Adaptive Leadership in the

Military Decision Making Process

Lieutenant Colonel William J. Cojocar, Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired

Army leaders in this century need to be pentathletes, multi-skilled leaders who can thrive in uncertain
and complex operating environments . . . innovative and adaptive leaders who are expert in the art and
science of the profession of arms. The Army needs leaders who are decisive, innovative, adaptive, culturally
astute, effective communicators, and dedicated to life-long learning.
— Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, speech for U.S. Army Command and General Staff College graduation1

Originally published in the

T ODAY’S ARMY LEADERS have accepted adaptive leadership as a
practice and a methodology, integrating it into the way we train leaders
to meet the challenges of the contemporary operating environment. Adap-
Nov-Dec 2011 issue of MR.
tive leadership is an accepted leadership practice that facilitates leading in a
difficult and changing environment, as we encounter threats that change and
evolve their tactics, techniques, and procedures on a weekly to monthly basis.
L ieutenant Colonel Bill Cojocar, Much has evolved in this practice in the last eight years, including leadership
Ph.D., U.S. Army, Retired, is a Com- and operational doctrine and new training venues to train tomorrow’s leaders.
bined Arms Center team lead for the
Training and Doctrine Command This article examines current U.S. Army doctrine on adaptive leadership,
G2 Intelligence, Surveillance, and reviews current adaptive leadership theory and practice, and recommends
Reconnaissance TOPOFF Program.
He previously served as a principal
ways to incorporate adaptive leadership practices into the military decision
analyst for operations/intelligence making process (MDMP).
for General Dynamics Information Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey recently
Technology, Army Solutions Division,
Simulations and Training Division’s commented on new leadership and operational doctrine, stating, “The recent
Battle Staff Training Team. He is an release of FM 5-0, The Operations Process, represents a major shift in how
adjunct professor for Texas A&M we develop adaptive leaders through its introduction of the Design process.
University-San Antonio and Wayland
Baptist University and served in U.S. The goal here is to develop leaders who do not think linearly, but who instead
Army CENTCOM in Afghanistan. He seek to understand the complexity of problems before seeking to solve them.
holds a B.A. from Kent State Univer-
sity, an M.A. from Boston University,
Design gives leaders the cognitive tool to understand complex problems
and a Ph.D. from Capella University. as part of the Visualize, Understand, Decide, Direct responsibilities of the
commander.”2
PHOTO: 3rd Armored Cavalry Regi- General Dempsey added, “We’re trying to decide how to build in new skill
ment soldiers identify targets for Iraqi sets for our leaders to meet the hybrid threats that exist in these uncertain
Army field artillery training, Wasit,
Iraq, 20 October 2010. (U.S. Army, times. The pace of change adds to the increasing complexity . . . . We’re seek-
SPC Charles M. Willingham) ing creative thinking skills and trying to replicate those complexities in our

MILITARY REVIEW  Mission Command 23

 Form Approved
Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED

2. REPORT TYPE
2012 00-00-2012 to 00-00-2012
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Adaptive Leadership in the Military Decision Making Process 5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center,Military Review,Truesdell Hall, 290
Stimson Ave., Unit 2,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 6
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
training scenarios. We want to build on the ability continuous scanning of their operational environ-
to adapt. The 2015 learners will be able to easily ment, maneuver with speed and agility through
create and adapt virtual training environments to material and cognitive capabilities to affect the
meet their individual or collective training needs.”3 will and psyche of others, in order to attain their
Our current doctrine addresses what adaptive political objectives.”6
leadership is and provides some tools for being The ability to shift approaches with agility
adaptive, but fails to address how to implement it and speed is the essence of the future threat, as
in the MDMP process. This is important because well as of former Secretary of Defense Robert
the MDMP is the genesis of operations. In order M. Gates’ vision for our armed forces (adaptive
to develop and execute adaptive plans and opera- in organizational and campaign Design, capa-
tions, and lead adaptively, today’s leaders must bilities development, and execution). Future
understand where and how in the MDMP they can threats will adapt specific mixes of cognitive and
integrate, apply, and master adaptive leadership to material capabilities based on a continual assess-
meet adaptive threats and changing situations. ment and reassessment of the other’s strengths
and weaknesses, requiring constant adaptation,
Adapting to the “Hybrid” Threat experimentation, and learning. This adaptability
Environment is a measure of one’s ability to change in order
The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Threats to fit altered circumstances and provides com-
Division defines the hybrid threat as a diverse, manders an added measure of resiliency in the
dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular face of the unknown. This need for adaptability
forces, and criminal elements unified to achieve and adaptive leadership points to a potential gap
mutually benefitting effects.4 The term “hybrid” in our doctrinal system.7
is used to capture the essence of the complexity
of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and Adaptive Leadership Reviewed
the blurring between traditional categories of The Army’s current leadership doctrine, Field
conflict. Hybrid threats are innovative, adaptive, Manual (FM) 6-22, provides a solid definition
globally connected, networked, and embedded in for adaptive leadership, exploring the practice of
local populations. They can possess a wide range creative thinking that uses adaptive approaches
of old, adapted, and advanced technologies—pos- drawn from previous circumstances or les-
sibly including weapons of mass destruction. U.S. sons learned, along with creating innovative
forces must prepare for a range of conflicts. New approaches.8 It says that when tasks are difficult,
threat doctrine includes an operational Design adaptive leaders identify and account for the
component called adaptive operations or actions capabilities of the team, noting that while some
to preserve the threat’s power and apply it in tasks are routine, others require leader clarifica-
adaptive ways against overmatching opponents.5 tion, and still others present new challenges.9 FM
The hybrid threat’s immediate goal is survival, 6-22 provides some new tools for adaptability and
but its long-term goal is the expansion of its influ- defines what it is to be an adaptable leader.
ence. The hybrid threat’s operational goal is to Adaptability is the ability to recognize changes
adapt temporarily, using patience, adapting tac- in the environment, identify the critical elements of
tics, techniques, procedures, and even operational a new situation, and trigger changes to meet new
and strategic goals, to live and fight another day. requirements. Adaptability is an effective change
In the article “Beyond the ‘Hybrid’ Threat: in behavior in response to an altered situation.
Asserting the Essential Unity of Warfare,” the Adaptable leaders scan the environment,
authors reinforce the notion that adaptive lead- determine the key characteristics of the situation,
ership is essential to counter present and future and are aware of what it will take to perform
adversaries. They note, “Those [threats] that have in the changed environment. Highly adaptable
not adapted have faced rapid extinction in the leaders are comfortable entering unfamiliar
jungle of the global strategic order. Those that environments, have the proper frame of mind for
do are entities or movements that, based on a operating under mission command orders in any

24 Mission Command  MILITARY REVIEW

 SPECIAL EDITION

organization (FM 6-0), and seek to apply new or Adaptability has two key components:
modified skills and competencies. ● The ability of a leader to identify the essen-
Adaptive leadership includes being a change tial elements critical for performance in each new
agent. This means helping other members of the situation.
organization, especially key leaders, recognize that ● The ability of a leader to change his practices
an environment is changing and building consen- or his unit by quickly capitalizing on strengths and
sus as change is occurring. As a consensus builds, minimizing weaknesses.11
adaptive leaders work to influence the course of the Adaptive leaders are open-minded. They do
organization. They use several different methods not jump to conclusions, are willing to take risks,
for influencing their organization depending on the and are resilient to setbacks. Our new leadership
immediacy of the problem.10 doctrine informs leaders how to become more
Deciding when to adapt is as important as deter- adaptable. They must learn to lead across cultures,
mining how to do it. Deciding not to adapt in a new seek challenges, and leverage their cognitive abili-
environment may result in poor performance or ties to counteract the challenges of the operational
outright failure. On the other hand, adapting does environment through logical problem solving.12
not guarantee the change will improve matters.
Field Manual 6-22 describes adaptable leaders Adaptive Thinking, Design, and
as leaders who are comfortable with ambiguity and FM 5-0
are flexible and innovative. They are ready to face The Army’s new FM 5-0, The Operations Pro-
the challenges at hand with the resources available. cess, addresses adaptation by focusing on creative
They are passionate learners, able to handle mul- thinking, a process that involves creating something
tiple demands, shift priorities, and change rapidly new or original when facing old or unfamiliar prob-
and smoothly. They view change as an opportunity. lems that require new solutions. Creative thinking
(U.S. Army)

Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Martin E. Dempsey speaks with U.S. soldiers from United States Division-Center during a
visit to Camp Liberty, Iraq, 19 April 2011.

MILITARY REVIEW  Mission Command 25

produces new insights, novel approaches, fresh people to tackle tough challenges and thrive. It’s
perspectives, and new ways of understanding and about changes that enable the capacity to thrive.
conceiving things. Leaders look at the options to Such changes build on the past rather than jettison-
solve problems using adaptive approaches (drawn ing it. Organizational adaptation occurs through
from previous similar circumstances) or innova- experimentation.18
tive approaches (completely new ideas).13 Today’s Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Linsky
full spectrum operations demand planning that state that adaptive leadership is an iterative process
can be integrated and addressed in the operational involving three key activities:
Design process, the MDMP, and troop-leading ● Observing events and patterns.
procedures.14 ● Interpreting them.
● Designing interventions based on the
observations.19
Adaptive leadership has three parts: observation,
…adaptive leadership is the
interpretation, and intervention. Adaptive leaders
framework required to effec- must adopt an experimental mind-set that commits
tively close the gap and make to an intervention but does not become wedded
aspirations a reality. to it. Adaptive leadership is about will and skill.
“The single most important skill and most under-
valued capacity for exercising adaptive leadership
is diagnosis,” which in military terms translates to
Innovation, adaptation, and continuous learn- “mission analysis” and “running estimate analysis.”
ing are all central tenets of Design. Innovation Heifetz, Grashow, Linsky provide the following
involves taking a new approach to a familiar or recommendations for practicing adaptive leader-
known situation. Adaptation involves taking a ship:
known solution and modifying it to a particular ● Don’t do it alone.
situation or responding effectively to changes in the ● Live life as a leadership laboratory.
operational environment. Design helps commanders ● Resist the leap to action.
lead; guides planning, preparing, executing, and ● Discover the joy of making hard choices.20
assessing operations; and requires agile, versatile Adaptive challenges are difficult because their
leaders who foster continuous organizational learn- solutions require people to change their ways.
ing while actively engaging in iterative collabora- Adaptive work demands three tough human tasks:
tion and dialog that enhances decision-making at ● Figure out what to conserve from past practices
all levels.15 Design provides a model for problem (lessons learned).
framing and cognitive tools to understand problems ● Figure out what to discard from past practices.
and appreciate their complexities before trying to ● Invent new ways that build from the best of
solve them. The tools help leaders recognize and the past.21
manage transitions, educating and training them When leaders realize their organization’s
to identify adaptive, innovative solutions, create aspirations—the innovations and progress they
and exploit opportunities, and leverage risks to want to see—demand responses outside the current
their advantage.16 Leaders must lead organizational capacities, adaptive leadership is the framework
learning, develop methods to determine if reframing required to effectively close the gap and make
is necessary during the course of an operation and aspirations a reality.22 It provides a disciplined
continuously assess, evaluate, and reflect on the approach to do more for what you care about most.23
problem at hand.17
Adaptive Leadership and the
Adaptive Leadership Practice MDMP
The pioneer of adaptive leadership theory, Understanding adaptive leadership is important,
Ronald Heifetz of Harvard University, states that but integrating it into the military decision making
adaptive leadership is the practice of mobilizing process is a challenge. Not many have written about

26 Mission Command  MILITARY REVIEW

 SPECIAL EDITION

Determining what Running smart Integrating new practices,

practices are core to experiments and testing aligning people across the
the future and which are new practices organization to execute
obstacles

Introduction to Organizational Adaption.

it. The following are some recommendations worth advantage. Time invested in the Design process
considering during the MDMP: is a valuable step in understanding the threat, the
Step 1. Receipt of mission. Receiving higher environment, and how to meet both with adaptive
headquarters’ order of a new mission is receipt of plans and operations.
mission. Commanders are responsible for provid- Step 2. Mission analysis. The commander and
ing initial guidance and time allocation. Depending staff conduct mission analysis to better understand
on the complexity of the situation, they may initi- the situation and problem and identify what the
ate Design activities before or in parallel with the command must accomplish, when and where to do
MDMP. As specified by FM 5-0, commanders may it, and most important, why—the purpose of the
choose to conduct Design to help them understand operation. Mission analysis is the most important
the operational environment, frame the problem, step in the MDMP because no amount of subsequent
and consider operational approaches to manage it planning can solve a problem if the commander
or solve it. and staff do not understand it. Mission analysis
Why are leaders reluctant to “Design”? Is it allows commanders to visualize the operation and
because they don’t understand what Design is? Is describe how it may unfold in the commander’s
it because it takes too much time? Or is it because intent and planning guidance.24 Mission analysis
they feel they have a firm grasp of what the real is one of the most important steps for integrating
problem is and do not need to waste time validat- adaptive leadership. How adaptable, flexible, and
ing the problem? agile are we? Are we lock-stepped into our tactics,
Whichever the case, Design provides an ideal techniques, and procedures, continually reacting
platform to begin adaptive thinking by modeling to the threat, or are we preemptive, proactive, and
innovative, adaptive problem framing. Design pro- agile? Although not specified in Army doctrine,
vides leaders with the tools to understand problems two valuable tools that can facilitate adaptability
and appreciate their complexities before trying to are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and
solve them. Taking and making time for this valu- threats analysis and the force field analysis. The
able exercise helps build adaptive leadership skills staff should also observe, analyze, understand, and
by educating and training leaders to identify and interpret patterns (pattern analysis).
employ adaptive, innovative solutions, create and Step 3: Course of action (COA) development.
exploit opportunities, and leverage risks to their This step generates options for follow-on analysis

MILITARY REVIEW  Mission Command 27

and comparison to satisfy the commander’s intent pushing the risk envelope? Are we hinging on a
and planning guidance. Planners use the problem low- to moderate-, or moderate- to high-risk level
statement, mission statement, commander’s intent, during wargaming? COA analysis (wargaming) can
planning guidance, and knowledge products devel- become an extremely adaptive exercise if the staff
oped during mission analysis to develop COAs. develops an adaptive COA, war games it, integrates
Staffs often develop one to two courses of action the results, and assesses them. This MDMP step is
that are diametrically different in their approaches the experimental stage, during which the staff tests
to solving the problem. Many times, staffs are interventions.
directed to develop a third COA that often serves Step 5: COA comparison. This is an objective
as a throw-away option, with the staff not invest- process to independently evaluate COAs against set
ing much time on it. Staffs should instead develop evaluation criteria approved by the commander and
a proactive, preemptive COA as a way to inject staff to identify their strengths and weaknesses and
adaptability into the MDMP. They may also use allow the commander and staff to select one with the
“adaptive” as a screening criterion to screen for highest probability of success and develop it in an
validity in COA analysis. Of course, we must train operations plan or order.26 Using adaptive screening
our staffs to understand what the screening criterion and evaluation criteria for COA comparison injects
is and how to apply it in quantifiable terms. adaptability into the MDMP process.
Step 4: COA analysis (wargame). This step
allows commanders and staffs to identify difficulties Conclusion
or problems in coordination as well as the probable Adaptive leadership is an accepted leadership
consequences of actions they are planning or con- practice that facilitates leading in a difficult and
sidering.25 Threat-focused decision making, proac- changing environment in which we encounter
tive or reactive, and adaptive actions, reactions, and adaptive and “hybrid” threats that change and
counteractions make for a dynamic COA analysis. evolve tactics, techniques, and procedures across
Risk assessment is another consideration. Are we the conflict spectrum. MR

NOTES

1. Dr. Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, speech for U.S. Army Command 12. Ibid.
and General Staff College graduation (2005). 13. FM 5.0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), 1-6.
2. See <http://www.military-training-technology.com/mt2-home/259-mt2-2010- 14. Ibid., 2-7.
volume-15-issue-4-july/3105-qaa-general-martin-e-dempsey.html>. 15. Ibid., 3-1.
3. See <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/09/04/27024-tradoc-commander- 16. Ibid., 3-3.
discusses-leadership-training-at-forum, http://www.military-training-technology. 17. Ibid., 3-7.
com/mt2-home/259-mt2-2010-volume-15-issue-4-july/3105-qaa-general-martin- 18. Ronald A. Heifetz, Alexander Grashow, and Marty Linsky, The Practice
e-dempsey.html>. of Adaptive Leadership (Boston, MA, Harvard Business Press, 2009), 14-17.
4. Training Circular 7-100, Hybrid Threat (Washington DC: Government Printing 19. Ibid., 32-32. Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky state that adaptive leadership
Office [GPO], 2011), iv. is an iterative process involving three key activities.
5. Ibid., 4-1. 20. Ibid., 37.
6. David Sadowski and Jeff Becker, “Beyond the ‘Hybrid’ Threat: Asserting the 21. Ibid., 41-45.
Essential Unity of Warfare,” Small Wars Journal (2010), Small Wars Foundation. 22. Figure 1. CLA (2010), from <http://www.cambridge-leadership.com/index.
7.Ibid., 11. php/adaptive_leadership>.
8. Field Manual (FM) 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006), 23. Ibid.
6-2. 24. FM 5.0, B-5.
9. Ibid., 9-1. 25. Ibid., B-21.
10. Ibid., 10-8. 26. Ibid., B-33.
11. Ibid., 10-9.

28 Mission Command  MILITARY REVIEW