atty. bernardo m.

luceres
RULE 70

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Distinction between forcible entry and unlawful detainer.

NOTES: Accion interdictal, is a recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court. An accion de
revindicacion seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession, while the accion
publiciana is the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an ordinary
proceeding in the Court of First Instance.  (Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney General, 20 Phil.
523; Lim Cay vs. Del, 55 Phil. 692; Central Azucarera de Tarlac v. De Leon, 56 Phil. 169;
Navarro v. Aguila, 66 Phil. 604; Luna v. Carandang, 26 SCRA 306)

In Vda. de Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, 4 [1929], we held:

Upon non-payment of rent by the lessee, the lessor may elect to treat the contract as
rescinded and thereby determine the right of the lessee to continue in possession; and this right to
recover possession may be enforced in an action of unlawful detainer. It is not necessary, in such
situation, that an independent action for the rescission of the lease should first be instituted in the
CFI (now RTC), for the purpose of putting an end to the right of the tenant to remain in
possession under the lease.

In Dayao v. Shell Co. of the Philippines, Ltd., 97 SCRA 407, 416 [1980], we held:

A lessor is not in law required to bring first an action for rescission but could ask the
Court to do so and simultaneously seek the ejection of the lessee in a single action for illegal
detainer. When Shell added instances of violation of the contract in its amended complaint, it did
so merely in amplification of its action for ejectment.

ANGELINA SORIENTE and ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING

RIGHTS UNDER HER
vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ARSENIO E. CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009, PERALTA, J.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court is erred in deciding the case in accordance with Section 7
of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

CHINATRUST (PHILS.) COMMERCIAL BANK vs. PHILIP TURNER

G.R. No. 191458, July 3, 2017, LEONEN, J.
Issue: Whether it is proper for the Regional Trial Court to consider the issue on negligence in
determining the respectice claims of the parties.

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Victoria D. Bayubay vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105866, July 6, 1993, the Supreme
Court held: (In this case, just write the jurisprudence, no need to digest).

Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge.

Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under Section 9,
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and a finding of guilt results in either suspension from the office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months,
or a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000. (Bontuyan v. Villarin, AM No. RTJ-
02-1718, August 26, 2002; cited in the case of Bonifacio Law Office vs. Judge Reynaldo B.
Bellosillo, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1308, December 16, 2002).

Section 12. Referral for conciliation. — Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where
there is no showing of compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without
prejudice, and may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with.
(18a, RSP).

The referral for conciliation is an old rule under PD 1508 which is implemented during
the time of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508
(the Katarungang Pambarangay Law), now included under R.A. No. 7160 (the Local Government Code
of 1991), is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of justice
which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. (Galuba vs. Laureta, No.
L-71091, January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 627, 634). To attain this objective, Section 412(a) of R.A. No.
7160 requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court. Non-compliance is a ground to dismiss the case. 

Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so in Garces vs.
Court of Appeals  62 SCRA 504, 511 [1988]:

In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-
compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the
subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact of
non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably
raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint,
dismissal of the action is proper.

It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required
under the law is not jurisdictional in nature (Millare vs. Hernando, 151 SCRA 484, 489 (1987)
and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. (Royales
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 127 SCRA 470 (1984), per Escolin, J.; Ebol vs. Amin, 135
SCRA 438 (1985), per Aquino, J.; Gonzales, vs. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 289 (1987).

After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore
becomes outside the court's power to amend and modify, a party who wishes to reinstate the case
has no other remedy but to file a new complaint. This was explained in Ortigas & Company

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Limited Partnership vs. Velasco, 234 SCRA 455, 486-487 (1994), per Narvasa, C.J. where we
ruled thus:

The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to
reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case
from the Court's docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice,
the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original
docketed action, but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of
course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.

What are the prohibited pleadings under the Rule on Summary Procedure?

Case: Victorias Milling Co., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168062, June 29, 2010
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in giving due course to the respondent’s
certiorari.

Motion for reconsideration in lower court is prohibited.

Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. Since the case before the the MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it was
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure
is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain
pleadings is prohibited, (Arenas v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 372 (2000), including the filing of
a motion for reconsideration. (Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang vs. GLucia Gaviola, G.R.
No. 156809, March 4, 2009)

Prohibited pleading cannot toll the running of the period to appeal.

It is obvious that a prohibited pleading cannot toll the running of the period to appeal since such
pleading cannot be given any legal effect precisely because of its being prohibited.
Clearly, a second motion for reconsideration does not suspend the running of the period to appeal
and neither does it have any legal effect. Hence, the CA did not commit any error when it
properly noted without action the petitioner's third motion for reconsideration for being a
prohibited pleading, as well as merely a reiteration of his arguments in his first motion for
reconsideration. Therefore, the said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap of paper that does
not deserve any consideration and the filing of the same did not toll the running of the
prescriptive period for filing a petition based on Rule 45. (Cited in the case of Rodging Reyes vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193034, July 20, 2015, Peralta, J.).

SPS. HEBER & CHARLITA EDILLO vs. SPS. NORBERTO & DESIDERIA DULPINA
G.R. No. 188360, January 21, 2010, BRION, J.

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Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs-respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 5,
2007 stop the running of the period for appeal.

Section 14. Affidavits. — The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state
only facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence,
and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits
the same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or
portion thereof from the record. (20, RSP)

The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious and

inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Section 36 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court provides that "a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception.

Example of ejectment with prayer of preliminary injunction:

In their complaint for forcible entry filed before the MTCC, the plaintiffs alleged that
they are the registered owners of a parcel of land. Erected on the land are various improvements
utilized for residential and business purposes. The defendants, on the other hand, with the aid of
armed men, forcibly fenced the perimeter of the said parcel of land with barbed wire. The
defendants and his men also intimidated the plaintiffs and their customers and destroyed some of
the improvements on the land. For the alleged acts of the defendants, the plaintiff may seek the
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction to preserve the last, actual, peaceable status of
the parties before the controversy.

GINA ENDAYA vs. ERNESTO V. VILLAOS

G.R. No. 202426, January 27, 2016, DEL CASTILLO, J.

Issue: Is the judge correct in ordering the petitioners to vacate the subject property?

FELICIDAD L. ORONCE and ROSITA L. FLAMINIANO

vs.
PRICILIANO B. GONZALES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125766 October 19, 1998, ROMERO, J.

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Issues: 1. Whether or not the unlawful detainer should prosper.
2. Whether or not the CA is correct.

Issue: 2. Whether or not the CA is correct in deciding that the controversy between the parties
was beyond the ordinary issues in an ejectment case

Facts: On April 25, 1995, private respondent interposed an appeal to the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondent stressed in its appeal that it was not unlawfully withholding possession of
the premises from petitioners because the latter's basis for evicting it was the Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage that did not reflect the true intention of the parties to enter into an
equitable mortgage. Clearly in pursuance of that allegation, private respondent filed a
motion questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC to entertain its appeal.

Issue: Whether or not private respondent was in estoppel from questioning the jurisdiction of the
MeTC since it voluntarily submitted thereto the question of the validity of its title to the
property.

Guidelines to be observe in ejectment case.

Sps. Refugia v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 982 (1996), the Court set out guidelines to be
observed in the implementation of the law:

1. The primal rule is that the principal issue must be that of possession, and that ownership is
merely ancillary thereto, in which case the issue of ownership may be resolved but only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, the legal provision under consideration
applies only where the inferior court believes and the preponderance of evidence shows that a
resolution of the issue of possession is dependent upon the resolution of the question of
ownership.

2. It must sufficiently appear from the allegations in the complaint that what the plaintiff really
and primarily seeks is the restoration of possession. Consequently, where the allegations of the
complaint as well as the reliefs prayed for clearly establish a case for the recovery of ownership,
and not merely one for the recovery of possession de facto, or where the averments plead the
claim of material possession as a mere elemental attribute of such claim for ownership, or where
the issue of ownership is the principal question to be resolved, the action is not one for forcible
entry but one for title to real property.

3. Where the question of who has the prior possession hinges on the question of who the real
owner of the disputed portion is, the inferior court may resolve the issue of ownership and make
a declaration as to who among the contending parties is the real owner. In the same vein, where
the resolution of the issue of possession hinges on a determination of the validity and
interpretation of the document of title or any other contract on which the claim of possession is
premised, the inferior court may likewise pass upon these issues. This is because, and it must be
so understood, that any such pronouncement made affecting ownership of the disputed portion is
to be regarded merely as provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice an action between the
same parties involving title to the land. Moreover, Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court

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expressly provides that the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer
shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building.

SPOUSES MARIO OCAMPO and CARMELITA F. OCAMPO vs.

HEIRS OF BERNARDINO U. DIONISIO
G.R. No. 191101, October 1, 2014, REYES, J.
Issues: (1) whether the finality of the decision in the forcible entry case constitutes res judicata,
which would warrant the dismissal of the respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession;
(2) whether the respondents were able to establish their ownership of the subject property; and
(3) whether the respondents’ cause of action is already barred by laches.

Two distinct concepts of res judicata:

(1) bar by former judgment and

(2) conclusiveness of judgment, Hacienda Bigaa, Inc. v. Chavez, G.R. No. 174160, April
20, 2010, 618 SCRA 559, 576.

In Judge Abelita III v. P/Supt. Doria, et al., 612 Phil. 1127 (2009).the Court explained the
two aspects of res judicata, thus:

There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action (Pa.Su.Ca). In this
instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second
action.

But where there is identity of parties (Pa) in the first and second cases,
but no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as to
those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to
matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."

FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE VS. SPOUSES SILVINO S. ESTOMO

and CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO
G.R. No. 223399, April 23, 2018, PERALTA, J.

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits are designed to summarily restore physical
possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived
thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession
in appropriate proceedings. These actions are intended to avoid disruption of public order by
those who would take the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of
possession. (Barrientos v. Rapal, 669 Phil. 438, 444, 447 (2011). A judgment rendered in a
forcible entry case, or an unlawful detainer as in this case, will not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title or ownership because between a case for forcible entry or unlawful
detainer and an accion reinvindicatoria, there is no identity of causes of action. Such

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determination does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land; neither is it conclusive
of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action
involving possession (Spouses Ocampo v. Heirs of Dionisio, 744 Phil. 716, 728 (2014). In fact,
Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that a "judgment rendered in an
action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and
shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land." Since there is no identity of
causes of action, there can be no multiplicity of suits.

Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same

The general rule in ejectment proceedings is that the decision in favor of the plaintiff is
immediately executory. The plaintiff is entitled to reacquire possession of the subject property
after the trial court rules in his favor, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the
loss of possession of the property in question. (Hualam Construction and Development Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85466, October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 612, 626-627).

To stay the immediate execution of the judgment while the appeal is pending, the
following requisites must concur (San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114300, August 4,
1994, 235 SCRA 145, 148):

(1) the defendant perfects his appeal;

(2) he files a supersedeas bond; and

(3) he periodically deposits the rentals which have become due during the
pendency of the appeal. (First paragraph, Sec. 19, Rule 70). The failure of the defendant
to comply with any of these conditions is a ground for the outright execution of the
judgment. (Spouses Chua v. Court of Appeals, 350 Phil. 74, 83 (1998).

The supersedeas bond secures the payment of the rents and damages adjudged in the
appealed judgment. It answers only for rentals as fixed in the judgment and not for those that
may accrue during the pendency of the appeal, which are, in turn, guaranteed by the periodical
deposits to be made by the defendant. (De Laureano v. Adil, No. L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72
SCRA 148, 157). The supersedeas bond and the monthly deposits are primarily designed to
ensure that the plaintiff would be paid the back rentals or the compensation for the use and
occupation of the premises, should the inferior court’s decision in his favor be affirmed on
appeal. Hence, if no bond was filed or no monthly deposit was made, the plaintiff is entitled to
the possession of the premises. To allow the defendant in an ejectment case to continue his
possession without any security for the rentals would be prejudicial to the plaintiff. He might not
be able to recover the back rentals when the judgment in his favor becomes final and executory.
In that event, his claim for rentals would be illusory and ineffectual (Id).

Even if the defendant had appealed and filed a supersedeas bond but failed to pay the
accruing rentals (succeeding monthly rental), the appellate court could, upon motion of the
plaintiff with notice to the defendant and proof of such failure, order the immediate execution of
the appealed decision without prejudice to the appeal taking its course. (Second paragraph, Sec.

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19, Rule 70). Such deposit, like the supersedeas bond, is a mandatory requirement; hence, if it is
not complied with, execution will issue as a matter of right. (San Pedro v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 114300, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 145, 148).

The amounts so deposited as bond and the rentals periodically paid thereafter should be
maintained until the final determination of the appeal. This holds true even if execution pending
appeal was earlier ordered due to the insufficiency of the bond and defendant’s default in the
payment of a monthly rental. Defendant is not entitled to withdrawal of the deposits already
made and the cancellation of the supersedeas bond, as the plaintiff would lose the chance to
collect the rents that had accrued prior to execution. (Victor D. Ricafort vs. Judge Rogelio C.
Gonzales, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1798, September 7, 2004)

True, under Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the RTC, as the
appellate court may order the withdrawal of the deposits made to it "in the absence of reasonable
grounds of opposition" or "for justifiable reasons" supporting the withdrawal. X x x. Precisely,
the periodic deposit of future rentals is required to ensure the payment of rentals accruing after
judgment of the inferior court and until final judgment on appeal. (1 F. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium 797 7th ed. (1999).

It is clear then that it was error for respondent judge to grant defendant’s motion to
withdraw supersedeas bond and rental deposits. Respondent judge incorrectly believed that the
bond and the rentals do not guarantee the money judgment. His failure to comprehend the basic
purpose of the bond and the rentals constitutes gross ignorance of the law, for which he may be
held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law and imposes upon him a FINE of Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), to be deducted from whatever retirement benefits he may be
entitled to receive from the government. (Victor D. Ricafort vs. Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales, A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1798, September 7, 2004)

HERMINIA ACBANG vs. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION,
TUGUEGARAO CITY, and SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L. LOPEZ
G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014, BERSAMIN, J.

The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113886, February 24, 1998, 286 SCRA
437, 444-445, is instructive on the means of staying the immediate execution of a judgment in an
ejectment case, to wit:

As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is

immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of
possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said
judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following
requisites must concur:

(1) the defendant perfects his appeal;

(2) he files a supersedeas bond; and

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 (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency of
the appeal.

The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a ground
for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect being
"ministerial and imperative." Hence, if the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but
failed to file a supersedeas bond, the immediate execution of the judgment would
automatically follow. Conversely, the filing of a supersedeas bond will not stay the
execution of the judgment if the appeal is not perfected. Necessarily then, the supersedeas
bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately

executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must:

(1) perfect an appeal;

(2) file a supersede s bond; and
(3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the
appeal. Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a
motion for execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the
immediate execution of the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing
out that they were entitled to the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the
Acbangs failure to comply with all of the three abovementioned requisites for staying the
immediate execution. The filing of the notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did
not suffice to stay the immediate execution without the filing of the sufficient
supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing rentals.

Jesus Dayao vs. Shell Company of the Philippines, LTD.

G.R. No. L-32475, April 30, 1980
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge is correct in granting the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction

AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

(NINETEENTH DIVISION) and BERNIE G. MIAQUE
G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction.

Rule 70 is too long. Pass your answers/digest cases on this coming Saturday.
Next is Rule 71 - CONTEMPT.

I am expecting you that you will remember all the things

that you wrote in your notebook and pass to me as your homework.
DO NOT FORGET all the things you learned until you become a lawyer.