810 Phil.

931

THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 219848, June 07, 2017 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V.

GODOFREDO MACARAIG Y GONZALES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Challenged in this appeal is the November 20, 2014 Decision [1] promulgated by the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06484, which affirmed the October
16, 2013 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calabanga, Camarines Sur,
Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 11-1623, finding accused-appellant Godofredo
Macaraig y Gonzales (accused-appellant Macaraig) guilty of the crime of Murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay
the heirs of Joven Celeste (Joven) the amount of PhP75,000 as civil indemnity,
PhP50,000 as moral damages, PhP16,750 as actual damages, and PhP30,000 as
exemplary damages.

Accused-appellant Macaraig was charged under the following Information:

That on the 31st day of May 2011 in Brgy. Salvacion, Baybay, Municipality of

Calabanga, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, while armed with a
bladed instrument, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault,
attack and stab one JOVEN CELESTE y MALANYAON, and with treachery hitting the
latter on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him stab wound (sic)
which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.

The Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution. presented the following witnesses: Francis Losano (Losano),

Herson Heles (Heles), Corazon Celeste (Celeste) and Dr. Daniel Tan (Dr. Tan).

The events, as put forward by the prosecution, were summarized by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in its brief[4] as follows:
On 31 May 2011, at around 12:00 in the morning, Francis Losano (Francis),
together with the victim Joven Celeste (Joven), and three other friends were at the
basketball court of their barangay attending a dance party as it was the last day of
the Sta. Cruzan.

At. around one o'clock in the morning, Francis and Joven both decided to go home.
On his way home, Francis saw appellant following Joven. Then he saw appellant
approach Joven from the back, place his left arm over his shoulder and suddenly
stabbed Joven.

After stabbing Joven, appellant saw Francis and ran after him. Sensing his life was
in danger, Francis went inside his house, got a bolo and flashlight. He went back
out but saw appellant ran away upon seeing him. Francis pursued appellant and
caught up with him. Conscious of the possibility that appellant was armed, Francis
maintained his distance. Francis asked him why he stabbed Joven, but appellant did
not answer. Francis shouted for help. A friend heard his shouts and heeded his call.
Appellant, on the other hand, escaped into the rice field.

Joven, despite the stab wounds, managed to get home and was able to seek help
from his parents Julio and Corazon. Herson Heles (Herson), cousin of the victim,
saw Julio carrying his son outside their house. Together, they boarded Joven in a
tricycle and brought him to Poblacion where they boarded an ambulance which
brought them to Bicol Medical Center. On their way to the hospital, Herson asked
Joven about the identity of his assailant. Joven categorically told him it was
appellant. Joven however expired and was declared dead on arrival at the hospital,

The search for appellant lasted until morning. Appellant was later found in a place
somewhere near the Trade School in Sta. Cruz, Ratay.

Dr. Daniel Tan testified that Joven suffered one stab wound which he described as 8
cm. x 3 cm. midepigastric area, extending to the left upper quadrant, penetrating
the liver, abdominal aorta, small intestine, with non-clotted blood pooled in the
peritoneal cavity. The kind of instrument used in inflicting the wound, according to
the doctor, was a pointed sharp edged instrument such as a knife or bolo.

The Version of the Defense

The defense presented as its sole witness, the accused-appellant. His version of the
facts, as set forth in his brief[5], is as follows:

Accused GODOFREDO MACARAIG was a resident of Paolbo, Calabanga, Camarines

Sur. On May 29, 2011, he was invited by his friend, Jeffrey Crobalde (hereafter
referred to as "Crobalde"), to visit the latter's place in Sogod, Calabanga.

In the evening of May 30, 2011, Joven was throwing stones in the window of
Crobalde's house. When Macaraig told Joven to stop throwing stones, the latter left
the place.
At around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of May 31, 2011, after a dinking (sic) spree
at the basketball court in Barangay Salvacion-Baybay, he was about to go to the
house of Crobalde when two (2) unidentified men followed him and another man
was waiting for him. One of the men tried to stab him with a balisong but it was the
latter's companion who was hit. When he noticed that one of them was carrying a
bolo, he ran away.

The RTC Ruling

On October 16, 2013, the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused-appellant guilty
of the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of  reclusion perpetua,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of Joven Celeste (Joven) the amounts of
PhP75,000 as civil indemnity and PhP50,000 as moral damages, PhP16,750 as
actual damages and PhP30,000 as exemplary damages.

The CA Ruling

Seeing merit on the RTC ruling, the CA, in its November 20, 2014 Decision,
affirmed the RTC decision in its entirety.

The Ruling of this Court

Accused-appellant prays for the reversal of the judgment of conviction arguing that
the lower courts erred in convicting him of murder and in not considering his theory
of self-defense.

The appeal fails.

After a review of the records, the Court sustains the conviction of the accused-
appellant for murder.

Self-defense, when invoked as a justifying circumstance, implies the admission by

the accused that he committed the criminal act. Generally, the burden lies upon the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than
upon the accused that he was in fact innocent. When the accused, however, admits
killing the victim, it is incumbent upon him to prove any claimed justifying
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule that in
criminal cases, self-defense shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the
defense.[6]

To invoke self-defense, in order to escape criminal liability, it is incumbent upon the

accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the following
requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC, viz.: (1) unlawful
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Of all the burdens the accused-appellant carried the most important of all is the
element of unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault,
or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. The element of
unlawful aggression must be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully
pleaded. There can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the
victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.[7]

We do not see the credibility of accused-appellant's theory of self-defense. Suffice it

to state that his version of what transpired, specifically that the victim and his
companions mauled him, is vague, and too implausible to merit any weight. At the
outset, accused-appellant was uncertain as to who were the men who assaulted
him and whether the victim was one of those men who allegedly attempted to stab
him. Further, accused-appellant claims that it was not him but the victim's
companion who ended up stabbing him since accused-appellant was able to evade
the blows. Evidently, without a clear showing that the victim attacked or tried to
attack accused-appellant, We find that unlawful aggression cannot be deemed to
have occurred. On this note, We completely agree with the appellate court's
observation to wit:

In his lone testimony, Macaraig tried to establish self-defense by testifying that on

the said date and time of the incident in this case, he was alone when he left the
Santa Cruzan celebration. He was, however, followed by two unidentified men,
while another unidentified man was waiting for him. One of the two men poked
something at him, held him in the shoulder and boxed him. He was able to evade
the blow. After which another person, armed with balisong, tried to stab him but as
he was able to evade the blow again, another person got stabbed.

It is well to note that by invoking self-defense, the accused-appellant, in effect,

admitted to the commission of the acts for which he was charged, albeit under
circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him. With this admission, the
burden of proof shifted to the accused-appellant to show that the killing was
attended by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons
resorting to self-defense. "In this case, however, the accused-appellant
stated that it was not him who stabbed the victim, but the victim's
companion or somebody else. From this observation alone, the trial court
correctly struck down accused-appellant's (plea) self-defense. As correctly
stated by the State in its Comment, this assertion negates accused-appellant's
defense.

That said, the presence of the elements of self-defense need not be

discussed as there is no self-defense to speak of in the first
place. Furthermore, a plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated in favor
of the accused where it is not only corroborated by independent and competent
evidence but is also extremely doubtful by itself.[8] (Emphasis supplied).

Contrary to the .accused-appellant's claim of self-defense, We find that the

prosecution sufficiently established accused-appellant's culpability. The testimonies
of Losano and Dr. Tan, as well as the victim's dying declaration, undoubtedly
support the version set forth by the prosecution that the accused-appellant went
behind and collared Joven and then suddenly proceeded to stab him with a knife.

It bears to note that the wounds on the victim's body, particularly on the abdomen
area, match the prosecution's narration of events. Moreover, Joven's statement
prior to his death, naming accused-appellant as the assailant who stabbed him,
proves accused-appellant's guilt of the crime charged.

While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own
perception, a report in open court of a dying person's declaration is recognized as
an exception to the rule against hearsay if it is "made under the consciousness of
an impending death that is the subject of inquiry in the case." It is considered as
"evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person
aware of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation." [9]

The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the
following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding
circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made when death appears to be
imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the
declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the
dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarant's death.”[10]

Heles related to the trial court Joven's ante mortem statement, as follows:

Q: You said you were going to bring "kapid" or Joven Celeste to the BMC, and then what
happened while bringing him to the BMG, if any?
A: While we were inside the ambulance while we were traveling I was asking him who stabbed
him and when we were already in Magarao, he was speaking in a low voice, so I leaned
towards him and he said it was Godo Macaraig who stabbed him and he was already very
weak.
   
Q: What did you observe from Mr. Joven Celeste when he told you that it is Godo Macaraig?
A: From what I observed, that was his last word.
   
Q: And then what happened next if any?
A: When we reached BMC, he was already dead.[11]

All the above requisites are present in this case. When Joven told Heles who
stabbed him, he was then being brought to the Bicol Medical Center. Further, the
fatal quality and extent of the injuries Joven suffered underscored the imminence of
his death, as his condition was so serious that he was pronounced dead upon arrival
in the hospital. There is no showing that Joven would have been disqualified to
testify had he survived. Lastly, his declaration was offered in a murder case where
he is the victim.
Having established accused-appellant's act of killing Joven, We shall now determine
the propriety of his conviction for the crime of murder.

From the evidence and as found by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate
court, the facts sufficiently prove that treachery was employed by accused-
appellant when he stabbed Joven.

It was candidly narrated by witness Losano that accused-appellant followed Joven

from behind, suddenly approached him, put his left arm over Joven's shoulder and
proceeded to stab him using his right hand. Such circumstances showed that
accused-appellant employed a method which tended directly and specifically to
insure the execution of his dastardly act without any risk to himself arising from
whatever defense which the victim might make. Verily, the attack on Joven was so
swift and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
opportunity to resist or defend himself. As testified to by Losano:

Q: Alright after you saw Joven heading home, what happened next after that if any?
A: There was a person behind him who was following him.
   
Q: Alright you said that there was a person following him. What happened next after that if any?
A: He was stabbed ma'am in front.
   
Q: He was stabbed by whom?
A: Godo ma'am.
   
Q: What is the complete name of Godo?
A: Godofredo Macaraig.
   
Q: How did Godo stabbed (sic) Joven Celeste?
A: He was behind him and then when he got near, he put his left arm on Joven's shoulders
and then he stab (sic) Joven using his right arm.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant's guilt of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

As to the imposable penalties, the Court affirms the penalty of reclusion

perpetua  imposed upon the accused-appellant. Under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized
with reclusion perpetua to death. The lower courts were correct in imposing the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in the absence of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.[13] We affirm the award
of civil indemnity and actual damages, but the award of the other damages should
be modified, in accordance with the prevailing jurisprudence. [14] As such, we
increase the award of moral damages from PhP50,000 to PhP75,000, and
exemplary damages from PhP30,000 to PhP75,000. The damages awarded shall
earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated November 20, 2014
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06484 finding accused-appellant
GODOFREDO MACARAIG y GONZALES GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing
accused-appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for
parole, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Joven Celeste the following amounts:
(a) PhP75,000 as civil indemnity; (b) PhP75,000 as moral damages; (c) PhP16,750
as actual damages; and (d) PhP75,000 as exemplary damages. All damages
awarded in this case shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum  from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Martires,[*]  J., on leave.

July 25, 2017

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on June 7, 2017 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on July 25, 2017 at 10:20 a.m.

  Very truly yours,

   
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITAN
 
Division Clerk of Court

[*]
 Designated as additional Member as per Raffle dated March 15, 2017.

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo F. Barza and concurred in by Associate
Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Ramon A. Cruz; Rollo, pp. 2-13.

[2]
 Penned by Judge Pedro M. Redona, CA  rollo, pp. 76-87.

[3]
 Id. at 12.
[4]
 Id. at 92-103.

[5]
 Id. at 60-73.

[6]
 People v. Cristina Samson, G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015.

[7]
 Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra v. People, G.R. No. 170462, February 5,
2014.

[8]
 Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[9]
 People v. Jay Mandy Maglian y Reyes, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011.

[10]
 Id.

[11]
 See  RTC Decision citing TSN, May 2, 2012, p. 6, CA rollo, p. 85.

[12]
 See Rollo, p. 9.

[13]
 People v. Samson Berk y Bayogan, G.R. No. 204896, December 7, 2016.

[14]
 People v. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016.