SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 204544. July 3, 2017.]

MARLON BACERRA y TABONES , petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J : p

The identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may

rest solely on the strength of circumstantial evidence. ITAaHc

This resolves the Petition for Review 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated
August 30, 2012 and the Resolution 3 dated October 22, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32923, which upheld the conviction of Marlon
Bacerra y Tabones (Bacerra) for the crime of simple arson punished under
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613. 4
In the Information dated January 12, 2006, Bacerra was charged with
violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613:
That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 15,
2005, at Brgy. San Pedro Ili, Alcala, Pangasinan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to cause damage to another, did then and theres [sic], willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously set fire to the rest house of Alfredo
Melegrito y Galamay, to his damage and prejudice in the amount of
Php70,000.00, more or less.
Contrary to Sec. 1, 1st par. of P.D. 1613. 5

Bacerra pleaded not guilty to the charge. 6

During trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Alfredo
Melegrito (Alfredo), Edgar Melegrito (Edgar), Toni Rose dela Cruz, and PO3
Marcos Bautista, Jr. to testify on the alleged incident. 7 Their collective
testimonies produced the following facts for the prosecution:
Alfredo and his family 8 were sound asleep in their home on November
15, 2005. 9 At about 1:00 a.m., he was roused from sleep by the sound of
stones hitting his house. Alfredo went to the living room 10 and peered
through the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to recognize his
neighbor and co-worker, 11 Bacerra. 12
Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying, "Vulva of your
mother." 13 Just as he was about to leave, Bacerra exclaimed, "[V]ulva of
your mother, Old Fred, I'll burn you now." 14 Bacerra then left. 15 Alfredo's
son, Edgar, also witnessed the incident through a window in his room. 16
Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 sat down beside the window. 17 At around 4:00 a.m., 18 he heard dogs
barking outside. 19 Alfredo looked out the window and saw Bacerra walking
towards their nipa hut, 20 which was located around 10 meters from their
house. 21
Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it. 22 Moments later,
Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning. 23
Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire. 24 Edgar
contacted the authorities for assistance 25 but it was too late. The nipa hut
and its contents were completely destroyed. 26 The local authorities
conducted an investigation on the incident. 27
The defense presented Bacerra, Alex Dacanay (Dacanay), and Jocelyn
Fernandez (Fernandez) as witnesses. Their collective testimonies yielded the
defense's version of the incident:
At around 11:00 p.m. of November 14, 2005, Bacerra was at the house
of his friend, Ronald Valencia. The two (2) engaged in a drinking session with
Dacanay and a certain Reyson until 1:00 a.m. of November 15, 2005. 28
Bacerra asked Dacanay to take him to his grandmother's house.
Dacanay conceded but they found the gate closed. 29 Embarrassed to
disturb his grandmother, 30 Bacerra asked Dacanay to bring him to
Fernandez's house instead. 31 However, Dacanay was already sleepy at that
time. 32 Hence, Bacerra requested his brother-in-law, Francisco Sadora
(Sadora), to accompany him to Fernandez's house, which was located one (1)
kilometer away. 33
Bacerra and Sadora arrived at Fernandez's house at around 1:30 a.m.
Fernandez told Bacerra to sleep in the living room. She checked on Bacerra
every hour. 34 At around 7:00 a.m., police officers who were looking for
Bacerra arrived at Fernandez's house. 35 Knowing that he did not do
anything wrong, 36 Bacerra voluntarily went to the police station with the
authorities. 37
In the Decision dated October 6, 2009, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial
Court in Villasis, Pangasinan 38 found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of arson:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
Marlon Bacerra y Tabones GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Simple Arson defined and penalized in Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1613 and, there being no modifying
circumstance, is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties
provided by law. CHTAIc

The accused is likewise ordered to pay the private complainant

P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED. 39 (Emphasis in the original)
Bacerra appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court. 40 He argued
that none of the prosecution's witnesses had positively identified him as the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 person who burned the nipa hut. 41

In the Decision 42 dated August 30, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the Decision dated October 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court in toto. 43
Bacerra moved for reconsideration 44 but the Motion was denied in the
Resolution 45 dated October 22, 2012.
On January 15, 2013, Bacerra filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 46
assailing the Decision dated August 30, 2012 and Resolution dated October
22, 2012 of the Court of Appeals.
In the Resolution dated January 30, 2013, this Court required the
People of the Philippines to comment on the petition for review. 47
On June 18, 2013, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, filed a Comment on the Petition 48 to which petitioner
filed a Reply 49 on January 27, 2014.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his
conviction based on circumstantial evidence, which, being merely based on
conjecture, falls short of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 50 No
direct evidence was presented to prove that petitioner actually set fire to
private complainant's nipa hut. 51 Moreover, there were two (2) incidents
that occurred, which should be taken and analyzed separately. 52
Petitioner adds that there were material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. 53 Petitioner also points out that
private complainant acted contrary to normal human behavior, placing great
doubt on his credibility. 54 Persons whose properties are being destroyed
should immediately confront the perpetrator. 55 Private complainant and his
family, however, merely stayed inside their house throughout the entire
incident. 56
Petitioner argues in the alternative that the mitigating circumstances
of intoxication and voluntary surrender should have been appreciated by the
lower tribunals in computing the imposable penalty. 57 Petitioner was drunk
at the time of the alleged incident. 58 In addition, he voluntarily surrendered
to the authorities despite the absence of an arrest warrant. 59 Lastly,
petitioner asserts that temperate damages should not have been awarded
because private complainant could have proven actual damages during trial.
60

In its Comment, respondent asserts that direct evidence is not the only
means to establish criminal liability. 61 An accused may be convicted based
on circumstantial evidence as long as the combination of circumstances
leads to the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
62

Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the

trial court's decision. For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating
circumstance, it must be shown that it is not habitual. 63 The state of
drunkenness of the accused must be of such nature as to affect his or her
mental faculties. 64 Voluntary surrender cannot likewise be considered as a
mitigating circumstance because there is no showing of spontaneity on the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 part of the accused. 65

Lastly, respondent argues that temperate damages amounting to

P50,000.00 was properly awarded because the burning of private
complainant's nipa hut brought some pecuniary loss. 66
This case presents the following issues for this Court's resolution:
First, whether petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt
based on the circumstantial evidence adduced during trial; 67
Second, whether the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and
voluntary surrender may properly be appreciated in this case to reduce the
imposable penalty; 68 and
Finally, whether the award of temperate damages amounting to
P50,000.00 was proper. 69 EATCcI

This Court affirms petitioner's conviction for the crime of simple arson.
I
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of
evidence with legal consequences.
The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence
involves the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the
offense. Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the
evidence.
Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any
inference. 70 Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a
fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence." 71
The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than
nor superior to circumstantial evidence. 72 The Rules of Court do not
distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances
from which the existence of a fact may be inferred." 73 The same quantum
of evidence is still required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 74
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a
fact from which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. 75 There is
no requirement in our jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. 76
After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any fact
that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and
beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3)
requisites that should be established to sustain a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 77
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, 78 and the
finding of guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence. 79 The
circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an
unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the
crime. 80
The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one. 81 The
proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt." 82
The crime of simple arson was proven solely through circumstantial
evidence in People v. Abayon . 83 None of the prosecution's witnesses
actually saw the accused start the fire. 84 Nevertheless, the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution, taken in its entirety, all pointed to the
accused's guilt. 85
I n People v. Acosta , 86 there was also no direct evidence linking the
accused to the burning of the house. 87 However, the circumstantial
evidence was substantial enough to convict the accused. 88 The accused had
motive and previously attempted to set a portion of the victim's house on
fire. 89 Moreover, he was present at the scene of the crime before and after
the incident. 90
Similarly, in this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa
hut. Nevertheless, the prosecution has established multiple circumstances,
which, after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson.
First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner
stoned private complainant's house and threatened to burn him. 91 Private
complainant testified that he saw petitioner throwing stones at his house
and heard petitioner say, "okinam nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!" 92
(Vulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll burn you now.) 93 Petitioner's threats
were also heard by private complainant's son 94 and grandchildren. 95
Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that
petitioner returned a few hours later and made his way to private
complainant's nipa hut. 96 Private complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m., 97
he saw petitioner pass by their house and walk towards their nipa hut. 98
This was corroborated by private complainant's son who testified that he
saw petitioner standing in front of the nipa hut moments before it was
burned. 99
Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that
petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire. 100
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner walk to and fro in front
of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire. 101 Private
complainant's son likewise saw petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut
before it was burned. 102 DHITCc

The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and
analyzed separately. Instead, they must be viewed and considered as a
whole. Circumstantial evidence is like a "tapestry made up of strands which
create a pattern when interwoven." 103 Each strand cannot be plucked out
and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture.
104 The events that transpired prior to the burning incident cannot be

disregarded. Petitioner's threat to burn occurred when he stoned private

complainant's house.
Also, there is no other reasonable version of the events which can be
held with reasonable certainty.
Private complainant could have actually seen petitioner burn the nipa
hut by stepping outside of his house. However, behavioral responses of
individuals confronted with strange, startling, or frightful experiences vary.
105 Where there is a [perceived threat or danger to survival, some may fight,

others might escape. 106 Private complainant's act of remaining inside his
house during the incident is not contrary to human behavior. It cannot affect
his credibility as a witness.
Furthermore, "the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a
function . . . of the trial courts." 107 It is a factual matter that generally
cannot be reviewed in a Rule 45 petition. 108 Petitioner failed to prove, much
less allege, any of the exceptions to the general rule that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review brought under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court. 109 Hence, this Court will not disturb the trial court's findings on the
matter.
II
For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the
intoxication of the accused must neither be "habitual [n]or subsequent to the
plan to commit [a] felony." 110
Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of
the accused were impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused's
capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts. 111 The bare
assertion that one is inebriated at the time of the commission of the crime is
insufficient. 112 There must be proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect
of intoxication on the accused. 113
There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that
petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime. A
considerable amount of time had lapsed from petitioner's drinking spree up
to the burning of the nipa hut within which he could have regained control of
his actions. Hence, intoxication cannot be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance in this case.
Neither can voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 circumstance.
Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element
of spontaneity. The accused's act of surrendering to the authorities must
have been impelled by the acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to "save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his [or her]
search and capture." 114
Based on the evidence on record, there is no showing that petitioner's
act of submitting his person to the authorities was motivated by an
acknowledgement of his guilt.
Considering that no mitigating circumstances attended the commission
of the crime, the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum,
imposed by the trial court, stands.
III
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be
awarded when there is a finding that "some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount [cannot], from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty." The amount of temperate damages to be awarded in each case is
discretionary upon the courts 115 as long as it is "reasonable under the
circumstances." 116
Private complainant clearly suffered some pecuniary loss as a result of
the burning of his nipa hut. However, private complainant failed to
substantiate the actual damages that he suffered. Nevertheless, he is
entitled to be indemnified for his loss. The award of temperate damages
amounting to P50,000.00 is proper and reasonable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision dated
August 30, 2012 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32923, finding petitioner Marlon Bacerra y
Tabones guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of arson is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, ** Mendoza and Martires, JJ., concur.
Carpio, * J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
* On official leave.

** Designated Acting Chairperson per S.O. No. 2445 dated June 16, 2017.
1. Rollo , pp. 8-35.
2. Id. at 36-51. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias
and concurred in by Associate Justices Isaias P. Dicdican and Nina G. Antonio-
Valenzuela of the Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. Id. at 65.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 4. Pres. Decree No. 1613, sec. 1 provides:
 Section 1. Arson. — Any person who burns or sets fire to the property of
another shall be punished by Prision Mayor.
 The same penalty shall be imposed when a person sets fire to his own
property under circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of
another.
5. Id. at 37.
6. Id.
7. Id.

8. Id. at 130-131, TSN dated January 15, 2007.

9. Id. at 37.
10. Id. at 132.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 37.

13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 160, TSN dated October 23, 2006.

17. Id. at 137-138.

18. Id. at 37.
19. Id. at 138.
20. Id. at 37.
21. Id. at 37-38.

22. Id. at 38.

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 139, TSN dated January 15, 2007.
26. Id. at 38. The following items were inside the nipa hut at the time that it was
burned: a television set, an electric fan, a mountain bike, catering items, and
an antique sala set. The estimated value of these items was P70,000.00.
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id. at 38-39.

30. Id. at 202, TSN dated May 18, 2009.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 31. Id. at 39.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 206, TSN dated May 18, 2009.
37. Id. at 39.
38. Id. at 36.

39. Id. at 39-40.

40. Id. at 66-84, Appeal Brief for the Accused-Appellant.
41. Id. at 72.
42. Id. at 36-51.

43. Id. at 50.

44. Id. at 52-64, Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals Decision.
45. Id. at 65.
46. Id. at 8-35.
47. Id. at 283-284.

48. Id. at 297-336.

49. Id. at 343-354.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id. at 21.
52. Id. at 22.

53. Id. at 11.

54. Id. at 25-27.
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id.

57. Id. at 11.

58. Id. at 27-28.
59. Id. at 29-30.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id. at 306.

62. Id. at 306-307.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 63. Id. at 331.
64. Id. at 331-332.
65. Id. at 332-333.
66. Id. at 333-334.

67. Id. at 11.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 12.
70. People v. Ramos , 310 Phil. 186, 195 (1995) [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
71. People v. Villaflores , 685 Phil. 595, 614 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First Division].

72. People v. Fronda , 384 Phil. 732, 744 (2000) [Per C.J. Davide, First Division].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See People v. Villaflores , 685 Phil. 595, 613-618 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division]; People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677, 696-699 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division].
76. See People v. Villaflores , 685 Phil. 595, 614 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division]; People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677, 696 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, First Division].

77. RULES OF COURT, Rule 133, sec. 4.

78. Cirera v. People, 739 Phil. 25, 41 (2014) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].
79. People v. Villaflores , 685 Phil. 595, 615-617 (2012) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division].
80. People v. Whisenhunt, 420 Phil. 677, 696 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division].
81. See People v. Ludday , 61 Phil. 216, 221 (1935) [Per J. Vickers, En Banc].
82. Id. at 221-222.
83. G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2016/september2016/204891.pdf> [Per J. Brion, Second
Division].
84. Id. at 4.
85. Id. at 5-6.
86. 382 Phil. 810, 820 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
87. Id. at 820.

88. Id. at 823.

89. Id. at 821.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 90. Id. at 822.
91. Rollo , p. 44.
92. Id. at 182, TSN dated September 3, 2007.
93. Id. at 136-137, TSN dated January 15, 2007.
94. Id. at 160, TSN dated October 23, 2006.

95. Id. at 182, TSN dated September 3, 2007.

96. Id. at 44.
97. Id. at 37.
98. Id. at 138, TSN dated January 15, 2007.
99. Id. at 167, TSN, dated October 23, 2006.

100. Id. at 44.

101. Id. at 138, TSN dated January 15, 2007.
102. Id. at 167, TSN dated October 23, 2006.
103. People v. Ragon , 346 Phil. 772, 785 (1997) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
104. Id.

105. People v. Mactal, 449 Phil. 653, 661 (2003) [Per J. Corona, En Banc).
106. Thierry Steimer, The biology of fear-and anxiety-related behaviors, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION
<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3181681/> (last visited on
May 16, 2017).

107. Torres v. People , G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017

<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
file=/jurisprudence/2017/january2017/206627.pdf> 6 [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].

108. Id.
109. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1.

110. REV. PEN. CODE, art. 15, par. 3.

111. People v. Bautista , 468 Phil. 173, 180 (2004) [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third
Division]; Licyayo v. People , 571 Phil. 310, 327 (2008) [Per J. Chico-Nazario,
Third Division]; People v. Nimuan , 665 Phil. 728, 736 (2011) [Per J. Brion,
Third Division].

112. People v. Nimuan , 665 Phil. 728, 736-737 (2011) [Per J. Brion, Third Division].
113. Id. at 736.

114. People v. Garcia , 577 Phil. 483, 505 (2008) [Per J. Brion, En Banc], citing
People v. Acuram , 387 Phil. 142 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
115. CIVIL CODE, art. 2216.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
 116. CIVIL CODE, art. 2225.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com