Tofino Security

White Paper
Version 1.2
Published May 2014

Using ISA/IEC 62443 Standards to Improve Control

System Security

Contents
1.  Executive Summary....................................................................................................... 1 
2.  What’s New in this Version ........................................................................................... 1 
3.  Why the “Push for Productivity” has degraded Control Network Security...................... 1 
4.  The ISA/IEC 62443 Zone and Conduit Security Model ................................................... 3 
5.  Defining the Security Zones .......................................................................................... 5 
6.  Defining the Security Conduits ......................................................................................6 
7.  Securing the Conduits ................................................................................................... 7 
8.  A Real-World Oil Refinery Example .............................................................................. 7 
9.  Implementing Zones and Conduits with Industrial Security Appliances ..................... 10 
10.Testing and Managing the Security Solution ................................................................11 
11. Summary .....................................................................................................................11 
12. Resources..................................................................................................................... 11 

Author
Eric Byres, P. Eng., ISA Fellow
Chief Technology Officer
Tofino Security, a Belden Brand
Belden Inc.

[email protected]
www.tofinosecurity.com
www.tofinosecurity.com/blog
Tofino Security White Paper Using the ISA/IEC 62443 Zone & Conduit Strategy

1. Executive Summary
Anyone integrating automation technologies these days is well aware of the pressure on the
operators of industrial plants to increase productivity, reduce costs and share information in real
time across multiple industrial and enterprise systems. Adding to these business pressures is the
growing fear of cyber attack as the world has become aware that the Stuxnet worm was specifically
designed to disrupt an industrial process. Operators and engineers are under pressure to isolate
automation systems at the same time as management is asking for greater interconnectedness.
How can you help your company or clients deal with the conflicting requirements of more
integration and more isolation? This white paper explains how the “zone and conduit” model
included in the ISA/IEC 62443 (formerly known as ANSI/ISA-99) security standards provides a
framework for helping deal with network security threats that arise from both the “push for
productivity” and the fear of the next “Son-of-Stuxnet” worm.

2. What’s New in this Version

In 2010, the standards were renumbered to be the ANSI/ISA-62443 series. This change was
intended to align the ISA and ANSI document numbering with the corresponding International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards. This revision reflects those changes.

3. Why the “Push for Productivity” has degraded Control Network Security
As corporate networks have converged with Industrial Control System (ICS) networks, there have
been many integration projects where proprietary networks were replaced with commercial-off-the-
shelf equipment using Ethernet-TCP/IP technology.
This shift in technology has greatly increased the complexity and “interconnectedness” of control
systems. As a result, they now have many of the same vulnerabilities that have plagued enterprise
networks. In addition, the controllers in these networks are now subjected to new threat sources
that they were never designed to handle.
The result has been a significant increase in the number of plant disruptions and shut-downs due to
cyber security issues in the control networks.
The Repository for Industrial Security Incidents (RISI1) is the world’s largest database of security
incidents in control and SCADA systems. An analysis of the data from 1982 to 2010 found that the
type of incidents affecting control systems breaks down as follows:
 50% of incidents were accidental in nature
 30% of incidents were due to malware
 11% of incidents were due to external attackers
 9% of incidents were due to internal attackers
In our study of the incidents included in the RISI database, we see problems arising from three
common sources:
i. Proliferation of “Soft” Targets
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and ICS devices such as PLCs, DCS controllers,
IEDs, and RTUs were designed with a focus on reliability and real-time I/O, not robust and secure
networking. Many ICS devices will crash if they receive malformed network traffic or even high
loads of correctly-formed data. Also, Windows PCs in these networks often run for months at a
time without security patches or antivirus updates, and are even susceptible to outdated malware.

1www.securityincidents.org

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ii. Multiple Points of Entry

Even without a direct connection to the Internet, modern control systems are accessed by
numerous external sources. All of them a potential source of infection or attack. These include:
 remote maintenance and diagnostics connections
 historian and Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES) servers shared with business users
 remote access modems
 serial connections
 wireless systems
 mobile laptops
 USB devices
 data files (such as PDF documents or PLC project files)

Figure 1: Possible Pathways into the Control System

These pathways are underestimated and poorly documented by the owners and operators of
industrial systems. In testimony by Mr. Sean McGurk, the Director of National Cybersecurity and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) at the Department of Homeland Security noted:
"In our experience in conducting hundreds of vulnerability assessments in the private sector,
in no case have we ever found the operations network, the SCADA system or energy
management system separated from the enterprise network. On average, we see 11 direct
connections between those networks. In some extreme cases, we have identified up to 250
connections between the actual producing network and the enterprise network.”2
As the Stuxnet worm showed us in 2010, these pathways can be readily exploited by malware and
other disruptive elements. Stuxnet used at least eight different propagation mechanisms, including
USB drives, PLC project files and print servers to work its way into the victim’s control system.

2The Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations May 25, 2011
hearing. 58:30 -- 59:00

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iii. Poor Internal Network Segmentation

Control networks are now more complex than ever before, consisting of hundreds or even
thousands of individual devices. Unfortunately the design of many of these networks has remained
“flat” with virtually no segmentation. As a result, problems that originate in one part of the network
can quickly spread to other areas.

4. The ISA/IEC 62443 Zone and Conduit Security Model

Given the above concerns, what can the control or SCADA engineer do to secure his or her system?
With the competitive pressure that most companies face to improve productivity and access to the
data in their plants, it is unlikely that engineers will be able to significantly reduce the number of
internal and external pathways into their facilities. Furthermore, the use of modern IT technologies
now requires a steady stream of electronic data onto the plant floor as well. These often take the
form of upgrades, patches, process recipes and remote support connections, all of which pose a
security risk.
There is also limited opportunity for plant engineers to address the proliferation of soft targets in
the short term. Aggressive patching strategies do help reduce the risk of exposed operating system
vulnerabilities, but most plant operators are dependent on their ICS/SCADA equipment vendors to
secure the actual controllers and ICS software products. Unfortunately, this has met with limited
success. As of December 2011, the US ICS-CERT had published 137 advisories on control system
products3 with known security vulnerabilities. Less than 50% of these had patches available at the
close of the year.
The good news is that engineers can address the third cause by implementing good network
architectures in their control systems. This white paper explains how to do this using the strategies
outlined in the ISA/IEC 62443 Standards: Security for Industrial Automation and Control
Systems.
ISA/IEC 62443 is a complete security life-cycle program for industrial automation and control
systems. It consists of 11 standards and technical reports on the subject, a number of which have
been publicly released as American National Standards Institute (ANSI) documents. Work products
from the ISA99 committee are also submitted to International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
as standards and specifications in the IEC 62443 series.
ISA/IEC 62443 introduces the concepts of “zones” and “conduits” as a way to segment and
isolate the various sub-systems in a control system. A zone is defined as a grouping of logical or
physical assets that share common security requirements based on factors such as criticality and
consequence. Equipment in a zone has a security level capability. If that capability level is not equal
to or higher than the requirement level, then extra security measures, such as implementing
additional technology or policies, must be taken.

3 https://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/ics-cert/archive.html

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Figure 2: Security Zone Definition

Any communications between zones must be via a defined conduit. Conduits control access to
zones, resist Denial of Service (DoS) attacks or the transfer of malware, shield other network
systems and protect the integrity and confidentiality of network traffic. Typically, the controls on a
conduit are intended to mitigate the difference between a zone’s security level capability and its
security requirements. Focusing on conduit mitigations is typically far more cost effective than
having to upgrade every device or computer in a zone to meet a requirement.

Figure 3: Conduit Definition

It is important to understand that ISA/IEC 62443 standards do not specify exactly how a company
should define its zones or conduits. Instead, the standard provides requirements based on a
company’s assessment of its risk from cyber attack. Since risk is a function of not only the
possibility of a cyber incident, but also the consequences of such an incident, the zones and
conduits and the protection needed for each will vary for each facility. Figure 4 lists some of the
sub-sections in the document ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1 (99.02.01)-2009 that address network
segmentation using zones and conduits.

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Sub-section Number and Requirement

Description

4.3.2.3.1: Develop the A network segmentation countermeasure strategy employing

network segmentation security zones shall be developed for IACS devices based upon
architecture the risk level of the IACS.

4.3.2.3.2: Employ isolation or Any high-risk IACS zone shall be either isolated from or employ a
segmentation on high-risk barrier device to separate it from other zones with different
IACS security policies, levels or risks. The barrier device shall be
selected commensurate to the risk reduction required

4.3.2.3.3: Block non-essential Barrier devices shall block all non-essential communications in
communications with barrier and out of the security zone containing critical control equipment.
devices

Figure 4: Key Zone and Conduit Requirements from ISA/IEC 62443-2-1

5. Defining the Security Zones

Zone and conduit design starts with the facility or operation being analyzed to identify groups of
devices that have common functionality and common security requirements. These groups are the
zones that require protection.
For example, a facility might first be divided into operational areas, such as materials storage,
processing, finishing, etc. Then within these areas it could be further divided into functional layers,
such as Manufacturing Execution Systems (MES), Supervisory Systems (i.e. operator HMIs),
primary control systems (e.g. DCS Controllers, RTUs and PLCs) and safety systems. Often models
from other standards such as ANSI/ISA-95.00.01-2000 or the Purdue manufacturing model are
used as a basis for this division. Vendor design documents can also be helpful.
Each zone can then be defined by a number of zone characteristics (attributes). The following are
some recommended characteristics:
1) Zone Description
i) Zone Name
ii) Definition
iii) Zone Function
2) Zone Boundaries
3) Typical Assets (or if possible, Asset Inventory)
4) Inheritance from Other Zones
5) Zone Risk Assessment
i) Security Capabilities of Zone Assets
ii) Threats and Vulnerabilities
iii) Consequences of a Security Breach
iv) Business Criticality
6) Security Objectives
7) Security Strategy
8) Acceptable Use Policy
9) Inter-zone connections (i.e. Access Requirements)
10)Change Management Process

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Examples are provided later in this white paper to help clarify these attributes.
Notice that each zone is defined with not only its boundaries, assets and risk analysis, but also its
security capabilities. In other words, the security capabilities of a zone full of Windows 2008
servers is very different than of a zone of Windows NT servers or a zone with PLCs. This security
capability, along with the security risk faced by the zone, drives the security function requirements
for conduits that connect the zone to other zones. The soon to be published ISA-62443.03.03
(99.03.03): Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems: System Security
Requirements and Security Assurance Levels helps the user define these security capabilities and
requirements.
Zones can also be defined according to a control asset’s inherent security capabilities. For example,
older PLCs that have very weak password controls (i.e. authentication) could be grouped into a zone
that provides them with additional defenses.

6. Defining the Security Conduits

The next step is to discover the pathways in the system through which data is passed between these
zones; these are the network “conduits”. Each conduit should be defined in terms of the zones it
connects, the technologies it utilizes, the protocols it transports and any security features it needs to
offer its connected zones.
Typically, determining the information transfer requirements between zones over the network is
straight forward. Tools like traffic flow analyzers or even simple protocol analyzers can show which
systems are exchanging data and the services they are using.
It is also wise to look beyond the network, to determine the hidden traffic flows. For example, are
files ever moved via USB drive between the lab and the primary control systems? Do people
remotely connect to the RTUs using a dialup modem? These flows are easy to miss, but can result in
serious security issues if not managed carefully.
Data flow diagrams are an excellent tool to summarize the conduits and the traffic flows they
contain. Each zone can be represented by a node and each flow can be represented by a vector.

Figure 5: Example Data Flow Diagram

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7. Securing the Conduits

Once the conduits and their security requirements are defined, the final phase is to implement the
appropriate security technologies. There are two popular options for this stage:
• Firewalls: These devices control and monitor traffic to and from a zone. They compare
the traffic passing through to a predefined security policy, discarding messages that do
not meet the policy’s requirements. Typically they will be configured to pass only the
minimum traffic that is required for correct system operation, blocking all other
unnecessary traffic. They can also filter out high risk traffic, such as programming
commands or malformed messages that might be used by hackers to exploit a security
hole in a product. Industrial firewalls are designed to be very engineer-friendly and are
capable of detailed inspection of SCADA protocols such as DNP-3, Ethernet/IP and
Modbus/TCP.
• VPNs (Virtual Private Networks): These are networks that are layered onto a more
general network using encryption technology to ensure “private” transmission of data and
commands. VPN sessions tunnel across a transport network in an encapsulated format,
making them “invisible” to devices that don’t have the have access to the VPN members’
secret “keys” or “certificates”.
The whole zone and conduit approach implements a strategy of “defence in depth” – multiple layers
of defence distributed throughout the control network – which has been proven in the IT
community to be a strategy that works well.

8. A Real-World Oil Refinery Example

An example from the oil industry site shows how the
ISA/IEC 62443 zones and conduits design techniques
were used by a large refinery to create a security
architecture and protect its operations.
This company owns a large industrial refinery process
facility. Inside the facility there are multiple operations
such as Distillation, Hydrotreating, Catalytic Reformers
and Utilities.
The company also follows the concepts of ANSI/ISA-
95.00.01-2000 and ANSI/ISA-62443-1-1 (99.01.01)-
2007, dividing its process operations into Levels 0
through 4. Because of the nature of its operations, many
(but not all) of its operations require safety integrated
systems (SIS). It also has several control areas that are
beginning to use wireless technology. Finally, suppliers
(such as control system vendors) and downstream
customers (for custody transfer) must interface with its
control systems.
A high-level network diagram of the refinery is shown in
Figure 6. For simplicity, only two refinery operations
areas (Op #1 and Op #2) are shown in this diagram, but
in real life, there were multiple operations. Each
operation has its own basic control, safety and
HMI/supervisory systems.
Figure 6: Core Refinery Operations These systems connect to a common Process
Information Network, where Historian and MES servers
are accessible from both the Enterprise and control
networks. In addition, wireless sensors are being

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Figure 7: Refinery Zone Diagram

deployed throughout Op #2, and a Remote Access gateway is provided to permit remote
maintenance on plant systems by the control system engineers.
The company then began to divide its systems into zones based on operational function, process
level, security requirements and security capabilities as shown in Figure 7. All control functions
belong to an overall Process Control Zone (A) and within that there are Operational Zones (O1, O2…
On) for each major operational unit. This way security requirements for a particular operation
could be adjusted for its potential for risk (e.g. security for a low consequence unit like waste water
could be relaxed, as compared to a hydrocracker unit). Finally, the Operational Zones could be
divided into subzones based on the ISA-95 level they operate at.
Once the zones were defined, they needed to be described with the zone attributes as noted earlier.
Figure 8 shows an example zone definition for one of the safety area zones. It is worth mentioning
that the zone definition procedure is an iterative process. It is likely that zone boundaries need to be
redefined and new zones created as the description stage is conducted.

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ZONE S1
Zone Name: Unit 1 Hydrocracker Safety System
Definition of this Zone: This zone includes all safety integrity systems for the Unit 1 Hydrocracker.
Controlling Agency: Process Automation Department, SIS Team.
Zone Function: The systems in this zone provide safety functions to the Unit 1 Hydrocracker.
Zone Boundaries: The Safety Integrated System as defined by the Unit 1 Hydrocracker HAZOP.
Typical Assets: The Safety Integrated System controller, engineering station and communications hardware
Inheritance: This zone inherits attributes from Zone C1 (Unit 1 Hydrocracker Basic Control System)
Zone Risk Assessment: This is a low to moderately secure zone with extreme consequences if breached.
a) Security Capabilities of Zone Assets: All assets are assumed to be incapable of withstanding low
level attacks (i.e. those launched by unsophisticated attackers or malware) on their availability or
confidentiality. This is a result of the protocols in use and system design. Assets are assumed to be
capable of withstanding medium level attacks (i.e. those launched by moderately sophisticated
attackers or malware) on their integrity.
b) Threats and Vulnerabilities: The vulnerabilities of this zone are assumed to be typical of legacy
industrial control devices using MODBUS for communications. The principal threats are:
a. Network-based Denial of Service to SIS communications.
b. Internal or External unauthorized access to the SIS engineering station.
c. Spoofing of MODBUS/TCP control commands.
d. Spoofing of MODBUS/TCP responses to the process system.
e. Reprogramming of safety functions.
c) Consequences of a Security Breach:
a. Loss of production >6 hrs from false trip of emergency shutdown system.
b. Loss of production <6 hrs due to loss of visibility to safety system.
c. Disabling/manipulation of emergency shutdown resulting in fatality or major community
incident.
d) Business Criticality: Extreme
Security Objective: To protect the integrity and availability of the Unit 1 Hydrocracker Safety System.
Acceptable Use Policy: I/O and Fieldbus communications is allowed to Zone P1 (Unit 1 Hydrocracker Process).
Read access to published data is allowed to approved systems in the Zone C1 (Unit 1 Hydrocracker Basic Control
System). All Write access to this zone is forbidden. All system management and programming functions shall be
internal to this zone.
Inter-zone Connections: Conduits to this zone may be established from Zone C1 (Unit 1 Hydrocracker Basic
Control System) and from Zone P1 (Unit 1 Hydrocracker Process).
Security Strategy: All connections to this zone must be controlled using type S conduits. Access to these
systems must be approved by the Controlling Agency.
Change Management Process: All changes to this zone or any of its connecting conduits must follow the
approved change management process of its corresponding Controlling Agency (see above). This includes, but
is not limited to, the installation or replacement of equipment, modification of security policy, and exceptions to
security policy or existing practices.

Figure 8: Example Zone Definition Document for the Safety Zone

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This facility was no exception. Following the

initial analysis, the potential threat sources and
consequences of an attack were identified and
reviewed with the plant engineers. Through this
analysis, it was evident that the safety integrated
system (SIS) in each operational unit should be
located in its own zone (initially they were part
of the basic control zone). To ensure continued
safe plant operation, it was vital that the safety
system could not be compromised from the plant
control network. Later in the process, these were
the first zones to be protected with security
appliances on the conduits.

With the zones defined, the next stage was the

conduit definitions. For all connections between
two zones, a “conduit” was defined. This is a
record of approved connections and data flows
(called channels in ISA/IEC 62443) between
zones. Figure 9 shows a simplified diagram of
the network conduits. Non-network conduits
should also be documented, such as information
transfers by USB drives between zones, or the
use of dial up modems.
Figure 9: Defined Conduits in Refinery

9. Implementing Zones and Conduits with Industrial Security Appliances

The final stage of the zone and conduit security
process is to select technologies to secure the
conduits and zones. Some industrial security
appliances are engineered specifically to support
this “defence in depth” strategy in control
networks. These are the ideal platform on which
to base an ISA/IEC 62443 zones and conduits
deployment.
On start-up, any industrial security appliance
should be “plug and protect” ready. That is, as
shipped from the factory, it transparently bridges
all traffic between its Ethernet ports, so it can be
installed in the control network without any
changes to the design or IP addressing of the
network. Some industrial security appliances can
be fine-tuned for a particular purpose by
installing firmware modules that implement
security features, such as firewall, asset
management, VPN and content inspection of
particular protocols such as Modbus or OPC.
In an ISA/IEC 62443 zones and conduits
deployment, industrial security appliances can be
installed in each conduit identified in the
network. Once this is done, a firewall module can
be activated in each appliance to provide the Figure 10: Securing the Conduits and
capability to filter all traffic passing through that Zones with Firewalls and VPNs
conduit. The firewall makes it simple to build

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intrinsically secure networks because it automatically blocks and reports any traffic for which there
is no “allow” rule. The control system engineer need only configure firewall rules that specify which
devices in the network will be allowed to communicate through the conduit and what protocols they
may use, and the industrial security appliance will block any other traffic not matching these rules.

10. Testing and Managing the Security Solution

The next stage in the process is to test the architecture and implementation. This includes not only
making sure the deployment blocks attack, but also ensuring that the operation of the industrial
process is not negatively affected by the security deployment.
Ideally, the industrial firewall’s configuration tools should be designed specifically to match the
needs of the control engineer responsible for configuration and testing. Good security tools make it
very easy not only to configure firewall rules, but also to test them before they are actually
implemented. This is essential for safe deployment of a firewall or VPN in control networks – it is
not acceptable to accidently block “good” network traffic that is required for correct plant operation.
One solution is a “Test” mode that transparently bridges all traffic through the firewall, but reports
any traffic that would have been blocked if the firewall rules had been active. This permits the
control engineer to interactively edit and test the rules in the network using real network traffic, but
with no risk of accidently shutting down the plant. When no more “blocked traffic” alarms are
generated by the device, the engineer can have a high level of confidence that the firewall rules are
correct and complete. It is then safe to switch the security appliance to “Operational” mode where
the firewall rules will be enforced.
The final stage is to manage the system on an ongoing basis. Typical control networks will have
multiple conduits distributed over many locations in a plant. Ideally, the multiple industrial
security appliances should be managed from a single management console application. We will
discuss this in more detail in future white papers.

11. Summary
New network and PC-based technologies introduced into control systems have provided
tremendous improvements in plant performance and productivity. In 2010 the Stuxnet worm
showed us that sophisticated malware targeted at industrial processes exist and are likely to be
more common in the future. The impact of these two trends will be to increase the urgency and
thus project priorities for cyber security initiatives that improve control network security and
reliability.
The ISA/IEC 62443 Standards provide a framework for companies to achieve and maintain security
improvements through a life cycle that integrates design, implementation, monitoring and
continuous improvement. System integrators and control engineers who become proficient with
segmenting control networks for zones and conduits, and who gain expertise with appropriate
industrial security solutions, will be able to mitigate cyber security threats that arise from both the
“push for productivity” and “Son-of-Stuxnet” malware.

12. Resources
White Paper on the penetration of control systems by Stuxnet:
http://www.tofinosecurity.com/how-stuxnet-spreads
ANSI/ISA-62443-1-1 (99.01.01)-2007 Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems Part
1: Terminology, Concepts, and Models: https://www.isa.org/store/products/product-
detail/?productId=116720
ANSI/ISA-62443-2-1 (99.02.01)-2009 Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems:
Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security Program:
https://www.isa.org/store/products/product-detail/?productId=116731

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