Abanado VS Bayona
Abanado VS Bayona
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, * J : p
The case now before this Court sprang from Criminal Case No. 09-03-
16474, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr. 1 On March 24,
2009, complainant City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado filed the Information 2
in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod City, which was eventually raffled
to Branch 7 thereof presided by respondent Judge Abraham A. Bayona.
On April 13, 2009, respondent issued the following order in Criminal Case
No. 09-03-16474 in connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
the accused therein:
Pursuant to [Section] 6, paragraph (a) in relation to [paragraph]
b, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City is hereby ordered to present
additional evidence, relevant records and documents to enable this
Court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause, to
wit:
Compliance is required within five (5) days from receipt of this Order. 3
On April 29, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted a copy of
the Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation and informed respondent that
the documents submitted by the parties for preliminary investigation were
already appended to the complaint, thus, taking care of items 1, 2, and 4
required by the April 13, 2009 Order.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
With respect to item 3 thereof, complainant, in a letter also dated April 29,
2009, explained that there was no memorandum of transfer of the case from
the investigating prosecutor, Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Dennis S. Jarder,
to him. 4 In his aforementioned letter, complainant discussed that the case was
initially handled by ACP Jarder who found no probable cause against Cresencio
Palo, Sr., accused in Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474. However, complainant,
upon review pursuant to Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 5 found otherwise; that is, there was probable cause against Palo.
Thus, complainant disapproved ACP Jarder's Resolution and filed the
Information in court. 6 SEHaTC
On May 11, 2009, in view of the foregoing order, the Office of the City
Prosecutor again sent a letter 9 explaining the impossibility of submitting the
Jarder Resolution to the court. The letter stated that the Jarder Resolution was
no longer part of the records of the case as it was disapproved by complainant
and it attached a letter of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño which reads:
This refers to your letter dated April 18, 2008. For your
information, all resolutions prepared by an Investigating Prosecutor
after preliminary investigation shall form part of the record of the case.
But if they have been disapproved by the Provincial/City Prosecutor,
the same shall not be released to the parties and/or their counsels.
Thus, only resolutions approved by the Provincial/City Prosecutor for
promulgation and release to the parties shall be made known to the
parties and/or their counsel. 10
Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the
City Prosecutor and insisted instead that the Jarder Resolution should form part
of the records of the case. Thus, in an Order 11 dated May 14, 2009, he required
complainant to explain within five days from the receipt thereof why he should
not be cited for contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. 12
Complainant received the aforementioned order on May 15, 2009 and
requested for a ten-day extension to comply with it. 13
Complainant likewise filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to restrain respondent from
proceeding 17 with the May 26, 2009 hearing of the contempt proceedings.
Complainant's prayer for a TRO was granted in an Order dated May 25, 2009 by
Presiding Judge Pepito B. Gellada of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53,
Bacolod City.
In an Order 18 dated June 15, 2009, Judge Gellada granted the petition for
certiorari (Gellada Order) holding that:
[W]hen a city or provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating
assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable
cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor
recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would be that the
resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records
of the case. It is no longer required that the complaint or entire
records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted
to and be examined by the judge. CSIDTc
The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to
unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete
records of the cases all the time for the purpose of determining
probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest
against the accused. "What is required, rather, is that the judge
must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the
complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of
witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to
make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the
existence of probable cause. . . . . 19 (Emphases supplied.)
We adopt the factual findings of the OCA but find reason not to impose
the recommended penalty of reprimand on respondent.
(2) within five days from the date of his resolution, the
investigating fiscal shall forward his resolution to the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, as the case may be,
for review;
(3) if the resolution of the investigating prosecutor is reversed
by the provincial, city or chief state prosecutor, the latter
may file the information himself or direct another assistant
prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so;
(4) the resolution of the investigating prosecutor shall be
strictly confidential and may not be released to the parties,
their counsels and/or any other unauthorized person until the
same shall have been finally acted upon by the provincial,
city or chief state prosecutor or his duly authorized assistant
and approved for promulgation and release to the parties;
and
(5) that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the
complainant's affidavit, the sworn statements of the
prosecution's witnesses, the respondent's counter-affidavit
and the sworn statements of his witnesses and such other
evidence, as far as practicable , shall be attached to the
information.
We find that there is nothing in the DOJ-NPS Manual requiring the removal
of a resolution by an investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of a
criminal complaint after it was reversed by the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to an
information filed in court is optional under the aforementioned manual. The
DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
should be attached to the information only "as far as practicable." Thus, such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent erred in insisting
on the production of the Jarder Resolution when all other pertinent documents
regarding the preliminary investigation have been submitted to his court, and
in going so far as to motu proprio initiating a proceeding for contempt against
complainant.
However, not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the law
and if it was committed in good faith, the judge need not be subjected to
administrative sanction. 32 While complainant admitted that he erred in
insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution despite the provisions of the
DOJ-NPS Manual, such error cannot be categorized as gross ignorance of the
law as he did not appear to be motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of
procedure in the prosecution office were not clear as to whether or not an
investigating prosecutor's resolution of dismissal that had been reversed by the
city prosecutor should still form part of the records.
Neither did respondent's action amount to gross misconduct. Gross
misconduct presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in the performance of
duty. 33 In the case at bar, respondent's act of requiring complainant to explain
why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to submit the Jarder
Resolution in court was in accordance with established rules of procedure.
Furthermore, complainant did not abuse his contempt power as he did not
pursue the proceedings in view of the May 29, 2009 and June 15, 2009 Gellada
orders. 34 Lastly, as previously discussed, respondent issued those orders in
good faith as he honestly believed that they were necessary in the fair and just
issuance of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 09-03-16474. CaAIES
Footnotes
*Per Special Order No. 1226 dated May 30, 2012.
**Per Special Order No. 1227 dated May 30, 2012.
1.For Violation of Section 12, Republic Act No. 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972.
7.Id. at 23-25.
8.Id. at 25.
9.Id. at 26.
10.Id. at 92.
11.Id. at 27-29.
19.Id. at 40-41.
20.Id. at 2-10.
21.RULES OF COURT, Rule 140, Section 8 (9).
22.Id., Section 8 (3).
23.A hearing is not necessary therefor. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge, following
the established doctrine and procedure, shall either (a) personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest, or (b) if on the face of the information he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the prosecutor's certification and require the
submission of the supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. (De los Santos-Reyes v.
Judge Montesa, Jr., 317 Phil. 101, 111 (1995).
24.Rollo , pp. 57-82; dated October 1, 2009.
25.Id. at 61.
26.Id. at 79-80.
27.Id. at 102-107.
28.Id. at 118-121.
29.Id. at 121.
30.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tobias, G.R. No. 177780, January 25,
2012; People v. Court of Appeals and Cerbo , 361 Phil. 401, 410 (1999).
33.See Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua, A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 07-2630-RTJ, April 23, 2010,
619 SCRA 59, 92-93.
34.Cf. Tabujara III v. Gonzales-Asdala, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2126, January 20, 2009, 576
SCRA 404, 413-414.