G.R. No.

178411               June 23, 2010

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY

ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF
PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG
PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M.
ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES,
ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES, Petitioners,

vs.

MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO V.

EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL V.
EBIO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents claim that they are the absolute owners of a parcel of land located at 9781 Vitalez
Compound in Barangay Vitalez, Parañaque City and covered by Tax Declarations in the name
of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek. Respondents assert
that the original occupant and possessor of the said parcel of land was their great grandfather,
Jose Vitalez ose gave the land to his son, Pedro Vitalez. From then on, Pedro continuously and
exclusively occupied and possessed the said lot. Pedro was able to obtain a tax declaration
over the said property in his name. Since then, respondents have been religiously paying real
property taxes for the said property.

Respondent Mario Ebio married Pedro’s daughter, Zenaida. The couple established their home
on the said lot. Mario Ebio secured building permits from the Parañaque municipal office for the
construction of their house within the said compound. Pedro executed a notarized Transfer of
Rights8 ceding his claim over the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio.

the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez passed a Resolution seeking assistance from
the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek
located in the said barangay.

Respondents were surprised when several officials from the barangay and the city planning
office proceeded to cut eight (8) coconut trees planted on the said lot. Respondents filed letter-
complaints before the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands, the Department of Interior and
Local Government and the Office of the Vice Mayor.

The Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez held a meeting to discuss the construction of the

proposed road. In the said meeting, respondents asserted their opposition to the proposed
project and their claim of ownership over the affected property. Respondents attended another
meeting with officials from the city government, but no definite agreement was reached by and
among the parties.

City Administrator Noli Aldip sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to vacate the area
within the next thirty (30) days, or be physically evicted from the said property.
Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005
and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. In the course of the
proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for
the issuance of a sales patent before the DENR.

The RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of merit because respondents were not
able to prove successfully that they have an established right to the property since they have
not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application for sales patent has not yet
been granted.

The respondents moved for reconsideration but it was denied thereby elevating the same to the
Court of Appeals, where the issue was whether who owns the lands adjoining Cut-cut Creek
particularly Road Lot No. 8 (hereinafter RL 8) and the accreted portion beside RL 8.

The Court of Appeals decided in their favor because applying Article 457 of the Civil Code it
could be concluded that Guaranteed Homes is the owner of the accreted property considering
its ownership of the adjoining RL 8 to which the accretion attached. However, this is without the
application of the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory
injunction.

2. Whether or not the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject
property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

RULING:
1. No, an action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the
performance of an act. It is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction,
which cannot exist except only as part or as an incident to an independent action or
proceeding. Moreover, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of a preliminary
prohibitory or mandatory injunction may issue.

Respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of Parañaque
City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through a
parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams,
rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the
owners of such lands.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.

From the above provisions, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part
of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that
the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system;
 otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by
third persons.

It is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part
of the public domain by clear provision of law.

Moreover, an indispensable party is one whose interest in the controversy is such that a
final decree would necessarily affect his/her right, so that the court cannot proceed
without their presence.

2. Yes, the Court found out that character of possession and ownership by the respondents
over the contested land entitles them to the avails of the action. A right in esse means a
clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive relief must prove
that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should not be
contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.

For more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the
accreted portion. Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership
over the subject property through prescription. Respondents can assert such right
despite the fact that they have yet to register their title over the said lot. It must be
remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands, but only
the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration
was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely
confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

Confirmation of an imperfect title over a parcel of land may be done either through
judicial proceedings or through administrative process.