Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179922             December 16, 2008

JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. DE CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL CARLOS or FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. DE CARLOS,
and TEOFILO CARLOS II, respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages solemnized during
the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior to March 15, 2003. The nullity
and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a judgment on the pleadings, summary
judgment, or confession of judgment.

We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals

(CA) which reversed and set aside the summary judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage, status of a child, recovery of property,
reconveyance, sum of money, and damages.

The Facts

The events that led to the institution of the instant suitare unveiled as follows:

Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six parcels of land to their
compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos. The lots are particularly
described as follows:

Parcel No. 1

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No. 6137 of the
Court of Land Registration.

Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is specifically reserved.

Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.

Parcel No. 2
 A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in the Bo. of
Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x containing an area of
Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One (13,441) square meters.

Parcel No. 3

A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903, approved as a non-
subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC] Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot 155,
Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the S, points 5 to 1 by Lot
159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1 (Road widening) all of the subd. plan,
containing an area of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

PARCEL No. 4

A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a portion of Lot 28,
Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa
Estate; on the East & SE, along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West.,
along line 6-1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area of ONE
THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.

PARCEL No. 5

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de Solocan. Linda por el
NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela 36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el
SW, con la calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon de
concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.

PARCEL No. 6

PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De Solocon. Linda por
el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela 37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por
el SW, con la Calle Dos Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual
se halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana, que es un mojon
de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong
Laan y Dos. Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA
(150) METROS CUADRADOS.3

During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to Teofilo. The agreement
was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Teofilo, in turn, undertook to
deliver and turn over the share of the other legal heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in the name of
Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 234824
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061 issued by the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered by TCT No.
160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.

On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their
son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the
name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are
covered by TCT Nos. 219877 and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Manila.

In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before the RTC in Muntinlupa City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the parties submitted and caused the
approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the parties acknowledged
their respective shares in the proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This
includes the remaining 6,691-square-meter portion of said land.

On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition, dividing the
remaining land of the first parcel between them.

Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,4 2,331 square meters of the second parcel
of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion
was later divided between petitioner and respondents.

The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement executed on August 17,
1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties submitted the supplemental
compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.

Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August 1994. Under the contracts,
the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth parcels of land.

In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-135, against
respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action: (a) declaration of nullity
of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of
money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.

In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and
respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of
respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with respondent
Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that the properties covered by
such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as proceeds, should be
reconveyed to him.

Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.

On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the material averments of
petitioner's complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of details regarding the requisite
marriage license did not invalidate Felicidad's marriage to Teofilo. Respondents declared that
Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.

On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial court. They also asked that their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees, be granted.

But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for summary
judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace who solemnized
the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of respondent Teofilo II.
In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad were designated as parents.

On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on the ground of
irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath, petitioner lodged his own
motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a certification from the Local Civil Registrar
of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.

Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the testimony of
respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil Case No. 89-2384,
entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Piñas. In her testimony, respondent
Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child with Teofilo.5

Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the trial court its
report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the parties.

RTC and CA Dispositions

On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's (respondent's) Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby denied. Plaintiff's (petitioner's) Counter-Motion for Summary
Judgment is hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favour of
plaintiff as follows:

1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos
solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14, 1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate
submitted in this case, null and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
 2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is not the natural, illegitimate,
or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo E. Carlos;

3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to plaintiff the sum

of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at the legal rate from date of filing of
the instant complaint until fully paid;

4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the parcel of land, less the
portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said
title and to issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;

5. Declaring the Contract, Annex "K" of complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void, and ordering the Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCT
No. 139058 in the name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;

6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between plaintiff and defendant
Sandoval null and void;

7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names of defendant Sandoval and
defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to
issue another title in the exclusive name of plaintiff herein;

8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name of defendant Sandoval and
defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein.

Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiff's evidence on his claim for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees, and litigation
expenses on June 7, 1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.

SO ORDERED.6

Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents argued, inter alia, that
the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering summary judgment
annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring Teofilo II as not an
illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.

On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and in lieu thereof, a new one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.7
The CA opined:

We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary judgment by the court a
quo contrary to law and public policy as ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact
that it was appellants who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not
justify the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action "to recover upon a
claim" or "to obtain a declaratory relief," the rule on summary judgment apply (sic) to an
action to annul a marriage. The mere fact that no genuine issue was presented and the
desire to expedite the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the rule.
The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil Code expressly prohibit the
rendition of decree of annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession
of judgment. Yet, the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.

We are not unmindful of appellee's argument that the foregoing safeguards have
traditionally been applied to prevent collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of
marriages and that the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellee's own brother and
appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband and wife for thirty years and that
the annulment of their marriage is the very means by which the latter is sought to be
deprived of her participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather that the summary
nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues in the case, the rule is to the effect
that the material facts alleged in the complaint for annulment of marriage should always
be proved. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

"Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue,

or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the
court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in
actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts
alleged in the complaint shall always be proved." (Underscoring supplied)

Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment
to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a
quo  for appellee would still not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a
valid marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of
the Civil Code the failure to reflect the serial number of the marriage license on the
marriage contract evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee represents it to be.
Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's
affirmation of the existence of said marriage license is corroborated by the following
statement in the affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
 "That as far as I could remember, there was a marriage license issued at Silang,
Cavite on May 14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract executed by Teofilo
Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval, but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for the reason that it was the
Office Clerk who filled up the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may
have overlooked the same."

Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court, We are of the considered view
that the veracity and credibility of the foregoing statement as well as the motivations
underlying the same should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.

If the non-presentation of the marriage contract - the primary evidence of marriage - is

not proof that a marriage did not take place, neither should appellants' non-presentation
of the subject marriage license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized, rests upon the
plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.

Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party who disputes the legitimacy
of a particular party, the same may be said of the trial court's rejection of the relationship
between appellant Teofilo Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the
inconsistencies in appellant Felicidad Sandoval's statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellant's prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate son of appellee's brother, to Our
mind, did not altogether foreclose the possibility of the said appellant's illegitimate
filiation, his right to prove the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance
rights as such.

Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case, We find appellee's bare
allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was merely purchased from an indigent couple
by appellant Felicidad Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be
a minor's total forfeiture of the rights arising from his putative filiation. Inconsistent
though it may be to her previous statements, appellant Felicidad Sandoval's declaration
regarding the illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when considered
in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his life, Teofilo Carlos allowed
said appellant the use of his name and the shelter of his household. The least that the trial
court could have done in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be
able to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant Teofilo Carlos
II.8

On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin motions.

Issues

In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
 1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment under the Decision, Annex
A hereof, and in denying petitioner's Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution,
Annex F hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave reversible error in
applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code, despite the fact that the circumstances of
this case are different from that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise
decided a question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court, or has
decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of
this Honorable Court;

2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error in applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35 governing Summary
Judgments;

3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment and, in lieu thereof,
entering another remanding the case to the court of origin for further proceedings,
petitioner most respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion, disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of speculations,
surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed misapplications of the laws and
misapprehension of the facts.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the benefit of a
trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who is not a spouse in
bringing the action for nullity of marriage.

Our Ruling

I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be proved. Neither
judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed. So is confession of judgment
disallowed.

Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 1910 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:

SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may,
on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall
always be proved.

He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing summary
judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the Rule
on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise considered the
provisions on summary judgments, to wit:

Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the rules on summary judgment
to the case at bench, Our perusal of the record shows that the finding of the court a
quo for appellee would still not be warranted. x x x11

But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was correct
in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on judgment on the
pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage and even in annulment of marriage.

With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," the question on the application of
summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity or annulment of
marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid down by the said Rule,
which took effect on March 15, 200312 is found in Section 17, viz.:

SEC. 17. Trial. - (1) The presiding judge shall personally conduct the trial of the case. No
delegation of evidence to a commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving
property relations of the spouses.

(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be

proved. No judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of
judgment shall be allowed. (Underscoring supplied)

Likewise instructive is the Court's pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.13 In that case,

We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application of summary
judgments.

Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for annulment of marriage or declaration

of its nullity or for legal separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.14 (Underscoring supplied)

By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its lawful right and
duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not terminated by the declaration of
the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between the parties. The State should have been
given the opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered.15

Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the prosecuting
attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the public prosecutor sees
to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even if there is no suppression of
evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the evidence to be presented or laid down
before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:

SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. -  (a) x x x

(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public prosecutor to intervene
for the State during the trial on the merits to prevent suppression or fabrication of
evidence. (Underscoring supplied)

Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for declaration of nullity
of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of evidence.16

II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code.

Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed
by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the spouses by
stating:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. -

(a) Who may file. - A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife. (Underscoring supplied)

Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is enlightening, viz.:

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable

marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be
filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can
only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular
courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek
its dissolution.17 (Underscoring supplied)

The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects of a healthy,
loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decide when and how to build the
foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their marital life. They are
simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-life play. Hence, they alone
can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in accordance with the grounds allowed by
law.

The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988.18

The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the
beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage
case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or
intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional
right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity
but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.19

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before
March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This
is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 200320 is prospective in its
application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,21 viz.:

As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in its application.22 (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends
upon when the marriage took place.23

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable
law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.24 But the Civil
Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that
any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?

We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as
a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.25 Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-
in-interest.26
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the
question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not the real party-
in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.27

Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,28 where the Court held:

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate "proper interest"  can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions,  must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest  and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Niñal v. Badayog,  the
Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity
of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner's personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot
be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing
it. Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and
whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent
Orlando's remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent's marriage as
bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral damages from P300,000.00
to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary,
if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry,
then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the
ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.29 (Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a real-party-in-
interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in controversy.

In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II. Under the law on
succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and the
compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.30

Upon Teofilo's death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of
the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were respondents Felicidad
and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil Code.31

Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral
relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right
to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide:

ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied)

Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral
relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate,
or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral
relatives.32 Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a
surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.33

If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage
of his deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives,
like a brother and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without
issue and without ascendants in the direct line.

The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no other siblings but
petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a legitimate, illegitimate, or
adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of the estate of his brother, the first
half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article 1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes
petitioner a real-party-interest to seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio,
petitioner succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the nullity of marriage
case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a legitimate, adopted, or
illegitimate son of Teofilo.

If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo, then

petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother and
respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no successional right to be
protected, hence, does not have proper interest. For although the marriage in controversy may be
found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner would not inherit. This is because the
presence of descendant, illegitimate,34 or even an adopted child35 excludes the collateral relatives
from inheriting from the decedent.

Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to determine the validity or
nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is strictly instructed to dismiss the
nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II
is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of
petitioner.

IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent Teofilo II is proper
and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the trial court as to the other causes of
action before it.

Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the remand of the
case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding, We should not leave
the matter hanging in limbo.

This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the
parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.36

We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioner's bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent couple is
insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative filiation. However, We
are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration of respondent Felicidad as to
the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more credible. For the guidance of the
appellate court, such declaration of respondent Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We
remind the CA of the guaranty provided by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status
of legitimacy of a child, to wit:

ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
(Underscoring supplied)

It is stressed that Felicidad's declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the very act
that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is unmistakable.
An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a
child born or conceived within a valid marriage.37
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action concerning
reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be vacated. This has to be so, as
said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that the marriage in controversy was null
and void ab initio.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action on the
status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the validity or nullity of marriage
between respondent Felicidad Sandoval and the late Teofilo Carlos;

2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally adopted

son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action
for nullity of marriage for lack of cause of action;

3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision is VACATED

AND SET ASIDE.

The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch and to give
this case priority in its calendar.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS VS. FELICIDAD SANDOVAL

G.R. No. 135830 – 471 SCRA 266 – Civil Law – Family Code – Annulment of Marriage –
Proper Party

Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each had three
parcels of land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived
by his wife Felicidad Sandoval and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death,
two parcels of land were registered in the name of Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August
1995, Carlos commenced an action for the annulment of the marriage between
Teofilo and Felicidad. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between
his late brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II. He argued that the properties
covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by respondents as
proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.

ISSUE: Who may file an action for annulment of marriage?

HELD: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced
before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages celebrated during
the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage. A
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition
for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal
right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights
prior to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity of
the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of
the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks
the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a
nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to
deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.

While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on
Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the
marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the
death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse filed in the regular courts.

It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced
before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the
Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is
prospective in its application.

Carlos commenced the nullity of marriage case against Felicidad in 1995. The
marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern
depends upon when the marriage took place.

The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage?

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents
were married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can
file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of
marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party-in-interest and must be based on a cause of action. Thus, in Ninal v.
Badayog, the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to
declare the nullity of marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it
affects their successional rights.