Introduction1

The security environment has changed drastically 1 rically from each other. This is a characteristic
in recent decades. Above all, this affects the way in of UAVs that applies to all multi-role capable
which violent conflicts are conducted, including by systems of this type. Comparing UAVs to a
military means. It can be observed that these battle tank, it is noticeable that the
conflicts are also supplemented with means from communicative attribution of the mission’s
other domains and thus interwoven with them. This purpose will generally be easier with the latter.
results in disputes involving multidomain hybrid UAVs also become all the more interesting for use
attacks, and reflects the new reality of war and in multiple domains of the hybrid conflict field due to
conflict management in the 21st century. their multi-role capability. They can be used for
Conflicts are becoming increasingly character- intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
ized by their inherent frictions and chameleon-like missions just as they can for kinetic attack
nature in general, which is something that military operations. Such a system can serve classical mili-
theorist Carl von Clausewitz recognized as early tary, propaganda, media or even psychological pur-
as the nineteenth century. This state of affairs poses, either sequentially or in parallel. In addition,
is all too apparent in the ambiguity of modern the degree of autonomy, if any, of these systems
hybrid conflicts. The obvious deception and con- creates the impression that UAVs could make their
fusion inflicted by an adversary or adversaries has own decisions (although this is not technically true at
become an important part of the hybrid conflict/ this time). This offers the hybrid actor the pos-sibility
warfare toolbox. The interplay between covert and to reject the responsibility for use of the system and,
non-covert modes of operation and the ambiguities for example, to blame a set action on the semi or fully
of one’s own actions play an important role in autonomous acting system and its technical
these forms of conflict. Hybrid conflicts are also components. Such a circumstance can be termed
char-acterized by their multi- and inter- technical deniability. The UAV thus pro-vides the
dimensionality, which underlines the nature of such hybrid actor with the agility needed for flexible
conflicts. mission and operation designs.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly However, this mutability and multi-role capa-
referred to as drones, duly represent a means of bility can also lead to misperceptions on the part
choice for hybrid actors. UAVs are airborne sys- of the actor facing the use of such a system. As a
tems that can be operated in conjunction with a result, it is possible that the conflict dynamics will
ground-control station in the area of the direct be catalyzed in one direction or the other by the
line of sight (LOS), or beyond this area (BLOS) announced or actual use of these systems.
via a relay/satellite link.2 UAV systems can therefore disruptively change the
UAVs favour particularly active and offensive action dynamics in conflicts, as they are able to ensure the
within a conflict and can thus help hybrid actors gain empowerment of actors in a way that was not
an operational advantage for the pur-pose of imposing possible in the past. UAVs can also be described as
their own will. UAVs allow the true purpose of the “the little man’s air force”. The systems can be
adversary’s actions to be only guessed at, as the procured and operated by conflict actors them-selves,
systems’ multifaceted application (multi-role capability) or they can be provided by third parties to be
helps obscure this true pur-pose of the deployment. deployed in the interests of the end user. This creates
As a result, the purpose of use and communication an “instant deployment value” that can lead
about it can differ diamet-

1 The views presented here are those of the author and do not represent the opinions of the organizations for which he works, or on behalf of
which he appears in public. All information used comes from publicly available sources.
2 Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century.

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 to premises about the mutual capabilities (striking as traditional (mostly military-dominated) devel-
power and readiness) between adversaries hav- opment and procurement processes have been
ing to be discarded with the outbreak of hostili- partly transferred to private structures, or com-
ties, and hence to considerations about balance pletely replaced by them.4 Thus, private UAV
and imbalance in the run-up to conflicts no longer sys-tem developers have been able to develop
appearing reliable. a differ-ent dynamic in the area of research,
Moreover, the reliable identification and attri- development and market readiness as opposed
bution of systems in use is often impossible at first to previous state-controlled approaches. The
glance because the patterns of use are often simi- development of the role of UAVs and their
lar in external characteristics (appearance, digital/ influence on the hybrid conflicts of our time will
electronic signatures, etc.), but can also be cam- be one of the key focuses of this study.
ouflaged in parts and in terms of ownership and UAVs are divided into different classes (high-
authorship through modifications and production altitude long-endurance (HALE); medium-altitude
processes (e.g. through computer-aided design long-endurance (MALE); and tactical unmanned
and 3D printing processes). aerial vehicle (TUAV)). This paper focuses primar-
The proliferation rate at which UAV systems ily, but not exclusively, on systems of the MALE
have manifested themselves worldwide to varying and TUAV classes. HALE systems are usually
degrees of technical maturity underlines the criti- very expensive to procure, operate and deploy,
cal nature of the trend towards the increasing use and are located in the sub-strategic area. They
of such systems in hybrid conflicts. This will likely currently have no significant influence on conflict
change hybrid conflict dynamics as a whole. The and prolif-eration dynamics, and are therefore not
escalatory capability that can be attributed to UAV dealt with in this study.
use unfolds asymmetrically-exponentially rather In some of the conflicts presented below,
than symmetrically-linearly, which distinguishes the sources repeatedly blur the lines between
their impact power from other means of engage- (i) UAVs, (ii) cruise missiles, (iii) ballistic missiles
ment in numerous dimensions of the hybrid con- and (iv) loitering munitions. This is partly because
flict field. they are often used together in these conflicts, and
This trend is accompanied by a change in partly because they can be compared with each other
the actors that take part in conflict-related in terms of their operational effect. Never-theless,
actions. Previously it was mainly state or these are systems that can be distinguished from
governmental organizations and actors. each other, and it is important to understand their
Lately, the quality of the non-state actor of different characteristics in order to measure their
violence, once supported or at least tolerated respective operational value more effectively.
by the state, has recently been increasing in Therefore, the essential differences will be briefly
its relevance in these forms of conflict. discussed so that the combination of these recon-
On the one hand, this is related to the successive naissance and effective means can be fully under-
erosion of the de facto bipolar confrontation, which stood in the conflicts, as well as the way they differ
seems to have given way to a superficially more from the UAV system as such, and its unique
diverse disorder since the end of the East-West selling points in hybrid conflicts (see Table 1).
conflict. On the other hand, it is related to the hybrid The tendencies of hybrid conflict/warfare will
nature of conflict realities, which has grad-ually be examined along with five selected conflicts,
instituted a struggle for zones of power and influence which can be distinguished from each other geo-
in various parts of the international arena. graphically and with regard to the actors involved
The role of technology in this struggle for influ- on the ground. The conflict regions are Ukraine,
ence and power has always been significant, 3 but Syria, Libya, Yemen, and the conflict over the
in today’s conflicts it has reached a new dynamic, Nagorno-Karabakh region.

3 Cf. revolution in military affairs (RMA).

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First of all, the underlying conflicts will be briefly be identified and any trends and special
outlined before the specific use of UAVs in each features in the conflicts from the perspective
case is discussed on the basis of examples and of hybrid methods highlighted.
types of operation. In addition, other actors will

TABLE 1. Basic characteristics of different weapons systems

UAVs are characterized by remote controllability and reusability. They can be equipped for different military and
intelligence purposes and can be deployed in various escalating ways. The versions used differ widely from each other
(e.g. in their dura-tion of use, service ceiling, and payload). UAVs are launched from launching devices, for example by
a catapult (in some cases in conjunction with a rocket propulsion system) or by conventional take-off on a runway.
Furthermore, some types have a vertical take-off and landing capability, which in turn reduces the infrastructure
conditions required for their operation and deployment. This enables their use from ships, for example. All of these
systems are guided or monitored for the most part by ground-based control stations, depending on their degree of
autonomy. UAVs can take over any of the operational scenarios of conventional military systems in the air force sector
and are appealing compared to conventional manned aircraft due to their relatively low lifecycle costs.

Cruise missiles are systems powered by a jet engine (turbine) and characterized by a flight path similar to that of a conven-
tional aircraft, as well as comparable mission speeds. Cruise missiles are available with a wide range of warheads and
sensors, which can be conventional or non-conventional. Newer versions of these systems can be modified in terms of the
explosive power delivered to the target in flight via satellite link. The unique selling point of these systems is a contour flight
capability, which is made possible in part independently of satellites by built-in inertial navigation systems, and which makes
the detec-tion of these systems difficult despite their comparatively low speed (compared to a fighter jet). Therefore, airborne
warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft are usually required for their detection (especially over land). Cruise missiles can
duly operate in a semi-autonomous mode. These systems can be deployed from the air, from the ground, or even from surface
and underwater vehicles. It is essential that the destruction of the system is intended when it is deployed, and this is
sometimes associated with high financial costs. During deployment, the sensors, communications equipment and all other
components of the system are irrevocably destroyed.

Ballistic missiles are characterized by their ballistic trajectory, their primarily kinetic purpose, the destruction of the
system during deployment,5 and their propulsion system, which can be based on either liquid or solid rocket fuel and
which deter-mines their possible uses in the long term. Missiles are designed to reach high speeds and can also be
armed conventionally or non-conventionally. Like cruise missiles, they can be launched from ground-, air-, sea- or
underwater-based platforms. They are usually detected by geostationary satellites. 6

Loitering munitions comprise a category of weapons and agents that can be used for different purposes. On the one hand,
this can be the kinetic effect in the target, but on the other hand it can also be battlefield illumination. As a rule, these systems
are not designed for reusability. Their operational added value in relation to rocket or tube artillery shells, for example, is that
they give the operational command an intervention on the time of effect after the weapon has been fired, and thus enable
a more optimal effect in the target with regard to a wide variety of aspects (e.g. avoidance of collateral damage).

5 Only civilian systems from Space-X are a current exception.

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