A2 Disads

ALLIED PROLIF

APPEASEMENT

2AC FRONTLINES

HEGEMONY

SECTION 3.1
 A2 Allied Prolif
1. Non-unique: Allied prolif now. NMD cut guarantees.
David 9 (Jack David, deputy assistant secretary of defense for combating weapons of
mass destruction from 2004-2006, 9/18/2009, WallStreet Journal, pg. np)
The "smarter" missile-defense system that President Obama announced yesterday won't replace that capability.
The mobile and sea-based system could help protect Berlin and Paris from short-range or medium-range missiles, but it won't
protect New York from an ICBM. The administration's plan is a blow to the security architecture that protects the American
homeland. The administration's move also signals U.S. friends and allies whose own security architectures
heretofore relied heavily on the existence of U.S. support that they should re-evaluate the continuing
validity of such reliance. They will be skeptical of longstanding U.S. assurances and Mr. Obama's
future promises and explanations. None will be more skeptical than the 30 countries that the U.S. has
encouraged to forego the development of nuclear weapons by promising protection under the U.S.
nuclear umbrella. If the U.S. walks away from its missile defense commitments so easily, the promises
that its nuclear deterrent affords are plainly diminished. Consider the unanimous finding of a recent bipartisan
congressional commission on the U.S. nuclear posture, led by former secretaries of Defense William Perry and James
Schlesinger. The commission warned of a coming "tipping point" in proliferation, when more nations might
decide to go nuclear if U.S. allies lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them .

2. No link-no Turkish prolif-we don’t withdraw TNWs, TNWs make Turkey feel secure
Bell 9 (Alexandra. Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security
Fellow. 8/25/9. http://www.good.is/post/turkey’s-nuclear-crossroads/.)
At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in
addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90
tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general,
following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the
end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed
the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain
neighbor got the bomb.

3. No link-no Turkish prolif-Turkey has NATO nuclear guarantee, plus Turkey won’t risk EU
accession through prolif
Posen ‘6 (Barry, Professor of Politcal Science at MIT, "A Nuclear Armed Iran: A Difficult but not
Impossible Policy Problem", Century Foundation Report, p. online)
Turkey also will be concerned, for security and prestige reasons, about a nuclear weapons capability in neighboring
Iran. Turkey’s economic, scientific, and engineering capabilities probably make it more capable of going nuclear than either
Egypt or Saudi Arabia. Turkey’s calculation will be affected by other political interests , however. Turkey is
a member of NATO, a nuclear alliance, and thus already enjoys a nuclear guarantee by the United
States. Dozens of tactical nuclear weapons are based in Turkey, and some of Turkey’s aircraft are wired
to deliver these weapons, which could be turned over to them under circumstances determined by the United States, and based
on long-standing procedures agreed within NATO. This relationship would be jeopardized were Turkey to embark
on its own independent nuclear weapons program. Turkey also aspires to membership in the E uropean
U nion. Though the Europeans have been only moderately encouraging, it seems likely that the EU would discourage
an independent Turkish nuclear effort. Conversely, it seems possible that the EU might become more
accommodating of Turkey’s effort to join the EU if that helped discourage a Turkish nuclear program .
4. No link-troop reductions inconsequential
Adams 5 (Karen Ruth, Associate Prof. IR – U. Montana, and PhD Pol Sci. – UC Berkeley, “New Great Powers: Who Will They
Be, and How Will They Rise?”, http://www.cas.umt.edu/polsci/faculty/adams/greatpower.pdf, p. 11)
Extended deterrence can be substantiated in many ways – through the deployment of expatriates such as
diplomats, advisors, or troops, for example, or through the cultivation of extensive political, economic, or cultural ties.
Determining how this is most efficiently and effectively done in the nuclear, information age will be the key to identifying
how second-tier states become great powers, as well as which ones are furthest along that path. 41 Despite the variety
of options, there is a tendency in the US to focus on troop deployments, especially large ones. This
is why policy makers see “command of the commons” as so vital. It is also why they discount the possibility
that the US will have “peer competitors” in the near future. Yet, occasionally, officials acknowledge the logic
of deterrence. For example, although during the Cold War, massive US deployments in the Korean DMZ
were thought necessary to deter North Korea from attacking the South, today (when those troops are
being redeployed to Iraq and within South Korea), Pentagon officials acknowledge that trip-wire forces of
5,000 are just as effective as deployments of 500,000.42

5. (for prolif impact) No impact to prolif-new nuclear states won’t be aggressive

Gartzke and Jo 9 (Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science – UC San Diego, and Dong Joon Jo, Professor of International
Relations – University of Seoul, South Korea, 2009, “Bargaining, Nuclear Proliferation, and Interstate Disputes” Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol 53 No 2)
Even if only some of the substantial increase in lethality from “going nuclear” can be converted into political leverage,
nuclear-capable nations are bound to increase their influence in international affairs. Greater influence
amounts to getting what states want without having to use force. To the degree that nuclear capabilities
lead to bargains that approximate the outcomes states expect from fighting, aggres- sion becomes less appealing,
and the anxieties of opponents are reduced. Diplomacy serves as a tool for smoothing the bumpy road of world politics. The
decision to proliferate is also endogenous to conflict. Nations are not assigned nuclear weapons at random but
select into nuclear status despite high costs, long delays in development, and international opprobrium.
Countries with significant security problems or responsibilities and substantial governmental resources are more prone to seek
nuclear weapons (Jo and Gartzke 2007). These same nations fight more often, not because they possess a nuclear arsenal but
because the causes of conflict also prompt states to proliferate. Nations with few enemies, modest resources,
limited technology, or little dissatisfaction about world affairs are unlikely to pursue nuclear
capabilities and also are less inclined to fight. Thus, nominal nuclear status probably overstates the
empirical effect of proliferation in propagating interstate disputes.

6. (for Turkish-US impact) Turkish-American relations down now, their impacts should have
already happened. Tavernise and Slackman 10 ( Sabrina and Michael, Turkey, Long a Pliable Ally for the
United States, Displays a New Assertiveness, Ney York Times, Late Edition, June 9, Lexisnexis)AC
For decades, Turkey was one of the United States' most pliable allies, a strategic border state on the edge of the
Middle East that reliably followed American policy. But recently, it has asserted a new approach in the region,
its words and methods as likely to provoke Washington as to advance its own interests. The change in Turkey's
policy burst into public view last week, after the deadly Israeli commando raid on a Turkish flotilla, which
nearly severed relations with Israel, Turkey's longtime ally. Just a month ago, Turkey infuriated the United
States when it announced that along with Brazil, it had struck a deal with Iran to ease a nuclear standoff, and on
Tuesday it warmly welcomed Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the Russian prime minister,
Vladimir V. Putin, at a regional security summit meeting in Istanbul. Turkey's shifting foreign policy is making
its prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a hero to the Arab world, and is openly challenging the way the
United States manages its two most pressing issues in the region, Iran's nuclear program and the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process. Turkey is seen increasingly in Washington as ''running around the region doing
things that are at cross-purposes to what the big powers in the region want,'' said Steven A. Cook, a scholar
with the Council on Foreign Relations. The question being asked, he said, is ''How do we keep the Turks in
their lane?'' From Turkey's perspective, however, it is simply finding its footing in its own backyard, a troubled
region that has been in turmoil for years, in part as a result of American policy making. Turkey has also been
frustrated in its longstanding desire to join the European Union. ''The Americans, no matter what they say,
cannot get used to a new world where regional powers want to have a say in regional and global politics,'' said
Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Bilgi University in Istanbul. ''This is our neighborhood, and
we don't want trouble. The Americans create havoc, and we are left holding the bag.''
 A2 Appeasement
1. Non-unique: US withdrawing now
AFP 6/28 [US public support for Afghan war hinges on Kandahar: senator, American Free Press, 6/28/10,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5irlGXlYNWZ2SLQuJA1XQaXzpd2_A]
Backing among American voters for the war effort "will depend on this fall in Kandahar," Senator
Carl Levin told defense reporters."I would say in September and October, when we expect an
acceleration of operations in Kandahar, will have a major effect on it (public support)," Levin said.
"Success is very important," said Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. US
military commanders say pivotal operations in and around Kandahar city, the Taliban's birthplace,
have been postponed to allow more time to secure political support among local leaders and
Afghans. Levin said President Barack Obama's fellow Democrats in Congress still back the US-
led fight against Taliban insurgents but there are "the beginnings of a fraying of that support."
Both Democratic lawmakers and the loyal "base" of the party were worried about the course of
the nearly nine-year-old war, he said. However, the Democrats retained confidence in Obama's
leadership and found reassurance in a July 2011 target for the start of US drawdown, he said.
"That (mid-2011) date was critically important towards maintaining the support of the American
people for a war which has gone on so long," the senator said. Levin renewed his criticism of
what he called a shortage of Afghan forces in the volatile south, where he said the country's army
and police should be deployed in greater numbers and playing a more prominent role."The
success of the mission is dependent upon the Afghan military growing in number and growing in
capability," he said. He said about 5,300 Afghan forces are on the ground in Kandahar and 6,900
foreign troops from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, with the Afghan
contingent due to expand to 8,500 by October -- compared to 11,850 coalition troops.

2. I/L Turn-withdrawal key to two-war capabilities

Kagan and O’Hanlon 7. (4.24.07. “The Case for Larger Ground Forces” American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar
at AEI. Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in foreign policy
studies at the Brookings Institution. http://www.aei.org/article/26017)
US defense planning since the end of the Cold War has been organized around the need to be
prepared to fight two overlapping wars. In 2001 the George W. Bush administration modified the
two-war concept somewhat, but kept much of the basic logic and the associated force structure
(which Kagan has argued was, from the beginning, always inadequate to support the strategy).1
In the aftermath of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, further changes are now needed in
America’s armed forces and their undergirding defense strategy. The deterrent logic of being able to do
more than one thing at a time is rock solid. If involved in one major conflict, and perhaps occupied in one or
more smaller ongoing operations around the world, the United States also needs additional capability to
deter other crises—as well as maintain its forward presence at bases around the world and on the
seas, carry out joint exercises with allies, and handle smaller problems. The current conflict in
Iraq highlights the limitations of our two-war force structure, since the US military is patently unable to
contemplate another “major theater war” at the present with anything other than horror. But our inability to
cope with such a scenario only increases the likelihood that one will emerge, as opportunistic enemies take advantage
of our perceived weakness and overcommitment. The scenarios considered below represent the types of
possible operations that defense planners will need to consider in the coming years. We treat the
need to be ready for war in Korea as a given, either in the less probable form of a North Korean
invasion of the South or in the more likely event of a North Korean collapse. Less likely, but hard
to rule out, is the possibility of an invasion of Iran—for example, if that country went to war against Israel as it also
neared completion of a nuclear weapon. We do not include some missions that seem relatively less plausible—a
hypothetical Russian threat to Europe; an American response to a possible Chinese threat against Siberia (even if Russia
joined NATO, technically obliging the United States to respond to such an aggression in some way); and a Chinese
overland threat to Korea, which seems extremely unlikely and is probably not a sound scenario for force planning
purposes. Even if one excludes these scenarios, however, many remain.
3.No impact-there is no perception of the plan compared to far more contentious policies in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Perception of US policy comes from Afg and Iraq, not Turkey.

4. No impact-offshore balancing solves international stability

Layne 9 (Christopher, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service,
Texas A & M University., “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for
offshore balancing has arrived”, Review of International Studies (2009), 35, 5–25)

Primacy’s neorealist critics have outlined an alternative grand strategy that increasingly resonates
with the American public: offshore balancing.3 Its proponents believe that offshore balancing can do a
better job than primacy of enhancing American security and matching US foreign policy objectives with the
resources available to support them. The driving factor behind offshore balancing is its
proponents’ recognition that the US has a ‘hegemony’ problem. America’s strategy of primacy increases
US vulnerability to a geopolitical backlash – whether in the guise of countervailing great power coalitions, or terrorist
attacks – and alienates public opinion in large swaths of the globe, including Europe and the Middle
East. Offshore balancing is based on the assumption that the most vital US interests are preventing the
emergence of a dominant power in Europe and East Asia – a ‘Eurasian hegemon’ – and forestalling the
emergence of a regional (‘oil’) hegemon in the Middle East. Only a Eurasian hegemon could pose an
existential threat to the US. A regional hegemon in the Middle East could imperil the flow of oil
upon which the US economy, and the economies of the advanced industrial states depend. As an
offshore balancer, the US would rely on the tried and true dynamics of the balance of power to thwart any states with
hegemonic ambitions. An offshore balancing strategy would permit the US to withdraw its ground forces from
Eurasia (including the Middle East) and assume an over-the-horizon military posture. If – and only if –
regional power balances look to be failing would the US re-insert its troops into Eurasia. Offshore
balancing contrasts sharply with primacy because primacists fear a world with independent,
multiple poles of power. Primacy is based on the belief that it is better for the US to defend its
allies and clients than to have them defend themselves. Offshore balancers, on the other hand,
believe for an insular great power like the US, the best strategy is to rely on a balance of power approach that
devolves to other states the costs and risks of their defense.
 A2 Hegemony

1. Non-Unique: Decline Inevitable

The current addiction to hegemony assures that America will never regain its world
power status
David P. Calleo, professor at Johns Hopkins University, 7/21/2010, Survival (American Decline
revisited, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a924622589~db=all~jumptype=rss)
Thus, while the financial crisis has certainly made Americans fear for their economic future, it
does not yet seem to have resulted in a more modest view of the country’s place in the world or
a more prudent approach to military spending. Instead, an addiction to hegemonic status
continues to blight the prospects for sound fiscal policy. Financing the inevitable deficits
inexorably turns the dollar into an imperial instrument that threatens the world with inflation. It
might perhaps be expected that Obama’s own unusual life experience would make him both
willing and able to lead the country to embrace a more plural world. His eloquent speeches often
suggest that he is ready to pronounce a more genuinely pluralist vision, one that permits the
United State to follow a less economically extravagant foreign and security policy. The
Pentagon’s recent National Security Strategy, for example, finds the president himself trying to
lay out a more balanced view. But despite rhetorical bursts of presidential wisdom, the president
has substantially increased America’s commitments in Afghanistan and a relentless worldwide
expansion of American military engagement continues apace. Seen from the Pentagon, the globe
is six military districts, each with its American commander and a massive pool of resources. In
short, the unipolar vision is poisoned legacy passed on all too firmly to new generation of
American leaders. Not only does it repeatedly entrap the nation in unworthy adventures, but it
makes America’s morbid decline much more probable than it ought to be.
2. A.
Russia prefers a multilateral world order. US efforts to maintain hegemony go
against this, which inherently makes us adversaries.
Bugajski 10(Janusz, holder of the Lavrentis Lavrentiadis Chair and director of the New
European Democracies program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s
Pragmatic Reimperialization” CRIA Vol. 4(1))AQB
Russia’s leaders believe that the world should be organized around a new global version
of the 19th century “Concert of Europe” in which the great powers balance their interests, and
smaller countries orbit around them as satellites and dependencies. From their point of view, in addition
to having enduring interests, Russia also has enduring adversaries, particularly NATO and the
U.S., in a competition to win over satellite states. For the Kremlin leadership there are only a
handful of truly independent nations which must act as “poles of power ” in a multipolar world
order. Unipolarism, where the U.S. dominates world politics, must be replaced in order to
establish checks and balances between the most important power centers. According to
President Medvedev, the “continuing crisis of Euro-Atlantic policy is brought about by the
“unipolar syndrome.”1 Russia’s regime does not favor working within multilateral institutions where its
sovereignty and decision-making may be constrained, aside from privileged clubs such as G8 or the UN Security
Council (UNSC).2 Hence, Moscow prefers multipolarity to multilateralism, where its power is
enhanced rather than its involvement in cumbersome bodies where its power is
diminished by the presence of several smaller countries . Russia is also more interested in regional
organizations than global bodies, especially where it can play a leading role within them or act as a counterweight to
Western leadership. Russia also favors participation in inter-institutional frameworks, in
which it can assume an equal position to that of the EU, the U.S., or NATO, such as within the
“Quartet” which deals with the Middle East peace process.
B.
US-Russia relations are key to solving WMD terrorism
Hart 7 (Gary, Wirth Chair professor at the University of Colorado, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/gary-hart/letter-to-
democrats-on-us_b_45075.html, AD: 7/3/10) jl
Second, we have a mutual interest in defeating terrorism. Those interests have caused the
Russians to conduct prolonged military actions in Chechnya and the United States to conduct equally
prolonged military occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. Clearly, there are differences in methodology, with the
Russians using much more brutal means, but the residents of Grosny and of Falluja may not see that much difference.
Though opposing our invasion of Iraq, the Russians fully endorsed our invasion of Afghanistan (where
they themselves had a rather unpleasant experience). If we are not fully exploiting Russian intelligence
networks in pursuit of this common interest, it is to our detriment. Third, there is the matter of oil. The
Russians have it and we need it. During the first Clinton term, I urged our government to negotiate long-term oil purchase
agreements with the Russians to help reduce our dependence on dangerously unstable Persian Gulf sources. It is not too late
to pursue that idea. The Russians need massive Western investment in oil production facilities and the United States and its
European allies need predictable oil supplies. High level diplomatic and commercial engagement with the Russians can
prevent destructive Russian tendencies to nationalize their oil production facilities. There is no reason that arrangements such
as we have had with the Saudis for decades cannot be replicated in Russia. But this will only occur in the context of stable,
friendly relations between our two nations. Fourth, we have high technology and the Russians need high technology,
particularly in the fields of telecommunications, health care, and industrial modernization. A decade of experience in
modernization of Russia's telecommunication system convinces me of two things: 21st century communications technology
is key to Russia's emerging economy, and Russian science, though inadequately equipped, has much to offer the West and
global markets. Russia represents a huge potential market for U.S. technology companies--its health care system is still
abysmal for most Russians--and U.S. companies require encouragement to explore those markets. Fifth, Russia is neighbor to
several Islamic states, former Soviet republics, and whether one subscribes to a Huntingtonian thesis of civilization clashes or
merely civilization frictions, Russia occupies an unrivaled strategic position on the margins of a cultural divide. Further, it
occupies a strategic position in Northeast Asia, particularly with regard to North Korea and China. Russia allied with the
West and sharing a common international agenda can only be in our interest. As the noted Russian expert Dimitri Simes has
repeatedly pointed out, its geo-strategic location places Russia in a unique position to exert influence on critical matters such
as Iran's nuclear ambitions. According to Professor Simes, "exactly like the United States, Russians wonder what will be the
immediate purpose of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program." The list above is merely illustrative of the common interests
the U.S. and Russia share. Several principles might be evoked to produce a constructive bi-lateral relationship. Our
relationship should be based upon mutual self-interest , not altruism. We do not develop a working
relationship as a favor to the Russians but as an advantage to ourselves. Russia is by history and culture a Western nation and
should be integrated into the West. The U.S. and Russia share security interests and concerns. We are a
market for Russia's natural resources and Russia is a market for our technology. An isolated ,
anti-democratic Russia increases our insecurity. Russia's development as a market democracy will
best be achieved by engagement not rejection. Except in recent years when American foreign policy assumed a
theological aura, we have consistently sought self-interested relations with nations with whom we did not always agree. The
late Jean Kirkpatrick is notable for having distinguished between authoritarian states, with whom we could collaborate
regardless of their undemocratic natures, and totalitarian states with whom we could have nothing to do. Even today, in the
era of a foreign policy based on good and evil, we maintain productive relations with highly authoritarian states (including
former Soviet republic) that are guilty of no more undemocratic behavior than Russia.
 3. Economic and Political ties are key to Turkey-U.S. relations, not U.S. troops.
Daloglu, 2009(Tulin, Chief Washington Correspondent of Habertürk, “Turkey and the United States”
Turkey Analyst, Vol. 2 no. 115 June,
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2009/090605B.html)

The point is that a broader effort exists to try to end the violence. Moreover, Obama’s reach out
to the Muslim world and his desire to withdraw troops from Iraq has shifted the focus of the
U.S-Turkey relationship into new areas, such as strengthening commercial and trade ties.
“Turkish exports to the U.S. are around $4 billion a year,” James Jeffrey, the U.S. Ambassador
to Ankara, said recently in Washington. “American exports to Turkey are a bit stronger, a little
more than $10 billion a year. The state of the Turkish economy – almost $800 billion, [with]
roughly $15 to $16 billion of two-way trade – is not impressive. We can do better.”  But, the
ambassador cautioned, businesses do not recognize friends or enemies – only profits. Only
an environment conducive to making profits can guarantee a stronger future business ties
between the two nations.  
CONCLUSIONS: There is no doubt that a new, positive attitude is coloring the relationship
between the United States and Turkey. Whether that continues, however, is more dependent on
political developments than on economic cooperation, even if the latter can make a difference as
well. The future of the region is however unpredictable. Turkey’s Muslim identity has forced it
to take sides in the past, and its new foreign policy, which makes it a more active player in the
neighborhood, could eventually push it to do so again. The sympathies of the ruling Justice and
Development Party, AKP, for Hamas and Hezbollah, as representatives of political Islam, may
eventually push Turkey in their direction. President Barack Obama’s call for such organizations
to lay down their arms may be put to the test soon. But the rhetoric of the relationship does
nevertheless hold the promise of a positive future – one that ideally will include not only a
strong political and military friendship, but an increased commercial and trade component as
well.

4. Incirlik Not Necessary for U.S. power projection

Turkish Daily News 2007 (Feb 23rd, Incirlik not vital for U.S. operation,
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-159735222/incirlik-not-vital-iraq.html)
The United States' use of Turkey's Incirlik airbase in the south greatly facilitates Iraq-related
military activities, but the base's role is not indispensable for American forces' operations in Iraq,
a top U.S. commander said
"I wouldn't say that we have to [use] Incirlik to conduct operations in Iraq," U.S. Air Force Chief
of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley told a briefing at the Foreign Press Center on Wednesday.
 5. Trying to maintain hegemony destroys the economy—controlled descent
from primacy is a preferable strategy.
Samuel A. Adamson, second-year MAIA candidate at the Johns Hopkins University SAIS Bologna
Center and undergraduate degree in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford, 10, Bolgona Journal
of International Affairs, “Supreme Effort: A Lesson in British Decline” cp
\The aim of this essay is to demonstrate the extent to which the initial failure by British
governments to recognize, accept and adapt to the country’s new position in the post-war world
had deep, painful and long-lasting effects on the domestic British political economy. Rather than
being a time of reflection and re-evaluation of the world order, the post-war consensus amongst
successive governments was that Britain’s victory was a validation of the old, rather than a
trigger for its removal. As such, sterling was expected to continue as the world’s reserve
currency and the preferred unit of exchange. From 1945 until the major devaluation of 1968, one
after the other, British governments oriented economic policy towards the maintenance of
sterling’s international prestige, through the manipulation of the domestic economy. Using
deflationary packages to curb demand and defend the pound against external pressure, the
government indirectly (but repeatedly) inflicted punishing restrictions on British industry
through a chronic underinvestment in capital. As Samuel Brittan has it, “The position of sterling
as an international currency, with all the risks to which it exposed Britain, was regarded as
desirable in itself, like a prisoner kissing the rod with which he is being beaten.”39 In a
desperate attempt to improve British competitiveness, British governments then began to
intervene in industrial relations, to the detriment of the Welfare Compromise that had presided
over a relatively stable period from 1945 –1960. Government-union cooperation worsened
throughout the 1960s under a Labour government and reached exploding point following the
election of Heath’s conservative government. The British economy plumbed new depths in the
1970s, with factories being reduced to a three- day working week and with the entire population
having to endure the infamous “Winter of Discontent.” Such harsh times brought about harsh
measures, to be administered by Margaret Thatcher. Her reshaping of the British political
economy marks the beginning of the current era for Britain, for better or worse. With increased
focus, she drew onto the City’s financial services; however, at the moment it is difficult to see
past the latter. Britain, still today, feels the pain of bone-breaking readjustment to the post-war
world.
It should also be emphasized that the thesis put forward here is only one example of the way in
which the British government failed to adapt properly to the nation’s declining position in the
post-war world. This paper could easily have taken as its topic of investigation the exuberant
defense spending exhibited by an unbroken succession of British governments, characterized by
the costly maintenance of an independent nuclear deterrent in obeisance to the “Top Table”
argument or, as Churchill had it, “our badge to the Royal Enclosure.”40
The wider lessons to be drawn from the British experience are complex and difficult to identify
clearly, as each declining hegemon (of which there have been —and will be— many) faces a
potentially different set of international and domestic conditions. However, there is a clear and
universal warning to be taken from the illustration presented here — a world power that may be
in decline needs, more than ever, to maintain a high level of vigilance and flexibility in its
attitudes to its international position. Being prepossessed of pretensions of past glories serves for
nothing; rather it inhibits a nation in its readjustment. Therefore, the attitudes put forward by E.
Garten in his essay regarding American decline (as outlined at the beginning of this paper)
should be regarded as, at best, unhelpful, and at worst severely damaging to the future of the
United States. For reasons that will not be argued here, however, I find myself in complete
agreement with Garten regarding the undesirable nature of American decline, particularly in
light of the candidates currently waiting in the wings to take the crown. Indeed, it is for that
reason that this paper argues that it is wrong to assess the methods of “how to remedy signs of
decline” (as Garten does), but rather suggests that it is instead critical to accept the inevitability
of its occurrence, allowing for a more controlled descent, thereby minimizing domestic damage
and allowing declining powers to still exert a good deal of influence on the international stage —
at least due in part to their masterfully orchestrated readjustment to their dethronement.
 6. Hegemony causes war – imperial aspirations produce geopolitical
backlash
Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas
A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute,
03 –
(The American Conservative "The Cost of Empire" October 3rd,
http://www.amconmag.com/article/2003/oct/06/00007/)

Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U.S. will not suffer the
same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Don’t bet on it. The very fact of America’s
overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a
short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. Indeed, on
its present course, the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation.”
Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them, they are
tempted to use it repeatedly, and thereby overreach themselves. Over time, this hegemonic
muscle-flexing has a price. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines, possibly
in a failed Pakistan, and elsewhere), regional powers (Iran, North Korea), and rising great
powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U.S. suffers setbacks
in future conflicts, for example in a war with China over Taiwan.