CIVIL LAW REVIEW I (2021-2022) CASE DIGESTS

SPS BAYUDAN v. DACAYAN

DOCTRINE

The right of the seller to cancel the contract upon failure of the buyer to pay in installments the
purchase price of the real estate must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of RA 6552

FACTS

On May 6, 2015, Dacayan filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Bayudan.
According to Dacayan, he is a co-owner of a parcel of land on which a store was constructed.
Dacayan leased the store via oral contract to Sps. Bayudan. However, Sps. Bayudan failed to
pay the monthly rent since September 2012. In 2014, Dacayan sent a demand letter for the
unpaid rents but Sps. Bayudan refused to pay alleging that they are already the owners of the
subject property by virtue of the "Kasunduang Magbilhan ng Bahagi ng Lupa" they executed
with Dacayan as the seller. Dacayan sent a final demand letter dated March 31, 2015 ordering
Sps. Bayudan to pay and vacate the property within 15 days from receipt thereof.

In their Answer, Sps. Bayudan claimed that though they initially rented the property, in 2013,
the parties entered into a Contract to Sell. Pursuant to the Contract to Sell, Sps. Bayudan
agreed to buy the subject property in the amount of P300,000, with P91,000 paid upon signing
of the Contract, and the P209,000 balance to be paid within two years or until January 2015.

On December 29, 2014, Sps. Bayudan tendered the balance of the purchase price to Dacayan
but he refused to accept the same. Hence, two months before the filing of the unlawful detainer
case against them, Sps. Bayudan filed a complaint for specific performance against Dacayan to
enforce their right over the property pursuant to the Contract to Sell.

The MeTC rendered its Decision in favor of Dacayan. On appeal, the RTC reversed the ruling
of the MeTC.

The Petition for Review to the CA, reversed the ruling of the RTC and reinstated that of the
MeTC.

Hence this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the possession of Sps. Bayudan of the property became unlawful giving rise to a
cause of action for unlawful detainer.

RULING
The petition is meritorious.

For an unlawful detainer case to prosper, the following requisites must concur:
(1) The defendant originally had lawful possession of the property, either by virtue
of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) Eventually, the defendant's possession of the property became illegal or

(3) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived
the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof;
and

(4) Within one year from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

The second element requires that the possession of Sps. Bayudan of the subject property
should have become illegal. Here, the parties do not dispute they executed a Contract to Sell,
on which Sps. Bayudan based their continued possession of the property. The question,
therefore, is whether the Contract to Sell was validly cancelled by Dacayan which would make
Sps. Bayudan's possession of the subject property, illegal.

We answer in the negative.

The payment scheme involving the Contract to Sell the lot is covered by R.A. No. 6552.

R.A. 6552 recognizes the right of the seller to cancel the contract upon failure of the buyer to
pay in installments the purchase price of the real estate. However, to be valid, the cancellation
must comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the law.
Section 4. In case where less than two years of installments were paid, the seller
shall give the buyer a grace period of not less than sixty days from the date the
installment became due. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the
expiration of the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after thirty days
from receipt by the buyer of the notice of cancellation or the demand for rescission
of the contract by a notarial act.

The records of this case do not show that Dacayan complied with Section 4 of R.A. 6552. In
fact, the first demand letter was sent by Dacayan even before the lapse of the two-year period
given to Sps. Bayudan to pay the full purchase price of the subject property which was due on
January 2015. In addition, the final demand letter sent by Dacayan is not the same as the
notarized notice of cancellation required by R.A. No 6552.

Given the foregoing, there is no basis for the illegality of Sps. Bayudan's possession of the
property.
 ESPERAL v. TROMPETA-ESPERAL
G.R. No. 229076; Sept. 16, 2020
Inting, J.

DOCTRINE

The issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately

FACTS

Sometime in September 2012, petitioner Ma. Luz Teves Esperal who was working in the US,
came home to the Philippines. She discovered that her property was now occupied by persons
unknown to her. Upon inquiry, the occupants informed her that they were the lessees and
paying rentals to respondent Lorenz Biaoco, nephew of co-respondent Ma. Luz Trompeta-
Esperal. She then told the occupants that she is the owner of the property and that she did not
authorize Biaoco to have the property leased to anyone.

When petitioner met Biaoco, petitioner told him that she is the owner of the property and not
his aunt. Respondents voluntarily left the premises. Thereafter, petitioner took over the
possession of the property and designated her sister, Rosario Ola to be the property
administrator. She likewise made an arrangement with the lessees to pay the rentals to Ola and
changed the locks of the gate.

For more than two weeks, petitioner's possession of the subject property was peaceful.
However, in the third week of October 2012, when petitioner was back in the US, Ola
informed her that respondents entered the premises by destroying the locks using a bolt cutter;
and that respondents changed the locks, prohibited the tenants from entering the premises, and
posted a rent signage.

Ola immediately reported the incident to the barangay. Petitioner's counsel then sent a demand
letter to respondents for them to vacate the property. Respondents refused to leave prompting
the petitioner to file the Complaint for Ejectment and Damages against respondents.

Respondents averred that petitioner is not the real party-in-interest because she was not the
owner of the subject property. They insisted that although the property was registered under a
TCT in the name of petitioner and Pablo Rostata, with petitioner described therein as the wife
of Pablo, but their marriage was later nullified due to the existing marriage of Pablo to another
woman. They asserted that Pablo already executed in their favor, an Affidavit of Acceptance
for the Foreclosure of the Mortgage Property dated March 15, 2005 wherein Pablo declared
that respondent Trompeta is the new owner of the subject property.

The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner. The RTC affirmed the MeTC on
appeal.
The CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC Decision. Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the court can resolve an ejectment suit when parties have conflicting ownership
claims

RULING

The Court grants the petition.

In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, its jurisdiction is
generally limited to reviewing errors of law. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states
that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. The
Court explained the difference between a question of fact and a question of law in this wise:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.

Petitioner is raising the issue of whether the court can resolve an ejectment suit even if both
parties claim ownership of the subject property. Clearly, the issue raised is a question of law.

Still, the Court will have to pass upon the factual findings in the case considering the
conflicting or contradictory decisions of the CA and RTC; thus, the Court is constrained to
make its own factual findings in order to resolve the issue presented before it.

The Court finds that the CA erred in holding that an ejectment case is not the proper
proceeding where contrasting claims of ownership by both parties exist. At the risk of
repetition, the only issue in forcible entry cases is the physical or material possession of real
property—prior physical possession and not title.

For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege and prove: (a) that they have prior
physical possession of the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and (c) that the action was filed within one year from
the time the owners or legal possessors learned of their deprivation of the physical possession
of the property.

Petitioner was able to satisfactorily prove by preponderance of evidence the existence of all the
elements of forcible entry. While respondents occupied the property before 2012, it was
without the knowledge of petitioner and respondents voluntarily left the premises after the
latter learned of petitioner's ownership. More importantly, petitioner was already in prior
peaceful occupation of the subject property when respondents forcibly entered it by using a
bolt cutter, evicted the tenants therein, changed the padlocks, and placed a rent signage in front
of the property.

Respondents, on the other hand, countered that their entitlement to possession over the subject
property is based on their ownership rights as evidenced by an Affidavit of Acceptance for the
Foreclosure of the Mortgage of Real Property executed by Pablo. The Court stresses that the
issue of ownership in ejectment cases is to be resolved only when it is intimately intertwined
with the issue of possession to such an extent that the question of who had prior possession
cannot be determined without ruling on the question of who the owner of the land is. Contrary
to the conclusions of the RTC, the Court deems it inappropriate for the ejectment court to
dwell on the issue of ownership considering that respondents' claim of ownership could not
establish prior possession at the time when the subject property was forcibly taken from
petitioner.

Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, a person in possession cannot be
ejected by force, violence or terror, not even by the owners. Respondents had no right to take
the law into their own hands and summarily or forcibly eject petitioner's tenants from the
subject property. Their employment of illegal means to eject petitioner by force in entering the
subject property by destroying the locks using bolt curt replacing the locks, and prohibiting the
tenants to enter therein made them liable for forcible entry since prior possession was
established by petitioner.

All told, the Court agrees with the MeTC's conclusion as affirmed by the RTC that petitioner is
better entitled to the material possession of the subject property and that she cannot be forcibly
evicted therefrom without proper recourse to the courts.