EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.]

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPE

WORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.,
defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-
appellant.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.

Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.

DECISION

ZALDIVAR, J : p

Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894.
The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:
Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of
the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employ of
the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since
1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the Company a
collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which
reads as follows:
"Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement."

The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but

was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964.
Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its
amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded
"from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a
condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is
the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic
Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: . . . "but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members in any such labor organization".
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to
appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he
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 reiterated his resignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union
wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee
from the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as
a member. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and
his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory
arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss
him from the service. This prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to
enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer,
the Union invoked the "union security clause" of the collective bargaining
agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 2 Upon the facts agreed
upon by the parties during the pre-trial conference, the Court a quo rendered
its decision on August 26, 1965, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining
the defendant Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff
from his present employment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union to pay the plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and
the costs of this action." 3

From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely
questions of law, assigning the following errors:
"I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that
Republic Act No. 3350 is unconstitutional.

"II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant

herein to pay plaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost
thereof."

In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350,

the Union contented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right
to form lawful associations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act
3350, that membership in a labor organization is banned to all those
belonging to such religious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor
organization" 4 , "prohibits all the members of a given religious sect from
joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members
thereto" 5 ; and, consequently, deprives said members of their constitutional
right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the
1935 Constitution. 6
Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while the
Union is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreement
containing a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer from its
reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of union
membership as a condition of employment; and that said Act, furthermore,
impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of dues from members
who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation to continue as such
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 members. 7
Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350
discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their members from
joining labor unions, in violation of Article III, Section 1 (7) of the 1935
Constitution; and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it
leaves no rights or protection to labor organizations. 8
Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates the
constitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for the
exercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join
associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determined under the
Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if a worker has to
sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibits membership in a
labor organization in order to be able to join a labor organization, said Act
would violate religious freedom. 9
Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the
"equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being a
discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the operation of
closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it has granted
said members undue advantages over their fellow workers, for while the Act
exempts them from union obligation and liability, it nevertheless entitles
them at the same time to the enjoyment of all concessions, benefits and
other emoluments that the union might secure from the employer. 10
Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the
constitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11
Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision"
in a collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of
religious freedom, as to call for the amendment introduced by Republic Act
No. 3350; 12 and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declared
unconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out as
employers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristo in
order to do away with labor organizations. 13
Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic Act
No. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful associations, for the right
to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from a labor
organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membership therein, and
the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting the compulsion of
workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act does not impair the
obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was incorporated
into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that the Act does not
violate the establishment of religion clause or separation of Church and
State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodated the
religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members from
joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor
with the constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen
religion; that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has
primacy and preference over union security measures which are merely
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 contractual 16 ; that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of
equal protection, for the classification of workers under the Act depending
on their religious tenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the
purpose of the law, and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that
said Act, finally, does not violate the social justice policy of the Constitution,
for said Act was enacted precisely to equalize employment opportunities for
all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs. 18
I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it
is necessary to premise that there are some thoroughly established
principles which must be followed in all cases where questions of
constitutionality as obtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions
are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that
a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be
upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts
are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute; and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 19
1. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits
and bans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their
members with labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the
wording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by
necessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that
appellant, having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending
that said Act is obnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of
association.
Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of
association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as
Section 7 of Article n of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to
form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall
have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
and other mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial
Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the "right" to form or join associations.
Notwithstanding the different theories propounded by the different schools
of jurisprudence regarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be
safely said that whatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at
least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i e., the absence of
legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for himself without being
prevented by law; and second, power, whereby an employee may, as he
pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the
employee who should decide for himself whether he should join or not an
association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as
to which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still
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 retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership with
said organization at any time. 20 It is clear, therefore, that the right to join a
union includes the right to abstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as
what both the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, and
guaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of his choice,
it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the same breath,
upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law does not enjoin an
employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal
protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a
closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of
the collective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to be
members of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keep their
jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before its amendment
by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hire or tenure of
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization" the employer is, however,
not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to
require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor
organization is the representative of the employees". By virtue, therefore, of
a closed shop agreement, before the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if
any person, regardless of his religious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to
keep his employment, he must become a member of the collective
bargaining union. Hence, the right of said employee not to join the labor
union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement,
Republic Act No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4
(a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350
merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the
exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot
be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment
or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of
the collective bargaining union. It is clear, therefore, that the assailed Act,
far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association,
upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious
sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects
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 prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and
fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law
does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from
joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional
provision on freedom of association.
2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional for
impairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security
clause" embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company,
by virtue of which "membership in the union was required as a condition for
employment for all permanent employees workers". This agreement was
already in existence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted of June
18, 1961, and it cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated
into the agreement. But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as
others similarly situated, could no longer be dismissed from his job even if
he should cease to be a member, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the
Company could continue employing him notwithstanding his disaffiliation
from the Union. The Act, therefore, introduced a change into the express
terms of the union security clause; the Company was partly absolved by law
from the contractual obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union
members in permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there
was indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the
express terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its
discharge, or the remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract. The
extent of the change is not material. It is not a question of degree or manner
or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing
with any part of its force. There is an impairment of the contract if either
party is absolved by law from its performance. 22 Impairment has also been
predicated on laws which, without destroying contracts, derogate from
substantial contractual rights. 23
It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair the
obligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition is
general, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in the
details. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like a
mathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 24 In
spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts
already in effect. 25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in
order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a
postulate of the legal order. All contracts made with reference to any matter
that is subject to regulation under the police power must be understood as
made in reference to the possible exercise of that power. 26 Otherwise,
important and valuable reforms may be precluded by the simple device of
entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be
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 prohibited. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment
presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which
contractual relations are worthwhile — a government which retains adequate
authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The contract clause
of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the state to
safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows that not all legislations,
which have the effect of impairing a contract, are obnoxious to the
constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and a statute passed in the
legitimate exercise of police power, although it incidentally destroys existing
contract rights, must be upheld by the courts. This has special application to
contracts regulating relations between capital and labor which are not
merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being impressed with public
interest, must yield to the common good. 27
In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition against
impairing the obligations of contracts has no application to statutes relating
to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the
state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also held that the Blue
Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of a contract that
required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to his employees, the law
having been enacted to secure the well-being and happiness of the laboring
class, and being, furthermore, a legitimate exercise of the police power. 29
In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairs
contract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times and
under all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may be
measured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be
determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing the obligation
of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for the promotion of the
general good of the people, and when the means adopted to secure that end
are reasonable. Both the end sought and the means adopted must be
legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reserved power of the state construed
in harmony with the constitutional limitation of that power. 30
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No.
3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to
promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those
members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional right to
work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby they can
maintain their own life and the life of their dependents. It cannot be gainsaid
that said purpose is legitimate.
The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said
religious sects against two aggregates of group strength from which the
individual needs protection. The individual employee, at various times in his
working life, is confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor,
directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. The
union, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and
thus protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is,
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 paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source of
their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with management, it
produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from which the individual
also needs protection — the collective bargaining relationship. 31
The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in
the Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic
Act No. 3350, as follows:
"It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person
who, on account of his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept
membership in a labor organization although he possesses all the
qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to punishing such person
for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to believe in.
The law would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of
those whose religion discards membership in any labor organization,
Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their right to
work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any manner
violating their religious faith and/or belief." 32
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to
achieve that purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects from
coverage of union security agreements — is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious
profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter
must, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United States
has also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First
Amendment, which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in
the constitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a
fundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in the
hierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of
religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement
of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent
necessary to avoid the danger.
3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 is
unconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor
of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1(7) of Article III of
the 1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article 8 of the 1973
Constitution, which provides:
"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without. discrimination
and preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political rights."

The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the

support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus
forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice
of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
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 form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the
religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. 36
Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one
or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid,
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. 37 But
if the stage regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law
which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. 38
In Aglipay v. Ruiz 39 , this Court had occasion to state that the
government should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectives secular
ID character even if the incidental result would be favorable to a religion or
sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order to withstand the
strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 40
Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350 cannot be said to violate
the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of
the Constitution.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal,
not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the
secular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed
from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to
pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security
agreements. To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they
can make a living to support themselves and their families is a valid
objective of the state. In fact, the state is enjoined, in the 1935 Constitution,
to afford protection to labor, and regulate the relations between labor and
capital and industry. 41 More so now in the 1973 Constitution where it is
mandated that "the State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the relation between workers
and employers." 42
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in
favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees
against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, and
relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and by
eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to unemployment,
which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and welfare of the people of
the State, the Act also promotes the well-being of society. It is our view that
the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not directly
advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that
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 prohibit their members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the
religious sects is merely incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause"
(of religion) does not ban regulation on conduct whose reason or effect
merely happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions. 43 The free exercise clause of the Constitution has been
interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially aided. 44
We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress acted
consistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merely to
relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is
imposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself that imposed
that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act 875), and,
certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take away the same
burden. It is certain that not every conscience can be accommodated by all
the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict with scrupples of
conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state
interest" intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We see no such compelling state
interest to withhold exemption.
Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members
of certain religious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the
protection of, labor organizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was
not to grant rights to labor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply
provided for in Republic Act No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the
lamented silence of the Act regarding the rights and protection of labor
unions, suffice it to say, first, that the validity of a statute is determined by
its provisions, not by its silence 46 ; and, second, the fact that the law may
work hardship does not render it unconstitutional. 47
It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel
persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation
of their religious scrupples, would hurt, rather than help, labor unions.
Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance
spread to other workers, for religious objections have contagious
potentialities more than political and philosophic objections.
Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the
country, and a fortiori to a labor union - assuming that such unity and loyalty
can be attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be
promoted by prohibited means.
4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the
exercise of a civil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act does not
require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association
membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither does
the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits Its members
from joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing
from a labor union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a
positive act. Republic Act No. 3350 only exempts members with such
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 religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under
this Act, a religious objector is not required to do a positive act — to exercise
the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without
need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious religious objector need
not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning from the labor
union — he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement
that a labor union may have entered into. How then can there be a religious
test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact
Republic Act No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance
with the Constitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a constitutional
provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in
itself, by discovering or following a legal way to do it. 49
5. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is a
discriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certain
religious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus violating Section
1 of Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any person
of the equal protection of the laws. 50
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of
equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,
therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike
by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. 51 It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. 52 The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so
that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. 53 All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. 54 This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if
the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of
enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as
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 enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in
their relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be made with
mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59 for the equal protection guaranty
does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm,
and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.
We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementioned
requirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effect and
coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who by reason of
their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with a labor union, and
those whose religion does not prohibit membership in labor unions. The
classification rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical,
distinctions. There is such real distinction in the beliefs, feelings and
sentiments of employees. Employees do not believe in the same religious
faith and different religions differ in their dogmas and canons. Religious
beliefs, manifestations and practices, though they are found in all places,
and in all times, take so many varied forms as to be almost beyond
imagination. There are many views that comprise the broad spectrum of
religious beliefs among the people. There are diverse manners in which
beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be
articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion than
before, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important
and should not be ignored.
Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based
on real and important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs,
mere ideas existing only in the mind, for they carry with them practical
consequences and are the motives of certain rules of human conduct and
the justification of certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view
things and events in their relation to his God. It gives to human life its
distinctive-character, its tone, its happiness, or unhappiness, its enjoyment
or irksomeness. Usually, a strong and passionate desire is involved in a
religious belief. To certain persons, no single factor of their experience is
more important to them than their religion, or their not having any religion.
Because of differences in religious belief and sentiments, a very poor person
may consider himself better than the rich, and the man who even lacks the
necessities of life may be more cheerful than the one who has all possible
luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like the martyrs, became
resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even the most painful and
excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious beliefs, the world has
witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed and war,
generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of
other religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No.
3350, therefore, rests on substantial distinctions.
The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose.
The purpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of
their religious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to
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 work and from being dismissed from their work because of union shop
security agreements.
Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide
that it is to be effective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as the conditions to which the law is applicable
exist. As long as there are closed shop agreements between an employer
and a labor union, and there are employees who are prohibited by their
religion from affiliating with labor unions, their exemption from the coverage
of said agreements continues.
Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects;
this is evident from its provision.
The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious
sects cannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have
adverted to, the Act only restores to them their freedom of association which
closed shop agreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane
as the other workers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining
labor unions. The circumstance, that the other employees, because they are
differently situated, are not granted the same privilege, does not render the
law unconstitutional, for every classification allowed by the Constitution by
its nature involves inequality.
The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual
inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in
some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification
otherwise reasonable does not offend the constitution simply because in
practice it results in some inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said
that whenever it is apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for
the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be
obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though
incidental advantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the
general public. 62
6. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates
the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is
intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 Republic Act No. 3350
promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who,
because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; the Act prevents
their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood. In determining
whether any particular measure is for public advantage, it is not necessary
that the entire state be directly benefited — it is sufficient that a portion of
the state be benefited thereby.
Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the
inter-relations of the members of the community. 64 Republic Act No. 3350
insures economic stability to the members of a religious sect, like the Iglesia
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 ni Cristo, who are also component elements of society, for it insures security
in their employment, notwithstanding their failure to join a labor union
having a closed shop agreement with the employer. The Act also advances
the proper economic and social equilibrium between labor unions and
employees who cannot join labor unions, for it exempts the latter from the
compelling necessity of joining labor unions that have closed shop
agreements, and equalizes, in so far as opportunity to work is concerned,
those whose religion prohibits membership in labor unions with those whose
religion does not prohibit said membership. Social justice does not imply
social equality, because social inequality will always exist as long as social
relations depend on personal or subjective proclivities. Social justice does
not require legal equality because legal equality, being a relative term, is
necessarily premised on differentiations based on personal or natural
conditions. 65 Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity 66 , and this is
precisely what Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives
laborers, irrespective of their religious scrupples, equal opportunity for work.
7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendment
introduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for - in other words, the
Act is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has been held
that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason, unconstitutional;
that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are
unconcerned with issues as to the necessity for the enactment of the
legislation in question. 67 Courts do inquire into the wisdom of laws. 68
Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people, are presumed to
understand and correctly appreciate the needs of the people, and it may
change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear is entertained by appellant that
unless the Act is declared unconstitutional, employers will prefer employing
members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining labor
unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We do not agree. The threat to
unionism will depend on the number of employees who are members of the
religious sects that control the demands of the labor market. But there is
really no occasion now to go further and anticipate problems We cannot
judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, the validity of a statute is
to be determined from its general purpose and its efficacy to accomplish the
end desired, not from its effects on a particular case. 70 The essential basis
for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its
exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statute is to be measured.
71

II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of

which the Union argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union
to pay P500 for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 875, for the instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the
Union was a party, and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights
under the union shop provision of its existing collective bargaining contract
with the Company; that said order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil
Code; that, furthermore, Appellee was never actually dismissed by the
defendant Company and did not therefore suffer any damage at all. 72

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 In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the
instant case there was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to
compel Appellee to maintain its membership in the union under pain of
dismissal, and that the Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on
Appellee; that since Appellee was compelled to institute an action to protect
his right to work, appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees
under Articles 1704 and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73
The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is
relied upon by appellant provides that:
"No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any
court against a labor organization or any officer or member thereof for
any act done by or on behalf of such organization in furtherance of an
industrial dispute to which it is a party, on the ground only that such
act induces some other person to break a contract of employment or
that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with the trade, business or
employment of some other person or with the right of some other
person to dispose of his capital or labor." (Emphasis supplied)

That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be 'disputed
for appellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shop
agreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question
involving tenure of employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74
The discharge or the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the
labor dispute itself, that very same act of the Union in asking the employer
to dismiss Appellee cannot be "an act done . . . in furtherance of an
industrial dispute". The mere fact that appellant is a labor union does not
necessarily mean that all its acts are in furtherance of an industrial dispute.
75 Appellant Union, therefore, cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of

Republic Act No. 875. This case is not intertwined with any unfair labor
practice case existing at the time when Appellee filed his complaint before
the lower court.
Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve
as its shield. The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation may be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff . . . to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in
any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it
cannot be gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's
dismissal caused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed
from his job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court,
shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated
August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No.
58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union.
It is so ordered.
Makalintal, C .J ., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,
Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ ., concur.
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 Fernandez, J ., did not take part because he was co-author, when he
was a Senator, of Rep. Act No. 3350.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J ., concurring:

The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act No.
3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it was
demonstrated in a manner well-nigh conclusive in the learned, scholarly, and
comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of the ponente, Justice
Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur fully. Considering moreover,
the detailed attention paid to each and every objection raised as to its
validity and the clarity and persuasiveness with which it was shown to be
devoid of support in authoritative doctrines, it would appear that the last
word has been written on this particular subject. Nonetheless, I deem it
proper to submit this brief expression of my views on the transcendent
character of religious freedom 1 and its primacy even as against the claims
of protection to labor, 2 also one of the fundamental principles of the
Constitution.
1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individual
possesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of any sect,
to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is constitutionally safeguarded,
according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator . . ." 3 The choice of what a man
wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is a domain left untouched,
where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to which the law is denied entry,
whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In that sphere, what he wills reigns
supreme. The doctrine to which he pays fealty may for some be unsupported
by evidence, devoid of rational foundation. No matter. There is no
requirement as to its conformity to what has found acceptance. It suffices
that for him such a concept holds undisputed sway. That is a recognition of
man's freedom. That for him is one of the ways of self-realization. It would
be to disregard the dignity that attaches to every human being to deprive
him of such an attribute. The "fixed star on our constitutional constellation,"
to borrow the felicitous phrase of Justice Jackson, is that no official, not
excluding the highest, has it in his power to prescribe what shall be orthodox
in matters of conscience — or to mundane affairs, for that matter.
Gerona v. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. In the language of
its ponente, Justice Montemayor: "The realm of belief and creed is infinite
and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the
freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds.
One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and
unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed
in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards." 5 There was this
qualification though: "But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of
said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the exercise of said
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 religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and with
the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes
the one exercising it." 6 It was on that basis that the daily compulsory flag
ceremony in accordance with a statute 7 was found free from the
constitutional objection on the part of a religious sect, the Jehovah's
Witnesses, whose members alleged that their participation would be
offensive to their religious beliefs. In a case not dissimilar, West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette, 8 the American Supreme Court reached
a contrary conclusion. Justice Jackson's eloquent opinion is, for this writer,
highly persuasive. Thus: "The case is made difficult not because the
principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our
own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear
that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will
disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not
flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a
compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our
institutions to free minds. We can have intellectual individualism and the rich
cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of
occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless
to others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too
great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order." 9
There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of
the primacy of religious freedom in the forum of conscience even as against
the command of the State itself: "Much has been said of the paramount duty
to the state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts
with convictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists
within the domain of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws
regardless of scruples. When one's belief collides with the power of the
state, the latter is supreme within its sphere and submission or punishment
follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than
the state has always been maintained. The reservation of that supreme
obligation, as a matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many
of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is
belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation." 10 The American Chief Justice spoke in dissent, it is true,
but with him in agreement were three of the foremost jurists who ever sat in
that Tribunal, Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone.
2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my concurrence,
as set forth earlier, is wholehearted and entire. With such a cardinal
postulate as the basis of our polity, it has a message that cannot be
misread. Thus is intoned with a reverberating clang, to paraphrase Cardozo,
a fundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The labored effort to
cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in question is far from
persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for this Court, as I conceive of
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 the judicial function, to restrict the scope of a preferred freedom.
3. There is, however, the question of whether such an exception
possesses an implication that lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to
protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally ordained. Such a view, on
the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closer analysis, it
cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedom of association,
likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For the late Professor Howe, a
constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of the great Holmes, it
even partakes of the political theory of pluralistic sovereignty. So great is
the respect for the autonomy accorded voluntary societies. 11 Such a right
implies at the very least that one can determine for himself whether or not
he should join or refrain from joining a labor organization, an institutional
device for promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed shop, on the
other hand, is inherently coercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected
in our decisions, the latest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 12 it is far from being a favorite of the law. For a statutory
provision then to further curtail its operation, is precisely to follow the
dictates of sound public policy.
The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is
in the mainstream of constitutional tradition. That, for me, is the channel to
follow.

Footnotes

1. Record on Appeal, pages 2-7.

2. Record on Appeal, pages 14-17.

3. Record on Appeal, pages 27-35.

4. Quoted from Brief for Appellant, page 3.

5. Quoted from Brief for Appellant, page 2.

6. Brief for Appellant, pages 2-3.

7. Brief for Appellant, pages 3-5.

8. Brief for Appellant, pages 5-6.

9. Brief for Appellant, page 6.

10. Brief for Appellant, pages 7-8.

11. Brief for Appellant, pages 8-9.

12. Appellant cites in support thereof Otten v. Baltimore & Or., et al., 205 F 2d
58, and Wieks v. Southern Pacific Co., D.C. Cal., 121 F. Supp. 454; Jenson v.
Union Pacific R. Co., et al., 121 F. Supp. 454.

13. Brief for Appellant, pages 9-11.

14. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pages 6-8.
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 15. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pages 8-11.

16. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pages 11-28.

17. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pages 28-32.

18. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pages 32-36.

19. Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2d 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2d,
660, 63.

20. Pagkakaisa Samahang Manggagawa ng San Miguel Brewery vs. Enriquez, et

al., 108 Phil., 1010, 1019.
21. Abo, et al. vs. PHILAME (KG) Employees Union, et al., L-19912, January 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 120, 123, quoting Rothenberg, Labor Relations.

22. Black's Constitutional Law, 2nd ed., page 607.

23. Home Building & Loan Association vs. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 78 L Ed 413,
425.

24. Re People (Title & Mort. Guar. Co.) 264 N.Y. 69, 190 N.E., 153, 96 ALR 297,
304.
25. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 176, 77 L. ed. 288, 301, 53 S. Ct. 181,
87 A.L.R. 721.

26. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, pages 584-585.

27. Art. 1700, Civil Code of the Philippines.

28. Ilusorio, et al. vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., L-20344, May 16, 1966,
17 SCRA 25, 29; Ongsiako v. Gamboa, et al., 86 Phil., 50, 54-55.

29. Asia Bed Factory vs. National Bed and Kapok Industries Workers' Union,
100 Phil., 837, 840.

30. Re People (Title & Mort. Guar. Co.), 264 N.Y. 69, 190 N.E. 153, 96 ALR 297,
304.
31. "Individual Rights in Industrial Self-Government - A 'State Action' Analysis",
Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 63, No. 1, March-April, 1968, page
4.

32. Congressional Record of the House, Vol. IV, Part II, April 11 to May 18, 1961,
pages 3300-3301.
33. Jones vs. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 86 L. ed. 1691, 62 S. Ct. 117; Follet vs.
McCormick, 321 U.S. 158, 88 L. ed. 938, 64 S. Ct. 717.

34. Schneider v. Irgington, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 84 L. ed. 155, 164, 60 S. Ct. 146.
35. U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153.

36. William A. Carroll, "The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion", The
American Political Science Review, LXI: 657-674, page 663, Sept., 1967.
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed. 2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970.

38. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US 599, 6 L ed. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 1144; McGowan
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 v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449.

39. 64 Phil. 201, 209-210.

40. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 US 236, 20 L. ed. 2d, 1060, 88 S. Ct. 1923.
41. Art. XIV, Section 6, 1935 Constitution of the Philippines.

42. Article II, Section 9, 1973 Constitution.

43. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 6 L. ed. 2d 393, 408, 81 S. Ct.
1101.

44. Alan Schwartz, "No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value",
Yale Law Journal, 1968 Vol. 77, page 692.
45. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L. ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790.

46. People ex rel. Ryan v. Sempek, 147 N.E. 2d 295, 298.

47. Diamond Auto Sales Inc. v. Erbe, 105 N.W. 2d 650, 652; Spurbeck v.
Statton, 106 N.W. 2d 660, 663; Danner v. Hass, 134 N.W. 2d 534, 539.

48. Cf. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 67 L. ed. 1042, 1046.

49. Book v. State Office Bldg. Commission, 149 N.E. 2d 273, 278.
50. Now Section 1, Article IV, 1973 Constitution.

51. 16 Am Jur. 2d, page 850.

52. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 1282.

53. Atchison, T.S.F.R. Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 58 L. ed. 1276, 282.

54. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126.

55. People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 542, citing 16 C.J.S. 997.

56. 16 Am. Jur. 2d, page 862.

57. Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 76 L. ed. 1155, 1182.

58. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. ed. 1193,
1200.

59. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 58 L. ed., 1011, 1024.
60. Charles Dubray, Introductory Philosophy, 1923, page 132.

61. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. ed. 1193,
1200.
62. State v. Stinson Canning Co., 211 A. 2d 553, 555.

63. Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 734.

64. Ibid.
65. Speech delivered by Jose P. Laurel before the Constitutional Convention on
November 19, 1934, In Malcolm and Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law,
page 534.
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 66. Guido v. Rural Progress Administration, 84 Phil. 847, 852.
67. 16 Am Jur. 2d. page 378.

68. Province of Pangasinan v. Hon. Secretary of Public Works, et al., L-27861,

October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 134.
69. Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400, 63 L. ed. 1058, 1066.

70. Sanitation Dist. v. Campbell, 249 SW 2d 767, 770; City of Rochester v.

Gutberlett, 211 NW 309, 105 NE 548, 550.

71. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 545.
72. Brief for Appellant, pages 12-14.

73. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pages 48-49.

74. Seno v. Mendoza, L-20565, Nov. 29, 1967, 21 SCRA 1124, 1129.

75. Abo v. PHILAME (kg) Employees and Workers Union, L-19912, January 30,
1965, 13 SCRA 120, 124.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:

1. Article IV, Section 8 of the Constitution provides: "No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights." There is thus
a reiteration of such freedom as found in Article III, Section 1, par. 7 of the
1935 Constitution.

2. Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution provides: "The State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall
assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration." The above is an expanded version of
what is found in Article XIV, Section 6 of the 1935 Constitution.
3. Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, 206 (1937).

4. 106 Phil. 2 (1959).

5. Ibid, 9-10.
6. Ibid, 10.

7. Republic Act No. 1265 (1955).

8. 319 US 624 (1943). Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 US 586 (1940)
was thus overruled.
9. Ibid, 641-642.

10. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 US 605, 633-634 (1931).

11. Cf. Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 Harvard Law
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 Review, 91, 94 (1953). He was reflecting on the radiations to which Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94 (1952) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 US 249
(1953) might give rise to.
12. L-28791, August 27, 1973, 52 SCRA 307. Cf. Confederated Sons of Labor v.
Anakan Lumber Co., 107 Phil. 915 (1960); Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co.,
Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-16561, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 353;
Findlay Millar Timber Co. v. Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, L-18217, Sept.
29, 1962, 6 SCRA 227; Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa Ng Alak v. Hamilton
Distillery Company, L-18112, Oct. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 367; United States Lines
Co. v. Associated Watchmen & Security Union, L-15508, June 29, 1963, 8
SCRA 326; National Brewery & Allied Industries Labor Union of the Phil. v. San
Miguel Brewery, Inc., L-18170, Aug. 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 805; Phil. Steam
Navigation Co. v. Phil. Marine Officers Guild, L-20667, Oct. 29, 1965, 15 SCRA
174; Rizal Labor Union v. Rizal Cement Co., Inc., L-19779, July 30, 1966, 17
SCRA 857.

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