Capital Markets and Investments INCOMPLETE - Dastidar
Capital Markets and Investments INCOMPLETE - Dastidar
Siddhartha G. Dastidar
First Edition
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About the Author
Siddhartha G. Dastidar
Dr. Siddhartha Ghosh Dastidar is an Associate Professor (adjunct) at Columbia University, and has taught
at the Graduate School of Business and the Department of Industrial Engineering & Operations Research.
He teaches courses on capital markets and investments to full-time graduate and undergraduate students,
and also in the executive education program.
Sid has nearly two decades of experience in the financial services industry, both buy-side and sell-side, across
asset classes and regions. As part of the Quantitative Portfolio Strategy team at Lehman Brothers and Bar-
clays Capital in New York, he has advised large institutional clients on portfolio construction, management
and risk budgeting issues. He was also the chief US equity derivatives strategist at Newedge, part of Société
Générale. He is currently a risk manager in Brigade Capital, a USD18 billion credit alternatives asset manag-
er, where he has been responsible for coming up with portfolio construction, risk and quantitative
frameworks. He has also worked in emerging market private equity for three years.
Sid received a Ph.D. in Finance & Economics from Columbia Business School in New York, a MBA from
Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad and an undergraduate degree in economics from Presidency
College Kolkata (both in India). He holds the CFA charter and has published in top journals such as the
Journal of Financial Economics and the Journal of Portfolio Management. He has presented at the National
Bureau of Economic Research in Boston and at top universities globally. He is a member of the Economic
Club of New York.
Reader Comments
Dastidar has put together a concise, very readable book covering the essentials of capital markets and investments. It nicely
covers the big three – fixed income, equities, and options – at a mathematical level that is typically just short of using calculus.
But what really stands out is the very current discussion of the institutional mechanics behind the markets. Automated trading
markets and high-frequency traders get more than a passing mention, and Dastidar details the process of offering new securities
and the role of sell-side investment banks. Well worth adding to your investments bookshelf!
- Charles M. Jones, Robert W. Lear Professor of Finance and Economics
Chair, Finance Sub-division, Columbia Business School, New York
This concise book provides a wide perspective on capital markets ranging from asset pricing, and the anatomy of buy and sell
side firms, to financial statements and macro-economics. It is ideal for anyone needing a rapid introduction or re-introduction to
finance and financial institutions -- students transitioning into a graduate program in financial engineering, or technologist ex-
ploring opportunities, or even finance professional transitioning areas.
- Garud N. Iyengar, Chair and Professor, Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations
Research, Columbia University, New York
An excellent survey of financial markets, explaining in concise language everything from the different asset classes to fixed in-
come and equity markets and portfolio theory. A useful and very practical orientation for finance professionals and students
alike.
- David Weisbrod, former CEO of LCH Clearnet LLC (one of the world’s largest clearinghouses)
and Vice Chairman of JPMorgan , New York
Finally, a clear and concise book that uniquely marries sound theoretical constructs with close-up practical insights... an excel-
lent body of knowledge for both students of finance and practitioners in the asset management industry.
- Adri Guha, Chief Investment Officer, Advanced Portfolio Management (institutional fund-of-
funds/ advisory services)
Siddhartha does an excellent job of mixing finance concepts with real life examples, thus helping build a good foundation.
- Ajit Agrawal, Managing Director, Investment Research, UBS Securities LLC
This manuscript is an excellent supplement to the existing textbooks about Investments. It distinguishes itself by concise intro-
duction of the key financial instruments and tools for analyzing them. Big-picture description of the financial system and the role
of financial intermediaries is an invaluable feature.
- Mikhail Chernov, Professor of Finance, Anderson School of Management, UCLA
This book is written with the student in mind. With clear language and sharp focus on essentials, it feels like learning from a
personal tutor.
- Hayong Yun, Associate Professor of Finance, Eli Broad College of Business, Michigan State
University
Essential reading for anyone looking for a comprehensive introduction to investment management. This book makes quantita-
tive finance accessible by succinctly blending various key aspects of investment management while also describing the pricing and
mechanics of common financial instruments and important metrics and models most relevant in finance. Qualitative investors
can use it to incorporate quantitative tools into their investment process, and it serves as a helpful refresher for experienced quan-
titative investors. The annexures contain relevant background including an overview of concepts in accounting, economics and
statistics.
- Tarun Gupta, Ph.D., Managing Director at AQR Capital Management
Dastidar's book provides a concise, readable and up-to-date coverage of key capital markets topics. It's perfect for introductory
finance classes, and practitioners looking for quick refreshers.
- John Kiff, Senior Financial Sector Expert, International Monetary Fund
Capital Markets and Investments provides a comprehensive review of today’s capital markets, financial industry structure and
the latest theories underlying asset pricing and portfolio construction. Professor Dastidar, based on his experience in both indus-
try and academia, clearly and succinctly explains important concepts without glossing over those essential details that every
aspiring market professional must know. The book’s logical and topical format lends itself to being used as a handy desk refer-
ence.
- Bruce D. Phelps, Managing Director, Head of Research, PGIM (Prudential Financial’s invest-
ment management arm, with over USD 1 trillion in AUM)
Masterful rendering of a complex subject into an easily digested elixir of finance; students will love the rarely-seen practical per-
spective that Dastidar brings to the topics.
- Nandu Nayar, Hans J. Baer Chair in International Finance and Chair of the Perella Department
of Finance, Lehigh University, PA
References......................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Further thoughts................................................................................................................................................................ 47
5. INDICES, BENCHMARKING,
BENCHMARKING, RISK MODELS AND PERFORMANCE
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
EVALUATION ....................................
.................................... 62
Indices – What are they? Why do we need them? ............................................................................................................. 62
Criteria for a Good Index ...................................................................................................................................................... 62
Index Rebalancing ................................................................................................................................................................ 63
Examples of Popular Indices................................................................................................................................................. 63
References......................................................................................................................................................................... 73
Regulation ......................................................................................................................................................................... 77
FinTech .............................................................................................................................................................................. 79
Big Data in Investment Management ................................................................................................................................... 79
Quantitative Investing .......................................................................................................................................................... 82
Factor-based investing .......................................................................................................................................................... 82
Crowdfunding ....................................................................................................................................................................... 83
Marketplace Lending ............................................................................................................................................................ 83
Robo-advisors ....................................................................................................................................................................... 83
Blockchaining ........................................................................................................................................................................ 83
Payment Mechanisms and Cryptocurrencies ....................................................................................................................... 83
Compliance Software ............................................................................................................................................................ 85
References......................................................................................................................................................................... 85
What is a bond?................................................................................................................................................................. 89
8. FACTORS AFFECTING
AFFECTING TREASURY BOND PRICES
PRICES ................................................................
.................................................................................
................................................. 105
Reviewing Bond Price-Yield Relationship ......................................................................................................................... 105
Price-yield graph................................................................................................................................................................. 105
Term Structure of Interest Rates – Theories of the Shapes of yield curve ........................................................................ 121
Investing in Treasury Markets - Expressing views using Treasuries *** ........................................................................... 123
Leverage ............................................................................................................................................................................. 124
Carry Trades ....................................................................................................................................................................... 124
Steepeners and Flatteners ................................................................................................................................................. 124
Relative Value Trades ......................................................................................................................................................... 125
References....................................................................................................................................................................... 136
Equities and the Capital Structure –Role of Leverage for a Corporation........................................................................... 171
Investors’ Risk-Return Tradeoffs – Utility Function and Indifference Curves .................................................................... 192
References....................................................................................................................................................................... 213
References....................................................................................................................................................................... 223
ANNEXURES ................................................................
................................................................................................
................................................................................................
..............................................................................
.............................................. 242
References....................................................................................................................................................................... 272
Excel integration – FLDS, BDP, BDH, BDS, overrides, XLTP ............................................................................................... 287
About this Book
I have intentionally placed this section after the Table of Contents, because I hope readers will spend a few
minutes reading this.
Who is this book for?
This book is meant to help practitioners and students understand the essentials of capital markets, quickly. It
requires no specific prerequisites, except possibly some fluency in high school/ undergraduate math. Basic
information on financial statements and statistics are included in self-contained annexures at the end. The
annexures can help bridge any gaps in background that readers may have to understand the content in the
body of the book thoroughly and build on it.
Over the years, more people need a rapid orientation in finance:
• Finance professionals need a quick refresher on a market that they do not deal with regularly.
• Professionals with qualifications in other disciplines continue to look to switch careers into finance.
• Students with prior background in another discipline often join a Masters degree program, specializ-
ing in finance (MBA, quantitative finance, etc.)
• Advanced undergraduate students want to decide whether finance is right for them.
• Mid-career professionals in another industry, serving financial services clients, need to understand
the basics of financial markets better. For example, Fintech professionals with a technology back-
ground are looking to connect more with mainstream finance companies.
• Or, it may be a curious individual who simply wants to understand the financial periodicals better,
and possibly make more sensible investment decisions!
Practitioners currently employed in the finance profession will find this book useful in refreshing basic con-
cepts in a part of the market they do not deal with regularly. Students of finance will find the book useful in
teaching them preliminary/ intermediate ideas, putting facts in context and “connecting the dots”.
Because of the book’s introductory nature, it is heavy on principles, mechanics, details, etc. and light on perspective.
This book gives readers the tools to formulate opinions and evaluate the opinions of others, but it does not
offer opinions on a platter. The best way to form opinions on the market is to read and assess commonly
offered opinions, and assimilate them yourself. This book helps, but the hard work has to be yours.
What makes this book different?
This book scratches the surface of several potentially interesting areas within finance, allowing the reader an
informed choice regarding which topics to go deeper. I would recommend most students read this book in
its entirety (even if they only care about a few topics) as I consider most of this information essential
knowledge for aspiring finance professionals. The first section, in particular, describes the operations of
large financial organizations; this is less relevant for finance professionals but will help beginner students
(even in interviews!).
As the emphasis is on quick learning, the book aims to be concise, at the cost of being cryptic at times. The book
avoids detailed explanations and examples of concepts, expecting readers to look that up elsewhere if neces-
sary (many people may not need it), once they have an idea what to look for. At the same time, the book
delves into institutional detail not commonly found in textbooks, instead of being merely conceptual, be-
cause these details often drive the market dynamics. This book is heavy on jargon, as the biggest hurdles in
finance are not the concepts but the vocabulary. Because of the emphasis on brevity, most concepts are in-
troduced but not explained comprehensively.
I wrote this book because I wanted an inexpensive book to introduce motivated readers without a prior
background quickly (in a one-semester course for students) to the essential elements of capital markets,
while not skipping important (albeit dry) practical details. Finance (and most other fields, from my experi-
ence) is much more about gory details than lofty ideas, a perspective lost in most introductory books.
Market plumbing matters a lot!
This book will be regularly updated, as the industry is in a state of constant flux. A necessary step in keeping
the price low was to publish to book personally, without a large publisher. Hopefully, the content and price
more than makes up for the lack of “features” and look-and-feel.
How, practically, to use the book
Readers need to be active participants in the reading and learning process. By itself, the book is unlikely to teach much,
because it is cryptic and does not reinforce concepts (a fallout of brevity). This book will especially help par-
ticipants get a quick overview of a topic before diving deep into it (using some other source). Alternatively,
it will help synthesize concepts and reinforce the broad idea after having studied the painstaking details
elsewhere.
So, introductory readers would do well to:
• Read unfamiliar material slowly and with deliberation – many sentences are dense and introduce
multiple concepts. Re-read; subsequent readings will get easier.
• Take copious notes in the book or elsewhere (and jot down questions for later clarification) while
reading the book.
• Have access to the Internet or other references (most concepts are common and easy to find exam-
ples and information on) to get more details on any topic that the student finds interesting or
relevant. Many topics which the book covers in a sentence or a paragraph need a book to do justice,
but that would defeat the objective of being concise and quick, and may be of marginal importance
to many readers (and of primary importance to others).
• The index is detailed. If a term is unfamiliar, please consider looking it up at the back to check for
another section of the book that explains it in more detail.
• The reference section at the end of every chapter have lists of sources with more details; this may be
easier for readers who do not want to search the Internet continually for supplementary information.
Organization and Formatting
Most of the information in the different sections of the book – Institutional Overview, Bond Markets, Equi-
ty Markets, Options Markets and Annexures – is independent. I would suggest instructors (and students)
sequence the sections whichever order they please, and refer liberally to the relevant Annexures for back-
ground detail. There are a few sections on institutional detail in most chapters; this can be skipped in an
introductory class, or a first reading. The first section on Institutional Overview can also be treated like a
(very large) annexure; while advanced readers can skip it and use it as a reference, introductory readers
would do well to go through that material, to understand the building blocks.
I use the male pronoun “he” almost exclusively; I’m not biased against women capital markets professionals,
but it’s just easier to use one pronoun.
Within a chapter, the headers are organized in the following manner:
SECTION HEADING
Sub-Section Heading
Topic Heading within Sub-Section
Some words in the text are italicized, either for emphasis or to indicate (the first few times) that it is financial
market terminology. They mean something precise and are used in a specific context, and may (or may not) be
discussed in a later section in the book. Internet searches (or a different part of the book, navigated with the
index) can help here to understand the concept better. Sometimes, words are in “quotes”, when the mean-
ing is markedly different from regular usage. Keywords, often discussed in nearby pages, are highlighted and
italicized. Of course, the headings will also contain some keywords, which we will not format distinctively.
This book has a significant amount of material that can be skipped on a first reading or treated like the Ap-
pendix. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 are totally optional. Most chapters also have sections with details that can
be glossed over initially. These optional chapters and sections have been marked with “***” in the relevant
headers.
While the book is certainly suitable for a global audience, certain examples and details have taken on a more
US-centric tone. Usually, these sections are fairly apparent and disjoint, like the discussion of the US bank-
ruptcy code, and can be easily skipped.
Suggested Teaching Plan
The independent reader can pick and choose which chapters and sections he wants to read. I’ve made an
effort to keep various parts of the book self-contained, while focusing on central themes. Since several pro-
fessors and students will use this as a textbook, I am taking the liberty of proposing a tangible teaching plan
for instructors who wish to cover most of this material in one semester.
This book can probably not replace an extensive textbook with many solved examples and exercises with
lots of illustrations, so most instructors who have a workflow that they are happy with will find it easiest to
assign this book as a supplementary text. But, for
Instructors can either assign Chapter 1 and 2 (and Annexure I) as prior background reading, or cover them
in an introductory session. Students should be required to go through the annexures on their own, at least to
be familiar with the concepts so that they can return to the back when necessary. Classes with a more quan-
titative background can begin with fixed income (Chapters 7, 8 and parts of 9), where the concepts are more
tangible, before transitioning to equities (Chapters 11 and 12) and ending with options (Chapters 13 and 14).
Classes where the emphasis is predominantly on qualitative insights will find it more natural to cover the
equities section first, before fixed income and finally options.
Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 are completely optional; one can visualize them as an extension of the Appendix
section. Further, many chapters (especially Chapter 9) have a few sections which can easily be skipped, add-
ing to the “list” of optional topics. These sections have been marked with “***” in the respective headers.
1. The Financial System – Introduction
16
Capital Markets and Investments
17
The Financial System - Introduction
an “allocation” (i.e. “participate in the deal). This scarcity of the opportunity to invest in the proposal creates
buzz, which also allows the secondary market (described below) in the name to do well.
The primary market facilitates the allocation of risk capital to (potentially) future cash flow generating pro-
jects. But, if this were the only market, then the investors would need to part with their capital for the
duration/ time horizon of the project, or until all promised cash flows are paid back, which may take dec-
ades. Meanwhile, the risk characteristics of the project may change because of market conditions. Also, since
most projects take several years to mature, investors with short-term capital (e.g. available for six months to
three years) would find it difficult to invest.
The secondary market addresses this issue; in this market, risk is transferred from one investor to another; the
producers or the project sponsors do not usually participate in this market. After an instrument is issued,
current holders of the security who want to sell it are matched with prospective buyers in the secondary
market. Depending on the trading mechanism of the particular instrument, brokers can play an active role
here, by finding buyers and sellers, and providing a layer of anonymity. An active secondary market allows
investors to have a flexible time horizon, and allows them to exit a position based on liquidity needs or cur-
rent attractive valuations. It also allows speculators to participate, providing another source of liquidity.
18
Capital Markets and Investments
superiority. Since capital owners can easily use multiple investors to invest in different markets, the best-of-
breed specialization has become dominant among investment managers.
As we discuss specialization within the financial system, it is important to recognize that many of these
businesses do not need massive investments in physical capital, decades to build, and armies of people. A
handful of smart seasoned people, focused on the specific market, can play a meaningful role in this chain
of value-creation. Formally, these specialized individuals may be a separate stand-alone firm, or work within
the boundaries of a larger firm, so a larger broad-based firm will often have smaller dedicated teams, often
working in silos (which could easily fit into another firm instead). The performance of these focused teams
is relatively easy to isolate; both these issues lead to the apparently large compensation bonuses that the
press reports.
The current financial system is a loosely connected set of silos. Sometimes these silos occur within a large
organization, and sometimes they are stand-alone. Each of these set-ups has its own costs and benefits.
While assessing these systems, it is important to understand how each of these agents gets compensated,
because that ultimately points to the biases of these players.
ish”); a buyer’s aim is often to buy the security at a low price, and sell it at higher price, while collecting
any interim cash flows that the security pays while he owns the security. Conversely, an investor takes a
short a position in a security when he feels that the security is likely to go down in price (i.e. feel “bear-
ish”). This position has diametrically opposite risks to the long investor; the investor benefits from a
short position when the price goes down, and loses when it goes up. This is mechanically achieved by
selling a security without owning it first, by borrowing the security from a securities lending program and then
selling it. The short “seller” receives cash flows from this initial sale (in reality, these proceeds effectively
serve as collateral to the lender of the security, and may earn a small interest), and plans to buy back (i.e.
cover) the security hopefully at a lower price, to earn the difference between the initial sale price and the
later covering (i.e. purchase) price. During this time, the short seller needs to pay the security’s original
owner any cash flows that the security pays during this period, and also a per-period security borrowing
cost (and receives a small interest payment on the collateral), so it is costly to be short for an extended
period, since there is a recurring cost every day. If the security’s price goes up after the short, it is terrible
for the short since now the security has to be bought back at a higher price. Further, if the seller chooses
to stay in the position, the earlier collateral is now inadequate and needs to be replenished, since a more
expensive asset needs to be secured.1
As we will learn later, most of the world’s financial assets are managed through long-only accounts such as
mutual funds, so the concept of shorting securities is only directly relevant to a small investor base. But, it is
an important mechanism to keep asset prices fair, as some (large) investors can definitely short if prices get
too high. If no investor was allowed to short securities, prices could theoretically get higher from fair value
and remain high, driven by either speculators betting on even higher prices, or by investors with different
opinions about future prospects. We discuss shorting in more detail, in the section on prime brokerage in
Chapter 3.
• The principle of no-arbitrage emphasizes that if a security A has the same cash flows as security B in every
possible future period (or state), they will have the same price today. Otherwise, an investor could short
the more expensive security (based on today’s price) and buy the cheaper security simultaneously and
lock in a profit upfront, with all subsequent cash-flows offsetting each other. This principle is also im-
portant in pricing securities – if a security’s cash flows can be replicated using a portfolio of other
securities with known prices, this security’s fair price can be calculated using those known prices.
More formally, an arbitrage is said to exist when an investor receives some (positive) cash inflow today,
with zero probability of having to pay more than that amount (adjusted for time value of money) in fu-
ture. Alternatively, the investor enters the position today at zero cost, with at least some probability of
getting a positive cash inflow in future, and zero probability of a cash outflow in future.
To build on the topic about pricing securities using replication/ no arbitrage, let us consider the fol-
lowing example:
Let us consider a world with three time periods – 0 (today), 1 and 2. The payoffs of instruments A, B
and C are given below. The prices of B and C are known, the price of A is to be determined. Figure
1.1 shows these prices and payoffs.
1 This long/short terminology gets more confusing for unfunded positions since no cash is exchanged upfront; the convention is to look at the
20
Capital Markets and Investments
2In reality, the investor would need to borrow A from a securities lending program through his broker, pay a borrow cost, and put up collateral,
maybe including the assets B and C that he purchased, reducing the profits from the trade. There is also usually a bid-offer spread which we will
discuss later. There are some popular examples of such trades not working out, such as the Palm spin-off from 3Com in 2000 and the VW-
Porsche deal in 2008.
21
The Financial System - Introduction
22
Capital Markets and Investments
be some information that most analysts haven’t chanced upon; this version of efficiency does not allow for
that too. Most analysts will believe that this version of efficiency does not always hold.
Strong-form Efficiency insists that even with private information, it is not possible to predict security returns;
this is probably a stretch.
The core argument justifying market efficiency is that there are millions of investors and analysts following
financial markets, several hundred track any particular focus area. If a security’s price were obviously wrong,
capital would flow in / out of that security until the price reflects fair value. In particular, investors could
put on arbitrage strategies and lock in profits if prices are not aligned with the economic reality.
Whichever version one chooses to believe in, it is indeed true that new public information is getting dissem-
inated and incorporated in prices very rapidly, so the edge to analyzing information may be going down; in
fact speed may even lead to misinterpretation and present an opportunity. Further, many pricing anomalies
may appear to exist or investment opportunities appear lucrative, but they are either transient, or may not be
thoroughly researched or may reflect (incorrectly assessed) investment risk. So, in a sense, recognizing that
the market may plausibly be somewhat efficient overall should cause the investor to ask why the other per-
son wants to sell when the investor wants to buy (or vice versa) and convince himself that he is not missing
anything.
Counterclaims to Market Efficiency
Theories of Asymmetric Information - Agency Theories
Efficient market theories are based on frictionless markets, with all players having the same information
(among other assumptions), consistent with perfect competition. In both the retail and the institutional in-
vestment world, professional investment managers manage most of the financial capital on behalf of their
clients (who own the capital), as we elaborate in Chapter 4. In the real world, the entity owning the capital
(principal) cannot precisely observe if the manager deploying the capital (agent) is doing an earnest job to
create value, or doing “just enough” to maintain a good impression or taking excessive risk to get paid in-
centive fees3. So, the capital owner often decides on the performance of the agent based on returns over a
certain pre-specified time horizon. This also motivates the creation of investment guidelines, which restricts
the agent’s investment universe to his stated expertise. This leads to the frictions discussed in the justifica-
tion for limits to arbitrage, below.
Limits to Arbitrage
The first line of skepticism to market efficient arguments is that it is not easy to implement arbitrages as the
textbooks will have readers believe. This is because of investor guidelines (limiting which assets investors
can invest in), short selling constraints, lack of borrow availability/ cost of borrow, prices deviating even
more from fundamentals in the short run, high transaction costs, short investment horizons aligned with
investor performance evaluation cycles, etc. The counter to this argument is that, for arbitrage to disappear,
not all investors need to be adept at implementing arbitrage trades; one large investor with the capital and
flexibility should be able to drive out mispricing and profit from it. Said differently, if prices reflect a
weighted-average of trader beliefs, an arbitrageur, because of reasons above, may not be in a position to
build a large enough position to influence prices significantly, leading to the persistence of a potential arbi-
trage opportunity.
3 This line of thinking was pioneered by Michael Spence, George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz in the early 1970s, for which they won the Nobel
Prize for Economics in 2001. This (asymmetric information) problem can be mitigated by signaling (where the informed party takes a costly
action to credibly disclose private information) or screening (where the uninformed party presents the informed party with a menu of choices;
the pick from the menu reveals the private information).
23
The Financial System - Introduction
Further, most mispricings do not show up as textbook arbitrages (where one makes certain money, or has a
zero probability of losing and a non-zero chance of making money) but show up as lucrative trades in an
expected value framework (high positive expected values). So, while putting on such trades, there remains a
non-zero chance of losing (potentially large amounts of) money; investors may be reluctant to allocate mas-
sive amounts of capital to such trades, and invest only in small size in a risk-controlled manner. And, if new
capital flows to investors with views divergent from the arbitrageur, the arbitrageur will find himself on the
wrong side of the trade, in the short term.
Principal-agent issues also make risk-control issues especially important. This is because the capital owner
cannot precisely monitor the investment manager’s actions, so needs to come up with a contract to create a
suitable incentive structure. Now, such contracts can also lead to perverse incentives, so the contract usually
also contains guidelines to restrict the manager’s actions. Even in the absence of such contracts, the manag-
er may choose to “play it safe” instead of putting on (potentially risky and contrarian) arbitrage trades, which
may lead to large losses and stick out, leading to the capital owner firing the manager.
Behavioral Biases of Investors
All the arguments put forward in this chapter (and in most of the book) assume that investors behave ra-
tionally, based on the information at their disposal. Studies have shown that this is not always true4.
Individual (and institutional) cognitive biases lead to non-rational judgments and decisions, which affect
trading dynamics and market prices. These biases can broadly be classified as either related to overconfi-
dence, or limited cognitive processing5 (e.g. simplifying decision-making by using quick heuristics, feelings
short-circuiting well thought-out decision frameworks).
Overconfidence leads to investors believing that their estimates are much more precise than reality, their
ability is higher than that of their peers; they selectively pick facts to reinforce these biases. This causes in-
vestors to trade aggressively, invest actively instead of indexing (Chapters 4, 5). Overconfidence also leads to
over-reaction in prices which eventually corrects, leading to short-term momentum but longer term mean-
reversion (Chapter 12). This may also show up in large investment allocations to local assets or own-
company stock.
Limited focus and mind space to absorb/ analyze information also causes people to ignore information for
pricing financial assets. For example, investors overreact to salient or recent information, and de-emphasize
less salient information. Investors’ subjective probabilities of events are influenced by how easily they can
think of examples. Investors often frame the decision problem narrowly, leading them to ignore relevant
investment aspects such as employer 401k matches, tax implications or diversifying characteristics to overall
portfolios. Investors have been shown to usually simply default to an equally weighted average of securities
in their portfolio, without due consideration to risk. Reference points seem to matter to investors, be it the
price at which they acquired a security in the past and their aversion to sell losers, their anchoring to initial
ideas and premises, mentally compartmentalizing using quick heuristics to get to an answer rather than de-
liberating fully on the problem. These biases slow down the incorporation of information into market
prices.
To summarize, it’s probably fair to say that most of the market behaves in a (more or less) efficient manner
most of the time. But, for the other times (and parts of the market), behavioral biases become important in
4While several researchers, beginning with Savage and Ellsberg have documented investor irrationality in various forms, Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky provided the Prospect Theory to explain some of these behavioral patterns, for which Kahneman shared the Nobel Prize in 2002
5 A strand of academic literature in microeconomic theory refers to this phenomenon as bounded rationality.
24
Capital Markets and Investments
determining/ explaining the final outcome. And, these effect of these biases may linger, because of agency
effect and the resulting limits to arbitrage. Reinforcing behavioral actions by groups of investors (rather than
individuals) can also affect prices. Some investors may be in a position to exploit these inefficiencies at the
margin, at least temporarily.
REFERENCES
• Akerlof, George A., O. Blanchard, D. Romer and J. E. Stiglitz (ed., 2014). What Have We Learned? MIT
Press.
• Barberis, Nicholas & Thaler, Richard (2003). A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M.
Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 18,
pages 1053-1128 Elsevier.
• Hirshleifer, David A (Aug, 2014). Behavioral Finance. Retrieved from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2480892
• Kahneman, Daniel (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
25
Capital Markets and Investments
Index
Buyer’s curse, 94
1 Buy-side, 17, 50
E G
Economic data, 121 Gaussian Distribution, 279
Efficient Market Hypothesis, 22 General Collateral (GC), 96
Electronic Communications Network (ECN), 44 Geometric Brownian Motion, 235
Emerging Markets, 35, 121 Gordon Growth Formula
Empirical Distribution, 279 Dividend Discount Model with Growth, 178
Endowments, 58 Government Bonds, 31
Enterprise Value, 172 Graham-Dodd Valuation, 177
Environment, Social and Governance (ESG), 76 Greeks – options
Equities, 27, 172 Delta, Gamma (Convexity), Vega, Theta, 237
Equity Multiples Gross Basis, 128
P/E, EV/EBITDA, 179 Guidelines, 51
Eurodollar Futures, 131
European option, 217
290
Capital Markets and Investments
H M
Haircut, 96 Macaulay Duration, 111
Hedge funds, 55 Macro Investing, 182
Heteroskedasticity, 286 maker/taker model, 45
High Frequency Trading, 57, 97, 190 Margin investment, 41
Hybrid instruments, 28 Market maker, 37
Market microstructure, 43, 75, 97, 189
I Market portfolio, 201
Marketplace Lending, 84
IEX, 191 Mean-Variance Efficient (MVE) Portfolio, 200
Immunization, 115, 116 Mean-Variance Efficient Frontier, 200
Implied volatility, 238 Mean-variance Optimization, 198
Income Statement MiFID II, 79
Cost of Goods Sold, SG&A, EBITDA, Depreciation, Interest Minimum variance portfolio, 196
Expense, Net Income, 252 Model Robustness, 183
Index, 63 Modified Duration, 111
Index Rebalancing, 64 Modigliani-Miller, 174
Index Rules, 63, 67 Mortgages, 32
Index swaps, 57 MBS, 139
Index Value OAS, 143
Total Return Index Value, 66 Prepayment Risk, 140
Indifference Curve, 194 TBA, 141
Inflation, 122, 129 Multicollinearity, 286
Information Technology Division, 42 Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF), 189
Insurance companies, 59 Municipal bonds, 32
Inter dealer broker, 38, 97 Municipal Bonds, 144
Interest Rate Risk, 109 Mutual fund, 53
Interest Rate Swaps, 31, 131
Internal Rate of Return (IRR), 92 N
Investment bank, 36
Investment Banking Division, 36 NBBO, 189
ISIN, 27 Net Basis, 128
Net Present Value (NPV), 92
J No-Arbitrage, 20
Nominal interest rates, 122
Jump Process – Option pricing, 240 Normal Distribution, 278
K O
Key-Rate Duration, 116 Offer price, 37
Kurtosis, 281 Off-The-Run, 95
Omitted Variable Bias, 286
L On-the-Run, 95
Open Interest, 128
Leverage, 41, 125, 173 Open-end fund, 53
LIBOR, 130 Option
Limited liability, 27 Strike, Underlying, Expiration, Writer, Premium, Exercise, In/
Limits to Arbitrage, 23 Out-of-the-money, Moneyness, Intrinsic Value, Time
Liquid alts, 56 Value, Multiplier, 217
Liquidity, 97 Options, 29
Lit market, 44 Order management system (OMS), 45
Long, 20 Outsourced CIO (OCIO), 61
Long-only fund, 20, 53 Overconfidence, 24
Long-short fund, 53 Over-the-counter (OTC), 45
291
Index
P Risk model, 69
Risk Neutrality
Paid-in Kind (PIK), 90 Probability, Pricing, 231
Partial Duration, 116 Risk Parity, 215
Passive management, 52 Risk Premium, 197
Pension plans, 58 Risk Reversal, 221
Pension Plans Risk-adjusted returns, 21
Funding Status, 115 Robo-Advisor, 51, 57, 84
Performance Attribution, 73 Rolldown, 104
Brinson-Fachler, 73
Performance Evaluation, 71
S
Physical Settlement, 127
Poisson Distribution, 281 Sales & Trading, 37
Preferred Habitat Theory, 122 Scenario Analysis, 71, 211
Preferred stock, 28 Secondary market, 18
Price-Yield Relation, 106 Securities lending, 20, 41
Primary Dealer, 97 Securitization, 161
Primary market, 17 ABS, 167
Prime Brokerage, 40 CDX, CDO, 169
Principal-Agent Problem, 24 CLO, 168
private equity, 55 CMBS/ CMBX, 167
Private Wealth Management, 57 CMO, 164
Probability Risk Retention, 170
Distribution, Density, Cumulative Distribution, 278 Securitized Products, 33
Proprietary trading, 38, 60 Security Market Line, 205
Protective Put, 222 Security Selection, 73
Pull-to-par, 103 Sell-side, 17
Put option, 217 Separately Managed Account, 56
Put Spread, 223 Sequential pay, 33
Put-Call Parity, 223 Serial Correlation, 286
Settlement
Q Physical and Cash, 29
Settlement date, 47
Quantitative Easing, 121 Sharpe Ratio, 72, 191, 198, 201, 203
Quantitative Investing, 51, 83, 182 Short, 20, 41
SIP, 189
R Skew - option, 241
Skewness, 281
Rating Agencies, 17 Smart-beta, 51, 69
Rational Expectations, 123 Socially Responsible Investing (SRI), 76
Real interest rates, 122 Spot Rate, 100
Realized volatility, 238 Standard Deviation, 277
Registered Investment Advisor (RIA), 58 Standard Error, 280
Regression, 209, 283 Standard Normal Distribution, 279
Reinvestment Risk, 108 Statistics, 275
Replicating Portfolio - Option, 227 Steepener, 126
Repo, 95 Stochastic Volatility – Option pricing, 240
Residual value, 28 Stock Replacement, 221
Returns Stocks, 27
Total, Price, Annualized, Holding Period, Simple, Stop-out Yield, 94
Compounded, Log, 245 Straddle, 222
Reverse Repo, 96 Strangle, 222
Risk factor, 69 Strategy Index
Risk management - Equity, 211 Custom Index, 65
Risk management – sell side, 40 Stratified Sampling, 65
292
Capital Markets and Investments
Stress Tests, 78 U
STRIPS, 99
Structured credit, 33 Underlying, 28
Structuring, 39 Utility Function, 194
Style drift, 50
Swaps, 29 V
Swaptions, 31, 135, 219, 288
Synthetic Credit Indices (CDX), 169 Value Investing, 183
Vanilla option, 224
VaR, 70, 211, 212
T
Variance swap, 242
Tax shield of Debt, 174 venture capital, 55
T-Bills, 95 VIX
TED Spreads, 131 VIX futures, Options on VIX futures, 242
Term Structure of Interest Rates, 98, 123 Volatility, 277
Term structure of option volatility, 241 Vol-of-vol, 242
TEV
Tracking Error Volatility, 65, 73 W
Time Series Data, 275
Time Value of Money, 19 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), 176
TIPS, 129 When-issued market, 94
Top-down investment, 52
Total Return Swaps (TRS), 66 Y
Trade date, 47
Tranche, 33 Yale Model, 59
Treasuries, 31 Yield Curve, 98
Treasury Auction, 94 Yield to Maturity (YTM), 93
Treasury Bonds, 89
Trinomial model, 233 Z
Two-fund separation, 65, 201, 209
Zero Coupon Bonds, 99
Zero Interest Rate, 77
Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP), 77, 121
293