IRREGULAR WARFARE: COUNTERING IRREGULAR

THREATS

JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT

VERSION 2.0
17 May 2010

Distribution Statement A
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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 APPROVAL
This concept reflects the continued evolution in Department of
Defense thinking about future security challenges and outlines the
Department's approach to improving its capabilities and increasing its
capacity for countering irregular threats. As part of this effort, the
concept probes more deeply into the nature of these threats and the
approach required to address them, to include striking the appropriate
balance between population-focused and enemy-focused action. This
concept envisions a collaborative process by which all agencies
synchronize and integrate their activities and commit to a multinational,
multidisciplinary effort to counter irregular threats posed by state and
non-state adversaries.

The Department of Defense leads for the Irregular Warfare:

Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC) v. 2.0, U.S.
Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, co­
authored this concept. They developed it jointly with the Joint Staff,
Services, Combatant Commands, and Agencies through the use of joint
and service operational lessons learned, joint wargames, seminars,
workshops and other concept development venues.

~. -0
ERIC T. OLSON ON:MATTIS
Admiral. General.
United States Navy United States Marine Corps
Commander, Commander,
U.S. Special Operations Command U.S. Joint Forces Command

APPROVED

MICHAEL G. MULLEN
Admiral. United States Navy
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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 Table of Contents

Executive Summary .............................................................................. 3 

1. Introduction ...................................................................................... 8 
2. The Future Operating Environment ................................................. 11 
3. The Irregular Warfare Problem......................................................... 14 
3.a. The Joint Force Problem ............................................................ 14 
3.b. Factors that Compound the Joint Force Problem ....................... 14 
4. The Approach .................................................................................. 15 
4.a. Central Idea .............................................................................. 16 
4.b. The Ways: Irregular Warfare Activities and Operations............... 17 
4.c. Means to Counter Irregular Threats ........................................... 24 
5. Key Required Capabilities ................................................................ 35 
5.a. Methodology .............................................................................. 35 
5.b. Requirements ............................................................................ 35 
6. Implications .................................................................................... 37 
7. Risks and Mitigation........................................................................ 42 
Appendix A – References..................................................................... A-1 
Appendix B – Glossary and Acronyms................................................. B-1 
Appendix C – IW JOC Relationship to Other Joint Operating ConceptsC-1 
Appendix D – Consolidated Table of Capabilities .................................D-1 
Appendix E – IW Vignette: Countering Irregular Threats ..................... E-1 
Appendix F – Joint Assessment and Experimentation Plan ................. F-1 
Appendix G – IW Planning Between the Military and the Rest of
Government .......................................................................................G-1 

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 IRREGULAR WARFARE: COUNTERING IRREGULAR THREATS
JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Joint operating concepts describe how the joint force is expected to
conduct joint operations within a military campaign in the future. They
identify the broad military capabilities necessary to achieve the ends
envisioned by the concept. 1 Since the original version of the Irregular
Warfare Joint Operating Concept was approved in September 2007, the
understanding of irregular warfare has continued to evolve. Battlefield
experience, further reflection, and official guidance led to the decision to
update the concept in advance of the normal revision cycle. Events such
as joint and Service wargames, workshops, seminars, and joint
experimentation have all contributed to the development of thinking
about irregular warfare.

Official guidance has directed a continuing quest for better ways to

prepare for and address irregular threats. The Quadrennial Roles and
Missions Report, released in January 2009, cites irregular warfare as one
of six core mission areas for the entire joint force. 2 The Capstone Concept
for Joint Operations, also published in January 2009, states that we must
“build a balanced and versatile force” to accomplish a variety of missions,
especially to improve combat capabilities with respect to irregular
enemies. 3 The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 “recognizes that
irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare.” 4 In
addition, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 2009
Foreign Affairs article: “As secretary of defense, I have repeatedly made
the argument in favor of institutionalizing counterinsurgency skills and
the ability to conduct stability and support operations.” 5

This joint operating concept (JOC) is part of the effort to identify

and institutionalize these skills and abilities. The twofold purpose of this
document is to articulate how the joint force must operate to counter
irregular threats and to guide force development, materiel and non-
materiel capability development, and experimentation. To that end, this

1 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, 27 January 2006. See also Mattis, James N.,
Vision for Joint Concept Development, 28 May 2009 (see page 3, paragraph 1 for a description of how concepts
differ from doctrine).
2 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM), January 2009,

5.
3 United States Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), v.3.0, 15 January 2009,

28-29.
4 Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, December 2008, 2.
5 Gates, Robert, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no.1

(January/February 2009).

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JOC describes how the future joint force will conduct operations, when
directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to prevent, deter,
disrupt, and defeat non-state actors, as well as state actors who pose
irregular threats. The joint force must be prepared to address them
without compromising its ability to address conventional threats.

This document assumes that “whole-of-government” efforts are

critical to the joint force’s success in countering most irregular threats. 6
While this JOC does not presume to tell other agencies how to conduct
their activities to counter irregular threats, it does identify what the joint
force must do to support a whole-of-government effort. Since irregular
threats are not purely military problems, many of the responses required
are not purely military either. Moreover, due to the complex and
amorphous nature of these threats, many of these contests will not end
with decisive military victory. They are more likely to require long-term
involvement to remedy, reduce, manage, or mitigate the causes of violent
conflict. For those threats deemed to require a U.S. response, the joint
force must find multidimensional approaches in tandem with other
partners.

The irregular warfare problem is defined in this joint operating

concept as follows: Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents,
and criminal networks as well as states will increasingly resort to
irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to challenge conventional
military powers. Advances in technology and other trends in the
environment will render such irregular threats ever more lethal, capable
of producing widespread chaos, and otherwise difficult to counter. These
threats are enmeshed in the population and increasingly empowered by
astute use of communications, cyberspace, and technology, such that
their impact extends regionally and globally. Many of these conflicts are
essentially contests for influence and legitimacy over relevant
populations.

The joint force approach as identified in this joint operating

concept is as follows: To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular
threats, the joint force must seek to work in concert with other
governmental agencies and multinational partners, and, where
appropriate, the host nation to understand the situation in depth, plan
and act in concert, and continually assess and adapt their approach in
response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem. This will be
achieved through a sustained and balanced approach aimed at both the
threats themselves as well as the population and the causes and

6A whole of government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments
and agencies of the U.S. Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. Army Field Manual FM 3-
07, Stability Operations, October 2008, 1-17.

4
conditions that give rise to the threats. The goal is to enhance a local
partner’s legitimacy and influence over a population by addressing the
causes of conflict and building the partner’s capacity to provide security,
good governance, and economic development.

The approach in detail: The approach to the problem is to

prevent, deter, disrupt, or defeat irregular threats. Prevention is the
primary focus of effort, since it is preferable to deal with incipient threats
and the conditions that give rise to them. Once a threat is manifest the
joint force will aim to deter, disrupt, or defeat it.

There are principally five activities or operations that are

undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent
campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT),
unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID) 7 ,
counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO). 8 In addition to
these five core activities, there are a host of key related activities
including strategic communications, information operations of all kinds,
psychological operations, civil-military operations, and support to law
enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations in which
the joint force may engage to counter irregular threats.

In order to maximize the prospect of success, the joint force must

understand the population and operating environment, including the
complex historical, political, socio-cultural, religious, economic and other
causes of violent conflict. The joint force must adopt collaborative
frameworks to understand, plan, act, assess, and adapt in concert with
U.S. Government (USG) interagency and multinational partners and the
host nation. Adequate frameworks for such collaboration do not
currently exist in any codified or institutionalized form, although a
variety of ad hoc mechanisms have been used and various studies have
proposed such frameworks.

In planning and executing these collaborative operations, the joint

force must be prepared to give priority to the battle of the narrative;
undertake persistent engagement and sustained effort; build partner
capability; employ a calibrated approach to the use of force that weighs
its potential negative consequences; counter irregular threats’ leveraging
of cyberspace; overcome institutional seams to address the regional and
global linkages of many irregular threats; and enable scalable,

7 Security force assistance (SFA), a term that overlaps with foreign internal defense, is defined as: activities
that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their
sustaining institutions. (DoD Draft Instruction)
8 These five activities and operations are not listed in an effort to suggest sequence or a linear phasing model.

This concept advocates the execution of these five activities in concert with one another to achieve the desired
ends.

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integrated, distributed operations by general purpose and special
operations forces. 9 Maximizing the prospect of success will likely require
additional or improved capabilities as well as potential doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facility, and policy changes.

9According to the USJFCOM Draft Concept, A Concept for Joint Distributed Operations v.0.6.1, dated 28
October 2009, distributed operations are those characterized by forces widely dispersed in multiple domains
throughout an operational area, often beyond mutually supporting range and operating independently of one
another because of distance or differing missions or capabilities, but supported by a variety of nonorganic
capabilities. The critical distinction between distributed operations and joint distributed operations is the level
and responsiveness of external support to the distributed units.

6
 IW JOC Logic
The Irregular Warfare Problem: Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and
transnational criminal networks as well as states present irregular threats that are not readily
countered by military means alone. These threats:
• Are enmeshed in the population
• Extend their reach and impact regionally and globally through use of communications,
cyberspace and technology
• Compete with host nation for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations
• Require long-term effort to address the causes of violent conflict

The Approach: To prevent, deter, disrupt and defeat irregular threats, the Joint Force must:
• Understand in depth
• Plan and execute in concert with partners
• Assess and adapt in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem
This approach requires balance between defeating the threats and enhancing a local partner’s
legitimacy and influence over a population by addressing the causes of conflict and building the
partner’s ability to provide security, good governance and economic development.

Required Capabilities:
IW Operations & Activities: The ability to:
• Counterterrorism • Gather, assess, and share a holistic understanding of
the environment
• Unconventional Warfare • Integrate joint force IW planning with interagency (IA)
• Foreign Internal Defense partners
• Counterinsurgency • Synchronize joint force IW activities with IA partners
• Stability Operations • Provide support to host nation, multinational (MN), IA,
and nongovernmental partners
• Draw support from host nation, MN, IA, and
nongovernmental partners
Guiding Principles to • Develop within the host nation an enduring capability
Counter Irregular Threats: to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate
• Understand complex political, governance, and foster development programs that
address root causes of conflict and grievance
economic, cultural, religious, • Influence relevant populations by planning and
and historical factors executing coordinated communications strategies and
• Use collaborative frameworks by matching actions to messages
to plan, act, assess and adapt • Enable partners to plan and execute communications
• Persistent engagement and strategies and match activities and messages
sustained effort given long- • Conduct cyber operations to influence, disrupt, deny,
term nature of conflict and defeat adversaries’ activities
• Build partner capability to • Conduct local and regional assessments of operational
increase legitimacy of host effectiveness
• Evaluate and understand the potential effects from
nation both population-focused action and enemy-focused
• Balanced approach to the use action.
of force • Project or modify IW-related actions and activities
• Prioritize the battle of the with flexible force and operational constructs
narrative
• Counter use of cyberspace as
a safe-haven and means of
attack Ends:
• Overcome institutional seams A joint force with an improved ability to prevent, and
to address complex factors of when necessary, counter irregular threats through a
conflict balanced approach aimed at both the threats
• Enable scalable, integrated themselves, as well as elements of the operating
and distributed operations environment, including the population and the
causes and conditions that give rise to the threats

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1. Introduction
Irregular threats of growing reach and power will frequently confront the
United States and its strategic partners. 10 This joint operating concept
describes how the future joint force will conduct activities and operations
when directed to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat non-state actors as
well as state actors who pose irregular threats. 11 The concept also
identifies military capabilities to be applied as part of a “whole-of-
government” effort.

Given the prevalence of irregular threats in the current and

expected future operating environment, the U.S. military must become as
proficient in addressing irregular threats as it is in confronting
conventional or regular threats. 12 Historically, the joint force has focused
its efforts on defeating a state adversary’s conventional military forces.
Current and future adversaries are more likely to pose irregular threats,
however, and the United States must be able to respond to them. Once
considered largely the province of special operations forces (SOF),
irregular threats are now understood to fall within the purview of the
entire joint force.

The purpose of this document is to guide force development,

capability development, and experimentation by:
 Further developing the framework for military professionals to
think about irregular warfare (IW)
 Describing how the joint force will conduct future operations to
counter irregular threats and provide military support to
interagency and international efforts to counter irregular threats
 Identifying the joint force military capabilities required to
successfully conduct the IW core mission area
 Identifying potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel,
leadership and education, personnel, facility, and policy changes
 Informing Federal government agencies and partner nations of
joint force capabilities and support to whole-of-government efforts.

10 The use of the term “partner” in this concept may refer to one or more of the following, depending on

context: interagency, host nation, allied nations, coalition partners, other partner nations, sub-state
partners, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or private voluntary
organizations.
11 Non-state actors include individuals, violent extremist groups, and state-like adversaries, who may use

conventional as well as irregular methods. State-like adversaries refer to non-traditional adversaries that have
evolved to the point of attaining state-like power, authority, and influence over a population. These are
elements that have taken root in a population group and have grown to become the de facto governing
authority but are not formally recognized by the United States or the international community.
12 The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (DoDD 3000.07): Irregular Warfare establishes policy and

assigns responsibility for DoD conduct of IW and development of capabilities to address irregular challenges
to national security. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM) and other documents also
identify the need for increased proficiency in irregular warfare as a priority.

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 Understanding and appreciation of the challenges of irregular
warfare have matured since the publication of the Irregular Warfare Joint
Operating Concept v. 1.0 in 2007. This concept uses the official definition
adopted in Joint Publication 1-02, which describes irregular warfare as: “a
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and
influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect
and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of
military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power,
influence, and will.” 13

Discussion and debate continues regarding the use of the terms

“irregular” and “irregular warfare” to describe campaigns, equipment,
and training of personnel. In addition, some allies and other partners
object to the use of the term “irregular warfare” to characterize their
actions, or the actions of the joint force in non-hostile environments.
This concept also acknowledges that compartmentalized distinctions of
warfare rarely exist in practice and that forces may very well employ
some combination of conventional and irregular methods. 14

For clarity this concept follows the original usage from the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review in applying the term “irregular” to describe
the nature of the threat (i.e., the methods and actions of the
adversary). 15 Irregular threats include actors who employ methods such
as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities,
and insurgency. 16

While violent extremist organizations and other non-state

adversaries have turned to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to
counter traditional military powers, such methods are not limited to use
by non-state actors. Therefore, for the purpose of this concept, irregular
threats are those posed by a) non-state actors and b) state actors who

13 United States Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP

1-02).
14 The QRM and the CCJO note this blending tendency of categories of warfare. One characterization uses the

term hybrid warfare to describe a blend of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal aspects, namely: “a
full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations,
terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be
conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by
separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and
coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological
dimensions of conflict.” in Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars, by Frank G. Hoffman.
15 The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review introduced the term irregular as one of four types of threats faced by

the United States: irregular, traditional, disruptive, and catastrophic.

16 The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations v.3.0 observes that combatants “may employ methods ranging

from combined-arms tactics to guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, unconventional warfare, or
other methods usually considered ‘irregular.’ This full range of methods will be available to both state and
non-state adversaries, who are likely to adopt some combination.” Colin Gray, in Another Bloody Century:
Future Warfare, also includes insurgency as one of the “familiar branches on the tree of irregular warfare,”
225-226. He also notes that methods used by irregular forces may be adopted by regular forces.

9
adopt irregular methods. This concept recognizes that irregular methods
may also be used against state actors who present more or less
conventional threats, though this is not a focus of this JOC. The concept
recognizes that irregular warfare activities and operations are a
component of the military instrument of national power and may be
employed to address a variety of challenges as national policy directs. 17

Thus, the scope of this concept addresses activities and operations

involving irregular threats that are either present or nascent, as well as
the enablers of such threats including financiers, recruiters, and
logistical support. While such operations will occur in both steady-state
and surge conditions, they do not include conventional military
operations or normal peacetime military engagement where no threat is
present. 18 These operations occur in environments where there is actual
or incipient violence emanating from irregular threats.

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), which is the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s vision for how the joint force will
operate, informs this concept. 19 The central thesis of the CCJO proposes
that future joint force commanders will take the following three steps to
respond to a wide variety of security challenges. First, commanders will
address each situation in its own unique political and strategic context.
Second, they will then conduct integrated action according to a concept
of operations designed for that unique situation. Third, they will
continuously assess the results of operations and modify their
understanding and operations accordingly.

The integrated action that the CCJO envisions future joint force
commanders employing is a blend of four military activities – combat,
security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction – which will be
applied in accordance with the unique requirements of each operational
situation. Combat aims to defeat armed enemies; security activities seek
to protect and control civil populations and territory; engagement seeks
to improve the capabilities of or cooperation with partners; and relief and
reconstruction seek to restore or maintain essential civil services. 20 The
CCJO offers them as the four basic building blocks from which joint
operations are designed. The joint force commander will develop a
concept of operations that integrates these four activities. Most joint

17 Since not all actions undertaken to address these challenges are necessarily named military operations,

this concept uses “operations and activities” or “activities” to refer to those undertaken by the joint force or
any of its partner entities.
18 Steady-state is defined as cumulative day-to-day activities that are outside of major surge operations. Surge

is defined as a condition, which requires forces to be provided to support Combatant Commander operations
beyond routinely scheduled activities and results in exceeding Secretary of Defense and Military Department
rotation planning goals or Reserve Component access policies in order to meet that demand. The definition of
steady-state and surge are drawn from the Guidance for the Development of the Force.
19 United States Department of Defense, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations v 3.0, 12-21.
20 Ibid. 15-20.

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operations require some combination of these activities arranged and
weighted to accomplish the missions described in the subordinate joint
integrating concepts.

In response to the changing character of warfare and irregular

threats in particular, this concept first provides a description of the
future environment, followed by an operational problem set and those
aspects which pose the greatest challenge for the joint force. The concept
then proposes an operational approach that describes how the joint force
will operate in response to those problems in the environment we
anticipate. This in turn leads to a set of capabilities and implications that
will allow the joint force to operate in the described manner. The concept
then describes the risks and mitigations of adopting the approach. The
joint force and the Services will use this concept to identify and address
capability gaps and ultimately drive change in how the force will operate.

2. The Future Operating Environment

The 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) serves as one of the primary
source documents to aid the joint force in identifying the potential
challenges of the future security environment. 21 The JOE describes
major trends in demographics, globalization, economics, resources,
climate, and other areas that affect security, as well as challenges arising
from intra-state competition, weak and failing states, unconventional
threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advances in
technology, and increasing urbanization. The complex interplay of these
trends and challenges, together with the varied nature of cultures,
historical experience, leaders’ idiosyncrasies, and the occurrence of
events foreseen by no one, suggest that the operating environment will be
even more complex and ambiguous in the future. Taking the JOE as the
starting point, this section discusses three aspects that have particular
relevance for irregular warfare: the fluidity of the environment, the
adaptive nature of adversaries, and the centrality of the population.

The future operating environment will be one of constant and

accelerating change. Economic, demographic, resource, climate, and
other trends will engender competition locally, regionally, and globally.
Global integration, intense nationalism, and religious movements will
likely exacerbate the tensions created by each of these trends. Frequent
conflicts will erupt among sub-state ethnic, tribal, religious, and political
groups. State fragmentation, transnational crime, the globalized
movement of capital, competition for resources, and migration and
21 United States Joint Forces Command, 2008 Joint Operating Environment: Challenges and Implications for

the Future Joint Force, United States Joint Forces Command, November 2008. Also see the National
Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, November 2008.

11
urbanization will all contribute to the likelihood of conflict in this
complex and fluid environment. Of particular concern are failed and
failing states, which could lead to more “ungoverned spaces,” which
become safe havens for terrorists, criminals, and groups engaged in
other illicit activities. These “spaces” could be rural, urban, maritime, air,
or “virtual.” Also of increasing concern are rogue states that use proxies,
which allow the state to distance itself from actions and achieve strategic
aims simultaneously.

Thinking, highly adaptive actors will take advantage of the trends

outlined above and employ a combination of methods to include
criminality. Non-state actors will be a significant component of the future
operating environment, and irregular wars will be more common than
major regular or nuclear wars. 22 Non-state actors will become
increasingly powerful as they extend their reach and capabilities through
globalization and advancing technology, including cyber-warfare;
chemical, radiological, biological, or nuclear weapons; and sophisticated
information campaigns.

Often motivated by extremist ideologies or the desire to overturn or

challenge the established order, or simply exploit the larger state and
international system for their own gain, these adaptive actors may
possess some of the power of states and adopt state-like structures;
others will take the form of popular movements or distributed networks.
Regardless, these actors are less constrained, or even unconstrained, by
international laws and conventions observed by most states. These
actors present a unique challenge, as they do not employ the same
calculus as the states they oppose and will exploit the norms observed by
states.

State and non-state actors will find new and more deadly means of
conducting operations in all domains, to include land, air, maritime, and
cyberspace to further their aims. This may include piracy and smuggling
on the high seas; interruption of the flow of people, goods and services;
fostering illicit commerce and activities; and otherwise leveraging land,
air and maritime areas to ensure their freedom of movement and deny it
to others.

These actors will use cyberspace for a host of activities that

transcend state and regional boundaries. 23 Cyberspace provides a
worldwide virtual safe haven to recruit, train, finance, plan, and conduct
operations, as well as to magnify the impact of messages and actions

22United States Joint Forces Command, 2008 Joint Operating Environment, 46.
23 Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks,
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02).

12
through graphic, rapid information operations (IO). 24 Any group or
individual armed with the necessary knowledge and technology may
wage stealthy cyber attacks to disrupt state or global information
systems and networks, or obtain information that confers insight and
advantage. Effective countermeasures are difficult to develop and employ
with equal rapidity. The JOE states it succinctly: “the introduction and
employment of new technologies and the adaptation and creativity of our
adversaries will alter the character of joint operations a great deal.” 25

Since irregular warfare is a contest for legitimacy and influence

over the relevant populations, the populations carry particular weight as
both the battleground and object of the conflict. Stealthy adversaries
hide among the population, using it as a shield and willing or unwilling
helper. These adversaries often play on legitimate aspirations and
grievances against unpopular, abusive, or corrupt governments to gain
popular support and legitimacy, such as in an insurgency. At other
times, the “relevant” population these adversaries are trying to influence
could be very particular government or security apparatus officials,
commercial activities and businesses, or even groups outside of the host
nation and not the general public, as seen with irregular adversaries who
have infrastructure links to diasporas and criminal enterprises. These
adversaries target civilians to intimidate and coerce them, and expose the
inability of the state to provide protection.

Given the psychological and political dimensions of the contest,

perceptions are as important as any physical reality of the battlefield.
Adept adversaries plan their actions around sophisticated
communications strategies enabled by the globalization of information
and technology. 26 In this age of instant communication, actors have
become proficient at crafting their accounts of events into a compelling
story or narrative. The intent of this narrative is to influence not only the
local population but the global community as well. The battle of the
narrative, as this struggle for influence has been called, is waged
primarily through critical elements of the population who have formal or
informal power or standing to sway the sentiments or induce the
compliance of the general population. 27

24 Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations defines IO as: “The integrated employment of the core

capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP),
military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and
related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision
making while protecting our own.”
25 United States Joint Forces Command, 2008 Joint Operating Environment, 3.
26 Ibid. 39.
27 The “battle of the narrative,” an idea further developed in section 4.c. of this document, is an informal term

meant to denote efforts by the joint force and its interagency and other partners to counter the
message/narrative that the adversary socializes to win favor with the population. An effective counter-
narrative is based in real grievances that resonate with the relevant population.

13
3. The Irregular Warfare Problem
In the 21st century’s complex operating environment, adaptive
adversaries present irregular threats that seriously challenge military-
only responses in what are essentially contests for influence and
legitimacy. Irregular threats including terrorists, insurgents, and
criminal networks are enmeshed in the population and are increasingly
empowered by astute use of communications, cyberspace, and
technology to extend their reach regionally and globally. Subversion and
terrorism are not readily countered by military means alone, just as
legitimacy and influence cannot be achieved solely by rapid, decisive
application of military power.

Since the problem is not purely a military one, the approach is also
not purely military. Due to the nature of these complex and amorphous
threats, these contests are unlikely to end with decisive military victory.
Success will more often be defined by long-term involvement to remedy,
reduce, manage, or mitigate the conflict and its causes. The joint force
thus must find multidimensional approaches in tandem with other
partners to solve them, when directed by the President to do so.

3.a. The Joint Force Problem

How should the joint force operate to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat
irregular threats in conjunction with other governmental agencies and
multinational partners, and support efforts to address the underlying
causes of conflict and win the contest for legitimacy and influence?

3.b. Factors that Compound the Joint Force Problem

Irregular threats present the following challenges for the joint force:
 The complex political, cultural, religious, and historical factors and
diverse populations involved in each conflict are difficult to
understand in sufficient depth
 The non-military nature of many aspects of the conflict fall outside
the sole competence of the joint force
 Many irregular threats are proficient in waging the battle of the
narrative
 The protracted nature of the conflict tests U.S. staying power;
adversaries aim to survive and outlast rather than defeat the joint
force outright
 The host-nation government or local partner often possess limited
ability to meet their populations’ security, governance, and
economic needs, and otherwise address causes of conflict, which in
turn affects political legitimacy
 Non-state actors leverage cyberspace as an operational safe haven
and as a means to attack

14
  The application of military force, while often necessary, can be
used by adversaries to rally opposition, and excessive use of force
can outweigh any gains derived from military power
 Irregular threats operate as networks with regional and global
linkages that enable more rapid, sustained and stealthy action,
and transcend governments’ institutional boundaries 28
 The varied and decentralized nature and organizational structure
of irregular threats demand versatile and agile joint forces and
organizations that are able to adapt to the complexity of the threat.

4. The Approach
The approach describes how the joint force and its partners prevent, and
when directed, counter irregular threats through a variety of methods
aimed at changing the character of the operating environment, including
the critical segments of the relevant populations, the threats themselves,
and the causes and conditions that give rise to these threats. The
approach outlined here consists of ends, ways, and means to counter
irregular threats. For the purposes of this JOC, ends are the objectives or
desired outcomes; ways are specific actions that the joint force will
undertake to reach those outcomes; and means are the methods and
capabilities required to execute the ways.

28 Networks include internal and external support mechanisms and agencies.

15
The ends are to prevent, deter, disrupt, or defeat irregular threats.
Prevention is a primary focus of effort, since it is preferable to deal with
incipient threats and the conditions that give rise to them. Once a threat
is manifest the joint force will aim to deter, disrupt, or defeat it. Deterring
irregular threats requires new approaches that take into account the
nature of non-state groups’ leadership, motivations, and means of
communicating. 29 In some cases, disruption, mitigation, or suppression
may be the most that can be accomplished to degrade or limit the
adversary’s ability to cause harm. In other cases irregular threats may be
defeated by swift and precise military action, but most often a long-term
focus on the causes and conditions will be required for eventual success.
The strategic measures of success are the degree to which a) the
influence and control of the relevant populations have been wrested from
the adversary and b) the legitimacy and credibility conferred on the
political authorities opposing the adversary have been increased.

The ways are principally five activities or operations that are undertaken
in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent campaign to
address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare
(UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and
stability operations (SO).

The means are collaborative frameworks for the joint force to act with its
partners to understand the problem in depth, plan and execute activities
and operations, and assess and adapt continuously to achieve the
desired outcomes, as well as key elements that characterize effective joint
force operations against irregular threats, and their corresponding
capabilities.

4.a. Central Idea

To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, the U.S. military
will apply some blend of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare,
foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. To
carry out these activities successfully, the joint force must collaborate
with other governmental agencies, multinational partners, and, where
appropriate, the host nation to understand the situation in depth, act in
concert, and continually assess and adapt their approach in response to
the dynamic and complex nature of the problem. The contest for
legitimacy and influence over a population will be won primarily through

29 Amorphous leadership, nihilistic or millennial motivations or stealthy communications all pose challenges

for deterring irregular threats. It is difficult, for example, to design measures that will deter adversaries bent
on self-destruction or willing to absorb mass casualties.

16
persistent effort to enable a legitimate and capable local partner to
address the conflict’s causes and provide security, good governance, and
economic development. Success requires an appropriate balance of
population-focused and threat-focused action, special emphasis on a
strategy of continuous communication, offensive and defensive
cyberspace measures, regional and global coordination across
institutional seams, and tailored combinations of capable forces to
conduct these varied missions.

4.b. The Ways: Irregular Warfare Activities and Operations

The principal way that the joint force will counter irregular threats in
both steady-state and surge conditions is by some combination of
counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense,
counterinsurgency, and stability operations. These are the preferred
activities for addressing irregular threats because they are typically
sustained activities that focus on the population and are conducted with
other partners. Rather than treating them as five separate activities or
operations, however, the joint force will blend these complementary
activities into a coherent campaign tailored to the specific circumstances.
The five activities may be undertaken in sequence, in parallel, in partial
or blended form as needed to address the specific circumstances. This
holistic application of the five activities characterizes the approach to
irregular threats, which have often proven impervious to the singular
application of any one of the five. 30 Counterterrorism operations, for
example, do not normally eradicate the threat or engender lasting
stability without complementary efforts to address drivers of conflict and
build host-nation capacity.

This concept recognizes that these five IW activities may also be

applied outside the arena of irregular threats, as reflected in their
doctrinal definitions. There is also significant overlap among these five
activities. 31 Finally, these activities are not an exclusive listing of how the
joint force counters irregular threats. Key related activities are strategic
communication, information operations of all kinds, psychological
operations, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement,
intelligence, and counterintelligence operations. 32

30 An imperfect analogy may aid understanding of this fundamental point: the adoption of a combined arms
approach provided greater synergistic effect than infantry, cavalry/tanks, and artillery operating separately.
31 There is also significant overlap among the five activities, in particular between foreign internal defense,

stability operations, and counterinsurgency. The former term came into being as a replacement for
counterinsurgency in the decade after Vietnam, but it is now used more broadly to characterize support to
another country facing insurgency or other forms of lawlessness and subversion. When foreign internal
defense is conducted in low-threat environments, it shares many common features with stability operations.
Finally, counterterrorism and unconventional warfare are evolving to include broader features than their core
notions of defeating terrorists and using indigenous partners to overthrow state or state-like adversaries.
32 For the purposes of this concept, and in accordance with Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations,

psychological operations is considered a subset of information operations.

17
 This section describes how these five IW activities will be
conducted. Most of them will require the general purpose forces (GPF) to
play a large and varied role. In addition, USG agencies and multinational
and host-nation forces will often be partners as well. Conducting many of
these activities and operations effectively will require innovations in the
roles, skills, and relationships of the joint force in regard to its
interagency, host nation and other partners, general purpose forces, and
special operations forces components, as well as in the footprint, size,
scale, basing, sustainment, visibility, and distribution of its forces.

In particular, because these activities may be undertaken on a

small or large scale, depending on the level of the threat and the capacity
of the host nation, the joint force must be able to provide scalable,
flexible force packages to support distributed operations, including
logistics support for small unit operations, transportation, lift/mobility,
air support, human and technical intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), force protection, engineering, communications,
medical assistance, and other enablers. In many cases this entails
employing existing capabilities in new ways rather than developing new
capabilities. Advisory personnel with the requisite language and cultural
skills are needed. The footprint should be the minimum essential to
accomplish the mission at an acceptable level of risk, since a large
foreign presence tends to provoke opposition and undermine the
legitimacy of the host nation. Various sustainment and basing options
can be employed to include joint forces based at sea.

Land, air, and maritime forces will all be used in new ways to
counter irregular threats, address root causes, and build partner-nation
capability and capacity so they may provide ongoing security. For
example, the Africa Partnership Station builds maritime safety and
security capabilities in the Gulf of Guinea with partner nations using an
at-sea platform that provides persistent regional presence with a minimal
footprint ashore. 33 Similarly, building partner air forces will be an
important component of the overall security mission. The Combined Air
Power Transition Force 438 AEW in Afghanistan and the Iraq Training
and Advisory Mission-Air Force 321 AEW are examples of long-duration
aviation capacity-building missions. Interdicting irregular threats and
related operations will require continued, increased, and innovative use
of precision strike capability, unmanned aerial systems, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, and other space-based
assets including weather and navigational capabilities. Distributed

33 The Africa Partnership Station serves as a “maritime university” that makes repeat visits on a schedule

tailored to meet the partner nations’ need for sustained support. It is an interagency effort, coordinated with
the country teams, as well as nongovernmental organizations.

18
operations will place a premium on expanded use of low-profile and other
forms of airlift for mobility, resupply, and medical evacuation.

Aspects of these activities and operations that are critical to an

irregular warfare context, including their focus, partners, and key
requirements, are described below.

Stability operations in IW. 34 This section addresses how the

joint force will conduct stability operations to establish or re-establish
order in a fragile state where the threat of violence exists. The focus of
joint force activities will be to provide a safe and secure environment to
support other government agency programs to build host nation
capacity. When conditions require, the joint force will conduct activities
to provide essential services, enable good governance, and foster
economic development.

The Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) will be the lead U.S. agencies to
support a host-nation’s efforts to establish or improve key aspects of
governance to include rule of law and a variety of services. Other
agencies and departments, nongovernmental and intergovernmental
organizations, and partner nations are also likely to be involved. An
interagency protocol would provide a concept of operations, structure for
civilian-military command authority, and an essential task list
identifying functions to be performed by each component of the
interagency team. In a large-scale effort, a shortage of personnel from
non-Department of Defense (DoD) agencies may require the use of DoD
personnel, including civilians and Reservists, who possess critical non-
military skills in governance, rule of law, and development.

In stability operations, general purpose forces will likely conduct

multiple civil-military operations across several lines of operation. These
efforts, particularly large-scale projects, must be coordinated with USAID
and may be conducted by Service-specific engineering units and others.
Civil affairs personnel will also be required for these efforts, as may
expeditionary medical personnel. In low-profile stability operations, SOF
units will also conduct civil-military operations. Stability operations often
include building host-nation security forces as outlined in following
sections on FID and building partner capability.

34 The joint force doctrinal definition of stability operations is “an overarching term encompassing various

military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other
instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” (Joint Publication
1-02) Other definitions for Stability Operations exist, for example, in the National Defense Authorization Act of
FY 2009. The Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 codified the existence and
functions of the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)
and authorized new interagency capabilities under the lead of the Department of State.

19
 Foreign internal defense in IW. 35 The joint force will conduct
FID to enable and assist a host nation to prevent, deter, and defeat a
variety of irregular threats, including criminal activity, insurgency, and
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. The Department
of State will generally lead efforts that support the sovereign host-nation
government’s defense and development plan. The joint force will often
focus on the military element of FID to build the host-nation’s security
capacity, from the ministerial to tactical level. It may, if requested, also
support civilian-led efforts to improve the host-nation’s governance and
development capacity, for example by providing advisory assistance
outside of the security sector in support of interagency requirements. 36

Security force assistance (SFA) is an overlapping term that is

defined as: activities that directly support the development of the
capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining
institutions. 37 SFA encompasses DoD’s efforts to strengthen the security
forces and their sustaining institutions of partner nations as well as
international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across
the range of military operations, during all phases of military operations,
and across the spectrum of conflict. 38 FID occurs in the context of an
internal threat, whereas SFA may be provided or conducted as part of
peacetime engagement activities or in response to an external threat.

FID is a long-term effort that requires persistent rather than

episodic engagement. A comprehensive strategy must be developed for
providing training and assistance to host nation security forces. Civilian
and military efforts to build partner capacity to perform security
functions should be a multi-year program of synchronized civilian and
military activities and engagements. GPF, SOF, and other interagency
partners may conduct missions focused on assessing, training, advising,
and assisting host-nation security forces to include ground, air, and
maritime military forces as well as police, border forces, and other
relevant divisions of the host-nation’s security apparatus.

35 Foreign internal defense is defined as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any

of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.”(Joint Publication 1-02)
36 The Foreign Internal Defense Joint Integrating Concept, v. 0.5, March 2009 describes these operations in

greater detail.
37 This definition of SFA is in draft form and not based in doctrine. See section 4.c. on “Build partner

capability” for a discussion of related issues.

38 DoD shall conduct SFA activities in support of U.S. policy in coordination with U.S. Government

departments or agencies and wherever possible, with foreign governments and security forces, to enhance
partners’ capacity and capability to deter, and, when necessary, defeat state and non-state adversaries as well
as expand the capacity and capability of partners to contribute to multilateral operations. SFA comprises an
important component of the activities conducted through Security Cooperation (SC) initiatives undertaken by
DoD. While SC encompasses all of DoD’s efforts to encourage and enable international partners to work with
the United States in order to achieve strategic objectives (e.g., ranging from civil affairs activities to modeling
and simulation exchanges to senior leader bilateral meetings), SFA focuses exclusively on enhancing the
capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. (DoD Draft Instruction).

20
 The development of non-military security forces is an important
component of FID, and an effective model with appropriate authorities
and mechanisms to integrate interagency, training, advice, and
assistance is essential to achieve unity of effort. For small-scale efforts,
police training and advising may be primarily a civilian mission. If
required and appropriately authorized, military police and other units
may be trained and deployed to train, advise, and assist non-military
security forces. SOF’s primary role is to assess, train, advise, and assist
host-nation military and paramilitary forces in the tasks that require
their unique capabilities. 39

Counterinsurgency. 40 The joint force, in conjunction with civilian

agencies, will conduct military, political, economic, and information-
related actions as well as civic actions to defeat an insurgency. The joint
force may lead COIN operations or it may support the host-nation’s COIN
operations. The primary focus of effort for the joint force is to establish
security, counter subversion and disrupt the insurgency, and its external
support network. As it establishes security, the joint force will also help
build the host-nation’s ability to provide security and support
development and governance to gain or maintain its legitimacy. As the
host-nation’s capabilities improve, the joint force will move into a
supporting FID role to enable the host nation to continue the
counterinsurgency effort.

The joint force may conduct counterinsurgency under either a

civilian or military lead. The ideal model for successful
counterinsurgency is a thoroughly integrated civilian-military command
structure in support of the host nation government. The greater
emphasis in COIN on combat and securing the population
notwithstanding, the political nature of the struggle requires a concerted
effort to address the root causes fueling the insurgency as an acceptable
level of security is being established.

The scale, footprint, and capabilities required for COIN will vary.
Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive because of the need to provide
population security. If host-nation forces are insufficient, COIN
operations may require a large initial commitment of GPF, including
enablers, support, and sustainment capabilities. In some cases, the joint
force may need to operate in a low-profile (i.e., not readily identifiable)

39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Special Operations, II-7.
40 JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations defines counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military
efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances” and insurgency as the following two
definitions will be included if finalized: The final draft of JP 3-24 defines insurgency as “the organized use of
subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing
authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.” These definitions are approved for inclusion in JP 1-
02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

21
manner, which would also require low-profile means of air, land, and
maritime transport and sustainment. Rapid air mobility, airlift, and
target acquisition are also crucial to success and can limit the footprint
required and/or the duration of the operations. 41 In addition, certain
specialized capabilities may be required according to the circumstances,
including, but not limited to, manned and unmanned aviation, armed
reconnaissance, IO, riverine and littoral capabilities, explosive ordnance
disposal, or other personnel or units that must be rapidly deployable. 42

Counterterrorism. 43 The joint force will conduct lethal and non-

lethal operations against terrorists and their networks to deter, disrupt,
and defeat terrorists and their enablers, such as recruiters, financiers,
facilitators, and propagandists. The focus of the joint force effort in CT is
to capture or kill terrorists in order to permanently remove them from a
position of damaging influence in the populace. 44 To do so, the joint force
will operate in a network-versus-network approach that focuses on
dispersed, protracted, and persistent actions. This focus of joint force
operations will be to first identify and understand the terrorist networks’
leadership, affiliate groups, local organizations, radicalized individuals,
and supporters and enablers, and then undertake continuous action as
part of a global counterterrorist network that utilizes a broad set of
interagency and multinational partner capabilities. Counterterrorism
activities may be undertaken either before, or concurrently with, FID and
COIN activities, and long-term success will normally require sustained
follow-on efforts to build partner-nation capacity to address residual
threats and prevent their resurgence.

Critical attributes of successful counterterrorism operations

include rapid, distributed transnational, regional, and global activities by
interagency, coalition, and host-nation partners as well as other
international or multinational entities. Counterterrorism operations are
often performed in conjunction with the host nation where terrorists and
their networks reside or transit as well as with U.S. and partner nation
intelligence services. The joint force must leverage foreign partners’
capabilities and streamline information-sharing procedures to ensure
rapid, successful, continuous action against terrorists and their
resources. The joint force will also support host-nation capacity to
conduct counterterrorism operations at the regional level, and thereby

41 Pre-deployment training of joint air attack team personnel has increased air-ground coordination and

effectiveness. Such innovations and the importance of adaptability are discussed in Air Force Doctrine
Document 2-3: Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007.
42 The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command is one example of a command designed to provide adaptive force

packages of rapidly deployable forces of active duty and reserve specialists.

43 Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.

(Joint Publication 1-02)

44 The Defeating Terrorist Networks Joint Integrating Concept, v.1.0 further explores the lethal and non-lethal

actions against terrorists and their support networks.

22
expand the CT network with new non-USG forces that have greater
cultural knowledge and a lower profile. SOF additionally will train host
nation CT forces, which can include constabulary, police, and other
Ministry of Interior security forces. Host nations will require appropriate,
sustainable material solutions to support their counterterrorism
operations.

Specially organized, trained, and equipped forces execute many of

the joint force missions for counterterrorism, but are dependent on the
same range of support capabilities that reside within the GPF that other
distributed operations such as counterinsurgency require. They must be
transnational and possess the standoff capabilities needed for “look and
listen” operations, which provide a means of information gathering in
denied and contested areas from a distance.

Unconventional warfare in IW. 45 The joint force may employ

unconventional warfare to counter irregular threats, such as states that
wage irregular or proxy warfare. When direct U.S. military power
projection or intervention against state sponsors of irregular threats is
militarily or politically undesirable or infeasible, unconventional warfare
provides decision makers with an alternative to direct U.S. military
intervention in order to counter irregular threats. Pursuant to a national
policy decision, the joint force may conduct unconventional warfare to
induce change in a foreign government’s behavior that is contrary to U.S.
national interests. It may also be conducted to isolate, destabilize, or
undermine a hostile foreign government. Finally, it may be used to
enable the overthrow of a hostile regime or a shadow government or force
the withdrawal of an occupying power by supporting or fomenting an
insurgency. 46 Additionally, unconventional warfare may be executed
independently or in conjunction with other operations executed by the
joint force. In the latter case, unconventional warfare would support the
main effort. For example, the joint force might conduct UW against a
revolutionary movement while at the same time conducting FID with the
host nation.

While primarily considered a SOF activity, the conduct of

unconventional warfare requires the full capabilities of the joint force to
provide enablers. 47 Unconventional warfare requires significant
assistance from partner nations providing the following support: basing
for joint forces, overflight rights, sanctuary, and external support for

45 Unconventional warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to

coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground,
auxiliary and guerilla force in a denied area. Pending JP 1-02 definition.
46 One example of a successful UW operation was the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the

9/11 attacks on the United States.

47 The Unconventional Warfare Joint Integrating Concept v. 0.9 discusses the actions and activities associated

with unconventional warfare in greater detail.

23
resistance forces. Additionally, allied nations may provide SOF units to
work with resistance forces in conjunction with U.S. forces.

Unconventional warfare requires significant interagency

participation because the activity includes support to both the military
and political aspects of internal opposition. Various forms of diplomatic,
information, economic, or military pressure may be used to increase the
effects of an insurgency or resistance movement. Unconventional warfare
operations will require a highly capable joint force that conducts
collaborative planning, resourcing, and execution of unconventional
warfare related activities with key USG agencies such as the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. Each of these agencies
provides essential capabilities and expertise to support unconventional
warfare operations.

Joint force strategists and planners should be capable of

recognizing and assessing the conditions that are appropriate for
successful unconventional warfare operations. This includes the
preparation of center of gravity analyses, vulnerability assessments of
unfriendly and potentially adversarial regimes, and the identification and
assessment of existing or potential insurgent or resistance movements.
As in counterterrorism operations, unconventional warfare entails non-
traditional military approaches that often necessitate low-profile or
clandestine operations including support. 48

4.c. Means to Counter Irregular Threats

The joint force will use fully integrated combinations of general purpose
forces and special operations forces, and DoD combat support agencies
(CSAs), usually in combination with interagency and multinational
partners, to capitalize on the individual competencies of each
component. These fully integrated components will employ the
capabilities identified later in this document under the guiding principles
described in this section to maximize the prospect of success.

A collaborative process to understand the operating

environment and the problem. The first and fundamental means
required are detailed processes to arrive at a holistic understanding of all
facets of the problem, including the relevant root causes of the conflict.
The varied, adaptive, networked nature of adversaries who operate
stealthily and hide among the population creates a daunting challenge
for the joint force to develop an in-depth understanding of the threat(s)

48 Joint elements conducting and supporting unconventional warfare generally operate in a highly distributed

manner. Small elements of SOF will work with the underground and guerrillas, and small support bases will
be located in neighboring countries or sanctuaries. When the resistance movement matures, it may move into
more lethal and visible operations, which will concurrently increase the profile of joint unconventional warfare
forces.

24
and the environment, including the relevant population. The joint force
must develop a thorough appreciation of the specific socio-cultural,
political, religious, economic, and military factors involved and a detailed
portrait of key segments of the population, including those who wield
most influence in the society. 49 Joint force commanders will provide an
assessment to policymakers to inform their decision of the costs, benefits
and implications of undertaking action. Commanders must make
realistic assessments to inform decision makers as to the prospects for
success.

To accomplish this essential and fundamental task of

understanding, the joint force will marshal all available resources in a
collaborative knowledge enterprise. Within its own ranks, it will identify,
utilize, maintain, and incentivize the accumulation of linguistic and
cultural expertise, since language proficiency and in-depth knowledge of
regions, sub-regions, and subgroups takes years to acquire. The joint
force will also simultaneously cast a wide net to tap sources of
information, intelligence, and knowledge throughout the U.S.
Government, its partners, and the local society to leverage expertise,
methods, and technology available in academia, the private sector, and
other organizations. 50 A multinational, multidisciplinary effort will
provide greater expertise than is available in the joint force or the U.S.
Government. The joint force will incorporate these insights into campaign
plans. 51 The joint force will collaborate with interagency partners to form
fusion cells to bring multiple sources of expertise and resources to bear
on specific areas of concern such as narcotics or threat financing.

This process of understanding includes, but is not limited to,

improved and expanded joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment. The joint force and its interagency partners will initiate
intelligence collection, production, and dissemination in a timely and
synchronized manner across the U.S. Government and other partners,
employing a variety of low-profile, multidisciplinary means. The aperture
of intelligence collection and analysis must broaden from a threat focus
to one that includes the population and other aspects of the operating
environment, since a narrow focus limits understanding of a situation. A
variety of tools such as social network analysis, biometrics, and
electronic mapping should be applied systematically to create integrated

49 For example, certain components of the population may be more influential or relevant than others, and

this determination will vary from case to case. The relevant population may not be every villager but rather
particular tribes, traditional leaders, or other influential groups or individuals.
50 The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is a tool that enables an interagency team to assess

conflict situations systematically and collaboratively. It is described in Appendix G. Operational design offers
an additional approach. For a description, see TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: Commander’s Appreciation and
Campaign Design v1.0, 1-5 and 1-6.
51 Possible models for emulation, further development, or codification are the MNF-I Joint Strategic

Assessment Team and the USCENTCOM Assessment Team, groups of experts tasked by a commander to
conduct an independent, intensive study of the situation.

25
databases as part of an ongoing effort to gain a comprehensive
understanding that will in turn inform planning and operations. 52

Adopt collaborative frameworks to plan, act, assess, and

adapt. DoD should seek to establish processes and structures that will
go beyond current USG department and agency approaches, with the
goal of institutionalizing frameworks capable of directing civilian-military
action on a regional and global scale. This may be done through
wholesale creation of a new framework, or in a more evolutionary
manner, drawing on real-world opportunities for innovation. It will
institutionalize frameworks capable of directing integrated civilian-
military action on a regional and global scale. Such efforts to improve our
whole-of-government approach will lay a strong foundation for a broader
comprehensive approach, which integrates the USG effort with
multinational, nongovernmental, intergovernmental, and private sector
partners who share common goals. 53 The U.S. Government cannot
achieve consistent unity of effort without these collaborative frameworks,
but their adoption requires a decision of the U.S. Government, not DoD
alone. 54

Plan and Act in Concert. Collaborative frameworks will be sought to

enable the joint force to act in concert with other USG agencies and other
partners. The country team performs such a function within the
boundaries of a single country, but its planning and operational capacity
may need to be augmented by more robust military groups and greater
interagency capacity to deal with irregular threats. Moreover, since many
irregular threats transcend the boundaries of any single country, the
U.S. Government will create new mechanisms to conduct integrated
civilian-military planning and implementation above the country-team
level. 55

52 For example, the understanding of the drivers of the conflict and the population will inform the approach to

strategic communication, e.g., identification of themes that resonate with the population and which local
messengers wield the most influence.
53 A comprehensive approach refers to efforts at cooperation among a broad variety of government and

nongovernment actors. For descriptions of and distinctions between a whole-of-government approach and a
comprehensive approach, see Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations, 1-17 through 1-22. The former
seeks collaboration while the latter relies on cooperation, because the broader array of actors are not
compelled to work toward a common goal as are agencies of the same government.
54 As acknowledged in the Risks and Mitigations section of this JOC, the adoption of collaborative frameworks

is contingent upon a U.S. Government decision to do so. Absent such a decision, the joint force must
continue to seek ad hoc means of coordination and collaboration.
55 The Regional Security Initiative was one effort to coordinate counterterrorism planning and execution

among embassies in a given region and with the geographic combatant command. To maximize the impact of
U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism created the Regional Security Initiative, a series of regionally-based, interagency strategy
planning activities, hosted by U.S. Embassies, to form a flexible network of coordinated country teams to deny
terrorists safe haven. (United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, The
Terrorist Enemy)

26
 A number of civilian-military planning and implementation
mechanisms have been implemented or proposed. One such mechanism,
the Interagency Management System, currently exists, but its use is
limited to reconstruction and stabilization contingencies. 56 A previous
mechanism for use in contingencies and steady-state operations was
established by Presidential Decision Directive 56, which mandated the
creation of political-military implementation plans. During the Vietnam
War, an integrated civilian-military team led by civilians, the Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), was
employed to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Similarly, in Iraq and
Afghanistan, integrated planning cells and interagency fusion cells were
created at the country team and joint task force level to bring multiple
skills and authorities to bear on a given problem, although these entities
did not have directive authority. Another example is the National
Counterterrorism Center, which was established by Executive Order
13354 as the primary USG agency responsible for strategic operational
planning and synchronizing interagency operations, activities, and
actions to counter terrorism. 57 The Project on National Security Reform
and the Center for Strategic and International Studies both published
studies that proposed a standing procedure to form civilian-military
entities or permanent interagency task forces to enable interagency
collaboration. 58

Under a civilian-military framework, the U.S. Government will

adapt the specific characteristics of the task force or command entity to
the situation. Most activities to counter irregular threats will not be
primarily combat operations led by joint task forces but rather non-lethal
activities conducted with other partners. In these cases the joint force
will most often operate as the supporting element, with the Department
of State, a coalition, or other interagency or host nation partner in the
lead. The joint force will enable unified action, anticipate the potential
need to support numerous extended operations and be prepared to fulfill
them. The combined civilian-military entity will ideally form its plans and
programs in a single process but in any case they will be synchronized to
achieve maximum synergy. The joint force may serve as lead for major
mission elements or sub-objectives, and it will likely be required to
support the transition of mission responsibilities to the host nation when
conditions permit.

When acting as the supported entity, the joint force will

incorporate civilian USG agencies into its extensive planning process

56. The Interagency Management System is described in Appendix G.

57 NCTC can assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for CT activities that are consistent with
applicable law and support strategic plans to counter terrorism.
58 The Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, November 2008, and Center for Strategic

and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Series.

27
from the start and draw on civilian expertise in all relevant areas of those
plans. 59 Government-wide planning will occur simultaneously with
military planning, and coordination mechanisms will ensure
transparency and compatibility. If required to perform non-military
tasks, the joint force will partner with the relevant U.S. Government
civilian agencies in their planning and execution and transition to
Department of State lead when conditions permit. 60 Geographic
combatant commands will adopt additional mechanisms to integrate
civilian-military operations. Two combatant commands have both a
military deputy and civilian deputy (a senior foreign service officer).
Interagency representatives at geographic combatant commands are a
welcome advance, but these representatives do not have authority to
decide or act on behalf of their parent agency. One further evolution
might be interagency unified commands. 61

Local commanders have the best understanding of their area of

responsibility. These commanders should have access to the resources
needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical
operations, and manage IO and civil-military operations. To enable
subordinate commands to conduct effective, decentralized operations,
the designated operational commanders will task organize their assets at
the lowest practical level to push appropriate capabilities and authorities
down to the local commander’s level to encourage the initiative of the
subordinate commanders. These lowest echelons are closest to the
population and the irregular threats, and must have access to or control
of the resources to adapt and react as quickly as the threat. To enable
subordinate commands to conduct effective, decentralized operations,
operational commander theater capabilities will be allocated, based on

59 Collaboration between the joint force and the interagency partners will avoid unintended effects. Even if the

joint force has funding and authority to carry out stabilization and reconstruction projects, it should enlist
the expertise of other partners to ensure that the right projects are selected and executed with the right
sensitivity. For example, the joint force may have funds and authority to build a school and do so, only to find
that the local tribal chief was dishonored when he did not get credit. The host nation or USAID, for example,
may have had the requisite knowledge to ensure that the project was executed in a way that honored the
chief. USAID’s Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework gathers and analyzes the information
required to understand and achieve the desired impact on a given local population.
60 The joint force has provided security for civilian entities, such as the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction

Teams, in order to enable them to operate in hostile environments. Responsibility for securing U.S. civilian
department and agency personnel under chief of mission authority falls to the regional security officer of the
Embassy. Responsibilities will be decided on a case by case basis in a memorandum of agreement between
the joint force and chief of mission. The joint force’s desire for civilian expertise in planning and operations to
promote governance and development may lead it to provide security for such personnel in order to obtain the
needed integrated civil-military action.
61 The U.S. Southern Command’s Command Strategy 2018: Partnership for the Americas, December 2008,

states that “USSOUTHCOM seeks to evolve into an interagency-oriented organization seeking to support
security and stability in the Americas.” The document specifically recommends that such a command be able
to: 1) Improve synchronization of operations and activities between Combatant Command (COCOM) and other
U.S. Government organizations operating in this part of the world to create a collaborative, effective, and
efficient command, 2) Integrate personnel from interagency partners into the COCOM staff and provide
similar liaisons to partner agency staff, 3) Ensure interagency participation at all COCOM exercises and
conferences, 4) Support interagency-oriented security command concept in future Unified Command Plans
and 5) Ensure COCOM has a 21st century facility to enable discussions at all levels of classification.

28
prioritization of available resources, in order to satisfy needs and achieve
desired end states.

Assess and Adapt. The joint force will also use these collaborative
frameworks to conduct continuous assessment and adaptation, which
are essential given the dynamic and adaptive nature of irregular threats.
The problem itself will continuously evolve, as will the joint force’s
understanding of it. Since any actions will alter the operational
environment and the problem, the joint force must also factor the effects
into the assessment. These insights are captured in operational design,
which provides a sophisticated method for understanding and clearly
defining an approach to complex problems. 62 The joint force commander
or interagency task force leader and his staff initially frame the problem
after an in-depth study of it, then proceed to formulate his design and
operational approach. This approach is dynamic in that it recognizes that
the original framing is a starting hypothesis and basis for learning as
operations proceed. Along the way, strategic guidance may be refined,
the operational environment will change, and situational understanding
may increase. Through a process of ongoing assessment, the commander
continually refines his design and reframes the problem to take account
of new insights as well as the evolving situation. Leaders will assess
progress against measurements of effectiveness and the desired ends.
The assessment process requires a sophisticated methodology that relies
on meaningful and apt quantitative measurements 63 as well as other
means to determine the value of new information, to include the
commander’s growing intuitive grasp of the problem. Leaders will then
use the assessment to determine what adaptations may be needed in the
framing of the problem or the campaign design in an ongoing, iterative
process.

Give priority to the battle of the narrative. In irregular warfare,

the primary effects are created by influencing perceptions of disparate
populations. 64 Adversaries understand this and design their operations
to achieve the desired effect on the perception of populations at the local,
regional, and international level. Their efforts are made easier when they
operate in domains that the United States and its allies generally
consider “free” (e.g., cyberspace, the press, and religious institutions).
Adversaries use their knowledge of local history, culture, and religion to

62 See TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design v1.0, 1-5 and 1-6.
63 There is a growing appreciation that many input or output metrics that simply tally actions taken (e.g.,
number of wells dug) do not capture what if any impact the actions have had on the crucial issues of
influence and legitimacy. Some quantitative metrics are powerful indicators; for example, based on his
experience in Southeast Asia, Sir Robert Thompson identified two metrics, the amount of intelligence supplied
by the population and the rate of insurgent recruitment, as significant measures of a counterinsurgency
campaign’s effectiveness.
64 For a more detailed explanation on influencing the behaviors of selected populations, governments or other

decision-making groups, see the Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept,v1.0.

29
frame their actions positively and those of the joint force negatively. The
joint force and its partners must grasp the central importance of this
“battle of the narrative” and adopt a meaningful approach to
communications that enables the host nation and other local partners.

The first principle is to recognize that perception is shaped by both

actions and words, and that both must convey the same message.
Actions taken that are contrary to words undermine credibility and
negate the latter’s effect. The joint force must craft a strategy of
continuous communication that guides its own plans and operations,
conveys its intent, and explains its actions. To do so effectively requires
strategic listening, ongoing dialogue, and understanding of the local
culture. It must also rapidly and proactively provide truthful information
and evidence, since altering perceptions once created is difficult.

The second principle is to work with the host nation or local

partner to bolster the local partner’s legitimacy and assist it in crafting
alternative narratives that are culturally authentic and at least as
compelling as the adversaries’. Bolstering the local partner’s legitimacy
and de-legitimizing the adversary are the critical objectives, more so than
creating a favorable image for the United States. Building indigenous
communications serves long-term objectives, and indigenous messages
and messengers are usually far more resonant with the local population.
Moreover, messages delivered unilaterally by the joint force tend to
undermine the legitimacy of the local partner and the primacy of civilian
rule.

The third principle is to delegitimize the adversary by highlighting

how his actions contradict his stated aims and the needs, interests, and
values of the local population. The joint force should facilitate and
amplify local voices that effectively counter the adversary to the extent
this is possible without the appearance of sponsorship. The joint force
and its partners should also disrupt the adversary’s messaging capability
and exploit his barbarous acts. In some cases, the potential for success
may be modest: eroding an adversary’s influence may be the only
achievable goal in some cases where that influence is longstanding or
deeply rooted. 65 To execute this approach, the joint force must organize
more effectively at all levels to conduct information operations and
strategic communication, and ensure it has appropriate authorities,
policy, and doctrine to implement a proactive strategy. Commanders
should push approval authority for rapid release of information products
down to the tactical level to increase timeliness and effectiveness. They

65 United States Government, Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide, 20-21.

30
should form interagency fusion cells to ensure all perspectives are
integrated. 66

Undertake persistent engagement and sustained effort. In

many cases, success will require persistent engagement and sustained
effort to counter irregular threats in both steady-state and surge
scenarios, since the threats are not susceptible to rapid or surgical
solutions and sporadic and uncoordinated actions have little positive and
often negative effect. The great majority of these efforts will be very small-
scale and non-combat in nature, but longer-term assignments,
deployments, and/or repeat tours will be required for maximum
effectiveness to sustain relationships and develop the in-depth cultural
knowledge required for effective IW activities. These efforts will occur as
directed by the President, in permissive, uncertain, and hostile
environments, in situations where a standing government needs to be
buttressed as well as those where no semblance of functioning
government exists. Given the proliferation and global reach of some
irregular threats, numerous protracted operations may be conducted
simultaneously. The joint force will therefore need the resources,
authorities, rotational constructs, and area expertise to conduct activities
and operations that may range from several months to many years. Low-
profile operations will also have unique requirements, including long-
range clandestine infiltration methods and heavy reliance on ISR and
precision strike capabilities.

Build partner capability. The contest for legitimacy ultimately

rests on the local government’s own ability to provide security, good
governance, and economic development and otherwise address the
population’s needs. Activities that enhance the local government’s
capability will go a long way toward the prevention of many irregular
threats. A capable and professional local security force is vital to
securing the population and achieving political legitimacy. Thus, in many
cases the joint force will be required to assist in building host nation
security force capability and capacity. Building partner capability will
allow the joint force to limit the scope of its efforts and thus allow the
joint force to maintain persistent engagement. Building partner security
force capacity is one means of enhancing preventive security and a
primary focus of effort for the joint force during steady-state operations.
The joint force will work with other USG and multinational partners to
enhance the capability of indigenous foreign security forces, including
land, air, and maritime forces. DoD will train, advise, assist and where
appropriate equip and combat-advise counterpart units from the tactical
to the ministerial level, including defense ministries, Service secretariats

66 For a more detailed discussion on this topic, to include required joint force capabilities, see the Strategic

Communication Joint Integrating Concept, v.1.0.

31
and staffs, and other military institutions. These efforts will require land,
air, and maritime advisors to provide training and expertise in Service-
specific areas, as well as approaches that are transferrable, affordable,
modular, and interoperable. Security also requires building viable and
integrated criminal justice systems capable of implementing the rule of
law. This includes policing, detention, judicial, and other criminal justice
functions grounded in a local conception of law and legitimacy. As such,
when required and if the appropriate authorities are in place, DoD may
also provide such support to non-military security, law enforcement, and
intelligence organizations at the invitation of the host nation with full
coordination and support of the chief of mission and geographic
combatant commander. This may include, in accordance with authorities
and policy guidance, constabulary, national and regional police, border
security forces, port security forces, and authorized local defense forces.
The joint force efforts should be coordinated, paced, and scaled to
complement other training, education, assistance, and material support
to a partner’s forces from other USG agencies, countries, or private
entities. For example, the joint force should make use of coalition
partners’ experience in building national police forces, since the U.S.
Government does not have such forces. In addition, security sector
reform requires an interagency approach to strengthen basic
governmental functions such as management, oversight, finance, and the
entire judicial/criminal justice system, to include police,
detention/corrections, and prosecutorial/defense functions. 67 Such
integrated rule-of-law programs should be the norm if host nation
capability is lacking. In certain circumstances, the joint force must be
prepared to execute basic governance and development tasks at the local,
provincial, and national levels.

Employ a balanced approach. The joint force commander must

determine and strike the appropriate balance between population-
focused and enemy-focused action, recognizing that the latter can cause
civilian casualties and other negative impacts on the population and the
battle of the narrative. This balancing act is one of the commander’s
most difficult and important tasks. The joint force may be required to
engage in combat actions against irregular threats, but the inappropriate
use of military force can undermine the entire undertaking. In some
cases, it may be necessary to limit use of force, or refrain from the use of
force altogether. 68 Bearing in mind the overarching objectives of
legitimacy and influence, the joint force must be precise and discriminate
in attacking and defeating the threat while also shaping and influencing
the operating environment itself. The joint force must disrupt violent

67 United States Agency for International Development, United States Department of Defense, and United

States Department of State, “Security Sector Reform,” February 2009 defines as “reform efforts directed at the
institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote rule of law.”
68 This does not preclude the appropriate use of force in accordance with commanders’ rules of engagement.

32
extremist organizations, their infrastructure, their resources, and access
to, and use of, weapons of mass destruction. This includes actions to kill,
capture, and interdict adversaries. The joint force must calibrate and
integrate these short-term actions with the much broader and sustained
set of activities to shape and influence the environment, secure the
population, and address the underlying drivers of the conflict. Ultimately
these latter efforts, if successful, will have the most lasting and
potentially decisive effect, because they erode the enemy’s ability to
survive and regenerate. 69

Counter irregular threats’ leveraging of cyberspace. One of the

chief ways in which irregular threats increase their reach and impact is
through cyberspace, which provides a virtual safe haven to recruit, train,
finance, and plan operations by using sophisticated concealment
techniques. Countermeasures are complicated by the ubiquity of
cyberspace and the ease and ubiquity of establishing or reestablishing a
presence there. Adversaries also execute denial of service attacks to
inhibit, counter, control, or infiltrate opponents. In addition to defending
against attacks, the joint force may take offensive measures to disrupt
adversaries’ expanding and more sophisticated use of cyberspace. To do
so the joint force must possess advanced access and technological
expertise in computer network operations to exploit, attack, and defend
websites, mobile technologies, various messaging systems, and social
network environments, and achieve synergy among the various computer
network operations and media. Barriers in law, policy, and culture must
be overcome to achieve the agility needed to detect threats and conduct
proactive cyberspace operations to deny, disrupt, and defeat
adversaries. 70

Overcome institutional seams to address the regional and

global linkages of many irregular threats. In irregular warfare,
adversaries frequently operate without regard to state, regional, or other
institutional or jurisdictional boundaries. The joint force must work with
its partners to overcome these seams that complicate their ability to
respond to these regional and cross-border threats. One important
interagency seam is the Department of State’s bilateral orientation,
which vests authorities at the ambassadorial level, while the geographic
combatant commands are focused regionally. One of the primary
planning and coordination seams occurs because mission strategic plans
and country assistance strategies of the civilian USG agencies are
formulated on a country-by-country basis while the geographic
combatant commands’ theater campaign plans are regionally focused.

69United States Special Operations Command, 2008 USSOCOM Posture Statement, 4.

70The Cyber Joint Operating Concept, currently in development, addresses the full range of cyberspace issues.
For more on the use of cyberspace in irregular warfare, see the Foreign Internal Defense Joint Integrating
Concept Appendix F: Cyberspace Operations: Domestic and International Legal Implications.

33
Another seam is with USAID, which takes a much more long-term
approach in planning its development assistance and other programs in
most situations. Deconflicting the differing time horizons and
methodologies between DoD and USAID is important. This can be
accomplished in part through DoD participation in USAID/country team
planning and project design activities.

There are also seams between geographic combatant commands.

Geographic combatant commands meet semiannually to synchronize
their theater plans for combating terrorism and determine roles,
missions, and priorities for the participating organizations. Additionally,
while GCCs conduct informal cross-boundary coordination on a daily
basis, these efforts can be expanded to incorporate interagency partners
as well. The joint force has instituted synchronization efforts for global
training and assistance planning and threat finance coordination. These
means can be extended to address the full range of irregular threats.
Revisions in law and policy are also needed to address the jurisdictional
issues involving advances in technology and remove the barriers that
impede agile responses by the joint force.

Devise force generation and allocation systems and policies

that enable scalable, integrated, distributed operations by general
purpose and special operations forces. The operational environment
and national objectives will determine the specific organization of the
military response. In some circumstances SOF will support and enable
GPF, and in others GPF will be required to support and enable SOF. At
times they may be mutually supporting. New organizing and deploying
constructs may be required to employ the desired skill sets and achieve
the desired effects in protracted operations. 71 The objectives and the
nature of the operation should drive the decisions about the type of
military units needed and their roles rather than the conventional
hierarchical planning of unit size and rank structure. 72 For example,
large-scale operations in training and partner capacity building will likely
fall to appropriate GPF units with SOF in direct support. Special
operations elements will require enabling combat support as they work
in more remote locations or politically sensitive missions. In general,
countering irregular threats will require distributed, small-unit
operations and scalable, tailorable, integrated military-civilian teams
with a mix of mutually supporting SOF and GPF. Distributed operations

71 The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, Enclosure, Responsibilities, 12 (3) instructs the U.S. Joint

Forces Command commander in coordination with USSOCOM and the Secretaries of the Military
Departments to “recommend mechanisms and capabilities for increasing interoperability and integration of
SOF and GPF in IW-related activities.”
72 GEN (Ret) Gary Luck and COL (Ret) Mike Findlay, Insights and Best Practices: Special Operations and

Conventional Force Integration, Focus Paper #5, for the Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces
Command. See also United States Special Operations Command, Publication 3-33: Handbook on
Conventional and SOF Integration and Interoperability.

34
on a global scale place great stress on enablers’ capacity for providing
mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering
planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, human terrain
teams, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close air
support specialists, security forces, and base operating support.

5. Key Required Capabilities

5.a. Methodology
The capability requirements for the IW JOC v. 2.0 were derived from over
24 months of strategy-to-task analysis based on the IW JOC v. 1.0
capabilities based assessment, IW Development Series, development of
three joint integrating concepts (Defeating Terrorist Networks, Foreign
Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare), the Guidance for Development
of the Force study, the Joint Urban Warrior 2009 wargame, and two IW
JOC v. 2.0 workshops.

Most recently, a draft of these capabilities was examined in June

2009 as part of the IW JOC v. 2.0 limited objective experiment and
subsequently refined or revised. Additionally, some implications of the
activities and operations required to support irregular warfare were
identified and catalogued.

5.b. Requirements
This capabilities list captures those joint requirements at the operational
level deemed new, critical, or different for IW JOC v. 2.0, and groups
them according to the three elements highlighted in the central idea of
this concept. The capabilities listed in the IW JOC v. 1.0 remain valid and
are still being considered and assessed in other venues.

Element 1: Create in-depth understanding of the operational

environment

 IW 2.0-001C. The ability to gather, assess, and share a holistic

understanding of the operational environment that includes the
drivers of instability, the root causes of conflict, and the history
behind them; the threats to security locally, nationally, and
regionally; as well as the capability and actions of the host
nation to respond to these factors

35
Element 2: Plan and execute in concert with partners

 IW 2.0-002C. The ability to integrate joint force IW planning

with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and global
operations across USG agency and department boundaries

 IW 2.0-003C. The ability to synchronize joint force execution of

IW activities with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and
global operations across USG agency and department
boundaries

 IW 2.0-004C. The ability to provide support to host nation,

multinational, other USG agencies, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGO)

 IW 2.0-005C. The ability to draw support from host nation,

multinational, other USG agencies, and nongovernmental
organizations

 IW 2.0-006C. The ability to assist efforts to develop within the

host nation an enduring capability to establish and maintain
security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development
programs that address root grievances

 IW 2.0-007C. The ability to influence relevant populations by

planning and executing coordinated communications strategies,
to include crafting narratives that match actions to messages so
that the population
 Perceives the legitimacy of local and host nation
authorities
 Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and
competing actors

 IW 2.0-008C. The ability to enable partners to plan and execute

communications strategies, to include crafting narratives that
match activities and messages so that the relevant population

 Perceives the legitimacy of local and host nation

authorities
 Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and
competing actors

36
  IW 2.0-009C. The ability to conduct offensive cyberspace
operations to influence, disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries’
activities

 IW 2.0-010C. The ability to conduct defensive cyberspace

operations and computer network defense to influence, disrupt,
deny, and defeat adversaries’ activities

Element 3: Assess and adapt in response to the dynamic and

complex nature of the problem

 IW 2.0-011C. The ability to conduct local and regional

assessments of operational effectiveness

 IW 2.0-012C. The ability to evaluate and understand the

potential effects from both population-focused action and
enemy-focused action

 IW 2.0-013C. The ability to project or modify IW-related actions

and activities with flexible force and operational constructs

6. Implications
Listed below is a set of initial implications, based on elements of the
central idea and the enabling capabilities. These implications will need
to be explored, validated, and refined through further experimentation,
capability analysis, and subsequent operational experience.

Element 1: Create understanding in depth

1. The joint force should establish semi-annual regional forums

as a mechanism that brings together academia, business and industry,
diplomats, interagency partners, the military, multinational partners,
and nongovernmental organizations to discuss development, governance,
humanitarian conditions and the security of priority countries within
their regions. This forum would allow all key stakeholders to provide
input towards developing an adequate, holistic appreciation of the
environment.

2. The Service and joint force professional military education

(PME) institutions should include education on a range of topics related
to irregular warfare including: balanced approach, crafting the narrative,
civil affairs, building partner capability, funding sources for building
partner capability, civil-military teams, best and worst practices, and
expectation management.

37
 3. The Service and joint force PME institutions should stress
the importance of cultural norms and that enhanced understanding of
culture and other environmental factors may require changes in the
application of existing doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and
standards.

4. The joint force should develop "senior mentor" type programs

with retirees from other USG agencies and nongovernmental
organizations in order to train and advise the DoD in developmental and
governance activities.

5. Leaders at all levels should make a mental shift from

winning decisive engagements to embracing the idea that “winning the
battle of the narrative” should be what drives many joint force operations
in an IW environment – rather than conducting operations and
attempting to tell a favorable U.S. story in the aftermath.

6. The joint force should adopt a layered/tiered approach to

cultural awareness and language skills. Some personnel get all the
requisite training and education, some personnel receive additional
specialized training, and a third smaller tier receives the most highly
specialized skills. These skills will provide an appreciation of the
environment, as well as linguistic, social, and societal aspects of
specified regions.

7. The Services should continue to refine personnel tracking

systems that identify IW-unique skill sets (e.g., in security force
assistance activities, regional expertise, intelligence and/or interagency
experience) to support the joint force. The intent is to develop and
sustain those skill sets, expertise and personal relationships/contacts
throughout the course of an individual’s career.

8. Leaders should understand that the mere presence of the

joint force can radically alter and skew local, traditional power brokers
and structures.

9. The joint force should leverage multinational partners when

developing cultural awareness of a country, region, people, society or
tribe. Many of our partner nations have extensive experiences and
previous relationships within a region that provide cultural knowledge of
areas, people, and environments that the joint force may lack.

10. Service and joint force manpower models should support IW

requirements. Irregular warfare requires a force of more experienced and
mature personnel who have experience in country, links to host nation
personnel, are able to understand the causes of conflict, and work with
other partners (e.g., interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental).

38
 11. The Services should incentivize and track personnel, both
active duty and reserve, with critical IW skills and experience (e.g.,
trainer advisor billets; interagency assignments; foreign area officers; or
civil affairs related specialties such as agricultural planning, water
treatment, and public administration experience). Incentives could
include career-level or re-enlistment bonuses, precepts to PME
education, promotion, and command selection boards, as well as other
career enhancing assignments.

12. The joint force should expand its ability to conduct foreign
media analysis; leveraging the capabilities and capacities of other USG
agencies when and where applicable. This ability will allow the joint
force to identify the local media, their audiences, and how information is
spread and transferred within the cultural context of the relevant
population.

13. Service and joint force lessons learned repositories should

become more integrated, more easily searchable, more user-friendly, and
accessible to all USG agencies and relevant partners.

14. The joint force should recruit local formations and

incorporate local personnel (e.g., regional scouts, KATUSAs) when and
where acceptable.

Element 2: Plan and execute in concert with partners

1. As joint force actions take place within the political context

of decisions made by the U.S. Government, DoD should continue to work
with interagency partners to further develop national level mechanisms
to determine the prioritization and resourcing of activities to be
performed by the joint force and those expected to be performed by other
USG agencies
2. The joint force should pursue permanent, flexible, multi-
agency funding authorities with multi-year funding streams. 73 Single-
year funding makes it difficult to establish persistent engagement plans
for training host nation security forces.
3. The joint force should expand and place greater emphasis on
its knowledge and expertise in stability programming in order to identify
and synchronize development, governance and security activities; the

73 Sections 1206, 1207 and 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act respectively provide the
Department of Defense with the authority to train and equip foreign military and maritime security forces;
transfer funds to the Department or State for reconstruction, stabilization and security activities in foreign
countries; and reimburse foreign forces, groups or individuals supporting or facilitating ongoing
counterterrorism military operations by U/S. special operations forces.

39
relevant authorities; as well as the actors and transition points among
them.
4. The joint force should increase and enhance MILGP
structures to oversee military support to host nation partners in order to
reflect IW requirements and priorities.
5. The joint force should work with interagency partners to
refine doctrine that articulates supported and supporting roles when
working together.
6. The joint force should identify the appropriate civil-military
integration points throughout the structure of the joint force, its multi-
national partners, and the host nation. When appropriate, this could
include other USG agency billets embedded in the joint force structure
and joint force billets embedded in our partner’s structure from the
tactical to the ministerial level.
7. The joint force should institutionalize nongovernmental
organization and civil-military team training as part of military exercises,
pre-deployment training, and other events.
8. The joint force should emphasize the importance of joint
information operations in mission planning and ensure coordination
between public affairs, military support to public diplomacy and IO
functions to increase the potential for synergy.
9. The joint force should develop enhanced working
relationships with media outlets, in particular multinational and local
outlets, and provide access to appropriate information.
10. The joint force should use appropriate and timely messaging
devices and methods in order to engage in sophisticated, interactive
strategic communication at the local, regional, national, and global
levels.
11. The joint force should establish mechanisms to streamline
the current review and approval process for computer network attacks.
12. The joint force should place greater emphasis on cyberspace
in the planning process when developing courses of action.
13. The joint force should establish a collaborative system that
allows cyberspace operations to coordinate real-time with partner
nations, host nation, and interagency partners.
14. The joint force should develop the capabilities to support
global distributed operations that would place small units (below the
battalion level) of GPF in civil-military teams and situations where they
will have to rely on host nation enablers and medical care.

40
 15. The Services should review the training, leadership, and
rank structure needed by the GPF to conduct global distributed
operations.
16. The joint force should establish appropriate enablers,
sustainment, and support relationships and processes in support of
global distributed operations.

Element 3: Assess and adapt in response to the dynamic and

complex nature of the problem

1. An existing, high-level coordination body with appropriate

seniority should establish a regular, integrated security assessment
process for prioritized countries, inclusive of interagency partners (e.g.,
DoD, DoS, USAID), which develops an appreciation of the environment in
those countries; identifies potential threats to governance, development
and security; articulates the resources needed to deal with the various
types of threats; and assesses the range of ability of the country to deal
with these threats.

2. The joint force should develop frameworks and mechanisms

with academia, business and industry, NGOs and other USG agencies to
enable the identification and analysis of the appropriate leading
indicators that measure the effectiveness of developmental, governance,
and security activities in an IW environment.

3. The joint force and Services should make the Global Force
Management process and Service Force Generation models flexible
enough to meet the demand signals for IW activities; ensuring that
deploying organization and constructs are paired with appropriate and
sufficient enabler, support, and sustainment capabilities.

4. The joint force should establish processes to ensure there is

continuity and consistency of message and deeds, particularly when
units rotate in and out of the host nation.

5. The joint force should institutionalize the capabilities,

currently being provided by ad-hoc and in-lieu-of organizations employed
in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF),
that are proven through experimentation to retain relevance in a post-
war threat environment where there is the continued need to conduct
counter-insurgency and population-centric missions.

6. The joint force should consider how readiness reporting is

conducted – readiness models should be flexible enough to account for
units participating in IW activities and operations as well as major
combat operations.

41
 7. The Services and USSOCOM should ensure that weapons
systems and other material designs are transferable, affordable, modular,
and interoperable to facilitate building partner capability.

7. Risks and Mitigation

Risks are hypothetical events that could render this concept invalid.
They help frame the context in which this JOC applies. Mitigations are
potential means to address the risks.

Risk #1: Adjusting joint force capabilities and capacities to provide

greater emphasis on countering irregular threats risks reducing
capabilities and capacities to address regular threats, which may be
less likely but potentially more dangerous.

Mitigation: This risk can be mitigated to the degree that capabilities and
organizations can be designed for maximum versatility. In addition, a
balanced approach is needed to develop and maintain those specialized
capabilities and capacities that are required to address irregular and
regular threats. New training techniques and technologies can enhance
the ability of the joint force to develop, increase, and maintain the
proficiency required to address both irregular and regular threats.
Previously, training and education in irregular warfare activities was
allowed to atrophy post-conflict. The joint force should not allow our
education in conventional or traditional skills to atrophy. U.S. military
personnel should be provided a balanced education that instills in them
an understanding of both conventional and irregular warfare and the
ability to adapt quickly to the challenges of either, or both, in
combination. Modularization of enabling capabilities can also facilitate
rapid mission transition. In the final analysis, the President and
Secretary of Defense will decide where to take risk if such a decision is
necessary due to resource or other constraints.

Risk #2: Participating in protracted irregular warfare activities in

multiple locations may strain the capacity and reduce the readiness
of the joint force to conduct major conventional combat operations
and sustain its other long-term global commitments.

Mitigation: Identifying the likely range of irregular warfare activities and

other contingencies should lead to an assessment of capacity and
capabilities that will most likely be needed. Conduct assessments of GPF
capabilities to determine capability gaps, and prepare a plan with a
timeline to address them. This risk can be mitigated to the degree that
capabilities and organizations can be designed for maximum versatility.
In addition, a balanced approach is needed to develop and maintain
those specialized and general purpose capabilities and capacities that are

42
required to address irregular and regular threats. Mitigation strategies
include increasing JPME to develop leaders that are more capable of
operating across the spectrum of conflict; pursuing technological
advances to increase our asymmetric advantages; and dedicating force
structure to establish a persistent presence that may be useful to avoid
violent conflict altogether and/or to shape the environment. This could
include establishing permanent MILGPs within U.S. missions in select
countries, and/or otherwise reconsidering the composition and/or
training of DoD presence in U.S. missions. In addition, contingency
plans and hedging strategies should be considered to provide surge
capabilities and capacities to address irregular threats, either through
utilizing capacity in the reserve component, rapid retraining of other
specialties not in high demand, and identification of additional capacity
in the DoD civilian workforce.

Risk #3: Assuming that civilian capacity and capability will be

created to conduct development and governance activities to
address irregular threats risks a lack of military preparedness to
undertake these tasks if the civilian USG agencies cannot perform
them.

Mitigation: Mitigating this risk requires acknowledgement in doctrine

and training that the joint force may be called upon in certain
circumstances to perform or assist in the performance of such tasks and
to conduct these activities if necessary in the absence of other agencies.

Risk #4: The U.S. Government does not develop collaborative whole-
of-government approaches to conducting irregular warfare activities.

Mitigation: The Department of Defense should conduct analyses to

identify lessons learned and best practices from recent studies and past
irregular warfare efforts and share these findings with other agencies.
DoD and partners should collaborate in an effort to lead development of
a unified approach with the requisite authorities and mechanisms for
planning and operations, as well as roles and responsibilities for specific
interagency partners in countering irregular threats. Whole-of-
government exercises should be established to test and rehearse whole-
of-government collaborative approaches. Furthermore, given the political
nature of IW, the joint force commander should carefully consider his
command and control (C2) structures and review them with key civilian
counterparts to identify required USG civilian-military integration points.
For legal reasons related to Title 10 and Title 22, which will likely
continue to exist for the foreseeable future, establishing a unified
civilian-military command will probably be impossible. That said, the
aforementioned C2 review may contribute to improved processes for
cooperation and collaboration that will be important to enable unified

43
action. In the absence of clear, formal processes, joint force commanders
should familiarize themselves with successful experiences and seek to
get USG agreement to apply them as appropriate.

Risk #5: Lack of success in building coalitions with partner nations

to counter irregular threats reduces the prospects for achieving
overall success.

Mitigation: The Defense Department should strengthen current

alliances, partnerships, and informal associations while the Department
of State and other USG agencies develop new relationships to expand the
range of potential partners around the world. The United States can
explore new ways to cooperate with existing international, multinational,
regional, nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations and other
non-state entities with which it shares common aims.

Risk #6: This concept’s emphasis on the indirect methods of

countering irregular threats could lead to the misconception that IW
can be conducted successfully with limited casualties and little
physical destruction.

Mitigation: The requirement to strike the appropriate balance between

population-focused and enemy-focused action does not diminish the
need for the joint force to be able to kill, capture, and interdict
adversaries with speed, precision, and discrimination. The imperative to
refrain from or de-escalate the use of force in certain circumstances does
not imply that use of force will never be necessary. These are tasks that
the military and no other agency of the U.S. Government is uniquely
designed to accomplish.

44
Appendix A – References

Byman, Daniel, et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.

Arlington: RAND (2001)

Gates, Robert M. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for

a New Age,” Foreign Affairs88, no. 1 (January-February 2009)

Gray, Colin. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. New Haven:

Phoenix Press (2007)

Headquarters Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-0: Operations

(February 2008)

Headquarters Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-07: Stability

Operations (October 2008)

Headquarters Department of the Army. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500:

Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design v. 1.0 (January 2008)

Hoffman, Frank. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars.
Arlington: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (2007)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. CJCSI 3170.01G: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff Instruction on Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
(March 2009)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special
Operations (December 2003)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency

Operations (October 2009)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-57: Civil Military Operations

(July 2008)

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 5-0: Doctrine for Planning Joint
Operations (April 1995)

Luck, General (Ret) Gary and Colonel (Ret) Mike Findlay. Insights and
Best Practices: Special Operations and Conventional Force Integration,
Focus Paper #5, for the Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint
Forces Command (October 2008)

A-1
Mattis, General James N. Memorandum for Joint Forces Command:
Irregular Warfare Vision (March 2009)

Mattis, General James N. Memorandum for Joint Forces Command:

Joint Concept Development Vision (28 May 2009)

National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World

(November 2008)

National Security Council. Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing

Complex Contingency Operations (1997)

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. AJP-9(A): NATO Civil-Military

Cooperation (CIMIC) Doctrine (June 2003)

Olson, Admiral Eric T. “A Balanced Approach to Irregular Warfare,” The

Journal of International Security Affairs 16 (Spring 2009)

Project on National Security Reform. Forging a New Shield (2008)

United States Agency for International Development, United States

Department of Defense, and United States Department of State. Security
Sector Reform (February 2009)

United States Air Force. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3: Irregular
Warfare (August 2007)

United States Congress. Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian

Management Act of 2008

United States Government. Interagency Counterinsurgency Guide

(January 2009)

United States Department of Defense. Defeating Terrorist Networks Joint

Integrating Concept v. 1.0 (May 2009)

United States Department of Defense. Department of Defense Directive

3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and
Reconstruction Operations (November 2005)

United States Department of Defense. Department of Defense Directive

3000.07: Irregular Warfare (December 2008)

United States Department of Defense. Foreign Internal Defense Joint

Integrating Concept v. 0.5 (March 2009)

A-2
United States Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review
Report (February 2006)

United States Department of Defense. Quadrennial Roles and Missions

Review Report (January 2009)

United States Department of Defense. Strategic Communication Joint

Integrating Concept v. 1.0 (October 2009)

United States Department of Defense. Unconventional Warfare Joint

Integrating Concept v. 0.7 (2009)

United States Joint Forces Command. 2008 Joint Operating Environment:

Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force.

United States Joint Forces Command. Capstone Concept for Joint

Operations v. 3.0 (January 2009)

United States Joint Forces Command. Concept for Joint Distributed

Operations v. 0.6.1 (October 2009)

United States Southern Command. Command Strategy 2018: Partnership

for the America’s (December 2008)

United States Special Operations Command. 2008 Global War on

Terrorism Campaign Assessment

United States Special Operations Command. 2008 USSOCOM Posture

Statement

United States Special Operations Command, Publication 3-33: Handbook

on Conventional and SOF Integration and Interoperability (September
2006)

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A-4
Appendix B – Glossary and Acronyms

Capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A

capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (Joint
Publication [JP] 1-02) It is defined by an operational user and expressed
in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities
document or a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of
materiel proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF
performance attributes identified in the capability development document
and the capabilities production document. (CJCSI 3170.01) See also
military capability.

Combat support agency. A Department of Defense agency or activity

that provides combat support or combat service support functions to
joint operating forces across the range of military operations and in
support of combatant commanders executing military operations. Also
called CSA.

Computer network operations. Includes three sub-categories: computer

network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and computer
network exploitation (CNE). CNA consists of actions taken through the
use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy
information resident in computers and computer networks, or the
computers and networks themselves. CND involves actions taken
through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze,
detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD information
systems and computer networks. CND actions not only protect DoD
systems from an external adversary but also from exploitation from
within, and are now a necessary function in all military operations. CNE
is enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted
through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or
adversary automated information systems or networks.

Conventional forces. 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations

using non-nuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated
special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

Counterinsurgency. Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to

defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called
COIN. (JP 3-24)

Counterterrorism. Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and

indirectly to influence and render regional and global environments
inhospitable to terrorist networks. Also called CT. (JP 3-26 RFC)

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Distributed Operations. Operations characterized by forces widely
dispersed in multiple domains throughout an operational area, often
beyond mutually supporting range and operating independently of one
another because of distance or differing missions or capabilities, but
supported by a variety of nonorganic capabilities. The critical distinction
between distributed operations and joint distributed operations is the
level and responsiveness of external support to the distributed units. (US
Joint Forces Command Draft Concept, A Concept for Joint Distributed
Operations, v.0.6.1, 28 Oct 2009.)

Foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies

of a government in any of the action programs taken by another
government or other designated organization to free and protect its
society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID.
(JP 1-02)

Hostile environment. Operational environment in which hostile forces

have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or
react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

Insurgency. The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or

movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing
authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

Irregular warfare. A violent struggle among state and non-state actors

for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular
warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may
employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode
an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

Joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant

elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments
operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force
commander. (JP 1-02)

Joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted

by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support,
coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint
forces. (JP 1-02)

Operational environment. A composite of the conditions,

circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military
forces and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

Permissive environment. Operational environment in which host

country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as

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the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to
conduct. (JP 3-0)

Psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected

information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of
foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The
purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called
PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

Security assistance. A group of programs authorized by the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of
1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States
provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related
services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national
policies and objectives. Also called SA. See also security assistance
organization; security cooperation. (JP 3-57)

Security cooperation. All Department of Defense interactions with

foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that
promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly
military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and
provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host
nation. See also security assistance; security assistance organization. (JP
1-02)

Security cooperation activity. Military activity that involves other

nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in
peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the U.S.
military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding
and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition
partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s
theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan.
(JP 1-02)

Security cooperation planning. The subset of joint strategic planning

conducted to support the Defense Department’s security cooperation
program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater
strategy. See also security cooperation. (JP 5-0)

Security force assistance. Activities that directly support the

development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and
their sustaining institutions. Also called SFA. (Draft DoD Instruction)

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Security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and
constabulary forces of a state. (DoDI 3000.07)

Security sector reform. Efforts directed at the institutions, processes,

and forces that provide security and promote rule of law. (United States
Agency for International Development, United States Department of
Defense, and United States Department of State. Security Sector Reform)

Special operations. Operations and activities conducted in hostile,

denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military,
diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military
capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.
These activities often require covert, clandestine, or low profile
capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military
operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with
operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may
include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.
Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of
physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment,
independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed
operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 1-02)

Stability operations. An overarching term encompassing various

military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United
States in coordination with other instruments of national power to
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and
humanitarian relief. (DoDI 3000.05)

Strategic communication. Focused U.S. Government efforts to

understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve
conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. Government interests,
policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans,
themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all
instruments of national power. (Strategic Communication Joint
Integrating Concept, v.0.9, 26 August 2008, B-10)

Terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful

violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally
political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

Traditional warfare. A form of warfare between the regulated militaries

of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an
adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or

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seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s
government or policies. (DoDD 3000.07)

Unconventional warfare. Activities conducted to enable a resistance

movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or
occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary
and guerilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (UW Joint Integrating
Concept [JIC], USSOCOM-approved definition)

Unified action. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of

the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military
operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02)

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Acronyms

C2 – Command and control

CABP – Comprehensive Approach to Building Partnership
CCJO – Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CJCSI – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJIATF – Combined joint interagency task force
CNA – Computer network attack
CND – Computer network defense
CNE – Computer network exploitation
COCOM – Combatant command
COIN – Counterinsurgency
CORDS –Civil operations and revolutionary development support
CSA – Combat support agency
CT – Counterterrorism
DoD – Department of Defense
DoS – Department of State
DOTMLPF-P – Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership,
Personnel, Facilities and Policy
FID – Foreign internal defense
GPF – General purpose forces
ICAF – Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
IGO – Intergovernmental organization
IMS – Interagency Management System
IO – Information operations
ISR – Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW – Irregular warfare
JIATF – Joint interagency task force
JIC – Joint integrating concept
JOC – Joint operating concept
JOE – Joint operating environment
JP – Joint publication
JTF – Joint task force
JWAC – Joint Warfare Analysis Center
MILGP – Military group
NGO – Nongovernmental organization
NSC – National Security Council
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
PME – Professional military education
PSYOP – Psychological operations
PVO – Private voluntary organization
SA – Security assistance
SFA – Security force assistance
SO – Stability operations
SOF – Special operations forces

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U.S. – United States
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USG –U.S. Government
UW – Unconventional warfare

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Appendix C – IW JOC Relationship to Other Joint Operating
Concepts
The Irregular Warfare JOC v. 2.0 is consistent with the Capstone Concept
for Joint Operations v. 3.0. The CCJO states that U.S. forces require the
same level of expertise in irregular warfare that they developed for
conventional warfare. The institutional implications of adopting the
CCJO include improving knowledge of and capabilities for waging
irregular warfare. The relationship of the IW JOC to the other extant
JOCs is described below.

The Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (CS) JOC v. 1.0

supports irregular warfare by setting conditions for future operations.
Countering irregular threats is dependent on complementary and
foundational elements of the CS JOC by helping gain knowledge of the
operational environment, enabling operational access, and preparing the
operational environment for potential irregular warfare activities and
operations. CS activities provide pre-crisis situational awareness, set the
foundation for operational access and develop the relationships and
organizational precursors that enable effective partnerships in times of
crisis. The CS JOC also makes clear that a commander’s primary
objective during cooperative security is to create a less permissive
environment for extremists by helping alleviate the underlying
conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and
destabilizing militancy. The CS JOC addresses primarily overt activities,
acknowledging that other more irregular methods may be used in
countries that are neither partners nor adversaries. Additionally,
cooperative security and IW activities such as FID can both include
security force assistance.

The Deterrence Operations (DO) JOC v. 2.0 describes operations

that aim to decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus
in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests by both
state and non-state actors. The DO JOC identifies five key factors
relevant to irregular warfare. First, it is far more difficult to determine
who the important non-state actor decision makers are. Second, there is
generally greater uncertainty regarding how non-state actor decision
makers perceive the benefits, costs, and consequences of restraint
regarding actions we seek to counter. Third, state and non-state actors
often differ in their susceptibility to our efforts to credibly threaten cost
imposition. The fourth key factor that differentiates non-state actors
involves the manner in which they value things: they have different
goals/objectives, and they employ different means to achieve them.
Finally, in contrast to non-state actors, countering state actors is
facilitated by well-established means of communications between states.

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 In summary, success in these efforts will greatly reduce enemy
capabilities and discredit the enemy’s reputation for effectiveness, while
at the same time enhancing the reputation and effectiveness of the Joint
and coalition forces and the host-nation government.

The Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and

Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations JOC v. 2.0 addresses a broad range of
military support to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or
has collapsed due to a natural or manmade disaster. This joint operating
concept overlaps in some respects with the IW JOC in recognizing that
hostile forces will likely opt to attack the joint force, U.S. allies, elements
of the existing or new host government, and even the local population
through various irregular means, e.g., terrorism and insurgency. The
SSTR JOC states the most critical determinant of success when
conducting SSTR operations in a conflict environment will be convincing
the local populace to recognize the legitimacy of the existing or new
government. If these operations are conducted in the presence of armed
insurgent forces that are actively opposing the efforts of the existing or
new host government, then operations against the insurgent force are a
counterinsurgency operation where stability and reconstruction activities
are part of the larger COIN operation. Pursuant to DoDD 3000.07, the IW
JOC includes a subset of stability operations. Those SSTR operations
carried out in the wake of natural disasters or other situations that
require humanitarian assistance, stabilization and reconstruction, but
which do not occur where irregular threats are present or incipient, are
not considered in the IW JOC. The forthcoming JP 3-07 contains further
discussion of stability operations.

The Major Combat Operations (MCO) JOC v. 2.0 addresses conflicts

that involve primarily conventional, large-scale, violent military
operations against state adversaries. It overlaps with the IW JOC in that
state adversaries with capable militaries will use their capabilities in new
and creative ways including access denial, information operations,
advanced conventional, WMD and irregular warfare methods to coerce or
attack friends or allies, threaten regional stability, or take other actions
that pose an unacceptable threat to the United States. The U.S. military
must be capable of defeating such adversaries while minimizing the
prospects for unintended escalation and considering the burdens of post-
war transition and reconstruction. More importantly, joint force planners
must anticipate continued, protracted resistance in the form of irregular
warfare to occur by some enemy elements as major combat operations
begin to subside.

The DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support (CS) Joint Operating
Concept (DOD HD and CS JOC) v. 2.0 states that threats to the homeland

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will continue to be diverse, adaptive, and in many cases difficult to
predict. Potential adversaries will attempt to surprise the United States
as they adopt an array of persistent and emerging traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, and disruptive methods and capabilities to threaten the
homeland. DoD intends to fulfill its responsibilities associated with
securing the homeland by: 1) detecting, deterring, preventing, or, if
necessary, defeating external threats to the homeland, 2) responding to
catastrophic incidents, and 3) integrating and operating with U.S. and
international partners to achieve unity of effort for HD and CS. There are
also three circumstances that govern DoD involvement in HD and CS
operations and Emergency Planning activities within the homeland that
are categorized as extraordinary circumstances, emergency
circumstances, and limited scope missions. The central idea of this
concept is for DoD to contribute to a national system that is active and
layered. There are two key supporting ideas. First, HD and CS, including
Emergency Preparedness, are national missions to which DoD
contributes. Second, these integrated national HD and CS activities are
conducted via an active, layered defense comprised of a number of
overlapping systems. This JOC proposes a multi-faceted solution with an
active, layered defense, unified action to achieve unity of effort, methods
to reduce uncertainty (including the proposal for a National Homeland
Security Plan), and the desired ends, effects, and capabilities that the
Joint Force Commander will need in the 2012-2025 timeframe

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Appendix D – Consolidated Table of Capabilities
This appendix provides a table of broad IW capabilities. These
capabilities represent the incremental development of capabilities
identified during IW JOC v. 1.0 development as well as those capabilities
defined during the development of the Defeating Terrorist Networks,
Foreign Internal Defense, and Unconventional Warfare Joint Integrating
Concepts (and the execution of follow-on capabilities based
assessments).
The tables are organized by the operations cycle of plan, prepare,
execute, and assess. Within each table, the original source document of
the capability is reflected by parenthetical notation in the left hand
column. Following columns decompose the capabilities into the relevant
Joint Capability Areas. The appendix does not include all tasks required
to conduct IW in the future – it highlights capabilities and tasks that are
new or have resurfaced and should be considered in a Capabilities-Based
Assessment.
1. Design the Campaign.

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW- Ability to gather, Battlespace Intelligence, Intelligence, Surveillance and
001C assess, and share Awareness Surveillance and Reconnaissance Planning &
(IW a holistic Reconnaissance Direction
2.0- understanding of Collection
001C) the environment Analysis and Production
that includes the Intelligence, Surveillance and
drivers of instability, Reconnaissance Dissemination
the root causes of Command Organize Foster Organizational
conflict and the and Control Collaboration
history behind
Understand Develop Knowledge and
them, the threats to Situational Awareness
security locally,
Share Knowledge and
nationally, and
Situational Awareness
regionally, as well
as the capabilities Net-Centric Enterprise Information Sharing/Computing
and actions of the Services
host nation to
respond to these
factors
IW- Ability to evaluate Command Understand Develop Knowledge and
002C and understand the and Control Situational Awareness
(IW potential effects
2.0- from both
012C) population-focused
action and enemy-
focused action.
IW- Ability to project or Command Organize Structure Organization to
003C modify campaigns and Control Mission
(IW with flexible force Planning Apply Situational Understanding

D-1
 Most Relevant JCA(s)
IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
2.0- and operational Develop Courses of Action
013C) constructs Analyze Courses of Action

2. Conduct Preparation of the Environment.

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW- Ability to conduct Force Maneuver Maneuver to Insert
0041C operational Application
(IW - preparation of the Logistics Deployment and Move the Force
007T) environment Distribution Sustain the Force
Logistics Food Service
Services Basecamp Service
Command Organize Establish and Maintain Unity
and Control of Effort with Mission Partners
Structure Organization to
Mission
Foster Organizational
Collaboration
Building Shape Partner with Governments
Partnerships and Institutions
Build Capabilities and
Capacities of Partners and
Institutions
IW- Ability to conduct Battlespace Intelligence, Intelligence, Surveillance and
005C intelligence Awareness Surveillance and Reconnaissance Planning &
(IW- preparation of the Reconnaissance Direction
006T) environment Collection
Processing/Exploitation
Analysis/Production
ISR Dissemination

3. Integrate Activities with Interagency and Multi-National Partners.

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW- Ability to share Net-Centric Enterprise Information Sharing and
006C information with other Services Computing
(IW 1.0- government
013T) agencies, multi-
national and
nongovernmental
partners
IW- Ability to integrate Command Organize Establish and Maintain Unity of
007C joint force IW and Control Effort with Mission Partners
(IW 2.0- planning with other Structure Organization to
002C) USG agencies to Mission
facilitate regional and Foster Organizational
global operations Collaboration
across Federal Planning Apply Situational

D-2
 Agency and Understanding
Department Understand Share Knowledge and
boundaries Situational Awareness
Direct Communicate Intent and
Guidance
Building Shape Partner with Governments and
Partnerships Institutions9
IW- The ability to Command Organize Establish and Maintain Unity of
008C synchronize joint and Control Effort with Mission Partners
(IW 2.0- force execution of IW Structure Organization to
003C) activities with other Mission
USG agencies to Foster Organizational
facilitate regional and Collaboration
global operations Direct Task
across Federal Monitor Assess Compliance with
Agency and Guidance
Department
boundaries

4. Develop Within the Host Nation an Enduring Capability to Establish

and Maintain Security, Provide Legitimate Governance, and Foster
Development Programs that Address Root Grievances. 74

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW- Provide Security Building Shape
009C Force Assistance Partnerships
(IW 1.0- (formerly provide Build Capabilities and
031C) military training and Capacities of Partners and
advisory assistance) Institutions
IW- The ability to enable Building Shape Partner with Governments and
010C partners to plan and Partnerships Institutions
(IW 2.0- execute Provide Aid to Foreign
008C) communications Partners and Institutions
strategies and match Build Capabilities and
activities and Capacities of Partners and
messages so that the Institutions
relevant population
 Perceives the
legitimacy of
local and host
nation authorities
 Denies moral and
physical support
to adversaries
and competing
actors
IW- Ability to provide Logistics Deployment Move the Force
011C support to host and Sustain the Force
(IW 2.0- nation, multinational, Distribution Operate the JDDE

74This capability was originally identified in IW JOC v. 2.0 as IW 2.0-006C; during capability
consolidation, it became a Tier 1 IW capability.

D-3
 Most Relevant JCA(s)
004C) other USG agencies Supply Manage Supplies and
and nongovernmental Equipment
partners Inventory Management
Manage Supplier Networks
Maintain Inspect
Test
Service
Repair
Logistic Food Service
Services Water and Ice Service
Basecamp Services
Hygiene Services
Building Shape Provide Aid to Foreign
Partnerships Partners and Institutions
Partner with Governments and
Institutions

5. Conduct Operations to Disrupt and Defeat Adversaries.

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW- Ability to strike using Force Engagement Kinetic Means
012C kinetic means Application
(IW 1.0-
036C)
IW- Ability to strike using Force Engagement Non-Kinetic Means
013C non-kinetic means Application
(IW 1.0- (includes ability to
042C) conduct offensive
cyber operations to
influence, disrupt,
deny, and defeat
adversaries’ activities)
IW 2.0-009C)
IW- Ability to conduct Net- Information Protect Data and Networks
014C defensive cyber Centric Assurance Respond to Attack/Event
(IW 2.0- operations and Protection Prevent Prevent Non-Kinetic Attack
010C) computer network
defense to influence,
disrupt, deny, and
defeat adversaries’
activities

6. Control and Influence Populations and Resources.

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW- The ability to Command Planning Apply Situational
015C influence relevant and Control Understanding
(IW 2.0- populations by Building Communicate Inform Domestic and Foreign

D-4
 Most Relevant JCA(s)
007C) planning and Partnerships Audiences
executing coordinated Persuade Partner Audiences
communications Influence Adversary and
strategies and by Competitor Audiences
matching actions to Shape Partner with Governments and
messages so that the Institutions
population
 Perceives the
legitimacy of
local and host
nation
authorities
 Denies moral
and physical
support to
adversaries and
competing
actors
IW- The ability to conduct Building Communicate Influence Adversary and
016C information Partnerships Competitor Audiences
(IW 1.0- operations Force Engagement Non-Kinetic
022C) Application
IW- The ability to conduct Building Shape Provide Aid to Foreign
017C civil affairs operations Partnerships Partners and Institutions
(IW 1.0- Protection Prevent Prevent Kinetic Attack
040C)
Mitigate Mitigate Lethal Effects
Force Health Force Health Protection
Support Readiness
Logistics Deployment Sustain the Force
and
Distribution
Engineering General Engineering
IW- The ability to Building Shape Partner with Governments and
018C integrate Partnerships Institutions
(DTN - development actions
005C) with interagency,
multinational and
NGO partners

7. Sustain the Campaign.

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW- Ability to establish Logistics Deployment Sustain the Force
019C sustainment support and
(FID- Distribution
008C)
IW- Ability to provide Logistics Deployment Move the Force
020C movement services and
(FID- Distribution
025T)
IW- Ability to draw Logistics Supply Manage Supplier Networks

D-5
 021C support from host Operational Contract Support Integration
(IW 2.0- nation,, multinational, Contract
005C) other USG agencies Support Contractor Management
and nongovernmental Building Shape Partner with Governments and
partners Partnerships Institutions
IW- Ability to conduct Force Maneuver Maneuver to Secure
022C personnel recovery Application
(IW 1.0-
033C) Engagement Kinetic Means
Non-Kinetic Means

8. Assess Plans and Operations.

Most Relevant JCA(s)

IW Broad Capability
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3
IW Ability to conduct Command Monitor Assess Effects
Consol- local and regional and Control Assess Achievement of
023C assessments of Objectives
(IW 2.0- operational Assess Guidance
011C) effectiveness Battlespace Intelligence, Intelligence, Surveillance and
Awareness Surveillance and Reconnaissance Planning &
Reconnaissance Direction
Collection
Analysis and Production
IW Ability to modify the Command Planning Apply Situational
Consol- campaign and Control Understanding
024C Develop Courses of Action
(IW -
024T)

D-6
Appendix E – IW Vignette: Countering Irregular Threats

Introduction
This is a notional vignette based on a regional scenario that describes
future U.S. conduct to counter irregular threats. It details the integration
of the five primary IW activities and operations and the employment of IW
JOC-derived capabilities. While grounded in real challenges, it should
not be interpreted to be current events or situations in any country.

The vignette begins by briefly outlining current notional theater

campaign plan activities. It then describes a series of actions that show
how the joint force may confront the complex challenges presented and
the results that are achieved. This vignette focuses on a single regional
campaign, and it does not address the global capacity requirements to
conduct multiple regional campaigns simultaneously.

Situation and Background

Sharkia, a state in the Central Gulf region, and Jaiysh al Safrani (JAS), a
violent extremist group, are waging an irregular campaign against
countries in the region and the United States.

Figure 1. Overview of Regional Actors

E-1
 Table 1. Regional Threats
Sharkia End: Increase influence and control of resources in the
Gulf while undermining U.S. influence in the region.
Ways:
 Operates through proxies to maintain deniability.
 Supports Jaiysh al Safrani through Shimal.
 Supports organized criminal networks in Harbia.
 Employs propaganda to portray itself as the victim of
Western hostility. 75
 Conducts terrorist and cyber attacks. 76
 Manipulates images of attacks to portray the United
States and its allies as the perpetrators of hostility.
 Leverages digital media and social networks 77 to
cultivate worldwide network of support. 78
 Sponsors criminal and hacker organizations to conduct
cyber attacks against Jisria.
Jaiysh al End: Eliminate U.S. presence in the region
Safrani Ways:
(JAS)  Conducts limited terrorist attacks against U.S. interest.
 Minimizes operational ties to Sharkia.
 Maintains broad network of support from extra-regional
states and ideologically-based charities.

The United States has been providing diplomatic and security

assistance to both Janubia and the island nation of Jisria. In accordance
with the theater campaign plan of EASTCOM and the strategic plans of
the respective U.S. missions, the joint force is conducting a modestly
funded program to help develop these nations’ security forces and to
target JAS and other emerging challenges. WESTCOM has granted a low
priority to addressing the relevant countries in its area of responsibility,
Harbia and Shimal. It has conducted sporadic engagement activities
primarily aimed at maintaining bilateral military relations with Harbia
and monitoring threats from the military regime in Shimal.

75 The effective use of a global media campaign and global network of supporters is similar to the rise of the

Zapatistas of southern Mexico in 1994.

76 This reflects the growing disruptive use of cyber in conflicts such as the pre-emptive cyber attacks by

Russia prior to the invasion of Georgia following the Georgia incursion into South Ossetia.
77 The recent use of Twitter, Facebook, and proxy servers by Iranian protestors demonstrates the global effect

of on-line social networking to rapidly and widely broadcast messages and influence world opinion – despite a
state’s efforts to control the information domain (e.g., jam broadcasts and block message traffic on the
Internet).
78 “Diasporas have played an important role in helping Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, Kurdish guerrillas in

Turkey, and the PLO, among other movements.” Daniel Byman, et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent
Movements.

E-2
2011: Request for Assistance and Understanding the Operational
Environment
In 2011, the government of Janubia makes a formal request to the
United States to increase its level of assistance and counter the growing
unrest and violence. Acknowledging the threat posed by JAS, the U.S.
Government, and partner nations agree to the request and begin to
develop a campaign plan for persistent engagement in the region.

In order to accomplish overarching U.S. objectives, the National

Security Council (NSC) establishes the Janubia Regional Support Group
(JRSG) – an interagency task force. 79 The JRSG first seeks to develop an
in-depth understanding of Janubia and the region. This team quickly
recognizes that they have limited information due to a lack of access in
the region. In response, the U.S. ambassador to Janubia establishes an
information fusion cell within the U.S. mission to overcome access issues
and gain new information. 80 WESTCOM engagement includes a HUMINT
Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activity capability able to conduct
strategically overt debriefing of U.S. personnel in contact with foreign
counterparts, other sources in the regional AOR. The government of
Janubia grants permission to embed combined host nation, interagency,
and civilian teams with local authorities executing defense and
development programs in order to build partner capability. 81 These
teams survey the population to understand their grievances and identify
and assess sub-national powerbrokers and stakeholders. The Secretary
of Defense directs EASTCOM to deploy small advisory teams composed of
GPF military police elements and SOF advisors and embed them with
host nation security forces. At the same time the ambassador and the
EASTCOM commander draw together a broader group of high-level
experts to assess the current operating environment and gain a deeper
understanding of the root causes of the current conflict. This effort
includes representatives from host nation ministries, USG agencies,
academic, nongovernmental and other nations who are supporting
Janubia and the region-wide support effort. Virtual forums are instituted

79 See Forging a New Shield, Project on National Security Reform, for detailed discussion of such a mechanism

for integrated civilian-military policy implementation. The JRSG is led by the Ambassador to Janubia with the
Deputy Commander of EASTCOM as the second in command, and includes the Ambassadors from Janubia,
Harbia, and Jisria. The JRSG coordinates operational planning in support of Janubia counterinsurgency
efforts. The JRSG includes planning elements from interagency and partner nation organizations. Planning
and execution is coordinated through respective Embassies. To support operational unity of effort and provide
integrated tactical control of deployed forces, EASTCOM and WESTCOM establish a military group within
each Embassy. WESTCOM forces operating in the AOR are shifted to the operational control of the deputy
commander EASTCOM for unity of command.
80 The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework and Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning

Framework were used to enable an interagency team to assess the situation systematically and
collaboratively. For more information see Appendix G.
81 To tap expertise from outside the joint force, in 2003 DoD developed the Human Terrain Teams and

subsequently the Human Terrain System to embed social scientists with military units for the purpose of
improving their understanding of the socio-cultural elements of the operating environment.

E-3
to connect continuously with an even broader network of subject matter
experts in social, economic, political, military, religious, and cultural
domains.

This intensive initial assessment reveals how the ethnic

allegiances, which cross state and geographic combatant command
boundaries, facilitate the supply of money, arms, recruits, and
propaganda emanating from Sharkia to the JAS insurgency movement in
Janubia, the dictatorship of Shimal, and sympathetic segments of the
population in Jisria. It also reveals the mutually supportive ties between
Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria (Janubia and Jisria contain ethnic enclaves
of Harbian expats) as well as ethnic cross-border ties between tribal
elements of Harbia and Shimal. The assessment concludes that a
campaign of influence and support can counter these trends.

The NSC is briefed on this assessment by the ambassador to

Janubia. Based on this assessment, the President directs attainment of
the following objectives within the region:

1) Counter the growing insurgency threat in Janubia;

2) Disrupt the subversive support to criminal and insurgent networks
emanating from Shimal;
3) Defeat the terrorist network JAS;
4) Enhance the internal defense and development programs of Harbia
to strengthen its role as a regional stabilizing force;
5) Subvert the destabilizing influence of Sharkia in the region;
6) Be prepared to conduct stability operations if required.

The NSC designates this region as a Tier 1 priority and directs the
JRSG to accomplish these objectives.

2012: Initial Actions

The JRSG provides guidance to conduct a coordinated campaign aimed
at:
 Promoting stability (legitimacy, good governance, trust, rule of law,
and tolerance) in Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria
 Undermining the disruptive influence of Sharkia
 Eroding the legitimacy of the military regime in Shimal
 Eliminating the threat posed by JAS
 Build the capacity of regional ally security forces to eradicate JAS
networks.

The JRSG undertakes five simultaneous lines of operation, each

weighted based on priorities and available capabilities, and undertaken

E-4
with the approval and participation of the governments of Janubia,
Harbia, and Jisria.

1) Enable Janubia to counter the JAS insurgency, secure the

population and promote stability. The U.S. MILGP in Janubia is
tasked with embedding military advisors with Janubia security
forces to improve their capability to conduct direct action raids
against JAS strongholds. While these actions disrupt current JAS
activities, a broader indirect campaign is conducted to isolate JAS
from its sources of external support and from the population as
well as its sources of external support. Civil-military teams repair
and upgrade infrastructure, facilitate economic development, and
demonstrate support to the local population by the government of
Janubia.

2) Undermine Sharkia’s influence by improving the professionalism

and effectiveness of Janubia security forces, eliminating
corruption, and addressing rule-of-law initiatives to enhance
policing, judicial, detention, and administration of law enforcement
and justice. Small SOF and GPF teams operating under the
direction of the MILGP are deployed in select, often remote, parts of
Janubia, ensuring a minimal U.S. footprint and helping to
legitimize the host nation security forces by providing security
services to the population. 82 The JRSG also establishes an
interagency coordination group (ICG) to support the U.S. mission
staff in Janubia and Harbia to assist in their mission of building
development and governance capacity in their respective countries.
The ICG coordinates a broad range of civil development programs
ranging from foreign investments to direct support where critical
host nation capacity shortfalls exist.

3) Erode Shimal’s legitimacy by training and equipping subversive

elements within Shimal with ethnic ties to Harbia. This enables
cross border support to reduce the level of support Shimal is able
to provide to JAS in Janubia without requiring incursions into
Shimal. This action is conducted in partnership with forces from
Gyamarti who have maintained relationships with sub-national
leaders in northwest Shimal. In this manner, money and arms are
able to be supplied without direct implication of the nation of
Harbia.

82 In El Salvador, a multibillion-dollar FID effort over a decade supported the Salvadoran government’s

national plan, Unidos Para Reconstruir, which included economic development, governance programs and
security force assistance. A small U.S. MILGP oversaw the military element of FID in support of an army with
very limited combat experience and a history of corruption and human rights violations. The war was
concluded through a UN-mediated peace accord signed in 1991.

E-5
 4) Establish a regional maritime security initiative combining the
maritime security development programs in Harbia, Janubia, and
Jisria. This international task force is chartered to counter the
Shimal-sponsored piracy disrupting shipping in the Shimal Straits,
improve the flow of goods and bolster the import/export economies
of Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria. Of particular importance are U.S.
diplomatic negotiations with Sebaya to support the maritime
security initiative, reduce its level of support to Shimal, and
increase its support for Jisria. 83 Command for the maritime
security initiative is rotated between Jisria, Janubia, and Harbia –
strengthening the legitimacy of the task force to provide security to
the shipping lanes in international waters.

5) Isolate JAS and Sharkia from the population and counter their
broad global support by establishing a strategic communication
cell in order to assist Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria in their strategic
communication efforts. This includes the central government
crafting a message of support to the populations at risk, backing it
up with development and governance programs that implement
actions directly supporting the message and obtaining feedback
through units in the field that interact with local populations,
assessing their views towards the central government and the
impact and reach of the information campaign. Additionally, the
strategic communication cell makes continuous efforts to
broadcast acts of violence and disruption committed by JAS and to
clearly articulate linkages between JAS, Shimal, and Sharkia as
they are uncovered.

Because of the strong, vocal, global support for Sharkia, no

operations are conducted that directly target Sharkia – denying any
opportunities for fueling Sharkia propaganda efforts.

2014: Assessment of Campaign Effects

The initial phase of the campaign succeeds in reducing the presence of
JAS inside Janubia, de-escalates the conflict, and isolates the military
regimes in Shimal and Sharkia. As a result of operations conducted by
host nation security forces and security sector reforms implemented in
all three countries, the legitimacy of the governments of Janubia, Harbia,
and Jisria are strengthened. Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria are increasingly
able to support and execute their own national plans.

83 The United States launched an international naval force targeting Somali pirates, over 20 countries

contributed to the force including Russia. This collaboration with a current peer competitor is an example of
partnering with third party nations to directly support stability in a critical region while building stronger
constructive ties and indirectly reducing tensions between the two nations – turning a potential adversary into
a partner with mutually supportive motivations.

E-6
 Figure 2. Reduced effectiveness of Sharkia/JAS

2015: Changes in Janubia Regional Support Group objectives

The assessment of the campaign’s progress produces an understanding
of the shift in adversary objectives as well as an understanding of
evolving operating environment. This results in a review of theater
campaign plans with updated leadership intent and planning guidance:

 Continued support to enhance the stability of Harbia, Janubia,

and Jisria
 Re-establish the legitimately elected former government of
Shimal by leading diplomatic efforts to remove the current
military regime, contain violence resulting from the transition of
power and conduct stability operations to minimize the
disruption of services
 Defeat JAS terrorist network elements operating in Shimal
 Contain the influence of Sharkia in the region
 Counter the disruptive cyber capabilities of Sharkia.

The United States commits to long-term defense and development

support for Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria and strengthens its military
relationship through permanently established MILGPs in each nation,
staffed with a rotating group of personnel with expertise and long
experience in the region as well as habitual training relationships with

E-7
host nation forces. The MILGPs provide command and control of U.S.
forces, training and advisory services to security forces, foreign military
sales programs that ensure proper equipping of indigenous forces, and
ensure unity of effort with civilian agencies.

The United States also leads a diplomatic effort to gather support

for a UN mandate to re-establish the former legitimately elected
government of Shimal. Supporting indigenous forces under the UN
mandate, coalition forces (led by Harbia with key enablers provided by
the United States) succeed in deposing the regime. At the same time that
diplomatic negotiations are underway, the JRSG begins planning for
post-conflict stability operations. This enables a quick transition from
military to civilian lead with minimal disruption of essential services.

The United States and regional partners develop a long-term

strategy during a Regional Synchronization Conference to deter any
resurgence of influence by Sharkia, as supporters in multiple countries
are actively working to rebuild the insurgency. To prevent a resurgence
in support for Sharkia, the countries represented at this conference
agree to provide continued support to partner governments in countries
in which Sharkia and JAS supporters maintain a continued presence.
Meanwhile, the JRSG is expanded with national-level representation and
given directive authority to bridge the seams in the operating models of
various USG departments and agencies. The enduring effect is a national
effort that draws upon the appropriate strengths of multiple USG
agencies and multinational support in a coordinated manner in support
of national policy.

E-8
Appendix F – Joint Assessment and Experimentation Plan

1. Purpose. The purpose of this appendix is to describe the primary

activities that informed the development of the IW JOC v. 2.0 and present
an outline for joint assessment and experimentation to further refine the
elements of this concept and validate it for possible inclusion in joint
doctrine.

2. Insights and Results Gained From Joint Assessment and

Experimentation. Multiple activities since the publication of the IW JOC
v. 1.0 in September 2007 have contributed to the development of the
ideas contained in this concept. These events include:

 The IW JOC v. 1.0 Capability Based Assessment (CBA)

 Review of insights from the 2008 IW Development Series and other
IW related experiments
 An IW JOC v. 2.0 limited objective experiment (LOE)
 Review of current strategic guidance and IW-related literature
including outcomes of the Guidance for the Development of the
Force-directed IW study
 Unified Quest 2008 Building Partnership Capacity wargame
 Unified Quest 2009 Full Spectrum Operations wargame
 Joint Urban Warrior 2009 wargame
 Senior level military leader and IW subject matter expert dialog to
help frame the problem.

Below are specific insights from some of the key activities referenced
above.

IW JOC LOE (15-17 June 2009). An LOE was conducted during the IW
JOC v.2.0 development process. The purpose of the LOE was to accept,
refine, revise, or identify an initial set of capabilities required of the joint
force to execute IW activities as stated in the JOC and to determine the
DOTMLPF-P implications of these capabilities. To examine the required
capabilities, participants were asked to explore how the joint force will
understand, act, assess, and adapt coordinated activities in multiple
operating environments.

Key insights from IW JOC LOE.

 Understanding the operational environment as well as the cause of

competition for the popular support are essential elements of
planning and strategy development. Additionally, since information
will not be perfect, establish an acceptable level of understanding
of the operating environment and host-nation culture.
F-1
  Although the U.S. Government conducts numerous, international,
pre-crisis operations, there is a lack of synchronization. Local
actions have regional and international effects; therefore require a
system of harmonization.
 Too often generalizations are made of a pending crisis due to
ambiguity of information where in reality a deep appreciation of
complex, adaptive systems is essential to formulate an appropriate
solution.
 Doctrine does not identify who plays the lead and supporting roles.
The joint force should understand that due to the nature of IW, it
is supporting a greater whole-of-government approach.
 A mechanism is required to cross-walk geographic combatant
command plans and actions to assess impact in other areas or
responsibility and subsequently develop mitigation strategies.
 When addressing IW dynamics, a combined joint interagency task
force is preferred over a joint task force due to the inherent
combined and interagency construct for planning and execution.
 Confusion exists when using the terms direct or indirect approach.
 There needs to be agreement on the accepted definition of IW.
 Inadequate emphasis is placed on the battle of the narrative, an
area where irregular adversaries have a distinct advantage.

IW Development Series (May-December 2008). The 2008

USJFCOM/USSOCOM Irregular Warfare Development Series was a set of
six workshops and an LOE that focused on the challenges facing the
Department of Defense and other elements of the U.S. Government to
understand and resolve the most difficult issues and capability gaps for
conducting the type of irregular activities described in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, the Irregular Warfare JOC, v. 2.0, and
related documents.

Key Topics Discussed during the IWDS.

 The term “irregular warfare” is misunderstood through the

different agencies including USG agencies, combatant commands,
academia, industry, NGOs, and sovereign partners. This
discussion among the JOC’s stakeholders continued, with the
result that the JOC revision was re-titled: Irregular Warfare:
Countering Irregular Threats.
 Refining the Indirect Approach. The Irregular Warfare
Development Series explored how to develop capabilities, which
enable achievement of indirect approaches using traditional and
non-traditional partners. Debate over the meaning of direct and
indirect approaches dominated early stakeholder discussions
during development of IW JOC v. 2.0. It was agreed that IW JOC v.

F-2
 2.0 would focus on a balanced approach that describes direct and
indirect approaches without titling them as such. Aspects of the
indirect approach are emphasized in IW JOC v. 2.0, particularly in
the sub-section titled Employ a balanced approach.
 Interagency Collaboration. Multiple issues concerning
interagency partnering in IW were addressed during the Irregular
Warfare Development Series, including lack of sufficient resources
and the need for improved planning and execution frameworks.
These are other related issues are addressed in IW JOC v. 2.0,
particularly in the sections titled Adopt collaborative frameworks to
plan, act, assess, and adapt and Overcome institutional seams.
 Countering Violent Extremism. “By, with and through” and the
perceived lack of effectiveness of our strategic communications
efforts were addressed during the IWDS. Both topics are directly
addressed in the IW JOC v. 2.0 sections titled Building partner
capability and Give priority to the battle of the narrative.
 Assessing the Effectiveness of IW Operations. The Irregular
Warfare Development Series found that there is no capability to
effectively assess IW operations in a steady state. This issue is
addressed in the IW JOC v. 2.0 section titled Assess and Adapt.
 Sovereign Partner Collaboration. The Irregular Warfare
Development Series explored how to build trust, enable
sovereignty, and connect countries with complementary U.S.
capabilities. The need to develop an enhanced shared situational
awareness among sovereign partners in the security, political,
social, economic, and information domains was identified. Both the
whole-of-government and the broader comprehensive approach are
used to frame this discussion in the IW JOC v. 2.0 section titled
Adopt collaborative frameworks to act, assess, and adapt.
 SOF-GPF Synchronization. Irregular Warfare Development Series
identified a need to codify the relationships for support between
SOF-GPF and to develop a coherent IW planning construct. IW JOC
v. 2.0 addresses these issues in the section titled, Enable scalable,
integrated, distributed operations by general purpose and special
operations forces.

Unified Quest 08 Building Partnership Capacity Seminar Wargame.

This venue provided several key insights that were addressed in IW JOC
v. 2.0:

 Regional assessment, a critical step in the regional engagement

process, requires a whole-of-government approach to address the
full spectrum of conditions.
 BPC will need a mix of short-term initiatives tied to and consistent
with long-term objectives to be successful.

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  A complementary mix of civilian interagency personnel assigned to
the geographic combatant commands will improve the commands’
responses and decisions across the range of country and regional
issues.
 As more emphasis is placed on building partner capability as a
method of creating stability, prioritization of military capability will
become a challenge.

Unified Quest 09 Full Spectrum Operations Seminar Wargame. This

venue included identified the following insights related to IW:

 SOF and GPF enabler, support, and sustainment requirements

and considerations are a subset of the larger issue of enabling,
supporting, and sustaining distributed DoD and USG agencies.
 Establishing a U.S. structure that the host nation cannot adapt to
or will not adopt may cause a lack of command and control
capability in the host nation when U.S. forces depart.
 Army designers and planners must consider joint, interagency,
intergovernmental, and multinational, and not solely military
factors.
 Determining the structures and practices to enable sharing of
information and intelligence is a key requirement for the
[operational] design and planning process between the joint task
force and country team.

Joint Urban Warrior 2009. Reflecting a growing interest in IW, JUW 09

shifted its focus and objectives from combat in urbanized environments
to the military’s contributions to a more holistic approach to conflict
prevention – involving the U.S. Government interagency community,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational partners. Key
insights related to the IW JOC include:

 Existing crisis response and military planning constructs are

inappropriate for steady-state conflict prevention.
 Whole-of-government is limiting, as it focuses attention on USG
actors – excluding multinationals, NGOs, and international
governmental organizations (IGO). A comprehensive approach is a
preferable and more descriptive term, capable of including
multinational partners, regional powers, host nations, NGOs,
IGOs, and others.
 A multi-faceted, comprehensive approach to assessing a conflict is
critical; this may be the interagency conflict assessment as
articulated in the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.
 Civilian USG agencies are the executive agents in steady-state
efforts, but they generally lack the capacity, expeditionary

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 experience and, in some cases, statutory authority to lead large-
scale multi-institutional, multinational efforts abroad.
 JUW-09 recommendations included the establishment of a formal
training and education institution (styled after U.S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command), to train and educate government
civilians, military, NGO, IGO, and multinational partner
professionals.
 Embed the Department of State’s regional bureau desks with the
headquarters of their corresponding geographic combatant
commands to create greater unity in strategic vision.
 A system of elevated “super ambassadors” at the regional levels
that operate much like current diplomatic special envoys would
bridge the gap between DoD regional focus and the Department of
State’s country focus.
 There are less than optimal information sharing arrangements
between USG and multinational partners. Information is not
always shared, even with close allies. The need to incorporate
multinational opinions is critical to producing a balanced, accurate
portrayal of the affected region.
 There is a growing understanding of the importance of conflict
prevention vice post-conflict reaction and the importance of a
comprehensive approach integrating all aspects of the U.S.
Government, as well as multinational partners, IGO, and NGOs.

3. Areas for Future Joint Assessment and Experimentation. Based on

the prevalence of irregular threats in the current and expected future
operating environment, the IW JOC v. 2.0 identifies operational capability
gaps in IW. Based on the work summarized above, this concept proposes
an approach that describes how the joint force will operate in response to
the problems anticipated in this environment. While these approaches
are actionable, each should be refined through a more detailed
examination.

Assessments. Current and programmed assessment activities as part of

existing IW-related CBAs are well-suited to further examine some of the
approaches proposed in this JOC. As such, IW JOC v. 2.0 related
assessment activities will be integrated into the ongoing USSOCOM “IW
CBA Campaign.”

Current work in the IW CBA Campaign consists of capability

assessments from the IW JOC v. 1.0 and one of three subordinate joint
integrating concepts (Defeating Terrorist Networks). The IW JOC v. 1.0
CBA was divided into three subordinate CBAs: preparation of the
environment (complete), security force assistance (ongoing), and control
and influence (not started). The control and influence CBA from IW JOC
v. 1.0, originally sponsored by the U.S. Army, must be completed or

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incorporated into other CBA activities that are part of the overall IW CBA
Campaign. Several activities being considered as candidates to cover the
control and influence CBA are three related studies: the psychological
operations CBA, the civil affairs CBA, and the Strategic Communication
Joint Integrating Concept CBA.

The programmed work yet to be completed in the IW CBA Campaign

consists of two additional JIC CBAs, foreign internal defense, and
unconventional warfare.

Experimentation. Future Experimentation efforts include, but are not

limited to, Joint Irregular Warrior 2010. This wargame has made
advancing IW concepts and proposed approaches the focus of the venue.
It proposes to provide ample opportunity to experiment with the
proposed approaches contained in this JOC in an interagency and
international setting. Additionally, multiple other experimentation
venues, as listed below, may offer opportunities to test this concept.

Other Possible Joint Experimentation and Assessment Venues.

 Expeditionary Warrior 2010 (22-26 February 2010)

 Unified Quest 2010 (3-7 May 2010)
 USSOCOM Global Scout 2010 (September 2010)
 Unified Engagement 2010 (October 2010)
 Comprehensive Approach to Building Partnership
(CABP)/USJFCOM
 Socio-Cultural Analysis/USEUCOM
 Metrics Assessment/USJFCOM Joint Warfare Analysis Center
(JWAC) (focused at country and provincial levels)
 Influence CBA/USSTRATCOM
 Digital Warfighter/US Army
 Cyberspace Operations JOC/USSTRATCOM
 Assured Air Access/USJFCOM
 Other joint and Service training venues 84 .

84 Lessons learned at the operational and tactical levels can be immediately folded into joint training venues.

For example, the U.S. Air Force Green Flag West Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) and U.S. Joint Forces
Command’s Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team closely collaborated at the Army’s National
Training Center JAAT personnel, to include Army Brigade Combat Teams and Air Force fighter squadrons,
prepared for combat missions in support of irregular warfare.

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Appendix G – IW Planning Between the Military and the Rest of
Government

Assessment and planning tools that may be employed are the

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), the Tactical Conflict
Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF), and the Country
Assistance Strategy. The ICAF is a tool that enables an interagency team
to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively. It draws
on existing conflict assessment procedures used by USG departments
and agencies as well as some international and nongovernmental
organizations and builds upon them to provide a common framework. It
also draws on social science expertise to describe a process that an
interagency team uses to identify societal and situational dynamics
shown to increase or decrease violent conflict, and to provide a shared
perspective against which future progress can be measured.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) uses the

TCAPF to help commanders and their staffs identify the causes of
conflict, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the
effectiveness of the activities at the tactical (provincial or local) level. It
should be used to provide data for the ICAF, which has a strategic and
operational (country or regional) level focus. Country Assistance
Strategies and Mission Strategic Plans are the USAID and Department of
State official planning constructs. They are long-term plans focused on
single countries, in contrast to the theater campaign plans of geographic
combatant commands, which are regional in scope. USAID
representatives provide input on theater campaign plans.

The Interagency Management System (IMS) is an approved and

maturing response mechanism to organize USG planning and operations
in the event of a reconstruction and stabilization crisis critical to U.S.
national interests. Because its official use is limited to reconstruction
and stabilization contingencies and must be activated by high-level
decision, the IMS has only been tested in part, and has not been
routinely employed to date. It consists of a system of processes,
structures, and authorities that provide key leadership (Deputies
Committee/Interagency Policy Committee, GCC, chief of mission) with
the capacity to integrate the instruments of national power and leverage
the capabilities of all participants to achieve national strategic objectives.
Key structures include a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization
Group (CRSG) in D.C., an Integration Planning Cell (IPC) located at the
relevant combatant command, an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) located at
the U.S. mission, and any number of Field ACTs (FACTs) located
throughout the effected nation. The system must be activated by a
decision of the Secretary of State.
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