penetratingly
seen by Kierkegaard, without being existentially clarified by him.
Such clarification is not possible in the horizon of the vulgar con-
cept of time in which Kierkegaard remained caught, so that he
attempted to define the Augenblick with the help of the “ now ” and
“ eternity.” The vulgar concept of an infinite now-time, however, is
derived from the original temporality of care and is incapable of
explaining it. Hence, Heidegger says:
The phenomenon of the Moment ( Augenblick) can in principle not be clar-
ified in terms of the now. The now is a temporal phenomenon which
belongs to time as within-time-ness: the now “ in which” something
comes into being, passes away, or is objectively present. “ In the Moment”
nothing can happen, but as an authentic present it lets us encounter
[begegnenlassen] for the first time what can be “ in a time” as something at
hand or objectively present. (SZ, 338)

The instant, as the authentic attending to (looking out for ) a

“ gegen,” is the condition of the possibility that, within the horizon that
—
it holds out over against itself within the horizon of presentness
within-worldish beings can come face to face with here-being in their
—
own, bodily “ presence.” The instant attending to here-being’s situation
springs from the authentic future. The temporal structure of a resolute
understanding is thus an instant running-forward. In constrast to this,
the irresolute understanding projects here-being’s future ( ability-to-be )
from what can be taken care-of ; that is, here-being comes-to-itself from
a falling presenting. The inauthentic understanding has the temporal
structure of a presenting awaiting.
234 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

What is the corresponding past ( beenness ) that belongs to these

modifications of the future and present? As we have heard in the last
chapter, the coming-to-itself of forward-running anticipatory resolute-
ness at the same time comes-back-to its ownmost self as already
thrown. This ecstatic comlng-back-to-itself makes it possible that a fac-
tical existence can resolutely take over the being that it is as having-
been. “ In anticipation, Da-sein brings itself forth again to its ownmost
potentiality-of-being. We call authentic having-been [ Gewesen-sein ]
retrieve [Wiederholung ]” (SZ, 339).
The authentic having-been is thus a gathering up of here-being’s
thrownness and a bringing it forward to the utmost possibility of its
self, a “ retrieve ” or “ recollection ” or, with something of the sense in
which the term is used of music, a “ recapitulation.”
It is illuminating to glance back from the position we have
reached to Heidegger's interpretation of conscience as the call of care.
This call is defined as a “ forward-calling recall” (see above chap. 11).
Care calls from the depth of thrownness revealed in dread forward to
the utmost ability-to-be, to the disowned self whom it recalls from his
lostness back to his thrown being unto death . It has now become evi-
dent that the forward-calling recall reflects the authentic-temporality
of care and summons the factical self to take over precisely this tem-
poral being in its fully disclosed finiteness. Further, the “ movedness”
( Bewegtheit ) of the “ ecstatic unity” of temporality now begins to reveal
itself as a kind of circling in itself: on the one hand, here-being must
already be thrown to let-itself-come-to-itself, but, on the other hand,
only in an authentic coming-to-itself does here-being become fully man-
ifest as itself \ and only in being thrown back upon itself by the impass-
able limit of its hereness can this thrown being recollect itself and
bring itself forward to its utmost possibility. The recollecting running
forward or anticipation at the same time brings itself instantly face to
face with its situation.
The full temporal structure of resolute understanding has now
been brought into view as a recollecting-instant running-forward. The
ecstasis Heidegger mentions in the third place always indicates the
—
mode of time in which an existential phenomenon in the present
—
instance understanding is primarily grounded.
As against the authentic recollection of here-being’s thrownness,
what is the character of the having-been that belongs to a disowned
understanding? Heidegger explains it as follows:

But when one projects oneself inauthentically upon the possibilities

drawn from what is taken care of in making it present , this is possible
 Temporality and Everydayness 235

only because Da-sein has forgotten itself in its ownmost thrown poten-
tiality-of-being. This forgetting is not nothing, nor is it just a failure
to remember; it is rather a “ positive, ” ecstatic mode of having-been ;
a mode with a character of its own. The ecstasy ( rapture ) of forget-
ting has the character of backing away from one’s ownmost having-
been in a way that is closed off from oneself . This backing away
from . . . ecstatically closes off what it is backing away from , and thus
closes itself off , too. As inauthentic having-been , forgottenness is thus
related to its own thrown being. It is the temporal meaning of the
kind of being that I initially and for the most part am as having-been.
And only on the basis of this forgetting can the making present that
takes care of and awaits retain things, retain beings unlike Da-sein
encountered in the surrounding world. To this retention corresponds
a nonretention that presents us with a kind of “ forgetting ” in the
derivative sense. (SZ, 339 )

The self-forgetful way of having-been hides the “ what ” before

which it retreats ( das Wovor ). This “ what, ” however, is the nothing that
negates in Da-sein’s thrown being as the not-self-originated ground of
its own negativity, that is, of its not-being-able-to-be-here-anymore. At
the same time, this forgetting forgets itself, remains hidden to itself as
a disownment of here-being’ s own thrownness. But does this mean that
here-being is altogether cut off from a “ before” of itself to which it can
go back? Evidently not, for the self-forgetful having-been opens up a
different kind of “ before” into which memory can penetrate. This is
further explained by Heidegger as follows:

In the mode of forgottenness, having-been primarily “ discloses” the hori-

zon in which Da-sein, lost in the “ superficiality” of what is taken care of,
can remember. Awaiting that forgets and makes present is an ecstatic unity
in its own right, in accordance with which inauthentic understanding
temporalizes itself with regard to its temporality. (SZ, 339 )

The backing away from before here-being’s ownmost thrownness is

in itself a turning to the before of its having-already-taken-care of
things within the world. Just as the disowned future is an awaiting of
here-being’s ability-to-be-in-the-world by way of taking care of things , so
the self-forgetful past is a retaining ( remembering ) of what has hap-
pened to “ oneself ’ in “ one’s ” care-taking occupations with things. The
horizon of the “ before ” into which a self -forgetful, inauthentic under-
standing penetrates in memory is different from the horizon of the
“ before ” in which an authentic understanding “ recollects” or
“ retrieves ” its thrownness and brings it forward into the forethrow of
the utmost possibility.
236 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

For later reference, it will be helpful to summarize the results of

the present section in the formulas given in tables 13.1 through 13.4:

TABLE 13.1
The Temporality of Understanding

Inauthentic Authentic
forgetfully-presenting recollecting ( or retrieving
awaiting or recapitulating )-instant
anticipatory running-forward

( b ) The Temporality of Attunement

It will be remembered that what we translate by the single word attune-
ment is the existential character of a feelingly attuned self-findsomeness
( Befindlichkeit ) . Understanding is always in some way “ tuned” by moods
and feelings, just as in our “ feeling this way or that ” we always in some
way understand ourselves. Accordiing to Heidegger, in attunement lies
a most original and fundamental disclosure ( truth) of here-being, which
reaches far beyond our powers of explicit knowing and explaining. But
since Da-sein “ stands cooriginally in truth and untruth,” attunement can
not only reveal but also obstinately conceal his thrownness. Whether
authentically revealing or inauthentically concealing, the primary dis-
closing function of attunement is to bring Da-sein before the “ that” of his
already-being-here. Even in its inauthentic modes, attunement brings
Da-sein to his “ that I am and have to be,” for the “ that” follows him and
is revealed even in turning away and fleeing from it.
-
Da sein can be brought before his “ that” only because he con-
stantly is as having-been. Attunement does not “ create ” the having-
been, but, on the contrary, the latter makes it possible that Da-sein can
be brought back to himself in such a way that he finds himself ( sich findet )
in how he feels ( sich befindet ) . Conversely, attunement cannot be simply
dissolved into temporal phenomena or be “ deduced ” from temporal-
ity. All that the existential interpretation intends to show is that moods
and feelings could not be as they are except on the basis of their tem-
poral structure.
If the basic existential meaning of attunement is a bringing-back-
to . . . , then, as the “ back-to” indicates, it must temporalize itself pri -
marily from the “ past.” This is now to be demonstrated for two exem-
plary modes of attunement, fear and dread, which have already been
analyzed in a preliminary way in Division One ( chapters 5 and 6 ).
 Temporality and Everydayness 237

Fear is an inauthentic mode of attunement, insofar as it arises

from a care-taking being-in-the-world and refers Da-sein to a fearsome
thing or event that approaches from the sphere of circumspectly dis-
covered circumstances. As Heidegger rightly insists, only fear can dis-
cover something to be feared; the sharpest, most minute “ objective
observation ” could never reveal that something fearsome threatens the
factical self. Da-sein discovers a coming threat to his care-taking ability-
to-be, because, tuned by fear, his being-in-the-world is a fearfully await-
ing looking-out-for the fearsome that may bear down on him from
within the world.
But, Heidegger now asks, does this not prove that the primary
time-character of fear is the future and not the past? Has fear not been
rightly defined as the expectation of a future evil ( malum futurum)? To
be sure, a future must belong to the temporality of fear. The expectancy
of a threat to a possible-here-being is, in fact, doubly “ futural.” First, the
oncoming evil is not-now but “ in the future,” that is, it is “ futural” in the
sense of the in-timeness of things. Secondly, the fearful expectancy lets
here-being come-to-itself in its threatened ability-to-be-in-the-world; it is
“ futural” in the original sense of belonging to the temporality of care,
albeit in the inauthentic mode of expectancy.
This, however, is not enough to constitute the affective character
that distinguishes fear and attunement in general. The affectivity of
fear is constituted by letting the threat come-backdo the factical, care-tak-
ing self that I already am as having-been. It is in coming-back-to-itself
that the fearing self lets itself be affected by the approaching threat, so
that the fear of something is at the same time the fear for itself. Affec-
tivity is grounded in the streaming-back-upon-itself of temporality.
This constitutes the primary disclosing character of attunement: it dis-
closes here-being in the facticity of its having-already-been delivered
- -
over to its threatened ability to-be-in the-world.
What is the character of the having-already-been which is consti-
tutive of fear? As an inauthentic past, it is a self-forgetting. But has it
not just been said that fear brings here-being back to itself ? Must the
disclosure of its threatened having-been not jolt it out of its self-forget-
fulness? These questions are answered by remembering precisely what
Heidegger has said about the authentic and inauthentic past. Here-
being “ forgets” itself in a self-disowning backing away or retreat before its
—
ownmost thrownness that is, before the nothing of himself which
threatens it not from the “ outside, ” but purely from its own thrown
self. But the retreat before the threat that is solely and singly here-being’s
own, is in itself a turning to . . . . What is it to which here-being turns?
What can it turn to? Only to itself , but itself as already thrown into a
238 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

care- taking being-in- the-world. The concealing retreat before here-

being’s ownmost having-been does not simply blot out its “ past” this
—
would be impossible but covers it over by a self-forgetful “ remember-
—
ing” its having already taken care of the world. Just because being-in-
the-world is a fundamental structure of care itself, it can screen the
authentic having-been by shifting the horizon of the “ before” to which
care is ecstatically removed.
Since, however, fear is only one among many other modes of attune-
ment, it must affect here-being in a specific way, which distinguishes it
from other affections. The specific mood that characterizes fear, as Aris-
totle already recognized, is a depression or confusion (Rhetoric, chap. 5,
1382 a 21).1 Fear, as a depression, literally presses Da sein back on to his
thrownness, but at the same time covers over his ownmost having-been by
the exclusively “ worldish ” character of the thing that threatens him. The
past to which Da-sein is brought back in fear is therefore not authentically
his own, but the self forgetful having-already-been-taking-care-of-the-world.
The confusion that characterizes fear, Heidegger explains, arises from the
forgetting of here-being’s own thrown self.

When one forgets and backs away from a factical, resolute potentiality-of-
being, one keeps to those possibilitiies of self-preservation and evasion
that have already been circumspectly discovered beforehand. Taking care
of things which fears for itself leaps from one thing to the other, because
it forgets itself and thus cannot grasp any definite possibility. All “ possible”
possibilities offer themselves, and that means impossible ones, too. He
—
who fears for himself stops at none of these the “ surrounding world ”
—
does not disappear but he encounters it in the mode of no longer know-
ing his way around in it. This confused making present of the nearest best
thing belongs to forgetting oneself in fear. That, for example, the inhabi-
tants of a burning house often “ save” the most unimportant things nearby
is known. When one has forgotten oneself and makes present a jumble of
unattached possibilities, one thus makes possible the confusion that con-
stitutes the nature of the mood of fear. The forgottenness of confusion
also modifies awaiting, and characterizes it as depressed or confused
awaiting that is distinguished from pure expectation. (SZ, 342 )

The headless running hither and thither, as described by Hei-

degger, is of course a well-known symptom of fear. But equally well-
known is the “ paralysis ” that can overtake us in an experience of
“ paralyzing fear.” How would Heidegger explain this? Is the “ paraly-
sis ” due to an extremity of confusion or to a deficiency of coming-
back- to-oneself ? In this kind of fear, we seem to be caught in a fasci-
nated staring at the fearsome ( the whereof of fear ). This would
 Temporality and Everydayness 239

suggest a deficiency in the primary existential function of attune-

ment, which is to bring us back to our thrown selves.
The ecstatic unity that makes the full phenomenon of fear possi-
ble is a ( confusedly) awaitingly presenting forgetting. Except for a
change in the primary ecstasis, this corresponds exactly to the tempo-
rality of inauthentic understanding, which was shown to be a forgetfully
presenting awaiting. Now it might be reasonably assumed that the tem-
porality of the authentic mood of dread will show a similar correspon-
dence to the recollecting, instant running-forward of a resolute under-
standing. But the temporality of dread will turn out to be not a fully
fledged, authentic forward-running, instant recollection, but only the
possibility of it. How Heidegger works this out must now be considered.
Before proceeding to the temporal analysis, we must briefly recall
the phenomenal characteristics of dread. It is similar to fear inasmuch as
it also discloses a threat. But whereas fear discovers a definite something
within the world as the thing to be feared ( the what of fear ), dread
reveals the nothing as the threat that lies purely in here-being itself as a
thrown ( not-self-grounded) being unto death. Dread is thus not only
essentially different from fear, nor is it only one authentic mode of
attunement among others; it is the most basic mood. Its unique disclos-
ing function is to bring here-being originally before the nothing which
negates in the being of beings, and first and foremost in here-being itself.
How does dread reveal the negating of the nothing in the being
of beings? In dread, the familiar, reliable things that we usually under-
stand as relevant to our own existence sink into complete irrelevance
( Unbewandtnis ). They do not simply disappear, but all weight and hold
seems to vanish from them, so that they can give us nothing to which
we could cling for support. The world as a whole appears in the char-
acter of complete insignificance, and in this “ negated ” mode it can no
longer refer us “ significantly” to other beings as relevant to our own
being. It follows from this that “ our heedful awaiting finds nothing in
terms of which it could understand itself, it grasps at the nothingness
of the world. But, thrust toward the world, understanding is brought
by Angst to being-in-the-world as such ” (SZ, 343).
What does Heidegger mean by the “ nothingness of world ” ? In
the first place and most obviously, the world in the “ negated ” mode of
insignificance. But more than that, it is precisely the “ nothing of
world ” that reveals the world as such in its “ otherness” to the concrete
beings that appear within it. As the “ other ” to beings, the world itself
is a “ nothing, ” though not an absolute, negative nothing. That is why it
is in the “ nothingness of world ” that we are first “ thrust toward ” the
—
world itself: it is now revealed, not as we usually think of it as the all
240 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

—
of beings but as a pure ontological horizon that belongs to our own
being as being-in-the-worid.
What dread dreads is being-in-the-world itself. But this “ what” of
dread is not an expected “ approaching evil ” that may someday destroy
our care-taking ability-to-be. The what of dread is already here: it is
here-being itself. Does this mean that dread is not “ futural” at all ? No,
it means only that the dreading here-being does not come-to-itself in an
inauthentic expectancy.
When dread overturns our familiar at-homeness in the world, the
“ nothingness of world” reveals the impossibility of relying primarily on a
care-taking occupation with things for our own existence. The revelation
of this impossibility, however, lets the possibility of an authentic ability-to-
be come to light (aufleuchten-lassen). How this revelation is existentially
possible is explained by Heidegger in an extremely condensed way. To fol-
low him here, it is well to remember that the primary disclosing function
of attunement in general lies in its affective character: the attuned self lets
itself be affected by what it is attuned to. Now the affectivity of dread is
of a preeminent kind, inasmuch as it is the purest self-affection: the dread
of here-being is at the same time dread for this same, naked here-being-
itself as already thrown into an uncanny not-at-homeness. The dreading
here-being lets itself be affected purely by the dreadsomeness of itself.
This means in terms of temporality: the dreading here-being brings itself
back to the pure “ that” of its own thrownness. This “ back-to” cannot have

—— —
the character of a self-forgetful retreat that is, of an inauthentic having-
been nor, on the other hand, is it already a fully fledged recollecting or
retrieve that is, a gathering-up of the ownmost having-been and bringing
it forward into a resolutely taken-over existence. The latter can become a
fact only through the decision of a concrete self who resolutely answers
the call of conscience by an anticipatory forward-running recollection of
his thrown being unto death. This answer cannot be enforced by dread.
Dread can only bring a factical here-being back to its thrownness as possi-
bily recollectable ( als mögliche wiederholbare ). Thus reduced wholly and singly
to its own thrownness, the possibilities of here-being that can be thrown
forward can be drawn solely from this same thrownness itself. Hence the
dreading here-being can come-to-itself only in its ownmost ability-to-be as
a thrown being-unto-death. In bringing here-being before the recollec-
tability of its ownmost having-been, dread at the same time reveals the
possibility of its utmost ability-to-be. An authentic forward-running recol-
lection, however, remains only an existential possibility of care, unless it is
resolutely taken over by a factical self. Failing this, the choicelessly thrown
self remains in the inauthentic mode of his being.
It will now be easily understood that the present that belongs to
the ecstatic unity of dread is neither the confused presenting of fear,
 Temporality and Everydayness 241

which loses itself among ungrasped possibilities, nor, on the other

hand, the fully fledged Augenblick , the instant attending to here-being’s
situation. The instant arises only from a concrete resolution. Dread,
however, brings the factical self into the mood for a possible resolution.
The presence of dread holds the instant, as Heidegger vividly says, “ on
the jump” or, less literally, in readiness (SZ, 344).
The full temporal meaning of dread may thus be defined as a bring-
ing before a possible forward-running-instant recollectability. Its peculiar-
ity is that it is originally grounded in here-being’s having-been, which
brings forth the corresponding coming-to and presenting. In this peculiar
temporality “ the possibility was shown of the powerfulness that distin-
guishes the mood of Angst” (SZ, 344). Dread ( Angst ) is a “ powerful” mood,
for in it here-being confronts and is held fast solely by itself; hence in it lies
the possibility of the most original disclosure and experience of being. But
this possibility is not fully explained at this point; the temporal analysis
does not go beyond the limits reached in the preparatory analysis. The
negating of the nothing is shown in the not-at-homeness of a thrown being-
-
in the-world, in the possibility of not-being-in-the-world. But what of the
nothing of the ownmost, single self ? How does being become under-
standable from this nothing, how must it already be articulated in this orig-
inal disclosure? What is the temporal meaning of the nothing itself, assum-
ing that it must have a temporal meaning in a preeminent sense? None of
these questions is raised, let alone answered, at the present stage.
On the contrary, Heidegger’s final remarks seem to suggest that
the present analysis, while indispensable, is to some extent artificial,
because it must consider the constitutive moments of care in isolation;
whereas, they are as they are only in the interplay of the whole of care.
So, for instance, fear and dread never occur as isolated phenomena in
a “ stream of experience, ” but attuningly determine ( bestimmen ) an
understanding and are in turn determined by it. That is why, although
both moods are primarily grounded in a mode of having-been, when
they are considered in the whole of care, their origin proves to differ
in each case. “ Angst arises from the future of resoluteness, while fear
arises from the lost present of which fear is fearfully apprehensive, thus
falling prey to it more than ever” (SZ, 344-45).
This closes the temporal analysis of the two exemplary moods.
But now the question arises whether they really represent attunement
in general. What kind of temporal meaning can be found in the dull
lack of tone that characterizes our everyday existence? And what of
moods like hope, joy, and enthusiasm? Heidegger’s answer to these
misgivings may be briefly summed up as follows.
That attunement in general is primarily founded in having-been,
may be most easily seen in the “ depressive ” moods like sorrow, despair,
242 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

melancholy, and the like. These moods obviously press here-being

down into the heaviness of the thrown ground of itself. But even those
moods that “ lighten” or “ uplift” us arise from the burden of thrown-
ness, and that is precisely why we experience them as “ making our
hearts lighter ” and “ raising our spirits.” Why, then, are such moods
—
hope especially thought to have a primarily futural character ? Hope,
—
as the counterpart to fear, has been defined as the expectation of a
coming good ( bonum futurum). This definition betrays the essential ten-
dency of a falling being-in-the-world to explain existential phenomena
primarily from what they relate themselves to within the world so, in
the present instance, from the what of hope, the future good. Heideg-
—
ger, on the other hand, rightly insists that the true weight and meaning
of all moods and feelings lie in their affective character. In the case of
hope, also, “ the mood-character lies primarily in hoping as hoping some-
thing for oneself He who hopes takes himself, so to speak, along in the
hope and brings himself toward what is hoped for. But that presup-
poses having-gained-oneself ” (SZ, 345). The self must already have
“ gained himself,” that is, gained a stand, won ground in his thrownness
among beings as a whole as a self. Otherwise he could not hope for
anything for himself .
As for the toneless indifference of a gray everydayness, which
drifts along with what the day brings, it “ demonstrates in the most pen-
etrating fashion the power of forgetting in the everyday moods of taking
care of what is nearby” (SZ, 345). The mere, indifferent carrying on
from day to day is grounded in a forgetting self-abandonment to
thrownness (see the next section for more on “ self-abandonment ” ). Its
temporal meaning is an inauthentic having-been. A mood of “ could
not care less” indicates an extreme self-loss, even though it may go
hand in hand with an extreme activity. The authentic counterpart to
indifference is equanimity { Gleichmut ), the mood in which a resolutely
forward-running existence is instantly here to its possible situations.

TABLE 13.2
The Temporality of Attunement

Inauthentic Authentic
fear dread
a confused bringing before a possible
awai ting-presenting anticipatory forward-running-instant
forgetting recollectability ( or retrievability
or recapitulation )
 Temporality and Everydayness 243

( c ) The Temporality of Falling

We must remind ourselves again and again that falling is a movement

within here-being itself: a movement away from a resolutely grasped,
authentic self to an absorption in the world as one-of-them with whom
together one takes care of things ( das Man ). The everyday being-
together in a mutually shared world has the tendency to develop and
increase the momentum of the fall. It develops its own kind of com-
municating talk , the hearsaying idle chatter ( Gerede ); it has its own way
of “ seeing, ” curiosity ( Neugier, literally greed for the new ); and it
spreads an ambiguity ( Zweideutigkeit ) over the meaning of here-being.
The ambiguously curious hearsaying idle talk publishes an average
explanation of self, world, and beings within the world , which is acces-
sible to everyone and so relieves one of the burden of an immediate,
genuine contact with beings and of an original disclosure of being. In
everyday being-together, one constantly seduces oneself from a gen-
uinely understood, resolutely grasped ability-to-be, leading to an
increasing uprootedness in one’s relations to other beings and to the
loss of a firmly grounded dwelling in the world.
The present analysis is restricted to the phenomenon of curiosity,
in which the temporal structure of falling is most easily seen. Heideg-
ger treats curiosity not merely as a psychological trait that distin-
guishes only certain individuals, but as “ an eminent tendency of Da-
sein in accordance with which it takes care of a potentiality of seeing”
(SZ, 346 ). What is the specific kind of “ sight ” ( Sicht ) of which curiosity
takes care and how does it differ from other kinds? Here it must be
remembered that Heidegger uses the terms seeing and sight in an
extremely formalized sense. They denote quite generally any kind of
access we have to being and beings (SZ, 147). All “ seeing” is primarily
grounded in the disclosing forethrow of understanding, which makes
transparent ( durchsichtig ) here-being as a whole through all its con-
stituent moments (SZ, 146 ). This original “ foreseeing” of our own exis-
tence, however, is by no means the only one appropriate to our dis-
closing way of being. Our caring-for being-with-others, for instance, has
its own specific “ sight” that discloses the other as the other: Rücksicht,
a considerate regard ( for the other in his thrown dependence upon a
world ), and Nachsicht a forbearing looking to ( the other in his ownmost
self ). Everyday care has again its own proper access to things in a cir-
cumspect “ for-sight” ( Umsicht ) , which discovers the things at hand as
utensils, that is, in what they are for.
The practical circumspection of everyday care can modify itself
in various ways. It can become a theoretical only-looking-at things,
244 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

which discovers things not as utensils for doing something with, but as
pure substances. Curiosity also springs from everyday circumspection,
but while normally we would speak of a “ scientific curiosity ” as well as
of curiosity in the sense of undue inquisitiveness, Heidegger restricts
its meaning to a greed for seeing always something new.
Curiosity arises when everyday circumspection “ sees” nothing
more at hand that needs to be done. The care of making, improving,
finishing something comes to a rest; circumspection , whose proper
function is to bring things near (entfernen) so that they can be taken
care of, becomes liberated from the workaday world to which it has
been bound. The unoccupied care, however, does not thereby disap-
pear, but gathers itself in the liberated circumspection. Since its very
essence is to bring something near, yet there is nothing at hand that has
to be done, circumspection creates new possibilities for seeing itself:

It tends to leave the things nearest at hand for a distant and strange
world. Care turns into taking-care of possibilities, resting and staying to
see the “ world” only in its outward appearance [ Aussehen ] . Da-sein seeks
distance solely to bring it near in its outward appearance. Da-sein lets
itself be intrigued just by the outward appearance of the world, a kind of
being in which it makes sure that it gets rid of itself as being-in-the-world,
gets rid of being with the nearest everyday things at hand. (SZ, 172 )

But, it may be asked, is the specific way in which curiosity “ sees ”

things not the same, after all, as the theoretical only-looking? Certainly,
there is a resemblance between the two: both are modifications of
everyday circumspection, both are liberated from their boundedness in
the nearest workaday world and in the utensil-character of things; both
arise from an “ unoccupied ” care. But there is an essential difference
between them. The leisurely only-looking of theory is a dwelling upon
things, a staying with them (Verweilen ) in order to understand them
and so to “ stand in their truth,” whereas curiosity is not concerned
with understanding, but merely with the “ looking” itself; hence its dis-
tinguishing character is that it does not stay with anything, but as soon
as it has seen something new, it jumps away to the still newer. Curios-
ity is a mode of care that cares only for finding always new opportuni-
ties for “ abandoning itself to the world ” (SZ, 172 ).
Although the difference between these two ways of “ looking” has
now become sufficiently clear, it will greatly help us to understand the
temporal structure of curiosity if we make the implications of this dif-
ference more explicit than Heidegger does. What is implied by a “ stay-
ing with things” ? It implies that a theoretical approach to things,
although it has liberated itself from its original groundedness in the
 Temporality and Everydayness 245

nearest handy things, gains a new ground by binding itself to things as

pure substances. The theoretical only-looking finds a stand and stabil-
ity ( i.e., ground ) in the substantial presence of things. The wondering
contemplation of things is furthermore guided and stabilized by a
desire for understanding, for coming to “ stand in the truth, ” that is, it
grounds itself in the most fundamental possibilility of existence of
being-in-the-truth; and finally, it grows roots in binding itself to the
“ facts, ” which is possible only on the basis of here-being’s own thrown-
ness among beings as a whole. In a word, the theoretical only-looking,
while it breaks through the boundaries of the nearest world, conquers
a new ground for itself in staying near to things, which is itself
“ grounded ” in an authentic being-in-the-world.
A roaming curiosity, on the other hand, completely fails to gain a
ground for itself. It hovers merely on the public surface of things.
Hence the well-known rootlessness and inconstancy of curiosity that
increasingly uproots here-being from any stable hold on anything. Even
the “ new things” that curiosity desires to see are not chosen and
decided upon by itself, but by “ them,” who prescribe what it is that one
must see if one is to be “ with it.”
What, then, is the temporal unity that makes this uprooted
curiosity possible? All “ seeing, ” “ apprehending, ” “ perceiving, ” of
beings in their “ bodily presence” is primarily grounded in a pre-
senting, which “ provides the ecstatic horizon in general within
which beings can be bodily present ” (SZ, 346 ). But the curious pre-
senting of things does not dwell admiringly even upon their “ looks, ”
but “ seeks to see only in order to see and have seen ” (SZ , 346). The
presenting thus becomes completely tangled up ( verfangen ) in itself.
What does Heidegger mean by this entanglement in itself ? He
means that the presenting cannot fulfil its genuine function as a pre -
senting-of-something; the ecstatic removal to . . . cannot come to a
stand and find a hold in the beings it discovers in their presence, for
no sooner has it looked on a new “ sight ” than it is already off to
something else to see. Thus the presenting casts itself loose from its
proper anchorage in things and becomes entangled in itself that is,
presents merely for the sake of presenting.
—
As this making present that gets tangled up in itself, curiosity has an
ecstatic unity with a corresponding future and having-been . Greed for
the new indeed penetrates to something not yet seen, but in such a way
that making present attempts to withdraw from awaiting. Curiosity is
altogether inauthentically futural , in such a way that it does not await
a possibility , but in its greed only desires possibility as something real.
Curiosity is constituted by a dispersed making present that , only mak-
246 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

ing present , thus constantly tries to run away from the awaiting in
which it is nevertheless “ held , ” [ ugehalten” ] although in a dispersed
[ ungehalten ] way. (SZ, 346-47 )

Even a superficial reading of this passage shows that the key to its
understanding lies in the meaning of “ held ” and “ unheld.” Their mean-
ing, however, is left obscure by Heidegger, not only here but through-
out Division Two. All that we know so far is that the authentic instant
is held in thé forward-running recollection of a resolute existence and
is clearly the extreme opposite of the unheld presenting of curiosity,
which seeks to run away from even an inauthentic awaiting. How can
we grasp more precisely what Heidegger intends to say with the “ held ”
and “ unheld ” presenting? By remembering that what the analysis seeks
to show is the temporal structure of an uprooting curiosity that leads
to an increasing groundlessness of a falling here-being. The held and
unheld presenting must therefore belong to the temporality of a firmly
grounded and an ungrounded here-being respectively. Once this connec-
tion is seen, the meaning of the present analysis can be clearly grasped
and even the reason for Heidegger’s obscurity becomes understand-
able. Heidegger cannot give an explicit explanation at this point
because the ground-character of here-being is left entirely in the pre-
liminary state in which it is discussed in the second chapter of Division
Two. It was only two years after the publication of Being and Time that
the essay “ On the Essence of Ground” was published, in which the
problem of “ ground ” was carried a step further.
This essay tells us of the three ways in which a factical here-being
grounds itself, that is, stabilizes itself , gains a stand and constancy in
itself as a thrown being-in-the-world. The self-grounding character of
Da-sein is, in turn, “ grounded” in the temporality of care, which holds
the present in an ecstatic unity with the future and past. In resolutely
running-forward to its utmost possibility, here-being comes wholly to
itself as a self; it “ identifies” itself as the presenting being-in-the-world
it already is. Here-being’s future holds the instant to itself as the end by
which all presenting is in advance guided. That is why a resolute exis-
tence does not vacillatingly lose itself among the “ sights ” offered by the
world, but “ instantly” grasps what is relevant to its own possibilities and
lets go what is irrelevant.
The resolutely forward-running existence, however, must recol-
lectingly come-back-to its ownmost having-been. The recollection
nakedly reveals here-being’s thrownness which has already delivered it
over to itself in its dependence upon a world . The not-self-original
throw into a world is the reason why the hereness of a thrown existence
 Temporality and Everydayness 247

must be a presenting of those beings it needs for its own ability-to-be.

The authentic recollection thus holds the instant in itself as the
“ ground of ’ its attending to the beings to be met within the world.
In contrast to the steadfastly held instant, the unheld presenting
of an uprooted curiosity becomes more easily understandable. As we
have already seen above, this presenting seeks to escape from the hold
given to it by even an inauthentic waiting for a possibility. The unheld
presenting arises or springs from (entspringen ) the inauthentic future in
such a way that it seeks to “ spring away ” or “ run away” from it (ent sprin-
gen, literally, to leap away ).
But in so losing its steadying hold on its own future, curiosity can-
not gain a lasting hold in the things it desires merely to see; as soon as
it has caught sight of something, it is “ already looking for the next
thing. The making present that “ arises” from the awaiting of a definite,
grasped possibility makes possible ontologically the not-staying that is
distinctive of curiosity” (SZ, 347).
The graphic terms in which Heidegger describes the “ running
away” of the present may easily mislead us into envisaging it as an ontic
happening in which one thing breaks loose from another thing. But the
presenting is not any thing; it cannot “ stand ” in and by itself at all but
can only bring itself forth ( temporalize itself ) in the unity of time. Even
the unheld presenting is still in some way “ held ” in here-being’s coming-
to-itself awaitingly. How, then, is the running-away to be understood in
an existential-temporal sense? It modifies the awaiting in such a way that
the awaiting “ runs after” ( nachspringen ) the presenting. The awaiting
can no longer fulfil its proper function of “ running ahead ” and holding
out possibilities before and toward the presenting; it “ gives itself up,” it
abdicates its role of leading and guiding the thrown self in its choice of
“ present” opportunities. The awaiting cannot let even inauthentic pos-
sibilities come to a care-taking presenting, but must “ run after” the insa-
tiable demands of curiosity by discovering possibilities for a mere, fleet-
ing looking-at. By taking over the lead, the presenting modifies the
inauthentic future into an awaiting that runs after. It is this ecstatic mod-
ification that makes possible the dispersion or distraction or scatteredness
( Zerstreuung ) which is a constitutive character of falling.
The modified awaiting, in turn, reacts back on the presenting. It
is now that the movement of falling first comes into view.

Making present is left more and more to itself as it is modified by the

awaiting that pursues. It makes present for the sake of the present. Thus
tangled up in itself , the dispersed not-staying turns into the inability to stay
at all . This mode of the present is the most extreme opposite phenome-
248 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

non to the Moment. In this inability Da-sein is everywhere and nowhere.

The Moment brings existence to the situation and discloses the authentic
“ There.” ( SZ, 347 )

The growing momentum of the fall is made possible by the inter-

acting modifiability of the whole temporal structure. The more fleet-
ing the presenting, the more “ flightily” it conceals a definite ability-to-
be, the less able is the futural here-being to come back to its thrown
self. “ In the ‘arising’ of the present, one also forgets increasingly. The
fact that curiosity always already keeps to what is nearest by, and has
forgotten what went before, is not something resulting from curiosity,
but the ontological condition of curiosity itself ” (SZ, 347).
In Division One ( chapter 5, B), falling was defined as a seduc-
tively reassuring, estrangingly entangling way of being-in-the-world. Da-
sein “ seduces itself ’ in the literal sense of leading itself away from its
ownmost ability-to-be by throwing itself primarily into its worldish pos-
sibilities of being-with-others in a mutual taking-care of things. The
“ self-seduction ” estranges here-being from its own genuinely under-
stood possibilities, which are primarily grounded in an authentic
future and past. The growing self-estrangement culminates in the “ run-
away” presenting of curiosity, which seeks to temporalize itself from
itself. Unable to find a firm foothold even in the things it presents, it
becomes completely entangled in itself. “ But since making present
always offers something ‘new,’ it does not let Da-sein come back to
itself and constantly tranquillizes it anew” (SZ, 348). The tranquillizing
reassurance arises from the looking at an endless variety of sights that
prevent here-being from coming back to the being it is: a being that
exists endingly. It is here that the true origin of the running-away pre-
senting reveals itself: it is nothing else than “ the essence of temporal-
ity, which is finite.” It is because the factical self is choicelessly thrown
into its being unto death that “ the present arises from its own future
and having-been, so that it lets Da-sein come to authentic existence
only by taking a detour through that present ” (SZ, 348). The way to a
resolutely grasped existence is a roundabout way, leading through the
self-forgetful presenting of an already fallen being. In the next two
paragraphs, Heidegger goes on to elaborate how and why the throw of
thrownness in itself leads to the falling mode of being. These para-
graphs only recapitulate what is already familiar to us, but they do so
in a way so obscure that the unsuspecting reader is apt to be startled
into thinking them something new. A close analysis is certainly needed
to disentangle their meaning, especially of the one we are now going
to consider.
 Temporality and Everydayness 249

The thrownness before which Da-sein can indeed be brought authentically

and in which it can authentically understand itself yet remains closed off
from it with regard to where it comes from and how it comes ontically.
But this closed-off-ness is by no means only a factually existent lack of
knowledge, but constitutes the facticity of Da-sein. (SZ, 348)

In the first sentence of the paragraph Heidegger follows his usual

practice of italicizing the before ( vor ) when the word occurs in this par-
ticular context. In so drawing our attention to the before, Heidegger
reminds us that while we can be confronted with our thrownness, we can
never go beyond or behind the limit it sets us; that is, we can never find
ourselves already here previous to it as the ground and origin of our-
selves. Hence the where it comes from and where it goes remain onti-
cally closed off. What is nakedly disclosed is that I am already here, not
originated by myself. This not of myself, which hides and denies me to
myself as my own origin at the same time reveals my already being-here.
Hence the closedness of the ontic where and how it comes cannot be
compared with any other not-knowing, for it makes possible all other
kinds of knowing by revealing to me my facticity, that is, the that I am.
This same closedness, furthermore, “ also determines the ecsta -
tic nature of existence, left to the null ground of itself .” It also deter-
mines; it codetermines ( bestimmt mit ) ; it is not the sole determinant,
but one in a complex interplay with others. What it helps to deter-
mine is existence, i.e. the understanding forethrow of here-being’ s
ability-to-be. But, more precisely, it determines existence in a spe-
cific respect, namely in its being “ left to the null ground ( an den
nichtigen Grund ) of itself ( Uberlassenheit ).” The null- or no¿-deter-
mined ground is the thrown being which I already am, revealed to
myself from a nothing of myself that dominates me as long as I am.
How, then, is my own ability-to-be left or delivered over to me? Hei-
degger’s word Überlassenheit is often translated “ abandonment.” The
concept of abandonment has indeed become central in much exis-
tentialist philosophy and is often referred back to Heidegger as its
originator. But if “ abandoning” means letting something go, having
nothing more to do with it, then our passage suggests that Heideg-
ger has just the opposite in mind. The closedness, the not-self-origi-
nated throw that throws each factical self into his “ here, ” certainly
leaves it to him ( überlassen ) to throw himself forward into his possi-
bilities, but in such a way that it keeps the “ handed over ” existence
in its own hand. But how or where does our passage tell us this? It
tells us by specifying that it is the ecstatic character of the delivered-
ness that the closedness of here-being helps to determine.
250 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

What is the ecstatic character of the delivered-over existences? It

is the removal of here-being to itself , the resolute running forward to
or the irresolute waiting for the possibility of being-here. The closed-
ness of the where-from and how not only reveals the that I am, but
throws this factical self into his forethrowing way of existing and
helps to determine the how of the forethrow. It hands out his ability-
to-be to the thrown being, but does not abandon it in the sense of let-
ting it go. On the contrary, it determines and directs the whole of
here-being to its end.
How precisely the forward movement of a being-unto-death orig-
inates in the “ throw” is not explained in the two divisions we have of
Being and Time. We have already remarked on the astonishing circum-
stance that in the considerable body of Heidegger’s works of this
period it is left to one short paragraph to explain this vital point ( WM,
34, W, 11, G9, 114, P, 90, BW, 105, EB, 369). This paragraph tells us
that the movement takes its start from the dreadingly revealed nothing,
which repels us, refuses us admittance to itself. In repulsing us, it refers
us to the “ other” of itself, to the not nothing, to beings as a whole. Our
recoil from the nothing, our turning away from it, is therefore “ within
—
certain limits according to its inmost meaning ( intention ). It the noth-
—
ing in its negating itself refers us to beings” ( WM, 36, W, 13, G9, 116,
P, 92, BW, 106-107. EB, 371). The nothing reveals itself solely in its
negating, in its denying us any admittance to a nothing of ourselves.
This repulsion by the nothing is the “ throw ” that originates the for-
ward movement in which here-being comes-to-itself in its possibilities
that is, exists. The throw by the nothing not only delivers over an exis-
—
tence to its not-deternined ground, but refers it to beings as a
—
whole throws it into a world. Only when this is explicitly kept in mind
can the connection between the last two paragraphs of the analysis of
curiosity be grasped. We can now turn to the last paragraph, which fol-
lows immediately on the sentence “ It also determines the ecstatic nature
of existence, left to the null ground of itself.”

Initially, the throw of being-thrown-into-the-world does not authentically

get caught by Da-sein. The “ movement” in it does not already come to a
“ stand ” because Da-sein “ is there.” Da-sein is swept along in thrownness,
that is, as something thrown into the world , it loses itself in the “ world ”
in its being factically dependent on what is to be taken care of. The pre-
sent, which constitutes the existential meaning of being swept along,
never acquires another ecstatic horizon of its own accord, unless it is
brought back from its lostness by a resolution so that both the actual sit-
uation and thus the primordial “ boundary situation ” of being-toward-
death are disclosed as the held Moment. (SZ, 348- 49 )
 Temporality and Everydayness 251

In the first sentence Heidegger tells us that the “ being thrown ” is

not properly “ caught ” by a factical here-being, conjuring up the picture
of a fielder fumbling the catch of a cricket ball. The picture is of course
misleading as well as illuminating, because what we have to catch and
so bring to a stand is not the motion of a flying object but the moved-
ness of our thrown coming-into-being. Now the coming-into-being of a
thing is thought to come to a stand in the unchanging, durable pre-
sentness ascribed to a substance. But in the case of here-being, the
authentic way to bring its thrownness to a stand is to gather up its
movedness into a self who steadfastly holds himself in his being-here-to-
the-end. In the first place, however, the throw is not properly caught
and gathered up, because the throw itself, in repulsingly relegating the
concrete self to beings as a whole, lets them become his primary and
all-absorbing care. The lost presenting of these beings, as we have seen,
tries to run away from the hold of its own finite future, modifying it in
turn to a running-after awaiting. It is in this way that the closedness of
here-being’s “ where and how it comes” helps to determine the ecstatic
character of the deliveredness over of existence to the no¿-determined
or null ground of itself.
A close analysis of the last two paragraphs of the present section
has brought to light that what Heidegger has really in mind all along
is the “ owing” character of care and how this is rooted in or uprooted
from the hold of a finite time. It will be remembered that “ owing”
( Schuldigsein ) was defined in the chapter on conscience as “ being-the-
ground of a being which is determined by a not” (SZ, 283). The con-
cept of a being that is determined by a not was further compressed
into the single term nullity or negativity ( Nichtigkeit ) . But here-being, as
the ground of a negativity, already owes itself to not-itself. Hence the
owing-character of care must be fully defined as the not-determined
ground of a negativity. How this is made possible by the temporality
of care is the real theme of the analysis of curiosity, but this theme
remains implicit and obscured by hints that are impossible to under-
stand from the fragment of Being and Time alone. Hence even the
most attentive reader of Being and Time is apt to miss the importance
of this analysis and to pass over its difficulties without the attention
they deserve.
One difficulty that the preceding interpretation has not been
able to remove lies in the onesidedness and incompleteness of the
investigations that Heidegger has carried out so far. This becomes
strikingly obvious when , in table 13.3, we try to bring the results of the
present section into the same schematic form as we have done with the
temporal analysis of understanding and attunement.
252 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

TABLE 13.3
The Temporality of Falling

Inauthentic Authentic
curiosity
awaiting-
forgetting-
( running after,
running away )-
making present

Why is it that the “ authentic” mode of falling remains a complete

blank? Is it because Heidegger has so far not dealt with it, or is it
because there can be no such thing as an authentic falling? If falling,
as Heidegger has explained it, is the very movement of disownment to
the world, then indeed an “ authentic falling” is a contradiction in
terms. Nonetheless, if man’s being as care is essentially a being-in-the-
world, then there must be an authentic way in which a concrete self can
exist with others and take care of the things on which he is dependent.
Heidegger himself repeatedly assures us that the radical singleness of
a resolute self does not mean a withdrawal from the world; on the con-
trary, he alone can “ instantly” face and grasp his situation.
Beyond such general assertions, however, we are left completely
in the dark about the concrete details of this authentic being-in-the-
world. The most exhaustive analyses have been devoted to the circum-
spect using and handling of things as utensils, in order to show the ref-
-
erence structure of the everyday world. But how does an instant
attending to the situation discover the things within it? Do these things
reveal themselves in a different possibility of their being from the
handy-being of utensils? Judging from Heidegger’s later works, they do.
At present, however, the authentic way of being-in-the-world lacks all
concreteness. The question must be left open whether and in how far
these deficiencies will be made good by the end of Division Two.

( d ) The Temporality of Discourse

One of the tasks of the preceding sections has been to demonstrate
concretely how temporality unifyingly differentiates the whole existential
structure of care. This belongs to temporality only because it itself is
the differentiated unity of its three ecstases. It follows from this that
the being constituted by temporality and disclosed in its hereness by
 Temporality and Everydayness 253

an attunedly falling understanding is never a featureless, uniform

whole, but is already in itself “ jointed” (gegliedert, literally: limbed; so,
for instance, being-in-the-world is a jointed structural whole). The dis-
closedness of an already jointed here-being can be expressly articulated
in discourse or speech ( Rede ). Discourse is an existential character of

^
Da-sein’s being as an attunedly falling, understanding articulating
( discursive ) being-in-the-world. It is because Da sein factually exists in a
world with others that the articulated understandability of his hereness
comes to word and concretely voices itself ( utters itself ) in language.
The existentiell-ontic phenomenon of language is therefore not a man-
made tool consisting of words into which mutually agreed meanings
have been infused , but is the signifying voicing of the already disclosed
and articulated meaning of man’s hereness. Where language is a com-
municating talk , what is communicated, shared, is not the inner expe-
rience of an isolated subject with another isolated subject but the mutu-
ally understandable hereness in a mutually shared world. A verbal
expression, however, is not always indispensable to discourse, as the
silent, wordless call of care has strikingly shown.
The distinctive function of discourse helps to explain why its tem-
porality is different from that of the other disclosing characters of
here-being. While understanding, attunement, and falling are primar-
ily constituted by one ecstasis in the unity of time , there is no definite
ecstasis that has a similar constitutive function for discourse. Speech
articulates the whole dislosedness of here-being; so that in principle nei-
ther the futural character of existence, nor the having-been of thrown-
ness, nor the presenting of falling can have a preponderant weight. In
fact, however, discourse usually expresses itself in concrete language
and speaks primarily in the mode of care-taking talking-over of the
—
world roundabout us hence the presenting has a “ privileged constitutive
function ” (SZ, 349 ).
For the reason just stated, this analysis must clearly be different
from the preceding ones. There is no immediately obvious reason,
however, why it must be so disappointingly short, occupying barely a
page. It confines itself mainly to stating the temporal problems that
will have to be dealt with, such as the tenses of verbs, the gradations in
time ( Zeitstufen ) , and the kinds of action ( Aktionsarten ) distinguished by
language. These temporal characteristics do not arise from the fact
that language expresses, among other things, processes that happen in
time, nor from the fact that speaking takes place in a “ psychological
time,” but discourse is in itself temporal, insofar as all speaking o f . . . ,
about . . . , and to . . . , is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality
(SZ, 349 ). With the help of the traditional and vulgar concept of time,
254 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Heidegger maintains, the temporal problems of language cannot be

even properly formulated, and the science of language ( Sprachwis-
senschaft ) has been in the invidious position of having nothing else but
that wholly insufficient concept to lean upon.
After this repudiation Heidegger might well be expected to proceed
to a positive interpretation of the problems of language. But the analysis
of temporality, it now appears, has not yet been carried far enough to
make their solution possible. All further discussion is deferred to Division
Three, with the following rather curious justification.
But because discourse is always talking about beings , although not
primarily and predominantly in the sense of theoretical statements ,
our analysis of the temporal constitution of discourse and the expli-
cation of the temporal characteristics of language patterns can be
tackled only if the problem of the fundamental connection between
being and truth has been unfolded in terms of the problematic of
temporality. (SZ, 349 )

The first clause of this sentence tells us categorically that dis-

course is in effect always a “ talking about beings.” This statement,
made in the form of an unqualified and unrestricted assertion,
strikes a strange note in the middle of a book that is directly and
explicitly concerned with being as such. Taking Heidegger strictly at
his word , we would have to conclude that it is only the discovered-
ness ( truth ) of beings that is expressly articulable in language, while
the disclosedness ( truth ) of being remains “ unsayable, ” and a gen-
uinely philosophical speaking would have to be, like the call of care,
a wordless silence. Attractive as this idea may be in many ways, and
certainly not lightly to be dismissed, it is incompatible with Heideg-
ger’ s own interpretation of discourse and, above all, with his lifelong
search for a language appropriate to the “ saying of being” ( das Sagen
des Seins ).
Leaving this puzzle aside without any pretense at having solved it,
and examining what is involved in a “ talking about beings,” we shall put
ourselves in a position to appreciate why the connection between being
and truth has to be established before the temporal problems of lan-
guage can be tackled. In the first place, the beings we talk about must
already be manifest as beings; they must be already understandable in
what they are and how they are. In all our talk about beings, therefore,
being must in some way have a say.
For instance, in an ordinary everyday sentence, like “ that apple
tree is too old , ” being speaks in its most common form , the “ is.” But in
all such everyday is-saying, being is not directly and thematically in
 Temporality and Everydayness 255

view; on the contrary, the “ is” withdraws itself, it claims no attention

—
for itself, but turns the light entirely on the manifest ( true ) beings for
example, the apple tree, which it expressly presents in a definite mode
of its discoveredness ( truth ), as too old.
Our habitual is-saying has long ago lost the power of invoking
being and has sunk down to connecting a subject with a predicate. In
proposing to define the ontological meaning of the “ is” Heidegger
promises to give a radical solution to a problem which became central
to Aristotle’s thought. Although in the absence of Division Three the
promise is not fulfilled, there is at least one thing that the temporal
analysis so far carried out makes unmistakably clear: the “ is ” originates
in the making present of. . . . As the preceding interpretation has shown,
-
the making present of . . . forms the horizon of a face-to faceness with
itself, that is, of presentness, which is anticipatingly held out before the
beings which are there of themselves and which, from and within this
horizon of presentness can manifest themselves in their own bodily
presence. It is their disclosed ( true) presence that comes to word in the
“ is,” so that in all our talking about beings it expressly presents the
beings talked about (e.g., the apple tree ) in a definite mode of their dis-
coveredness (e.g., as too old).
A further important task that Heidegger defers to Division Three
is summed up by saying that “ the ‘origination’ of ‘significance’ can be
clarified and the possibility of the formulation of concepts can be
made ontologically intelligible only in terms of the temporality of dis-
course, that is, of Da sein in general” (SZ, 349)
In a general way, we can already see why and how language must
in itself be “ significant.” The temporality of here-being is the threefold
removal to. . . . The ecstatic removal to . . . in-itself refers to something,
signifies something. Meanings or significances are not something
which we, by mutual agreement, hang on to word-signs, nor does lan-
guage reflect or mirror an “ external reality” with which it happens in
some way to come into contact, but as the express articulation of the
disclosedness ( truth ) of the “ here, ” language is grounded in the “ sig-
nifying” removal to something.
The fact that the general outline of Heidegger’s promised solu-
tion of the problems of language is visible already, does not of course
make up for the absence of a fully worked-out solution in a sphere
where precision and detail are all-important. Although in Heidegger’s
later works language comes more and more importantly to the fore,
the precise and detailed explanations promised here are never given
and cannot be given because the final clarification of temporality itself
is missing.
256 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

2. THE TEMPORALITY OF BEINOIN-THE-WORLD

AND THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE WORLD

The inquiry now comes back to the point from which Division One
started, to being-in-the-world as a fundamental constituent of care. Hei-
degger’s first task in Being and Time was to show that Da-sein is never
merely “ here” as an isolated, relationless subject, but with his disclosed
hereness the whole complex of interlinked relations ( world ) from
which he refers himself to other beings is cooriginally disclosed. Being-
here is therefore in itself a being-in-relation-to . . . , a being-in-a-world.
The fundamental constitution of being-in-the-world carries and
makes possible Da-sein’s being-together-with things within the world,
whether in the mode of a circumspect having-to-do-with-them, or in
the mode of a theoretical-scientific observation of them. Both these
ways of taking care of things are grounded in Da-sein’s being as care.
The ecstatic temporality of care lies already in all Da-sein’s relations to
things and makes them first of all possible. To show this in detail will
be the task of the first two subdivisions ( a and b ) of the present sec-
tion. In the third subdivision ( c) the temporal analysis of being-in-the-
world will lead to the following questions:

How is something like world possible at all, in what sense is world, what
and how does the world transcend, how are “ independent ” innerworldly
beings “ connected” with the transcending world? The ontological exposi-
tion of these questions does not already entail their answer. On the other
hand, they do bring about the clarification, previously necessary, of the
structures with reference to which the problem of transcendence is to be
interrogated. (SZ, 351)

In subdivision c transcendence becomes explicitly a central theme

for the first time. Tho importance of this development can be fully
evaluated only in the light of Heidegger’s thesis, stated at the begin-
ning of Being and Time, that

as the fundamental theme of philosophy, being is not a genus of beings ;

yet it pertains to every being. Its “ universality” must be sought in a
higher sphere. Being and its structure transcend every being and every
possible existent determination of a being. Being is the transcendens pure
and simple. The transcendence of the being of Da-sein is a distinctive
one since in it lies the possibility and necessity of the most radical indi-
viduation. Every disclosure of being as the transcendens is transcendental
knowledge. Phenomenological truth ( disclosedness of being) is veritas tran-
scendentalis. (SZ, 38 )
 Temporality and Everydayness 257

How this veritas transcendentalis is at all possible in a factical here-

being, how disclosing understanding of being is grounded in the ecsta-
tic temporality of here-being is the central question of Being and Time .
In taking the transcendence of world for its theme, the present section
is visibly moving toward the very center of the problem of Being and
Time . Although it will not give us any final answers, we can expect it to
give us at least a hint of where the answers might eventually be found.

( a ) The Temporality of Circumspect Taking Care

A practical occupation with utensils is the primary way in which every-

day existence takes care of things, that is, reckons with them, takes
account of them. Even the most resolutely owned existence necessarily
engages in the acquisition, production, alteration, and use of the
things he needs to be able to exist. The concrete way in which Da-sein
is near to things raises the decisive philosophical question, How does
Da-sein’s care-taking being-in-the-world hang together with the things
that are handily there within the world? The things obviously cannot
cause the care-taking as Da-sein’s way of existing, nor, on the other
hand, can their bodily presence be deduced from the care-taking.
Nonetheless, the two do not simply occur side by side; they have an
essential bearing on each other. To determine the connection between
them, Heidegger’s first step is to elucidate the phenomenal character
of the things with which we are busy, the things we use as the means to
achieve our practical ends. The decisive feature of Heidegger’ s phe-
nomenological analysis of utensils in Division One ( chapter 3) is not
that it concentrates on the handy things in daily use, in contrast to
indifferent substances, but that it fixes from the start the within-world -
ish character of things. Although in our daily dealings with things their
world-character is not explicitly grasped, it is implicitly understood.
The whole work-world is already “ there” ( disclosed ) when, for instance,
—
we are searching for a mislaid tool. A single, isolated tool such as a
—
hammer is impossible. The hammer is in advance referred to ham-
mering something, the hammering to fixing things together, the fixing
to putting a roof on a house, and so forth . The hammer can show itself
for what it is only from and within the equipment- ( utensil ) whole,
which belongs to the work-world of a builder or carpenter. The utensil-
being of the hammer is constituted by its being referred to something
beyond itself. The reference structure from which utensils show them-
selves in their handy being within the world is called by Heidegger
Bewandtnis m i t . . . b e i . . . , the relevance o f something t o something, or
the relevance of something a t some occasion, for example, the rele-
258 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

vanee of the hammer to hammering. The being of a utensil lies in its

being destined for a purpose. The purpose is the specific task to be
accomplished, for example, the house to be built. This carries and uni-
fies the whole complex of references from which and within which
each utensil can be what it is, a tool relevant to a particular task ( des-
tined for a particular purpose ) within the whole. The accomplished
— —
task the house has in turn a utensil-character; it is relevant to ( des-
tined for ) living in.2 With this, however, the reference structure termi-
nates. The house is destined for sheltering a factical existence, whose
“ destiny ” it is to be the care of being-here. As the temporal analysis has
now made clear, here-being is constituted by its coming-to-itself in its
utmost, impassable possibility, and cannot therefore refer itself to
something beyond itself as the means to an end. On the ground of its
own temporal structure, here-being is its own end. From the predis-
closed “ for the sake of ” his own ability-to-be-here a factical Da-sein sig-
nifies to himself how he can be toward other beings; that is, how he can
refer himself to them and, conversely, how they can bear upon be
—
referred to his own ability to exist. The whole complex of predisclosed
—
references, the o f . . . to ( at ) . . . for . . . constitutes the ontological struc-
ture of the everyday world, which, in turn, makes it possible for the
things within it to manifest themselves as relevant to ( at ) some task to
be achieved ( or, to say the same thing in another way, as destined for a
purpose ). A care-taking being-together-with things, therefore, lets
things be relevant ( Bewendenlassen ) . This, however, is an essential con-
stituent of Da-sein’s being as care, whose unity is grounded in tempo-
rality. What is the specific mode of temporality that makes a care-tak-
ing occupation with things possible?
Letting something be relevant lies in the simplest handling of a useful
thing. Relevance has an intentional character with reference to which the
thing is useable or in use. Understanding the intention and context of
relevance has the temporal structure of awaiting. Awaiting the intention,
taking care can at the same time come back to something like relevance.3
Awaiting the context and retaining the means of relevance make possible
in its ecstatic unity the specifically handy way on which the useful thing
is made present. (SZ, 353)

The ecstatic unity of an awaiting-retaining making present is thus

the condition of the possibility of a practical having-to-do-with-things.
The retaining was mentioned briefly in connection with inauthentic
understanding. It must be noted that the retaining ( remembering)
refers to beings within the world which do not have the character of
here-being. The retaining is founded upon a forgetting of the thrown
 Temporality and Everydayness 259

self, which first of all opens up the horizon of a “ before” into which the
self-forgetful here-being can remember the relevant utensils. The every-
day retaining, however, is not an explicit “ fixing ” of a utensil-whole, just
as the awaiting is not an explicit, theoretical contemplation of an end;
it is rather the making present that springs from the unity of an await-
ing-retaining that makes “ the characteristic absorption in taking care in
the world of its useful things possible ” (SZ, 354 ).
The awaiting-retaining making present unifies the implicitly
understood references within which everyday care circumspectly moves
without any explicit, theoretical grasp of them. The smooth, matter-of
course movement within these familiar references, however, can be
interrupted. As Division One has explained in some detail ( chap. 3, §
16 ), it is on the occasion of such breaks that the utensil-world as a
whole may first come into view, and the hitherto taken-for-granted,
inconspicuous utensils may suddenly arrest our attention by showing
themselves in the unfamiliar mode of mere substances.
What is the ontological-temporal condition of the possibility that
—
something unusable for example, a tool which fails to do its job can
arrest our attention? In the following analysis, Heidegger proceeds to
—
show the inadequacy of a “ theory of association ” to explain even our
simplest dealings with things. First, “ association ” takes account only of
the connection between “ past experience ” and “ present experiences.”
Further, as a psychological theory, it lacks an adequate-ontological
foundation. In such a seemingly simple experience as, for instance, our
attention being caught by a damaged tool, lies already the whole of
temporality. The awaiting-retaining making present is “ caught, ” “ held
up” in its absorption in the relevance- relations, by what turns out to be,
on inspection , damage to the tool. The making present is held fast by
the unfitness of the tool for the work in hand, so that it is only now that
the implicit awaited what-for, together with the presently manipulated
tool, become explicit. The making present, on the other hand,

can meet up with something unsuited for . . . because it is already mov-

ing in an awaiting retention of what is in relevance. Making present is
“ held up, ” that is, in the unity of the awaiting that retains, it shifts more
to itself and thus constitutes the “ inspection, ” checking, and removal of
the disturbance. If heedful association were simply a succession of “ expe-
riences ” occurring “ in time ” and if these experiences “ associated ” with
each other as intimately as possible, letting a conspicuous, unusable tool
be encountered would be ontologically impossible. Whatever we have
made accessible in contexts of useful things , letting things be in rele-
vance as such must be grounded in the ecstatic unity of the making pre-
sent that awaits and retains. (SZ, 355)
260 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

But the unusability of a utensil is not the only way in which the
smooth flow of having-to-do-with-things may be broken. We may find, for
instance, that something we were looking forward to finding at hand is not
there at all. This discovery is made by our missing the utensil. Missing some-
thing is not merely a not-making-present ( Ungegenwärtigen ) of the utensil in
question, but rather a “ not-making-present” as “ a deficient mode of the pre-
sent in the sense of the not-making-present of something expected or always
already available.” Though deficient, this mode is positive. Missing some-
thing necessarily stands in an ecstatic unity with awaiting, since we could
never miss something unless we were already awaiting it
We can be taken by surprise, on the other hand, only by some-
thing not awaited. Just as the “ not-making-present” is not a sheer
absence of awaiting, nor is the “ not awaiting” ; it is rather a positive,
though deficient, mode of it. Otherwise, it would be wholly inexplica-
ble why Heidegger says that “ The not awaiting of the making present
that is lost first discloses the ‘horizonal’ realm in which something sur-
prising can overcome Da-sein ” (SZ, 355).
Obscure as this sentence is in many respects, one thing at least is
clear: unless the not awaiting were a positive ecstasis of temporality, it
could not possibly disclose a horizonal realm within which a surprise
can overtake a falling here-being. As we have heard earlier, the momen-
tum of the fall constricts the falling here-being more and more in a
making present that seeks to uproot itself from the hold and guidance
of a genuine awaiting.
Finally, a most important way in which a circumspect taking-care
of things can be interrupted is by knocking up against those things it
can neither produce, procure, nor guard against, avoid, or eliminate.
These insuperable obstacles are coped with or put up with by a care-
taking here-being. The “ coping with . . .” ( Sichabfinden mit . . .) is not a
merely negative acquiescing in or ignoring of things, but a specific
mode of discovering them in the character of the inopportune, hin-
dering, troubling, and endangering. Generally speaking, these things
encounter us in the mode of resistance ( Widerständigkeit ).

The temporal structure of accepting something lies in a nonretention that

awaits and makes present. The making present that awaits does not, for
example, count “ on ” something that is unsuitable, but yet available. Not
counting on . . . is a mode of taking into account what one cannot hold
on to. It is not forgotten, but retained so that it remains at hand precisely
in its unsuitability . Things at hand like this belong to the everyday con-
tent of the factically disclosed surrounding world. (SZ, 356)

The present passage completes the analysis of the modifications

of an awaiting-retaining making present. Further, it elucidates and jus-
 Temporality and Everydayness 261

tifies Heidegger’s earlier comment on certain phenomenological inter-

— —
pretations notably those of Dilthey and Scheler which ascribe the dis-
covery of the reality of the “ external world ” primarily to the experi-
ence of resistance (SZ, 205, 209ff. ). Heidegger in no way denies the
resistant character of things and its importance for the discovery of
their “ reality, ” but points out the insufficiency of this explanation. For
one thing, resistance is only one character of reality. For another thing,
it characterizes beings within the world, and by no means explains the
phenomenon of the world itself. Our last passage has shown the exis-
tential-temporal conditions that make the discovery of resistance first
of all possible. Once these foundations are laid bare, the importance of
experiencing the resistant character of things can be fully conceded: it
gives a factical existence to understand his exposedness to and depen-
dence upon a “ world of things” which, in spite of all technical progress,
he can never master.
Before proceeding to the next subsection , let us briefly summa-
rize the main conclusions reached.

1. The temporal structure of letting-things-be-relevant is an awaiting-

retaining making present. This constitutes the familiarity of here-
being’ s nearest world, by virtue of which even a “ strange world ” is
not totally strange to us but to a certain extent we find our way about
in it.
2. Modifications of the basic ecstatic unity:
(i) An “ arrested” awaiting-retaining making-present (e.g., on
the occasion of being held up by a damaged tool).
(ii) An awaiting-retaining not-making-present ( on the occasion
of missing something).
-
( iii ) An unawaiting-retaining making present ( being taken by
surprise).
(iv ) An awaiting-unretaining making-present ( resistance of the
unfit things at hand ).

With regard to ii and iii, it should be noted that Heidegger him-

self does not give the full temporal structures, but the above formula-
tions are well supported by what he says.

( b ) The Temporal Meaning of the Way in Which Circumspect

Taking Care Becomes Modified into the Theoretical
Discovery of Things Objectively Present in the World
Heidegger now takes up the problem of the ontological genesis of a the-
oretical-scientific approach to things, which , in losing the character of
262 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

handiness, reveal themselves as mere substances (Vorhandenes). It is not

the chronological-historical development of the sciences from everyday
practice that is in question, but the ontological constitution which
makes it possible for a factical here-being to exist in the way of scien-
tific research. The existential concept of science differs fundamentally
from its logical concept. The latter defines the results of science as a
systematic nexus of proof ( Begründungszusammenhang ) of true, valid
propositions. The existential concept, on the other hand,
understands science as a mode of existing and thus as a mode of being-in-
the-world which discovers or discloses beings or being. However, a com-
pletely adequate existential interpretation of science cannot be carried out
until the meaning of being and the “ connection” between being and truth have
been clarified in terms of the temporality of existence. The following con-
siderations are to prepare the understanding of this central problematic within
which the idea of phenomenology can first be developed, as opposed to the
preconception indicted in an introductory fashion. (SZ, 357)4

Once more, Heidegger draws our attention to the ultimate aim of

Being and Time and to the importance of the connection between being
and truth. His immediate aim, however, is a restricted one. It is to
examine the change from the circumspect discovery of handy things in
everyday practice to the pure looking at things { Hinsehen ) that is char-
acteristic of the theoretical-scientific discovery of them as mere sub-
stances. To make Heidegger’s elucidations easier to follow, let us recall
the following points. First, all ways of “ seeing,” intuiting, apprehend-
—
ing that is, of gaining access to being and beings are primarily
grounded in the forethrow of understanding. This constitutes here-
—
being’ s own ability-to-be for the sake of which he refers himself to beings
as relevant to ( handy for ) this or that provisional purpose, and ulti-
mately to his own existence. Secondly, this primary understanding of
existence and world takes explicit possession of itself in interpretation
( Auslegung). In interpreting something, “ understanding appropriates
what it has understood in an understanding” (SZ, 148). So, for
instance, a circumspectly discovered handy thing becomes explicitly
understood by being aus-gelegt , “ laid out, ” exhibited, together with its
what-for. The everyday question “ What is this thing? ” receives the
answer “ It is a knife,” where a knife is already known as a utensil for
cutting. Further, the explanation need not necessarily be expressed in
a proposition . We might just as well take up the thing in question and,
without saying a word, demonstrate what and how it cuts.
Keeping these matters in mind, we now examine in detail Hei-
degger’s renewed analysis of everyday circumspection. The explana-
 Temporality and Everydayness 263

tion already given of this phenomenon in Division One turns out to

have been incomplete. It now appears that circumspection is itself
subject to the guidance of an “ overall view ” ( Übersicht ), which surveys
the utensil-world as a whole together with the public world that
belongs to it. This overall view or survey over things as a whole illu-
mines everyday care-taking and, in turn , “ gets its own ‘light’ from the
potentiality-of -being of Da-sein for the sake of which taking care exists
as care ” (SZ, 359 ).
In what way does the surveying-circumspection “ illumine” our
everyday practice? It brings the already discovered handy things closer
by way of interpreting them; that is, it makes them clearer and more
explicit to our understanding. The circumspectly interpreting bring-
ing-closer of handy things is called by Heidegger “ deliberation” ( Über-
legung ). In what connection it stands with interpreting something as
something will be discussed later. The first task is to elucidate the
structure or what Heidegger now calls the “ schema” of deliberation.

The schema peculiar to it is the “ if-then ” : If this or that is to be produced,

put into use, or prevented, for example, then we need these or those
means, ways, circumstances, or opportunities. Circumspect deliberation
throws light on the actual factical position of Da-sein in the surrounding
world taken care of. Thus it never simply “ confirms” the objective pres-
ence of a being or of its qualities. Deliberation can also come about with-
out what is circumspectly approached itself being concretely at hand or
present within the nearest range. Bringing the surrounding world near
in circumspect deliberation has the existential meaning of making present
[ Gegenwärtigung ]. For representing [Vergegenwärtigung ] is only a mode of
making present. In it, deliberation catches sight directly of what is
needed, but not at hand. Representing circumspection does not relate
itself to “ mere ideas.” (SZ, 359 )

Every point made in this passage is important. In the first place,

the deliberating interpretation is anticipatingly contrasted with the sci-
entific explanation; the former brings closer, makes dearer, here -
being’s own situation in a world that concerns him, while the latter
makes explicit the actual occurrence of indifferent substances and
their properties. A handy thing has no properties; it reveals what it is
in itself by its fitness for the job for which it is destined, or by its unfit-
ness for it.
A circumspect deliberating, then , explicitly brings together the
awaitedly desired or feared thing with the ways and means of achieving
or avoiding it. This “ bringing together ” ( in Kantian terms, synthesiz-
ing) moves in the scheme of “ if-then.” The primary temporal meaning
264 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

of deliberating is a making present, even though the things we delib-

erate about may not be, and in fact usually are not, visibly present. Hei-
degger now introduces a mode of presentation for which German has
the excellent word Vergegenwärtigung: making something present to
ourselves, bringing it face to face with ourselves in thought, literally en-
visaging it. A cardinal point with Heidegger is that this mode of pre-
sentation refers no less directly to things themselves than to an immedi-
ate perception of them in their “ bodily presence.” In thinking, for
instance, of something far away from us, we are not merely occupied
with “ immanent” processes in our minds; we are out in the world with
and at the thing we are thinking of. Just because thinking is a way of
being-in-the-world , it is essential to it, so to speak, to extend itself, to
straddle the distance from us to the things to which we remove our-
selves in thought (see “ Bauen Wohnen Denken,” VA, 157, “ Building
Dwelling Thinking,” PLT, 156-57).
Heidegger’ s next step is to give a fuller analysis of circumspect
making present, which is by no means a simple phenomenon , but has
complex existential-temporal foundations. In the first place,

it belongs to the full ecstatic unity of temporality. It is grounded in a

retention of the context of useful things that Da-sein takes care of in await-
ing a possibility. What has already been disclosed in awaiting retention is
brought nearer by one’ s deliberative making present or representing.
(SZ, 359)

So far, the analysis is easily followed. Indeed, we become aware at

this point how firmly Heidegger has succeeded in establishing his tem-
poral interpretation. Already we take it for granted that the presenting
must belong to an ecstatic unity with a “ coming to” and a “ having
been.” Heidegger’s further elucidations, on the other hand, are
extremely difficult and confusing. Let us follow them step by step.

But if deliberatrion is to be able to move in the scheme of “ if -then, ” tak-

ing care must already understand a context of relevance in an “ overview.”
What is addressed with the “ if ” must already be understood as this and
that. For this, it is not necessary that the understanding of useful things
be expressed predicatively. The scheme “ something as something” is
already prefigured in the structure of prepredicative understanding. The
as-structure is ontologically grounded in the temporality of understand-
ing. (SZ, 359 )

What is addressed with the “ if ” is the awaitedly forethrown pos-

sibility of something desired or feared. Awaiting, we remember, is that
 Temporality and Everydayness 265

mode of the future in which here-being inauthentically comes-to-itself.

It is the primary temporal constituent of inauthentic understanding,
and so makes possible the everyday understanding of something as
something. This as-structure, however, already lies in the schema of
“ if-then.” In deliberating, for instance, about building a house { if I am
to have a house built ), the house must already be understood from its
relevance to dwelling, that is, as a dwelling-place; the dwelling, in turn,
is a disclosed possibility of my own existence, for the sake of which the
house is to be built. So far, all is clear. The real difficulties are only
just beginning.
Only because Da-sein, awaiting a possibility ( that is, here a what-for ), has
come back to a for-this ( that is, retains a thing at hand ), can conversely the
making present that belongs to this awaiting retention start with this
retention and bring it explicitly nearer in its reference to the what-for. The
deliberation that brings near must in the scheme of making present
adapt itself to the kind of being of what is to be brought near. The char-
acter of relevance of what is at hand is not first discovered by delibera-
tion, but only gets brought near by it in such a way that it circumspectly
lets what is in relevance be seen as this. (SZ, 359-60)

The first sentence tells us that the explicit interpretation of things

can take the reverse direction to the originally disclosing understanding
of them. While the latter starts from the “ futural ” forethrow of possi-
bilities and rebounds back to what already is, the former can start from
the already “ retained ” things and go forward to the relevant possibili-
ties. In every case, Heidegger stresses, the future preserves its primacy,
its leading role: only because and on the ground of it can the present-
ing explanation take the reverse direction.
The first sentence of our passage, in spite of its difficult con-
struction, is really quite clear. What is puzzling is why it should be there
at all. Deliberation starts with the awaited possibility addressed with
the “ if.” To introduce the possible reversal of the process of interpre-
tation seems not only unnecessary at this juncture, but positively con-
fusing. We simply do not see what Heidegger is aiming at. On further
reflection, however, several reasons suggest themselves. First, our inter-
pretations do in fact usually start from what is already “ there.” Second,
Heidegger may want to say, though does not explicitly do so, that delib-
eration is in fact a going back and forward within the “ if-then ” schema.
Its movement traverses the schema in both directions. Third, there may
be a more distant aim in Heidegger’s mind. He may be thinking for-
ward to a fundamental modification of the “ if-then ” schema: if
( because ) such and such a thing has happened , then ( therefore) such
266 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

and such a thing must follow. The circumspectly deliberating “ if-then ”

can change into the schema of causality, within which the scientific
explanation of the connection between substantial things moves ( FD,
109, WT, 139-40 ). The double movement of thought is especially evi-
dent here. It goes back from effects to causes and goes forward from
causes to their already discovered or awaitedly “ forethrown ” effects.
The curious thing is that when he comes to examine the theoretical-sci-
entific way of purely “ looking at” things, Heidegger makes no mention
at all of the possible modification of the deliberating “ if- then ” to the
schema of causality, which, in view of his careful analysis of the “ if-
then,” he might well be expected to do.
Let us now consider the last two sentences of our passage. They
tell us that in order to bring something nearer to a care-taking here-
being, deliberating must “ conform to” ( sich anmessen ) the manner of
being of what is to be brought closer. The expression “ sich
anmessen ” ( literally: “ to measure itself to . . . , ” “ to fit itself to . . . , ”
“ adapt itself to” ) has the sense of “ be adequate to ” or “ conform to ”
or “ correspond with ” in the sense of the traditional theory of truth
as adequacy, conformity, or correspondence. A judgment is true
when it corresponds with the judged object. But in order that a judg-
ment can correspond , that is, measure and bind itself to and by an
object, a whole series of preconditions must already be fulfilled.
One of these is that the object must already be discovered ( true ) and
understood not only in that it is but in how it is, that is, in the spe-
cific manner of its being.5 The specific manner ( the “ how ” ) in which
things within the world meet a care-taking being-in-the-world is in
their handy-being. The handy-being of a utensil is disclosed from the
ecstatic unity of an awaiting- retaining which in advance understands
it in its belonging to the whole of a relevance-complex. Deliberation
corresponds with the handy-being of utensils by presenting them pre-
cisely such ( in the selfsame manner ) as they show themselves in and
from their relevance-relations. More concretely expressed, delibera-
tion brings the handy things “ truly ” closer by explicitly making pre-
sent the for-what of relevance together with its with -what ( the
means ) as such , that is, as this relevance-complex from which and in
which the utensils in question present themselves. The “ schema of
presenting” is the “ as.” The “ as ” expresses the correspondence or
conformity of the presenting with the “ how ” of the utensil’ s being; it
brings the utensil closer precisely as it shows itself in its “ relevant ”
handy- being.6 The interpretative presenting of something as some-
thing may be simple or complex. In any case, it is possible only in the
ecstatic unity of the whole temporality.
 Temporality and Everydayness 267

The way the present is rooted in the future and in the having-been is the
existential and temporal condition of the possibility that what is pro-
jected in circumspect understanding can be brought nearer in a making
present in such a way that the present must adapt itself to what is encoun-
tered in the horizon of an awaiting retention, that is, it must interpret
itself in the schema of the as-structure. This gives us the answer to our
question whether the as-structure is existentially and ontologically con-
nected with the phenomenon of the projecting [SZ, 151]. Like under-
standing and interpretation in general, the “ as ” ¿5 grounded in the ecstatic and
horizonal unity of temporality. (SZ, 360 )

This passage only sums up what has already been discussed

above, making its connection with a problem formulated on page 151
explicit. We notice, further, that Heidegger once more recurs to the
still unexplained phenomenon of the “ ecstatic and horizonal unity of
temporality,” thereby referring us forward to the next subsection,
where the temporal constitution of world and its “ horizonal schema”
will become the theme. But even there the final interpretation of

—
—
“ schema” a concept whose importance is becoming more and more
evident will not yet be given. This is explicitly deferred by Heidegger
to the “ fundamental analysis of being, ” which was to have been carried
out in Division Three. There, Heidegger promises us and more pre- —
cisely “ in connection with the interpretation of the ‘is’ ( which as a cop-
ula ‘expresses’ the addressing of something as something ) ” that “ we
must again make the as-phenomenon thematic and define the concept
—
of the ‘schema’ existentially ” (SZ, 360 ).
That this promise remains unfulfilled is all the more regrettable
because there is good reason to think that Heidegger intends the exis-
tential-temporal interpretation or the “ schema” to cast light on “ the
obscurity of his [Kant’s] doctrine of the schematism ” (SZ, 23; and see
KPM, especially §§19-23, for fuller explanation of these connections ).
The preceding discussion, it is true, has cast some light on the mean-
ing of the circumspectly deliberating “ if-then ” and of the “ as.” But this
obviously cannot exhaust their meaning, for the “ schema of making
present” must conform to the manner of being in which the beings to
be explained encounter us. Our understanding of being is capable of a
wide range of modifications. If, for instance, the being of within-world-
ish beings is called “ reality, ” then handy-being ( handy reality ) is only
one manner of it, substantial reality another manner, and, as Heideg-
ger occasionally hints, there may be still further modifications of it. It
follows that even if the form of the schemata in which our explanations
move should remain the same, their meaning must be modifiable. The
same considerations lead to the conclusion that the “ is, ” which gives
268 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

expression as the copula to “ something as something, ” will have a dif-

ferent meaning in , say, an everyday pronouncement compared with a
scientific proposition.
This brings us to the change from a circumspect taking care to
a theoretical discovery, a change so abrupt and far- reaching that
Heidegger calls it an Umschlag, an overturning. Its analysis is intro-
duced by taking as a lead “ an elemental statement of circumspect
deliberation and its possible modifications ” (SZ , 360 ). The actual
pronouncement “ The hammer is too heavy ( too light ) ” has already
been discussed by Heidegger earlier (SZ , 157-58 ) , so that he can
forego a further discussion at this point. For us, on the other hand,
it will be helpful to consider the sentence briefly, and especially to
follow up Heidegger 's hint that the “ is” gives expression to “ some-
thing as something. ”
In the pronouncement “ The hammer is too heavy ( too light),” the
“ is” expressly presents this particular tool, the hammer, as too heavy
( too light ), that is, as unfit for the job in a definite way. Although the
“ too heavy ” may make the tool’s unfitness explicit only for the job
immediately in hand, implicitly it reaches out into a whole relevance-
complex, into the whole workworld, and further into the care of an
everyday existence to earn his daily bread. Now, it may be thought that
the power of reaching out beyond its immediate application is con-
ferred on this pronouncement by qualifying the “ heavy” by the “ too.”
( It might be interesting to compare here Plato’s reflections in The
Statesman 283ff. on the difference between the “ more” and the “ too
much.” ) But this is not at all the case, as Heidegger points out. When
we simply say “ The hammer is heavy,” we may be deliberating about
our work being made “ heavier,” “ more difficult,” by the hammer or
about the strength it will require to use it. On the other hand, the sen-
tence can also mean

the being before us, with which we are circumspectly familiar as a ham-
mer, has a weight, that is, the “ property ” of heaviness. It exerts a pres-
sure on what lies beneath it, and when that is removed, it falls. The dis-
course understood in this way is no longer in the horizon of the
awaiting retention of a totality of useful things and its relations of rele-
vance. What is said has been drawn from looking at what is appropriate
for a being with “ mass.” What is now in view is appropriate for the ham-
mer, not as a tool, but as a corporeal thing that is subject to the law of
gravity. Circumspect talk about being “ too heavy ” or “ too light ” no
longer has any “ meaning” ; that is, the thing now encountered of itself
provides us with nothing in relation to which it could be “ found” too
heavy or too light. (SZ, 360-61)
 Temporality and Everydayness 269

What the thing no longer “ provides” is nothing less than its

within-worldish character. As Heidegger said earlier, the thing “ falls
out of the world, ” it succumbs to an “ unworlding” ( Entweltlichung ) (SZ,
75). This radical change has certainly not come about through the way
we talk about things, for we see that exactly the same sentence can be
understood in vastly different ways. What, then , is the reason for this
modification? Not that we simply abstain from a practical having-to-do-
with- things, nor that we simply disregard their utensil-character, but
that we look at the thing in a new way , namely as a substantial thing.
“ The understanding of being guiding the heedful association with inner-
worldy beings has been transformed” (SZ, 361).
Before considering how the things that have “ fallen out” of the
world round about us reveal themselves to a theoretical approach, we
have to take special note of a point made in the paragraph that imme-
diately follows the one quoted above.
In our first characterization of the genesis of the theoretical mode of
behaviour from circumspection, we have made basic a kind of theoreti-
cal grasping of innerworldly beings, of physical nature, in which the
modification of our understanding of being amounts to a transforma-
tion. (SZ, 361)

The point to be noted here is that it is not the world that is modified
into a “ physical nature,” but that nature itself, according to Heidegger, is a
concrete “ within-worldish being” which is discoverable only within and in
transit through ( im Durchgang ) a predisclosed world. Now, taking the sen-

——
tence “ The hammer is heavy” to assert a “ physical” proposition though,
strictly speaking, there are no such things as hammers in physics Heideg-
ger goes on to analyze how it now presents the former utensil:
We overlook not only the tool-character of the being encountered, but
thus also that which belongs to every useful thing at hand: its place. The
place becomes indifferent. This does not mean that the objectively pre-
sent thing loses its “ location” altogether. Its place becomes a position in
space and time, a “ world-point, ” which is in no way distinguished from
any other. This means that the multiplicity of places of useful things at
hand defined in the surrounding world is not just modified to a sheer
multiplicity of positions, but the beings of the surrounding world are
released [ entschränkt ]. The totality of what is objectively present becomes
thematic. ( SZ, 362 )

Although no explicit mention was made in the sentence “ The

hammer is heavy” of either place or space, Heidegger evidently con-
siders that a definite conception of space belongs to each definite
270 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

mode or manner of being in which beings are understandable to us.

The theoretical understanding levels down the “ significant” places, the
places for this and that thing of the everyday world, to a featureless,
indifferent, uniformity. In a later lecture, however, Heidegger remarks
that “ even modern physics has been forced by the facts themselves to
conceive the spatial medium of cosmic space as a field-unity which is
determined by the body as a dynamic center . . ( “ Bauen Wohnen
Denken,” VA 156-57, “ Building Dwelling Thinking,” PLT,156 ).
Whether Heidegger sees in this development a vindication of our pri-
mary experience of space is unfortunately not further elaborated.
However that may be, the expansion of the significant place-man-
ifold into something like a universal space must clearly go hand in hand
with the “ theoretical” breaking down of the boundedness of the every-
day world. But this breaking down is at the same time a new and posi-
tive delimitation of the “ region ” of substantial beings , a delimitation
led by the dominant understanding of being as objective, substantial
reality. This is the “ manner of being” to which the theoretical-scientific
investigation and explanation of beings must conform, to which and by
which it must measure and bind itself.
The more appropriately the being of the beings to be investigated is
understood in the guiding understanding of being and the more the
totality of beings is articulated in its fundamental determinations as a
possible area of subject-matter for a science, the more assured will be the
actual perspective of methodical questioning. (SZ, 362 )

What Heidegger has in mind here is obviously not the positive

work of a science and its results, but rather the first encirclement of its
field, the laying down of its fundamental principles and the definition
of its basic concepts, such as we find for instance in Newton’s Principia
or in Galileo’ s Discorsi . It is with these works of “ natural philosophy”
that Heidegger compares Aristotle’s Physics, setting off the Greek expe-
rience of the phusiSy movement and place against the modern experi-
ence of “ nature ” and the conception of its constitutive moments ( FD,
- -
59 73, G41, 77 95, WT, 76-95). But although such comparisons of
detail are highly interesting and no doubt valid, it is at least open to
question whether the intention of these works as a whole can show a
one-to-one correspondence. It can hardly be doubted that Aristotle’s
Physics is, in phenomenological language, a “ regional ontology ” or an
“ ontology of nature, ” whose intention is primarily philosophical and
whose connection with “ first philosophy” is dearly laid down by Aris-
totle himself. But could the same be said without qualification of a
modern theoretical work on physics, fundamental though it may be?
 Temporality and Everydayness 271

How Heidegger would answer this question is not quite clear,

because he does not seem to be concerned with the exact demarcation
of a “ regional ontology ” against the theoretical groundwork of an
experimental science.7 Why and in what precise sense he thinks it
proper to call the latter “ philosophy ” ( ontology ) will become clear as
we follow up our passage in Being and Time .
Here the rise of mathematical physics is cited as the classical
example of both the historical development and the ontological gen-
esis of a science. What Heidegger considers to be decisive for this
development is neither the greater stress laid on observation of facts
nor the actual application of mathematics, “ but the mathematical pro-
ject of nature itself ’ (SZ , 362 ). We must note especially that the word
Heidegger uses is Entwurf ( forethrow ) , where we have to resort to a
“ plan ” or “ design ” or, as translated here, “ project.” At any rate, it is
certain that Heidegger means a “ forethrown ” plan, a previously
drawn-up blueprint of nature, which , however, is by no means arbi-
trarily invented, but is drawn from conformity to the dominant char-
acter of being a substantiality.

This project discovers in advance something constantly objectively pre-

sent ( matter ) and opens the horizon for the guiding perspective on its
quantitatively definable constitutive moments ( motion , force, location,
and time ). Only “ in the light oP a nature thus projected can something
like a “ fact ” be found and be taken in as a point of departure for an
experiment defined and regulated in terms of this project. The “ found-
ing” of “ factual science” was possible only because the researchers under-
stood that there are in principle no “ bare facts.” (SZ, 362 )

The irony of the last sentence is directed against that trend in

scientific thinking which may be generally entitled “ positivism.” The
hallmark of positivism is its belief that it can “ manage with facts or
with more and newer facts, while concepts are merely expedients
which one for some reason needs, but with which one must not get
—
too deeply involved for that would be philosophy” ( FD, 51, G41, 67,
WT, 67). The tragic irony of this situation is that it means to over-
come positivism by positivism. On the other hand , Heidegger
reflects, it is only the second -line scientists who cling to such views;
the leading minds who create new positions and new ways of ques-
tioning always “ think philosophically through and through ” ( FD , 51,
941, 67, WT, 67).
Why and in what precise sense such “ ground-laying” scientific
thinking must be called “ philosophical ” is indicated in the following
passage.
272 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

What is decisive about the mathematical project of nature is again not

primarily the mathematical element as such , but the fact that this pro-
ject discloses a priori. And thus the paradigm of the mathematical nat-
ural sciences does not consist in its specific exactitude and binding
character for “ everyone, ” but in the fact that in it the thematic beings
are discovered in the only way that beings can be discovered: in the prior
project of their constitution of being. When the basic concepts of the
understanding of being by which we are guided have been worked out,
the methods, the structure of conceptuality, the relevant possibility of
truth and certainty, the kind of grounding and proof , the mode of being
—
binding and the kind of communication all these will be determined.
The totality of these moments constitutes the complete existential con-
cept of science. (SZ, 362-63)

In what sense, then , is the theoretically forethrown or projected

plan of nature “ philosophical ” ? First of all, it “ discloses an a priori, ”
that is, it brings explicitly into view the vaguely and implicitly under-
stood being that already lies in and makes possible all our discovery of
beings. In the opening pages of Being and Time (SZ, 12 ) Heidegger calls
this implicit understanding of being preontological ( prephilosophical ).
In the same paragraph he defines ontology in a very wide sense as the
explicit theoretical inquiry into the meaning of beings ( Sinn des Seienden ).
What phenomenology understands by the meaning of beings ( not of
being) is nothing other than what these beings are, their essence. It is
the whole structure of the whatness, the essence of beings in all its con-
stitutive moments, that is called “ ontological constitution.” It is, there-
fore, the essence of the “ physical beings, ” the things of nature, which
the mathematical plan in advance has in view. But this essence ( the
ontological constitution ) is no longer understood from the handy-
being ( handy reality) of things within a world; the essential character of
things as handiness for something has been covered over. The essence
of “ physical beings” is drawn from the now leading understanding of
being as substantial reality. The essence ( ontological constitution ) that
the mathematical design of nature anticipatingly brings into view is the
substantiality of substances.
But if this new way of discovering beings is to deserve the title of
philosophy ( ontology ) in the widest sense, it must, according to Hei-
degger’s definition, be explicitly theoretical. In other words, it must
not only implicitly conform to the manner of being in which the dis-
coverable beings show themselves, but must explicitly explain and artic-
ulate their being. Now, if we look back to the passage quoted above, we
read there that the “ basic concepts of the understanding of being by
which we are guided have been worked out [ Ausarbeitung ] .” In § 32 of
 Temporality and Everydayness 273

Division One, Heidegger expressly defines “ interpretation ” as “ the

development [or working out ( Ausarbeitung ) ] of possibilities projected
in understanding ” (SZ, 148). Substantiality is one possible way in which
the essence of beings can be disclosed by understanding— one possible
way, for, as we have seen, there are other ways. The explicit-theoretical
working-out, the interpretation of substantiality, is concretely carried
out in the articulation and conceptual definition of its constitutive
moments (location, time, motion , etc.), in other words, in the defini-
tion of the basic concepts of the science. This interpretation is mathe-
matical in character insofar as it fixes the constitutive moments of sub-
stantiality as quantitatively definable. It is these “ ground-laying”
definitions, Heidegger says, which further determine all that belongs
to the structure of the science: its methods, its truth and certainty, the
kind of evidence and proof it admits and seeks, and so on.
No detailed comparisons are needed to show how vastly different
is the theoretical mode of explanation from a circumspectly deliberat-
ing bringing closer of handy things. To mention only one of its fea-
tures, the explicitness and rigor of scientific method, which guides and
regulates all approach and access to things within its field, would be
quite out of place in a circumspect taking care, not because the latter
is unmethodical, but because it is guided and stabilized by the care of
his own ability-to-be-here of a factical existence. In the scientific inves-
tigation of substantial beings, on the other hand, this guidance is lost
and must be replaced by the strictness and appropriateness of method.
Up to now, Heidegger has dealt primarily with the ontological-
theoretical side of science, so much so that he might easily be accused
of being a pure theorist, just as onesided in his own way as the
extremest positivist. But the accusation would be quite misplaced;
Heidegger is well aware of the constant interplay between working
experience and theory and their mutual influence on each other.
Moreover, we must not forget that Heidegger is not speaking of being
“ in itself, ” as though being were a substance, a thing which existed
somewhere “ in and by itself.” What he has constantly in view is the
ontological difference as a whole , in which and from which being is
manifest as the being of beings, and conversely, beings show them-
selves only in their being. As far as the sciences are concerned, their
theoretical work has the sole aim of making the beings, which we have
already encountered and which are known to us in a prescientific way,
accessible in distinctively new ways.

The scientific project of the beings somehow already encountered lets

their kind of being be explicitly understood in such a way that the pos-
274 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

sible ways of purely discovering innerworldly beings thus become evi-

dent. The articulation of the understanding of being, the definition of
the subject-matter defined by that understanding, and the prefigura-
trion of the concepts suitable to these beings, all belong to the totality
of this projecting that we call thematization. It aims at freeing beings
encountered within the world in such a way that they can “ project ”
themselves back upon pure discovery, that is, they can become objects.
Thematization objectifies. It does not first “ posit” beings, but frees
them in such a way that they become “ objectively ” subject to question-
ing and definition. (SZ, 363)

The scientific thematization does not originally “ posit ” beings,

that is, does not originally discover them in their being. Heidegger says
“ posit ” in quotation marks , alluding perhaps to being, Dasein, in Kant’s
sense of existentia and its modalities, possibility and necessity, as dif-
ferent ways of “ positing.” 8 The thematization “ sets them free ”
—
( freigeben) lets beings show themselves in a new way, namely as objects
of a pure “ looking at.” But, it is important to remember, the “ looking
at” is a mode of a care-taking being-near-to things. Its primary tempo-
ral character is a making present, but one Heidegger calls an “ aus-
gezeichnete Gegenwärtigung, ” a distinguished, preeminent presenting.
It is distinguished from a circumspect making present principally by its
awaiting purely and solely the discoveredness ( truth ) of the substan-
tially present being.

This awaiting of discoveredness is grounded existentielly in a resolute-

ness of Da-sein by means of which it projects itself upon its potentiality-
of-being-in-the-“ truth.” This project is possible because being-in -the-truth
constitutes a determination of the existence of Da-sein. How science has
its origin in authentic existence is not to be pursued here. (SZ, 363)

Heidegger’s last remark comes as a surprise, even when we read

it for the first time in the context of Being and Time, but especially
when we come back to it from his later works. There the stress is usu-
ally on how far science has fallen away from its “ origin, ” rather than on
the origin in a resolutely disclosed existence. But even in Being and
Time Heidegger always stresses the primariness of the circumspect dis-
covery of handy things, compared to which the objectifying presenta-
tion of mere substances appears secondary, derivative, and therefore
degenerate ( “ Any ‘arising’ [derivation, deduction ( ‘Entspringen ’)] in the
field of ontology is degeneration ” (SZ, 334 )) . It is surprising, but
nonetheless illuminating, that in its pure waiting upon truth , science
springs from owned existence, and is in that respect distinguished
 Temporality and Everydayness 275

“ above ” a circumspect discovery springing from the disownment of a

falling being-in-the-world.
The text does not mention the specific character of having-been
that belongs to the ecstatic unity of a “ distinguished” awaiting making
present. We may, however, assume it to be a retaining, since it helps to
— —
constitute a definite mode the objectifying mode of being-near-to
things. This structure, in turn, belongs to the fundamental constitution
of here-being as being-in-the-world.
It is at this point that the inquiry turns back to its own central
concern, and seems indeed to come to a decisive stage, which
announces itself in the word transcendence. If “ being is the transcendens

—
—
pure and simple, ” (SZ, 38 ) that which sheerly transcends beings as
such and if this transcendens is disclosed in here-being, then here-being
must always transcend ( go out, stand out beyond ) beings as such and

—
—
as a whole. “ If the thematization of what is objectively present the sci-
entific project of nature is to become possible, Da sein must transcend
the beings thematized. Transcendence does not consist in objectiva-
tion, but is rather presupposed by it” (SZ, 363). Those theories of
knowledge, on the other hand, which take their start from the subject-
object relation as the supposed “ ultimate” that cannot or need not be
further explained, see in this relation itself the “ transcendence”
whereby a “ worldless subject” goes out from his “ immanent sphere ” to
an object outside himself. To expose the inadequacy of such theories
and of the wholly insufficient conception of here-being as a “ subject, ”
is of course only a negative, but by no means negligible, aim of Being
and Timey considering the stranglehold of such conceptions on our
whole way of thinking.
In raising the question of transcendence, the inquiry brings itself
face to face with the central problem of how being as the transcendens
can be disclosed by the transcending here-being. The problem has
been brought to the foreground by the modification of the implicit,
everyday understanding of being into the theoretical understanding of
being as substantial reality and its explicit articulation in a predesigned
plan of nature.
Whether explicit or implicit, an understanding of being, and there-
fore a transcendence of here-being must already underlie the discovery
of beings, whether in the mode of a circumspect care- taking or of a the-
oretical observation. Heidegger explicitly identifies transcendence with
being-in-the-world, as we now know from Vom Wesen des Grundes ( WG,
37ff., W, 53ff., G9, 156ff., P, 121ff.). On the ground of this fundamental
structure, the factical here-being transcends beings as such and as a
whole, among them first and foremost his own thrown self. This tran-
276 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

scendence, however, is ultimately made possible by the primordial tran-

scendental ( ecstatic) structure of here-being as temporality. In the ecsta-
tic removal of here-being to itself, in its coming-to- and back-to-itself here-
being transcends itself to its own possibility and its own having been. It
is from this primordial self-transcendence that the ecstatic removal to a
vis-à-vis springs. In forming the horizon of a face-to-faceness with itself,
here-being in advance transcends the beings as such that can show their
presence within that horizon.This brings the inquiry back to the prob-
lem of world, its temporal constitution and transcendence.

( c ) The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World

The question to be raised now is different from the one asked and
answered in Division One ( chap. 3). There it was the worldishness of
world, its ontological structure, that was to be laid bare. This was found
to lie in significance, which constitutes the coherent unity of world. A
significant coherence might be called the “ essence ” of world, were the
word essence not so misleading in its usual meaning of the whatness or
the inner possibility of beings. The world is not a concrete being, nor
the totality beings, but rather the significant way in which they bear on
each other and on here-being’s existence as a whole. To call this the
“ essence” of world would therefore be misleading. But the predicament
into which Heidegger’s present question puts us is even worse, for now
he asks in what way world must be , how its “ being” is ontologically pos-
sible. The “ being” of world obviously cannot mean existentia, “ reality,”
or by whatever name we call the actual thereness of beings.
The cardinal point to be noted is that the “ being” of world is not
a problem about a world “ in and by itself, ” as though the world were the
all of substantial beings that can be there in and by themselves. The
question of how these substantial beings were there and what real con-
nections there are between them before and without a disclosure of
being, is not a question for a fundamental ontology. This takes its depar-
ture from the “ ontological difference,” the basic “ fact ” that from this
differentiation beings show themselves as the beings they are only in the
light of being and, conversely, being shows itself ( in a totally different
way) as the being of beings. Since world “ is” only as an irreducible and
unique character of being, and since being only “ is ” in its disclosedness
in a factical here-being ( Da sein ), the possibility of the being of world
can lie only in its unity with here-being as a being-in-the-world.
A minor, but not quite negligible point to be noted is that Hei-
degger now takes the “ for -the-sake-of-which ” into the unity of “ signif-
icance, ” whereas in Division One he spoke of “ the for- the-sake-of-
 Temporality and Everydayness 277

which and of significance ” (SZ, 143, emphasis added ). This gave rise
to the misleading impression that the everyday world was, after all,
the utensil-world.
Here-being’ s understanding of himself in connection with other
beings, that is, in a world, is an existential constituent of care. Only
when and as long as beings of the character of here-being “ are here, ”
is a world “ here ” also. Heidegger does not merely say that here-being
“ has ” a world, that the world is his world. He says more than that;
namely, that in existing, here-being is his world , that is, it is disclosed
in and with his existence. The solipsist, on the other hand, believes that
the world is “ his world ” in the-sense that all the other beings he expe-
riences exist only in his consciousness, only as his representations or
perceptions ( Vorstellungen). Heidegger’s interpretation of world as an
ontological character of here-being exposes not only the fallaciousness
of this reasoning, but also that it has arisen from a thoroughgoing con-
fusion of being with beings. Reality is confused with the real things,
their real connections and properties. The whole of reality is identified
with the totality of real beings, and this is what is usually called “ the
world.” Reality, however, is a mode of being which only “ is ” in its dis-
closedness. When this disclosure no longer happens, when, for
instance, through a catastrophe beings like ourselves no longer factu-
ally exist, then there will be no “ reality.” But this does not in the least
—
mean that real beings— the earth, the seas, the stars will suddenly dis-
solve into nothing. It means only that they would no longer be manifest
as the beings they are, they would be neither discovered nor hidden
(SZ, 212 ), and would, in that sense, remain beingless and nameless, for
only as long as there is disclosure and discovery ( truth ), can beings be
called by a name.
The disclosedness of the “ here,” as the preceding analyses of this
chapter have shown in detail, is grounded in temporality. This must
also make possible the significance which is the ontological structure
of world.
The existential and temporal condition of the possibility of world lies in the fact
that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon. The
ecstases are not simply raptures toward. . . . Rather, a “ whereto ” of rapt-
ness belongs to the ecstasy. We call this whereto of the ecstasy the hori-
zonal schema. (SZ, 365 )

The “ horizon of temporality ” that has been anticipatingly men-

tioned in the previous subsection now moves into the center of the
investigation. The “ whereto ” of the ecstasis is the horizon formed in
the rapture or removal itself; it is the limit in which the removal ends
278 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

itself. This pure existential-temporal horizon, however, is not an undif-

ferentiated uniformity, not a mere characterless boundary, but is
defined by the “ horizonal schema.”

The ecstatical horizon is different in each of the three ecstases. The

schema in which Da-sein comes back to itselffuturally , whether authenti-
cally or inauthentically, is the for-the-sake-of itself We call the schema in
which Da-sein is disclosed to itself in attunement as thrown, that in the
face of which it has been thrown and that to which it has been delivered
over. It characterizes the horizonal structure of the having-been. Existing
for the sake of itself in being delivered over to itself as thrown, Da-sein
is at the same time making present as being together with. . . . That hori-
zonal schema of the present is defined by the in-order-to. (SZ, 365)

The horizonal schemata thus turn out to be, somewhat surpris-

ingly, nothing but the already familiar references that articulate the sig-
nificance of world. Among them, only the schema of the having-been
needs further clarification. Heidegger speaks of the Wovor der Gewor-
fenheit. The preposition “ vor ” has many meanings , predominant among
—
which is “ before ” already in itself a polyvalent expression. We have to
recur, therefore, to the most significant ways in which Heidegger uses
—
the Wovor. One of those is the Wovor der Angst that in the face of
which, or of which, we are in dread. This “ whereof of dread, ” however,
is disclosed by dread itself, which brings us nakedly before ( face to face
with ) our already-being-here as not originated by ourselves; that is, as
an accomplished fact elementally revealed from a nothing of ourselves.
Heidegger’ s Wovor, it may seem, is a complexly jointed unity, which can
be only approximately expressed by the “ whereof.” The “ whereto”
( Woran ) , the “ to which it has been delivered over, ” is also complex,
since the self to which thrownness delivers the factical here-being is dis-
closed in connection with . . . ; that is, the deliveredness to the thrown
self is in itself deliveredness to a world.
Since Heidegger’s own explicit and final explanation of the con-
cept of “ schema” has been deferred to Division Three and so remains
inaccessible to us, it is important to note the precise terms in which
Heidegger speaks of it here. In connection with the “ whereof ’ and
“ whereto ” he says: “ Es kennzeichnet die horizontale Struktur der
Gewesenheit.” “ Kennzeichnen ” means to make something distinctively
knowable by a mark or a sign. The having-been to which here-being
removes itself is made distinctively knowable by its characteristic
schema. On the other hand, the schema of presenting is formulated in
a very misleading way: “ Das horizontale Schema der Gegenwart wird
bestimmt durch das Um-zu.” This seems to suggest that first there was
 Temporality and Everydayness 279

a horizonal schema, which is then defined by the “ for ” ; whereas, the

meaning is surely that the horizon of presenting is schematically
defined by the “ for.”
From all this it emerges that the function of the schema is to give
a distinctive and unifying character to the horizon to which the three
differently directed ecstases remove themselves. The thus differenti-
ated and defined horizon, however, belongs to the unity of the whole
temporality. It
determines whereupon the being factically existing is esentially disclosed.
With factical Da-sein, a potentialit.y-of-being is always projected in the
horizon of the future, “ already being” is disclosed in the horizon of the
having-been , and what is taken care of is discovered in the horizon of the
present. (SZ, 365)

This paragraph, we notice, does not speak of the horizonal schema,

but of the horizon itself. What becomes understandable from it is the
being of beings, in the mode of future-being, past-being, and present-
being. Now the question that usually arises with regard to a “ limit ” is
that it already implies another “ side” from which alone it can be under-
stood as a limit at all. Heidegger’s answer to this question, as we have
seen before, is not fully worked out, but we can infer it in the main both
from passages in Being and Time and in “ What Is Metaphysics? ” Accord-
ingly, it is the confrontation with the nothing, both in the sense of the
“ other” to beings ( not-beings) and of the “ other” to being ( not-being)
which makes manifest to the factical here-being the impossibility of any
further coming-to-himself beyond the impassable limit of death, and of
coming-back-to-himself as having-been-here before his thrownness. The
temporality of here-being must end itself in a horizon of its removals
to . . . because the manifestness of the nothing in advance closes them
and so gives the factical existence a constant limit which, as the original
“ image” of a “ standing something, ” makes the being of beings ( the
standingness of something) first of all “ apprehensible.”
Even if these inferences from what Heidegger explicitly says
should prove to be untenable, or could be improved upon by further
attempts to work out the details left unfinished in Being and Time, it is
at any rate clear that Heidegger’s existential- temporal analysis of here-
being goes radically beyond the solutions offered in, say, Kant’s Cri -
tique of Pure Reason. Kant’ s attempt to “ lay the ground of metaphysics ”
was concretely carried out by an analysis of “ our inner nature.” So it
resulted that our “ highest faculty, ” “ pure reason ,” could not be further
explained by Kant. It is the “ nature” of pure reason to bring the con-
cepts of pure understanding to completeness, to conclude a series of
280 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

conditions by seeking, for instance, an absolute beginning of the world.

Heidegger, on the other hand, shows that all understanding, both the
originally disclosing and the explaining, inferring, and “ concluding”
that may be derived from it, is grounded in the finiteness of tempo-
rality, which in advance “ concludes” the ecstatic forethrow of exis-
tence, bringing being to a “ stand” by the disclosed possibility of not-
being, and it is from this horizon formed by the “ other ” to being that
being itself becomes in the first place fully understandable.
It may be easily seen that the horizonal character of a finite tem-

— —
porality can also explain and explain perhaps for the first time in a sat-
isfactory way how we can experience ourselves together with other
beings in the wholeness of a world. As long as the world is conceived as
—
a totality of beings whether these beings are interpreted as things or
—
facts, makes no difference it remains a mystery how we can experience
such a totality. Kant held that the idea of the totality of world, although
a necessary idea, lay beyond a possible experience, meaning by “ expe-
rience ” the empirical intuition of “ what is, ” that is, of the substantial
things of nature, unified by the a priori synthesis of the categories with
the pure intuition of time and space. Heidegger also maintains that the
totality of beings can never be grasped by us, but at the same time
explains why we nonetheless experience these beings in the whole of a
world: the prior disclosure of the nothing in advance gathers all beings
into a whole by making them manifest as not nothing, as things that are.
But since the “ nothing” does not “ exist” at all, it can reveal itself only to
concrete beings like ourselves as a negating as a denying or withdraw-
ing: it denies us to ourselves as our own ground and withdraws from us
the possibility of being-here-anymore. Hence the disclosure of being
that happens with the disclosure of nothing cannot be an indifferent
happening, but is a throw which hands us out to our factical selves and
directs us to the beings upon which we are dependent. Heidegger thus
succeeds in giving an explanation not only of how we can experience
the world as a whole, but why this world-horizon must refer us to the
beings discoverable within it. It may be added that Heidegger’ s expla-
nation has a compellingness which Kant’s arguments about the applic-
ability of the categories solely to the a priori forms of intuition, and
mediately to a possible empirical intuition of objects, never achieve.
Since the world is grounded in the horizon of an ecstatic tempo-
rality, it must necessarily be “ transcendent” ; that is, it must be “ further
out” than any beings that can be discovered within it. Heidegger’ s elu-
cidations of the “ transcendence of world ” will bring strikingly into view
a characteristic of his thinking: it always seems to start, so to speak,
from the outmost circumference and work inward ; whereas, our usual
 Temporality and Everydayness 281

thinking works in exactly the opposite way. For instance, we are apt to
think of the past as stretching out behind us from our “ here and now, ”
and the future as stretching out in front of us from “ here and now.”
Similarly, we envisage space as radiating out in all directions, with our-
selves as a center. Heidegger, on the contrary, starts from the furthest
distance and comes back to the “ here and now.” So, for instance, he
finds the first constituent of an existential spaceishness in “ un-distanc-
ing” ( Ent -fernung ), a diminishing of distance. This peculiarity of Hei-
degger’s thought has been noted already, but it is only now, with the
exposition of the ecstatic horizon of temporality, that its full force can
strike us:

Temporality already holds itself ecstatically in the horizons of its

ecstasies and, temporalizing itself, comes back to the beings encountered
in the There. (SZ, 366 )

factical Da-sein, ecstatically understanding itself and its world in the

unity of the There , comes back from these horizons to the beings
encountered in them. Coming back to these beings understandingly is
the existential meaning of a letting them be encountered in making them
present; for this reason they are called innerworldly. (SZ, 366)

Both of these passages evidently say the same thing, the only dif-
ference being that in the first Heidegger is thinking purely of the struc-
ture of temporality, while in the second he thinks of the factical here-
being as temporality become existent. Incidentally, the language of the
first passage comes dangerously near to suggesting that temporality is
something existing in and by itself, a possibility that Heidegger has
decisively ruled out and any suggestion of which must be strenuously
resisted. What Heidegger’s language reveals is rather the concrete way
in which he “ sees ” those phenomenal structures which to us only too
often remain vague abstractions.
The main point of our passages is the constancy of the ecstatic
removals to a corresponding horizon. Temporality “ holds i t s e l f . . . in
the horizons of its ecstasies. . . .” It constantly stands out beyond itself
and stays in its distant horizons. All movement originates from and
takes place within them, as the throw forward from thrownness to the
impassable possibility of not-being-here and the throw back from the
impassable not-being-here to the factical self, already on the “ look out”
for a possible vis-à-vis. The horizon of the present temporalizes itself
cooriginally with those of the future and the having-been. As an antic-
ipating removal to a wholly insubstantial “ something” facing the pre-
senting here-being, the horizon of presentness is necessarily “ further
282 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

out” than any beings whose bodily presence becomes discoverable and
understandable from and within it.
According to Heidegger, then, our knowledge of beings does not
start from an immediate perception of them “ here and now, ” but
rather the area of openness in which we move must be much wider
than the pin-point of “ here and now.” 9 It is only in coming back from the
distance opened up primarily by an ecstatic temporality that a concrete
—
being can meet us “ in the There ” or “ in the Here, ” as we prefer to say
in discussing Division Two. ( See above, our section entitled “ The Lan-
guage of Division Two.” )
But perhaps we should also prefer to say uinto the Here, ” for Hei-
degger’s words are “ in das Da begegnende Seiende.” Compare his
phrase “ in die Zeit begegnen ” in the later discussion of “ world-time.”
The use of the accusative suggests that Heidegger really intends to say
“ into ” and not “ in.” This is his way of expressing that the “ here ” and
the “ now ” are not self-subsistent media in which our encounters with
other beings take place, but are “ here ” only with the disclosed hereness
of being. Only when and as long as a world is opened up with a facti-
cally existing being-in-the-world can beings enter into its openness and
reveal themselves as the beings they are. That these beings become dis-
coverable within the world is, of course, in no way in the power of here-
being. They must in some way be “ there” of themselves, otherwise we
could not discover them.
With the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality, the problem of
the transcendence of world has been satisfactorily solved. Since the
world is grounded in the schematically defined horizon of the whole
temporality, it is necessarily transcendent: it is always “ further out” than
any “ objects” can possibly be. But, it may be asked, does Heidegger not
interpret the world entirely subjectively? Indeed, Heidegger says that “ if
the ‘subject’ is conceived ontologically as existing Da sein, whose being
is grounded in temporality, we must say then that the world is ‘subjec-
tive.’ But this ‘subjective’ world, as one that is temporally transcendent,
is then more ‘objective’ than any possible ‘object’ ” (SZ, 366 ).
A hurried reading of this passage could easily mislead the reader
into thinking that Heidegger is, after all, slipping back into the much-
maligned subject-object relation. But, in fact, Heidegger is doing the
opposite. He is restating once more that the first requisite for a funda-
mental ontology is to overcome the conception of man’ s essence as
subjectivity. Not only is the subjectivity of the subject a wholly inade-
quate foundation on which to answer the questions, How is a disclos-
ing understanding of being at all possible to a finite existence? and,
What does being mean ? It only too readily gives rise to the impression
 Temporality and Everydayness 283

that the self-glorifying subject, solely by his own power, imposes his
own law and order on an objective nature ( “ world ” ) which he has not
created, which he can never master, and on which he himself is depen-
dent. The existential-temporal interpretation of a finite here-being, on
the other hand, in advance conceives Da-sein as belonging to a disclo-
sure ( truth ) of being which is not of his own making, but into which he
has been “ thrown.” It is its “ power ” that confers on Da-sein the unique
task of discovering beings and so bringing them into the truth that is
appropriate to their specific ways of being. The horizonal schema, Hei-
degger claims, which defines the being of things within the world by a
“ for, ” and reveals their referredness to a for-the-sake-of-itself , is not an
arbitrary “ network of forms that is imposed upon some material by a
worldless subject, ” but rather here-being’s original understanding of
himself and his world in the ecstatic-horizonal unity of his “ here.” The
coming-back-from these horizons to the concrete beings discoverable
within them , and understanding them in their “ significant ” bearings
on a finite existence, reveals the connection between Da-sein and
things far more elementally than a theoretical observation of mere sub-
stantial objects can ever do.
Before we leave the fascinating subject of Heidegger’s conception
of world, we must briefly recur to the concept of “ schema, ” which first
became thematic in the previous subsection. What Heidegger dis-
cussed there under the title of “ schema” seemed to be only tenuously,
if at all, connected with Kant’s schematized categories. The exposition
of the “ horizonal schema, ” however, puts the whole matter into a dif-
ferent light. We can now see that the theme of Heidegger’s previous
discussion ( the “ if-then ” and the “ as ” ) was only the schema of interpre-
tation, and therefore not at all on a par with Kant’s transcendental
schema. The latter can be compared only with Heidegger’ s horizonal
schema, for this belongs to the original existential understanding of
being, and defines the being ( makes it “ apprehensible ” ) that is dis-
closed in the ecstatic horizon of temporality. However, when we try to
compare them we are struck by the differences rather than by any
resemblance. In the first place, Heidegger gives us only three
schemata. ( It is doubtful whether the “ whereto, ” the schema of factic-
ity, could be counted as a fourth.) Kant’s transcendental schema, on the
other hand, “ sensifies ” the categories, of which there are four groups,
each subdivided into three concepts that Kant regards as indispens-
able. But the greatest contrast is that two of Heidegger’ s three

— —
schemata define here-being’ s ecstatic removal to himself that is, are
existential schemata and only the “ for” defines the being of within-
worldish beings, so that it alone can be called a “ catégorial schema” at
284 Part Three: Di-vision Two of Being and Time

all. Kant’s schematized categories, on the other hand, all define being
as substantial reality . This, however, is the mode of being of things as
mere substances. The task would be to see whether the for-whatness of
handy things could be so modified into the mere-whatness of substan-
tial things as to yield all the categories Kant regarded as primordial
concepts, and whether the schematization of these categories into the
pure image of time could be really adequately explained from the
derivative concepts of time as a pure succession of nows.
It is very likely that Heidegger intended to carry out this task in
the first division of Part II of Being and Time. It would undoubtedly
have thrown a light into the “ obscurity ” of Kant ‘s teaching of schema-
tism , and especially, perhaps, upon the much-debated and highly
doubtful source and origin of the Kantian categories. Unfortunately,
the whole of Part II of Being and Time remains unwritten in the way it
was originally planned, because it required Division Three of Part 1 as
its indispensable basis.

3. THE TEMPORALITY OF THE

ROOMINESS CHARACTERISTIC OF HERE-BEING

Heidegger gives an entire section to his present theme, instead of inte-

grating it into the series of expositions which have dealt with the tem-
porality of being-in-the-world. Since space was shown in Division One
to be discoverable only within the world and to be constitutive of it, it
is surprising that Heidegger should now single it out for a separate dis-
cussion. His reason for doing so is suggested rather than explicitly
stated at the beginning of the present section. It would appear that the
roominess constitutive of being-in- the-world is so fundamental that it
might have to be coordinated with temporality. Must “ time and space”
be set side by side as of equal rank , or does the “ original time” of care
retain its priority as the existential foundation for all ways of existing?
While there can be little doubt at this stage that temporality
“ encompasses” (umgreift ) all possible spatial relations , an important
qualification must be added. Heidegger emphasizes that space cannot
be dissolved into time or deduced from it. Whether he has in view an
oblique criticism of Hegel’ s attempt to deduce all categories from
each other is not certain , but at any rate, Heidegger’ s own position is
clear: space is an irreducible phenomenon that cannot be deduced
from or explained by anything other than itself. This is perfectly com-
patible with a certain precedence of temporality, but a sounder expla-
nation must be demanded than that given by Kant for the preemi-
 Temporality and Everydayness 285

nence of time before space. In Kant’ s thought the representations of

objects in space are regarded as psychical occurrences that take place
in time, and therefore the “ physical ” is in an indirect way also “ in
time.” This purely ontic ( empirical ) explanation is rejected by Hei-
degger on the ground that it is completely inadequate to explain the
relation between space and time as a priori forms of intuition . If a
properly ontological reason can be given at all for the universality of
time, then it must show that “ although space and time as pure intu-
itions both belong ‘to the subject,’ time dwells more originally in the
subject than space. But then the time limited to what is immediately
given in the inner sense is at the same time ontologically more uni-
versal only if the subjectivity of the subject consists in an openness to
beings” ( KPM, 52, G3, 50, KPM( E), 33).
Now Heidegger does not make idle demands on Kant without
being confident that he himself can satisfy them. The existential-onto-
logical reason for the preeminence of time has in fact been amply
demonstrated in the preceding chapters. Not only does temporality
constitute the being of a finite self, but it originally opens up the
removedness ( distance ) of this self to itself and to other beings. In a
general way, we can already see that this “ distance ” must be the condi-
tion of the possibility of any “ spatial” bringing-near ( undistancing) of
things to the factical here-being. The task of the present section is to
show the specific way in which the temporality of an everyday being-in-
the-world makes the discovery of the significant within-worldish space
and place possible.
Heidegger begins his exposition, as usual, with a short summary
of what has already been established in Division One. He reminds us
that “ Da sein can be spatial only as care, in the sense of a factically
entangled existing ” (SZ, 367). Beings like ourselves are not “ in space ”
like a thing that fills out a part of space, “ so that the boundaries divid-
ing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define that
space spatially ” (SZ, 368). Here-being literally “ occupies space, ” where
“ occupying” must be understood in the pregnant sense in which we say
that troops occupy a town. Without any conquest of “ outer space, ”
here-being has already existentially “ conquered ” space for himself by
opening up a “ Spielraum , ” a room for movement and action as a self-
allocated area for his care-taking comings and goings among things. It
is from this self-allocated space that here-being comes back to the
“ place” which he already keeps occupied . It is no argument against the
existential interpretation to say that we can determine the size and loca-
tion of a human being in just the same way as we can of a thing,
because to do so we have to reduce him to the ontological status of a
286 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

material body, which is a glaring anomaly. Here-being is incomparably

“ roomier ” than any material body can possibly be, just because his spa-
tial limits are not the limits of his own body, but the nearer or farther
distances which he has allocated to himself as his existential room for
movement. This is why Heidegger decisively rejects the often-held view
that here-being’ s roominess ( spatiality ) is the fatal result of “ binding a
spirit to a body.” On the contrary, “ Da-sein is ‘spiritual,’ and only because
it is spiritual, it can be spatial in a way that essentially remains impossi-
ble for an extended corporeal thing” (SZ, 368).
The opening up of an existential space is constituted by the irre-
ducible constitutive moments of directing ( orientating) and undistanc-
ing ( diminishing distance, bringing-near ). Further, the discovery of
region (Gegend ) as the “ whereto of the possible belonging somewhere of
useful things at hand in the surrounding world” is essential to the roomi-
ness of a care-taking being-in-the-world. The discovery of locality is onto-
logically prior to any actual arranging and directing things to their place,
determining where they are to go. For instance, in choosing a building site
for a house, we must already understand a where to which something can
belong, otherwise we could never fix on a particular site where a partic-
ular house is to go. In the everyday world, locality has an essential bear-
ing on the relevance-whole of handy things. “ The relevant relations are
intelligible only in the horizon of a disclosed world. Their horizonal
nature also first makes possible the specific horizon of the whereto of
regional belonging” (SZ, 368). In other words, the horizon-forming struc-
ture of ecstatic temporality already underlies the discovery of within-
worldish space, and the horizonal schema in advance defines the signif-
icance-character of the thus discovered space. Now Heidegger goes on to
show more specifically that it is the temporality of circumspect care-tak-
ing that is the foundation of the roominess of everyday here-being.
The self-directive discovering of a region is grounded in an ecstatically
retentive awaiting of the possible hither and whither. As a directed await-
ing of region , making room is equiprimordially a bringing-near ( or de-
distancing) of things at hand and objectively present. De-distancing, tak-
ing care comes back out of the previously discovered region to what is
nearest. Bringing-near and the estimating and measurement of distances
within what is objectively present within the de-distanced world are
grounded in a making-present that belongs to the unity of temporality in
which directionality is possible, too. (SZ, 368-69 )

An awaiting- retaining making present was previously shown to be

the specific temporal unity of a circumspect taking care of things. It is
not clear whether this is the specific “ unity of temporality” to which
 Temporality and Everydayness 287

Heidegger refers above, or whether he has some possible modification

of it in mind. A retaining awaiting certainly seems to have a primary
constitutive function for the discovery of region, from which the pre-
senting undistancing ( bringing-near ) of something comes back to the
here. On the other hand, the succeeding passage indicates that the pre-
senting can gain predominance in a falling bringing- near of things.

In the bringing-close that makes the handling and being occupied that is
—
“ absorbed in the matter,” the essential structure of care falling prey-
makes itself known. Its existential and temporal constitution is distin-
guished by the fact that in falling prey, and thus also in the bringing near
which is founded in “ making present,” the forgetting that awaits pursues
the present. In the making present that brings something near from its
wherefrom , making present loses itself in itself, and forgets the over there.
For this reason if the “ observation ” of innerwordly beings starts in such a
making present, the illusion arises that “ initially” only a thing is objectively
present, here indeed, but indeterminately, in a space in general. (SZ, 369)

This passage suggests that even the everyday discovery of space

can be modified with the corresponding modifications of the tempo-
rality of care. It is not the explanation of such possible modifications,
however, that seems to be Heidegger’s main concern, but the demon-
stration why the ecstatic-temporal constitution of space is easily over-
looked or forgotten. The self-constricted presenting of a falling being-
in-the-world, from which the observation and contemplation of things
usually starts, is the reason for this.
From this situation Heidegger proceeds to draw another highly
interesting conclusion. It is well known that here-being’s self-interpre-
tations and language in general are far-reachingly dominated by spatial
imagery and conceptions. According to Heidegger:
The priority of the spatial in the articulation of significations and con-
cepts has its ground, not in some specific power of space, but rather in
the kind of being of Da-sein. Essentially entangled , temporality loses
itself in making present , and understands itself not only circumspectly in
terms of the things at hand taken care of , but from those spatial relations
that making present constantly meets up with in what is at hand as pre-
sent, it takes its guidelines for articulating what is understood and can be
interpreted in understanding in general. (SZ, 369)

Even in the prevalence of spatial imagery in language, Heidegger

finds a document not of the “ power” of space, but of the power of time.
Time as the ecstatic-horizonal unity of the three ecstases indeed dwells in
the subject more originally than space, for the “ subject” is the factical here-
288 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

being who is temporality become existent; whereas, only on the ground of

this temporality can here-being “ break into space,” “ occupy space.” Hei-
degger has not only demonstrated the existential-ontological priority of
“ original time,” but from his interpretation of space a sudden light is
thrown back onto the structure of temporality. If we reflect, for instance,
how an experience of movement in space is possible, we find that unless we
could await the whither to which the movement proceeds and retain the
where from which the movement proceeds, we could not experience spa-
tial movement at all. A presenting alone would certainly not be sufficient,
because if we could experience something only “ here and now,” without
simultaneously awaiting its whither and retaining its wherefrom, we could
never know that it is moving. Heidegger’s difficult and even seemingly
paradoxical doctrine that the “ future-present-past” of the temporality of
care do not occur in succession, but are “ simultaneous,” thus receives fresh
illumination. It might be argued, of course, that in order to see something
actually move, we must see the change of its position relative to other
things; that is, the whither and the wherefrom cannot be a mere empti-
ness, but must be marked by something other than the moving thing. This
argument in no way destroys Heidegger’s thesis that temporality tempor-
alizes itself in the unity of its three ecstases. If our seeing were purely and
solely a presenting, so that we could perceive things only “ here and now,”
we could never judge that they had changed their relative positions, and
an experience of movement would still be impossible.
The present section brings the long chapter “ Temporality and
Everydayness ” almost to an end. It is followed by only one more sec-
tion, which deals with the temporal meaning of everydayness. The dis-
cussion of this topic is condensed into only two pages, but their impor-
tance is out of proportion to their brevity, for reasons that will emerge
in the course of examining their content. A summary of the principal
results of this chapter will be given by setting out the various modifi-
cations of temporality in table 13.4.

TABLE 13.4
The Temporality of Care
Its General Structure: Having-Been Making-Present Coming-to-Itself

Inauthentic The Temporality Authentic

forgetfully presenting of understanding recollecting ( or retrieving

awaiting or recapitulating)-instant
anticipatory running-forward

( continued on next page )

TABLE IS.4 ( continued )

Inauthentic The Temporality Authentic

fear of attunement dread
awai ting-presenting bringing before a
forgetting possible forward-
running-instant
recollectability (or
retrieval or
recapitulation )
curiosity of falling
awaiting-forgetting
( running-after,
running-away)-
making present
of discourse
no specific primary
ecstasis
circumspect taking care of being-in-the-world
awai ting-retaining
making present
possible modifications:
(i )an “ arrested ” awaiting-retaining making present
awaiting-retäining not-making-present
( ii )
unawaiting-retaining making-present
( iii )
awaiting-unretaining making-present
( iv)
Theoretical thematization:
a preeminent awaiting-
retaining making present
of world
horizon of the ecstatic unity of
future, having-been, present
Horizontal schema:
future: for-the-sake-of-itself
having-been: whereof of thrownness
present: for
of space
ecstatic retaining-awaiting ( of possible thither and
hither )
making present ( undistancing )
290 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

4. THE TEMPORAL MEANING

OF THE EVERYDAYNESS OF HERE-BEING

Although the everyday ness of being-in-the-world was the central theme

of Division One, and although it remained the basis from which the
interpretation of authentic existence took off in Division Two, we are
still far from having grasped this phenomenon ontologically. More-
over, as Heidegger points out, “ It even remains questionable whether
the explication of temporality carried out up to now is adequate to
explain the existential meaning of everydayness ” (SZ, 370 ).
This unobtrusive remark gives us the first hint that the inquiry is
about to take an important step that will lead into a new dimension of
temporality constitutive of the historical character of here-being
( Geschichtlichkeit ). This dimension of temporality has so far been left
out of account , or more precisely, it has been lying latent in the previ-
ous analyses, for it will turn out later that everydayness itself is the inau-
thentic way in which here-being is historical. That is why the problem of
historicity is forced to the surface precisely by the obscurity of every-
dayness as an existential phenomenon. Its obscurity is itself strange,
because nothing could be more familiar to us than the way we exist
“ each day.” On the other hand, the meaning of “ each day” is not trans-
parent. This cannot mean simply the sum of all the days in our lifetime,
but yet the phrase does carry a suggestion of ticking days off on a cal-
endar. The primary meaning of everydayness, however,

is a certain How of existence that prevails in Da-sein “ as long as it lives. ”

In our earlier analyses we often used the expression “ initially and for the
most part.” “ Initially ” means the way in which Da-sein is “ manifest” in
the being-with-one-another of publicness, even if it has “ basically ” pre-
cisely “ overcome” everydayness existentielly. “ For the most part ” signi-
fies the way in which Da-sein shows itself for everyone “ as a rule, ” but not
always. (SZ, 370 )

The last two sentences explain not only the expressions Heideg-
ger mentions, but , at the same time , what he means by calling every-
dayness the indifferent and average way of existing. In what way does
here- being “ manifest” itself in the first place? It “ manifests” itself, Hei-
degger says ironically, in a public being-together-with that covers over
the singleness of a finite self, levels it down to the uniformity of “ what
one does,” so that everyone becomes interchangeable with and replace-
able by every other one.
This way of being-here is “ indifferent , ” insofar as one is not dif-
ferentiated from any other one. The inauthentic and authentic self
 Temporality and Everydayness 291

appears equally as one, even if the latter has just “ overcome ” every-
dayness. The “ overcome” has again an ironical tone. Heidegger may be
thinking of an all too facile assumption that everydayness can be once
and for all “ overcome, ” when in fact it is so deeply embedded in care
that it can never be wholly eliminated.
In the first place, that is, in the publicity of the everyday world,
unique existence appears as an indifferent “ one.” This is at the same time
the average way in which here-being is manifest to everyman. The aver-
age is not what is always and necessarily so, but what is so “ for the most
part, ” “ usually,” “ as a rule.” What begins to appear with the “ usual, ” the
“ as a rule,” is something like a span or stretch of time, for all usage and
habit imply a long period of practice. This becomes explicit in the next
paragraph, where Heidegger describes the way ( the how ) in which here-
being “ lives unto the day, ” drifting along from day to day, whether in all
respects or only in those which are prescribed by “ them.”
Being comfortable belongs to this How, even if habit forces us to what is
burdensome and “ repulsive.” The tomorrow that everyday taking care
waits for is the “ eternal yesterday.” The monotony of everyday ness takes
whatever the day happens to bring as a change. Everydayness determines
Da-sein even when it has not chosen the they as its “ hero.” (SZ, 370-71)

The uniformity characteristic of everydayness is well called

“ monotony,” for it reveals itself to the “ individual” here-being in the
attunement of a “ dull untunedness ” ( fahle Ungestimmtheit ) , in a “ lack of
tone” that is familiar to all of us. Indeed, all the varied characteristics
of everyday existence are ontically so well known that they are hardly
noticed, but for the existential-ontological investigation they harbor
“ enigma upon enigma.” It is the baffling character of everydayness
that reveals the insufficiency of the preceding explanations of tempo-
rality. They have brought here-being to a standstill in a certain situa-
—
tion that is , they have analyzed only the structure of temporality itself ,
while completely disregarding that here-being stretches itself “ tempo-
rally” in the succession of its days. “ The monotony, the habit, the ‘like
yesterday, so today and tomorrow,’ and the ‘for the most part,’ cannot
be grasped without recourse to the ‘temporal’ stretching along of Da-
sein ” (SZ, 371).
These sentences announce the principal theme namely, the —
—
stretchedness of here-being through time of the next chapter, but
without mentioning that this is basically the problem of historicity. It
seems at first sight to have little to do with what we usually mean by his-
tory. On second thought, however, a connection begins to emerge.
When we ask someone, for instance, to tell us his friend’s history, we
292 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

are in fact asking about what Heidegger calls the stretchedness of here-
being through his days, about the events which have happened in the
course of them , not as disconnected episodes, but in the meaningful
unity and coherence of a single “ fate ” or “ destiny.” There is, therefore,
at least a rough connection between the popular sense of “ someone’s
history ” and the existential concept of it, although the two are by no
means identical, and the latter will turn out to include the history of
the “ past, ” which is the primary meaning we usually attach to the word.
The first hint of the problem of historicity already raises the
problem of the “ time ” through which here-being stretches itself. This
is the time which here-being counts upon and takes account of, which
“ accounting” is astronomically regulated and published in calendars.
The everyday “ happening” of here-being and his care-taking counting
with time must be drawn into the interpretation of temporality before
the ontological meaning of everydayness can be made even a problem.
Division Two aims at a full working out of the problem, but the ade-
quate conceptual definition of everydayness, Heidegger announces in
the by now familiar formula, “ can succeed only in the framework of a
fundamental discussion of the meaning of being in general and its pos-
sible variations” (SZ, 371-72 ).
The importance of the present short section is easily overlooked,
because the preparatory steps it takes toward the existential problem of
history remain implicit, while in following up the complex thought of
the next chapter the reader may fail to connect it up in retrospect with
what has already been said here. That is why in this interpretation I
have made quite explicit what Heidegger only hints at.
An important, perhaps the most important, implication of this
section still remains to be mentioned. The time through which here-
being stretches itself, as we have heard, is the time that is regulated by
astronomical measurements and is kept count of by calendars. But this
is also the time in which within-worldish beings arise, have a duration
and pass away, and in which all kinds of events within the world take
place. How this world-time belongs to and springs from the original
time of care will be elucidated in detail in the last chapter of Division
Two. What interests us now is that here-being himself must necessarily
enter into the time which determines the in-timeness ( Innerzeitigkeit ) of
within-worldish beings and which originates in his own temporality.
His own being-in- time essentially belongs to the factical here-being, in
contrast to his being-in -space like a within-worldish thing, which Hei-
degger rejected as inappropriate. To put the point in another way:
while it is perfectly well possible for us to conceive our “ spatial prop-
erties” as though we were merely extended bodies in space, and for cer-
 Temporality and Everydayness 293

tain purposes it may even be extremely useful to do so ( for instance, in

being measured for clothes), this is in no way an essential constituent of
our being-here. Heidegger is therefore justified in pointing out its onto -
logical inappropriateness and in dismissing it in a sentence. But our
being-in-time along with things within the world, if not in the same, at
least in an analogous way, is essentially constitutive of our being-here,
and far from being able to dismiss it, the temporal analysis must make
it its task to inquire into this being-in-time. Once more, it seems, the
predominance of time over space asserts itself. It is not only that time
dwells in the subject more originally than space, but it would appear
that the factical here-being as temporality becomes existent, dwells in
time, more originally than in space.
The fact that Heidegger devotes a long discussion to our “ being-
in-time ” once more testifies to the predominance of time over space.
For undoubtedly we can regard ourselves as “ being-in-space” just like
—
other bodies as when we get measured for a suit of clothes or when we
determine our position in relation to something else, we treat ourselves
—
as purely extended things but the problems arising from this are not
dealt with by Heidegger in any detail. This does not mean that he con-
siders our embodiment in space as a negligible accident, but only that
the specific problems connected with it need not be discussed in a fun-
damental ontology (SZ, 108 ). The problem of history, on the other
hand, pinpoints that the “ public time, ” in which we exist and in which
historical events as well as the processes of nature take place, is central
to a fundamental ontology. It would appear therefore not only that
“ time dwells in the subject more originally than space, ” but that the
“ subject,” as a factually existing being-in-the-world, dwells more origi-
nally in time than in space.
 XIV
Temporality and Historicity

The introductory section to this chapter defines the problems that

have arisen from the incompleteness of the preceding interpretation of
here-being. The elucidation of the whole of here-being is the necessary
precondition for explaining how an understanding of being is at all
possible and for interpreting the meaning of the thus understood
being. The problem of how here-being can be a whole was raised in
chapter 1 of Division Two, but the solution has so far been exclusively
gained from the end in death that closes the possibility of a factical
existence. The other “ end, ” the beginning in birth , has been neglected,
so that in spite of a genuine explanation of an authentic and inau-
thentic being unto death the analysis has only onesidedly considered
here-being, as it exists “ forward,” advancing to its impassable possibil-
ity. This onesidedness must now be corrected. Further and most
importantly, here-being stretches itself out between its beginning in
birth and its end in death; surely it is this stretch or span of a life that
constitutes the whole of here-being, and this is just what has so far been
overlooked. The coherence or connection of a life ( Lebenszusammen-
hang ) , that is, its unity and continuity, the “ standing and staying” of a
self in constant change and movement, are the problems that now
come to the forefront of the inquiry. The solution of these problems
must explain how a factical here-being can have its own history as well
as take root in and stabilize itself ( ground itself ) in its historical her-
itage taken over from other existences.

295
296 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

In the fifth paragraph of § 72 Heidegger discusses the views on

the coherence or connection of life that were current before and at the
time of writing of Being and Time } According to them , the coherence
of life between birth and death is supposed to consist of a succession
of experiences ( Erlebnisse ) in time. The peculiarity of this explanation,
Heidegger says, is that only the experience in the “ present now” is
“ real,” while those nows that are past or are still to come are no longer
or not yet “ real.”

Da sein traverses the time-span allotted to it between the two boundaries

in such a way that it is “ real” only in the now and hops, so to speak ,
through the succession of nows of its “ time.” For this reason one says
that Da sein is “ temporal.” The self maintains itself in a certain sameness
throughout the constant change of experience. (SZ, 373)

A closer examination of Heidegger's account of the current the-

ory reveals a step in his reasoning that at first appears to be logically
invalid. For even if he righdy asserts that only each present experience
is generally held to be “ real, ” it by no means follows that the experi-
encing self is also “ real ” only in each present now. It is precisely by the
permanence of a self-same self through changing experiences that the
current theory explains the “ connection of life.” Moreover, it insists on
the “ insubstantiality” of the self. What justification, if any, does Hei-
degger’s rejection of this theory have? Its justification is that the per-
manence ( Beharrlichkeit ) of an identical self through a succession of
nows is the ontological-temporal character of the reality of a substance,
but not of the self-standingness of an existing here-being. Its stretched-
ness between birth and death cannot be explained by the popular con-
ception of time and the enduringness of a thing in this time, but only
from the temporal structure of care. It is not a course and stretch of
“ life” that is gradually filled up by the “ momentary realities” of here-
being, but

Da-sein [. . .] stretches itself along in such a way that its own being is
constituted beforehand as this stretching along. The “ between ” of birth
and death already lies in the being of Da-sein [. . .]. Understood existen-
tially, birth is never something past in the sense of what is no longer
objectively present , and death is just as far from being the kind of being
of something outstanding that is not yet objectively present but will
come. Factical Da-sein exists as born, and, born, it is already dying in
the sense of being-toward-death. Both “ ends ” and their “ between ” are
as long as Da-sein factically exists, and they are in the sole way possible
on the basis of Da-sein as care. In the unity of thrownness and the flee-
 Temporality and Historicity 297

ing or else anticipatory being-toward-death , birth and death “ are con «

nected ” in the way appropriate to Da-sein. As care, Da-sein is the

“ Between.” (SZ , 374 )2

The above-mentioned apparently invalid step in Heidegger’s

argument now turns out to be not illogical but elliptical. Heidegger
thinks himself entitled to omit several steps in the argument because
he is not telling us anything new: the enduringly self -same presence in
time that constitutes the identity of a thing has been repeatedly criti-
cized as insufficient to explain the self-standingness ( steadfast
endurance) of here-being. The latter is grounded in the ecstatic unity
of the temporality that determines the whole of care.

The ontological clarification of the “ connectedness of life,” that is, of the

specific way of stretching along, movement , and persistence of Da-sein,
must accordingly be approached in the horizon of the temporal consti-
tution of this being. The movement of existence is not the motion of
something objectively present. It is determined from the stretching along
of Da-sein. (SZ, 374 -75)

The “ movement” or “ movedness” (.Bewegtheit ) of a “ stretched out

stretching itself along” is implied already in that early definition Hei-
degger gives of Da-sein as thrown forethrow. It comes more fully to
light in the “ owing” character of care, which was expressed in the for-
mula “ the not-[or null-]determined ground-being of a negativity.” At
first sight, it is true, this formula seems to present us with a rigidly sta-
tic structure, but on closer view it reveals how here-being stretches itself
from its beginning to its end. The movement of this stretched self-
stretching originates in the nothing that negates ( denies ) each factical
self to himself as his own ground, and throws him forward to the noth-
ing of his own possible not-being. But although this forward-stretching
of here-being ends itself in the ultimate possibility of not-being-here,
this nothing ( not-being) does not bring here-being to a standstill, but
throws it back to its ownmost thrownness. In the movement of this
stretching back to the not-self-grounded “ origin” of here-being its
dependence upon other beings, among which it must ground itself,
becomes wholly transparent. The moved self-stretching of here-being
forward and back was first revealed by the call of care as a “ forward-
calling recall.” The task of the present chapter is to elucidate the full
content and structure of the being which discloses itself in that call.

The specific movement of the stretched out stretching itself along, we call
the occurrence of Da-sein. The question of the “ connectedness” of Da-sein
298 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

is the ontological problem of its occurrence. To expose the structure of

occurrence and the existential and temporal conditions of its possibility
means to gain an ontological understanding of historicity . (SZ, 375)

This paragraph prohibits us from taking the “ occurrence” or

“ happening” of here-being for an ontic event, such as the biological
birth of a human being. The “ occurrence” or “ happening” ( Geschehen )
is that movement in which the temporality of care accomplishes itself,
that is, brings itself to ripeness, temporalizes itself. The “ happening” is
not the coming to birth of a here-being, but constitutes the way in
which a factically existing being-in-the-world is here. The “ I am ” is never
the static presence “ here and now ” of a thing, but constantly stretches
itself forward and back. In this “ stretched stretching” lies the steadfast
constancy and continuity of the “ I, ” the “ self, ” and not in a lasting pre-
sentness from now to now.
But if here-being is that unique way of being that brings itself to
light, then its “ happening” is in itself the happening of the self-disclosure
of being . This self-disclosure happens in the accomplished temporality
of care. Now, as we are about to learn, being discloses itself historically,
or, to say the same thing in another way, historicity is an essential char-
acter of being. To put the matter in still another way, here-being is
essentially historical-being. What the happening ( Geschehen ) of here-
being and its historical constitution ( Geschichtlichkeit ) have to do with
history ( Geschichte ) as we usually understand the word will be explained
in the following sections.
What is important to us to note here is that here-being can be his-
torical in two different ways. In his everyday disownment of himself to
the world, here-being is inauthentically historical. Heidegger’s princi-
pal aim, however, is to explain first the historicity of a resolutely
“ owned” existence. This is done in the third section (§ 74) of the pre-
sent chapter of Being and Time. Undoubtedly, this section is the heart
of Heidegger’s interpretation of historicity, although he discusses also
the historical character of everydayness, as well as the popular-ontic
concepts of history. The latter indicate the starting points from which
a “ phenomenological construction ” of authentic historicity will have to
take off. The ontic concepts of history as a series of happenings “ in
time” have moreover a certain justification , because the factical here-
being is indeed temporal not only in Heidegger’ s original sense, but
also in the popular sense of “ being-in- time” ( within-timeness). The
within-timeness of here-being must be duly considered, all the more so
because the processes of nature also take place in the same time . His-
toricity and within- timeness are cooriginally grounded in the tempo-
 Temporality and Historicity 299

rality of care. The origin of the time in which both history and the
processes of nature take place and by which they are measured will be
exhaustively analyzed in his next chapter, chapter 6 of Division Two.
The introductory section to the present chapter ends with a refer-
ence to Dilthey, whose researches into the problem of historicity have
inspired Heidegger’s own inquiries. Heidegger acknowledges his
indebtedness in a somewhat startling way: “ Basically, the following
analysis is solely concerned with furthering the investigations of Dilthey
in a preparatory way” (SZ, 377). The word solely in this sentence is as
exaggerated as it is misleading. In all soberness, we can say that this
fifth chapter of Divison Two takes an important step toward the central
aim of elucidating the meaning of being, and solely by virtue of doing so
does it further an assimilation of Dilthey’s investigations. This becomes
clear from the key passage of the correspondence of Count Yorck von
Wartenburg with Dilthey, quoted in the last section of this chapter.3 In
this passage Count Yorck envisages the task of working out “ the generic
difference between the ontic and the historical ” (SZ, 403). “ Ontic” and
“ historical, ” we must note, are used here in Count Yorck’s and not in
Heidegger’s sense. “ Ontic ” means the visible and tangible, the substan-
tial, in sharp contrast to the “ historical,” the spiritual, the self-con-
sciously living. The task outlined by Count Yorck, Heidegger remarks, is
the fundamental aim of all “ philosophy of life.” This aim, however, is
not formulated radically enough, as the following key-passage shows.

How else is historicity to be philosophically grasped and “ categorially ”

conceived in its difference from the ontic than by bringing the “ ontic”
and the “ historiographical ” into a more primordial unity so that they can
be compared and distinguished? But that is possible only if we attain the
following insights:
1. The question of historicity is an ontological question about the consti-
tution of historical beings.
2. The question of the ontic is the ontological question of the being of
beings unlike Da-sein, of what is objectively present in the broadest
sense.
3. The ontic is only one area of beings.
The idea of being encompasses the “ ontic” and the “ historiographical.”
This idea is what must be “ generically differentiated.” (SZ, 403)

Heidegger’s own comments prove that he does not lose sight of

the tasks of Being and Time even for a moment. It is just by carrying
them out , that his present chapter can prepare the ground for an under-
standing of Dilthey’s aim.
300 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

1 . THE VULGAR UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY

AND THE OCCURRENCE OF HERE-BEING

Even in the popular understanding of history there must be indications

of what is originally historical. Heidegger therefore first examines the
varied meanings of “ history.”
An ambiguity in the expression shows itself immediately in the
fact that history means the “ historical reality ” as well as the science of
history. The latter meaning, as well as that of a “ historical reality” that
has already been thematized as the object of scientific research, are for
the moment left out of account. Heidegger concentrates solely on the
so-called historical reality itself, or more precisely, on the real happen-
ings, changes, destinies, and so forth, which are usually called history.
In other words, history is used here in an ontic sense. It is something
that is, with a stress on past things and events. The past is understood
in a positive and privative way from the present, the today. In a positive
way the past still affects and determines the present, or in a privative
way it is understood as something gone and no longer effective today,
although some pieces that belonged to these earlier times, like a Greek
temple or antiquities preserved in a museum , may still be present.
A second meaning of history is not so much the past things and
events, but rather the origin or emergence from them. History means
the coherence and continuity of a becoming. Something that has a his-
tory stands in a causal connection with the past that determines its pre-
sent and will still have an effect in the future. As a causal nexus of
events stretching through the past, present, and future, history does
not bear exclusively upon the past.
Thirdly, history can mean the whole of beings that wanders and
changes “ through time, ” in contradistinction to nature, which also
moves “ in time.” This juxtaposition is perhaps not so common in Eng-
lish as it is in German. It appears in Count Yorck’s concepts of the
“ ontic” and the “ historical.” In this meaning, history does not denote
the way in which events happen, but rather the region of beings
—
mankind which is essentially determined by “ spirit ” and “ culture ” in
—
distinction from the things and processes of nature, although the lat-
ter also, in a certain way, belong to history. We need only remember,
for instance, the natural waterways, the passes, the natural defenses of
mountain ranges, the climates, and so on, that have played so large a
part in the history strictly understood as the destinies of mankind.
Fourthly, history means what has been handed over and handed
down in a tradition; it means the tradition as such, regardless of
whether it is “ historiographically ” recognized as tradition or whether
it remains hidden in its origins.
 Temporality and Historicity 301

Heidegger now sums up these four meanings of history in the fol-

lowing masterly way:
If we consider the four meanings together, we find that history is the spe-
cific occurrence of existing Da-sein happening in time, in such a way that
the occurrence in being-with-one-another that is “ past ” and at the same
time “ handed down ” and still having its effect is taken to be history in
the sense emphasized. (SZ, 379 )

No sooner is this popular notion of history formulated than ques-

tions and misgivings arise. To be sure, all the various meanings of his-
-
tory are connected by a common reference to Da sein as the “ subject”
of historical events. Nonetheless, ontologically it is far from clear how
the “ happening” of these events is to be defined, and especially how
they belong to the history of here-being. Does here-being first become
historical through an intertwining with circumstances and incidents
that succeed each other in time? Or is there a happening ( coming-to-
pass ) that constitutes the being of here-being, as historical, so that, on
the ground of it, circumstances, events, and destinies become ontolog-
ically possible? And finally, why does the “ past ” have such a weight in
the popular notion of history? Why is the past the preeminent tempo-
ral character of a historical here-being that comes to pass “ in time” ?
Since the historical character of here-being is to be explained
from the temporality of care, the past as the predominantly temporal
meaning of the popular notion of history offers a foothold from which
the existential explanation of history from the temporality of care can
best be approached. Just as in his world-analysis Heidegger starts with
the innerworldly utensils, leading up to the world as an existential char-
acter of here-being, so now he starts with the “ world-historical ” utensils
and things leading up to what is primarily historical: the factical here-
-
being as a being-in the-world.
The utensils that Heidegger first gets into focus are those that
belong to antiquity and are now preserved in a museum. Why are these
utensils historical when they are still substantially present? The sugges-
tion that they are “ objects” of a historical interest and knowledge is
immediately rejected by Heidegger. These things must in some way be
historical in themselves in order to be possible objects of a historical
science. With what right are these things called “ historical” when they
are not yet gone but are still present? Or do they in some way belong
to the past although they are still substantially present?
It might be said that the things in a museum are no longer the
utensils they once were because they are no longer in use. True, but
this does not explain their historical character, for there may be many
—
heirlooms in a household an old clock, furniture, and the like which —
302 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

are still in daily use and yet belong to the “ past.” What is it in them that
has “ passed ” ? Nothing less than the world within which they were once
handily encountered by a here-being and were used by him in his care-
taking being-in-the-world. It is the world that no longer exists, whereas
the utensil that formerly belonged to that world can still be substan-
tially present. But what does the no-longer-being of world mean? There
is world only as an existential-ontological constituent of here-being.
Strictly speaking, therefore, we should not speak of a “ past” world,
since Heidegger reserves the word past ( vergangen ) for things. We
should speak rather of a world that has been ( gewesen ) . Similarly, a
here-being who no longer exists is not “ past,” but has-been-here ( da-
gewesen ) . The still present antiquities owe their historical character to
their belonging to and descent from the world of here-being who has
been here. It is he who is primarily historical. Secondarily historical are
—
the things in the widest sense not only utensils but also events and
—
nature in the sense of “ historical ground” which belong to a world,
and are called by Heidegger the “ world-historical.”
With this, however, the problem of historical-being is not yet
properly formulated. Indeed, we might be misled into thinking that
only the here-being who has-been-here is historical; whereas, Heideg-
ger intends to show that it is precisely the factically existing here-being
who is primarily and originally historical. It is in the temporality of his
being that the has-been temporalizes itself cooriginally with a making-
present-coming. The problem now becomes acute: why should the has-
or having-been determine the historical when it belongs to the tempo-
ral unity of care as a making-present-coming?
The vulgar ontic notion of history is predominantly drawn from
the “ world-historical.” Although it also understands Da sein as the pri-
mary “ subject” of history, it cannot sufficiently distinguish the tempo-
rality of the “ subject ” from the being-in-time of things. Heidegger’ s
positive task now is to show the temporal-ontological conditions on the
basis of which the “ subjectivity of the subject” is essentially historical.

2. THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUTION OF HISTORICITY

The authentic “ happening” or “ coming- to- pass” ( Geschehen) of here-

being is to be explained from the authentic temporality of care. The
latter, as Heidegger reminds us, first came into view from an anticipa-
tory forward-running resoluteness. In this way of existing here-being
resolutely brings himself face to face with death as his ownmost,
utmost possibility. This impassable limit of his existence turns him
 Temporality and Historicity 303

back to his own thrownness. In taking over his whole being as his own
he is at the same time “ instantly ” here for his “ situation, ” in which and
from which he resolutely grasps the factical possibilities he chooses for
his own. It is these factical possibilities which now give Heidegger a lead
into the problem of historicity. The important transitional passage that
leads from the first to the second is unfortunately so condensed that
the coherence of Heidegger’s argument becomes almost invisible. The
following exposition will make the steps of the argument much more
explicit than they are in Being and Time (SZ, 383).
The first step is taken by formulating the hitherto unconsidered
question, From where, in principle, can the factical possibilities of
existence be drawn? They obviously cannot be derived from the ulti-
mate possibility that closes an existence, especially since the authen-
tic running-forward to it does not mean a contemplative dwelling
upon death, but means the resolute coming-back -to the factical
“ here.” Could it be then, Heidegger asks, that the thrownness of the
self into a world discloses a horizon from which an existence wrests
his factical possibilities?
If it should indeed be our thrownness from which we draw our
factical possibilities, then their historical character becomes immedi-
ately evident, for the temporal meaning of thrownness is the having-
been, the “ past.” The having-been, in turn, predominantly determines
the historical. It is an obvious ontic fact that no generation creates its
tasks and opportunities from nothing, but inherits them from preced-
ing generations, so that even the new departures from and breaks with
tradition are grounded in the “ past.” Heidegger’s problem is to explain
-
how the existential temporal constitution of care makes this obvious
fact possible. How can a factical here-being disclose not only his own
having-been in his own world, but go back to other existences who
have-been-here before him in their world ? The coming-back-to himself
in his thrownness discloses only the finite having-been of a single exis-
tence. Now the problem is how a wider horizon of the having-been can
be opened up, a horizon that reaches back behind and before a finite
existence, so that a continuity with the past and a handing down of
tasks and achievements becomes possible.
No sooner is this problem explicitly formulated than a difficulty
becomes evident. As Heidegger has shown earlier, our thrownness is
manifest to us from an untransgressable limit that closes our own hav-
ing-been-already-here as decisively as death closes our possibility of
being-here-any-more. The “ nothing of myself ’ is revealed in a negation
that becomes explicit in the structure of care as a no¿-determined
ground-being of a negativity ( Div. Two, chap. 2 ). Heidegger refers us
304 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

back to this negation in a single sentence: “ Did we not moreover say [at
SZ, 284] that Da-sein never gets behind its thrownness?” (SZ, 383).
—
Never to come back to myself as my own ground this is the impotence
in which the closedness ( finiteness ) of my own having-been stares me
in the face. The “ never ” seems to plunge my origins into complete hid-
denness. How, then, can that farther horizon of having-been become
accessible on the ground of which I exist historically?
Clearly, if the singleness of a finite existence were synonymous
with isolation , and if our understanding of being reached no further
than our own being, anything like history would be impossible. But
the same “ not ” that reveals my own “ that I already am” and delivers
me over to my own ability-to-be, at the same time reveals the being of
other beings and refers me to them in my impotence to be my own
ground, that is, it throws me into a world. Only in a not-self-grounded
being-with-others-in-the-world can that wider horizon of having-been
be opened up in which a finite existence “ grounds himself, ” that is,
comes to stand as himself among beings that have-been-here before
him and hand down to him his own factical possibilities. It is to be
noted that for an authentic historical being a being-with-others in the
same world is primarily constitutive. It is indeed self-evident that with-
out an understanding of other existences and a communicating dis-
course with them , no tradition could be formed, and even our most
immediate “ history ” would remain inaccessible. Even in the authentic
history of an everyday being-in-the-world , it is the ambiguous hearsay-
ing idle talk of being-with-others that transmits tradition. But whereas
the disowned oneself understands himself among the others from a
common preoccupation with things and from what is done and what
happens within the world, the resolutely owned self understands him-
self from the fully disclosed finiteness of his own existence. This dis-
closes other existences in their finite being, and makes authentic
being-with-others possible.
We have now come to the end of the transitional passage that
introduces Heidegger’ s elucidation of historical-being. Before going
any further, it should be remarked that a vital point remains unclari-
fied in Heidegger’s argument, namely, the connection between self ,
ground , and world. It is only from the essay “ On the Essence of
Ground” that we learn that being-in-the-world is essentially a “ ground-
ing,” and that one mode of grounding is “ having gained ground ”
among beings, having gained a firm stand in the soil ( Boden ) in which
all beings are rooted . All ways of grounding, as Heidegger briefly indi-
cates in the same essay, spring from the care of standingness and con-
stancy, belong to the ecstatic unity of temporality insofar as an endur-
 Temporality and Historicity 305

ing self-sameness ( self-standingness ) and continuity are constitutive of

it. Coming back from “ On the Essence of Ground” to the present chap-
ter, we shall be able to see that an authentic historicity is nothing other
than the concrete unfolding of authentic care as the not-determined
ground-being of a negativity. Up to the end of Division Two, on the
other hand, this vital connection is merely hinted at, but not made
explicit. Why not? Very probably the elucidation of this matter was to
have provided the transition from Division Two to Division Three, the
turning point between Being and Time and Time and Being.
Keeping these connections in mind, we will be able to understand
the tacit implications of the following interpretation. In the first place,
Heidegger reminds us briefly of what has already been said in Division
One about the everyday being-with-others-in-a-world. The disowned
oneself-among-others, it now begins to appear, is inauthentically his-
torical insofar as he understands himself primarily from his worldish
possibilities. These are made public by “ them, ” the “ others, ” in the
average interpretations of here-being that are current in everyday
being-together. Its ambiguous hearsaying idle talk forms and transmits
the “ tradition ” that prescribes to oneself what one can be and do.
The authentic existence does not simply reject and rebel
against this tradition, but “ from it and against it and yet again for it”
delivers over to himself the factically given possibilities of his own exis-
tence. These are authentically disclosed from the heritage which a res-
-
olute coming-back to here-being* s thrownness makes its own. It is not
an explicit, theoretical knowledge of tradition that distinguishes the
authentic taking-over of a heritage, but the undisguised disclosure of
a not-self-grounded thrownness that must ground itself in other
beings. This illumination of the full meaning of thrownness can only
happen in an understanding coming-back from the end of being-
here. The more undisguisedly a here-being understands himself in
and from his ownmost, utmost possibility, the more surely and the
less accidentally he can find and choose the inherited possibilities of
his existence.
Only the anticipation of death drives every chance and “ preliminary ”
possibility out. Only being free for death gives Da-sein its absolute goal
and pushes existence into its finitude. The finititude of existence thus
seized upon tears one back out of endless multiplicity of possibilities
—
offering themselves nearest by those of comfort, shirking and taking
—
things easy and brings Da-sein to the simplicity of its fate. This is how we
designate the primordial occurrence of Da-sein that lies in authentic res-
oluteness in which it hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a pos-
sibility that it inherited and yet has chosen. (SZ, 384 )
306 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

By “ fate ” [ Schicksal ] , then, Heidegger means the authentic way in

which a factically existing being-in-the-world “ occurs, ” “ happens, ” or
—
“ comes-to-pass” ¿s here in an inherited but nonetheless resolutely cho-
sen situation. But, we are inclined to ask, by what right does Heidegger
give such an unusual meaning to fate? Is this meaning completely arbi-
trary, or does it in some way connect up with what we would usually
understand by “ man 's fate” ? Indeed it does. Da-sein’s fate, according to
Heidegger, is to be the illuminated place, the “ here” of the self-disclo-
sure ( truth ) of being. The authentic happening of here-being is in itself
the happening in which being brings itself to light in the fullest and
widest way possible, namely historically . The existentially understood
“ fate ” accomplishes “ Da-sein’s fate” in the usual sense, or, to be more
precise, what Heidegger considers to be his fate. But more than that,
Heidegger’s conception of fate fulfils our obscurely or clearly felt need
for a fate that Da sein cannot himself make or confer on himself. The
authentic happening of here-being clearly cannot be man-made, for
ontically he is powerless to bring himself into being, and ontologically
he cannot possibly confer on himself the disclosing way of being that
first of all enables him to exist as Da sein. On the other hand, accord-
ing to Heidegger, our not-self-given fate is not imposed on us by a
power, be it divine or natural, which exists in and by itself apart from
here-being. Since being is nothing like a self-subsistent entity, its self-
disclosure needs the being of concrete beings like ourselves. How and
why being can bring itself to light ( come into its truth ) only in and as
a finite existence, has already been repeatedly discussed. Fate, then, in
Heidegger’s interpretation, is neither man-made nor imposed by an
external power, but is the unique happening of the self-disclosure of
being in and as a finite here-being.
Furthermore, we usually think that in his finite freedom man can-
not be merely a passive tool in the “ hand of fate, ” but must himself be
able to take a hand in fulfilling his fate. Now, we must note, that it is
only the coming-to-pass of a resolutely disclosed existence that Hei-
degger calls fate. Resoluteness, as he has told us in chapter 2, is that
free response that only a factical self can make, but need not necessar-
ily make, to the call of care. Fate, in Heidegger’s strictly defined sense,
already comprehends in itself the free choice and willing response on
the part of a resolutely “ owned ” self. A disowned self, on the other
hand, exists in the “ unfreedom ” of not-having-chosen the utmost truth
of which his factical being-here is capable.
The free choice that lies in the properly understood fate concerns
not only the truth ( disclosedness ) of our own single existence. It con-
cerns also the factical possibilities of our situation that we inherit but
 Temporality and Historicity 307

nonetheless take over as our own. To a resolutely disclosed here-being

the particular circumstances, opportunities, chances, and accidents
( Zufälle ) that fall to his share ( zufallen ) from his world reveal them-
selves as fortunate or unfortunate, favorable or unfavourable, lucky or
unlucky. Heidegger thus gives us a perfectly lucid explanation of how
we can legitimately understand such notions as fortune and misfortune
or good and bad luck-notions that are often held to be philosophically
obscure, if not meaningless. Kant goes as far as to call luck, fortune,
and fate “ usurped concepts, ” whose use has no clearly justifiable
ground either in experience or in reason ( Critique of Pure Reason, B
117). In Heidegger’s words,
Da sein can only be reached by the blows of fate because in the basis of
its being it is fate in the sense described. Existing fatefully in resoluteness
handing itself down, Da-sein is disclosed as being-in-the-world for the
“ coming ” of “ fortunate ” circumstances and for the cruelty of chance.
Fate does not first originate with the collision of circumstances and
events. Even an irresolute person is driven by them, more so than some-
one who has chosen , and yet he can “ have” no fate . (SZ, 384)

If, however, a freely willing choice is an essential constitutive

moment of fate, then it becomes urgently necessary to define how far
and in what way a finite being is free. This is what Heidegger now all
too briefly proceeds to do by introducing the existential concepts of
Ohnmacht and Ü bermacht . The first means literally “ without power” and
can be easily recognized as our powerlessness in the face of our being
already here, delivered over to ourselves in a dependence upon other
beings. Übermacht is more difficult to translate. “ Ü ber” means over,
beyond, above. At first sight an analogy with Nietzsche’s so-called
superman ( Übermensch ) suggests itself, but must be quickly rejected.4
The “ Über” in “ Übermacht” means exactly the “ trans” of “ transcen-
dence” which Heidegger explicitly identifies with freedom (WG, 43ff.,
W, 59ff., G9, 163ff., 125ff., P, 125ff., ER, lOlff.). Übermacht is the
power of transcending beings as a whole, among them first and fore-
most our own factical selves. This power of overstepping beings “ goes
over ” to and ends itself in the ( forethrown ) possibilities of being . On no
account must we conceive this “ over-going power ” as a superpower that
overcomes and annuls the powerlessness of facticity. On the contrary,
we must already find ourselves thrown among beings in order to be
able to transcend them to being. Powerlessness and over-going power
together characterize the finite freedom of transcendence. All this is
condensed by Heidegger into a single sentence which would be barely
understandable without “ On the Essence of Ground.”
308 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

When Da-sein , anticipating, lets death become powerful in itself , as

free for death it understands itself in its own higher power, the power of
its finite freedom, and takes over the powerlessness of being abandoned
to itself in that freedom, which always only is in having chosen the
choice, and becomes clear about the chance elements in the situation
disclosed. (SZ, 384 )

One point in this sentence remains to be explained. While in the

essay “ On the Essence of Ground” Heidegger elucidates freedom ( tran-
scendence ) as the existential -ontological character of here-being as such,
in the present passage he speaks only of the authentic, “ positive” free-
dom of a resolute self. This freedom in fact “ exists” only in “ having
chosen the choice,” it is the factical ( existentiell-ontic ) freedom that
can belong only to the concrete self who has willingly responded to the
“ call of care.” In contrast to this, the “ unfreedom ” of the lost self, while
also a mode of factical freedom, is a negative mode insofar as it is an
evasion of the most essential choice a free existence can make.
Whereas the disowned self is blindly driven round by the acci-
dents { Zufä lle ) of his everyday being-in-the-world, the resolute self
becomes clear-sighted for the accidents that fall to his share { zufallen )
from his world. His world, however, is essentially a “ with-world, ” which
he shares with others. The happening of here-being is therefore essen-
tially a happening-with-others in the same world, and is defined by Hei-
degger as “ common destiny” { Geschick ) .

With this term we designate the occurrence of the community, of a peo-

ple. Destiny is not composed of individual fates, nor can being-with-one-
another be conceived of as the mutual occurrence of several subjects [§
26, ll 7f.]. These fates are already guided beforehand in being-with-one-
another in the same world and in the resoluteness for definite possibil-
ities. In communication and in battle the power of destiny first becomes
free. The fateful destiny [ schicksalhaftes Geschick ] of Da-sein in and with
its “ generation ” constitutes the complete, authentic occurrence of Da-
sein. (SZ, 384-85)

Once we have understood what Heidegger means by “ fate, ” the

meaning of “ common destiny ” seems to be easy to grasp. But this
apparent ease only hides the difficulties implicit in the above passage.
In the first place, we notice with astonishment that what Heidegger
defines there in a few sentences is nothing less than an authentic being-
with-others. The “ communication, ” we must presume, is the authentic
way of speaking-together in contrast to the uprooted hearsaying idle
talk of everyday ness, and the “ battle, ” the authentic way of taking care
 Temporality and Historicity 309

of a mutually shared world, in contrast to a mutual lostness in “ what

one does.” But why, we ask, does Heidegger treat this important theme
with such reticence? Why the disproportionately more careful and
detailed analyses devoted to an everyday being-together? If the latter is
more familiar and common, it requires less explanation than the unfa-
miliar phenomenon of an authentic “ common destiny.” And further,
what criteria do we or can we have for distinguishing the authentic hap-
pening of a community, a people, from an inauthentic one? The his-
torical examples of communities most conscious of their “ common
—
destiny” for example, in the fanaticism of religious or ideological or
racial wars, when one community feels itself appointed to the “ mis-
—
sion ” of destroying others make us extremely doubtful whether such
“ common destinies” do not arise from an extreme self-loss rather than
from the resolute grasp of the finitude of all being-with-others and its
inherited tasks. It may well be, of course, that ontic criteria forjudging
in what particular instance we are facing an authentic or an inauthen-
tic happening are in principle impossible to give. So, for instance, a
Christian may be convinced that salvation is possible for each human
being but may not presume to know whether this or that particular
human being has been saved. Or, to take another example, “ moral
action” in the strictly Kantian sense is possible to every man as a free
moral being, but it is impossible to judge whether this or that action is
“ moral” as Kant understood the term. Similarly, it is possible that an
authentic “ common destiny” is a factical-existentiell possibility of here-
being as being-with-others and yet we may lack , for essential reasons,
the criteria for judgment in any specific instance. But if this is so, we
—
can rightly demand from Heidegger an explanation that and why this
should be so. The doubts and dissatisfactions that many thoughtful
—
readers of Being and Time feel in the face of “ authentic existence” and
—
“ common destiny” whether these are mere “ phenomenological con-
—
structions” without any relevance to our factical existence are only
strengthened by Heidegger’s inadequate treatment of this theme.
On the other hand, the ontological conditions of the possibility of
historical-being are worked out by Heidegger in a highly original and
impressive way. These conditions lie in the ontological constitution of
care, that is, in its temporal constitution. “ Only if death, guilt, con-
science, freedom , and finitude live together equiprimordially in the
being of a being as they do in care, can that being exist in the mode of
fate, that is, be historical in the ground of its existence. (SZ, 385 ).
The enumeration of death, owing, condolence, freedom, and
finiteness gives us, as it were, the full ontological content of care as the
not- or null-determined ground-being of a negativity. That these man-
310 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

ifold constituents of care can “ cooriginally dwell together ” is, however,

made possible by temporality. The following paragraph ( almost the
whole of which is printed in italics ) is undoubtedly the core of Hei-
degger’s interpretation of historical-being.
Only a being that is essentially futural in its being so that it can let itself be
thrown back upon its factical There, free for its death and shattering itself on it,
that is, only a being that, as futural, is equiprimordially having-been, can hand
down to itself its inherited possibility , take over its own thrownness and be in the
Moment for “ its time. ” Only authentic temporality that is at the same time finite
makes something like fate, that is, authentic historicity, possible. (SZ, 385)

Of ail statements in Being and Time this one brings most sharply
into focus the whole movement in which temporality temporalizes
( accomplishes ) itself. For the constitution of historical-being, the
throw-back from the nothing manifest in death is undoubtedly decisive,
since its violence carries us behind our own having-been and makes the
inherited character of our world fully understandable.
But, it may be asked, is the back-to-itself movement of temporal-
ity not the same as the “ reflexivity, ” the “ bending-back-upon-itself ” of
self-consciousness and thinking? Or if the two are not the same, how
are they related? This question is relevant to all modern transcenden-
tal philosophy whose essential dimension is undoubtedly a “ transcen-
dental self-consciousness” ( Kant’s pure apperception ). Husserl’ s phe-
nomenology, for instance, is a method of peculiar reflection that aims
at penetrating to that transcendental self-consciousness whose func-
tion is to “ constitute being.” According to Heidegger, on the other
hand, self-consciousness is only a character of a distinctive way of being,
namely of self-conscious-being (Selbstbewusstsein). The attempt to
explain being from one of its characters, Heidegger maintains, tackles
the problem from the wrong end. The task is rather to explain the tem-
poral structure of this being by virtue of which it can bring itself to light ,
so that it can be “ conscious-of-itself.” This is a decisive turning away
from Husserl and from all previous transcendental philosophy.5 Self-
consciousness ( thinking ) and its reflexivity are, for Heidegger, not pri-
mary and ultimate, but derivative phenomena that owe their possibil-
ity to the temporality of care.
Nevertheless, the new departure made in Being and Time has its
immediate historical roots in transcendental philosophy. One of
Heidegger’s early acknowledgments of this philosophical “ heritage ”
is made in his so-called Kant-book, first published in 1929, where
Being and Time is called a Wiederholung, a bringing-forward-again ( re-
collection, recapitulation , retrieval ) of Kant’ s attempt to lay the
 Temporality and Historicity 311

ground of metaphysics. Being and Time, then , is a specific and con-

crete example of a historical “ recollection , ” whose general meaning
is expounded by Heidegger in a long paragraph that we shall now
consider in detail.
It is not necessary that resoluteness explicitly know of the provenance of
its possibilities upon which it projects itself. However, in the temporality
of Da sein , and only in it , lies the possibility of fetching the existentiell
potentiality-of -being upon which it projects itself explicitly from the tra-
ditional understanding of Da-sein. Resoluteness that comes back to itself
and hands itself down then becomes the retrieve of a possibility of expe-
rience that has been handed down. Retrieve is explicit handing down, that
is, going back to the possibilities of the Da-sein that has been there. The
—
authentic retrieve of a possibility of existence that has been the possi-
—
bility that Da-sein may choose its heroes is existentially grounded in
anticipatory resoluteness; for in resoluteness the choice is first chosen
that makes one free for the struggle to come, and the loyalty to what can
be retrieved . (SZ, 385 )

The first thing that strikes us in this passage is that the technical
term Wiederholung, bringing-again or recollection or retrieve or repeti-
tion or recapitulation, is now used in a different sense from its earlier
use. Let us glance back to the passage where Heidegger first defined
the strictly technical meaning of Wiederholung.

The authentic coming-toward-itself of anticipatory resoluteness is at the

same time a coming back to the ownmost self thrown into its individua-
tion. This ecstasy makes it possible for Da-sein to be able to take over res-
olutely the being that it already is. In anticipation, Da-sein brings itself
forth again to its ownmost potentiality-of-being. We call authentic having-
been retrieve. (SZ, 339 )

We see that this passage elucidates Wiederholung solely with

respect to here-being’s ownmost, single self. Since, however, this self is
not an isolated worldless subject, but is already thrown into a world,
and exists historically, the first definition of recollection evidently does
not exhaust the range and depth of its meaning. It must already implic-
itly include the bringing-again into here-being’ s own existence of those
inherited possibilities that have been handed down to him by preced-
ing existences. The new meaning of recollection or retrieve, it might be
said, explicitly completes the old.
This explanation , however, is unsatisfactory, because it ignores
the repeatedly stressed character of “ explicitness” { Ausdrücklichkeit )
that belongs to a historical recollection . Although an “ explicit knowl-
312 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

edge ” of the origins of our possibilities is not absolutely necessary,

some kind of explicit acknowledgment is required if we are to make
our inheritance fully our own as inherited . The recollecting forethrow
of our chosen possibility must make it explicitly manifest that we are
taking it over from existences who have-been -here before us. Why
does this “ explicitness ” or “ expressness” belong to a historical recol-
lection? Because the proper understanding of a historical being-in-
the- world must articulate itself in communicating discourse ( expres-
sion ). This already underlies and makes possible all explicit
interpretation { Auslegung ) and transmission of those “ recollectable ”
possibilities of existence that each generation must grasp anew and
take over for itself.
It seems, therefore, that the moment of “ explicitness ” does intro-
duce an element into the concept of recollection that was entirely
absent from its first definition. Or is this impression to some extent
deceptive? We must remember that the resolute recollection of my
ownmost, single self is the willing understanding of the call of care.
This call, in which care makes itself known, is also a mode of dis-
course. It speaks in the uncanny mode of silence, because it calls
myself alone in my own finite being. Hence I properly hear, i.e. under-
stand the call in a reticent silence { Verschwiegenheit ). Sound and word
are not needed to articulate the recollection of my own single self.
When, on the other hand, the recollection concerns my thrownness
into a world, then a communicating speech ( expression ) is necessary
to make concretely manifest the inherited possibility that I bring-again
into my own existence.
Recollection or retrieve is therefore a single, existential-temporal
concept. It denotes here-being’s understanding of his own thrownness
( having-been ), but in two different relations: once in relation to his
own finite being, and once in relation to his being-with-others in the
same world. Hence the two different modes of discourse that articulate
the authentic disclosure of thrownness.6
Furthermore, just as the silent understanding of the call of care
does not lead to a theoretical self-examination , but to the instant reso-
lution for a factical situation, so the express understanding of trans-
mitted possibilities does not primarily consist in a theoretical-objective
study of historical personages, but in the choice of a “ hero” to be emu-
lated in struggle.
But what does the ‘’emulation of a hero ” concretely mean? Does it
mean merely the imitation of an admired pattern , or the present accom-
plishment of possibilities that could not, perhaps, be fully realized when
they were first conceived ? On these points, Heidegger remarks:
 Temporality and Historicity 313

The retrieve of what is possible neither brings back “ what is past,” nor
does it bind the “ present” back in what is “ outdated.” Arising from a res-
olute self-projection, retrieve is not convinced by “ something past,” in
just letting it come back as what was once real. Rather, retrieve responds
to the possibility of existence that has-been-there. But responding to the
possibility in a resolution is at the same time, as in the Moment, the dis-
avowal of what is working itself out today as the “ past.” (SZ, 385-86)

We notice that this passage is mainly negative. It repudiates inap-

propriate notions of history drawn from an inauthentic understanding
of here-being. The “ past ” and the “ present, ” for instance, characterize
the within-timeness of things and not the temporality of care. Nor can
an existential possibility “ recur as the formerly real,” because it never
has had the character of “ reality, ” and its facticity is never a mere
occurrence or recurrence. The continuity of a historical tradition is
not the continuity of things that stand in a cause and effect relation,
but is accomplished in the free response of a factically existing being-
in- the-world to a being-in-the-world who has-been-here. This response,
as the instant presentation of a factical situation , “ revokes ” a petrified
tradition as the effect of the past on the present, revealing that the
bindingness of a historical “ past ” on the today is fundamentally differ-
ent from a causal necessitation.
The positive definition of recollection as a response, while beau-
tifully apt and illuminating, still leaves us in doubt how precisely the
emulation of a hero is to be understood. For a more concrete answer
we must turn to the Kant-book, where Heidegger expounds how
Being and Time is a recollection of a fundamental philosophical prob-
lem that was brought to light in a specific way in Kant’ s Critique of
Pure Reason. The original formulation of the problem was the possi-
bility of philosophical existence as construed by Kant, to which Being
and Time is a reply. “ By the recollection of a fundamental problem
we understand the disclosure of its original , hitherto hidden possi-
bilities. In working them out the problem is transformed and so first
of all preserved in its problematic content” ( KPM, 185, G3, 204,
KPM( E ), 139 ).
These few words give us the aptest description of how a specific
kind of recollection can be concretely accomplished. Being and Time is
indeed not a mechanical repetition of the Critique of Pure Reason; it
does not ask the same questions as its great predecessor; but it seizes
upon a possible interpretation of being from time, toward which Kant
took the first steps. In penetrating more deeply into this possibility
Being and Time transforms the problem into that of the meaning of
being in general.
314 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

The principle embodied in a specifically philosophical recollec-

tion , repetition, or retrieve must be applicable to other spheres, be our
hero a statesman, a scientist, or a saint. An emulating struggle cannot be
merely a slavish imitation, nor an impossible return to what has been,
but a transformation of a possibility which was perhaps first shown, or
outstandingly exemplified, in an earlier existence. The transformation
keeps it alive as the possibility which I throw forward again in my own par-
ticular situation, which can never be identical with what has been.
The more we think about recollection or retrieval, the more we
become aware of a distinctive, perhaps unique feature of Heidegger’s
interpretation. It is not the having-been that is primarily constitutive of
historical-being, but the coming-to-itself, the “ futural ” character of the
temporality of care. This is explicitly stated by Heidegger in the fol-
lowing important paragraph.

We characterize retrieve as the mode of resolution handing itself down ,

by which Da sein exists explicitly as fate. But if fate constitutes the pri-
mordial historicity of Da-sein, history has its essential weight neither in
what is past nor in the today and its “ connection ” with what is past, but
in the authentic occurrence of existence that arises from the future of
Da-sein. As a mode of being of Da-sein, history has its roots so essentially
in the future that death, as the possibility of Da-sein we characterized ,
throws anticipatory existence back upon its factical thrownness and this
first gives to the having-been its unique priority in what is historical.
Authentic being-toward-death, that is, the finitude of temporality, is the concealed
ground of the historicity of Da-sein. Da-sein does not first become historical
in retrieve, but rather because as temporal it is historical, it can take
itself over in its history, retrieving itself. Here no historiography is
needed as yet. (SZ, 386 )

It is the throw-back from the impassable possibility of death

which makes here-being “ ecstatically open ” to the having-been. This
ecstatic openness is the indispensable and ultimate condition for any
going back to the “ past.” Retrieve makes here-being’ s own history
expressly manifest, but not necessarily in a scientific-objective way. The
“ hero, ” for instance, may be transmitted from generation to generation
in legend and song. Existentially this may be a more original way of
opening up our history than a scientific explanation, just as the every-
day explanation of handy things is more original than a theoretical-sci-
entific thematization of the substances of nature. But whether our
explanations be scientific or prescientific, they are always grounded in
the disclosedness of the happening of here-being, and this, in turn, is
made possible by the temporality of care.
 Temporality and Historicity 315

But how does this happening as fate constitute the “ connection ”

of here-being from birth to death? Not a word has been said so far on
the “ connection of life,” in spite of the fact that this theme has been
announced in the introductory section as one of the most important to
be discussed. Heidegger now leads us over to this theme in a surpris-
ing way. It is not the rightness or wrongness of the usual answers that
must be examined in the first place, but the appropriateness of the
question itself. In what ontological horizon does this “ self-evident”
question about the “ connection of life” move? Does it not originate in
an authentic historical-being? And if so, does an inauthentic under-
standing of this being not misdirect the approach to its “ connection ” ?
These questions will be discussed in the following section.

3. THE HISTORICITY OF HERE-BEING AND WORLD-HISTORY

The theme of this section is developed in a devious way, with an

unusual jerkiness in important transitions of thought. This is due
partly to the distracting rear-guard action Heidegger fights against the
current theories of the “ connection of life ” and the subject-object rela-
tion , but partly to the number of preliminary steps through which the
central point is reached. These are:

1. ( a) To what extent is the world, as an essential constitutive moment

of being-in- the-world, in itself historical?
( b ) To what extent are the beings we encounter in this world historical?
Are they historical in themselves, or do they become so incidentally
and in an extraneous way as objects for a historical subject?
2. (a ) What constitutes the inauthentic historical character of an every-
day being-in-the-world?
( b ) What is the meaning of history and of being in general that is
implicitly understood in an inauthentic being-in-the-world?
( c) How does the understanding that belongs to an inauthentic his-
torical-being open up the horizon in which a question of the
“ connection of life” originates?

Let us now briefly consider how Heidegger works out these pre-
liminary steps of the argument.

1. ( a ) Heidegger’s answer to the first question is a foregone conclu-

sion. On the ground of the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of care, a
world essentially belongs to its temporalization. “ The occurrence of his-
316 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

tory is the occurrence of being-in-the-world" (SZ, 388). The world which

belongs to a factically existing being-in- the-world is historical in an orig-
inal and primary sense.
( b ) On the ground of the happening of world, within-worldish
beings are already discovered. “ With the existence of historical being- in-the -
world, things at hand and objectively present have always already been
included in the history of the world ” (SZ, 388). It is not a mere metaphor
to speak of the “ fates ” of certain works, buildings, or institutions.
Moreover, it is not only man-made things that are historical, but also
nature as territory for settlement and exploitation, as battlefield and
place of religious cults. These beings are as such historical, and are not
merely external paraphernalia that somehow accompany the “ ‘inner’
history of the ‘soul’.” They are in themselves world -historical . Heidegger
uses the term world -history in an ontological and deliberately ambiva-
lent sense. It means in the first place “ the occurrence of world in its
essential existent unity with Da sein” (SZ, 389 ). Insofar, however, as
beings are already discovered within the factually existing world, the
term means at the same time the “ occurrence” or “ happening” of
handy things and substantial things. The within-worldish happenings
of historical processes and events, to some extent even of natural cata-
strophies, as well as what happens to individual things, for instance a
ring that is passed on and worn, have a “ movedness” which, according
to Heidegger, is an ontological mystery. Here, for the first time, Hei-
degger hints that the vulgar conception of a linear, one-dimensional
time may be inadequate to define even the world-historical happenings
to and with things, let alone the primary happening of here-being. The
hint, however, is not positively developed. What, then, is the positive
result of these first steps of Heidegger’s interpretation?
The result may perhaps best be appreciated by comparing it with
Count Yorck’s concepts of the “ historical ” and the “ ontic.” While
Count Yorck saw the “ historical” and the “ ontic” in a fundamental
antithesis, Heidegger takes them back into a deeper unity. Not only the
historical being-in-the-world, but also the “ ontic ” beings within the
world are as such historical. In this deeper unity, however, they are dif-
ferentiable as the primarily and the secondarily historical. This differ-
entiation is analogous to the difference between the primary and the
secondary way of “ being true.” “ To be true, ” we remember, means pri-
marily “ to be disclosing and discovering.” Secondarily, it means “ to be
discovered.” Discoverability belongs to within-worldish beings them-
selves; it is their specific possibility of being brought into the truth
appropriate to them. The being of here-being, on the other hand,
brings itself into its own truth, that is, discloses itself. By virtue of it,
 Temporality and Historicity 317

here-being as a being-in-the-world can discover within-worldish beings

as beings— that is, as things that are. On the ground of their belonging
— —
to the world of here-being the primarily historical these things are in
themselves historical in a secondary sense. They do not merely become
so because the “ subject of history” takes up a relation to them, but
because the world of here-being is in fact the world of things. The
world is, so to speak, the “ go between ” between man and things. It
makes any kind of “ between ” and “ relation ” between man and things
ontologically possible.

2. ( a) In his everyday being-in-the-world, the factical existence loses

himself to the things of which he takes care. The self-explanations of
inauthentic existence are primarily drawn from the commonsense
horizon of a care-taking absorption in things. These, however, are not
immutably fixed, but have their own “ history.” Not only the work and
the utensil, but also what happens to them belong to everyday experi-
ence, even though their historical character is not explained in an
objective and scientific way. “ On the basis of the temporally founded
transcendence of the world , what is world-historical is always already
‘objectively’ there in the occurrence of existing being-in-the-world, with-
out being grasped historiographically” (SZ, 389). The “ world ” itself as the
theater of the changing scene belongs to the daily commerce with
things. The others meet one in those activities in which “ one oneself ’
takes part. In a common lostness to things, the “ fate” of the individual
here-being is made by what he has done and what has happened to him
in his care-taking being-in-the-world.
( b ) In a self-forgetful waiting for the occurrences and opportuni-
ties that the day brings, the everyday here-being understands his own
history world-historically. The being of the world-historical, in turn, “ is
experienced and interpreted in the sense of objective presence that
comes along, is present, and disappears” ; that is, it has the ontological-
temporal meaning of a not-yet-present, actually present, and no-longer-
present reality ( Vorhandenheit ). This undifferentiated meaning of being
holds not only an unquestioned predominance, but appears to be so
self-evident that even where the concepts drawn from it are negatively
rejected as inappropriate to the “ historical subject, ” a positive interpre-
tation is not forthcoming, or is thought to be superfluous.
( c ) The inauthentic existence is so scattered into his manifold
businesses and undertakings that, if he wants to come to himself at all, he
must first of all “ pull himself together from the dispersion and the discon-
nectedness of what has just ‘happened’ . . .” ( SZ, 390 ). It is the incon-
—
stancy or instability ( Un-st ändigkeit ) of the irresolute that is, inauthen-
318 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

—
tically historical self which gives rise to the question how the successive
experiences of the subject are to be retrospectively linked up into a
coherent unity. The operative word, we must note, is retrospectively , for,
as Heidegger rightly maintains, the whole of historical here-being must
in itself and in advance be constituted as a coherent unity; otherwise
no amount of subsequent putting-together could make up the whole.
The question to be asked, therefore, is this: In which mode of existing
does here-being lose himself in such a way that he must subsequently
bring himself together from scatteredness and must think out an
embracing unity which holds him together? The fundamental reason
for losing “ oneself ’ among “ them” and in the world-historical lies in a
flight from death , which “ flight from . . reveals, inauthentically, the
being-tmto-death. The anticipatory forward-running resoluteness, on
the other hand, brings the being-into-death into the authentic exis-
—
tence. The happening of resoluteness the specific movedness of an
anticipatory forward-running recollecting of inherited possibilities
constitutes the authentic historicity in which, according to Heidegger,
—
there lies already the original, unlost stretchedness of the whole exis-
tence, which does not need a restrospective coherence.

The resoluteness of the self against the inconstancy of dispersion is in

itself a steadiness that has been stretched along-the steadfastness in which
Da-sein as fate “ incorporates” into its existence birth and and their
“ between ” in such a way that in such constancy it is in the Moment for
what is world-historical in its actual situation. In the fateful retrieve of
possibilities that have-been, Da-sein brings itself back “ immediately,” that
is, temporally and ecstatically, to what has already been before it. But
when its heritage is thus handed down to itself , “ birth ” is taken into exis-
tence in coming back from the possibility of death ( the possibility not-to-
be-surpassed ) so that existence may accept the thrownness of its own
There more free from illusion. (SZ, 390-91)

The predominant temporal characteristic of a falling being-in-

the-world was earlier shown to be an “ unheld making present” of
within-worldish things that “ runs away” from the original temporality
of care. In an authentic historicity, on the contrary, not only the instant
presenting of the world-historical, but the whole of here-being and its
continuity with what has been before it is brought into and held in a
resolutely owned existence. In forward-running resoluteness the facti-
—
cal existence “ stands fast ” is “ faithful” or “ loyal ” or “ true ” to his own
—
self where the truth here is Treue (SZ, 391). This steadfastness, how-
ever, must not be mistaken for an obstinate insistence on a particular
resolution once made. On the contrary, it is free and open to what our
 Temporality and Historicity 319

situation may “ instantly ” demand from us because, in running forward

to the ultimate possibility, it has in advance anticipated all factical pos-
sibilities among which we may have to decide. The constancy of the self
is not composed of a linking-up of successive “ instants ” or “ Moments, ”
but “ these arise from the temporality already stretched along, of that
retrieve which is futurally in the process of having-been” (SZ, 391).
The resoluteness in which an existence keeps faith with his own
self is constantly “ tuned” by a readiness to dread. Dread is the mood that
most originally reveals our thrownness. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the mood that tunes our recollection of earlier existences is akin to
dread: it is the awe or reverence ( Ehrfucht ) “ for the sole authority that a
free existence can have, for the possibilities of existence that can be
retrieved ” (SZ, 391). This bare statement, which Heidegger does not
explain further, raises a host of interesting problems. In one respect it
shows an unexpected similarity to Kant’s thought. Awe or reverence,
according to Heidegger, is the mood that makes manifest an authority
over us and in which we submit ourselves to it. Similarly, for Kant,
respect { Achtung ) is the pure moral feeling in which man submits him-

— —
self to the moral law which he, as a free existence as “ practical reason”
in Kant’s thought gives to himself. With this, however, the similarity
between the two thinkers is at an end. For one thing, the “ possibilities
of existence that can be retrieved” are self-chosen, but not self-given. For
another thing, their bindingness is not that of an unchangeable,
absolute law; on the contrary, as we have heard, recollection transforms
the inherited possibility. Its authority cannot therefore have the charac-
ter of a sheer necessitation, but rather of a “ guidance” which in advance
guides the fate of here-being. And finally, why are the “ possibilities of
existence that can be retrieved ” authoritative? Is it only because we have
inherited them from former existences? Surely not, but rather because
they are possibilities of existence, that is, of a way of being that brings itself
to light in its essential possibilities. The self-disclosure of being, however,
—
is essentially historical hence the bindingness, authority, of its retriev-
able possibilities. Now, for Kant, too, reason belongs to the essence of
man and can therefore no more be man-made than the existential way
of being. But rationality is the essential structure--of subjectivity, it
belongs to an interpretation of man as the subject that is radically ques-
tioned and reinterpreted in Being and Time. As the present chapter has
specifically attempted to show, the temporal-dialectical movement and
stretchedness of here-being cannot be sufficiently explained with the
help of the inherited interpretation of subjectivity.
The inappropriate question of how the successive experiences of
a subject can be linked up into a coherent unity arises because the orig-
320 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

inal stretchedness of here-being as fate remains hidden in an inau-

thentic way of being historical. The inconstant oneself-among-others
loses itself in the presentation of the “ today.” In expecting the newest
of the new, it has already forgotten the old. It cannot properly recollect
what has-been, but retains and preserves the remains of the formerly
world-historical and the present knowledge of it. Lost in the presenting
of the today, it understands the past from the present.
Inauthentic historical existence, on the other hand , is burdened with the
legacy of a “ past” that has become unrecognizable to it, looks for what is
modern. Authentic historicity understands history as the “ recurrence” of
what is possible and knows that a possibility recurs only when existence
is open for it fatefully, in the Moment, in resolute retrieve.” (SZ, 391-92 ).

The twofold meaning that Heidegger assigns to “ world-history ”

must, of course, always be kept in view. It means not only the happen-
ing of world, but at the same time the happening with and to the
within-worldish things. With the thematization of the factical having-
been-in- the-world of an existence, the things that belonged to his world
are ipso facto drawn into the historical investigation. The things may, of
course, outlast the world and may, as utensils, buildings, documents, be
still discoverable in the present as historical material. But they can
become historical material only because their own being has a world-
historical character and they are in advance understood in their
belonging to a world. The going-back into the “ past” is not started off
by the discovery and interpretation of the “ material, ” but “ rather
already presupposes historical being toward the Da-sein that has-been-
there, that is, the historicity of the historian’ s existence. His existence
existentially grounds historiography as science, down to the most triv-
ial, ‘mechanical’ procedures” (SZ, 394 ).
It is relevant to ask whether Heidegger’s idea of history has so far
shown any appreciable divergence from the actual practice of rep-
utable historians. No great difference can be detected up to now, for
the “ fate ” of man in his world has always been the main theme of his-
torians, no matter how inadequately, according to Heidegger, the exis-
tential-temporal structure of historical-being may have been explained.
But now Heidegger touches on a point that appears to give ajolt to gen-
erally accepted views. This point is introduced by him with the remark,
“ If historiography is rooted in historicity in this way, then we should
also be able to determine from there what the object of historiography
‘really’ is ” (SZ, 394 ).
The object of history, to be sure, has already been defined, but in
such a general way that many different approaches to it and the selec-
 Temporality and Historicity 321

tion of any one of its possible “ aspects ” may equally well claim to be
essential. What Heidegger has in mind now is a stricter and narrower
definition of the most “ proper, ” most essential object of history and
the perspective in which it can be disclosed. But from where can the
proper theme of history be drawn in such a way that it is free from the
arbitrary preference or the relative point of view of the individual his-
torian? Only from an authentic historicity , to which a retrieving disclosure
already belongs. The outstanding feature of Heidegger’s interpretation
of retrieval is that it understands the former here-being in his authen-
tic possibility which has-been.

The “ birth ” of historiography from authentic historicity then means

that the primary thematization of the object of historiography projects
Da-sein that has-been-there upon its ownmost potentiality-of-existence.
Does not its whole “ meaning” lie in “ facts,” in what has factually hap-
pened ? (SZ, 394 )

The gulf between Heidegger and the historians is not as

unbridgeable as it looks, provided that facticity and possibility ( exis-
tence ) are understood from the existentiality of here-being and not
from the reality of things. The “ fact” with which history is essentially
concerned, then , is the factical existence who has-been-in-the-world. If
here-being is “ really,” “ in fact” here only in his existence, in throwing
himself forward into his possibilities, then the resolute forethrow of his
chosen ability-to-be is just what constituted his facticity.

What has “ factually ” really been there, however, is then the existentiell
possibility in which fate, destiny, and world history are factically deter-
mined. Because existence always is only as factically thrown, historiogra-
phy will disclose the silent power of the possible with greater penetration
the more simply and concretely it understands having-been-in-the-world
in terms of possibility, and “ just” presents it. (SZ, 394)

The implications of Heidegger’s idea of history are not at all easy

to grasp. In the first place, Heidegger considers the question of
whether the proper theme of history is only the series of single events
that have happened once or also the “ general ” historical “ law.” Char-
acteristically, Heidegger rejects this question as thoroughly miscon-
ceived, for neither the single, unrepeatable happening nor the univer-
sal law that somehow hovers over it is the theme of history, but “ the
possibility that has been factically existent.” The authentic recollection
of the former factical possibility has already made the “ universal ” man-
ifest in the “ singular.” This may be understood in the following way: On
322 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

the one hand, the finiteness that throws the factically existent possibil-
ity into its singleness prohibits its perversion “ into the pallor of a
supratemporal pattern.” On the other hand, the same finiteness throws
the factical existence back upon its inherited possibility. What has-been-
here once is therefore not repeatable as a recurrent embodiment of an
unchanging ideal that exists outside time, but it is recollectable or retriev -
able; that is, it can be brought back and forward again into the trans-
forming forethrow of another existence. Hence the has-been is not irre-
trievably “ past” and “ gone ” (vergangen), but is essentially “ futural” ; it
remains in “ coming” insofar as a factical here-being comes-to-himself in
his inherited possibility. How, then, does the science of history originate
in the authentically historical existence of the historian?

Only factically authentic historicity, as resolute fate, can disclose the his-
tory that has-been-there in such a way that in retrieve the “ power ” of the
possible breaks into factical existence, that is, comes toward it in its futu-
rality. Historiography by no means takes its point of departure from the
“ present ” and what is “ real ” only today, any more than does the his-
toricity of unhistorical Da-sein , and then grope its way back from there
to a past. Rather, even historiographical disclosure temporalizes itself out
of the future. The “ selection ” of what is to become a possible object for his-
toriography has already been made in the factical existentiell choice of the
historicity of Da-sein, in which historiography first arises and is
uniquely. (SZ, 395)

The existential origin of history, however, leaves us in consider-

able doubt about the concrete meaning of “ retrieve ” in scientific prac -
tice . In our factical existence, as we have heard, we recollect a former
possibility by bringing it forward again into our own existence. In so
coming- to-ourselves in an inherited possibility, we transform it accord-
ing to our own historical situation in our own world. But can a “ scien-
tific” recollection aim at transforming the former possibility? Must it
not rather present it precisely as it has-been in the world that belonged
to it? Or, since the former possibility is essentially “ futural ” in the
above-described sense, must the scientific presentation of how it has in
fact been not illuminate just its “ futural ” character ? No definite answer
to these questions can be given from our present passage. All we can
say is that the last suggestion seems to be in keeping with all that Hei-
degger has explicitly said.
On the other hand , Heidegger himself raises some questions
about which misgivings may arise. In the first place, it may be asked
whether the fatefully retrieving disclosure of the “ past ” does not con -
demn history to be wholly “ subjective, ” and therefore not a science at
 Temporality and Historicity 323

all in the usually accepted sense. On the contrary, Heidegger replies, it

alone guarantees the “ objectivity ” of history. The objectivity of a sci-
ence means that it binds itself to the beings that have been thematized
as the objects of its research. A science is the more objective the more
undisguisedly it presents to our understanding the beings that are its
theme in the primordial!ty of their being. These , as far as history is
concerned, are the former existences in their historicity. Their disclo-
sure and interpretation demand the authentically historical existence
( understanding ) of the historian, unlike, for instance, the scientific
explanation of nature, for which it is irrelevant in what way the scien-
tist is “ historical.” For reasons already indicated above, the validity of
universal, unchanging laws sought by the sciences of nature is not the
proper criterion for “ objective ” historical truth.
But if all this is admitted, can history be saved from a nebulous
vagueness? Does it not need , like other sciences, the “ hard facts” that
give it a firm hold? These misgivings, according to Heidegger, are
unfounded and do not follow from his interpretation. Just because the
central theme of history is the possibility in which the former existence
has-been-here, and has factually existed world -historically , the concrete
research can

demand of itself a relentless orientation toward “ facts.” For this reason

factical research has many branches and makes the history of useful
works, cultures, spirit, and ideas its object. At the same time history,
handing itself down, is in itself always in an interpretedness that belongs
to it, and that has a history of its own; so that for the most part it is only
through traditional history that historiography penetrates into what-has-
been-there itself. [. . .]
Thus the dominance of a differentiated historiographical interest,
even in the most remote and primitive cultures, is in itself no proof of
the authentic historicity of an “ age.” Ultimately, the rise of the problem
of “ historicism ” is the clearest indication that historiography strives to
alienate Da-sein from its authentic historicity. Historicity does not nec-
essarily need historiography. Unhistoriographical ages are as such not
also automatically unhistorical. (SZ, 395-9Θ )7

The “ historicism ” attacked by Heidegger means an uprooted and

uprooting knowledge of all the world and a syncretizing comparison of
all kinds of cultures, leading to a relativism and skepticism that was
sharply criticized already by Nietzsche in his “ On the Use and Disad-
vantage of History for Life ” ( “ Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie
f ü r das Leben, ” 1874 ). Heidegger must, in fact, have this work of Niet-
zsche’s in mind, for its discussion occupies the whole of the succeed-
324 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

ing paragraph . Nietzsche has distinguished three kinds of history: the

monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical, without demonstrating
the ground of this threefold unity. Heidegger now proceeds to give his
own demonstration , and at the same time to show that authentic his-
tory must be “ the factical and concrete unity of these three possibili-
ties ” (SZ, 396 ). The “ threefold unity” of history is grounded in the
ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality.

Da sein exists as futural authentically in the resolute disclosure of a

chosen possibility. Resolutely coming-back to itself , it is open in
retrieve for the “ monumental” possibilities of human existence. The
historiography arising from this history is “ monumental.” As having-
been, Da-sein is delivered over to its thrownness. In appropriating the
possible in retrieve, there is prefigured at the same time the possibility
of reverently preserving the existence that has-been-there, in which the
possibility grasped becomes manifest. As monumental, authentic his-
toriography is thus “ antiquarian.” Da-sein temporalizes itself in the
unity of future and the having-been as present. The present , as the
Moment, discloses the today authentically. But since the today is inter-
—
preted in terms of understanding a possibility of existence grasped an
—
understanding that futurally retrieves authentic historiography ceases
to make the today present , that is, it suffers itself to become detached
from the entangled publicness of the today. As authentic, monumental-
antiquarian historiography is necessarily a critique of the “ present.”
Authentic historicity is the foundation of the possible unity of the
three kinds of historiography. But the ground on which authentic his-
toriography is founded is temporality as the existential meaning of the
being of care . (SZ, 396-97 )

Even the most critical reader of Heidegger will hardly deny the
brilliance of this exposition. It is, at the same time, an admirable exam-
ple of a “ transforming” interpretation of an earlier thinker. Further-
more, this passage is the only one where the meaning of “ de-present-
ing” ( Entgegenwärtigung) is explained at all. It is said to mean a
suffering detachment ( das leidende Sichlösen ) from the publicness of a
falling being-in-the- world that loses itself in the presenting of things
within the world. Characteristically, it is in the mood of suffering and
pain that Heidegger experiences the loosening of the bonds that keep
us sheltered in familiar and unquestioned explanations. Nothing could
be further removed from the half-baked enthusiasm or angry rebellion
that is so often associated with an “ existentialism ” mistakenly ascribed
to Heidegger.
In summing up the findings of the present section, Heidegger
emphasizes that the principal task of historical thematization is to unfold
 Temporality and Historicity 325

—
the hermeneutical situation that is opened up once historically existing
—
Da-sein has made its resolution to the disclosure in retrieve of what has-
been-there. The possibility and the structure of historiographical truth are
to be set forth in terms of the authentic disclosedness ( “ truth ” ) of historical
existence. (SZ, 397 )
The basic concepts of all historical sciences are existential con-
cepts. The “ historical sciences” seem to be taken by Heidegger in such
a wide sense that they include all studies concerned with “ mind” or
“ spirit” ( Geist ) and their methods, in distinction from the sciences of
nature, whose basic concepts are concepts of reality. A theory of nature
is not dependent on an existential interpretation of historical here-
being, but for a theory of the “ sciences of mind ” (Geisteswissenschaften)
it is a necessary precondition. This was the aim approached by Dilthey.
To conceive the same aim more fundamentally and to formulate it con-
cretely as a problem has been the task of the present chapter.
Since the last thing Heidegger claims is that the problem has now
been completely solved, it may be useful to look back on what has
become clear and what remains obscure in Heidegger’ s interpretation.
Perhaps its most outstanding feature is the decisive constitutive func-
tion of authentic “ future, ” that is, the anticipatory forward-running res-
oluteness in which a factical here-being authentically comes-to-himself.
This constitutes the forward-stretching movement in which the whole
of here-being “ stands” ( endures ) as fate, and at the same time origi-
nates the rebounding movement in which here-being comes-back to his
own thrownness ( having-been ). Since, however, here-being is essentially
a being-with -others-in-the-world, the coming-back to his own finite hav-
ing-been opens up a wider dimension of temporality, in which the hav-
ing-been-in-the-world of former existences becomes accessible. These
are authentically understood in a resolutely forward-running recollec-
tion or retrieve, in which a factical here-being chooses his own factical
possibility as inherited , that is, brings the possibility in which a former
here-being existed forward into his own existence. The whole move-
ment ( “ movedness” ) in which here-being stretches himself forward and
back is the “ happening” or “ occurrence” (Geschehen ) whose existential-
temporal structure constitutes the historicity of here-being.
This short summary pinpoints the importance of authentic exis-
tence and its temporal structure for Heidegger’s interpretation of his-
torical-being. In the inauthentic happening ( “ history” ) of everyday ness,
it is just the decisive movement, stretchedness, and stability of historical
here-being that remains hidden, or is distorted and misinterpreted from
the reality of things. The chief difficulty in all this is not that Heideg-
ger’s explanations are obscure, but that in any concrete instance we find
326 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

ourselves unable to distinguish between an authentic and inauthentic

existence. And yet, as Heidegger insists, the distinction is not a mere
phenomenological construction, but a concrete, factical possibility of
each of us that makes itself known in the call of care. A further indica-
tion that these two different ways of existing can in fact be distinguished
lies in the many distinguishing marks by which Heidegger describes
them, and further, in the origin of history in the authentically historical
existence of the historian. If we are to assume, then, that the distinction
is not in principle impossible, we must conclude that the distinguishing
marks that Heidegger gives us are insufficient to apply reliably as crite-
ria to concrete examples. This was specifically brought to our notice
with Heidegger’s interpretation of authentic being-with-others and the
authentic “ happening” of the community as “ common destiny.” It
remains obscure whether or not the “ happening” of a community is ipso
facto authentic, not to speak of our inability to point to this or that com-
munity, or this or that example of being-with-others as authentic.
A problem that remains not only obscure but is passed over with-
out comment is the mode of being in which the things within the world
would become manifest to a fatefully recollecting instant presenting, that
is, to an authentically historical here-being. Both the handy presence of
things discovered by the care-taking circumspection of everydayness, and
its modification into the substantial presence of substances discovered by
a theoretical only-looking-at things, are modes of being in which the
within-worldish things are manifest to an inauthentically falling being-in-
the-world. The position is not in the least altered by the new definition
of things as “ world-historical.” This, it is true, brings into focus the
dimension of time in which things can be handily or substantially
“ there,” and raises the problem of the “ movedness” of within-worldish
happenings, but makes no difference to the ontological character of
things which has been disclosed from an inauthentic making present. We
are therefore faced with the anomalous situation that the world-histori-
cal things discovered by the “ instant making present” of authentic here-
being still retain the inauthentic ontological characters in which they
meet a falling being-in-the-world. Worst of all, this anomaly is not even
hinted at by Heidegger as a still-to-be-solved problem and may therefore
be completely overlooked by the student of Being and Time .
 XV
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the
Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time

1 . THE INCOMPLETENESS OF THE FOREGOING ANALYSIS

OF THE TEMPORALITY OF HERE-BEING

The previous chapter took no account of the fact that all “ happening,”
both historical and natural, takes place “ in time.” It explained historical-
being purely from the existential-temporal structure of care. The “ vul-
gar” or popular understanding of history, on the other hand, explains
it as an ontic- temporal happening in time. Similarly, the scientific expla -
nations of nature define and measure its processes by time. A funda-
mental analysis of this time is one of the tasks of the present chapter,
though not its first one. Its first consideration is the elemental fact that
here-being, before any thematic-scientific investigation of nature and
history, already “ counts with time ” and orientates himself from it. This
way of relating himself to time is so original to here-being that it goes
—
before all handling of time-measuring utensils clocks and watches of
—
any kind and makes the use of clocks first of all possible.
What precisely does Heidegger mean by a “ counting with time ” ?
It is a mode of “ taking care ” of things within the world. Obviously, how-
ever, we cannot take care of time in the way of handling and using it as
we do a hammer and nails, but in the way of taking account of it, count-
ing upon it and reckoning with it. On the basis of this elemental tak-
ing-care of time, we say that we “ have” time or have none, we “ take ”

327
328 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

time or cannot “ leave ” ourselves time. But why and from where do we
take the time which we can “ have” or “ lose ” ? In what relation does this
time stand to the temporality of here-being? These questions must be
answered before the present inquiry can turn to the time in which
beings are and happenings take place. The emergence of these ques-
tions shows that the preceding analysis of temporality are not only
incomplete “ since we did not pay heed to all the dimensions of the phe-
nomenon, but it has fundamental gaps in it because something like
world-time belongs to temporality itself, in the strict sense of the exis-
tential and temporal concept of world “ (SZ, 405). On the ground of
the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of world, the beings within it must
meet us “ in time.” The time-character of within-worldish beings is
accordingly called by Heidegger “ within-timeness.”
The predominant way in which the everyday here-being exists in
his world is in a care-taking being- near-to things. Hence he first dis-
covers the time he “ takes ” for himself on the things which are handily
or substantially there. The time thus discovered is understood in the
horizon of the indifferent understanding of being as something that is
also in some way “ there ” { vorhanden ) . How the popular concept of time
grows from the taking care of time of the temporally constituted here-
being will be explained. The popular concept of time will prove to have
its origin in a levelling-down of original time.
The popular conception of time vacillates between the view that
time is “ objective ” and the view that it is “ subjective.” In this popular
conception time is something “ really” there “ in itself,” that is, has an
“ objective” being, yet it is ascribed primarily to the “ soul.” Conversely,
the time that is considered to be “ in the soul” or “ in consciousness” nev-
ertheless functions objectively. In Hegel’ s time-interpretation both pos-
sibilities are in a certain way “ elevated” { aufgehoben ) . It must be remem-
bered, however, that Aufhebung in Hegel’s thought has a threefold
meaning. It is a suspending-preserving-reconciliation. Hegel’s attempt
to establish a connection between time and spirit { Geist ) and to explain
how spirit as history can “ fall into time” will be discussed toward the
end of this chapter and compared with Heidegger’s own attempt to
explain how world-time belongs to the temporality of here-being.
The fundamental-ontological question that Being and Time must
ultimately attempt to answer is whether and in what way there is time.
Does time belong in any way to the realm of beings, so that we can legit-
imately say of it that it is? If so, what meaning can the “ is ” have when
it expresses the being of time? The peculiarity of this question
becomes evident when we remember that time is the meaning of
being, that time is the universal horizon from which being discloses
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 329

itself in the whole range of its understandability. This question cannot

yet be answered in the present chapter, for it must first of all be shown
how temporality in the whole of its temporalization makes an under-
standing of being and an explanation of beings possible. This task is
deferred to Division Three of Being and Time.

2. THE TEMPORALITY OF HERE-BEING

AND THE TAKING CARE OF TIME
The first paragraph of this section leads into Heidegger’s new theme
via a short sketch of everyday being-in- the-world. Since the decisive
transition to the interpretation of time is made in this paragraph, it
will be quoted in full.

Da-sein exists as a being that, in its being, is concerned about that being
itself. Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its poten-
tiality-of-being before going on to any mere consideration of itself. In its
project it is revealed as something thrown. Thrown and abandoned to
the world, it falls prey to it in taking care of it. As care, that is, as exist-
ing in the unity of the entangled, thrown project, this being is disclosed
as a There. Being-together-with others, it keeps itself in an average inter-
pretedness that is articulated in discourse and expressed in language.
-
Being-in-the-world has already expressed itself and as being together-with
beings encountered within the world, it constantly expresses itself in
addressing and talking over what is taken care of. The circumspect tak-
ing care of common sense is grounded in temporality, in the mode of
making present that awaits and retains. As taking care in calculating,
planning, preparing ahead, and preventing, it always already says,
whether audibly or not: “ then ” . . . that will happen, “ before” . . . that will
get settled, “ now” . . . that will be made up for, that “ on that former occa-
sion” failed or eluded us. (SZ, 406 )

The most striking feature of this paragraph is that, together with

the time expressed in the “ then ,” “ on that former occasion,” and so on,
it brings speech and language itself to the forefront. The “ speaking”
( Sprechen ) , moreover, appears in three distinct forms: expressing oneself
(Sich-aussprechen ), addressing ( Ansprechen ) and discussing or talking
over or about something ( Besprechen ). We are immediately compelled
to ask what speaking has to do with the phenomenon of time. And why
do just these three forms of speaking belong to time as it is understood
in our everyday being-in- the-world ?
Speech and language lie already in all explicit exposition, expla-
nation, and interpretation ( Aus-legen , literally: to ex-pose, to lay out or
330 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

set out ). That the temporally constituted everyday here-being expresses

himself means that he articulates his own temporality as an awaiting-
retaining making present, be it silently, be it audibly. The time, there-
fore, that is expressed in the “ then, ” “ on that former occasion, ” “ now, ”
is nothing but the ¿¿/ expression in which existent temporality ex-poses
^
itself , sets itself out into the open by articulatingly bringing itself to
word . The everyday care- taking speaks awaitingly in the “ then, ” retain-
ingly in the “ on that former occasion ” and as making present in the
“ now.” In the ecstatic unity of an awaiting-retaining making present,
the making present is the dominant and leading ecstasis. This charao
teristic of a falling temporality determines its self-expression insofar as
the “ then ” is implicitly understood as “ not yet now, ” and the “ on that
former occasion ” as “ no longer now.” In other words, these time-phe-
nomena are understood primarily from the present, the “ now.” In the
“ now ” the making present speaks in the horizon of the “ today, ” in the
“ then ” it speaks in the horizon of the “ later on” (‘’coming” ), and in the
“ on that former occasion ” it speaks in the horizon of the “ earlier.”
In short, the time expressed in the “ then, ” “ on that former occa-
sion, ” “ now,” has not merely a connection with speaking, but is noth-
ing other than the articulating, interpretative self-expression of an await-
ingly retaining making present.
And that is again possible only because, in itself ecstatically open, it is
always already disclosed to itself and can be articulated in the interpre-
tation that understands and speaks. Since temporality is ecstatically and
horizonally constitutive of the clearedness of the There, it is already always inter-
preted primordially in the There and is thus familiar. (SZ, 408)

Now we turn to the other two modes of speaking, the addressing

-
and talking about things, which go hand-in hand with the expressed
now, then, and so forth. Since the concrete way in which we are in-the- -
world is in a lost preoccupation with things, the self-expressing taking
care essentially addresses itself to and discusses the things among
which it loses itself. This “ going out” to things is made possible by the
ecstatic structure of temporality, all of whose modes are an ecstatic
removal to . . . . The time expressed in the “ now,” “ then, ” and “ on that
former occasion ” reflects the ecstatic structure of temporality by refer-
ring itself to something. Each “ then ” is as such a “ then, when . . .” ( e.g.,
then, when the building will be finished ); each “ on that former occa-
sion ” is an “ at that time, when . . .” ( e.g., at that time when we met );
each “ now ” a “ now, that . . .” ( e.g., now that it is raining ). The essential
reference-structure of the expressed time means that every “ now, ”
“ then , ” or the like, can in principle be dated from something. At this
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 331

stage, we must not yet think of the highly sophisticated “ dating” of time
from astronomically calculated dates in a calendar, but of its more orig-
inal “ dating” from within-worldish events by everyday care. The refer-
ence to something expressed in the “ then, when . . . , ” “ at that time,
when . . . “ n o w, that . . . is called by Heidegger “ datability” ( Datier-
barkeit ). This reference-structure, whether expressly pronounced or
not, essentially belongs to time, even where the “ dating” from some
definite event is vague or seemingly missing. The “ then, when . . . , ”
“ now, that . . . , ” and the like, in which ecstatic temporality expresses
itself already refer us to an addressing and discussing of things. And
conversely, the most commonplace everyday pronouncements for
—
example, “ it is cold ” tacitly imply the “ now, that . . . ,” because, in and
—
with all speaking of something, everyday care expresses itself as a mak-
ing present of within-worldish beings.
Heidegger himself ascribes a peculiar importance to datability, as
is shown in the following passage.

The fact that the structure of datability belongs essentially to what is

interpreted with the “ now,” “ then,” and “ on that former occasion,”
becomes the most elemental proof that what has been interpreted origi-
nates from temporality interpreting itself. [. . .] The datability of the
now, w u then,” and “ on that former occasion” is the reflex of the ecstatic
constitution of temporality, and is thus essential for time itself that has
been expressed. The structure of the datability of the “ now,” “ then,” and
“ on that former occasion ” is evidence for the fact that they stem from tem-
porality and are themselves time. The interpretative expression of “ now, ”
“ then,” and “ on that former occasion ,” is the most primordial way of giv-
ing the time [ Zeitigung ] . (SZ, 408)

According to our passage, datability “ proves” that the “ now, ”

“ then, ” and so on, originate in the ecstatic temporality of here-being,
and in furnishing this proof, it verifies that these phenomena “ are them-
selves time ” As to the first point, a proof is possible and necessary
because the time expressed in the “ now, ” “ then,” and so on, is already
derivative and therefore demands a demonstration of its “ origin.” The
proof itself, of course, is made possible only by Heidegger’s own inter-
pretation of here-being and temporality, but this is no real objection,
because it is the nature of all similar philosophical proofs. What is sur-
prising in the above passage is that Heidegger should consider it nec-
essary to find a “ proof ’ of the genuine ¿me-character of the “ now,”
“ then, ” and “ on that former occasion.” Who, we feel inclined to ask,
would question that these phenomena are indeed time? Heidegger may
—
be thinking of certain attempts perhaps Bergson’s to explain the—
332 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

externalized , measured time as space. Otherwise a “ proof ’ would seem

—
to be all the more superfluous because as Heidegger himself stresses
—
earlier in this section we unquestioningly recognize the above phe-
nomena as time, and take our familiarity with them far too much for
granted. For where, Heidegger asks, have we found this “ time” ? Have
we found it among the things that are simply “ there ” within the world ?
Obviously not, and yet we always know it and dispose of it without any
further ado. What truly demands an explanation is not so much the
remote mystery of time but its constantly familiar nearness.
Once these first decisive steps of Heidegger’s analysis have been
thoroughly grasped, its further steps are comparatively easy to follow.
The character of time to which Heidegger next turns his attention is its
“ spannedness” or “ duration.” The explanation starts from the await-
ing, which stands in an ecstatic unity with a retaining making present.

If awaiting, understanding itself in the “ then , ” interprets itself and in

so doing, as a making present, understands what is awaiting in terms of
its “ now,” the “ and now not yet ” already lies in the “ giving ” [ Angabe] of
the “ then.” The awaiting that makes present understands the “ until
then.” (SZ, 409)

The cardinal point brought out by this passage lies in the “ and
now not yet, ” for it is from a primary view to the “ now ” that a pre-
dominantly presenting care-taking understands the spanned “ until”
namely until the waited-for given then. The ‘’ until then ” is articulatingly
—
exposed in the “ in-between, ” which can itself be “ dated.” Its datability
is expressed in the “ during which . . .” ( e.g., between now and then,
during which such and such can be expected ). The “ during” can, in
turn, be articulated and divided up by awaitingly giving further “ from
—
then till then, ” which, however, are in advance delimited by the pri-
marily forethrown “ then.”

The “ lasting” [ “ Währen” ] is articulated in the understanding of the “ dur-

ing” [ “ während" ] that awaits and makes present. This duration is again
the time revealed in the ¿ -interpretation of temporality, a time that is
^
thus actually, but unthematically, understood in taking care as a “ span.”
The making present that awaits and retains interprets a “ during” with a
“ span , ” only because in so doing it is disclosed to itself as being ecstati-
cally stretched along in historical temporality, even though it does not
know itself as this. (SZ, 409 )

Heidegger’s exposition of time-phenomena that are existentially

well known to all of us throws an interesting light back onto his exis-
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 333

tential interpretation of temporality. While the datability of the “ then,”

“ now, ” and so forth, as we have seen, springs primarily from the ecsta-
tic unity of temporality, the spannedness of the “ during” springs pri-
marily from its ecstatic unity, for only the unity of a making present
that awaits can make the time between a “ now ” and a “ then ” disclosable
and expressible . Since, however, temporality is an ecstatic unity , the data-
bility and the spannedness that spring from it must mutually deter-
mine each other. Not only the “ during” is datable, but conversely, every
datable “ now, ” “ then, ” and so on, also has a span of variable width, for
instance “ now ” during the intermission, at dinner, in the evening, in
summer; “ then ” : at breakfast, during the climb, and suchlike.
The enduringness articulated in the “ until ” and the “ during”
already indicates the possibility of a concept of time as an uninter-
rupted flow, as a pure “ continuum.” This concept, however, is a later
development and is not yet characteristic of the stage at present under
review. Everyday care-taking, as a making present that awaits and
retains, “ ‘allows itself time in this or that way and gives this time to
itself in taking care, even without determining the time by any specific
reckoning, and before any such reckoning has been done” ( SZ, 409).
What does Heidegger mean by this obscure statement?
Let us start with that part of the statement which has already
been unambiguously explained: everyday taking care gives itself time
in the expressly exposed “ then, ” “ on that former occasion, ” “ now.”
This “ most primordial time -giving is definable, that is, datable, from
within-worldish happenings, without and before any calculating fixing
of ‘’dates ” in a calendar. What is not so clear is how taking care is an
allowing itself time ( Sich-Zeit -lassen), and Heidegger’s explanations on
this point leave much to be desired. The preceding and subsequent pas-
sages, however, imply the following explanation. The time that care-tak-
ing allows itself to have is the span between the awaitingly given “ then”
and the presentingly given “ now.” This is what we unthinkingly express
when we say “ Between now and then I have time ” Much the same thing
is meant by “ taking time, ” as when we say “ Between now and then I
shall take time to do such and such.”
But how is it that everyday care- taking can give itself time and let
itself have it? Because the care-taking- here-being is essentially mine, and
so the time, which, as existent temporality, I give myself or let myself
have, is essentially my time. And since, as existent temporality, I can
exist as my own self or not my own self, I can let myself have time “ in
this or that way, ” that is, authentically or inauthentically.
The inauthentically existing here-being usually dates his time
from what happens to occur and from what he pursues “ during the
334 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

day.” It is just in this mode of existing, of “ living unto the day,” that the
factical here-being does not understand himself as “ running along in a
continuously enduring succession of pure ‘nows’” (SZ, 409 ). The rea-
son is that when the inauthentic here-being becomes absorbed in the
things he awaitingly takes care of, and,

not awaiting itself, forgets itself, the more its time that it “ allows ” itself
is covered over by this mode of “ allowing.” [. . .] By reason of this covering
over, the time that Da-sein never understands itself has gaps in it, so to
speak. We often cannot bring a “ day” together again when we come back
to the time that we have “ used.” Yet the time that has gaps in it does not
go to pieces in this lack of togetherness, but is a mode of temporality
that is always already disclosed and ecstatically stretched out. (SZ, 409-10 )

All theoretical conceptions of a continous flow of nows must

therefore be excluded from the explanation of how a care-takingly
given and taken time “ runs.” The decisive consideration here is how a
factical here-being “ has time ” according to his possible ways of existing.
The irresoluteness of an inauthentic existence, as was shown ear-
lier, temporalizes itself in the mode of an unawaiting-forgetting mak-
ing present. The “ unawaiting-forgetting, ” it will be remembered, refers
to here-being’s own self. The more he loses himself to the “ world, ” the
more he constricts himself in a presenting of things, until even the
inauthentic awaiting-retaining is modified. (See the temporal analysis
of curiosity above, chap. 13, sec. 1, subsec. c. )

The irresolute person understands himself in terms of the events and

accidents nearest by that are encountered in such making present and
urge themselves upon him in changing ways. Busily losing himself in
what is taken care of , the irresolute person loses his time in them , too.
Hence the characteristic way of talking: “ I have no time.” Just as the
person who exists inauthentically constantly loses time and never “ has ”
any, it is the distinction of the temporality of authentic existence that
in resoluteness it never loses time and “ always has time.” For the tem-
porality of resoluteness has, in regard to its present, the nature of the
Moment . The Moment’s authentic making present of the situation does
not itself have the leadership, but is held in the future that has-been.
The existence of the Moment temporalizes itself as fatefully whole,
stretching along in the sense of the authentic, historical constancy of
the self . This kind of temporal existence “ constantly ” has its time for
what the situation requires of it. But resoluteness discloses the There
in such a way only as situation . Thus the resolute person can never
encounter what is disclosed in such a way that he could lose his time on
it in an irresolute way. (SZ, 410 ).
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 335

At first reading this passage raises the hope that Heidegger is at

last giving us some reliable characteristics by which we can distinguish
between an authentic and inauthentic existence in a concrete instance.
The phenomena he describes are certainly familiar to us from experi-
ence, especially the ‘’losing our time ” on trivialities. Unfortunately,
these phenomena are neither unambiguously interpretable nor fully
described. To take the last point first, the characteristic of a resolute
here-being who never loses his time but always has it is felt by Heideg-
ger himself to need further qualification. He always has time for what
the situation demands from him, that is, for the factical possibility of
his existence which he must choose for himself. But since all decison
for one possibility must bear the not-choosing of others, it is just the
authentic existence who will “ have no time” for what he had to forego
and reject. And, conversely, it is ridiculous to assume that all inau-
thentic existence must be a feeble drifting among what chances occur.
There is no reason why he should not decisively “ have time ” for the
possibilities he has chosen within the sphere of his lostness to things.
And since the factical here-being can be equally decisively engaged in
the world in both his ways of existing, how can we know whether a sin-
gle-minded devotion to a chosen possibility springs from a resolutely
owned self or from a flight from death into the complete self-forget-
fulness of an absorbing activity? It seems, therefore, that no experience
can enable us to distinguish between authenticity and inauthenticity in
any concrete case, because the same experienced phenomena can
belong to either, depending solely on how an existence faces his own
finiteness, and this is just what we cannot judge, perhaps least of all in
our own case. From where, then, does Heidegger draw the distin-
guishing marks of these two ways of existing? Are they not entirely
drawn from a “ phenomenological construction ” ? That a resolute here-
being never, for instance, loses his time logically follows from the exis-
tential-temporal definition of “ resoluteness.” But this is a one-way
street, for the concretely experienced “ not losing his time” is too
ambiguous to lead us back to its “ origin, ” quite unlike, for instance, the
unambiguously interpretable “ datability ” of experienced time.
In keeping with his usual method, Heidegger concludes the dis-
cussion of “ taking” ( “ having” ) time and “ losing” it by a statement of the
existential-temporal conditions that make these existentiell-ontic phe-
nomena possible: “ Tactically thrown Dasein can ‘take ’ and lose time for itself
only because a time is ‘allotted ’ to it as temporaly ecstatically stretched along
with the disclosedness of the There grounded in that temporality n (SZ, 410 ).
What is “ allotted ” or “ given ” to each here-being is a time. This is
the expressed and existentielly experienced time of a finite existence.
336 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

The original self-expression of its own temporality, as Heidegger said

earlier, is not necessarily audibly pronounced and communicated with
others. But since here-being is essentially disclosed to himself in his
being-with-others, and usually understands his own hereness from the
average explanations given by “ them,” the publicly pronounced “ now,
t h a t . . . , ” “ then , when . . . , ” and “ on that former occasion ” are in prin-
ciple understandable, even when they are not unequivocally dated.
The “ now ” expressed is spoken by each one in the publicness of being-
with-one-another-in-the-world. The time interpreted and expressed by
actual Da-sein is thus also always already made public as such on the basis
of its ecstatic being-in-the-world. Since everyday taking care understands
itself in terms of the “ world ” taken care of , it knows the “ time” that it
takes for itself not as its own , but rather heedfully exploits the time that
“ there is,” the time with which the they reckons. The publicness of “ time”
is all the more compelling, the more factical Da-sein explicitly takes care of
time by expressly taking it into account. (SZ, 411 ).

This concluding paragraph already forms the transition to the

theme of the next section. Only one phrase in it requires comment
here: . . but rather heedfully exploits the time that ‘there is’ [' es gibt’ ] ,
the time with which the they reckons.” “ Es gibt” means literally “ it
gives, ” and we may legitimately wonder what Heidegger has in mind
with the “ it.” In this specific context the “ it ” could well mean “ das
Man, ” the “ they,” the everyday “ one-among-others” who gives the pub-
lic time, in contrast to the time which each here-being gives to himself
from what is allotted ( given ) to him by his own finite temporality. Our
phrase could therefore be also read as: “ . . . but rather heedfully
exploits the time that ‘one gives,’ with which one reckons.” This inter-
pretation of the “ es gibt ” is, of course, proper only in the present con-
text. It does not cancel its first meaning, “ there is /’ but compliments it.

3. TIME TAKEN CARE OF AND WITHIN-TIMENESS

This section shows how the public time unfolds into a time-reckoning
and how the measuring of time, as well as the utensils used for mea-
suring ( sundials, clocks, watches ) are themselves made possible and
necessary, by the temporality of here-being.
It has already been indicated that the publishing of time is not
accidental, but springs from the understandingly interpretative way in
which the temporally disclosed here-being factically exists. The dating
of the public time can be accomplished from within-worldish occur-
rences, but even this elementary dating already happens
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 337

in the horizon of a taking care of time that we know as astronomical and

calendrical time-reckoning. This reckoning is not a matter of chance, but
has its existential and ontological necessity in the fundamental constitu-
tion of Da-sein as care. Since Da sein essentially exists entangled as
thrown, it interprets [ auslegt ] its time heedfully by way of a reckoning
with time. In this reckoning the “ real ” making public of time temporalizes
itself so that we must say that the thrownness of Da-sein is the reason why
“ there is” public time. (SZ, 411-12 ).

It will be noticed that a new overtone in auslegen, to lay out, now

makes itself felt. The explaining reckoning with time “ lays it out, ” in a
similar sense as we speak of “ laying out capital, ” circumspectly distrib-
uting it to the best advantage. In his thrown being-with-others-in-the-
world, the circumspect here-being does not “ lay out” his time from his
own finite temporality, but goes by the publicly reckoned time that
must be more or less the same for every “ one.” Even for a public time-
reckoning, however, the decisive thing is not that it “ quantifies” time by
numerically defining the “ dating, ” but that it springs from the tempo-
rality of here-being who counts with and on time.
The temporal structure of a circumspectly care- taking being-in-
the-world, as we have repeatedly heard, is a making present that awaits
and retains. Even in his self-forgetful lostness to the “ world, ” however,
here-being still exists for the sake of himself, but understands himself pri-
marily from his ability-to-be-in-the-world, taking care of the things rele-
vant to his own existence. In his dependence on a “ world, ”

Da-sein awaits its potentiality-of-being-in- the-world in such a way that it

“ reckons” with and on whatever is in eminent relevance for the sake of its
potentiality-of-being. Everyday, circumspect being-in-the-world needs the
possibility of sights that is, brightness, if it is to take care of things at hand
within what is objectively present. With the factical disclosedness of
world, nature has been discovered for Da-sein. In its thrownness Da-sein
is subject to the changes of day and night. Day with its brightness gives
it the possibility of sight , night takes it away. (SZ, 412 )

It is now clear what Heidegger meant earlier when he said that

even the most elementary dating of time already takes place in the
horizon of an “ astronomical ” time-reckoning. The “ astronomy” of cir-
cumspect care-taking is altogether prescientific. It makes use of the
“ handiness” of the sun, which dates the carefully “ laid-out” time of
everyday here-being. This dating gives the “ most natural ” time-mea-
sure, the day. At the same time, the sun is the most natural time-mea-
suring utensil ( “ time-piece ” ) insofar as the division of the day into a
338 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

number of care-takingly given “ thens” also takes place with a view to

the “ wandering sun.” The thrown here-being takes account of and
counts on the regularly recurring occupation of distinctive “ places” or
“ positions ” in the sky by the wandering sun: sunrise, midday, sunset.
On the around of this express dating of time, the “ happening” of here-
being is a day-to-day happening.
The enormously complex meaning of everydayness and its exis-
tential-temporal origin are only now beginning to come to light. It will
be remembered that Heidegger has earlier identified everydayness
with the inauthentic mode of historical-being. Now if historical-being is
essentially a “ happening” with others in the same world, then its inau-
thentic mode must in some prominent way be defined by the dating
from the sun, which gives it its “ day- to-day” character.
The sun , however, is not only exceptionally “ handy ” as the com-
mon measure of time in our everyday being-with-each-other. It is, as
Heidegger said earlier, in eminent relevance for our ability-to-be-in-the-
world. Its light gives the possibility of seeing to our circumspect care-tak-
ing. Hence the dating of the awaitingly exposed “ then ” comprehends
in itself “ then , when it dawns, it is time for the day’s work ” (SZ, 414).
The carefully “ laid out ” time is essentially a “ time for . . it is appro-
priate or inappropriate, the right or the wrong time for something. The
reference structure of “ for something” brings the worldishness of the
published time into view. We remember that the significance that con-
stitutes the worldishness of the everyday world is characterized by the
“ for, ” which, in turn , is ultimately fixed in the “ for the sake of ’ here-
being’ s own ability-to-be. Not only every utensil has the structure of
“ something for something,” but the space discovered within the every-
day world is also significantly defined by the “ for” ; so the places into
which the within-worldish space is articulated are not merely indiffer-
ent points or locations, but the carefully allocated places for such and
such utensils. The expressly explained time of everyday here-being
shows the same world-character.1

Thus we shall call the time making itself public in the temporalizing of
temporality world-time . And we shall designate it thus not because it is
objectively present ( vorhanden ) as an innerworldly being ( that it can never
be ), but because it belongs to the world in the sense interpreted existen-
tially and ontologically. [. . .] Only now can time taken care of be com -
pletely characterized as to its structure: It is datable, spanned , and pub-
lic and , as having this structure, it belongs to the world itself. Each
“ now,” for example , that is expressed in a natural , everyday way, has this
structure and is understood as such when Da-sein allows itself time in
taking care, although unthematically and preconceptually. ( SZ, 414-15).
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 339

Heidegger does not define the being of time in this passage, but
only denies that reality is a mode of being that can be appropriate to it.
The fact that time is not a within-worldish entity does not mean that it
must be a total nothing, nor that it is “ merely subjective, ” since the tem-
porality of existent here-being is not identical with the subjectivity of a
subject. Heidegger will recur to the highly problematic “ being” of time
later in this chapter. At the moment, having completed the structural
analysis of interpreted time, he turns to the development of time-mea-
suring and its foundation in one definite mode of the temporalization
of temporality.
In comparing the “ natural” time-reckoning with the more highly
developed one Heidegger notes that a direct reference to the presence
of the “ natural clock, ” namely to the sun in the sky, grows less and less
important. We can read the time off our manufactured clocks and
watches, which, however, are ultimately regulated by the “ natural
clock.” Just like the most primitive time-reckoning, so too the most
sophisticated use of time-measuring utensils is grounded in the tem-
porality of here-being, for it makes the dating of public time possible
at all.
Already the “ primitive” here-being to some extent makes himself
independent from a direct observation of the sun by measuring, for
instance, the shadow thrown by a conveniently available thing. A famil-
iar example of this is the sundial, on which the shadow moves on a
numbered path opposite to the course of the sun.
But why do we find something like time at the position that the shadow
occupies on the dial? Neither the shadow nor the graduated dial is time
itself, nor is the spatial relation between them. Where, then, is the time
that we read off directly not only on the “ sundial” but also on every pock-
etwatch? (SZ, 416 )

—
These seemingly childish questions they are indeed just the
—
questions a child might ask serve to remind us that there is much
more to “ reading the time” than merely watching the changing posi-
tions of the clock hand ( or shadow ). In telling the time from a clock,
the essential thing is that “ we sayf whether explicitly or not, now it is
such an hour and so many minutes , now it is time to . . . , or there is
still time . . . , namely now until. . . . Looking at the clock is grounded
in and guided by a taking- time-for-oneself ” (SZ , 416 ).
The time we “ take ” or “ let-ourselves-have ” is the span between
now and then . Each “ then” implies “ and not yet now ” ; each “ at that
—
time ” implies “ and no longer now ” that is, they are understood from
a primary view to the “ now.” This tendency becomes more pro-
340 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

nounced in a “ clock-watching” reckoning with time, which is essentially

a “ now-saying.” That each “ now” is already understood and exposed in
its full structural content of datability, spannedness, publicity, and
worldishness seems so obvious and natural that we take no explicit
notice of it.
But why does the now-saying become so much more pronounced
when we date our time from a clock or a watch than when we do it
from a within-worldish occurrence? Because, Heidegger says, “ The dat-
ing carried out in the use of the clock turns out to be the eminent mak-
ing present of something objectively present. Dating does not simply
take up a relation with something objectively present, but taking up a
relation itself has the character of measuring” (SZ, 416-17).
This explanation is anything but clear. We can clarify it by remem-
bering that all dating is accomplished by reference to “ something
there.” So, for instance, when we say ‘’now that the door is bang-
ing . . . we are dating the now by referring to the banging door. But
this kind of referring does not measure, whereas, according to Heideg-
ger, reference to a thing like a clock does. This is surprising, because we
are not usually aware that by simply glancing at a clock ( referring to it )
we are in fact measuring . Why do we remain unaware of what we are
doing? Because, as Heidegger says, “ the number of the measurement
( Masszahl ) can be read off directly ” (SZ, 417). When we see, for instance,
that “ it is four o’clock, ” we simply find the number four on the dial and
so get the impression that it is the clock that does the measuring. What
we forget are the preconditions that must be fulfilled in order that we
can understand any number as a measure. Taking an ordinary twelve-
hour clock as an example, it is evident that the “ stretch to be measured ”
is that between two extreme positions of the sun, from midday to mid-
night and midnight to midday, and this is originally and “ naturally ”
dated from two extreme positions of the sun relative to our position on
the earth. This stretch is represented on the dial by the complete course
the hand has to travel. The unit of measure, the hour or some other
convenient fraction of the whole, is represented by the numbered lines
or marks. In referring to the clock and seeing the hand pointing to four,
we are presenting the unit of measure as being four times present in the
present stretch to be measured. This complex presenting of a measure
and something measured constitutes the dating of our time from the
clock. Without it, there could be no clocks, but, at most, meaninglessly
marked surfaces over which pointed things meaninglessly move.
Heidegger has now taken a decisive, “ ground-laying” step toward
explaining the “ genesis” of the popular concept of time, which will be
carried out in the next section. The problems that remain to be clari-
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 341

fied in the present section still move on a more fundamental level. The
first of these , the “ coupling” of time and space, has already briefly
appeared in Heidegger’s remarks on the sundial, where it was noted
—
that what we really find on the sundial and of course on every kind of
—
clock is nothing but spatially extended things and spatial relations.
Although none of these is “ time itself, ” it cannot be an accident that
they can be used for a measuring dating of time. As Heidegger has
shown earlier ( chap. 4, § 70 ) , it is the temporality of a factical being-in-
the-world that makes the disclosure of space possible and enables the
“ spatial” here-being to allocate to himself his “ here” from the care-tak-
ingly discovered “ there.” Hence the datability of the time taken care of
is bound to a definite place of the factical here-being.
According to Heidegger, then, untenable notions about the cou-
pling of time and space arise from a confusion of the essential databil -
—
ity of time from a within-worldish occurrence preeminently from the
—
movement of the sun across the sky with time itself as the express self-
exposition of temporality. Just as space is an irreducible phenomenon
that can never become time, so time can never be reduced to space
through its dating from spatial relations that serve as a measure. For
the time- measuring itself, as the preceding analyses have shown, it is not
the numerical definition of spatial relations and movements that is
ontologically decisive, but the preeminent making present of a thing in
every now and for every one present. In our everyday now-saying we
are so intent on reading off the number of measurement as such that
we are apt to forget the measured as such, so what we “ really” find on
the clock is nothing but stretch and number.2
The world-time so pronouncedly made public in the measuring is
the time within which within-worldish beings meet us. The time-charac-
ter of their being is within-timeness ( being-in-time ). Here again the
essentially dual role of world shows itself. Looking at the within-world-
ish beings, world- time is the time within which they are there, but look-
ing at the factually existing being-in-the-world, world-time belongs to
the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality. It has, therefore,
“ the same transcendence as the world ” (SZ, 419 ). But in what way is
there world-time? What mode of being can be ascribed to it? This ques-
tion, which was briefly touched upon before, is now more elaborately
unfolded by Heidegger as follows.

The time “ in which ” objectively present things move or are at rest is not
“ objective,” if by this is meant the objective presence in itself of beings
encountered in the world. But time is not “ subjective ” either, if we under-
stand by that the objective presence and occurrence in a “ subject.” World-
342 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

time is more “ objective ” than any possible object because, with the disclosedness
of the world, it always already becomes ecstatically and horizonally “ objectified ”
as the condition of the possibility of innerworldly beings (SZ, 419 ).s

The phrase “ the condition of the possibility of innerworldly

beings” can be misleading. It is well to remember that “ the condition
of the possibility ” has a purely ontological sense, and not the ontic
sense of a “ cause ” or a “ condition ” that allows something to come into
being. What Heidegger means is that world-time is a necessary condi-
tion for within-worldish beings to be discovered as beings, that is, as
things that are . The being of these beings can and must show itself as a
being-in-time. That the world-time belongs to the temporality of exis-
tent here-being does not mean that he forces an alien “ form ” onto
other beings, but means that his self-disclosing, self-exposing tempo-
rality first of all enables these beings to show that and how they are in
themselves . Without the temporality of the factical being-in-the-world,
these beings would not dissolve into nothing, but would remain being-
less and nameless, neither hidden nor unhidden as beings, for the name
“ beings ” already implies that they have come to light in their being .
Further, it may be asked whether and how far the “ more objec-
tive” character that Heidegger ascribes to world-time is the same as the
“ objective reality ” that Kant ascribes to the schematized, temporally
defined categories. For Kant also does not mean by “ objective reality ”
that these temporally defined categories occur in nature just like
things, but means that they enable the things in nature to appear ( show
themselves ) as objects, as what they are . The kinship between the two
interpretations is unmistakable, but there are also essential differences.
Quite apart from the fact that Kant’s “ nature in general ” { Natur über-

— —
haupt ) is not identical with Heidegger’s “ world ” they are two different
attempts to explain the same thing a decisive difference is that in Hei-
degger’s interpretation the world-time is already expressly exposed with
the disclosure of world, so that,

contrary to Kant’s opinion, world-time is found just as directly in what is

physical as in what is psychical, and not just by way of a detour over the
psychical. Initially “ time” shows itself in the sky, that is, precisely where
one finds it in the natural orientation toward it , so that “ time ” is even
identified with the sky. (SZ, 419 ).

According to Heidegger, then, the natural, everyday understand-

ing of time has it own rightness, even though it can give no explana-
tion why it finds “ the time ” simply and directly on the things of nature.
Heidegger concurs with this view, but gives a philosophically satisfying
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 343

explanation of it; on the ground of the self-exposition of temporality, no

mediation is required between the “ psychical ,” the soul ( das Gemüt ) , and
the “ physical, ” the things of the phusis .
But world -time is also “ more subjective ” than any possible subject, since it first
makes possible the being of the factical existing self that being which, as is now
well understood, is the meaning of care. “ Time” is neither objectively present
in the “ subject ” nor in the “ object , ” neither “ inside ” nor “ outside,” and
it “ is ” “ prior” to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the
condition of the very possibility of this “ prior.” Does it then have any
“ being” at all? (SZ, 419 )

We see that Heidegger only elaborates what and how time is not .
The seemingly positive descriptions of “ more objective ” and “ more
subjective” do not, after all, tell us how time itself is . On the contrary,
the disturbing question now comes explicitly to the forefront, “ Has
time any ‘being’ at all? ”
If it has not, is it a mere nothing, “ a phantom, ” or should we more
truly say of it “ it is” than of any concrete beings? These questions are not
answered by Heidegger here, nor can they be answered until after the
“ question of being” ( Seinsfrage ) as it is posed and worked out in Being and
Time has been solved. But although the answer is once more deferred to
Division Three, these questions are not asked here merely to arouse idle
curiosity; they have the positive aim of making us doubtful whether the
distinction between the being of a self conceived as a subject and the
being of objects is fundamental enough to allow a proper answer to these
questions. It is clear that world-time can be neither “ volatized ‘subjec-
tivistically’ nor be ‘reified’ ( verdinglicht ) in a bad ‘objectification’ ” (SZ,
420). No more satisfactory than these two unacceptable extremes is a
“ vacillating insecurely” between them. The next step toward a solution
of this problem is to show how a theoretical concept of time grows out
of the prescientic everyday understanding of time, and how it itself shuts
out the possibility of understanding its intended meaning “ in terms of
primordial time, that is, as temporality . Everyday taking care that gives
itself time finds ‘time’ in innerwordly beings that are encountered ‘in
time.’ Thus our illumination of the genesis of the vulgar concept of time
must take its point of departure from within-timeness” (SZ, 420).

4. WITHIN-TIMENESS AND THE GENESIS

OF THE VULGAR CONCEPT OF TIME

At the beginning of this section Heidegger asks how something like

“ time” first shows itself to a circumspect taking care . “ In what mode of
344 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

taking care and using tools does it become explicitly accessible?” (SZ, 420).
The word Heidegger uses for ‘’explicitly” is ausdrücklich, literally: expressly .
But the word here no longer means the original “ self-expressing” ( Sich-
aussprechen ) in which temporality ex-poses itself, lays itself out into the
open. There are several stages or gradations of “ expressness” until it
comes to a fully fledged, theoretical conceptualization. The utensil in
whose use time first becomes explicitly accessible is the clock; for here-
being, in counting with and on himself \ that is, with his own temporality,
regulates himself by the time which publicly shows itself on the clock. What
is decisive for the present stage of “ explicitness” is a calculating counting
of time, which grows from a measuring reference to the clock.

The existential and temporal meaning of the clock turns out to be mak-
ing present of the moving pointer. By following the positions of the
pointer in a way that makes present, one counts them. This making pre-
sent temporalizes itself in the ecstatic unity of a retaining that awaits. To
retain the “ on that former occasion ” in making present means that in say-
ing-now to be open for the horizon of the earlier, that is, the now-no-
longer. To await the “ then ” in making present means: in saying-now to be
open for the horizon of the later, that is, the now-not-yet. What shows itself
in this making present is time. Then how are we to define the time manifest
in the horizon of the use of the clock that is circumspect and takes time
for itself in taking care? This time is what is counted, showing itself in follow-
ing making present, and counting the moving pointer in such a way that mak -
ing present temporalizes itself in ecstatic unity with retaining and awaiting hori-
zonally open according to the earlier and later. But that is nothing more than
an existential and ontological interpretation of the definition that Aristo-
tle gave of time: touto gar estin ho chronos, arithmos kinêseôs kata to proteron
kai hysteron. “ That, namely, is time, what is counted in the motion encoun-
tered in the horizon of the earlier and the later.” (SZ, 421)4

It can hardly be denied that Heidegger’s interpretation of the

temporality of here-being and its self-exposure into world-time brings
Aristotle’s definition to clarity. Heidegger does not claim too much
when he says that this seemingly strange definition becomes almost
“ obvious” when the existential-ontological horizon from which Aristo-
tle drew it is defined. It is to be regretted that Heidegger gives here no
interpretation of the whole passage in Aristotle’s Physics, but this task
first needed the completion of Division Three, and was therefore
deferred to the unwritten second part of Being and Time }
All subsequent time-interpretations, according to Heidegger,
keep in principle to the Aristotelian definition. This means that the the-
oretical-scientific approach thematizes “ the time ” which prescientifi-
cally shows itself in a circumspect care-taking.
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 345

Time is the “ what is counted,” that is, it is what is expressed and what is
meant, although unthematically, in the making present of the moving
pointer ( or shadow ). In making present what is moved in its motion, one
says “ now here, now here, and so on.” What is counted are the nows. And
these show themselves “ in every now ” as “ right-away-no-longer-now ” and
as “ just-now-not-yet.” The world-time “ caught sight of ” in this way in the
use of clocks we shall call now-time. (SZ, 421)

A comparison with the essential structure of world-time shows

that the datability of each “ now, that . . . ,” “ then , when . . . , ” and so
on , as well as the significance-structure of the “ time for . . . , ” are con-
cealed by the popular understanding of a pure succession of nows. This
concealment “ levels down ’ the articulated structure of the ecstatic-hori-
zonal unity of temporality in which datability and worldishness are
grounded. “ The nows are cut off from these relations, so to speak, and,
as thus cut off , they simply range themselves along after one another
so as to constitute the succession ” (SZ, 422 ).
We can now see why Heidegger has repeatedly emphasized that the
care-taking reckoning with time does not attend to time as such: it was to
show that the levelling-down concealment of the full structure of world-
time is not accidental, but arises from the lostness of a falling care- taking
in its makings and doings. The direct, unreflecting going-out-to things
simply understands the counted nows together with the things in which it
is absorbed. What happens when here-being begins to reflect, that is,
come back to time itself from the things which are there? He finds that
the nows are also in some way “ there, ” and explains their “ thereness”
from the horizon of that undifferentiated, whether theoretical or prethe-
oretical, understanding of being by which he is constandy guided: being
as “ reality” (Vorhandenheit ) in the widest sense. Even the commonsense
view of time, of course, does not assert that the nows are “ there” in the
same way as the solid, tangible things, but, Heidegger maintains, it does
“ see” time in the horizon of the “ idea of reality.” As evidence for this,
Heidegger cites the characteristic that everyday understanding ascribes
to time. According to it, the nows “ go away” or “ pass away,” and those
which are gone make up the past; the nows which “ come” and the com-
ing make up the future. This characteristic implies that some kind of
“ independent existence ” is tacitly ascribed to the nows, and “ indepen-
dent existence” is just an essential moment of being conceived as sub-
stantial reality. But even this misconception of the “ being” of the now-
time still reflects its origin in the ecstatic unity of temporality. This is
necessarily so, because, as already Aristotle explained in the previously
mentioned chapter of the Physics, the “ now ” could not show itself at all
except in the horizon of the “ before ” and “ after.” What the common-
346 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

sense view necessarily conceals is the datability and worldishness of

world-time, for in the horizon of real “ thereness,” objective “ present-
ness” (Vorhandenheit ), these structures are not accessible at all.
This concealment grows more rigid and fixed in the conceptual-
ization of the characteristics of time as popularly understood. Insofar
as the now-succession is explicitly comprehended as in some way
“ there, ” it itself enters “ into time” :

We say that in every now it is now, in every now it already disappears.

The now is now in every now, thus constantly present as the same, even if
in every now another may be disappearing as it arrives. Yet it does show
at the same time the constant presense of itself as this changing thing.
Thus even Plato, who had this perspective of time as a succession of
nows that come into being and pass away, had to call time the image of
eternity. (SZ, 423)6

Not surprisingly, however, Heidegger finds the most impressive

evidence for the leveling-down concealment of world- time and of tem-
porality as such in the thesis that time is endless. The endlessness of the
now-time, as Heidegger rightly points out, is logically implied already
in the conception and definition of the “ now, ” for insofar as each now
as such comingly goes-away, none can be the first or the last, the begin-
ning or the end of the uninterrupted now-flow.
As in the preceding critical points made by Heidegger against the
concept of now-time, the principal reason on which his argument is
based is the misplaced ontological conception of the “ being” of time as
—
a being objectively there-in-itself Vorhandensein. Similarly Kant argues
in his First Antinomy of Pure Reason that the assumption of the “ real
existence” (Wirklichkeit , Vorhandenheit ) of time constricts pure reason
into insoluble contraditions with itself. But the supporting reasons
adduced by the two thinkers are different, and above all, their starting
points from the subjectivity of the subject and the temporality of here-
being considerably diverge. This comes most clearly into view in Hei-
degger’s elucidation of the reason why the above analyzed levelling-
down of world-time takes place. The reason lies in the being of
here-being as care, or more precisely, in its mode of a fallingly thrown
lostness to the things it takes care of in making them present. What
reveals itself in this lostness is the concealing flight of here-being from his
ownmost existence, which accomplishes itself in a forward-running res-
oluteness. This flight from death looks away from the end of being-in-
the-world and is the inauthentic mode of ecstatically futural being to an
end. As we have already seen , the being-unto-death is grounded in the
temporal structure of here-being’s coming-to-himself in his utmost pos-
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 347

sibility; that is, coming-to-his-own-end. The falling everyday here-being

looks away from the coming-to-his-own-end, and so conceals that his
“ futural” temporality essentially ends itself . In so disowning his own
finite temporality, here-being forgets himself in being “ one self among
others, ” and conforms to the publicly explained “ endlessness ” of time.
“ One’s ” time may, in a certain sense, rightly be called “ endless”
because “ one ” can never die, insofar as death is singly mine , and
authentically understood in my forward-running resoluteness. The dis-
owned oneself, on the other hand, understands death as the end until
when “ one has always still time.” This having time betrays the possi-
bility of losing time, not in the sense of the finiteness of time itself , but
in the sense of carefully snatching as much as possible of the time
which still comes and goes on.
But just as in a fleeing being-unto-death death can never be
wholly hidden , so the seemingly “ harmless” passage of the endless
“ imposes itself ‘on’ Da-sein in a remarkably enigmatic way” ( SZ, 425).
Why should we speak so emphatically of the passing of time and not of
its coming when , in view of the now-succession , both would be equally
justified? Even in the commonsense view of time, the finite “ temporal -
ity , in which the world-time temporalizes itself, is not completely closed
off ’ (SZ, 425). The seemingly commonplace experience of the “ pass-
ing” of time is only the ground of a wanting-to-hold-time. In strictly
existential terms, this means
an inauthentic awaiting of “ moments” that already forgets the moments
as they slip by. The awaiting of inauthentic existence that makes present
and forgets is the condition of the possibility of the common experience
of time’s passing away. Since Da-sein is futural in being ahead-of-himself ,
it must, in awaiting, understand the succession of nows as one that slips
away and passes away. Da-sein knows fleeting time from the ' fleeting ” knowl-
edge of its death. In the kind of talk that emphasizes time’s passing away,
the finite futurality of the temporality of Da-sein is publicly reflected.
And since even in the talk about time’s passing away death can remain
covered over, time shows itself as a passing away “ in itself.”
But even in this pure succession of nows passing away in itself , pri-
mordial time reveals itself in spite of all levelling down and covering
over. The vulgar interpretation determines the flux of time as an irre-
versible succession. Why can time not be reversed ? Especially when one
looks exclusively at the flux of the nows, it is incomprehensible in itself
why the sequence of nows should not accommodate itself to the reverse
direction. The impossibility of this reversal has its basis in the prove-
nance of public time in temporality, whose temporalizing, primarily
futural, “ goes ” ecstatically toward its end in such a way that it “ is ” already
towards its end. (SZ, 425-26 )
348 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

In the last sentence Heidegger refers, of course, to the structure

of care as a thrown being-to-an-end, or more strictly defined, as a
thrown being-unto-death . The last paragraph completes the positive
and new tasks of this section; what follows are comments on its find-
ings. In the first place, Heidegger emphasizes once more that the com-
mon concept of time as an endless, passing, irreversible flow of nows
springs from the temporality of a falling here-being. From this he
draws the conclusion: “ The vulgar representation of time has its natural jus-
tification” (SZ, 426 ). After a fundamental critique of this concept it may
seem surprising that Heidegger should suddenly restore to it “ its nat-
ural justification.” Yet it is not altogether surprising, when we remem-
ber that the equally severely criticized inauthentic view of history as
“ an occurring ‘in time” ’ was also said to “ be justified within its limits”
(SZ, 377). In this respect Heidegger stands entirely within our philo-
sophical tradition , whose great exponents have again and again taken
up the same ambivalent relation to “ common opinion ” or “ natural con-
sciousness.” Its philosophical short-sightedness and one-sidedness have
their own necessity and right, because the popular representation
“ belongs to the everyday kind of being of Da-sein and to the under-
standing of being initially prevalent ” (SZ 426 ). The common view, how-
ever, exceeds its rightful limits when it claims to possess the “ truth ” and
the right to prescribe the only possible horizon for the interpretation of
time and history. The preceding analyses have demonstrated that the
origin, the characteristics, and development of the “ now-time” cannot
be comprehended at all except in the horizon of the ecstatic-horizonal
temporality of here-being. When, on the other hand, the start is taken
from the common understanding of time, the primordial time -the
—
temporality in which it originates “ remains inaccessible” (SZ, 426).
—
This is most clearly seen in that time-phenomenon which the two
interpretations take to be most primary and basic. While ecstatic-hori-
zonal temporality temporalizes itself primarily from the future ( coming-
to-itself ), the basic phenomenon of the commonly understood time is
the pure now, clipped of its full structure and called the “ present.”
From this now, the ecstatic-horizonal Moment of authentic temporality
can in no way be explained. Similarly, the common concept of the
“ future” as the still coming, levelled-down nows, is incapable of
explaining the ecstatically understood future, the datable, significant
“ then, ” just as the “ past ” in the sense of the passed-away, pure nows
cannot cover the ecstatic has-been, the datable, significant “ on that for-
mer occasion.” “ The now is not pregnant with the not-yet- now, but
rather the present arises from the future in the primordial, ecstatic
unity of the temporalizing of temporality ” (SZ, 427).
7
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 349

Finally, Heidegger brings new evidence for what he has already

repeatedly stressed: that through all the concealment that lies in the com-
mon experience of time, primordial time still shines through. Even where
the world-time is thought to be somehow “ there-in-itself,” it is brought
into a preeminent relation with the “ soul” or the “ spirit, ” and, moreover,
this happens before philosophical questioning turns primarily to the “ sub-
ject.” Heidegger quotes two passages: “ But if nothing other than soul or
the soul’s mind were naturally equipped for numbering, then if there
were no soul, time would be impossible (Aristotle, Physics, 223a 25). The
second quotation runs: “ Hence it seemed to me that time is nothing else
than an extendedness; but of what sort of thing it is an extendedness I do
not know; and it would be surprising if it were not an extendedness of the
soul itself ’ (St. Augustine, Confessions, bk. XI, chap. 26 ).
This is a question taken up by Hegel. However, before proceeding
to the interpretation of Hegel given in the next section, it will be help-
ful to summarize the main steps taken so far in the present chapter.
Heidegger has tried to show that existent temporality expresses
itself in speech. In the first place and for the most part, it is the inau-
thentic temporality of the falling being-in-the-world that expresses itself ,
so that its self-enunciation is in itself a care-taking turning-to and address-
ing of beings within the world. The time thus exposed reflects in its own
structure the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality. The expressly
exposed world-time essentially belongs to here-being. The worldishness
of time makes possible the care-taking measuring of time by reference to
the eminently relevant thing, the sun in its movement. The measuring
dating develops into a counting of time in the use of clocks. This devel-
opment goes hand in hand with the exclusive interpretation of world-
—
time as in-timeness as the time in which things and events occur. The
growing explicitness and conceptualization of the counted time leads to
a concealing levelling-down of world-time into an endless, passing, irre-
-
versible continuum of nows that is somehow “ there-in itself.” Its origin in
the finite temporality of the single here-being is unrecognized by com-
mon sense, but still shines through all concealment.

5 . THE CONTRAST OF THE EXISTENTIAL AND ONTOLOGICAL

CONNECTION OF TEMPORALITY, HERE-BEING , AND
WORLD-TIME WITH HEGEL S INTERPRETATION OF
THE RELATION BETWEEN TIME AND SPIRIT

The present section confronts the expositor and commentator with

particular difficulties of its own. Not only are the extracts quoted from
350 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Hegel difficult in themselves, but Heidegger’s interpretation of them

can be challenged in some important respects.8 The reason for that is
not that Heidegger presents us with one of his “ retrieving” interpreta-
tions, which are controversial simply as “ retrieving.” All he aims at
there is a straightforward explanation that does not go beyond Hegel’s
own texts, but it is doubtful whether he does justice to what Hegel him-
self has said.
What is the central problem to be elucidated? It is Hegel’s
attempt to grasp how the spirit, as the self-comprehending concept,
can “ concretize” or “ realize ” itself in time, and so reveal itself in and as
a historical process. “ The development of history falls into time”
where history is essentially that of the spirit.9 Hegel, however, as Hei-
—
degger points out, is not content with simply stating the “ within-time-
ness ” of the spirit as a fact, but
seeks to understand how it is possible for spirit to fall into time, which is
the “ completely abstract, the sensuous.” Time must be able to receive
spirit, as it were. And spirit must in turn be related to time and its
essence. Thus we must discuss two things: (1) How does Hegel define the
essence of time? ( 2 ) What belongs to the essence of spirit that makes it
possible for it to “ fall into time ” ? (SZ, 428)

The way in which Heidegger formulates the problem already

provokes thought. It is striking that the questioning goes entirely from
the spirit to time, asking how it is possible for the spirit to fall into
time, that is, to realize or externalize ( ex-pose ) itself, to become exis-
tent in time. But, we ask, is it not just as important to go the opposite
way, from time to spirit? The question is all the more justified because
Hegel’s thought not only allows but demands this two-way traffic. Its
very core is just the “ return ” of the spirit, through the historical
process, to itself, in which “ return ” aufhebt — that is, reconcilingly pre-
serves the “ banished ” or “ annulled” ( aufheben as tollere ) differentia-
tions, which are the only seemingly independent externalized moments
of itself. Such a “ one-sided ” moment of the spirit is time in a preemi-
nent way, for it is, as Hegel writes in the Phenomenology of Spirit , “ the
pure self, the merely intuited concept.” 10 This is why, in the words of
the Encyclopaedia that Heidegger himself quotes, “ time has no power
over the concept, but rather the concept is the power over time. ” 11
Unless this “ power” were conceived as an external force imposed on
— —
an alien thing an absurd notion the subservience of time to the con-
cept and the power of the concept over time can only mean that in
their kinship the concept, that is, the spirit, has a precedence over
time. The structural relation between spirit and time is that between
Temporality and Withm-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 351

the origin and the originated, that is, the same as that between the
temporality of here-being and the ex-posed world-time. What makes
Heidegger’s own time-interpretation so impressive and convincing is
just that he constantly goes back from the originated world-time to its
origin in temporality. The moment a new characteristic of the world-
time appears, he immediately refers it back to the original ecstatic-
horizonal structure of temporality. If a fair comparison with Hegel is
to be made, a going from spirit to time and back from time to spirit is
essential, provided that Hegel’ s thought demands such a two-way traf -
fic. But Heidegger’s formulation of the problem, laying the whole
stress on the fall of the spirit into time, already prohibits the making of
such an attempt.

( a ) Hegel's Concept of Time

Starting from a thus restricted problem, Heidegger perfectly consis-
tently draws Hegel’ s concept of time from his Philosophy of Nature, for
the time in which the spirit realizes itself as a historical process must be
the same as that in which the events of nature happen. More ques-
tionable is Heidegger’ s thesis that the “ systematic place ” of a time-
interpretation provides us with a “ criterion ” of the basic views on time
held by a philosopher (SZ, 428). Whether this thesis holds in general,
whether it applies to Hegel in particular, is not so clear as Heidegger
suggests. Especially with regard to Hegel it can be reasonably ques-
tioned whether the natural-philosophical aspect of time is the most
important and basic to his system.12
On the other hand, if we take Heidegger’s explanation of the
dialectical movement from space to time by itself, its excellence can
hardly be denied, and it deserves to be followed up in detail.
In the first section of the “ Mechanics , ” Hegel defines both space
and time as “ das abstrakte Aussereinander,” the abstract outside-one-
another.13 But Hegel does not simply coordinate space and time. Space,
according to him, “ is” time, in the sense that time is the “ truth” of
space.14 That is to say: “ If space is thought dialectically in what it is , this
being of space reveals itself . . . as time” ( SZ, 428).
To follow up this dialectical movement Heidegger first turns to
space. It is “ the immediate ( unmediated ) indifference of the outside-
itself-being of nature.” 15 What this means is elucidated by Heidegger
as follows:
Space is the abstract multiplicity of the points distinguishable in it .
Space is not interrupted by these points, but neither does it first arise
from them by way of joining them together. Space remains in its turn
352 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

undifferentiated, differentiated by the differentiable points that are

themselves space. The differentiations themselves have the nature of
what they differentiate. But yet the point is a negation of space in that it
differentiates something in space as something other than space,
though in such a way that it remains in space as this negation ( the point
is, after all , space ). The point does not lift itself out of space as some-
thing other than space. Space is the undifferentiated outside-one-
another of the multiplicity of points. But space is not a point , but , as
Hegel says, “ punctuality” [ PunktualitäC ( Ene., § 254, Supplement ) ]. On
this Hegel bases his statement in which he thinks space in its truth, that
is, as time.
“ The negativity, which as point relates itself to space and develops
in it its determinations as line and surface, is, however, in the sphere of
being-outside-itself both for itself and its determinations therein, but at
the same time as positing ( itself ) in the sphere of being-outside-itself ,
appearing as indifferent to the quiet beside-one-another. So posited for
itself, it is time.” 16 (SZ, 429-30 )

Compare:
If space is represented, that is, directly looked at in the indifferent sub-
sistence of its distinctions, the negations are, as it were, simply given.
But this representation does not yet grasp space in its being. That is pos-
—
sible only in thought as the synthesis that goes through thesis and
antithesis and supersedes [aufhebenden] them. Space is thought and thus
grasped in its being only if the negations do not simply subsist in their
indifference, but are superseded , that is, themselves negated. In the
negation of negation ( that is, punctuality ), the point posits itselffor itself
and thus emerges from the indifference of subsistence. Posited for
itself, it distinguishes itself from this or that point ; it is no longer this and
not yet that one. In positing itself for itself , it posits the succession in
which it stands, the sphere of being-outside-of-itself that is now the
negated negation. The superseding of punctuality signifies that it can
no longer lie quietly in the “ paralyzed stillness of space.” The point
“ rebels ” against all other points. According to Hegel, this negation of
negation as punctuality is time. If this discussion has any demonstrable
meaning at all, it can mean nothing other than that the positing of itself
for itself of each point is a now-here, now-here, and so on. Every point
“ is” posited for itself as a now-point. “ Thus the point has actuality in
time.” By what means the point can posit itself for itself , always as this
point, is always a now. The condition of the possibility of the point’s
positing itself for itself is the now. This condition of possibility consti-
tutes the being of the point, and being is at the same time being-thought .
Thus, since the pure thinking of punctuality, that is, of space, always
“ thinks ” the now and the being-outside-itself of the nows, space “ is ”
time. (SZ, 430 )
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 353

The differences between Hegel’ s and Heidegger’ s approach to

“ space and time ” could not be more striking, especially when we
remember the concrete way in which , according to Heidegger, the
“ now-here, now-here ” first shows itself in the care-taking, counting use
of the clock. All the more important is it to perceive in what respects
they are similar. In the first place, while Heidegger would never say
that space “ is” time, any more than that time “ is ” space, or that time is
the dialectical “ thoughtness” of space, he does say that the “ truth ” of
space is grounded in time or, more originally, in temporality. It is the
temporality of here-being that makes the disclosure ( the “ truth ” ) of
space possible; that is, it is the condition of the possibility of the
’’ truth ” of space. In the second place, Heidegger also holds fast to the
“ outside-itselfness ” of “ primordial time,” defining it as the ekstatikon
purely and simply, as “ the ‘outside-of-itself in and for itself ’ (SZ, 329).
But here again , the standing-out-of-itself of existent here-being is much
more “ concretely ” conceived than is Hegel’ s abstract being-outside-of-
itself. Even with regard to space, where the distance between the two
thinkers seems greatest, a reflection of the earlier in the later can be
found. Hegel’s abstract, “ indifferent” ( gleichgültig ) space is recognizably
the “ unworlded, ” universal space in which each point is “ equally valid”
( gleich gültig), and into which the circumspectly discovered, significantly
structured everyday world-space is levelled-down by a theoretical “ only-
looking-at-it ( Nur-hinsehen ).
The dialectical movement from space to time has now brought
time itself into view. Hegel’ s definition of time is introduced by a pas-
sage taken from § 258 of the Encyclopaedia:

“ As the negative unity of being-outside-itself, time is similarly something

absolutely abstract [ ideell ] .17 It is the being that, in being, is not, and, in
not being, is: it is intuited becoming. This means that the absolutely
momentary distinctions that directly supersede themselves are deter-
mined as external, but as external to themselves.” Time reveals itself for
this interpretation as “ intuited becoming.” According to Hegel, this sig-
nifies a transition from being to nothingness, or from nothingness to
being.18 Becoming is coming into being as well as passing away. Being, or
nonbeing, “ goes over.” What does that mean with regard to time? The
being of time is the now. But since every now either “ now ” is-no-longer,
or now not-yet-is, it can also be grasped as nonbeing. Time is the “ intu-
ited” becoming, that is, the transition that is not thought, but simply pre-
sents itself in the succession of nows. If the essence of time [ das Wesen
der Zeit ] is determined as the “ intuited becoming, ” this reveals the fact
that time is understood primarily in terms of the now, in the way that
such a now can be found by pure intuition. (SZ, 430 -31)
354 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

It is immediately evident that the definition discussed here is

incomplete, for it considers only the “ constant changing,” the “ becom-
ing” purely “ imaged ” in the now-flow, whereas what changes, namely
the constantly self-same now, is not yet mentioned here. If in Heideg-
ger’s comment on Hegel “ das Wesen der Zeit ” is translated by its admit-
tedly more common meaning “ the essence of time, ” the whole passage
loses the very point it aims to make: that it considers solely the prob-
lem of how time is , the existentia of time, and not what time is , the essen-
tia of time. The latter is rightly deferred by Heidegger to the problem
to be discussed in the next subsection , namely, the kinship of the
essence of the spirit as the .^//-comprehending concept with the
'

essence of time as the pure self-identity, albeit the only looked-upon or

intuited and not self-thinking identity of the “ standing and staying”
self-same now.
To come back to the theme of the present discussion, the being of
time as a pure becoming , Heidegger’ s further comments only elaborate
what has already appeared in the above passage: that Hegel’s time-
interpretation moves entirely in the direction of the common under-
standing of time, whose characterization from the pure now already
presupposes “ that the now remains covered over and levelled-down in
its full structure, so that it can be intuited [ angeschaut looked at] as
something objectively present, though objectively present only ‘ide-
ally’” (SZ, 431).
All Heidegger’s subsequent citations from Hegel and his com-
ments on them, as well as the exceptionally long footnote to pages 432
through 433 of Being and Time establishing the connection of Aristo-
tle’s and Hegel’s time interpretations, concentrate primarily on the
“ now.” For instance: “ Moreover, in nature where time is now, no ‘sta-
ble’ [ bestehend ] difference between those dimensions ( past and future )
ever comes about.” 19 « In the positive sense of time one can thus say that
only the present is, the before and after are not; but the concrete pre-
sent is the result of the past and pregnant with the future. Thus the
true present is eternity.” 20
These and other citations aim at establishing that Hegel not only
starts from the common experience and interpretation of time, but
radicalizes it. Although Hegel speaks occasionally of time as the
“ abstraction of consuming, ” he is, Heidegger says, “ consistent enough
to grant no such priority to consuming and passing away as that to
which the everyday experience of time rightly adheres; for Hegel can
no more provide dialectical grounds for this priority than for the ‘cir-
cumstance’ ( that he introduces as self-evident ) that precisely when the
point posits itself for itself, the now turns up ” (SZ, 431-32).
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 355

Both arguments brought against Hegel are doubtful. As to the

first point, speaking of time in its “ positive sense, ” Hegel says that
“ only the present is, the before and after are not , ” and it is just the con-
stant self-annulment of the now that constitutes the becoming. Hence
the negativity, so vividly and concretely expressed in the “ consum-
ing, ” can be said on philosophically demonstrable grounds to pre-
dominate. Even more doubtful is Heidegger’ s contention that Hegel
cannot prove ( begründen ) why the now should emerge just when the
point posits itself for itself. One would have thought that the dialecti-
cal movement from space to time is itself the proof why this should be
so. It is because the now is the condition of the possibility that the point
can “ rebel ” and so step out of the “ paralyzed stillness” of the indiffer-
ent sameness of space. Heidegger himself constantly advances this
( though not dialectical ) kind of proof for the groundedness of all
structures of here-being in temporality. The latter is the condition of
their possibility . It is through such questionable arguments that Hei-
degger establishes his conclusion:
So even when he characterizes time as becoming, Hegel understands this
becoming in an “ abstract ” sense that goes beyond the representation of
the “ flux ” of time. The most appropriate expression for Hegel’s inter-
pretation of time thus lies in the determination of time as the negation of
the negation ( that is, of punctuality). Here the succession of nows is for-
malized in the most extreme sense and levelled down to an unprece-
dented degree. It is only in terms of this formal and dialectical concept
of time that Hegel can produce a connection between time and spirit.
(SZ, 432 )

Even if the “ abstractness ” of Hegel’s concept of time must be con-

ceded, it does not necessarily follow that the “ negation of the nega-
tion ” is its “ most appropriate expression.” Indeed, it arouses immedi-
ate misgivings, because the “ negation of the negation ” is the formal
structure of the dialectical movement itself, which lies already in every
“ concrete universal” reached through the synthesis of the thesis and
antithesis, and is in no way specifically distinctive of time, whereas we
would have thought that some quite unique relation is required to
enable the spirit to “ fall into time. ” On the other hand, this conclusion
throws a sudden light upon a puzzling feature of this subsection. The
attentive reader must already have asked himself why Heidegger starts
from space. If the main theme is Hegel’ s conception of the being of
time, then the whole discussion of space is really redundant. The start
could have been made just as well, or much better, from the passage
cited above which begins: “ As the negative unity of being-outside-itself,
356 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

time is similarly something absolutely abstract and ideal.” But now the
seeming redundancy turns out to be essential to Heidegger’s purpose
of establishing that the negation of the negation is the “ most appro-
priate expression ” of Hegel’ s concept of time. Whether this is truly the
“ sole” bridge that Hegel can throw across from spirit to time will be
seen in the next subsection.

( b ) Hegel’s Interpretation of the Connection between Time and Spirit

To state the basic problem once more: How can spirit fall into time?
What is the essence of spirit that enables it to realize itself, to become
existent in time as a historical process? Heidegger’s explanation starts
as follows:

The essence of spirit is the concept . By this Hegel understands not the
universal that is intuited in a genus as the form of what is thought, but
—
the form of the very thinking that thinks itself: Conceiving itself as grasp-
ing the non-I. Since grasping the non-1 presents a differentiation , there
lies in the pure concept, as the grasping of the differentiation , a differ-
entiation of the difference. (SZ, 433)

Before going on, let us clarify this difficult text. Concept usually
means a concipere, a grasping together into one through a general char-
acteristic that is common to many. The “ intuited ” common character-
istic of the many, the genus, is thought in the form of the concipere, of
a grasping together into one. Hence the concept in its usual meaning
is the form of something thought. What Hegel means by concept, on
the other hand, is the form of the self-thinking thinking itself.
In the not-I there lies already a distinction between the I, the self,
-
and its “ other, ” the not I. The pure concept, in comprehending itself as
the I, at the same time grasps the distinction between itself and the
—
other, the not-I that is, it distinguishes this distinction. In fully com-
prehending itself the I grasps and brings back into itself the not-I that
has been distinguished from it by a negation ( the “ not” ). This bringing-
back-into-itself of its negated self, of the not-I, is accomplished by
negating the negation whereby the self, the I, has been expelled into
its other, the not-I. Hence, Heidegger says, “ Hegel can define the
essence of spirit formally and apophantically as the negation of a nega-
tion. This ‘absolute negativity’ gives a logically formalized interpreta-
tion of Descartes’ cogito me cogitare rem, wherein he sees the essence of
the conscientia ” ( SZ, 433).
If the kinship between the spirit and time is established solely by
the sameness of their formal structure as the negation of negation,
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 357

then it would seem that this goal has already been reached. Nonethe-
less, this is not nearly enough to show why the spirit necessarily,
according to its own essence, concretizes and so reveals itself in time
as history. The following citations from Hegel, and Heidegger s com-
ments on them , serve to elucidate this necessity that lies in the nature
of the spirit itself. In the first place, the concept has to be more con-
cretely defined.

The concept is the conceivedness of the self conceiving itself , the way the
self is authentically as it can be, that is, free. “ The / is the pure concept
itself that has come to existence as the concept.” 21 “ But the I is the first
pure unity relating itself to itself, not directly, but rather, in abstracting
from all determinateness and content and going back to the freedom of
the limitless identity with itself.” 22 Thus the I is “ universality f but it is
“ individuality ” just as immediately ” (SZ, 433-34 )

What must be remarked here and for all that follows is that Hegel
uses the word Dasein ( “ als Begriff zum Dasein gekommen ” ) in the tra-
ditional sense of existentia, and not of course in the sense that Heideg-
ger gives it in Being and Time . It is just for Dasein and existence in the
traditional sense that Heidegger uses the interpretative term Vorhan-
densein, being-there, presence. He is therefore quite entitled, within the
context of Being and Time , to interpret Hegel’s da-seind with vorhanden,
using the term, of course, in its widest sense and not in its narrow sense
of the thereness of a thing. What remains to be seen, rather, is whether
Heidegger makes enough of the concept that has come into existence
( Dasein ) and its relation to time. So far, what has come to light is the
pure, limitlessly free self-identity of the concept as the I. Now Heideg-
ger goes on to unfold the further implications of the concept as the
negation of negation.

This negating of negation is both the “ absolute unrest” of spirit and also
its self revelation, which belongs to its essence. The “ progression ” of spirit
actualizing itself in history contains a “ principle of exclusion.” However,
in this exclusion what is excluded does not get detached from the spirit ,
it gets surmounted. Making itself free in overcoming, and at the same time
supporting, characterizes the freedom of the spirit. Thus “ progress”
never means a quantitative more, but is essentially qualitative, and
indeed has the quality of spirit. “ Progression ” is known and knowing
itself in its goal. In every step of its “ progress, ” spirit has to overcome
“ itself ” as the truly inimical hindrance of its aim. The goal of the devel-
opment of spirit is “ to attain its own concept.” The development of itself
is “ a hard , infinite struggle against itself . ” (SZ, 434 )
358 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

Nothing could show more succinctly than this short paragraph

that to regard the “ negating of negation ” simply and solely as a formal-

— —
logical abstraction is quite insufficient. It expresses in a formal way, to
be sure the origin of movement, of life ( the “ absolute unrest ” ), in the
very being of the spirit, which drives the spirit into its self-disclosing
concretization, and drives it on through an endless fight against itself
toward its return to a self-conceiving that “ grasps, ” that is, embraces and
elevates into itself its “ externalized ” moments ( the not-I ). The spirit has
to overcome itself as its own most obstinate enemy because the seem-
ingly fixed and true differentiations and determinations for instance,
the opposition between subject and object, in which each appears as an
—
—
independent entity are set by the spirit itself in its appearance as the
“ natural ” or “ naive consciousness” ( roughly corresponding to the com-
mon understanding of everyday here-being in Heidegger ). The in itself- -
being of these seemingly fixed and independent entities like subject
and object is just the “ mere being, ” and therefore the negative and
—
“ untrue ” being which has to be mediated annulled and preservingly —
elevated into the “ true being” of the self-conceiving concept. This is
the endless struggle of the historical development of the “ concretized ”
spirit returning to itself. While these implications of the above-quoted
texts are not elaborated by Heidegger, they have to be made explicit
here in order to enable us to weigh up what Heidegger makes of them.
His conclusions are summed up in the third paragraph following the
above, but this is preceded by two important paragraphs consisting
mainly of citations from Hegel. I shall quote these three paragraphs
together and comment on them afterward.
Since the restlessness of the development of spirit bringing itself to its
concept is the negation of a negation, it is in accordance with its self-actu-
alization to fall “ into time” as the immediate negation of a negation. For
“ time is the concept itself that is there [ da ist ] , and represents itself to con-
sciousness as empty intuition. For this reason spirit necessarily appears
in time, and it appears in time as long as it has not grasped its pure con-
cept, that is, has not annulled time. Time is the pure self that is externally
intuited [looked-upon] and not grasped by the pure self , the concept
merely intuited.” 23 Thus spirit appears in time necessarily in accordance
with its essence. “ Thus world-history in general is the interpretation [ Ausle-
gung. laying out] of spirit in time, just as the idea interprets itself in
nature as space.” 24 The “ excluding” that belongs to the movement of
development contains a relation to nonbeing. That is time, understood
in terms of the revolt of the now [ aus dem sich aufspreizenden Jetzt ].
Time is “ abstract ” negativity. As the “ intuited becoming” it is the differ-
entiated self-differentiation that is directly to be found , the concept that
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 359

“ is there,” that is, objectively present. As something objectively present

and thus external to spirit , time has no power over the concept, but the
concept is rather “ the power of time” [.Encyclopaedia, § 258].
Hegel shows the possibility of the historical actualization of spirit
“ in time” by going back to the identity of the formal structure of spirit and
time as negation of a negation. The most empty, formal-ontological and for-
mal-apophantical abstraction into which spirit and time are externalized
makes possible the production of a kinship of the two. But since at the
same time, time is yet conceived in the sense of world time that has been
absolutely levelled down, so that its provenance thus remains completely
covered over, it simply confronts spirit as something objectively present.
For this reason spirit must first fall “ into time.” It remains obscure what
indeed is signified ontologically by this “ falling” and the “ actualization ”
of spirit that has power over time and really “ exists” outside of it. Just as
Hegel throws little light on the origin of time that has been levelled
down, he leaves totally unexamined the question of whether the essen-
tial constitution of spirit as the negating of negation is possible at all in
any other way than on the basis of primordial temporality. (SZ, 434-35)
Let us now see whether these conclusions do not leave some essen-
tial points unexamined in the Hegelian texts quoted by Heidegger him-
self. First let us look back to Hegel’s crucially important sentence:
“ Time is the concept itself that is there [ da ist\, and represents itself to con-
sciousness as empty intuition. For this reason spirit necessarily appears
in time, and it appears in time as long as it has not grasped its pure con-
cept, that is, has not annulled time.” Time is simply there; its being is an
unmediated “ mere ” being in contrast to the mediated “ true” being of
the self grasping or self-conceiving concept; hence, although time is the
-

concept itself, it has not come into its full truth . In its simple being-
there, time presents itself to consciousness directly as an intuition, for
time is the “ nonsensible sensible,” that is, the purely “ viewable” not to
the bodily eye, but to subconsciousness. As this immediate intuition,
—
time is “ empty, ” and must be so if it is to be capable of taking up into
itself all things that appear in time, that is, show themselves, become
themselves “ viewable ” in time. Time is the pure, empty intuition as the
form in which all existing things must appear and so reveal themselves
-
to a looking upon. Hence, if the spirit is to come into existence at all it
must necessarily “ appear in time,” in which alone it can concretely
reveal itself as a historical process. This explains from the point of view
of time how it is in its own being capable of receiving the self-realizing
spirit into itself and why it is in time that the spirit must necessarily
appear in all stages of its concrete, historical “ life.” But now we must ask
back from time to the spirit. How is the spirit itself such that it necessi -
tates itself into its own concretization in time? The answer has already
360 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

been given: because the spirit is the negating of the negation, and because
this is not a mere formal abstraction, but the principle of life in the
spirit itself, it necessitates the spirit into its endlessly self-overcoming
( self-annulling) struggle, in which historical movement the spirit con-
—
cretely lives. Time as the pure, “ looked-upon becoming” that is, the
—
constant self-annulment of the now mirrors and makes directly “ view-
able” the negativity of the spirit concretized in its historical movement,
a negativity which constandy “ excludes” moments of itself into a seem-
ingly fixed and externalized “ independent being, ” and constantly strug-
gles to overcome itself by negating this negation.
Time most purely “ images ” the spirit; it is the pure “ other” self of
the self-comprehending concept. If the essence of the concept is its self-
conception, then the essence of time, the “ standing and staying” self-
sameness of the now, images the concept’s pure self-identity. The essence
of time is to present itself “ visibly” to the spirit as its own self, but as the
unmediated, not-self-conceiviing self. This is clearly said by Hegel in the
sentence “ Time is the pure self that is externally intuited [looked-upon]
and not grasped by the self, the concept merely intuited.” The essence
of time is the same as the essence of the concept, but time is the exter-
nalized, “ visible, ” and not-self-comprehending identity in which the pure
concept, come into existence as the “ I, ” can look upon itself.
The affinity between spirit and time is therefore fundamental.
Heidegger can quite correcdy express it in the “ negation of negation, ”
but ignores the concrete content of this formal “ sameness, ” brought
out by his own quotations from Hegel. At the end, he still insists on
treating the negation of negation as a purely formal abstraction.
But the most important point still remains to be clarified. Not
only is the kinship between spirit and time far more fundamental than
Heidegger admits, but the “ relation” between them is not that between
two partners of equal rank. This is indicated by Heidegger himself in
the following way: “ As something objectively present and thus external
to spirit, time has no power over the concept, but the concept is rather
‘the power of time’ [ die Macht der Zeit]” [ .Encyclopaedia, § 258]. Assum-
ing that the preposition in this last phrase implies an idea of domi-
nance like that explicitly expressed by the “ over” used in the first part
of the sentence, it has to be granted that as something external to
spirit, time can have no power over it; but this in no way explains why
the concept should be the power of time. To find out how and why the
concept is the dominant “ partner” in the relation , the questioning
must be reversed and go back from time to the concept. How can the
concept be the power either of or over time? Certainly not as the con-
cretized spirit that appears and “ is there” in time. This being-there-in-
Temporality and Within-Timeness as the Origin of the Vulgar Concept of Time 361

time of the spirit, however, as Heidegger hints in a single obscure

phrase, is not the “ true,” the “ authentic” being of the spirit; the spirit
truly is itself only as the fully self-comprehending concept, and as such
it is itself “ true being. ” In its “ true being, ” however, the concept is eter-
nal and not “ something” that is “ there” in time. Hence Heidegger
rightly speaks of the spirit “ truly ‘existing’ outside time ” ( ausser der Zeit
“ seiender” Geist ) . Only this eternal, truly “ existing,” fully self -compre-
hending concept has the power to “ banish time, ” because it originates
the time that is “ merely there” as its own externalized, self-excluded
self. Fundamentally different as Hegel’s “ concept” and its “ eternal tem-
porality” is from Heidegger’s finite temporality of existing here-being,
the relation between the concept and time is the same as that between
temporality and world-time. It is the relation between the origin and
the originated. Moreover, it must be remembered that Heidegger’s
temporality is just as little an entity ( Seiendes ) existing “ in time” as is
Hegel’s “ eternal” concept. It is only because the origin disposes over
the originated that the concept can be the power over time. And con-
versely, as Hegel beautifully says, “ time appears as the very fate and
necessity of spirit, ” 25 for the spirit “ is not in itself complete, ” but must
seek to give “ self-consciousness a richer share in consciousness ” by con-
cretizing itself in its historical movement.
Heidegger’s interpretation fails to do justice not only to Hegel,
but to himself. This comes perhaps most clearly into view in looking
back to Being and Time from Heidegger’s later works. In the closing
subsection of this section, Heidegger compares Hegel’ s start from the
spirit that must first of all “ fall” into time with his own start from the
“ concretization ” of the factually thrown existence, in order to lead
back from it to its “ original ground” in temporality. But as Heidegger’s
later works amply show, the start made in Being and Time is not the only
possible one, nor one that Heidegger himself later thought to be the
best, whatever his readers may think. In this later works Heidegger
starts from the “ self-destining” self-disclosure of being, the concrete
understanding of which lies in a “ dialogue” with earlier thinkers. In
this, Heidegger is much nearer to Hegel than he would allow in the pre-
sent interpretation.
The relation between spirit and time, and so the “ origin ” of time
in the concept, does not remain as obscure as Heidegger contends,
though it is not fully and systematically worked out. On the other hand,
Heidegger rightly says that Hegel does not raise the problem of
whether the essential constitution of the spirit is grounded in “ origi-
nal” temporality. If he had, there would have been no need perhaps for
Being and Time.
 XVI
Conclusion:
An Attempt to Outline
Heidegger’s Answer to the Question
Asked at the Beginning
of Being and Time

The end of Division Two is designed to throw the reader’s interest for-
ward to the answer to be given to the question “ Is there a way leading
from primordial time to the meaning of being? Does time itself reveal
itself as the horizon of being? ” (SZ, 437). It is therefore pertinent to ask
whether and, if so, how far it might be possible to discern the answer
from what Heidegger has already written.
The solution of Heidegger’ s problem cannot be arbitrarily tacked
on to the first two divisions of Being and Time. It must rise from them
by inner necessity. If the ground has been well and truly laid, at least
the main outlines of the answer must be discernible there, especially
when some of Heidegger’s later works, in which certain hints are made
more explicit, are taken into consideration.
An attempt will, therefore, be made here to outline Heideg-
ger’ s answer as far as possible. The short sketch to be given will at
the same time serve as a concise summary of the most fundamental
features of the way in which man exists, as far as they have been dis-
cussed in this guide .

363
364 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

For a start, we shall consider two questions: First, is there any

problem left unsolved in Heidegger’s interpretation of time? If so, it is
reasonable to expect that the explicit working out of this problem will
lead to the answer to Heidegger’s central question. Second, does Hei-
degger give us any clue as to where the solution of this problem may
be sought?
As to the first question, it may be observed that a problem is
implied in the very first step Heidegger takes in his interpretation of
time. A disclosure of being-toward-an-end, Heidegger says, is only pos-
sible because man exists in such a way that he can come toward himself
in his possibilities. The whole problem lies in the “ can.” How is it pos-
sible that man can come toward himself at all? How and where does
this “ coming” originate? The answer to this question, we can reason-
ably assume, will explain the inner possibility of our understanding of
being from time, and so the meaning of being as such.
As to the second question , in view of the central methodological
importance of dread, it is not an idle guess to say that dread must pro-
vide the approach to Heidegger’s answer. But if all the ways in which
man can be are fundamentally timeish, then the basic mood of dread
-
must have a peculiar and preeminent time character. Does Heidegger
give us any precise indication of this? He does so on page 344 of Being
and Time: “ In the peculiar temporality of Angst, in the fact that it is pri-
mordially grounded in having-been, and only out of this do future and
present temporalize themselves, the possibility was shown of the pow-
erfulness that distinguishes the mood of Angst .”
Keeping in view the indications Heidegger gives in Being and
Time as well as elsewhere, we shall now attempt to summarize what is
most relevant to his answer.
We begin by considering once more the disclosing function of exis-
tential understanding. Its remarkable achievement is to forethrow possi-
bilities. Since being is totally unlike any beings, “ to understand being”
means something like this: to forethrow a possibility in which this sheer
“ other” to any beings somehow reveals itself. This possibility evidently
cannot be one among many others, but must be unique and incompara-
ble. What is the unique possibility that reveals itself in Da-sein’s, here-
being’s, existence? It is the extreme possibility of the sheer impossibility
of being-in- the-world-anymore. In this “ impossible ” a not is revealed
which in advance closes all other possibilities of existence. This not
belongs to each Da-sein alone: it is solely his own being that is at stake,
and not another’s. The harshness of this not is so incomparable and in
the strictest sense of the word abysmal that it can only rise from the abyss
of Da-sein’s being, from his thrownness into a world. It is the basic mood
 Conclusion 365

of dread that originally brings Da-sein face to face with the not that closes
not only the end of his being, but dominates it from the beginning.
What is revealed by dread, however, is not a mere negation, such
as we perform in a rational judgment. Dread does not reveal by negat-
ing all things, nor by announcing an impending annihilation of the
world, but by bringing Da-sein’ s familiar, taken-for-granted being-at-
home-in-the-world into the unfamiliar mood of an uncanny not-at-
homeness. In the not-canny, not-at-home, the not is elementally
revealed as a threat that does not come from outside, but rises from
being-in-the-world itself.
The way in which dread gives Da-sein to understand the not is
totally different from the way in which he acquires some information
about a fact. “ In fact,” Da-sein may not know about death, its possibil-
ity may be kept covered over in the flight of disowned existence, dread
may never be fully experienced in a lifetime; nonetheless, as soon as
and as long as Da-sein is, the not is openly or covertly revealed as the
extreme possibility in which he already is, and which is singly and
uniquely his own.
It is the throw by and recoil from this not that throws Da-sein into
the world and so originates the movement of his being. But what is the
world itself into which Da-sein is carried by the impetus of the throw?
It is revealed by dread as “ nothing.” The whereof of dread, the dread-
some, it was said , is nowhere and nothing. But it was made clear that
the nowhere is not an absence and negation of all places; it is the orig-
inal disclosure of place itself, of the pure where itself.
The world itself, as a fundamental character of Da-sein’s being, is
directly revealed in the nothing of dread. This nothing, however, is not
the absence and negation of all things, but the totally “ other” to things
-
as such. The incomparable power of dread is to bring Da sein directly
before the nothing ( world) itself. Face to face with nothing, Da-sein is
in one leap beyond beings as a whole, among them first and foremost
himself. The transcendence of Da-sein’s being is only possible as this
confrontation with the sheer “ other” to any beings. What comes to
light in this transcendence, however, is not something outside and
beyond the world , but precisely beings as the beings they are, that is,
in their being. It is the essence of the nothing to repel, to point away
from itself, to direct and refer to beings, as totally other than itself.
Only in coming to things from the disclosed nothing of world can Da-
sein understand them in their strangeness: that they are something,
and not nothing. And only in coming to himself from the utmost limit
of his being-in-the-world can Da-sein understand himself fully as a self
existing among other beings.
366 Part Three: Division Two of Being and Time

How is it then that Da-sein can come toward himself at all? The
movement originates in the throw by and recoil from the not revealed
by dread, which throws Da-sein into the world and whirls him away to
the beings he meets within it. But at the same time, it throws him for-
ward into the extreme possibility of death , in rebounding from which he
can come toward himself in his ownmost possibility. The forethrow not
only comes to a limit, but is thrown back by it: it is the rebound that
enables Da-sein to come toward himself in his possibilities, and so exist
primarily from the future.
But it would still remain inexplicable how and why this “ coming-
toward ” should be the primary mode of time, or indeed any time at all,
unless the not itself had a time-character. If, however, the movement of
man’s being is the original unity of time as future, past and present,
the whole phenomenon of time seems to be accounted for, and it is
hard to see what function remains for the not to fulfill. Heidegger
leaves one possibility open: with the not is disclosed time itself . As the
last sentence of Being and Time suggests, it is time itself that will reveal
itself as the horizon of being. This is the problem with which Division
Three would evidently have had to deal first, before the temporal inter-
pretation of the idea of being could have been taken in hand.
In the absence of an explicit answer from Heidegger, do we have
any hints from him where we might look for an answer ? He gives us a
hint in his analysis of conscience (SZ, 284 ). Conscience gives man to
understand that he owes his being, that he can never go behind his
thrownness and exist as the ground of his own being. In calling man
back to the not revealed in his impotent thrownness, conscience makes
manifest the never . According to the whole trend of Heidegger’ s
thought, the never cannot be a mere negation of time: in it is disclosed
the pure when, i.e. time itself. If, indeed, man constantly comes toward
and back to himself from the never, then the whole movement of his
being must necessarily have a time-character, or, as one might equally
well say, a when-character. And if the never is the horizon into which
man in advance looks out, it becomes immediately understandable why
he must pro ject all possibilities of being on to time, and why all artic-
ulations and modifications of being must have a temporal meaning.
The temporal interpretation of the idea of being as such, the
final goal of Division Three, remains for the most part obscure. On the
other hand, the way toward this goal is discernible both from the two
divisions we have of Being and Time, and from Heidegger’s later works.
Above all, there can be no doubt of his answer to the most basic ques-
tion: how is it at all possible for man to understand being? The signif-
icance-whole of world enables man to understand that beings are and
 Conclusion 367

what they are, i.e. their real existence and their essence. But the unity
of the world is itself only possible on the ground of time; and time
itself is revealed with the not that determines man’s existence as a self.
Notness and nothingness ( Nichtigieit ) are the fundamental exis-
tential characters of a finite being. But it must be fully evident by now
that when Heidegger speaks of the notness or nothingness of Da-sein,
he cannot mean what is sometimes understood by these phrases: that
Da-sein is a nullity in the world-all, that his being is of no account, or
that he comes from nothing and dissolves into nothing and his existence
is therefore meaningless and purposeless. Far from declaring Da-sein’s
being to be meaningless because it is finite, Heidegger shows for the
first time that an understanding of being, and with it, an understanding
of meaning and purpose, is possible only to a finite existence. Da-sein
exists finitely, not because he does not in fact last forever, but because
to him a not is in advance revealed , and this harsh , inexorable not alone
has the revelatory power to enable him to understand being and so
bring him into the dignity and uniqueness of a finitely free existence.
The disclosure of being calls Da-sein to the task of existing as the
place of illumination in the world-all. This disclosure, however, cannot
happen to some abstract Da-sein in general, but only to a single, facti-
cally existing Da-sein. The circularity of the problem of being has now
come fully to light: the manifestness of the not makes it possible for Da-
sein to understand being, but, on the other hand, his own factical self
is needed to make manifest the not. This is the ground for Heidegger’s
thesis that ontology cannot be founded upon an “ ideal subject, ” a “ pure
I, ” a “ consciousness as such, ” but only upon the factically existing Da-
sein, because he and he alone, in his own finite existence, is the place
of the transcendental.
 NOTES

PART ONE: WHAT IS THE QUESTION?

1. The word ontology is used throughout this book in the sense defined
by Heidegger. It is the inquiry into beings as beings. This inquiry considers
beings purely in what and how they are, i.e., in respect of their being. Hence a
second definition of ontology, namely as the inquiry into the being of beings,
is often used by Heidegger as equivalent to the definition given first. Ontology,
theology, logic, in their essential unity, constitute metaphysics as a whole. For
a discussion of the threefold unity of metaphysics, see, e.g., Heidegger’s lec-
ture, “ Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik ” ( ID, 37-73, “ The
Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics,” ID( E ), 42-76. A list of the
abbreviations of titles used in references is given in the bibliography ).
2. When the explanation of a key word has an essential bearing on Hei-
degger’s thought, it will be given in the main text, unless it would interfere with
the movement of an important passage. Purely technical remarks will be made
in endnotes.
3. The fundamental changes within metaphysical thinking would natu-
rally be given far more weight in a detailed discussion than can be done in this
short sketch. For example, in the Latin word substantia there lies already a pro-
found reinterpretation of the Greek idea of being as ousia. The term substance,
according to Heidegger, is thoroughly inappropriate to Greek thought. At this
stage, however, it is unavoidable to use a language that is familiar to the reader
from the best-known translations of Greek thinkers.
4. Heidegger’ s interpretation of Descartes’s cogito sum cannot be even
approximately dealt with in this short sketch. It should be noted, however,
that Heidegger is fully aware of the epochal change within metaphysical
thinking that began with Descartes. The discussion of Descartes’s “ extended

369
370 A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time

world ” in the first Division of Being and Time ( chap. 3, B ) is misleading

because of its incompleteness. At the time of writing, Heidegger intended
to publish a full treatise on the cogito sum as the second Division of Part II
of Being and Time. Although Part II has not been and will not be published,
Heidegger has repeatedly elucidated the meaning and importance of
Descartes’s principle in his later works ( HO, 80ff., 9 Iff ., G5, 86ff., 98ff.,
QCT [ “ The Age of the World Picture ” ], 126ff., 139ff. ). One of the besetting
difficulties for the student of Heidegger’s philosophy is to grasp that his
interpretation of the being of Da-sein accomplishes a radical break with the
subjectivity of modern metaphysics, in spite of all appearances to the con-
trary. When Heidegger speaks of the “ subject ” in Being and Timey he postu-
lates that the whole idea of “ being-a-subject, ” and with it, of “ being-an-
object , ” must be fundamentally rethought and interpreted in the light of a
new question of being.
5. The main outline of Heidegger’s interpretation of traditional philos-
ophy is clearly discernible already in Being and Time, and is amplified and
expounded in many of his later works, for instance, in Einführung in die Meta-
physik , Was heisst Denken?, Identität und Differenz, Der Satz vom Grund , etc.; also
in numerous essays and lectures to be found in collections, e.g., Holzwege and
Vorträge und Aufsätze .
6. The translation of Heidegger’s word Zeitlichkeit by “ time ” in the early
part of this guide is a temporary expedient that will be corrected at the first
opportunity. Similarly, the meaning of Da-sein and the renderings adopted for
it will be fully explained in the next part.

PART TWO, CHAPTER I

1. The noun Weltlichkeit and the adjective weltlich would ordinarily be

translated by “ worldliness” and “ worldly.” These words, unfortunately, have so
definite a meaning in English as to require supplementation by a warning or
an alternative in the context of Being and Time. The expressions “ worldishness”
and “ worldish ” have the advantage of prohibiting the substitution of a familiar
meaning for Heidegger’s, as well as permitting parallel constructions with two
other key concepts, räumlich and zeitlich. Their normal meaning, “ spatial” and
“ timely, ” would be misleading, and they will therefore be rendered as
“ spaceish ” and “ timeish.” As we shall see in due course, man is worldish,
spaceish, timeish , i.e. world-forming, space-disclosing, time-originating.
2. Since the words “ exist ” and “ existence” are indispensable in English,
they will occasionally be used in this book for beings other than man. They will
then stand in quotation marks and have the meaning of real existence. “ Exis-
tent ” and “ nonexistent ” will be used in a similar way.
3. This implies that all existentials answer the question How? It is evident
that the how must have a very much wider application in Heidegger’s thought
 Notes to Part Two 371

than it had traditionally. We cannot appropriately ask “ What is man ? ” and even
the question “ Who is man ? ” applies to him only as a factical self. The primary
and leading question concerning man’s being is “ How is man ? ”

PART TWO, CHAPTER II

1. For further light on the problem of world as it is posed by Heidegger

in Being and Time, see especially his Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics . On Hei-
degger’s interpretation of time § 35 of that work is especially illuminating.

PART TWO, CHAPTER IV

This chapter seeks to elucidate one of the most widely known themes of Being
and Time, as it is presented in Div. One, chaps. 4 and 5 B. In view of the great
interest of the theme itself and Heidegger’s treatment of it , special care has
been taken to follow his text as closely as possible, bringing to the reader, if
only in a summarized form, as many passages from it as could be considered
within the limits of this book.
1. Joan Stambaugh says “ tolerance.” [ Ed.]
2. Joan Stambaugh translates Gerede by “ idle talk ” and uses “ hearsay ” for
Hörensagen. [ Ed.]

PART TWO, CHAPTER VII

1. The difficulties of Husserl’s thought have already been pointed out. It

is a study on its own, and no short description can make its basic principles
genuinely understandable, let alone do justice to it. The reader who wishes to
go thoroughly into the matter might perhaps best turn to the first volume of
Husserl’s Ideen.
2. The “ as ” is not expressed in speech but constitutes the interpretation
given by what is said . For instance, the proposition “ the hammer is heavy,” by
defining the hammer in respect of its weight , lets us see it as heavy. The as
which constitutes the interpretation given in speaking is called by Heidegger
the “ apophantic ‘as’.” This is to be contrasted with the original as , whereby a
particular thing comes to our understanding as a theater, as a bus, in one word,
as a utensil of a specific character. This original as of interpretation is called
by Heidegger the “ hermeneutic ‘as’” (SZ, § 7and § 32; the discussion of mean-
ing [ Sinn ] above in Part One, sec. 2, is also relevant in this connection. Further,
for the meaning of “ hermeneutic,” see US, 120 ff., G 12, 114 ff., OWL, 28ff.).
3. The extraordinary fusion of thought and language that distinguishes
not only Being and Time but perhaps even more markedly Heidegger’s later
372 A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time

works, opens up a topic of great importance and interest. Its discussion , how-
ever, would lead too far away from the main theme of this study, and must be
passed over here.

PART THREE, CHAPTER IX

1. Joan Stambaugh uses “ Temporality” for Temporalität and “ temporal-

ity ” for Zeitlichkeit. [ Ed.]

PART THREE, CHAPTER X

1. The same thought was expressed by Heidegger already in Division

One: “ Da-sein is always its possibility ” (SZ, 42 ). The not-yet indicates the time-
structure of possibilities. Their peculiar noi-character was commented upon in
a preliminary way already in our discussion of Division One above in Part Two,
chap. I, sec. 1.
2. This remark seems to be at variance with Heidegger’s later thought
( e.g., HU, 69ff., W, 157ff , G9, 325ff., P, 248ff., BW, 206ff.). There Heidegger
explicitly says that living beings, plants, and animals, are not “ set free ” in a
world: they “ hang worldlessly in their surroundings.” The reason is that being-
in-the-world in the full sense is only possible when the differentiation between
being and beings happens. Living beings, according to Heidegger, remain “ on
this side” of this all-important differentiation. It is indeed astonishing to think
that even the higher animals, which stand in an extremely complex and pur-
poseful relation to other beings in their environment, e.g., to their prey, are
incapable of understanding them as beings in their own right, i.e., as beings
that are.
This discrepancy between Heidegger’s earlier and later thought turns
out to be only apparent when the present short passage is more fully stated.
What Heidegger says is that an ontology of life must be preceded by an ontol-
ogy of man. His fundamental constitution of being-in-the-world must be taken
as a guide for determining the constitution of purely living beings. Although
a suitably reduced form of being-in-the-world is not defined by Heidegger, we
may reasonably suppose it to be something like “ being-in-an-environment.”
This structure would have to be analyzed by an appropriate phenomenological
method. See GM, G 29/ 30, FCM.
3. This passage is one of the few in Being and Time that have a direct bear-
ing on practical decisions we may have to make. It might be well to examine it
thoroughly. What is the concrete situation on which Heidegger bases his analy-
sis? He speaks of the “ dying” in quotation marks to emphasize that the word is
not meant in the existential sense, according to which I am dying as soon as and
as long as I am , i.e. , death is constantly disclosed to me as my end. The dying
one is a sick friend who may be nearing the “ end ” in the ontic-biological sense
 Notes to Part Three 373

that Heidegger calls “ decease.” To “ persuade” the friend that he may “ escape
death, ” Heidegger argues, helps to hide both from him and from ourselves the
ownmost possibility of existence.
The more carefully the argument is examined the less satisfactory it
becomes. It turns on the ambiguity of “ escaping death,” which introduces the
suggestion that we are trying to relieve our friend of the “ being toward death,”
instead of expressing the hope that his decease may not be imminent. Such
hopes, whether justified or unjustified, undoubtedly often help us to put off
facing death to another day, but they need not necessarily do so. Heidegger’s
own concept of death in no way implies that the hope of recovery from an ill-
ness and the desire for a longer life are incompatible with a fully disclosed
being toward death. If they were, we would be faced with the absurdity of
rejecting all medicine as a thoroughly “ disowned” business, for what could be
more “ reassuring ” than good medical care? The reassurance is itself not the
least part of medicine, since the outcome of a critical illness may well be
decided by whether the sick man himself has hope of recovery or whether he
has given himself up for hopeless.
Would a resolutely “ owned ” existence take it upon himself to assure his
friend that his decease is imminent, and so perhaps rob him of his chance of
recovery? It would seem so, considering that he is in every way the opposite of
disowned existence. Yet this conclusion is not only insupportable, but goes fun-
damentally against Heidegger’s own interpretation of dying. If death is always
and only my dying, I alone am responsible for how I take it upon myself. It can-
not be for anyone else to force me into facing it. No one would know this bet-
ter than the man who has become transparent to himself in the finiteness of
his own existence. He could indeed greatly help others to face their death, but
solely by the courage and fortitude with which he faces his own, not by telling
a sick friend that it is all up with him.
4. With a view to Heidegger’s later time-analyses, it is useful to note the
strange circumstance under which the basic when-character of time first comes
emphatically into sight. It is evident that every “ point ” which we define in time
is a “ when.” For example, we “ fix” the date of a meeting for 4 p.m. on a cer-
tain day. In doing so, we so to speak freeze the “ flow of time ” at a selected
point. Were time not definable by a “ when,” it obviously would not be of much
practical or scientific use. What is so strange about Heidegger’s inquiry is that
it brings the “ when ” for the first time to our notice where it is completely inde-
finable. What significance this may have is impossible to see at the moment,
but it may be illuminating to remember it later on.

5. This passage confirms the comment on illness and decease made in the
first section. According to Heidegger’s own interpretation, a proper being toward
death has nothing to do with “ hastening” of decease or with taking no steps to
postpone it. It is also equally far removed from any romantic “ death wish.”
6. This passage is in itself a refutation of the frequent accusations that
Heidegger’ s so-called existentialism provides the philosophical basis for and
374 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

necessarily leads to Nazism. The basic feature of Nazism is its total and ruth-
less disregard of the existence of others, culminating in the assumption of the
right of one race to exterminate others. Heidegger’s active support of the Nazi
—
movement in its earlier days, and particularly his treatment of Husserl it is reli-
—
ably reported that he never greeted Husserl on the street after 1933 must be
regarded as an almost incomprehensible fall below his own thinking. If it
proves anything, it proves only that even the deepest ontological insight is no
guarantee that one’ s practical-ethical decisions will be equally admirable.
Whether this detracts from the thought itself is a disturbing and not easily
answered question. In 1942, when the disillusionment with Nazism may
already have set in , under threat of having the publication of Being and Time
prohibited, Heidegger allowed the dedication to Husserl to be deleted ( US,
269, G12, 259, OWL, 199-200 ). We may legitimately wonder whether Being and
Time would not be an even greater work than it is, had Heidegger allowed it to
be suppressed. Would it not have gained greatness in a different dimension
from pure philosophy ? And has this other dimension nothing to do with phi-
losophy? However that may be, one thing is certain: Heidegger’s thought nei-
ther justifies nor necessarily leads to Nazism any more than to any other polit-
ical-historical ideology. What it does is to show that the greatest extremes of
—
human conduct utter ruthlessness as well as utmost self-sacrifice— are made
possible by the existential constitution of man, from which alone they can be
understood in a fundamental way.

PART THREE, CHAPTER XI

1. Beda Allemann, Hölderlin und Heidegger ( Zurich and Freiburg: Atlantis

Verlag, 1954 ), p. 73.

PART THREE, CHAPTER XII

.
1 This remark leads us to expect that Heidegger would at least comple-
ment his elucidations of the “ I think ” with that of the “ I act.” This expectation
is all the more justified because for Kant the “ practical person, ” the “ moral
agent,” as the free, autonomous intelligence, is the “ authentic self.” But Hei-
degger, apart from the single reference quoted above, takes no further notice
in Being and Time of the practical-moral self. How would he justify this omis-
sion ? He would say that the ontological foundations of Kant’s practical self are
no more adequate than those of his “ theoretical ” or “ logical ” subject. Nor can
the two put together make up the proper foundations, for unless man’s being
is in advance conceived ( “ projected ” ) in sufficient depth and width to originate
and carry both the “ theoretical ” and “ practical ” self , a subsequent merger
between the two remains an ontologically bottomless undertaking. This
thought is expressed in detail on page 320 ( footnote ), where Heidegger says
that even if Kant’s “ theoretical reason is included in practical reason, the exis-
 Notes to Part Three 375

tential and ontological problematic of the self remains not only unsolved , but
unasked . On what ontological basis is the ‘working together’ of theoretical and
practical reason supposed to occur? Does theoretical behaviour determine the
kind of being of the person, or is it the practical or neither of the two and
which one then ? Do not the paralogisms, in spite of their fundamental signif-
—
icance, reveal the lack of ontological foundation of the problematic of the self
from Descartes’s res cogitans to Hegel’s concept of the Spirit ? One does not
even need to think ‘naturalistically’ or ‘rationalistically’ and can yet be in sub-
servience to an ontology of the ‘substantial’ that is only all the more fatal
because it is seemingly self-evident.” The soundness of Heidegger’s position in
this matter can hardly be denied. Nonetheless, it does not seem fully to justify
his ignoring precisely that aspect of the self that is not only central to Kant, but
is his nearest approach to the idea of an “ authentic existence. ” The gulf
between, say, Kant’s “ feeling of reverence” ( Achtung ) , in which a free
autonomous subject submits himself to a self-given moral law, and Heidegger’ s
“ resoluteness,” whereby a free existence holds himself in readiness to be sum-
moned to himself by the call of conscience, is not nearly so deep as that
between the latter and the purely “ logical subject.” [ For further reflections on
Kant on Ί act’ see Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie
( Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), G 24, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology ,
trans. Albert Hofstadter ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982 ), Part
One, chapter 3. Ed.]

2. This interpretation, however, is open to serious objections. While it is

perfectly true that Kant did not see the phenomenon of world in Heidegger’s
sense, he saw perfectly well that the coherent unity in which anything “ empir-
ical ” can meet us must be a priori constituted. This coherent whole is con-
ceived by Kant as “ nature.” The a priori laws, in distinction from empirical
laws, which in advance constitute the unity of nature, are prescribed by the
“ synthetic judgements a priori,” and their possibility is the whole problem of
the transcendental aesthetic and logic.
Without minimizing in the least the fundamental ontological importance
of Heidegger’s being-in-the-world, we must maintain that Kant concretely tack-
led the same problem with his conception of the a priori constitution of a
nature as such. The problem each thinker attempts to solve is this: How can a
finite self have access to and knowledge of other beings, beings which he has
not himself created and over which he has no control? Kant recognizes, no less
than Heidegger, that beings can become knowable to us only if they are in
advance made accessible to us in a coherent wholeness. The problem of the knowa-
bility of beings shifts therefore to the prior problem of how this coherent whole
itself can be a priori constituted , i.e., the problem of world for Heidegger, of
nature for Kant. It may be added that although the “ I ” of transcendental apper-
ception must be kept free of all “ empirical content,” it has an a priori content
in the categories , e. g., “ I think causality,” “ I think substance, ” etc.
The difference and similarity between our two thinkers could be demon-
strated by a comparative study of Kant’s “ highest principle of all synthetic
376 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

judgments,” and Heidegger’s “ definition ” of the phenomenon of world .

Kant’s famous formulation of the “ highest principle ” runs as follows: “ The
conditions of the possibility of experience as such are at the same time the con-
ditions of the possibility of the objects of experience ” ( Critique of Pure Reason,
A 158, B 197 ). Heidegger’s “ definition,” whose literal translation is almost
incomprehensible in English , may be rendered in the following somewhat sim-
plified paraphrase; “ As that for which one lets beings be encountered in the kind of
being of relevance, the wherein of self referential understanding is the phenomenon of
world ” (SZ , 86 ). A far from accidental similarity lies already in the structure of
the two pronouncements. As Heidegger points out , the decisive content of
Kant’s “ highest principle ” is expressed not so much in the italicized words, as
in the “ are at the same time” ( KPM , 111, G3, 119, KPM( E ) , 81 ). A similar
observation applies to Heidegger’s definition: its operative word is the “ As.”
A further illuminating comparison could be made by drawing into considera-
tion the Parmenides Fragment V: to gar auto noein estin te kai einai , “ the same
namely are apprehending and being.” As Heidegger says, the “ at the same
time ” is Kant’s interpretation of Parmenides’ “ to auto, ” “ the same ” ( WHD,
149, WCT, 243).
Finally, it must be emphasized that the objections raised here apply only
to the interpretation we have quoted from Being and Time; in his “ Kant book ”
and in Die Frage nach dem Ding, Heidegger does far more justice to Kant than
in the short passage above.
3. This sentence is typical of Heidegger’s perhaps all-too caustic criticism
of Bergson. What Bergson means by the “ externalized , ” “ spatialized ” time is
the time measured by spatial movements, e.g., of the shadow cast by the sun on
—
a sundial a phenomenon which, after all, Heidegger himself will have to deal
with. This is contrasted by Bergson with the “ qualitative time, ” the experienced
time of “ duration.” The distinction corresponds to Heidegger’s derivative,
“ measured, ” “ counted , ” or “ reckoned ” time and original time. In spite of Berg-
son’s insufficient ontological foundations, Heidegger’ s criticism seems of an
uncalled-for severity.

PART THREE, CHAPTER XIII

1. Heidegger translates Aristotle’s words lupê tis hê tarachë as a Gedrück -

theit or Verwirrung , depressedness or confusion. In W. Rhys Roberts’s Oxford
translation they are rendered by “ pain or disturbance. ” Heidegger’s “ depres-
sion ” seems to be chosen to emphasize his own interpretation of attunement,
according to which all moods and feelings reveal in one way or another the
“ weight ” or “ heaviness ” ( Last ) of thrownness. In being “ depressed , ” we directly
experience the weight of our being the thrown ground of our finite ability-to-be-
here.
2. See William J. Richardson , Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to
Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1967 ), 54.
 Notes to Part Three 377

3. The German text has an obvious error in the sentence “ Des Wozu
gewärtig, kann das Besorgen allein zugleich auf so etwas zurü ckkommen ,
wobei es die Bewandtnis hat.” The Wozu is identical with the Wobei and the lat-
ter must be corrected in the text to Womit . The next sentence makes it clear
beyond doubt that that is what Heidegger intended .
4. The preconcept of phenomenology is given in the introduction,
chap. 2, § 7, C.
5. Although Heidegger makes no explicit statement on this subject , it is
extremely doubtful whether he would think it possible to understand some-
thing in its bare existentia without any qualifications whatever. Even when he
speaks of something that “ only persists” ( nur besteht ), the only-persisting is pre-
cisely the mode of that something’s being, its way of being-in-time. At the very
least, being must necessarily be defined by time.
6. The interpretation given of Heidegger’s extremely condensed text
may be thought to go beyond what actually stands there. It is well warranted,
however, by earlier discussions of “ statement as a derivative mode of interpre-
tation” (§ 33), and of “ the traditional concept of truth ” (§ 44, a and b ).
7. Some interpreters might argue that in one of his late works Heidegger
turns against his own early views, for there he contrasts Aristotle’ s Physics as a
genuine philosophy with modern physics as a positive science that presupposes
a philosophy (SG, 110-11, G10, 92-93, PR, 63-64. The date of SG is 1957,
while FD dates from 1935-36 ). But this evidence is inconclusive, because it is
quite possible, and indeed likely, that by “ positive science” Heidegger means
only the actual research-work and its results, which are of course irrelevant to
the point in question.
8. See Kants These über das Sein ( Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1962 ), 9ff., 12,
33, W, 276ff., 281, 304, G9, 448ff., 453, 476, P, 339ff., 453, 360.
9. It would take us too far afield to discuss how, for instance, the future
is primarily constitutive of all identification. To identify something as the same
with itself it is not enough to compare it as it presents itself now with what we
remember of it in the past. For further detail see Heidegger’s discussion of
Kant’s “ synthesis of recognition in the concept ” ( Critique of Pure Reason, A
103-10; KPM , § 33).

PART THREE, CHAPTER XIV

1. On pp. 129-30 of US (OWL, 35-36, G 12, 122- 23), published in 1959,

Heidegger reminds us of the dominant ideas of the 1920s. A keyword in those
days both inside and outside Husserl’s phenomenological school was Erlebnis,
which , in default of an expression like “ a-living something, ” we are forced to
translate by “ experience.” Erlebnis , like experience, means both the experiencing
( “ a-living” ) of something and the experienced ( “ a-lived ” ) happening. As a the-
378 A Guide to Heidegger’ s Being and Time

ory of the “ connection of life, ” Erlebnis implies a reflexive movement, a bend-

ing back of life and of the “ lived” experience to an I , a relating back of the
objective to the subjective. In short, the concept of Erlebnis moves in advance
in the dimension of the subject-object relation and is therefore in principle sus-
pect to Heidegger. In the above paragraph, Heidegger touches on the funda-
mental reason why the current theories do not satisfactorily explain the “ con-
nectedness ” of the whole of here-being.

2. In anticipation of the difficulties of the present chapter, an interpre-

tation of the stretchedness of here-being has already been attempted at the
place where it could be most appropriately explained . See chap. 13, sec. 4.
3. This section is not essential to an understanding of Heidegger’s own
thought and, except for the passage briefly discussed in our commentary, is
therefore omitted from it.
4. This quite apart from the rightness or wrongness of “ superman ” as a
rendering of Nietzsche’s Übermensch. Cf. here Heidegger’s “ Wer ist Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra?” in VA, 101-26 ( “ Who Is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra? ” trans. Bernd
Magnus, in David B Allison ( ed.), The New Nietzsche ( Cambridge: MIT Press,
1985), 64-79; also The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 20, no. 3, March 1967,
411-31). This important essay seems to be unduly neglected in favor of the
much cited “ Nietzsche’s Wort ‘Gott ist tot’ ” in HO, 193-247, G5, 209-67, QCT,
54-112. For Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy see his Niet-
zsche , vols. 1 and 2 ( Pfullingen: Neske, 1961 ), trans. David Farrell Krell (San
Francisco: Harper and Row. 1979-1987), G43, G44, G46, G47, G48.
5. The philosophical break with Husserl came with the publication of
Being and Time in 1927, at which time the personal relations between the two
thinkers seem to have been close and not yet darkened by the Jewish persecu-
tions of the Nazi period.

6. Heidegger’s increasing preoccupation with language in his later works

has often been remarked. This development goes hand in hand with his his-
torical “ dialogues ” with other thinkers and poets. It may not be too fanciful to
think that the present passage gives us a first, barely noticeable hint of the rea-
son for this development.
7. Historicism ( or perhaps better: historism ) has had widely differing
meanings in Germany. One came into use around the middle of the nineteenth
century. It meant a way of thinking that seeks to understand achievements,
actions, and values from the historical situation in which they arose, and
believed that their material content and present significance can be sufficiently
explained by a historical account. Historism also denotes a philosophical trend
that sees in historicity the decisive and essential character of human existence,
or indeed of being in general, and conceives the world as history. Dilthey,
among others, represented this trend. Historism in this sense is not far
removed from Heidegger’s own position.
 Notes to Part Three 379

PART THREE, CHAPTER XV

1. In discussing the transcendental (i.e. according to Heidegger, the tran-
scendence-forming) function of pure space in the second edition of Kant’s Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, Heidegger remarks that “ time ” understood as the pure suc-
cession of a now-sequence, which is formed in pure intuition , “ stands in a
certain sense always and necessarily on an equal footing with space ” ( KPM,
191, G3, 198-199, KPM( E ), 135-36 ). The elucidation of a “ world- time ” makes
it clear that Heidegger identifies Kant’s purely intuited time and space with that
modification of world-time and world-space in which they lose their world -char-
acter and are levelled down to the “ indifferently ” intuited time and space of a
theoretically viewed nature. The same modification, it will be remembered,
takes place when the “ handiness ” ( handy reality ) of within-worldish utensils is
“ unworlded ” into the” objective presence” ( substantial reality ) of mere sub-
stances occurring in nature.
The passage in Kant discussed by Heidegger is B 291: “ Even more
remarkable is it that, in order to understand the possibility of things resulting
from the categories, and so to prove the objective reality of the latter, we need
not merely intuitions, but more than that, we need always external intuitions
This might easily lead to the conclusion that the primacy of time as the uni-
versal form of all appearing things, has fallen. Heidegger contests the validity
of this conclusion on the ground that the purely intuited space, no less than
the purely intuited time, in the sense described above, originates in the “ tran-
scendental imagination ” which , more fundamentally penetrated and inter-
preted, is the temporality of here-being.
2. The above discussion of time and space has an evident bearing on the
problem of time measurement in the theory of relativity to which Heidegger
refers in a footnote (SZ, 417-18). His aim , of course, is not to enter into a sci-
entific problem quite out of the range of a fundamental ontology, but to
emphasize what far-reaching inquiries are needed to lay bare the foundations
in which all scientific time-measuring is rooted. First of all, it is necessary to
explain world-time and infinity from the temporality of here-being, secondly,
to clarify the existential-temporal constitution of the discovery of nature and,
thirdly, to demonstrate the temporal meaning of measuring in general.
3. Ob-jicere, we recall, is to throw forward, before or against.
4. Aristotle, Physics, 219bf . The translation given by R. P. Hardie and
—
R. K. Gaye is: “ For time is just this number of motion in respect of ‘before’
and ‘after’ ” ( Richard McKeon [ ed.], The Basic Works of Aristotle [ New York: Ran-
dom House, 1941], 292 ).
5. But see GP, BPP, G24 , § 19. See also BZ, CT; PGZ, HCT. [ Ed ]
6. Plato, Timaeus 37d .
7. Heidegger remarks in a footnote that the traditional concept of eter-
nity in the sense of a “ standing now ” ( nunc stans ) is evidently drawn from the
380 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

common understanding of time and is delimited by the idea of a “ standing”

( constant ) thereness, i.e., Vorhandenheit. This assertion could be contested only
if “ Vorhandenheit ” were taken in the narrow sense of the bodily “ thereness ” of
a thing, but not if it is taken in the ontologically widest sense in which Heideg-
ger understands it. But the most intriguing part of Heidegger’s footnote is the
remark its author almost incidentally appends: “ If the eternity of God could be
philosophically ‘constructed’ it could be understood only as a more primordial
and ‘infinite’ temporality. Whether or not the via negationis et eminentiae could
offer a possible way remains an open question” (SZ, 427 ). What can Heidegger
mean by “ a more primordial temporality” ? If our own temporality originates
the time in which beings can come to light in their being, could a more original
temporality originate these time-bound beings themselves? If that were Hei-
degger’s meaning, it would come close to Kant’s intuitus originarias , the infinite
intuition that creates the concrete things and so knows them “ in themselves, ” i.e.,
without any need for the anticipating preforming of their being ( the object-being
of the object ) which our finite, uncreative intuition needs in order to receive the
already given things in an intelligible way. And so an objection that might arise
from Heidegger’s own interpretation of being, the objection that only a finite
temporality can disclose being, would be no objection at all, since an under-
standing of being must be alien and unnecessary to an infinite creator of
beings. These notions, however, which arise from an analogy with Kant’s intui-
tus originarias , are entirely speculative. Heidegger’s suggestion is too problem-
atic to allow any concrete interpretation. It seems likely, indeed, that if a philo-
sophical “ construction ” of such a more original and “ infinite” temporality were
possible, it would move entirely in the sphere of negativity. For what could an
“ infinite” temporality mean ? Certainly not the endlessness of a pure continuum
of pure nows, but rather the measurelessness that reveals itself in the “ negating
of the nothing, ” in the inconceivable and not revealed nothing of beings ( not-
beings ) and nothing of being ( not-being). This negativity need not mean an
absolute nothingness, but the repudiation of all possible measure and compar-
ison with finite temporality. The reference to the via negationis seems to confirm
this impression, but here again Heidegger deliberately leaves the matter open
and so prevents the drawing of definite conclusions. In surveying Heidegger’s
thought as a whole, we may doubt whether he thinks that a genuinely philo-
sophical construction of “ the eternity of God” is possible.
8. For an excellent critical article on this section see Howard Trivers,
“ Heidegger’s Misinterpretation of Hegel’s Views on Spirit and Time, ” Philoso-
phy and Phenomenological Research , vol. 3, 1942-1943, 162ff. With the most
important conclusion of this article I am in complete agreement, though not
with some of its minor points.
9. G. W. F. Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte. Einleitung in die Philoso-
phie, ed. G. Lasson ( Leipzig: Meiner Verlag, 1917 ), 133. [The Supplements
referred to in this note and in note 24 are not included in Reason in History: A
General Introduction to the Philosophy of History , trans. Robert S. Hartman ( Indi-
anapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953). Ed.]
 Notes to Part Three 381

10. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit , trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1979 ), 492.
11. Hegel, Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part Two, Philosophy
of Nature , trans. A. V. Miller ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970 ), § 258.
12. See Howard Trivers, op. cit., 162.
13. Hegel, Encyclopaedia, § 254ff.
14. Hegel , Encyclopaedia, § 257, Supplement.
15. Hegel, Encyclopaedia, § 254.
16. Hegel, Encyclopaedia, § 257.
17. Ideell is frequently used in German instead of the more ambiguous
ideal, which can also mean an ethical pattern of perfection, a meaning to be
excluded here. The opposite of ideell is real or reell, also material or materiell,
i.e., that which pertains to or exists by way of the concrete reality of nature, in
contrast to the ideell, which pertains to or exists by way of the idea, or spirit.

18. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller ( London: Allen & Unwin ,
1969 ), vol. 1, bk 1, chap. 1, C, 82-83.
19. Hegel, Encyclopaedia, § 259.
20. Ibid., Supplement.
21. Hegel, Science of Logic, vol. 2, 583.
22. Ibid.
23. Hegel, Phenomenology , 487.
24. Hegel, Die Vernunft in der Geschichte, 134.
25. Hegel, Phenomenology , 487.
 GLOSSARY OF GERMAN EXPRESSIONS

Ableben: decease Bewendenlassen: letting things be rele-

Abständigkeit : stand-offishness vant
Alltäglichkeit: everydayness Bewusstsein: consciousness
angänglich: approachable, touchable Bodennehmen: having gained ground
dread
Ansprechen: addressing Da-sein: being-there, there-being,
Augenblick : Moment, instant, glance being-here, here-being, ( man )
of the eye Durchsichtigkeit: transparency
Auslegung: interpretation , laying
out eigen: own
Ausrichtung- direction
, eigenst: ownmost
eigentlich: owned, authentic
bedeuten: to signify Einfühlung, empathy
Bedeutsamkeit : significance Ekstase: ecstasis
Befindlichkeit : attunement, self-find- Entdeckung discovery
someness Entfernung un-distancing, de-distanc-
,

begegnenlassen: encounter ing

Behalten: retention, remembering Entfremdung, alienation, estrange-
bei : near to, close to ment
benommen: enthralled, bemused , Entschlossenheit: resoluteness, resolu-
taken in tion, dis-closedness
Beruhigung, tranquillizing Entweltlichung. un world ing
Besorgen: taking care, heedfulness Entwurf: fore-throw, project
Besprechen: talking about Ermöglichung, enabling
Bestand : persistence Erscheinung, appearance
Beständigkeit : standingness Erschlossenheit: disclosure
bestehen : to persist Erstreckung, stretching
Bewandtnis: relevance Erwarten: expectancy
Bewegtheit : movedness es geht um: it is at stake

383
384 A Guide to Heidegger' s Being and Time

es gibt : there is ( it gives) Man ( das ): “ they, ” “ them , ” one, peo-

Existenz : existence pie
existenzial: existential Man-selbst : “ they-self ”
Existenzialien: existentials Mitsein: being-with
existenziell : existentiell Mitwelt : with-world

faktisch: factical Nachsicht : ( forbearing ) looking-to

Faktizität : facticity ( the other self ), un-caring tolera-
Freigabe: setting free tion
freigeben: to set free Neugier, curiosity
Fürsorge: care-for, concern, solicitude Nichtigkeit : notness, nothingness, nul-
Fürwahrhalten: being certain lity
Nichts: nothing( ness )
Ganzseink önnen: can-be-a-whole,
potentiality of being a whole öffentlich: public, published
Gegend : place, neighborhood , region Öffentlichkeit : publicity, publicness,
Gegenstand : object public disclosedness
Gegenwärtigung. making present ontisch: ontic
gehalten: held
Gerede: hear-saying idle talk räumlich: spaceish , roomy, spatial
Geschehen: occurrence, happening Realität : reality
Geschichte: history Rede: discourse, speech
Geschichtlichkeit : historicity Rücksicht : considerate looking-back
Geschick : common destiny ( on the other’s thrownness), con-
Gewärtigen: awaiting siderateness
gewesen: having-been, has-been, “ past ”
Gewesenheit : having-been Schicksal: fate
Gewissen: conscience Schuld: owing, debt, guilt
Gewissen-haben-wollen: wanting ( will- Schwebe: swaying
ing)-to-have-a-conscience Seiende ( das ): beings
Geworfenheit : thrownness Sein: being
grund-legend : ground-laying Seinsarten: modes of being
Grund -sein: ground-being Seinsverfassung, ontological constitu-
Grundverfassung, fundamental consti- tion
tution Selbstständigkeit: standingness of the
self, independence
in-der-Welt sein: being-in-the-world Sich-aussprechen: self-expression
innerweltlich: innerworldly, within- Sinn: meaning, sense
worldish Sorge: care
Spanne: spannedness
Kategorien: categories ständige Anwesenheit : standing pre-
konstitutive Momente: fundamental sentness
constituents Stä ndigkeit: stability, standing

Lebenszusammenhang, coherence or Überlegung, deliberation

connection of life Ü bersicht : overview
 Glossary of German Expressions 385

Überzeugung: conviction Vorhandenheit : substantial , objective,

um: for, around reality or presence
Umgang, dealings with , going about
( for something) Weisungen: directions, rule, law
Umschlag overturning weltbildend: world-forming, world-
Umsicht : circumspect for-sight imaging
Umwelt : surrounding world, for-world weltlich: worldish ( worldly )
umwillen: for the sake of ( for the will Weltlichkeit : worldishness ( worldliness )
of ) Wiederholung: repetition, retrieval
uneigentlich: disowned , inauthentic Wirbel : whirl
unheimlich: uncanny, unhomely, not- Wirklichkeit : actuality ( reality )
at-home
Zeit: time
Verendung perishing zeitigen ( sich ): to bring oneself to
Verfallen: falling, falling prey or cap- ripeness, to arise, temporalize
tive ( to the world ) zeitlich: timeish
Verfängnis: entanglement Zeitlichkeit : timeishness
Vergangenheit : past, goneness Zerstreuung scatteredness, dispersion
Vergegenwärtigung, bringing face to Zeug, utensil , useful thing
face Zeugnis: witness
Verstehen, Verständtnis: understanding Zuhandenheit: handiness, handy reality
verweisen: to refer Zu kunft : coming-toward, future
Verweisung, reference zunächst und zumeist: initially ( in the
Verweisungganzheit: reference-whole first place ) and for the most part
vorgängig, fore-going Zweideutigkeit: ambiguity
 INDEX

a priori, 45-46, 53, 67, 104, 272; see arising (.Entspringen ), 229, 247, 274
also fore-going Aristotle, aesthêsis, 112; analogy,
actuality, reality ( Wirklichkeit ), 9, 33 15-17; being, 3; fear, 238; Hegel
addressing ( Ansprechen ), 329, 331, and time, 354; phusis, 270; Physics ,
349 377; time, 344 - 45; time and
affection, 237, 240 space, 43; truth, being and
ahead-of-itself , 98, 145, 151-52, 157, beings, 106
159, 210, 216, 220- 21, 230; see articulation, 57
also fore-throw as, 112, 116, 138, 264-68, 283, 376;
aisthêsis , 112 apophantic and hermeneutic, 371;
alienation ( Entfremdung ), 89 as such, 209, 211, 223, 316, 345;
Allemann, Beda, 175 schema of presenting, 266
already, 56, 99, 151, 216, 220-21, attunement ( .Befindlichkeit ), 55-61,
249 83, 85, 93, 94-96, 161, 163, 221,
ambiguity, 87-88, 199, 243 236-42, 289; dread, 121, 153, 178,
analysis, static and genetic, 117 319; that I am, 182; timeishness,
Anaximander, 78 125
animal, 13, 16, 20, 150, 372; ratio- Augustine of Hippo, Saint, soul and
nal, 40 time, 349
anthropology, 14, 19, 150 authentic (eigentlich ) and inauthen-
anticipation, 159-61, 179 , 201-7, tic, 40-41, 163-227, 232-34,
210, 218, 231, 242, 325; see also 247-52, 278, 288-90, 291-92 ,
ahead and forward-running 333-35, 349; historicity, 295, 298,
anxiety ( Angst ) , see dread 302- 25; see also owned and dis-
apophansis, 111 owned
appearance ( Erscheinung), 110-11; average, 42, 79, 82, 84-85, 230, 290
Kant , 111 awaiting (Gewärtigen ), 231, 233, 237,
approachable, touchable ( angänglich), 242, 247 , 252, 258-61, 264 , 267,
57 286-89 , 330

387
388 Λ Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

being, to be ( Sein ) , xix , 5, 7, 13, 122-23, 125, 150, 173, 210, 216,
15-16, 22; analogy, 15-17, as 222; theory and practice, 199;
such, 209, 211, 223; and beings, time, 217-25; truth, 102, 104;
342; horizon of being, 126; how- unity, 123; whole, 37, 56, 97-100,
being, 8, 15, 112, 140; humanity, 120, 125, 241
49; I am, 13-15, 18, 20 , 32, 47, care-for, concern, solicitude
97, 115, 117; is, are, 17, 21-23, ( Fürsorge ) , 76- 78, 86, 192
30, 47, 61, 71, 115, 137, 223, categories ( Kategorien ) , 33, 43-44, 99,
254 -55, 267-68, 276, 328; mean- 116, 280; catégorial structure, 46
ing, 126; nothing, 136; substan- causality, 266
tial, 10; temporality, 134-35; tens- certainty, 155-57, 160, 204
es, 135-36; that-being, 116; time, charity, 77
126, 328; transcendens pure and choice, 194-96, 198, 203, 306, 322
simple, 256, 275; truth , 262; Christianity, 14, 309
unity, 15; what-being, 8, 15, 33, circle, 23-24 , 37-38, 95-96, 167,
113, 140 209-10 , 234 , 331, 367
being-here, see Da-sein circumspect for-sight ( Umsicht ) ,
being-in-the-world ( in-der-Welt-sein ) , 69-70, 78, 86, 243
25, 27, 45, 51-65, 74 , 89, 92-97, coming-toward , future ( Zu-kunft ) , 18,
187, 275-84, 289 36, 124 , 218- 21, 230
being near ( close ) to ( bei ) , 44, 64, 74, common sense, 70, 168, 210, 329
85, 99, 180, 216, 222, 244 , 275, communication , 308, 312
328 concealment, see covering over and
being-one’s-self , 27, 75-90 hiddenness
being-with ( Mitsein ) , 27, 56, 58, concept , 135, 350, 356
63-64, 74, 75-83, 180, 198, 222, connection , coherence of life
304 ( Lebenszusammenhang ) , 295, 315,
beings ( das Seiende ), 9, 11-13, 16, 22 , 319-20
71-74; as beings, 106; being, 342; conscience ( Gewissen ) , 121- 22,
created , 15; in the whole, 138, 163-75, 190-95, 366; call, voice,
—
176, 177 78; sinking away,
176-77; ta onta , 11-12, 110; see
163-75, 191, 193; care, 166, 167;
existentiell and existential, 192;
also ontological difference reprimanding, 191; wanting-to-
Bergson, Henri, 125, 226, 331, 376 have-a-conscience, 122-23,
bindingness, 180, 183, 319 195-96; warning, 190-91
birth, 120, 149, 295-96, 318 consciousness, 114-15, 117, 367
body, 20 considerate looking-back ( on the
boundary situation , 250 other’ s thrownness ), considerate-
ness ( Rücksicht ) , 78, 243
calculation, 15; death, 157, 158, constancy, 181, 183, 204 , 216, 226,
160-61, 184 , 333 246, 281, 304 ; see also stability
care ( Sorge ) , 25, 28, 35-36, 42, 64; conviction ( Überzeugung ) , 156
the between , 297; conscience, correspondence, see truth
122 , 163-75, 193; everyday, 105; covering over, concealing, 112 ,
ground-being, 122; selfhood , 155-56, 205, 272, 334 ; see also hid-
212-17; structure , 119- 20 , denness
 Index 389

creation, 14-15 deliberation ( Überlegung ), 263-64; if-

culture, 300 then schema, 263-66, 283
curiosity ( Neugier ) , 86-87, 243, 252 , depression , 56
289; sight, 243-44 Descartes , Ren é, 14, 45; cogito ergo
sum, 205, 369- 70; method ,
Da-sein, xix, 10, 12-14, 19-20, 23, 116-17
25- 27, 94-95; care, 97; con- destiny ( Geschick ) , 292, 321; com-
science, 164; day-by-day, 338; mon , 308-9; self-destining self-dis-
everydayness, 290-93; exists, 29, closure of being, 361
51-65, 150; factically existing, dialectic, 174 , 176
367; finitude, 62, 63, 120, 224-25; Dilthey, Wilhelm , 261, 299, 325
historicity, 323- 24 ; individuation , direction ( Ausrichtung ) , 44 , 55, 104,
161, 177, 256; meaning, xiv-xv, 185, 286
—
67 49; occurrence, happening
( Geschehen ) , 296-97, 315-16;
directions ( Weisungen ) , rule, law, 188
disclosure ( Erschlossenheit ) , 30, 58, 84 ,
stretching ( Erstreckung ) , 291, 91-97, 236, 272, 367; care, 120,
295-97, 334 ; temporality, 327-43; 195; death, 121; resolute, 123;
that I am , 178, 204, 223, 249; truth , 101-2, 105, 112, 306,
transcendence, 175, 177-78, 180 , 317-18
184-85, 275, 367; truth, 102, 104 , discourse, speech ( Rede ) , 55, 83-86,
198, 204; understanding of being, 102, 111, 289; communication,
96, 328; unity, 120 ; untruth, 198; expression, 312; conscience, 163;
whole, 38, 120, 123, 128, 145-62, temporality, 252-55
206; world-forming, ( weltbildend ), discovery ( Entdeckung ) , 102-3, 282,
53-54, 67, 184-85; see also free- 316-17
dom disowned , inauthentic ( uneigentlich),
datability, 330-33, 335, 338-41 37, 40-41, 60, 76, 78, 88, 92, 98,
dealings with, going about ( for some- 120, 123-24, 141, 216, 252 ,
thing) ( Umgang ) , 69 288-89, 290-92; attunement ,
death, 120, 121, 123, 143, 157, 158, 236-37, 242; death , 157, 159, 373;
160-61, 218, 295-96, 346-47; cal- falling, 252; future, 230-32 , 234,
culation, 157, 158, 160-61; cer- 237-38, 240, 245-47, 265, 278;
tainty, 155-57, 160; death wish, past, 237, 240-41; present, 232;
373; flight, 143, 153, 155, 157; understanding, 235-36, 239 , 258
impassability, 157, 160, 202; distantiality ( Abständigkeit ) , see stand-
impossibility, 152, 159, 160, 161, offishness
181, 364; indefiniteness, 157, 161, dread ( Angst ) , xv, 19, 23, 28, 91-97,
206; individuation , 161, 177, 202; 121, 152-54, 161, 166, 174, 178,
others, 146-47, 149-62; positive 196, 206, 239-42 , 289, 319,
repulsion , 181, 250, 365-66; pos- 364-65; indefiniteness, 206;
sibility, extremest, 121, 123, 124, whereof, 278
128, 152, 158, 162, 181; unrela- dwelling, 96, 200, 243, 293
tional , 157, 159 , 160, 202; when ,
157, 158, 161, 206 ecstasis ( Ekstase ) , 36, 124 , 223-24 ,
debt ( Schuld ) , see owing 230, 232, 249-50, 277, 289, 330;
decease ( Ableben ) , 150, 156, 373 ekstatikon , 223, 353; unity, 288
390 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

eidos, 66 face to face, bringing

empathy ( Einfühlung ), 76 ( Vergegenwärtigung ) , 263-64
encounter ( begegnenlassen), 233 facticity ( Faktizität ) , 36-38, 43, 48,
end , 120, 121, 124, 127-28, 145-50, 52, 60, 84 , 95, 105, 120, 125, 182,
181, 185, 295; endingly ( finite), 249-50
248; endlessness of time, 347 falling, falling prey or captive ( to the
entanglement ( Verfängnis ) , 89, world ) ( Verfallen ) , 27, 36-38, 41,
245-47 43, 59, 74 , 88-90 , 125, 170, 193,
enthralled, bemused, taken in 289; death , 154-55; temporality,
( benommen ) , 59, 79 243-52; timeishness, 125
environment, see surrounding world fate ( Schicksal ) , 292, 305-7, 317 , 321,
Erlebnis , 377-78 325, 334
erring, 88, 105- 7, 198 fear, 57-58, 92, 93, 153, 237, 289;
es gibt , 336 confusion, 238, 242
essence, 8, 13, 29-30, 33, 53, 114, feeling, see attunement
135, 272; existence, 33, 40, 114, finitude, 62, 63; closedness, 304; Da-
354; existentia and essentia of time, sein, 97, 106, 120, 159, 160, 224,
354 367; endingly, 248; freedom , 27,
eternity, 233, 346, 354, 361 39-40, 120, 41; time, 18, 124, 225
ethics, 162, 168- 70, 173, 189, 211 fleeing, 143, 153, 155, 157, 169, 205,
Europe, 13 215, 248, 318, 346-47
everydayness ( Allt äglichkeit ), 21, 27, for the sake of ( for the will of )
41-42, 52, 68, 79-88, 105, 120, ( umwillen ), see sake
128, 147; conscience, 164; Da- forbearing looking-to ( the other self ),
sein, 290-93; day-by-day, 338; un-caring toleration ( Nachsicht ) ,
death, 153; taking care, 125; time, 78, 86, 243
124, 328 fore-going ( vorgängig ) , 37, 38, 45-46,
evil, 151, 169, 191, 237, 240 53
existence, 9-10; Da-sein, 29, 32, fore-throw, project ( Entwurf ) , 36, 170,
36-37, 43-48, 51-65, 83, 84, 95, 175, 179, 210, 218, 364; fore-struc-
125, 159; essence, 33, 40, 114; ture, 59, 60-61, 70, 88-89, 97, 121
existentia , 47, 134, 135, 183, 276, forgetting, 235, 237, 238, 242, 252,
354, 357, 377; finitely free, 367; 258, 289
light, 38; real, 12, 14, 19, 29; forward-running, 159, 160, 201-7,
truth, 196, 202-3; see also self 234, 242, 298; resoluteness, 206,
existential (existenzial ), 42, 43, 45-46, 208, 216, 218, 325; understand-
52, 70, 84; conscience, 121; death, ing, 121
151-53, 158-62; existential-onto- freedom , 27, 39-40, 41, 58, 95, 104,
logical, 42-43, 44, 48-49, 52, 70, 161, 172, 177, 194 , 367; free play,
80, 82, 122 182; free will, 187; sake of ( for
existentialism , 19, 196, 249, 324, 373 the), 180; setting free, 160 , 274,
existentials ( Existenzialien ) , 43-46, 83 372; transcendence, 181, 195
existentiell (existenziell ), 46; existen- fundamental constitution
tiell-ontic, 120 ( Grundverfassung ) , 44-45, 65, 68
expectancy ( Erwarten ) , 231, 237, 240 future, 36, 136, 218-21, 230, 289; see
extension , 15 also coming-toward
 Index 391

Galileo, Galilei, 270 hermeneutical situation , 325

generation , 308 hero, 291, 311-14
God , 14, 189; philosopher’ s, 14, 18 hiddenness, 105-7, 113
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, xv historical situation , 182
good and bad, 187-88 historicism , 323; historism , 378
Greek-Western thinking, 14-15, 18, historicity ( Geschichtlichkeit ) , 174 ,
65, 66, 67, 74, 99, 101, 106 175, 212, 226, 290, 291, 292, 295,
grim ( das Grimmige ), 188 298, 298-326, 310; authentic, 295,
ground-being ( Grund -sein), 122, 143, 298, 302- 25
169-72, 175-87, 193, 215; found- historiography ( Historie ) , 299 , 314,
ing ( Stiften ) , 181-82; gaining or 317, 320-21, 323; antiquarian,
taking ground ( Bodennehmen ) , monumental , critical, 324
182, 304; grounding, proving history ( Geschichte ), 10, 13, 105, 125,
( Begründen ) , 182 150, 290-93; Hegel, 350; nature,
ground-laying ( Grund-legend ) , 201, 300; Nietzsche, 324; past, 301; vul-
212, 273, 340-41 gar understanding of , 300-2;
guilt, 187-95; see also owing world history, 301-2 , 315-26
Hölderlin , Friedrich, 84
handiness, handy reality holy, wholesome, healing ( das Heile ) ,
( Zuhandenheit ) , 27, 65, 72- 74, 77, 188
134, 262, 272; proposition, 103; hope, 242
sun, 337-38; utensils, 257-61, 266 horizon , 6-8, 94, 185-86, 286; being,
having-been, has-been, ( gewesen), see 126, 180; meaning, 207; nothing,
past 232; possibilities, 182; schema,
hearing, 84; conscience, 191, 199 267, 278-79, 283; time, 18, 125,
hearsay, 85, 103 126, 267, 277; understanding, 24,
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 60, 66, 128
125; Aristotle and time, 354; Housman , Alfred Edward, xv, 3
Aufhebung , 328, 350, 352, 358; humanity, 49
becoming, 353-54; being and Husserl, Edmund, xix, 26, 28, 42, 44,
nothing, 137; concept, 356, 357, 45, 75-76, 107, 109, 310, 374,
359, 361; consuming, 354-55; his- 378; intentionality, 114, 115, 116
tory, 350; intuited becoming, hylê , stuff, material, 116
353-54, 358; life, 359-60; nega-
tion of negation, 355-56, 358-60; I, 76, 79, 210, 212-17, 367; cogito ergo
nothingness, 137; power of time, sum , 205; Hegel, 357, 360
360; punctuality, 352, 355; space, ideal , ideell , 381
351-53; space and time, dialectic, idle talk , hear-saying idle talk
353; spirit, 328; time and spirit, ( Gerede ), 83-86, 103, 153, 243; tra-
328, 349-51, 356-61 dition, 304
held ( gehalten), 246, 247 if-then , see deliberation
Heraclitus, 117, 189 immortality, 151
here, 133, 161, 163, 166, 179, 199, impossibility, 121, death, 152, 159,
219, 230; there, 282 364
here-being, see Da-sein inauthentic ( uneigentlich ) , 40 - 41,
hermeneutic phenomenology, 113 76-77, 91, 232-40, 242, 288-89,
392 A Guide to Heidegger' s Being and Time

inauthentic ( uneigentlich ) (continued ) also addressing and discourse and

318, 320; attunement, 236-38, self-expression and talking about
242; falling, 252; future, 230-32, laying out ( Auslegung ) , 337; see also
234, 237, 240, 245-48, 265, 278; interpretation
history, 290-91; past, 277, leaping ahead ( vorausspringen ) , 77,
240-41; present, 232; understand- 197
ing, 233, 235, 238, 239; see also leaping in ( einspringen ) , 77
disowned letting, 58, 111, 112 , 118; letting
indifferent, 42, 77, 290; forbearance, things be relevant, 258, 261, 376
toleration ( Nachsehen ), 78 life, 20, 42, 105, 150, 210; connec-
infinity, time, 18, 124 tion ( Lebenszusammenhang ), 295,
inhabiting, 96 315, 319-20, 378; Hegel, 358; phi-
inheritance, 305-12, 319-25 losophy of, 299
initially ( in the first place ) and for logic, 10, 15-16, 100, 164
the most part ( zunächst und logos , 110, 111-12
zumeist ), 41, 290 lostness, 334-35, 337
instant , see Moment
intentionality, 114 , 115, 116 man ( Dasein ) , xiv- xv, 7, 10, 12-14,
interpretation ( Auslegung), 84, 208, 19- 20, 23, 25, 29-30, 47, 97
211, 262, 273, 329-30; schema, manifestness, 142
283; violence, 207; see also laying mathematical physics, 270-72
out mathematics, 10, 104-5, 273
meaning, sense ( Sinn ), 2, 6-7, 36, 42,
joy ( Freude ) , 56, 58, 242 112, 257; being, 126; beings, 272;
essence, 114; horizon, 207; onto-
,

Kant, Immanuel, 2, 43, 111, 116, logical, 123, 217-25; see also signi-
117, 134, 141, 232; anticipations fication and significance
of perception , 185; awe, 319; meaninglessness, 367
being, 135; categories, 280, means, by means of , 55, 61, 64,
283-84, 375; cause, 181; concept, 69-70
135; fortune, 307; morality, 169, measurement, 225, 379; astronomi-
309, 374-75; nature, 375-76; cal, 292, 337, 339-41
practical reason , 274-75; pure medieval philosophy, 14, 16, 135; see
reason, 279; respect, 319; schema- also Schoolmen
tism , 267, 283-84; self , 213-15; metaphysics, 10, 13, 16, 20, 72, 118,
synthesis, 263, 280; time, 313, 369; death , 151; beings, 138
342; time and space, 284-85, 379; method , 109, 112-13, 117, 142-44,
totality, 280; transcendental 158, 175, 201, 212, 273;
object, 185; transcendental self- Descartes, 116-17; historical sci-
consciousness, 310; will, 195 ences, 325; violence, 207
Kierkegaard, Soren, 233 mind , 19, 325
knowledge, 67, 104 mine, 120, 147, 333, 373
Moment ( Augenblick ), 222, 233, 241,
lack , 145, 147-48, 151 248, 250, 289 , 310, 313, 319, 334 ,
language, 71, 83-86, 102, 141, 173, 348
252-55, 329, 378; speech, 329; see mood , see attunement
 Index 393

morality, 162, 169, 172, 173, 187-89, ontology, 11, 22, 68, 369; essence,
198 272; fundamental, 11, 19, 25, 29,
movedness ( Bewegtheit ) , 176, 234, 46, 113, 173, 212; meaning of
297, 316, 325; movement in space, beings, 272; ontological-existen-
288 tial, existential-ontological,
42-43, 44, 48-49, 52, 70, 80 , 82;
nature, 15, 19, 44 , 45, 52, 53, 69, regional, 19, 113, 270; traditional,
269- 71; history, 300; time, 342 11-12, 19, 42, 71, 83, 99, 183
Nazism , 373- 74 order, in order to, 55, 61, 69-70, 278
necessity, 8; world, 139; historical, organism, 20, 42
10, 19, 29, 33 otherness, 138, 178, 180, 186, 280,
never, 171, 173, 174, 186-87, 304, 366 365
Newton, Isaac, 270 others, 56, 64 , 76, 99, 160; birth and
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 160; history, death, 120, 146-47
323- 24; Übermensch, 307, 378; onsia , 184, 369
will, 195 overturning ( Umschlag ) , 268
nihilism , 9 overview ( Übersicht ) , 263- 64
noein, 18-19, 66, 112 owing ( Schuld ) , 122-23, 167-75,
noema, 116 186-200, 202, 216
not , 8-9, 34-35, 39, 60, 63, 80, own, 38, 47
96-97, 98, 174, 249, 251, 304, owned, authentic ( eigentlich ), 38,
365-67; debt, 122, 170-71 40-41, 76-78, 83, 91, 95, 102,
nothing( ness) ( Nichts ) , 8-9, 93-94, 120, 123-24, 141, 143, 158, 163,
171, 175-87, 365; conscience, 167, 201-27, 245, 246, 248-50,
164 ; horizon , 232; negates, -
288-89, 291 92; attunement, 242;
138-40 , 170, 177, 206; notness, death, 158-62, 373; existence,
nullity ( Nichtigkeit ) , 39, 122, 173, 187-200, 274; future, 232-34,
224; shrinking back from, 176; 240, 252, 278; history, historicity,
time itself, 366; see also Hegel 298, 304-5, 315, 318-24; occur-
now, 187, 233, 329-36, 339-40, rence, 302, 314; past, 234, 238,
344-48; Hegel, 352-55 247; present , 233; science,
nowhere, 93-95, 365 274-75; temporality, 310-11;
understanding, 236
object (Gegenstand ), 15, 23, 68, 111, ownmost ( eigenst ) , xviii, 32, 35, 154 ,
282 157, 159, 193
obligation , 180, 188
occurrence, happening ( Geschehen ) , Parmenides, 106, 376
296-97, 305-6, 315-16, 325 past , 18; having been, 36, 124, 136,
on , to on, xv; ta onta , 11-12, 110 218-19, 234-35, 289
ontic ( ontisch ) , 48, 68, 97, 150; ontic- perception, 112, 115, 277, 282
existentiell, 46, 52 perishing ( Verendung ), 150
ontological constitution phenomenology, 6, 26, 28, 75-76,
( Seinsverfassung ) , 44, 46, 272 109-18; hermeneutic, 113
ontological difference, 178, 273, 276 phenomenon, 18, 109-11
ontological structure ( Seinsstruktur ), phusis , 270, 343
42, 84 physics, 270 - 72
394 A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time

place, neighborhood , region 320, 322; explicitness

{ Gegend ) , 93-94, 128, 199, 223; ( Ausdrücklichkeit ) , 311-12; Kant,
indifferent, 269; place, places, 140 313; philosophical, 313-14
plants, 20, 150 representation , 15, 206, 213-14, 263
Plato, 268 resistance, 260-61
positivism , 173, 271, 273 resoluteness ( Entschlossenheit ) , 83,
possibility, 8, 31, 32-35, 38-40, 59-60, 163, 196-98, 201, 203-4 , 252;
63, 65, 70, 80, 88-90, 145, 152, fate, 306, 318; forward-running,
179, 203, 238, 364; dread, 95, 319; 206, 208, 216, 218, 325
extremest, 121, 123, 124, 128, 152, response, 313
158, 162, 181, 193, 205, 234, 240, responsibility, 82, 122, 173
318, 364; historical, 13; potentiality, retention ( Behalten ), remembering,
32-33, 166, 203-4; world, 139 235-36, 258-59, 261, 264, 267,
practice, 65-66, 72; care, 200 275, 286-89, 330
preontological , 20, 207, 272 ripeness, 37, 124, 148, 222
prephenomenological, 113, 213 roominess, 284-89
present , make present ( gegenwärti- running away, running after, 247,
gen ) , 10, 37, 124, 205, 232, 236, 252, 289, 318
240, 242, 252, 253, 255, 258, 261,
263, 289, 330; presence, 12, 15, sake of , for the ( Umwillen ) , 31, 35,
73, 94, 232, 255, 281; schema of 39, 49, 51, 60-61, 65, 67, 68, 70,
presenting, 266; vis-à-vis, 232, 281 73, 76, 78, 83, 170, 173, 179-81,
presuppositions, 206-9 188, 221, 231, 258, 262, 263, 289;
proposition, 102-3, 112, 164, 197 founding ( Stiften ), 182; freedom,
publicity, publicness, public dis- 185; significance, 276-77
closedness (Öffentlichkeit ), xv, 41, scatteredness, dispersion
83, 85, 290-91; time, 124, 336-38, ( Zerstreuung ) , 232, 247, 317-18
340 Scheler, Max, 261
schema, 267, 278, 283-84; see also as
real , reell, 381 and deliberation and Kant
reality ( Realität , Vorhandenheit ) , 12, Schoolmen, 14, 16-17
18, 20, 26, 27, 29-30, 45, 53, science, 7, 10, 15, 67, 72, 104-5, 112 ,
71-74, 115, 134, 276; real beings, 150, 244, 261-62, 273, 322; con-
277; time, 345-46 science, 165; owned existence,
reason, 12, 319; pure reason, Kant , 275; see also mathematical physics
279 and physics
reduction, 115; phenomenological, seduction, 88-89, 154, 248
115-16 seeing, sight ( Sicht ), 78, 86, 112, 113,
reference ( Verweisung ), 65; reference- 115, 337
structure, 134 , 258; reference- self, 26, 40, 58, 76, 79, 83, 96, 123,
whole, 67, 197 159, 172; care, 212-17
region, 286 self-consciousness, 20
relevance ( Bewandtnis ) , 72 , 257-58 self-expression (Sich-aussprechen),
repetition , retrieval, recollection , 329-30
recapitulation ( Wiederholung ) , sense, meaning ( Sinn ) , 2; see also
225- 27, 234, 240-42, 310-11, meaning
 Index 395

significance ( Bedeutsamkeit ) , 61, 65, subjectivity and objectivity, 72,

276-77 -
141 42, 146, 282, 322, 328, 339,
significance-structure, 69, 72-73, 341, 343
197, 338 subject-object, 68, 282
significance-whole, 83-84, 104, 197, substance, 10, 12, 15, 17, 67, 83
366-67 substantia, 369
signification, 61, 69, 255 substantial, objective, reality or pres-
silence, 84, 163, 164, 166, 173, 196, ence (Vorhandenheit ), 14, 73, 134,
312 165, 184 , 272-73
situation, 199-200, 219, 232, 241, surrounding world, for-world
303, 334; boundary, 250; ( Umwelt ), 27, 60, 68-70
hermeneutical, 325; historical, swaying ( Schwebe ), 86
182 synthesis, 111-12, 116, 263, 280
solicitude, see care-for
solipsism, 277 taking care, heedfulness ( Besorgen ) ,
something, 8, 98, 138, 185-86, 281 64, 257-61, 289, 328, 349; defi-
soul, 13-14, 20, 213, 343; Aristotle cient modes, 64-65; everyday,
and time, 349; Augustine and 125; timeishness, 125
time, 349 talking about, discussing ( Besprechen ) ,
space, 7, 44, 45, 63, 67, 104-5, 128, 329, 331
132, 199-200, 223, 269-70, tautologies, 136-41
284-89; irreducibility of space to technology, 15, 67, 184
time, 341; predominance of time temporality, 124, 134-35, 137, 220,
over space, 293; truth of, 353 335, 343; attunement, 236-42;
spaceish, spatial ( räumlich ), xv, 44, care, 217-25, 222, 225; circum-
199 spect taking care, 257-61; dis-
spannedness ( Spanne ) , duration, course, 252-55; everydayness,
332-33, 338, 339-40 290-93; falling, 243-52; horizon,
spirit, 20, 44, 286, 300, 325; Hegel, -
277 78, 282; roominess, 284-89;
125, 328 schema, 282; transcendence of
stability, standing ( Ständigkeit ), 83, the world, 276-84; understand-
183-84, 188, 215, 246; standing- ing, 230-36
ness of the self ( Selbst- temptation, 88-89
ständigkeit ) , 216- 17, 296-97; see thematization, 274
also constancy then, 329-36, 339-40, 344-48
stake, to be at ( es geht um ) , 30-31, 35, theology, 14-15; conscience, 165
147, 152, 155, 160 theory, 65-67, 72, 86, 243-45,
stand-offishness ( Abständigkeit ) , xv, 261-76; care, 200; of knowledge,
81, 82 67, 275
standing presentness ( ständige there, 121, 133, 248, 281, 330; here,
Anwesenheit ) , 183-84, 216 282
stones, 20, 30, 84 there-being, see Da-sein
stretching ( Erstreckung), 291, 295-96, “ they,” “ them , ” one, people ( das
318, 332, 334 Man ) , lostness in, 41, 80-82, 133,
subject, 67 , 68, 76, 213-17, 293; tran- 153-54, 156, 166, 189, 197-99,
scendental, 114-17 205; hero, 291
396 A Guide to Heidegger’ s Being and Time

“ they-self " (.Man-selbst ) , 98,

122, 124, transparency ( Durchsichtigkeit ) , 243
133, 190 truth, 28, 66, 101-7, 198, 204,
things, 8-9; real and ideal, 9, 20, 27, 254 -55; being, 262; corespon-
44, 53, 71-74 , 94; things them- dence, 102-3, 266; existence, 196,
selves, to the ( zu den Sachen selbst ), 202-3; ontic , 101, 104, 211; onto-
84, 109, 112 logical, 101, 104, 182-83, 211;
thinking, 14, 264 ; I think therefore I phenomenological, 256; scientific,
am , 14 -15, 205; I act, 375 104 ; see also disclosure
thither and hither, 289 turn-round, from being and time to
thrownness ( Geworfenheit ), 20, 36-37, time and being, 128, 174, 187,
42, 56, 58-59, 78, 88-90, 97, 99, 305
120, 122, 153, 170, 176, 179, 204 ,
216, 218, 246, 248-49, 251, 280, uncanny, unhomely, not-at-home
283, 289 ( unheimlich ), xv-xvi, 23, 86,
time, 7, 8, 9, 18, 104-5, 116, 117, 96-97, 166, 176, 193, 365
132, 139, 175; astronomical, 292 , understanding ( Verstehen ,
337; calendars, 292, 333, 337; Verständtnis ), 6-7, 22, 24, 25, 36,
counting with, 327- 28; datability, 54 , 55, 58, 60, 70, 83, 96-97, 158,
330-33, 338-41; finitude, 124, 163; average, 13, 85, 89; being,
225; horizon of being, 126, 267, 161, 328, 364; existendell-ontic
328; infinite, 124; irreducibility of and existential-ontological, 196;
space to time, 341; measurement, forward-running, 121; interpreta-
225, 292, 327; not, 366; origin of tion, 262; temporality, 230-36;
vulgar concept, 327-61; phantom, timeishness, 125
343; predominance of time over undifferentiated, 42
space, 293; primordial, 141-42; un-distancing, de-distancing ( Ent-fer-
published, 124, 336-37; reckon- nung ) , 244, 281, 286, 289
ing, 336-37, 339-41; soul, untruth, 106, 198
Aristotle, 349, Augustine, 349; unworlding ( Entweltlichung ) , 269
standing, 187; subjectivity, utensil, useful thing ( Zeug ) , 257-61,
341-42; timeishness ( Zeitlichkeit ) , 266
XV, 42, 124 , 125, 134-35, 137;

transcendence, 341; unity of care, values, 73- 74, 172, 180, 188
123, 216; within-timeness, 327-61,
336-43; world-time, 338, 341-42; wanting ( willing)-to-have-a-conscience
Zeitlichkeit, 370 ( Gewissen-haben-wollen): see con-
totality, see whole science
tradition, 300, 304 when, 186-87; indefinite, 206; pure,
tranquillizing ( Beruhigung), 248 366
transcendence, transcendental, 44, where, whereness, whereish , 93-94,
60; consciousness, 114, 117; Da- 132, 365
sein, 175, 177-78, 180, 275, 367; whirl ( Wirbel ) , 89-90, 106
freedom , 181, 195, 308; ground- whole, wholeness, totality, 37, 38, 43,
giving, 183; philosophy, 310; sub- 51-53, 94 , 120, 123, 139, 145-62,
ject , 114-17; time, 341; world, 177-78, 204, 206, 280; see also Da-
181, 275-84 , 280, 341 sein
 Index 397

willing, 180, 195; see also sake of , for world-forming, world-imaging ( welt-
the bildend ) , 53-54 , 67, 184-85
with-world ( Mitwelt ) , 76 worldishness, worldliness
witness ( Zeugnis ) , 156, 162, 163 ( Weltlichkeit ) , xv, 26, 27, 42 ,
world , 25, 51-70, 71-74, 93, 289; 51-70, 94 , 124, 128, 338, 340
past, has been , 302; significance- world-time, 338
whole, 367; transcendence, 181,
275; world history, 315- 26; world Yorck, Paul, Graf von Wartenburg,
worlds, 140, 180 299-300; historical and ontic, 316
PHILOSOPHY

MAGDA KING

A Guide to Heidegger s
Beirut and Time
Edited by John Llewelyn

This is the most comprehensive commentary on both Divisions of Heidegger's Being

— —
and T ne, making it the essential guide for newcomers and specialists alike . Beginning
with a non-technical exposition of the question Heidegger poses "What does it mean
to be ?" and keeping that question in view, it gradually increases the closeness of focus
on the text. Citingjoan Stambaughs translation , the author explains the key notions of
the original with the help of concrete illustrations and reference to certain of the most
relevant works Heidegger composed both before and after the publication of Being
and Tinu
"Originally published in the early sixties as one of the first English-language commentar-
ies on Heidegger ’s B mg and Time , Magda King ’s masterful Guide has now been vastly
expandtd to cover the whole of B ing and Time, its renderings of Heidegger’s German
terms revised to correspond to Joan Stambaughs new translation of Bang and Time , and
its discussions of Heidegger 's later texts supplemented with references to his recendy
.
published earliest texts before B mg and Time In this expanded and revised edition
prepared by John Llewelyn , King’s Guide is now the best companion volume to use

"
—
with Stambaugh ’s new translation of B mg and Time ”
John van Buren , author of The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King —
Of all the studies of B ing and Time with which I am familiar, Magda King’s is the most
direct , the simplest, and the clearest. ”
— Joseph P Fell,J H. Hams Professor Emeritus Bucknell University — .
.. . .
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K
s volume in the SUNY senes in Contemporary Continental Philosophy
¡Xnnh J. Schmidt , editor

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