Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 11

CHAPTER 1

HINDU ETHICS

Satyam eva jayate nanritam.

Truth alone is victorious and not falsehood.

THE CONCEPT OF DHARMA

The Sanskrit word for ethics is dharma (“to hold”). It signifies that which
upholds or embodies law, custom, and religion, and is analogous to the
concept of ‘Natural Law’ in Christian ethics, though the idea of ‘law’
should not detract from its dynamic character. Dharma is activity, mobil-
ity, and is possessed of catalytic qualities. By contrast, a-dharma is stasis,
stoppage, and therefore unnatural.
From the beginning of Indian civilization, the Indian mind has chiefly
been preoccupied with the notion of dharma. K. N. Upadhyaya notes that
“the persistence and intensity with which the inquiry into dharma has
been pursued is mainly on account of the firm conviction of the Indian
people that dharma constitutes the differentia of man,” just as in Western
philosophy, following Aristotle, rationality has been upheld as the mark
that distinguishes humans from all other creatures.1
Notwithstanding this historic preoccupation with dharma, the Hindu
scriptures do not have systematic discussions of moral doctrines, fash-
ioned in the manner of Aristotelian or Thomistic models. At the same
time Hindu scriptures are rich repositories of certain theoretical state-
ments that define the shape of reality and the nature of things, along with
prescriptive and practical sayings, aimed at the cultivation of moral be-
havior. The terminology in which these ideas and ideals are expressed is
richly suggestive, making it possible to reconstruct these fertile fragments
into models of systematic ethics.
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 12

12 Foundations

The common scriptural ground on which the whole system of Hindu

ethics is founded is the postulation of a summum bonum and the proper
means to achieve it. This highest ideal is the state of liberation or mokÓ sa.
In it a person finds self-fulfillment and deepest bliss. It is established on
the metaphysical conviction of the oneness of Reality, which is attainable
through direct experience. MokÓ sa serves as the ultimate standard of right
conduct. An act is of value or disvalue to the extent it either helps or hin-
ders the attainment of freedom. Actions most distinctively oriented to
mokÓ sa are those characterized by truth, non-violence, sacrifice, and re-
nunciation.
At first glance the philosophical ideal of mokÓ sa, which calls for detach-
ment and progressive resignation, appears antithetical to ethics, because
ethics involves a person’s active role in the world.
There is no doubt that the Hindu philosophical ideal transcends the
ethical ideal, but, as with the rungs of a ladder, the higher and lower lev-
els are connected and cannot function separately. Thus while Hinduism
draws a sharp distinction between the spiritual and material, the eternal
and the temporal, these dimensions of existence are not polarized but
correlated within the inclusive concept of dharma. Dharma incorporates
the metaphysical and practical wisdom of the Hindus.
The unity between philosophical wisdom and ethical excellence is
clearly illustrated in the doctrine of adhik¯ara. This doctrine teaches that
before a disciple can aspire after knowledge, he must first be morally
qualified. The UpaniÓsads are replete with references correlating prajñ¯a or
saving knowledge with moral practice. The KaÓtha UpaniÓsad clealy states:

Not he who has not ceased from bad conduct,

Not he who is not tranquil, not he who is not composed,
Not he who is not of peaceful mind
Can obtain Him by intelligence (prajñ¯a).2

Commenting on this verse, R¯am¯anuja explains that it “teaches that

meditation, which should become more perfect day by day, cannot be ac-
complished without the devotee having broken with all evil. This is the
indispensable condition of pleasing the Lord and winning His grace.”3
The adhik¯ara doctrine underscores the intrinsic connection between
rationality and morality. A truly rational person is bound to demonstrate
qualities that are moral. In the pursuit of truth he or she is obligated to be
free of bias, self-interest, and double standards. All of these are moral
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 13

Hindu Ethics 13

qualities. It follows that to be rational is to be moral, and just as a sound

mind requires a sound body, a sound philosophy requires a sound ethics.
Saksena says: “The moral and spiritual qualification of a philosopher is
. . . a condition of his philosophizing properly. Passion or ethical failings
cannot but distort the vision of even a philosopher. In fact, what is called
intuition is not so much an independent faculty as a purity of the moral
being of the knower which itself constitutes enlightenment.”4
The moral discipline Hinduism enjoins upon the seeker after philo-
sophical truth springs from a comprehensive ethic. Hindu ethics is a
systematic progression from the Objective level to the Subjective level,
culminating on the Superethical level. The first is the stage of Social Eth-
ics; the second is the stage of Personal Ethics; and the third is the stage of
the “Transcendental End.”5

Objective Level: Social Ethics

In its objective aspect Hindu dharma is tridimensional. Social duties

are classified as (1) Åśrama-dharma; (2) VarÓna-dharma; (3) S¯adh¯araÓna-
dharma.

(1) Åśrama-dharma
The ¯aśrama scheme provides the framework within which an individual
may express the total needs of one’s personality. These needs are incorpo-
rated within the doctrine of the four values of life or puruÓ s¯arthas, and are
identified as: success (artha); passion (k¯ama); virtue (dharma); and self-
perfection (mokÓ sa).
The puruÓs¯artha doctrine constitutes the psycho-moral basis of ¯aśrama-
dharma. It perceives human personality as a complex organism that is so-
cially oriented. It recognizes an empirical side to life, represented by the
first three puruÓs¯arthas, having natural desires and social aims. Persons are
conceived as naturally craving sex, and feeling the need for prosperity,
power, and public good. The fourth puruÓs¯artha acknowledges a spiritual
side to life marked by otherworldly hungers. Moreover, both sides are in-
tegrated within a holistic view of the person. Thus the puruÓs¯artha schema
allows for no schism between desire and aspiration, or between the de-
mands of the earth and of heaven. Both are good, when viewed relation-
ally. True, the earth perishes, while heaven abides, but to treat the perish-
able as non-existing is to invite ruin. As the UpaniÓsad declares: “In
darkness are they who worship only the world, but in greater darkness
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 14

14 Foundations

they who worship the infinite alone. He who accepts both saves himself
from death by the knowledge of the former and attains immortality by
the knowledge of the latter.”
Success is the first ideal worthy of pursuit. Artha is cognizant of the
economic, social, and political needs of persons, and is especially impor-
tant for a king. Through numerous passages wealth is praised, not only
for its contribution to physical well-being, but also for its cultivation of
social significance and political prestige. Wealth is said to transform a
person of low social status to one of high status. Contrary to the adage,
“Money is the root of all evil,” it is said that “all virtues attach them-
selves to gold.” However, there is nothing laissez-faire about artha; it
must be regulated by dharma, and must express itself through liberality.
“Let the rich satisfy the poor, and keep in view the long pathway. Riches
come now to one, now to another, and like the wheels of cars are ever
turning.”6
K¯ama is the second ideal every normal person must embrace. It refers
to any pleasure derived from the five senses, including the sensuous en-
joyment of art, music, literature, and especially sexual activity. Hindu re-
ligious and secular literature is replete with sexual allusions, symbolism,
and undisguised eroticism. In the Middle Ages sexual intercourse was di-
vinized to illustrate the wonder of creation, as figures of couples in close
embrace were elaborately carved on temple walls. The celebration of sex
reached its most exaggerated form with the introduction of ritual inter-
course within certain religious sects. But, as historian A. L. Basham ob-
serves, this extreme form of sexual religiosity in the later Middle Ages
was “only an expression of the vigorous sexuality which was to be found
in Indian social life at all times.” Here, too, k¯ama is not without limits:
passion is good when it unites body and soul, and is regulated by dharma.
This brings us to the third value of life: dharma. It posits the moral na-
ture and structure of the universe, because God is in it. The world is not
just the evolution of an unconscious material force, creating and express-
ing itself in a world of increasing complexity and heterogeneity by its
own unconscious dialectic. “It is a world of Divine and spiritual imma-
nence with fullest reality of moral values and forces, because they flow
from the power or Íakti of God.”8
We have said that artha and k¯ama must be regulated by dharma. The
rationale for this hierarchy of values is that whereas passion is born of in-
ertia (tamas gu˙na), and success is born of energy (rajas gu˙na), the source
of dharma is purity (sattva gu˙na)—the highest of the three fundamental
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 15

Hindu Ethics 15

qualities of nature. By this criterion Manu enjoins that wealth and pleas-
ure that are alien to righteousness must be discarded.9
Knowledge of one’s own dharma or sva-dharma, as the G¯ ıt¯a puts it, is
possible for the common person through a fourfold guide: (1) the Vedas;
(2) the SmÓrtis or expositions of Vedic wisdom; (3) the conduct of exem-
plary individuals; and (4) one’s own conscience.10
The three puruÓ s¯arthas reviewed so far represent the ideals of the em-
pirical life. They recognize and give balance to basic human needs. But
higher than the desire of the empirical self are aspirations of the spiritual
self. Maitreȳı knew this well in her interrogation of Y¯ajñavalkya. The old
sage is forced to admit: “Of immortality . . . there is no hope through
wealth.”11
Immortality (mokÓ sa) is the fourth and highest puruÓ sa¯ rtha. It is the state
of liberation wherein one’s spiritual self comes fully into its own. Correctly
pursued, artha, k¯ama, and dharma lead to mokÓ sa. Self-realization is not
the negation of these mundane values, but their fulfillment.
Thus the doctrine of the four puruÓ s¯arthas presents Hindu ethics as a
rich compendium of elements in life that less imaginative systems have
deemed exclusive and antagonistic.
The structure of existence defined by the puruÓ s¯arthas calls for a correl-
ative social organization through which human nature in all of its varie-
gated forms is actualized. This is supplied in the ¯aśrama scheme. Not only
does this scheme channelize the individual’s natural inclinations, it is a
practical outlet for a sense of social obligations formalized in the ethical
concept of the three debts (Ó rÓnas).
Before a person qualifies for mokÓ sa, it is obligatory to pay off vital
debts. These are debts to one’s teachers (Ó rÓ si Ó rÓna), to ancestors (pitÓ r Ó rÓna),
and to deities (deva Ó rÓna). They are repaid through study, by begetting off-
spring, and through ritual performances. The notion of debts in the
moral consciousness of the Hindu must be distinguished from the West-
ern notion of rights. RÓÓ na is the by-product of a culture in which the whole
web of life is seen as interdependent, and this elicits feelings of gratitude
and responsibility.
Having explored the four ends of life and the three springs of social ob-
ligation, we pass on to the ethical organization in which the puruÓ s¯arthas
are realized and the Ó rÓnas redeemed. The ancient Hindu philosophers were
not content to theorize about life. They were practical enough to organize
the life of the individual in such a way that he or she would have ample
scope to find fulfillment in all areas of life. Modern Hindu philosophers
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 16

16 Foundations

should pay heed that the notion of applied ethics was a vital part of
UpaniÓsadic culture.
Åśrama-dharma enjoins that each individual pass through four stages
in the quest for his true self. The ¯aśramas are: (1) student (brahmac¯arin);
(2) householder (gÓ rhasthya); (3) forest-dweller (v¯anaprastha); (4) hermit
(sanny¯asin).
The student was expected to live at close quarters with his mentor, for
the sake of training both mind and body. While the body was disciplined
in continence, the mind was exercised in knowledge of the arts and sci-
ences. In earliest times, women could enter brahmac¯arya and participate
in Vedic studies, but the practice ceased when the pool of females enter-
ing society included persons deemed of lesser stock and custom.
The student was not expected to repress his desires for the opposite
sex indefinitely, but was obliged to find fulfillment of his natural impulses
in marriage. Marriage was upheld as a universal ideal, because it helped
transform individuals with private interests and inclinations into com-
panions commited in love to each other, and to future generations. Fam-
ily solidarity included the living as well as members who had passed on.
When responsibilites to kith and kin are accomplished, as generations
come and go, it is time to enter the third stage of life that leads to the for-
est and to a life of solitude and meditation. Social success has a point of
diminishing returns, as the demands of the mind and the senses yield to
the demands of the soul. A wife may join her husband if she shares his
spiritual aspirations.
In the final stage, the path of life narrows and must be walked alone.
The sanny¯asin strives to free himself of all ego-consciousness that per-
mits his unfettered Self to appear. Once a person realizes the Self, he or
she becomes detached from all encumbrances associated with former no-
tions of ‘I’ and ‘mine.’ Since detachment is fundamentally renunciation
of ego consciousness, and not renunciation of the welfare of the world, a
liberated person may continue to strive toward human well-being. Like
the Buddha, moved by compassion, such a person may even eschew lib-
eration from saÂs¯ara, in order to relieve the sorrow of creatures who
suffer.
Thus the scheme of a¯ śrama dharma answers the moral question of how
a person should live by observing that there are distinct periods of life,
each having diverse needs that call for diverse deeds. Morality is not
monotone. Each stage is born of nature, and is therefore normal, neces-
sary, and good. The moral life is less a matter of chronology, as of biology,
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 17

Hindu Ethics 17

physiology, and psychology. What is good for spring is not necessarily

good for summer, and what is bad for autumn may be welcome in winter.

VarÓna-dharma
We now shift from the ethical organization of the individual, represented
by ¯aśrama-dharma, to the ethical organization of society, represented by
varÓna-dharma. Both dharmas are coordinated, forming a composite
system. Whereas the organization of ¯aśrama-dharma approaches life
from the side of nurture (śrama), training it through successive stages; the
organization of varÓna-dharma approaches life from the side of nature
(guÓna), defining the role of the individual in society by virtue of natural
inclinations, tendencies, and innate dispositions.
The Sanskrit word varÓna literally means color. Originally it was con-
nected with the class structure of the Vedic Åryan tribes. It is scientifically
inaccurate to apply the meaning of “caste” to varÓna. Basham explains:

There are only four varÓnas. There never have been less than four or more
than four. It is said that at the present time there are 3000 castes, and the
number of castes is known to have risen, and perhaps has sometimes fallen,
over the past 2000 years. Caste and varÓna are quite different institutions,
different in origin, different in purpose, and different in function.12

Originally the class structure was devised to promote a functional har-

mony between the various segments of society. Society was conceived as
constituting four distinct types. Brahmins belonged to the first type. They
were the priest-teachers. Due to the assumed prevalence of sattva guÓnas
in their nature, they were deemed capable of living on an exalted plane of
intellect and probity. The kÓsatriyas belonged to the second type. They
were the warrior-kings. Possessing a large portion of rajas guÓna, they
demonstrated uncommon virility, and were primarily men of action. The
vai śyas belonged to the third type. They were traders and craftsmen. The
dominance of tamas guÓnas made them into persons of feeling. The ś¯udras
belonged to the fourth type. Being manual laborers, it was assumed that
they did not possess any of the traits found in the other classes.
Modern Hindus consider the rationale behind the original classifica-
tion generally valid. Realistically speaking, all persons are not created
equal. People differ in their gifts and graces. It is unwise and unproduc-
tive to put a round peg in a square hole. Mahatama Gandhi’s comment
on varÓna-dharma was: “It is a law of spiritual economics and has nothing
to do with superiority and inferiority.”13
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 18

18 Foundations

However, it was not long before the original class structure was dis-
placed by the law of heredity, and an ironclad caste system took on all the
marks and trappings of superiority and inferiority in respect to food, cloth-
ing, language, ceremonials, social intercourse, marriage, and occupation.
The evils of the caste or j̄ati-system are too well known to bear repeti-
tion or reproach. It goes against the grain of Hindu dharma where only
virtue counts. In the Mah¯abh¯arata, YudhiÓsÓthira teaches: “truth, charity,
fortitude, good conduct, gentleness, austerity, and compassion—he in
whom these are observed is a br̄ahmaÓna. If these marks exist in a ś¯udra
and are not found in a twice-born, the ś¯udra is not a ś¯udra, nor the br̄ah-
maÓna a br̄ahmaÓna.”14 In his study of the Bhagvadg¯ ıt¯a, K. N. Upadhyaya
notes that whereas the text accepts the caste ideal on religious, biological,
and sociological grounds, it universalizes the orthodox concept of salva-
tion to make it accessible to all persons, and refuses to categorize moral
acts by hierarchical standards.15
Buddhism and Jainism were not alone in condemning the caste system;
their opposition was taken up by Hindu sects such as Íaivas and
VaiÓsn
Ó avas. Modern reformers, such as Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833)
and Swami Dayananda (1824–1883), declared caste a departure from the
Vedas; and Mahatama Gandhi (1869–1948) crusaded on behalf of
India’s outcastes (Untouchables), giving them the new designation of
Harijans or sons of God.
Thus it was when India became a democratic republic in 1947, the ab-
rogation of caste by her Constitution was not seen as being in conflict
with the original spirit of Hindu social ethics.

S¯adh¯araÓna-dharma
In addition to vishesha or specific duties, objective ethics includes
s¯a Óm¯anya or ‘generic’ duties. Whereas the first is relative and conditional,
the second is common and unconditional. The common duties (s¯adh¯a-
raÓna-dharma) are so named because they are independent of caste and
station in life, and are binding upon humans as humans—all members of
one community. As such, human rights precede communal rights. A brah-
min wanting to make a sacrificial offering is not at liberty to acquire the
object of sacrifice by stealth, for asteya or nonstealing is a universal duty.
S. K. Maitra observes that notwithstanding the social degradation of the
ś¯udra, the code of universal duties that are obligatory on persons as per-
sons provide a certain amount of moral protection. He says, “These du-
ties are to be observed by all alike, being the duties obligatory on every-
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 19

Hindu Ethics 19

body in his dealing with everybody else. They are thus to be observed not
merely by the shudras but also by members of the higher caste.”16 What
are these universal duties? Manu lists the following:

1. Steadfastness (dhairya)
2. Forgiveness (kshama)
3. Application (dama)
4. Non-Appropriation (choury¯abhava)
5. Cleanliness (shoucha)
6. Repression of sensuous appetites (indriya-nigraha)
7. Wisdom (dhi)
8. Learning (vidy¯a)
9. Veracity (satya)
10. Restraint of anger (akrodha)17

It is apparent that the virtues in this list of universal duties are predom-
inantly ascetical (steadfastness, application, and repression) and di-
anoetic (wisdom, learning, and veracity). Their end is self-culture, based
on an ethic of autonomy. This harmonizes well with the law of karma
that states that a person rises or falls by virtue of his or her own deeds.
The emphasis on self-sufficiency is important, but we miss any reference
to social service.
The element missing in Manu’s list is partially compensated for in
Praśastap¯ada’s record of generic or s¯a Óm¯anya duties. The humanitarian
component comes through in the inclusion of duties such as ahiÂs¯a (re-
fraining from injury to living beings), and bh¯utahitatva (seeking the good
of all creatures).
Objective ethics constitutes the first stage of Hindu dharma. On this
stage morality is represented by social codes demanding external confor-
mity. In psychological understanding, this is the stage of socialization and
introjection. The voice of conscience is for the most part the interiorized
voice of the group. The thrust of conscience is the sense of “must.” The
feel of conscience is driven by fear of punishment for duties not done.

Subjective Level: Personal Ethics

‘Must’ and ‘Ought’

Hindu dharma is cognitively developmental. It teaches that one should
progress from the ‘must consciousness’ to the ‘ought consciousness.’ This
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 20

20 Foundations

shift proceeds from a heightened awareness of the Self, which purifies the
mind and issues in actions that are consistent with the true nature of the
Self. This is the subjective stage of Hindu ethics, known as Cittaśuddhi or
purification of the mind.
Subjective ethics is an advance over objective ethics, because virtues
are superior to duties. Whereas duty is other-directed; virtue is inner-
directed. Duty represents tribalistic morality; virtue represents individual
morality. Duties are related to experiences of prohibition and fear, but
virtues arise from feelings of preference and self-respect. Duty is ad hoc
and specific, with reference to particular commandments, codes, and cus-
toms; virtue is generic and is expressive of fundamental orientations in
life, such as the Golden Rule.
Thus, on the level of Cittaśuddhi, the purified mind internalizes the
rules of objective morality, and transforms duty into virtue. You may con-
tinue to follow the old rules, but now it is not because you must, but be-
cause you ought. The quality of what you do, speak, and think is free,
and this internal freedom is characterized by vair̄agya or detachment.
Vair̄agya and virtue are two sides of the same coin. According to
V¯atsy¯ayana, virtue (dharma) has three forms, namely:

1. Virtues of the body—charity, helping the needy, social service

2. Virtues of speech—truthfulness, benevolence, gentleness, recitation
of scriptures
3. Virtues of the mind—kindness, unworldliness, piety

Like virtue, vice is also threefold:

1. Vices of the body—cruelty, theft, sexual indulgence

2. Vices of speech—falsehood, harshness, scandal
3. Vices of the mind—hatred covetousness, unbelief

Transcendental Ethics

For all of its elevation of individual perfection, subjective ethics is not the
highest level of spirituality. Like social ethics, personal ethics is not an
end in itself but a means toward the ultimate end which is “the life abso-
lute and transcendental.” Here social morality and personal morality are
reincarnated in a new light and “charged with absolute significance.”

one line short

Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 21

Hindu Ethics 21

Maitra reminds us this precisely is the goal of Patañjali’s Yoga, ÍaÂkara’s

view of mokÓ sa, R¯am¯anuja’s doctrine of bhakti, and the Buddha’s under-
standing of Nirv¯aÓna. “All these agree in recognizing the transcendental as
the limit of the empirical life, the timeless as the truth of all that is in time.
This timeless, transcendental life is therefore the culminating stage of the
spirit, the sphere of its consummation and fruition.”18
This transcendental life is not a new acquisition, something given from
above, like the Christian view of salvation. The self is already perfect, im-
mortal, and free, but has been concealed through m¯ay¯a. Through the veil
of m¯ay¯a, all one sees is the chrysalis, but when knowledge penetrates ig-
norance, the chrysalis is transformed into a butterfly. The transformation
is a total experience, which reveals the essential nature of the soul as pure
existence (sat), pure consciousness (cit), and pure bliss (ánanda).
The transcendental level of life is a post-ethical plane of being. The
ethical plane, as the G¯ ıt¯a dramatizes, is always a field of battle, with
contending impulses and wants. Morality is significant to the extent
that one finds multiplicity in the world. The enemy has to be engaged
and overcome. But on the transcendental level, ethics loses its sub-
stance, once all empirical contradictions are transcended—cold and
heat, pleasure and pain, praise and blame, and also, good and evil, right
and wrong. This position is not antinomian. The person who has
achieved the mystical state of mokÓ sa does not consciously follow the
moral path, but neither can he or she deviate from it. Virtue is not vic-
tory through battle, it is the spontaneous overflow of wisdom. The
Bhagavadg¯ ıt¯a declares:
The holy men whose sins are destroyed, whose doubts (dualities) are cut
asunder, whose minds are disciplined and who rejoice in (doing) good to
all creatures, attain to the beatitude of God.19

Thus love and compassion are the natural expression of enlighten-

ment. This kind of knowledge helps one transcend mundane conflicts,
but since through it one sees the divine in all things, it is no prescription
for otherworldliness. To the contrary, social responsibilities are taken
ever more seriously. Eminent philosophers, like ÍaÂkara, have also been
great humanitarians, not in spite of their philosophy but because of it.
In the remaining section we shall first highlight the cardinal principles
of Hindu ethics, and then focus on its contextual orientation, which
facilitates the task of making choices when dilemmas arise.

one line short

Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 22

22 Foundations

Cardinal Principles

The cardinal principles found in most Hindu sects are: purity, self-
control, detachment, truth, and nonviolence. Each of these ideals has its
own inner evolution and is therefore a mixture of ingredients not easily
understandable to one unfamiliar with their cultural history. Thus, purity
has a history of ritualism and ceremonialism, but progressively many of
the rules pertaining to ablutions, food habits, and the like are internalized
to signify the purity of mind and heart. So also, self-control, on one level,
refers to the physical and mental senses. In the history of Hinduism such
preoccupation has glorified asceticism and has made heroes of fanatics
who have destroyed their sight glaring at the sun or atrophied their limbs
through yogic acrobatics. On a higher level, self-control has gradually
been perceived as a means for harmonizing all of one’s calls and claims
toward the development of a happy and healthy personality.
The ideal of detachment also has a long history, representing the per-
ennial tension between the ideals of dharma and mokÓ sa—of world-
affirmation and world-negation. The early M¯ ım¯a ˙ms¯a espoused the ideal
of dharma so that the purpose of ethical action was that of enjoyment,
both in this life and the next. The M¯ ım¯a ˙ms¯a consequently ridiculed ascet-
ics who practiced renunciation. In time, under the influence of Jainism
and Buddhism, Vedic orthodoxy adopted the mokÓ sa ideal and thereby
ethics became the instrument for the attainment of liberation. However,
even when it incorporated this new ideal into its philosophy, the M¯ ı-
m¯aÂs¯a continued its former emphasis upon activity in the world. Against
the objection that such activity, even when it is good, keeps one bound to
the wheel of saÂs¯ara or rebirth, because a person must reap what is
sown, the M¯ ım¯a ˙ms¯a responded that action performed in the spirit of de-
tachment is emotionally empty and therefore not subject to the operation
of karma.
The Bhagavad G¯ ıt¯a built on the ethical stance of the M¯ ım¯a ˙ms¯a. Its for-
mulation of ethical activism is a refined synthesis of two orthodox
though conflicting modes of discipline: pravÓrtti (active life) and nivÓ rtti
(quietism).
Devotees who embraced the first ideal engaged in Vedic rituals and du-
ties prescribed by the Kalpa-s¯utras with a view to reward in heaven. Dev-
otees who embraced the second ideal abandoned all such works and
relied solely on jña¯na or knowledge as the pathway to liberation. They
reasoned: since all actions—good or bad—must have their consequences
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 23

Hindu Ethics 23

in reincarnations, the most direct way to escape the pain of rebirth was to
minimize all activity.
The G¯ ıt¯a counters the earlier argument that karma is evil and should
be abandoned, because it leads to rebirth, by making a shrewd analysis of
human behavior. It does not stop with karma, but goes beyond karma to
k¯ama. Behind the deed lies the desire. Aversions and attachments deter-
mine a person’s behavior, therefore an individual’s real enemies are not
actions but passions.20 Actions are only the motor manifestations of the
impulse to love or to hate.
The implication of this analysis is that the power to bind one to con-
tinued existence resides in k¯ama, not karma. Accordingly, karma without
k¯ama has no consequence for rebirth. Once desire is removed from the
deed, the deed loses its fateful sting. One who knows this is wise. He can
work and yet do nothing that binds him. In the G¯ ıt¯a’s words, “Having no
desire, with his mind and self controlled, abandoning all possessions, per-
forming actions with the body alone, he commits no sin.”21
The G¯ ıt¯a’s analysis of action as the extension of desire, along with the
inference that detached action per se has no binding power, brings one to
the conclusion that what is ethically required is not “renunciation of ac-
tion” but “renunciation in action.”22
The G¯ ıt¯a’s nomenclature for detached activism is karma-yoga. Karma-
yoga treats the act as an end in itself and not as a means to another end.
The classic formulation of karma-yoga is embodied in the admonition,
“In action only hast thou a right and never in its fruits. Let not thy motive
be the fruits of action; nor let thy attachment be to inaction.”23
Thus in the principle of karma-yoga the G¯ ıt¯a synthesizes the positive
elements of pravÓrtti and nivÓ rtti. “While it does not abandon activity, it
preserves the spirit of renunciation. It commends the strenuous life, yet
gives no room for the play of selfish impulses. Thus it discards neither
ideal, but by combining them refines and ennobles both.”24
The next two ideals, truth and nonviolence, are combined, and are re-
garded as Hinduism’s highest ideals.
The ethical imperative of truthfulness flows from the metaphysical
concept of Truth as Reality. Gandhi utters UpaniÓsadic insight when he
says, “Truth is by nature self-evident. As soon as you remove the cob-
webs of ignorance that surround it, it shines clear.”25 Earlier, Gandhi be-
lieved that God is Truth, but subsequently he revised it to: Truth is God.
By taking this step he felt he could include in the fold of believers all per-
sons who were lovers of Truth and yet could not subscribe to any theistic
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 24

24 Foundations

ideology. His seeming innovation was not far removed from the Sanskrit
word for Truth (Sat), which literally means “Being.” The ontological
meaning of Sat as “being” or “existing” is translated into the ethical
meaning of Sat as “good.”
The cardinal virtues reach their apex with the concept of ahiÂs¯a. It is
parama dharma (highest virtue). The word is a compound of a = ‘not’
and hiÂs¯a = ‘harmful.’ It literally means, “Not to injure or harm.”
AhiÂs¯a is a correlate of Hinduism’s cosmic outlook and therefore its
moral mandate comprehends the whole created order as being worthy of
nonviolence.
As with the other cardinal virtues that have been tried and tested
through the centuries, ahiÂs¯a has ancient origins. There is some specula-
tion it began as a “protest against blood sacrifice.” The ambitious Åryan
settlers were hardly disposed to the values of ahiÂs¯a, judging by their
records of wars and their aftermath. By the time of the UpaniÓsads, when
the meaning of sacrifice was ethicized, truthfulness and nonviolence were
given prominence. The Ch¯andogya UpaniÓsad says, “Austerity, almsgiv-
ing, uprightness, harmlessness, truthfulness—these are our gifts to the
priests.”26 Strict adherence to ahiÂs¯a was observed by Buddhism, and
more so by Jainism. Classical Hinduism, while maintaining the primacy
of ahiÂs¯a, adjusted the ideal to social and political realities and devel-
oped a “just war” theory not unlike its Christian counterpart.
The strict interpretation of ahiÂs¯a, without qualifications or caveats,
continued to appear in Hindu scriptural texts. For instance, in the the
Yoga S¯utras of Patañjali, ahiÂs¯a provides the ethical framework for all
the other virtues classified under Yama (restraint). AhiÂs¯a is more than
nonviolence, it is nonhatred (vairatyagah). Its scope is universal, and it
cannot be relativized by a series of “ifs,” “ands,” or “buts.”27
The individual, par excellence, who served as a bridge to bring the
pristine character of ahiÂs¯a into the twentieth-century was Mahatama
Gandhi (1869–1948). His innovation was the application of the principle
of nonviolence to national and global affairs. Satyagraha (nonviolent
protest) was the technique by which he took ahiÂs¯a out of the scriptures
and on to the streets.
Gandhi acknowledged that “nonviolence is common to all religions,”
but found its highest expression and application in “Hinduism” which,
for him, included Buddhism and Jainism. He declared, “Hinduism be-
lieves in the oneness not merely of all human life, but in the oneness of all
that lives. Its worship of cow, is in my opinion, its unique contribution to
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 25

Hindu Ethics 25

the evolution of humanitarianism. It is a practical application of the be-

lief in the oneness and, therefore, sacredness of all life.”28
On the point of cow protection, Gandhi thought it was “the gift of
Hinduism to the world.” “It symbolized the protection of the weak by the
strong. It subsumed everything that feels. Causing pain to the weakest
creature on earth incurred a breach of the principle of cow protection.”29
Gandhi discovered nonviolence in his pursuit of Truth. He found that
ahiÂs¯a and Truth were so intertwined that it was impossible to disentan-
gle them. Even so, ahiÂs¯a was considered the means and Truth the end.
“Means to be means must always be within our reach, and so ahiÂs¯a is
our supreme duty. If we take care of the means, we are bound to reach the
end sooner or later.”30
This concludes our overview of Hindu ethics. Next we focus on cer-
tain distinctive features of Hindu ethics that uniquely equip it in the task
of doing bioethics.

Contextual Structure of Hindu Ethics

Any survey of clinical cases reveals that dilemmas lie at the heart of bio-
ethics. For its part, Hindu ethics is a moral system that acknowledges
genuine moral dilemmas. We encounter a dilemma when values to
which we are equally committed are brought into conflict, so that the
honoring of one value necessitates the violation of the other. Western
ethicists admit that moral dilemmas are the Achilles heel of most prob-
lems encountered in bioethics. Beauchamp cites the classic case of Soc-
rates in prison, sentenced to die. His friend Crito offers him an escape
route with many good reasons to justify his act of breaking the law.
Socrates countered with equally weighty reasons to support his own po-
sition to respect law and stay. The illustration serves to highlight the
central problem of bioethics. “The reasons on each side are weighty
ones, and neither is in any obvious way the right set of reasons. If we act
on either set of reasons, our actions will be desirable in some respects
but undesirable in other respects. And yet we think that ideally we
ought to act on all of these reasons, for each is, considered by itself, a
good reason.”31
The Hindu position is to be distinguished both from the religious fun-
damentalist, who views dilemmas in the light of revelation, and the secu-
lar rationalist, who views them as problems to be solved by the use of rea-
son. For the religious fundamentalist, the problem is the need for better
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 26

26 Foundations

faith; for the secular rationalist, it is the need for superior knowledge. In
either case, there are no genuine dilemmas.
In Hinduism, dilemmas are not denied. Its scriptures strain with the
tension of irreconcilable alternatives. The best examples are found in the
epic literature. The Mah¯abh¯arata and the R¯am¯ayaÓna are not just works
of antiquity but embody the social sinew that connects past with present
and makes the epics dateless treasuries of true dilemmas.
The Bhagavad G¯ ıt¯a opens with a moral dilemma tugging at the heart
and mind of Arjuna, as this lonesome warrior faces the choice of having
to kill or be killed by his own kinsmen. Bimal K. Matilal in his Moral Di-
lemmas in the Mahabharata transports us to another episode in the life of
Arjuna in which he confronts the difficult claims of promise keeping ver-
sus fratricide.

On the very day of final encounter between KarÓna and Arjuna YudhiÓsÓthira
fled the battelfield after being painfully humiliated by Karna in an armed
engagement. When Arjuna came to the camp to pay visit to him and asked
what really happened, YudhiÓsÓthira flared up in anger and told Arjuna that
all his boastfulness about being the finest archer in the world was a lot of
nonsense because the war was dragging on. He reminded Arjuna that the
latter claimed to be capable of conquering everybody and thus end the war
within a few days. In a rage, he not only insulted Arjuna but also slighted
the “G¯aÓnÓdiva bow,” the most precious possession of this valiant warrior.
The bow was a gift to Arjuna from Agni, the fire-god. He held it so dear to
his heart that he had promised to kill anyone whou would ever speak ill of
“G¯aÓnÓdiva.”32

YudhiÓsÓthira’s vehemence put Arjuna in a tight corner where he would

either have to kill his elder brother or break his promise. “When his KsÓa-
triya duty (dharma) made him choose the first alternative, KÓrsÓ Óna (his alter
ego) appeared. On being asked, Arjuna explained: he was obliged to
commit fratricide in order to fulfil his obligation to keep his promise.”33
His strong sense of duty made Arjuna reduce the situation to a moral
conflict in which duty must prevail. To be sure, the duty of promise keep-
ing was inviolable—the moral equivalent of protecting the truth (satya-
rakÓ s¯a). Matilal observes that the scenario resonates with Kantian ethics,
which also gives highest priority to truth telling.34 But KÓrÓsÓna was no
Kant. He argued with Arjuna that “promise-keeping or even truth-telling
cannot be an unconditional obligation when it is in conflict with the
avoidance of grossly unjust and criminal acts such as patricide or fratri-
cide. Saving an innocent life is also a strong obligation; saving his elder
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 27

Hindu Ethics 27

brother would naturally be an equally strong obligation, if not stronger.

Hence, in fact, according to KÓrÓsn
Ó a, two almost equally strong obligations
or duties are in conflict here.”35
In all such conflicts, the dharmic thing to do is to be guided by the de-
mands of the situation. There is no question about the need to maintain
the consistency of an ethical system, but sometimes the infraction of these
virtues is permitted to achieve noble ends. This does not reduce ethics to
opportunism; but neither is it made the hostage of absolutism.
The point is illustrated by KÓrÓsÓna’s story about Kauśika, a hermit who
had taken a vow always to speak the truth. One day, while seated at a
crossroad, this holy man was begged by a band of fleeing travelers not to
divulge their escape route to bandits in hot pursuit, with intentions to
take their lives. Kauśika did not reply. When the bandits arrived at the
scene, knowing fully well that the hermit could not tell a lie, they asked
about the travelers, and Kauśika told them the truth. The travelers were
caught and killed. Kauśika’s fate was equally sad. Though he had punctil-
iously practiced virtue in order to reach heaven, he failed to achieve his
goal, because, in this instance, truthtelling was a violent act that emptied
his store of merit. Clearly the demand of the situation was the overriding
duty to save precious lives, even though to effect this meant recourse to
dissimulation. But Kauśika was an absolutist who could not see that truth
telling ceased being an unconditional obligation when weighed in the bal-
ance with the need for preserving lives.36
The Mah¯abh¯arata recounts numerous other instances illustrating the
relativity of moral conduct in the context of “duties in distress.” A Br¯ah-
maÓna in distress is allowed to perform sacrifice even for an unworthy per-
son, and may eat prohibited food. A KÓsatriya, unable to subsist by his
caste duties when his own avocation is destroyed, is allowed to engage in
the duties of a Vaiśya, taking to agriculture and cattle rearing. The
Íantiparvan declares it is not sinful to drink alchohol for medical pur-
poses, to accede to a preceptor’s wish to cohabit with his wife for the pur-
pose of raising progeny, to steal in a time of emergency, to tell lies to rob-
bers, and so on.37
Similar exceptions are permitted by Manu, the greatest exponent of
orthodox morality. Personal survival is deemed higher than the stealing of
property, making it justifiable for a hungry person to steal food when all
other measures fail.38 Following Manu, other Dharmaś¯astra writers per-
mit perjury to save life as an act of dharma.
However, notwithstanding the dharmic justification of lying and other
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 28

28 Foundations

such acts in situations of moral conflict, Hindu ethics strictly enjoins the
maintenance of its integrity in keeping with the puruÓ s¯arthas or values of
life. These values are integrated and progressive, culminating in the sum-
mum bonum of liberation.
Thus the internal flexibility of Hindu ethics gives it a certain advantage
over two extreme positions on the current social spectrum, dealing with
life-and-death issues.
First there is the position of authoritarianism. It surfaces in different de-
grees in the moral stance of religious groups such as the Roman Catholic
Chuch, Protestant fundamentalists, Mormons, and Operation Rescue, an
activist organization responsible for the bombing of several birth control
clinics. These groups base their truth claims on holy books in which they
find objectively valid norms of conduct. They see human reason as flawed,
and therefore rely on revelation for the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth. This makes them tend to see moral issues in terms of black
and white, and therefore to have little tolerance for exceptional cases.
At the opposite end of the spectrum is the position of relativism. Rela-
tivists argue that value judgments and ethical norms are reducible to mat-
ters of subjective preference, and therefore questions of life and death are
considered private issues to be answered by each individual. They, too,
minimize the capacity of reason. With hedonic overtones, relativists
make the individual’s own experience of happiness the standard of value,
worthy of protection by the American Constitution.
Hindu ethics is distinguished from both extremes by the importance it
gives to rational authority. This claim may be queried because of the part
played by revelation within its own system. However, Hinduism’s recog-
nition of revelation as a conduit of knowledge does not depreciate the
role of reason. The Hindu s¯aśtras make a liberal use of reason in support
of the positions they take. Only the final validity of reason is questioned
in mystical matters that lie beyond its purview. Thus the admission of rev-
elation does not prejudice reason, for there is continuity between the two.
Whereas in Western thought revelation is an external mode of testimony,
in Hindu perspective revelation is an internal activity, similar to intuition.
“It begins, no doubt, as an external opinion inasmuch as we appropriate
it from a guru. But we do not merely acquiesce in it. We are under an ob-
ligation to intuit it and make it our own, when it will cease to be external
and become inwardly as clear to us as it is to our teacher.”39
Through reason and intuition, Hinduism finds the source of ethics in
the nature of the person, holistically perceived. It agrees with the relativ-
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 29

Hindu Ethics 29

ists that the claims of authoritarianism to finding absolute values are illu-
sory and pretentious, because social morality is inevitably the construct
of subjective, historical forces that reflect the accidents of time and place;
but this admission of subjectivity is not tantamount to saying that all of
our choices between life and death are merely the products of subjective
preferences. To the contrary, we can arrive at objectively valid norms
based on our knowledge of deep-seated human capacties for life, for love,
for freedom, and for integrity. Our cultural formulations of these psychic
strivings will always be relative, constantly to be refined over the long
haul of human experience—which is to acknowledge that objectivity is
not absolute or unconditional. The notion of absolutism is alien to Hindu
ethics, because it is a concept of transcendental revelation that is removed
from an appreciative understanding of human nature and human history.
This approach imparts to Hindu bioethics a contextual orientation of
moral reasoning in its dealings with moral problems. It eschews the paths
of authoritarianism, creedalism, emotionalism, and takes the road of ra-
tionality. However it is not the rationality of the disembodied mind, but
the rationality of the whole person. The autonomous individual gives due
weight to scriptural injunctions and the precedents of persons of probity,
but in the final analysis he turns to his own conscience, guided by what
collective religious experience has defined as being of ultimate value.
Notwithstanding its claim to rationality, Hindu bioethics acknowl-
edges that persons of reason might not always agree on what is good, but
they can agree more generally on what is evil. Rational people wish to
avoid for themselves and for their loved ones evils such as pain, disease,
premature death, and the loss of abilities to do what one wants to do.
Therefore, while promoting the good, the basic agenda of Hindu bioeth-
ics is to prevent evil by advocating principles and proscriptions against
behavior that inflicts harm to persons and all sentient creatures. Its bot-
tom line is: Do no harm—hi ÓmsaÓm m¯a kuru.
The vehicle that brings Hindu ethics into the new world of bioethics is
the notion of dharma. This we have seen is not some static moral con-
cept, standing palely for the values of India in a bygone time with little
relevance for other peoples and other places. Dharma is a catalyst for
change. It preserves order in the midst of change, and change in the midst
of order; and thereby is always on the side of progress. For further discus-
sion of ideas presented here the reader is referred to my Dilemmas of Life
and Death (see Bibliography) in which the arguments of the concluding
section appear.
Crawford: Hindu Bioethics page 30

30 Foundations

Fuller treatments of Hindu ethics may be found in my earlier works on

which portions of the Introduction depends: The Evolution of Hindu
Ethical Ideals (Hawaii: The University Press of Hawaii, 1982), In Search
of Hinduism (UTS Press, 1986) World Religions and Global Ethics (New
York: Paragon House, 1989), and Dilemmas of Life and Death, Hindu
Ethics in a North American Context (New York: State University of New
Press, 1995).