Case 1:21-cv-21695-KMM Document 37 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/21/2021 Page 1 of 13

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 1:21-cv-21695-KMM
MRC44, LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

City of Miami,

Defendant.
/
ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAND
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Plaintiff MRC44, LLC (“Plaintiff MRC44”) and

Plaintiff 60 NE 11th, LLC’s “(Plaintiff 60 NE”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Remand to

State Court. (“Mot.”) (ECF No. 10). Defendant City of Miami (“City”) filed a response, (“Resp.”)

(ECF No. 11), and Plaintiffs filed a reply (“Reply”) (ECF No. 12). The Motion is now ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND1

This case arises from a dispute over the zoning of medical marijuana dispensaries within the

City of Miami. See generally Am. Compl.

Plaintiff MRC44 and Plaintiff 60 NE each own parcels of land located within the City of

Miami (“the Properties”). Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–6. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs state that they

seek to open medical marijuana treatment facilities (“dispensaries”) on each of the Properties. Id. at

1. However, Plaintiffs have not been able to do so because the City has “taken the position that a

1
The background facts are taken from the Amended Complaint, (“Am. Compl.”) (ECF No. 27), and
accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the Motion. Bacon v. McKeithen, No. 5:14-CV-37-RS-CJK,
2014 WL 12479640, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 28, 2014) (“[The Court] must construe all allegations in
the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”). Additionally, the Court has
relied upon representations of the City’s counsel made at the hearing held on September 8, 2021.
Hearing Transcript (“H’rg Tr.”) (ECF No. 31) at 4:4–5:19.
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Certificate of Use is required for Plaintiffs to operate [a dispensary]” and the City “refuses to issue

one because it contends that Plaintiffs’ business plans violate federal law.” Am. Compl. at 1. The

City’s refusal comes even though the “City has passed no ordinance either (a) banning [d]ispensaries

entirely or (b) specifying the criteria for the location of, and other permitting requirements for,

[d]ispensaries located within its boundaries.” Id. ¶ 18. The City’s counsel has informed the Court

that the City has no plans to pass a formal ordinance prohibiting the operation of medical marijuana

dispensaries in the City of Miami. H’rg Tr. at 4:4–5:19. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs seek

“a judicial declaration that Plaintiffs may lawfully operate a [d]ispensary within the City of Miami[,]

without obtaining a Certificate of Use from the City,” pursuant Fla. Stat. § 86.011(2). Id. at 4.

On April 21, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint seeking declaratory relief in the Eleventh

Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. See generally (Compl.) (ECF No. 1-1). On

May 3, 2021, the City removed the above-captioned case to federal court. Not. of Removal (ECF No.

1) at 1. In the Notice of Removal, the City asserts that this Court has jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’

request for declaratory relief “necessarily draws into question the interpretation or application of

federal law under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, [21 U.S.C. § 801], which criminalizes the

activities alleged in the [C]omplaint.” Id. Thus, the City seeks to avail itself of this Court’s

jurisdiction over federal questions.

Now, Plaintiffs have filed the instant Motion to Remand, which argues that this case presents

no federal question and should, therefore, be remanded for further proceedings in state court. See

Mot. at 3.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

The statute governing removal, 28 U.S.C. § 1441, permits a defendant to remove a case

brought in state court to federal court if the federal court has federal-question jurisdiction under 28

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U.S.C. § 1331 or diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. § 1441. The removing party bears

the burden of proving that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Mitchell v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002). A district court is required to

“‘strictly construe the right to remove’ and apply a general ‘presumption against the exercise of

federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of

remand.’” Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

Federal-question jurisdiction exists when an action “aris[es] under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” § 1331. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is

governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule.’” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392

(1987). The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that “the plaintiff is the master of the complaint,

that a federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, and that the plaintiff may, by

eschewing claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.” Id. at 398–99.

In this case, however, there are two relevant exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule

under which a federal court can exercise jurisdiction, even in circumstances where a federal question

does not appear on the face of the complaint. First, under the “complete-preemption doctrine,” a case

can be removed to federal court where a federal statute “wholly displaces the state-law cause of

action.” Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207 (2004) (quoting Beneficial Nat. Bank v.

Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). Second, jurisdiction can exist under the “substantial federal question

doctrine,” which “captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims

recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus

justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on

federal issues[.]” Grable & Sons Metal Prod., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).

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III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs argue that this case should be remanded to state court because their claim for

declaratory relief does not implicate a federal question. Mot. at 3. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend

that no jurisdiction exists under the “well-pleaded complaint” rule because Plaintiffs’ claim only

seeks to determine Plaintiffs’ rights “under [§] 381.96, Florida Statutes, and [the City’s Charter.]” Id.

Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that even if Plaintiffs’ claim did implicate federal law, the Court

should abstain from ruling on this issue because matters of state law could potentially make it

unnecessary for the Court to reach a federal constitutional issue. Id. at 4. Relatedly, Plaintiffs also

believe the Court should abstain from adjudicating this case because “matters of land use and planning

are primarily of local concern.” Id.

In response, the City argues that this Court has federal-question jurisdiction under the

complete-preemption doctrine because Plaintiffs’ complaint raises issues of federal law. Resp. at 3

(citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546 (1987)).2 In support of this theory,

the City points to the language of the CSA, which states that the CSA does not operate to preempt

state law unless there is a “positive conflict” between the state law and the CSA such that “the two

cannot consistently stand together.” Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 903). The City argues that the Court

should not abstain from hearing this case because it implicates questions of federal law. Resp. at 3.3

Lastly, the City contends that the denial of a Certificate of Use based on federal law “presents a

substantial federal question.” Resp. at 5–6.

2
As discussed below, these arguments are properly characterized as being under the “substantial
federal question” doctrine.
3
Originally, the Complaint referenced Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. Constitution. Compl. ¶ 21.
However, this reference has been omitted in the Amended Complaint and therefore the Court need
not address whether the reference to the U.S. Constitution is a basis for federal jurisdiction in this
case. See generally Am. Compl.
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In reply, Plaintiffs contend that the Controlled Substance Act does not preempt the relevant

portions of the Florida Constitution or Fla. Stat. § 381.986. Reply at 2. Plaintiffs point to several

cases in which courts have found that state-level legalization of marijuana does not prohibit the federal

government from enforcing the CSA or otherwise authorize violations of the CSA. Id. at 2–3 (citing

Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 2015); Reed-Kaliher v. Hoggat, 347 P.3d 136

(Ariz. 2015); (other citations omitted)). Plaintiffs also note that Florida’s Constitutional Amendment

which legalized medical marijuana explicitly states that “[n]othing in this section requires the

violation of federal law or purports to give immunity of federal law.” Id. at 3 (citing Fla. Const. art.

X, § 29(c)(5)). Lastly, Plaintiffs point out that the City has not identified how exactly the issuance of

a Certificate of Use would violate the CSA. Id.

A. No Federal Question is Presented in the Complaint.

To begin, the Amended Complaint brings no claim arising “under the Constitution, laws, or

treaties of the United States.” § 1331. Therefore, this Court would only have jurisdiction under one

of the narrow exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule. See Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392,

398–99. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that no exception to the well-pleaded

complaint rule applies in this case and the Court is, therefore, without jurisdiction.

B. There Is No Basis for Jurisdiction in This Case Based on the Complete-

Preemption Doctrine.

The City believes that, although a federal question does not appear on the face of the

Complaint, jurisdiction exists under the Supreme Court’s complete-preemption doctrine. Resp. at 3

(citing Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1546 (1987)). Plaintiffs did not address

this issue at great length in their Reply, other than to argue that other courts have found that the CSA

does not preempt state-level legalization of medical marijuana. Reply at 3–4.

The Parties appear to misunderstand the difference between “complete-preemption” and

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“ordinary-preemption.” U.S. District Judge Robert N. Scola illuminated the distinction between these

terms in Gonzalez v. United States Ctr. for SafeSport, which bears quoting at length:

“Ordinary” preemption is an affirmative defense that “simply allows a defendant to

defeat a plaintiff's state-law claim on the merits by asserting the supremacy of federal
law.” Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1260 n.16. (11th Cir. 2011). As
relevant here, “ordinary” preemption is neither a source of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, nor a basis for removal to federal court. Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321
F.3d 1349, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] case may not be removed to federal court
on the basis of a federal defense, including that of federal preemption.” (quoting
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)).

“Complete” preemption, on the other hand, is a rarely invoked and “narrowly drawn
jurisdictional rule for assessing federal removal jurisdiction when a complaint purports
to raise only state law claims.” Id. at 1353. The doctrine is a limited exception to the
“well-pleaded complaint” rule and requires a determination that “the pre-emptive force
of a statute is so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common law
complaint into one stating a federal claim.’” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. “Complete
preemption creates federal subject-matter jurisdiction over completely preempted
state-law claims, allowing for removal to federal court.” Strong, 651 F.3d at 1260
n.16.

374 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (internal citations reformatted). “Thus, ‘complete’

preemption only exists where the federal statute at issue creates a federal cause of action or ‘federal

remedy.’” Id. at 1292 (citing Anderson, 539 U.S. at 9 n.5). “A claim may not be removable to federal

court based on ‘complete’ preemption, but nonetheless still [be] subject to dismissal under ‘ordinary’

preemption.” Id. at 1291 (quoting Geddes, 321 F.3d at 1253 (holding that “a federal law may

substantively displace state law under ordinary preemption but lack the extraordinary force to create

federal removal jurisdiction under the doctrine of complete preemption”)).

Here, the City’s assertion that this Court has jurisdiction based on “complete-preemption” is

incorrect because the City has not identified, nor is the Court aware of, a federal cause of action or

federal remedy under the CSA that preempts applicable state law. Gonzalez, 374 F. Supp. 3d at 1292

(citing Anderson, 539 U.S. at 9 n.5). The City’s reliance on Metro. Life is misplaced because in that

case, the Supreme Court found that state law was completely preempted by ERISA’s creation of an

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exclusive federal cause of action governing the issues in that case. 481 U.S. at 63. In this case, the

City’s argument that the CSA completely preempts state law is based upon the CSA’s section entitled

“Application of State Law,” which provides:

No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as indicating an intent on the part

of the Congress to occupy the field in which that provision operates, including criminal
penalties, to the exclusion of any State law on the same subject matter which would
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless there is a positive conflict
between that provision of this subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot
consistently stand together.

§ 903 (emphasis added). Because this provision does not provide a federal cause of action, it cannot

serve as the basis for jurisdiction under the exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule for complete-

preemption. See Gonzalez, 374 F. Supp. 3d at 1291. 4 Therefore, the Court concludes that the

complete-preemption exception does not operate to confer jurisdiction in this case.

C. There Is No Basis for Substantial Federal Question Jurisdiction in this Case.

The City also contends that the denial of a Certificate of Use based on federal law “presents a

substantial federal question.” Resp. at 5–6. In the Notice of Removal, the City asserts that this Court

has jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief “necessarily draws into question the

interpretation or application of federal law under the Federal Controlled Substances Act, [21 U.S.C.

§§ 801], which criminalizes the activities alleged in the [C]omplaint.” Not. of Removal at 1. The

City also contended at the hearing that this Court has jurisdiction based on “the plain language in the

Controlled Substances Act itself.” Hr’g Tr. at 7:18–20. Plaintiffs have not offered a specific response

to the City’s arguments that appear to invoke the substantial federal question doctrine, but Plaintiffs

have generally argued that the CSA does not preempt applicable state law in this case. See Reply at

2–3.

4
At the hearing held on September 8, 2021, the City’s counsel stated: “We would acknowledge that
there is no cause of action created by the Controlled Substances Act per se.” H’rg Tr. at 7:10–12.
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The City’s argument appears to invoke the substantial federal question doctrine, which

“captures the commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized

under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law, and thus justify resort to

the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues[.]”

Grable, 545 U.S. at 312. “The classic example is Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.

180 (1921), a suit by a shareholder claiming that the defendant corporation could not lawfully buy

certain bonds of the National Government because their issuance was unconstitutional.” Id. In that

Smith, the Supreme Court found that federal-question jurisdiction existed because it “appear[ed] from

the [complaint] that the right to relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal law].”

Id. (citing Smith, 255 U.S. at 199). In this case, given the City’s argument that jurisdiction exists

because Plaintiffs’ right to relief depends upon the construction or application of the CSA, see Resp.

at 3–4, the Court will analyze its jurisdiction under the substantial federal question doctrine.5

Although medical marijuana is legal under Florida law, municipalities are not required to zone

dispensaries and have the following set of options:

A county or municipality may, by ordinance, ban medical marijuana treatment center

dispensing facilities from being located within the boundaries of that county or
municipality. A county or municipality that does not ban dispensing facilities under
this subparagraph may not place specific limits, by ordinance, on the number of
dispensing facilities that may locate within that county or municipality.

Fla. Stat. § 381.986 (11)(b)(1). Thus, the City has three options: (1) ban medical marijuana

dispensaries, (2) permit medical marijuana dispensaries, or (3) do nothing, in which case the City is

5
Generally, where there is no “complete-preemption,” the question of whether there is a “positive
conflict” between the CSA and § 381.986 (11)(b)(1) is properly left to state courts. See Gonzalez,
374 F. Supp. 3d at 1291. Here, however, because the City asserts that jurisdiction exists based on
“the plain language in the Controlled Substances Act itself,” the Court must address whether
Plaintiffs’ “right to relief depends upon the construction or application of [federal law].” Grable, 545
U.S. at 312 (citing Smith, 255 U.S. at 199).
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prohibited from placing specific limits, by ordinance, on the number of dispensing facilities. Id.

The Court held a hearing on September 8, 2021, after giving the City’s counsel time to confer

with the appropriate municipal officials as to the City’s stance on medical marijuana dispensaries. At

the hearing, the City’s counsel represented the City’s position on this issue as follows:

Mr. Green: Given the limited parameters of the Sunshine laws, all I can inform the
Court is at this time there has been no request for our office to draft an ordinance and
there’s nothing on the agenda. The last time this came up before the City Commission,
it was their intent to have this issue decided by the courts.
....

The Court: So the City is taking the position that -- I just want to be clear on this
because I’m now referencing Florida Statute 381.986(11)(b)(1). . . . So you’re telling
me that the City is choosing not to ban, by ordinance, medical marijuana treatment
dispensing facilities; is that correct?

Mr. Green: That’s correct at this time, Your Honor. The medical marijuana provision
in the [s]tate law does not provide any type of immunity under [f]ederal law. The City
believes that medical marijuana dispensary is a criminal enterprise under the
Controlled Substances Act, and under the [f]ederal laws it is entitled to deny a
Certificate of Use because it’s in violation of [f]ederal law.

The Court: But you have refused to do exactly what the State has given you the
opportunity to do in order to protect you from that liability.

Mr. Green: That is correct, Your Honor. The City has not chosen to pass an ordinance
one way or the other.

The Court: Okay. And that could relieve you of any liability.

Mr. Green: Understood, Your Honor, yes.

H’rg Tr. at 4:4–5:19. Therefore, even though the City could ban medical marijuana dispensaries

under § 381.986 (11)(b)(1), it has declined to do so after having been given time to weigh its options.

Yet, the City is now before the Court arguing that it is entitled to withhold a Certificate of Use from

medical marijuana businesses due to the CSA’s prohibition of marijuana. Thus, through the instant

action, the City’s elected officials have sought to skirt the performance of their own municipal

function by invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction to accomplish an outcome that is available to them

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under § 381.986 (11)(b)(1) in the first place. Unfortunately, for the City, this Court has no jurisdiction

to fulfill their responsibilities on their behalf.

Given the significance of the City’s inaction under § 381.986 (11)(b)(1), the Court finds that

Plaintiffs’ right to relief depends largely upon the construction or application of the state law—not

federal law. In other words, this case primarily involves the interaction between a municipality’s

failure to act and the operation of state law. This alone weighs against finding that Plaintiffs’ right to

relief depends upon the construction or application of federal law. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (citing

Smith, 255 U.S. at 199).

Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ right to relief does not depend upon the construction

or application of federal law because § 381.986 (11)(b)(1) is not preempted by the CSA. In general,

state laws must give way to federal laws in two circumstances: (1) where “the States are precluded

from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, acting within its proper authority, has determined

must be regulated by its exclusive governance,” (2) where “state laws are preempted when they

conflict with federal law.” Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)). The later

circumstance is implicated by the CSA, under which the federal prohibition of marijuana only

preempts state law where the two are in “positive conflict.” § 903. The Supreme Court has described

two circumstances in which a state law is nullified due to a conflict with federal law:

Such a conflict arises when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a
physical impossibility,” Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142–143 (1963), or when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,”
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).

Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citations

reformatted). Neither circumstance is presented in this case.

First, it is not impossible for the City to comply with the requirements of the CSA and Florida

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law because § 381.986 (11)(b)(1) affords the City the option to ban medical marijuana dispensaries.

Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013) (citing Florida Lime, 373 U.S. at 142–

43). Moreover, § 381.986 (11)(b)(1) does not require the City to affirmatively zone medical

marijuana dispensaries in the event the City opts not to ban dispensaries—rather, it simply prevents

the City from “plac[ing] specific limits, by ordinance, on the number of dispensing facilities that may

locate within that county or municipality.” Fla. Stat. § 381.986 (11)(b)(1). Thus, § 381.986 (11)(b)(1)

does not operate to require the City to affirmatively take steps in violation of federal law and the

City’s inaction on this issue does not render compliance with the CSA an impossibility.

Second, § 381.986 (11)(b)(1) does not frustrate “the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives” of the CSA because the Florida Constitution explicitly states that the

legalization of medical marijuana does not require the violation of federal law or purport to give

immunity of federal law. See Fla. Const. art. X, § 29(c)(5). The City has not cited to, nor is the Court

aware of, any case standing for the proposition that the federal prohibition of marijuana renders any

effort to legalize medical marijuana at the state level to be unconstitutional. 6 To the contrary, courts

consistently find that there is no positive conflict between the CSA and state laws legalizing medical

marijuana because the federal prohibition of marijuana still applies at the federal level—rendering

state legalization of medical marijuana to be merely a provision of “limited state-law immunity.”

Reed-Kaliher, 347 P.3d at 136 (quoting Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming, 846 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 2015).

The same is true of Florida’s Constitution, which states that the legalization of medical marijuana

6
The Court notes that the City cited to a case which discusses the substantial federal question
doctrine in the context of federal jurisdiction over RICO claims involving medical marijuana. Resp.
at 4 (citing Safe Streets Alliance v. Hickenlooper, 859 F.3d 865, 897 (10th Cir. 2017). However, in
Hickenlooper, the court did not address the question of whether the CSA preempted Colorado’s
recreational marijuana laws and it is therefore not instructive on the issues in this case. 859 F.3d at
913.

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does purport to confer any immunity under federal law. See Fla, Const. art. X, § 29(c)(5). Moreover,

courts in other jurisdictions have found that the federal prohibition of marijuana applies, for federal

purposes, regardless of the legalization of medical marijuana at the state level. See United States v.

Schostag, 895 F.3d 1025, 1028 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Johnson, 228 F. Supp. 3d 57,

62 (D.D.C. 2017) (determining individuals may be “prohibited from using state-sanctioned medical

marijuana while under federal court supervision”)); United States v. Meshulam, No. 15-8001 L-CR,

2015 WL 894499, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2015) (“If this Court were to grant Defendant’s request to

permit him to use medical marijuana while on federal pretrial release, it would be authorizing

Defendant to violate federal marijuana laws while a federal criminal prosecution is pending against

him.”); United States v. Hicks, 722 F. Supp. 2d 829, 833 (E.D. Mich. 2010). The Court finds the

reasoning of the cases discussed above persuasive and finds no reason to depart from the emerging

consensus on these issues. Thus, the Court concludes that § 381.986 (11)(b)(1) does not operate to

frustrate the purposes and objectives of federal law and, therefore, there is no positive conflict

between the CSA and § 381.986 (11)(b)(1). Hillsborough Cty., 471 U.S. at 713.

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ right to relief does not depend upon the

construction or application of federal law and, therefore, the Court does not have jurisdiction based

upon the existence of a substantial federal question. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (citing Smith, 255 U.S.

at 199).

Insofar as the City contends that it may refuse to zone medical marijuana dispensaries solely

based on the federal prohibition of marijuana under the CSA, regardless of any conflict between the

CSA and § 381.986 (11)(b)(1), that is an issue properly left to state courts to resolve because that

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question involves solely an interaction between municipal policies and state law. 7

Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no basis for federal jurisdiction in this case. This

matter is therefore REMANDED to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami-Dade County, Florida.

IV. CONCLUSION

UPON CONSIDERATION of the Motion, the Response, the Reply, the pertinent portions of

the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ORDERED AND

ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand to State Court (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED. This

case is REMANDED to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. The

Clerk of the Court is instructed to CLOSE this case. All pending motions, if any, are denied as

MOOT.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this ____

21st day of September, 2021.

K. MICHAEL MOORE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
c: All counsel of record

7
The Court need not reach the Parties’ arguments relating to abstention because the Court has
determined that there is no basis for federal jurisdiction in this case.
13