A.M. No.

P-07-2327 July 12, 2007

[Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 04-1934-P]

NENA GIMENA SOLWAY, Complainant,

vs.
ARIEL R. PASCASIO, Sheriff III, MTCC, Branch 5, Olongapo City, MICHAEL P. UCLARAY, Sheriff III, MTCC-
OCC-Olongapo City and BENJAMIN M. TULIO, Sheriff III, MTCC-OCC-Olongapo City, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

This administrative matter pertains to a complaint1 dated 5 April 2004 filed by Nena Gimena Solway
(complainant) against Ariel R. Pascasio (Pascasio), Michael P. Uclaray (Uclaray) and Benjamin M. Tulio
(Tulio), charging them with Abuse of Authority and Harassment before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA). Pascasio holds the position of Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Branch
5, Olongapo City, while Uclaray and Tulio are both employed as Sheriff III of MTCC-OCC.

The complaint, couched in Tagalog, recites the antecedents, thus:

Ely Palenzuela (Palenzuela) is the owner of a building in Baloy Beach, Bo. Barretto, Olongapo City. She
leased it to complainant, who opened at the premises an establishment called Mynes Inn and Restaurant.
Complainant paid a monthly rental of ₱13,200.00. Prior to the expiration of the lease contract on 1 August
2003, the parties agreed on its renewal for five (5) years with a ten percent (10%) increase in rentals or
₱15,000.00 monthly, but no formal contract was executed because Palenzuela had left for Hawaii. Upon
Palenzuela’s return, she increased the monthly rental to ₱25,000.00 and shortened the period of lease to
one year. The parties failed to reach an agreement. Hence, the matter was referred to the Office of the
Lupong Tagapamayapa (Lupon) of Barangay Barretto.

Before the Lupon, the parties signed an Amicable Settlement2 dated 28 January 2004, wherein it was
agreed that the monthly rental is ₱20,000.00; that complainant will pay ₱240,000.00 as rental for one year
after the finalization of the contract, and; that the contract will be renewed yearly.

On 9 February 2004, Palenzuela went to complainant’s restaurant. She produced a copy of a Notice of
Execution3 signed by Barangay Chairman Carlito A. Baloy, who turned out to be Palenzuela’s brother, and
forced complainant to sign the same. Complainant refused to do so. The following day, Pascasio and
Uclaray, with the same copy of the Notice of Execution in tow, also forced and threatened complainant to
sign. Out of fear, complainant relented and signed the Notice of Execution.

In the morning of 20 February 2004, Pascasio and Uclaray, accompanied by Isagani Saludo and Tulio,
returned to complainant’s restaurant. They introduced themselves as sheriffs and ordered complainant to
take all her properties out of the restaurant. The latter refused, insisting that there was no court order
authorizing the execution and that an agreement for the renewal of the lease contract had already been
reached.4 At around 3:00 p.m. on the same day, the barangay chairman ordered respondents to take
complainant’s stuff out of the restaurant and into the street. Respondents complied. Thereafter,
respondents padlocked all the rooms and ordered all customers to get out of the establishment.5
In her complaint, complainant questioned the presence of respondents in the premises, considering that
there was no court order to eject her.6

On 25 May 2004, the Court Administrator endorsed the complaint to respondents for their comment.7

In their Joint Comment/explanation,8 respondents admitted their presence in complainant’s

establishment. According to them, they were there to provide assistance in securing compliance with the
Amicable Settlement. Professing innocence of any act of harassment or abuse of authority, they further
claimed that they were instructed by Clerk of Court and City Sheriff Alexander Rimando to observe the
implementation of the arbitration award. They were thus mere witnesses to complainant’s refusal to
comply with the settlement process which was under the control and supervision of the barangay
chairman. Respondents accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the complaint.

On 13 December 2004, the OCA submitted a Report9 finding that respondents exceeded their functions
when they participated in the execution of the Amicable Settlement. Nevertheless, the OCA observed that
there was no showing that respondents profited from their participation in the exercise and on that basis
recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.10

In the Resolution11 dated 7 February 2005, the parties were required to manifest within ten (10) days from
notice, if they are willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. On 10 March 2005,
complainant made a manifestation to that effect12 while respondents submitted a similar manifestation
on 9 February 2007.13

Respondents are liable.

The Amicable Settlement reached by the parties before the Barangay Lupon is susceptible to legal
enforcement. However, the Local Government Code mandates that it is the Lupon itself which is tasked to
enforce by execution the amicable settlement or arbitration award within six (6) months from the date of
settlement. Upon the lapse of such time, the settlement may only be enforced by filing an action before
the appropriate court. Section 417 of the Local Government Code reads:

SEC. 417. Execution.–The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the
[L]upon within six (6) months from the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement
may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal court.

Clearly, the implementation of the Notice of Execution was then outside the legitimate concern of the
MTCC, of any of its officers or of any other judicial officer. The barangay chairman’s letter to the MTCC
seeking assistance in the enforcement of the Amicable Settlement is not by any measure the court action
contemplated by law as it does not confer jurisdiction on the MTCC over the instant dispute. Such could be
accomplished only through the initiation of the appropriate adversarial proceedings in court in accordance
with Section 417 of the Local Government Code. The OCA correctly stated that there is no justiciable case
filed before the MTCC that could have prompted respondents to act accordingly.

Mere presence of a sheriff in a place of execution where the court has no business is frowned upon. Such
act elicits the appearance of impropriety.14 Participation or intervention in the process is a more grievous
act which exacts a more stringent sanction. And whether it is unexplained presence or active participation,
the act gives rise to the impression that the execution of the Amicable Settlement is upon lawful order of
the court.

The situation at bar did not involve any court order. The execution was undertaken only under the
authority of the barangay chairman, not even that of the Lupon. Even if it was done under the auspices of
the Lupon, the presence of respondents would still not be warranted. Both the barangay chairman and the
Lupon are components of the local government unit which, in turn, is subsumed under the executive
branch of government. As the intended execution of the settlement in this instance was inherently
executive in nature and, therefore, extrajudicial, it necessarily follows that judicial officers cannot
participate in the exercise. The misdeeds of respondents unnecessarily put the integrity of the court to
which they are assigned and the dignity of the institution that is the judiciary on the line.

The fact of willful participation is penalized especially when the acts of the judicial officer concerned are
not within his or her legal authority. Complainant alleged that respondents actually participated in the
execution of the Amicable Settlement and the OCA observed that these allegations were not sufficiently
refuted by respondents.15 More tellingly, the defense of respondents that they were acting under the
order of the Clerk of Court is belied by the directive16 issued by the latter directing respondents to explain
their presence at the site of the implementation of the Notice of Execution.

Furthermore, the functions of sheriffs, such as respondents, are enumerated under the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court, as follows:

2.2.4.1 serves and/or executes writs and processes addressed and/or assigned to him by the Court and
prepares and submits returns of his proceedings;

2.2.4.2 keeps custody of attached properties or goods;

2.2.4.3 maintains his own record books on writs of execution, writs of attachment, writs of replevin, writs
of injunction, and all other processes executed by him; and

2.2.4.4 performs such other duties as may be assigned by the Executive Judge, Presiding Judge and/or
Branch Clerk of Court.

Nothing in this Rule justifies their participation in the implementation of the Notice of Execution. Clearly,
respondents were not acting within their authority. This further lends credence to complainant’s claim that
their presence was only meant to instill fear on her to make her sign the Notice of Execution.

Respondents have exceeded their mandated duties when they interfered with functions that should have
been exercised only by barangay officials. Their actions run counter to the Code of Conduct of Court
Personnel which provides that court personnel shall expeditiously enforce rules and implement orders of
the court within the limits of their authority. As we have so reiterated in a previous ruling, a court
employee is expected to do no more than what duty demands and no less than what privilege permits.
Though he may be of great help to specific individuals, but when that help frustrates and betrays the
public’s trust in the system, it cannot and should not remain unchecked.17

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice since they are called upon to serve court
writs, execute all processes, and carry into effect the orders of the court with due care and utmost
diligence. As officers of the court, sheriffs are duty-bound to use reasonable skill and diligence in the
performance of their duties, and conduct themselves with propriety and decorum and act above
suspicion.18

In the instant case, respondents failed to uphold the standard of integrity and prudence ought to be
exercised by officers of the court. Based on the foregoing, we are constrained to reverse the
recommendation of the OCA in dismissing the complaint.1avvphi1

We find that respondents’ unjustified presence in the implementation of the Amicable Settlement despite
the absence of an order from the court in tandem with its lack of jurisdiction over the matter constitutes
misconduct. Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct on the part of the person concerned in the
administration of justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It
generally means wrongful, improper, unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.19 Respondents’ impropriety subjected the image of the court to public suspicion and
distrust. Thus, they are guilty of simple misconduct.20

Under the Civil Service Rules,21 simple misconduct is punishable by suspension of one (1) month and one
(1) day to six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondents Ariel R. Pascasio, Sheriff III, Branch 5, MTCC, Olongapo City, Michael P. Uclaray,
Sheriff III, MTCC-OCC, and Benjamin M. Tulio, Sheriff III, MTCC-OCC, Olongapo City, are found GUILTY of
misconduct and are hereby SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months without pay, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 158901 - March 9, 2004]

PROCESO QUIROS and LEONARDA VILLEGAS, Petitioners, v. MARCELO ARJONA, TERESITA BALARBAR,
JOSEPHINE ARJONA, and CONCHITA ARJONA, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review is the decision of the Court of Appeals in an action for the
execution/enforcement of amicable settlement between petitioners Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas
and respondent Marcelo Arjona. Appellate court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City-Branch 44 and reinstated the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan.

On December 19, 1996, petitioners Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas filed with the office of the
barangay captain of Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, a complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land located at Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan. Petitioners sought to recover
from their uncle Marcelo Arjona, one of the respondents herein, their lawful share of the inheritance from
their late grandmother Rosa Arjona Quiros alias Doza, the same to be segregated from the following
parcels of land:

a) A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-189983, L.R. Case No. D-614, LRC Record No. N- 22630), situated in the
Barrio of Labney, Torud, Municipality of San Jacinto, Province of Pangasinan x x x Containing an area of
Forty Four Thousand Five Hundred and Twenty (44,520) square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Decl.
No. 607;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

b) A parcel of Unirrig. riceland situated at Brgy. Labney, San Jacinto, San Jacinto, Pangasinan with an area
of 6450 sq. meters, more or less declared under Tax Decl. No. 2066 of the land records of San Jacinto,
Pangasinan assessed at P2390.00 x x x;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

c) A parcel of Unirrig. riceland situated at Brgy. Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan with an area of 6450 sq.
meters, more or less, declared under Tax Declaration No. 2047 of the land records of San Jacinto,
Pangasinan assessed at P1700.00 x x x

d) A parcel of Unirrig. riceland situated at Brgy. Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan assessed at P5610.00 x x
x;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

e) A parcel of Cogon land situated at Brgy. Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, with an area of 14133 sq.
meters, more or less declared under Tax Declaration No. 14 of the land records of San Jacinto, Pangasinan
assessed at P2830.00 x x x.1
On January 5, 1997, an amicable settlement was reached between the parties. By reason thereof,
respondent Arjona executed a document denominated as "PAKNAAN" ("Agreement", in Pangasinan
dialect), which reads:

AGREEMENT

I, MARCELO ARJONA, of legal age, resident of Barangay Sapang, Buho, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, have a
land consisting of more or less one (1) hectare which I gave to Proceso Quiros and Leonarda Villegas, this
land was inherited by Doza that is why I am giving the said land to them for it is in my name, I am affixing
my signature on this document for this is our agreement besides there are witnesses on the 5th day
(Sunday) of January 1997.

Signed in the presence of:

(Sgd) Avelino N. De la Masa, Jr.

(Sgd) Marcelo Arjona

Witnesses:

1) (Sgd.) Teresita Balarbar

2) (Sgd.) Josephine Arjona

3) (Sgd.) Conchita Arjona

On the same date, another "PAKNAAN" was executed by Jose Banda, as follows:

AGREEMENT

I, JOSE BANDA, married to Cecilia L. Banda, of legal age, and resident of Sitio Torrod, Barangay Labney, San
Jacinto, Pangasinan. There is a land in which they entrusted to me and the same land is situated in Sitio
Torrod, Brgy. Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, land of Arjona family.

I am cultivating/tilling this land but if ever Leonarda Villegas and Proceso Quiros would like to get this land,
I will voluntarily surrender it to them.

In order to attest to the veracity and truthfulness of this agreement, I affixed (sic) my signature voluntarily
below this document this 5th day (Sunday) of January 1997.

(Sgd.) Jose Banda

Signed in the presence of:

(Sgd) Avelino N. de la Masa, Sr.

Barangay Captain
Brgy. Labney, San Jacinto
Pangasinan

Witnesses:

1) Irene Banda

(sgd.)
2) Jose (illegible) x x x

Petitioners filed a complaint with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
execution of the compromise agreement which was denied because the subject property cannot be
determined with certainty.

The Regional Trial Court reversed the decision of the municipal court on appeal and ordered the issuance
of the writ of execution.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
reinstated the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.2

Hence, this petition on the following errors:

THE PAKNAAN BEING A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT UNDER THE LAW IS AN IMMUTABLE
JUDGMENT CAN NOT BE ALTERED, MODIFIED OR CHANGED BY THE COURT INCLUDING THE HIGHEST
COURT; and

II

THE SECOND PAKNAAN ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FIRST PAKNAAN WAS NEVER
ADDUCED AS EVIDENCE BY EITHER OF THE PARTIES, SO IT IS ERROR OF JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER THE
SAME IN THE DECISION MAKING.

The pivotal issue is the validity and enforceability of the amicable settlement between the parties and
corollary to this, whether a writ of execution may issue on the basis thereof.

In support of their stance, petitioners rely on Section 416 of the Local Government Code which provides
that an amicable settlement shall have the force and effect of a final judgment upon the expiration of 10
days from the date thereof, unless repudiated or nullified by the proper court. They argue that since no
such repudiation or action to nullify has been initiated, the municipal court has no discretion but to
execute the agreement which has become final and executory.

Petitioners likewise contend that despite the failure of the Paknaan to describe with certainty the object of
the contract, the evidence will show that after the execution of the agreement, respondent Marcelo Arjona
accompanied them to the actual site of the properties at Sitio Torod, Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan and
pointed to them the 1 hectare property referred to in the said agreement.
In their Comment, respondents insist that respondent Arjona could not have accompanied petitioners to
the subject land at Torrod, Labney because he was physically incapacitated and there was no motorized
vehicle to transport him to the said place.

The Civil Code contains salutary provisions that encourage and favor compromises and do not even require
judicial approval. Thus, under Article 2029 of the Civil Code, the courts must endeavor to persuade the
litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise. Pursuant to Article 2037 of the Civil Code, a
compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata, and this is true even if the
compromise is not judicially approved. Articles 2039 and 2031 thereof also provide for the suspension of
pending actions and mitigation of damages to the losing party who has shown a sincere desire for a
compromise, in keeping with the Codes policy of encouraging amicable settlements.3

Cognizant of the beneficial effects of amicable settlements, the Katarungang Pambarangay Law (P.D. 1508)
and later the Local Government Code provide for a mechanism for conciliation where party-litigants can
enter into an agreement in the barangay level to reduce the deterioration of the quality of justice due to
indiscriminate filing of court cases. Thus, under Section 416 of the said Code, an amicable settlement shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment of the court upon the expiration of 10 days from the date
thereof, unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition to nullify the award has been
filed before the proper court

Petitioners submit that since the amicable settlement had not been repudiated or impugned before the
court within the 10-day prescriptive period in accordance with Section 416 of the Local Government Code,
the enforcement of the same must be done as a matter of course and a writ of execution must accordingly
be issued by the court.

Generally, the rule is that where no repudiation was made during the 10-day period, the amicable
settlement attains the status of finality and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court to implement and
enforce it. However, such rule is not inflexible for it admits of certain exceptions. In Santos v. Judge Isidro,4
the Court observed that special and exceptional circumstances, the imperatives of substantial justice, or
facts that may have transpired after the finality of judgment which would render its execution unjust, may
warrant the suspension of execution of a decision that has become final and executory. In the case at bar,
the ends of justice would be frustrated if a writ of execution is issued considering the uncertainty of the
object of the agreement. To do so would open the possibility of error and future litigations.

The Paknaan executed by respondent Marcelo Arjona purports to convey a parcel of land consisting of
more or less 1 hectare to petitioners Quiros and Villegas. Another Paknaan, prepared on the same date,
and executed by one Jose Banda who signified his intention to vacate the parcel of land he was tilling
located at Torrod, Brgy. Labney, San Jacinto, Pangasinan, for and in behalf of the Arjona family. On ocular
inspection however, the municipal trial court found that the land referred to in the second Paknaan was
different from the land being occupied by petitioners. Hence, no writ of execution could be issued for
failure to determine with certainty what parcel of land respondent intended to convey.

In denying the issuance of the writ of execution, the appellate court ruled that the contract is null and void
for its failure to describe with certainty the object thereof. While we agree that no writ of execution may
issue, we take exception to the appellate courts reason for its denial.
Since an amicable settlement, which partakes of the nature of a contract, is subject to the same legal
provisions providing for the validity, enforcement, rescission or annulment of ordinary contracts, there is a
need to ascertain whether the Paknaan in question has sufficiently complied with the requisites of validity
in accordance with Article 1318 of the Civil Code.5

There is no question that there was meeting of the minds between the contracting parties. In executing the
Paknaan, the respondent undertook to convey 1 hectare of land to petitioners who accepted. It appears
that while the Paknaan was prepared and signed by respondent Arjona, petitioners acceded to the terms
thereof by not disputing its contents and are in fact now seeking its enforcement. The object is a 1-hectare
parcel of land representing petitioners inheritance from their deceased grandmother. The cause of the
contract is the delivery of petitioners share in the inheritance. The inability of the municipal court to
identify the exact location of the inherited property did not negate the principal object of the contract. This
is an error occasioned by the failure of the parties to describe the subject property, which is correctible by
reformation and does not indicate the absence of the principal object as to render the contract void. It
cannot be disputed that the object is determinable as to its kind, i.e.1 hectare of land as inheritance, and
can be determined without need of a new contract or agreement.6 Clearly, the Paknaan has all the
earmarks of a valid contract.

Although both parties agreed to transfer one-hectare real property, they failed to include in the written
document a sufficient description of the property to convey. This error is not one for nullification of the
instrument but only for reformation.

Article 1359 of the Civil Code provides:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary

When, there having been a meeting of the minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is not
expressed in the instrument purporting to embody the agreement by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such
true intention may be expressed.

If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the
proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but annulment of the contract.

Reformation is a remedy in equity whereby a written instrument is made or construed so as to express or

conform to the real intention of the parties where some error or mistake has been committed.7 In granting
reformation, the remedy in equity is not making a new contract for the parties, but establishing and
perpetuating the real contract between the parties which, under the technical rules of law, could not be
enforced but for such reformation.

In order that an action for reformation of instrument as provided in Article 1359 of the Civil Code may
prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must have been a meeting of the minds of the
parties to the contract; (2) the instrument does not express the true intention of the parties; and (3) the
failure of the instrument to express the true intention of the parties is due to mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident.8

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement, except when it fails to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto, in which case, one of the parties may bring an action for the reformation
of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.9

Both parties acknowledge that petitioners are entitled to their inheritance, hence, the remedy of
nullification, which invalidates the Paknaan, would prejudice petitioners and deprive them of their just
share of the inheritance. Respondent can not, as an afterthought, be allowed to renege on his legal
obligation to transfer the property to its rightful heirs. A refusal to reform the Paknaan under such
circumstances would have the effect of penalizing one party for negligent conduct, and at the same time
permitting the other party to escape the consequences of his negligence and profit thereby. No person
shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 21, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court and reinstated the decision of the
Municipal Trial Court, is AFFIRMED. This is without prejudice to the filing by either party of an action for
reformation of the Paknaan executed on January 5, 1997.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, p. 17.

2 Decision penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, concurred in by Associate Justices Andres
B. Reyes and Regalado E. Maambong.

3 Philippine Bank of Communications v. Hon. Juan F. Echiverri, et al., G.R. No. L-41795, 29 August 1980, 99
SCRA 508.

4 Citing Philippine Veterans Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 178 SCRA 645 (1989).

5 Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

1) Consent of the contracting parties;

2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

6 See Article 1349 of the Civil Code which states:

Art. 1349. The object of every contract must be determinate as to its kind. The fact that the quantity is not
determinate shall not be obstacle to the existence of the contract, provided it is possible to determine the
same, without the need of a new contract between the parties.
7 53 Corpus Juris 906.

8 The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) represented by the Project Manager, Magat River Multi-
Purpose Project v. Estanislao Gamit and The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85869, 6 November
1992, 215 SCRA 436.

9 Id.

[G.R. NO. 167261 : March 2, 2007]

ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, Petitioner, v. CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES

and FLORENTINA MANACNES, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019, dated 9 February 2005, which reversed and set
aside the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and
reinstated the Resolution3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province
dismissing herein petitioner's action for Enforcement of Arbitration Award and Damages.

The instant petition draws its origin from an Action4 for recovery of possession of real property situated in
Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain
Province on 9 November 1994, against the spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-in-
interest of herein respondent.

On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their respective counsels,
agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in accordance
with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.5 Consequently, the proceedings before the
MCTC were suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6

Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the refusal of the
Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their insistence that the case should go
to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification, as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the
MCTC.

An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for conciliation by the
Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon. According to the MCTC, based on
the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned; however,
the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award as provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so
that, the case must be returned to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.

In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10 May 1995 ordering
herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses Manacnes of the amount of P8,000.00
for the improvements on the land. Aggrieved, Leoncio's widow,7 Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the
Arbitration Award but her repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished
with copies of the Arbitration Award.

On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the Arbitration Award. On
the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings
in the original case for recovery of possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the
Arbitration Award issued by the Lupon.

Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding the latter's failure to
appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC denied Florentina Manacnes' Motion to repudiate the
Arbitration Award elucidating that since the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day
reglementary period provided for under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has
become final and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an
Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the Arbitration Award. On 31
August 1995, the then incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the Award.

Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein petitioner Pang-et filed
with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration Award which was sought to be dismissed by
the heir of the Manacnes spouses.8 The heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the Agreement for
Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been personally
signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been written in English - a language
not understood by the parties.

In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for Enforcement of Arbitration
Award in this wise:

x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon Tagapamayapa
concerned?cralaw library

The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the lupon concerned and the
products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook rule that a null and void act could always be
questioned at any time as the action or defense based upon it is imprescriptible.

The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the pertinent law dealing on
this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:

"Section 413 - (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that they shall abide by
the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x x x"

The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which provides:
"Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties
must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers."

It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in conciliation proceedings
before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the execution of the agreement to arbitrate must
be done personally by the parties themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the
agreement.

Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed the agreement to
arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another person. Thus, it is very clear that the mandatory provisos
of Section 413 and 415 of RA 7160 are violated. Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who signed the
agreement per instruction of her parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must still be in the
negative. As provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled to an assistance, it
shall be done only when the party concerned is a minor or incompetent. Here, there is no showing that the
spouses [Manacnis] were incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law
provides is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.

Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor of their daughter
Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed
by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates the personal
appearance of the parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the appearance of representatives.

In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned agreement to arbitrate is
inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory provisions of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415
thereof as it was not the respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed it.

The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much to be desired, the
natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering that the agreement to arbitrate is
inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows that the arbitration award which emanated from it is also
inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration Award by itself, granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate is
valid, will readily show that it does not also conform with the mandate of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:

"Sec. 411. Form of Settlement - All amicable settlements shall be in writing in a language or dialect known
to the parties x x x. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same language or dialect, the
settlement shall be written in the language known to them."

Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:

"Sec. 13 - Form of Settlement and Award. - All settlements, whether by mediation, conciliation or
arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the parties. x x x"

It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the scenic and serene community
of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak the Kankanaey language. Thus, the Arbitration Award should have been
written in the Kankanaey language. However, as shown by the Arbitration Award, it is written in English
language which the parties do not speak and therefore a further violation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.

IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed.9

Petitioner Pang-et's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an Appeal before the RTC
which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and remanded the case to the MCTC for further
proceedings. According to the RTC:

As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51 of the expediente, dated
Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the Office of the Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada
was signed by the respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the
instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid predecessors-in-interest
therein were not personally affixed by the latter or are falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity
of the document on the ground that the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by fraud.
Indulging the Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the truth of the matter, the fact
still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that neither did said original defendants nor did any of
such heirs effectively repudiate the Agreement in question in accordance with the procedure outlined by
the law, within five (5) days from Feb. 6, 1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160;
Secs. 7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such failure is deemed a waiver on the part of
the defendants spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on the ground that their
consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs
being privy to the now deceased original defendants should have not been permitted by the court a quo
under the equitable principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time in the present case
(Lopez v. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).

The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995, written in English,
attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4 of the record is likewise assailed by the
Appellee as void on the ground that the English language is not known by the defendants spouses
Manacnis who are Igorots. Said Appellee contends that the document should have been written in
Kankana-ey, the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec. 11, KP Rules).
On this score, the court a quo presumptuously concluded on the basis of the self-serving mere say-so of
the representative of the Appellee that her predecessors did not speak or understand English. As a matter
of judicial notice, American Episcopalian Missionaries had been in Sagada, Mountain Province as early as
1902 and continuously stayed in the place by turns, co-mingling with the indigenous people thereat,
instructing and educating them, and converting most to the Christian faith, among other things, until the
former left about twenty years ago. By constant association with the white folks, the natives too old to go
to school somehow learned the King's English by ear and can effectively speak and communicate in that
language. Any which way, even granting arguendo that the defendants spouses Manacnis were the
exceptions and indeed totally ignorant of English, no petition to nullify the Arbitration award in issue on
such ground as advanced was filed by the party or any of the Appellee Heirs with the MCTC of Besao-
Sagada, within ten (10) days from May 10, 1995, the date of the document. Thus, upon the expiration
thereof, the Arbitration Award acquired the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA
7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants in Civil Case 83 (B.C. No.
07) and the Appellee Heirs herein privy to said defendants.
In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for Arbitration and Arbitration
Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in the first place been given due course by the court a
quo. In which case, it would not have in the logical flow of things declared both documents "inefficacious";
without which pronouncements, said court would not have dismissed the case at bar.

Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the Resolution appealed from, and
ordering the record of the case subject thereof remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.10

Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the Court of Appeals
seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the appellate court rendered the herein
assailed Decision, to wit:

After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would show that the spouses
Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with respondent Pang-et. Thus, We are at a loss as to
the basis of the Arbitration Award sought to be enforced by respondent Pang-et's subsequent action
before the MCTC.

There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended and the same remanded to the
Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which was allegedly not signed by the parties but agreed
upon by their respective counsels during the pre-trial conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it
would seem that the agreement to arbitrate was not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More importantly,
when the pangkat chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix their thumbmarks in the
agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no
other recourse but to issue a certificate to file action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the
Lupon to "render an arbitration award". This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the late Beket
Padonay affirming respondent Pang-et's right to the disputed property. While Pang-et offered to pay
P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the spouses Manacnes, the latter refused to accept the same
and insisted on their right to the subject property. Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an
Arbitration award which favored respondent Pang-et.

From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was again remanded to it, the
Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was
made clear in both the minutes of the Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With
the foregoing, We find it evident that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the case for
arbitration.

Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing that the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V of the Katarungan Pambarangay Rules.
And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI, thereof the Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed
to hear the case. However, according to the minutes of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995, the
pangkat Chairman and another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.

Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or the Pangkat Chairman should
attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the settlement arrived at. But how can this be possible
when the minutes of the two hearings show that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily
agreed to anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to repudiate the Arbitration
Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since the Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration
Award were never freely nor voluntarily entered into by one of the parties to the dispute. In short, there is
no agreement validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.

With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an action or defense against a
null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot but agree with the MCTC that the very
agreement to arbitrate is null and void. Similarly, the arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the
agreement is also void.

WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the MCTC Resolution
DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of Arbitration Award is REINSTATED.11

Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-et filed the instant
petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked material facts that resulted in reversible
errors in the assailed Decision. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the
original parties, as represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually agreed to submit
the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag. Petitioner insists that the
parties must be bound by the initial agreement by their counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement
as any representation made by the lawyers are deemed made with the conformity of their clients.
Furthermore, petitioner maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not want to enter into an
amicable settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at the first instance, which was at the
pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa for arbitration.

We do not agree with the petitioner.

First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that, during the initial
hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes declined to sign the Agreement for
Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must continue. As
reflected in the Minutes12 of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality of the
signature of Catherine Manacnes, daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the Agreement for
Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be the spouses Manacnes
themselves who should have signed such agreement. To resolve the issue, the Pangkat Chairman then
asked the spouses Manacnes that if they wanted the arbitration proceedings to continue, they must signify
their intention in the Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated earlier, the Manacnes spouses
did not want to sign such agreement and instead insisted that the case go to court.

Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the refusal of the
Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification are the following: 1) that there was personal
confrontation between the parties before the Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and 2) that the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was constituted but the personal confrontation before the Pangkat failed
likewise because respondents do not want to submit this case for arbitration and insist that said case will
go to court.13 Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the records of the case, the MCTC
ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an
arbitration award, explaining that:
Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa of Dagdag,
Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an "Agreement for Arbitration" was executed by the
parties anent the above-entitled case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as
mandated by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a finding that the case may now be
brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned by the court.14

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the amicable
settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely entered into by the
parties.15 Through this mechanism, the parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring
the rigors of court litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their
controversy during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead
find recourse in the courts16 in the event that no true compromise is reached.

The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit the dispute for adjudication
either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be binding upon them with the force
and effect of a final judgment of a court.17 Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their
dispute to arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding settlement
arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC further remanded the case to
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear
showing that the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.

It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to submit the case for arbitration until an
arbitration award is rendered by the Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the
proceedings under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary
acquiescence of the disputing parties to amicable settlement.

What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a confrontation between
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a certification be issued that no conciliation
or settlement has been reached, as attested to by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling
within the authority of the Lupon may be instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication.18 In other words, the only necessary pre-condition before any case falling within the
authority of the Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been personal
confrontation between the parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a failure to amicably
settle the dispute. It should be emphasized that while the spouses Manacnes appeared before the Lupon
during the initial hearing for the conciliation proceedings, they refused to sign the Agreement for
Arbitration form, which would have signified their consent to submit the case for arbitration. Therefore,
upon certification by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat failed
because the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the case should
go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the case for recovery of possession
which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable resolution of the case through
arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.

Petitioner's assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels' agreement to submit the
case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by
the parties' respective counsels was the remand of the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for conciliation
proceedings and not the actual amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may only be
compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary confrontation, but not to enter
into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to sign the Agreement for Arbitration. Thus, when the
Manacnes spouses personally appeared during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they
had already complied with the agreement during the pre-trial to submit the case for conciliation
proceedings. Their presence during said hearing is already their acquiescence to the order of the MCTC
remanding the case to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual confrontation
between the parties despite the fact that no amicable settlement was reached due to the spouses
Manacnes' refusal to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.

Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa to render an
arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such
arbitration award will not bind the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must have
agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any
other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be bound by said
agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one
who is not a party to it.19 In view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to
settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the spouses Manacnes
refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes
spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they
never became privy to any agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Besao-Sagada,
Mountain Province, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83 for Recovery of
Possession of Real Property, and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

1 Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando
and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-36.

2 Penned by Judge Artemio B. Marrero, dated 2 June 2003 in Civil Case No. 1090; id. at 37-40.

3 Penned by Presiding Judge James P. Kibitin, dated 20 August 2002 in Civil Case No. 118; records, pp. 52-
55.

4 Docketed as Civil Case No. 83.

5 The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, Sections 399-422, Chapter 7; Title One, Book III, Republic
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.

6 Docketed as Barangay Case No. 7.

7 Leoncio Manacnes died on 10 May 1995; records, p. 39.

8 Florentina Manacnes also died sometime after the issuance of the Notice of Execution; id. at 2

9 MCTC Resolution, pp. 2-4, records, pp. 53-55.

10 RTC Judgment, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 39-40.

11 CA Decision, pp. 5-8; id. at 33-36.

12 CA rollo, p. 66.

13 Id. at 67.

14 Id. at 68.

15 Preamble, Presidential Decree No. 1293, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

16 Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, Section 412 (a) - Pre-condition to filing of Complaint in Court -
No complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be
filled or instituted directly in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the
lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

17 Section 413, Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

18 CA rollo, p. 68.
19 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132196, 9 December 2005, 477 SCRA 85, 99.
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993

ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y. FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. PALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ
and MANUEL P. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON, respondents.

Isagani M. Jungco, Valeriano S. Peralta, Miguel Famularcano, Jr. and Virgilio E. Acierto for petitioners.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and
other operational expenses attached to the office . . . ."2 Paragraph (d) reads —

(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of
the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis supplied).

Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers
and members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain
that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 herein-above quoted in italics infringes on the following constitutional
and statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o elective
official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position
during his tenure,"3 because the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts
are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . .
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint",4 since it was Congress through the questioned
proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts;5 and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g), of
the Omnibus Election Code, which says:

Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an election offense: . . . (g) Appointment
of new employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. — During the period of
forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or
appointing officer of a government office, agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether
provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior authority of the
Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to
be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall
not be filled in a manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing provisions, a
new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the
appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days from the date of the appointment. Any
appointment or hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2) Any government official who
promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or
employee, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations . . . .

for the reason that the appointment of respondent Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent
Executive Secretary on 3 April 1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992
Elections.

The principal question is whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates
the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government
posts.

In full, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public positions in one person, so that
a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of
public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public officer or employee,
like the head of an executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
83896, and Anti-Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
G.R. No. 83815,6 ". . . . should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the distraction
of other governmental duties or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts,
attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and
inefficiency . . . ."

Particularly as regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a
local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus
neglect his constituents . . . ."7

In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official, i.e., the
Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no
stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher
interest of the body politic is of no moment.

It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local elective
official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.8 But, the contention is
fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, since the
constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the issue here nor is that section sought to be declared
unconstitutional, we need not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise
unconstitutional as authority for its validity.

In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of
Sec. 7, Art.
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph
appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment or
designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the
Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and planning agency;9 the Vice-President,
who may be appointed Member of the Cabinet; 10 and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. 11

The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, was not accidental when
drawn, and not without reason. It was purposely sought by the drafters of the Constitution as shown in
their deliberation, thus —

MR. MONSOD. In other words, what then Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the
prohibition is more strict with respect to elective officials, because in the case of appointive officials, there
may be a law that will allow them to hold other positions.

MR. FOZ. Yes, I suggest we make that difference, because in the case of appointive officials, there will be
certain situations where the law should allow them to hold some other positions. 12
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot
be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.

It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Mayor of Olongapo City,
hence, an excepted circumstance, citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 13 where we stated
that the prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the President, Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec.
13, Art. VII, of the Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the
primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided
by law, without receiving any additional compensation therefor.

This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not contemplate making the subject
SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without
need of appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA
posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative
intent to make the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word
"appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used. 14

Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that subject proviso may contravene Sec.
7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved
by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would not have been concerned with the effects of Sec. 7, first par.,
had they considered the SBMA posts as ex officio.

Cognizant of the complication that may arise from the way the subject proviso was stated, Senator Rene
Saguisag remarked that "if the Conference Committee just said "the Mayor shall be the Chairman" then
that should foreclose the issue. It is a legislative choice." 15 The Senator took a view that the constitutional
proscription against appointment of elective officials may have been sidestepped if Congress attached the
SBMA posts to the Mayor of Olongapo City instead of directing the President to appoint him to the post.
Without passing upon this view of Senator Saguisag, it suffices to state that Congress intended the posts to
be appointive, thus nibbling in the bud the argument that they are ex officio.

The analogy with the position of Chairman of the Metro Manila Authority made by respondents cannot be
applied to uphold the constitutionality of the challenged proviso since it is not put in issue in the present
case. In the same vein, the argument that if no elective official may be appointed or designated to another
post then Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution allowing him to receive double compensation 16 would be
useless, is non sequitur since Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case,
the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post under Sec. 3,
Art. VII, may receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. Section
13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of
Olongapo City.

As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the person or persons having
authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust," 17 or "[t]he selection or designation of
a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and
discharge the duties of the same. 18 In his treatise, Philippine Political
Law, 19 Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as "the selection, by the authority
vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office."

Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
According to Woodbury, J., 20 "the choice of a person to fill an office constitutes the essence of his
appointment," 21 and Mr. Justice Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an
executive act involving the exercise of discretion." 22 In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v.
Intermediate Appellate Court 23 we held:

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he
may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who
have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power . . . .

Indeed, the power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of
discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In
other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power.

Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at
the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is
conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even
on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to
divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice.
Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an
irregular restriction on the power of appointment. 24

In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with a presidential appointee for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the
appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can
qualify for the posts in question, the President is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom
to appoint. Such supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is no power at all
and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.

While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Accordingly, while the
conferment of the appointing power on the President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting
his choice to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during his
incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. The deliberation in the Constitutional
Commission is enlightening:

MR. DAVIDE. On Section 4, page 3, line 8, I propose the substitution of the word "term" with TENURE.

MR. FOZ. The effect of the proposed amendment is to make possible for one to resign from his position.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, we should allow that prerogative.

MR. FOZ. Resign from his position to accept an executive position.

MR. DAVIDE. Besides, it may turn out in a given case that because of, say, incapacity, he may leave the
service, but if he is prohibited from being appointed within the term for which he was elected, we may be
depriving the government of the needed expertise of an individual. 25

Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to

another public office.

Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his
ineligibility, appointed to other government posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor
remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an incumbent elective official is
not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of
his disqualification or lack of eligibility. This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the
Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The difference
between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national legislators lose their elective
posts only after they have been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective
officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the
elective post as well as not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not
directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different where it is expressly provided by
law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate
the incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan,
283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d 258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or
appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW 262. Annotation: 40
ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40 ALR 941)." 26 "Where the constitution, or
statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another
office, either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of
the first office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. — State ex rel. Van
Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445)." 27

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman
of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act
that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and
his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one
whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold
valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the office were
exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible,
or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or
irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or]
under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the
same is adjudged to be such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21
Am. Dec., 213; Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)." 28

Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems, allowances and other
emoluments which may have been received by respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment may be
retained by him.
The illegality of his appointment to the SBMA posts being now evident, other matters affecting the legality
of the questioned proviso as well as the appointment of said respondent made pursuant thereto need no
longer be discussed.

In thus concluding as we do, we can only share the lament of Sen. Sotero Laurel which he expressed in the
floor deliberations of S.B. 1648, precursor of R.A. 7227, when he articulated —

. . . . (much) as we would like to have the present Mayor of Olongapo City as the Chief Executive of this
Authority that we are creating; (much) as I, myself, would like to because I know the capacity, integrity,
industry and dedication of Mayor Gordon; (much) as we would like to give him this terrific, burdensome
and heavy responsibility, we cannot do it because of the constitutional prohibition which is very clear. It
says: "No elective official shall be appointed or designated to another position in any capacity." 29

For, indeed, "a Constitution must be firm and immovable, like a mountain amidst the strife of storms or a
rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves." 30 One of the characteristics of the Constitution is
permanence, i.e., "its capacity to resist capricious or whimsical change dictated not by legitimate needs but
only by passing fancies, temporary passions or occasional infatuations of the people with ideas or
personalities . . . . Such a Constitution is not likely to be easily tampered with to suit political expediency,
personal ambitions or ill-advised agitation for change." 31

Ergo, under the Constitution, Mayor Gordon has a choice. We have no choice.

WHEREFORE, the proviso in par. (d), Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227, which states: ". . . Provided, however, That for
the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the Mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority," is declared unconstitutional;
consequently, the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J.
Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.

However, all per diems, allowances and other emoluments received by respondent Gordon, if any, as such
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by
him in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of SBMA are hereby UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

# Footnotes

1 An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military Reservations into Other Productive Uses, Creating
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes," approved 13 March 1992, to take effect upon its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.

2 See "Action to Declare Unconstitutional Provisions of R.A. 7227 with Prohibition and Application for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction," dated 7 April 1992, p. 6; Rollo p. 7.
3 Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, provides: "No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in
any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."

4 Sec. 16, Art. VII, provides: "The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are not vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of
the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commission, or boards.

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether
voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."

5 Petitioners allege that the proviso constitutes a "limitation to the power of appointment of the
President and therefore violates the separation of powers" and that "Congress cannot create the position
and at the same time specify the person to fill up such position" (Petition, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 5-6).

6 G.R. Nos. 83896 and 83815 were consolidated and decided jointly on 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA
317, 339.

7 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 546.

8 Sec. 94. Appointment of Elective and Appointive Local Officials; Candidates Who Lost in an Election.
— (a) No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public office or position during his tenure.

"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no elective or appointive local
official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

"(b) Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election shall, within
one (1) year after such election, be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned
or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries."

9 Sec. 9, Art. XII, of the Constitution.

10 Sec. 3, second par., Art. VII, of the Constitution.

11 Sec. 8, par. (1), Art. VIII, of the Constitution. This particular provision was approved in anticipation
of a unicameral legislature. However, as it turn out, we adopted instead a bicameral form of government
so that the seat allocated to the representative of Congress has to be split between a member of the
Senate and a member of the House of Representative. Each being entitled to one-half vote in the
deliberations in the Judicial and Bar Council.
12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 5, p. 156.

Section 4 of the Proposed Resolution No. 468, the precursor of the first paragraph of Sec. 7, read: "Unless
otherwise provided by law, no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in a
temporary or acting capacity to any public office or position during his term" (Record of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 524).

The following were reactions on the floor:

FR. BERNAS. On page 3, Section 4, line 5, the provision begins with the phrase "Unless otherwise provided
by law" which does not exist in the 1973 Constitution. This was inserted in a 1981 amendment. We know
the reason why this was put here. It practically renders the provision useless because the whole matter
becomes discretionary with the legislature. It is one of those instance in the 1973 Constitution, as
amended and constantly reamended, where they threw in the phrase "Unless otherwise provided by law"
precisely to give the President a free hand in his decree-making power.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. FOZ. As presently worded now, the provision would allow the legislature to really provide otherwise,
meaning, to allow an elective official to be appointed to an executive office. (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 539.)

xxx xxx xxx

MR. COLAYCO . . . . The way I understand this is that we are giving the legislature the power to authorize
the appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity of an elective official to any public office
or position during his term, Am I right?

MR. FOZ. If a law is passed regarding this matter, then such law may reverse this provision as worded, but
we have said earlier that we will entertain suggestions from the floor.

MR. COLAYCO. Personally, I find the policy established in this provision meritorious. To make it a firm
policy, I suggest that we delete the prefatory phrase "Unless otherwise provided by law.

MR. FOZ. We agree with the Commissioner (Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 549).

As revised, known later as Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 10, and approved on third reading, the subject section
read: "No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure" (Ibid., Vol. II, p. 788).

13 Supra, p. 335.

14 . . . . When, in the exigencies of government, it is necessary to create and define new duties, the
legislative department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or these
duties shall be attached to and become ex officio duties of existing offices. The power extends to the
consolidation of offices resulting in abolishing one and attaching its powers and duties to the other. It
matters not that the name commission or board is given to the body created . . . ." (Tayloe v. Davis, 212 Ala
282, 102 So. 433, 40 ALR 1052, 1057).

15 Transcripts of Session Proceedings, Senate, 6 February 1992, p. 57.

16 Sec. 8, Art. IX-B, provides: "No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the
consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.

"Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation."

17 Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 128 citing In re Nicholson's Estate, 104 Colo, 561, 93 P. 2d 880,
884.

18 Ibid., citing State v. Braman, 173 Wis. 596, 181 N.W. 729, 730.

19 1987 ed., p. 180.

20 Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers (1890), p. 48, citing In
Johnston v. Wilson, 2 N.H. 205, 9 Am. Dec. 50.

21 Mechem, ibid., citing Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch (U.S.) 137; Craig v. Norfolk, I Mod. 122.

22 Concepcion v. Paredes, No. 17539, 23 December 1921; 42 Phil. 599, 603, citing Keim vs. U.S. (1900),
177 U.S., 290.

23 G.R. No. 65439, 13 November 1985; 140 SCRA 22, 35.

24 While it is inarguable that Congress has plenary authority to prescribe qualifications to a public
office, it "may not however prescribe qualifications such that the President is entirely stripped of
discretion, thus converting appointment to a mere ministerial act" (Gonzales, Neptali A., Administrative
Law, Law on Public Officers and Election Law, 1966 ed., p. 173, citing Manalang v. Quitoriano, No. L-6898,
30 April 1954; 94 Phil. 903).

25 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 591.

26 63 Am Jur 2d 678-679.

27 67 CJS 295.

28 Lino Luna v. Rodriguez and De los Angeles, No. 12647, 26 November 1917, 37 Phil, 186, 192
(emphasis supplied).

29 Transcripts of Session Proceedings, Senate, 29 January 1992, pp. 89-90.

30 Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 1 L. ed. 391, cited in Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, 1987 ed., p. 7.

31 Cruz, Isagani A., Constitutional Law, supra.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[G.R. Nos. 111416-17. September 26, 1994.]

FELICIDAD UY, Petitioner, v. HON. MAXIMO C. CONTRERAS, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila; HON. MAURO M. CASTRO, Provincial Prosecutor of Pasig, Metro
Manila; SUSANNA ATAYDE and WINNIE JAVIER, Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; REVISED KATARUNGANG PAMBARANGAY LAW; SIGNIFICANT FEATURES. — The

revised katarungang pambarangay law has at least three new significant features, to wit: 1. It increased the
authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment not exceeding thirty
days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. 2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at
the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where such parties are
enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. 3. It
provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some
ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the complainant of
the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or
pangkat secretary." What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of the complaint is unclear;
obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules
and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not found, such that
the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the
complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the
pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days. The first feature has necessarily
broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon and if the mediation and conciliation process at that level would be
effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice would be achieved at less expense to
the litigants, cordial relationships among protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace
and order therein enhanced. The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the
Local Government Code, also broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate civil and
criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in
the barangay where such workplace or institution is located. That barangay may not be the appropriate
venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the
parties. Procedural rules including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and convenient
hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a result. Elsewise stated, convenience is the
raison d’etre of the rule on venue. The third feature is claimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date
close to the expiration of the prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the
reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face
each other with less emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of
their dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the difference between peace
and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive litigation between the parties.

2. ID.; ID.; JURISPRUDENCE BUILT ON P.D. 1508 APPLICABLE THERETO. — While P.D. No. 1508 has
been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior
referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its
provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code. In Peregrina v. Panis, (133 SCRA 72,
75 [1984]) this Court stated: "Thus, Morata v. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy,
126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent
could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal
on the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members,
lacking which the case can be dismissed. The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508.
They are actual residents in the same barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted
cases." Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so in Garces v. Court of Appeals
(162 SCRA 504, 511 [1988]): "In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would
deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been
seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the
action is proper. . . . The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508
where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the
complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for
judicial determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss." There were, of course,
cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to the
appropriate lupon operated as a waiver thereof. Furthermore, when such defect was initially present when
the case was first filed in the trial court, the subsequent issuance of the certificate to file action by the
barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said requirement, cured the defect.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In view of the private respondents’ failure to appear at the first
scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for
slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing
then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and,
pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should
have granted the motion to dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which
states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as
earlier stated, pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was
automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private
respondents filed their complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati. Moreover, having brought the
dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from
disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the
authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing
the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on
the barangay conciliation system.

4. ID.; ID.; VITAL ROLE THEREOF IN DELIVERY OF JUSTICE AT BARANGAY LEVEL. — This Court wishes to
emphasize the vital role which the revised katarungang pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at
the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing or
reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with
sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors should exercise due
diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the appropriate
sanctions for non-compliance thereof.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the order dated 2 July 1993 of
public respondent Judge Maximo C. Contreras of Branch 61 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Makati, Metro Manila, denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234
for slight physical injuries. The motion to dismiss is based on the failure of the private respondents, as the
offended parties therein, to comply with Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 and Section 18 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure requiring prior referral of disputes to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of the
proper barangay.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

At the outset, it must be stated that were it not for the importance of the issue to be resolved in the light
of the revised law on katarungang pambarangay provided for in the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160) which took effect on 1 January 1992, 1 this Court would have declined to accept the invocation
of its original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ prayed for. We have already ruled that while it is
true that this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, such
concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application
therefor may be directed. There is a hierarchy of courts determinative of the venue of appeals which
should also serve as a general determinant of the proper forum for the application for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for this judicial hierarchy by the petitioner and her lawyers ought to have led
them to file the petition with the proper Regional Trial Court. 2

The antecedent facts as disclosed by the pleadings of the parties are not complicated.

Petitioner subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde (hereinafter Atayde) the other half of the second
floor of a building located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati, Metro Manila. She operated and
maintained therein a beauty parlor. 3

The sublease contract expired on 15 April 1993. However, the petitioner was not able to remove all her
movable properties.

On 17 April 1993, an argument arose between the petitioner and Atayde when the former sought to
withdraw from the subleased premises her remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves,
frames, a mirror, a shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing. 4 The argument degenerated into a
scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Atayde’s employees, including
private respondent Winnie Javier (hereinafter Javier), on the other.

On 21 April 1993, the private respondents had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries
inflicted on them by the petitioner. 5

On 23 April 1993, the private respondents filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela,
Makati, which was docketed as Barangay Cases Nos. 1023 6 and 1024. 7

The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain for 28 April 1993. On the said
date, only the petitioner appeared. The barangay captain then reset the confrontation to 26 May 1993. 8

On 11 May 1993, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical
injuries against the petitioner with the MTC of Makati, which were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 145234 and assigned to Branch 61 thereof.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

On 21 May 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras of Branch 61 ordered the petitioner to submit her
counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.

On 14 June 1993, the petitioner submitted the required counter-affidavits. 9 In her own counter-affidavit,
the petitioner specifically alleged the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo
conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of Manila. 10 She also attached
to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, dated 18 May 1993, that there was an
ongoing conciliation between Atayde and the petitioner in Barangay Case No. 1023. 11

On 18 June 1993, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 for non-
compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and
pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

On 2 July 1993, public respondent Judge Contreras handed down an order denying the motion to dismiss,
pertinent portions of which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The court finds the motion to be without sufficient merit. In the first place, the offense subject to these
cases occurred in Makati, Metro Manila on April 17, 1993; that Barangay Valenzuela of the Municipality of
Makati had started the conciliation proceedings between the parties but as of May 18, 1993 nothing has
been achieved by the barangay (Annex "2" of the Counter-Affidavit of the accused); that the above-entitled
cases were filed directly with this court by the public prosecutor on May 11, 1993; and the accused and her
witnesses had already filed their counter-affidavits and documents. At this stage of the proceedings, the
court believes that the accused had already waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the
barangay of Valenzuela, Makati considering that accused and complainant are residents of different
barangays; that the offense charged occurred in the Municipality of Makati; and finally, this offense is
about to prescribe.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the court believes, and so holds, that the complainants may go directly
to the court where their complaint is about to prescribe or barred by statute of limitations pursuant to
Section 6 of PD 1508." 12

A motion to reconsider the above order was denied on 5 August 1993.

Hence this special civil action for certiorari. The petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he denied the motion to dismiss
considering that the private respondents failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of P.D. No.
1508, now embodied in Section 412 of the Local Government Code of 1991 and further required under the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.

In their Comment, the private respondents contend that the denial of the motion to dismiss is proper
because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is not applicable in the case of private respondent Javier
since she and the petitioner are not residents of barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining
barangays in different cities or municipalities and that referral to the lupon is not likewise required if the
case may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that prior
referral to the lupon applies to the case of private respondent Atayde, the latter had, nevertheless,
substantially complied with the requirement.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234 should be dismissed for non-compliance with Sections 408, 409, 410, and 412 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 in relation to Section 7, Rule VI of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 1508.

The petitioner replied to the comments of the private respondents and of the Office of the Solicitor
General. The private respondents filed a rejoinder to the petitioner’s reply to their comment and a reply to
the comment of the Office of the Solicitor General.

In the Resolution of 16 May 1994, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda, which the petitioner and the private respondents complied with. The
Office of the Solicitor General, in view of its prior submission, moved that it be excused from filing a
memorandum.

The petition is impressed with merit.

The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D. No. 1508 which was enacted on
11 June 1978. However, the Local Government Code of 1991, specifically Chapter 7, Title I, Book III thereof,
13 revised the law on the katarungang pambarangay. As a consequence of this revision, P.D. No. 1508 was
expressly repealed pursuant to Section 534(b) of the Code. Pertinent portions of Chapter 7, Title I, Book III
thereof read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the
parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities,
except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by appropriate Lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The Court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are filed
may, at anytime before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

SEC. 409. Venue. — (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election
of the complainant.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where
the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution
where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise,
the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in
resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly
designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

SEC. 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement. — . . .

x x x

(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses. — While the dispute is under mediation, conciliation,
or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and cause of action under existing laws shall be
interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the punong barangay. The prescriptive period shall resume
upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to
file action issued by the lupon or pangkat secretary: Provided, however, That such interruption shall not
exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint with the punong barangay.

x x x

SEC. 412. Conciliation. — (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. — No complaint, petition,
action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon chairman
or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. — The parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal Liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;

(3) Where sections are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment,
delivery of personal property, and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of Limitations.

x x x

SEC. 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. — In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the
parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who are not lawyers."cralaw virtua1aw library

Pursuant to the authority vested in him under Section 421 of the Code, the Secretary of Justice
promulgated the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules to implement the revised law on katarungang
pambarangay. Sections 8 and 11 of Rule VI (Amicable Settlement of Disputes) thereof provide in part as
follows:cralawnad

"SECTION 8. Failure to appear. —

a. Sanctions

The complaint may be dismissed when complainant, after due notice, refuses or willfully fails to appear
without justifiable reason on the date set for mediation, conciliation or arbitration. Such dismissal ordered
by the Punong Barangay/Pangkat Chairman after giving the complainant an opportunity to explain his non-
appearance shall be certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary as the case may be, and shall bar the
complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of action as that dismissed.

x x x

"SECTION 11. Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses and cause of action. — The prescriptive
periods for offenses and causes of action under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the
complaint with the Punong Barangay. The running of the prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by
the complainant of the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the Lupon or
Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, that such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the
filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. After the expiration of the aforesaid period of sixty days,
the filing of the case in court or government office for adjudication shall be subject to the provision of
paragraph (b) (4) of Rule VIII of these Rules."cralaw virtua1aw library
It may thus be observed that the revised katarungang pambarangay law has at least three new significant
features, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. It increased the authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by imprisonment
not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.

2. As to venue, it provides that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located.

3. It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of offenses during the pendency of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers
from some ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by
the lupon or pangkat secretary." What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of the complaint is
unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight. Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of
the Rules and Regulations issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not found,
such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period shall, properly, be from receipt by the
complainant of the certificate of repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the
pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days.

The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon and if the mediation and
conciliation process at that level would be effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts,
justice would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships among protagonists in a
small community would be restored, and peace and order therein enhanced.

The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the Local Government Code, also
broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate civil and criminal cases arising from
incidents occurring in workplaces or institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located. That barangay may not be the appropriate venue in either paragraph
(a) or paragraph (b) of the said section. This rule provides convenience to the parties. Procedural rules
including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and convenient hearing to the parties with
complete justice between them as a result. 14 Elsewise stated, convenience is the raison d’ etre of the rule
on venue.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration
process. It discourages any intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the
prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as the reason for immediate
recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less
emotionalism and more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of their dispute. The
sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the difference between peace and a full-blown,
wearisome, and expensive litigation between the parties.

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991, the jurisprudence built
thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court remains
applicable because its provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

In Peregrina v. Panis, 15 this Court stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Thus, Morata v. Go. 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held
that P.D. No. 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for the filing
of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition precedent could effect the sufficiency of the
plaintiff’s cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause of
action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of
earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members, lacking which the case can be dismissed.

The parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are actual residents in the same
barangay and their dispute does not fall under any of the excepted cases." (emphasis omitted)

Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so in Garces v. Court of Appeals: 16

"In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation procedure required under P.D.
1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of its
jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however, the fact
of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an issue
before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper.

x x x

The precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508 where applicable is
much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; the complaint becomes
afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination.
The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss." (emphasis omitted).

There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the defendant to seasonably invoke
non-referral to the appropriate lupon operated as a waiver thereof. 17 Furthermore, when such defect was
initially present when the case was first filed in the trial court, the subsequent issuance of the certification
to file action by the barangay, which constituted substantial compliance with the said requirement, cured
the defect. 18

On 15 October 1991, this Court promulgated the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. 19 Section 18
thereof provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 18. Referral to Lupon. — Cases requiring referral to the Lupon for conciliation under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall
have been complied with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested
without a warrant."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the proceedings before the court a quo, the petitioner and the respondents had in mind only P.D. No.
1508. The petitioner further invoked the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by
the Local Government Code of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree and
Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the private respondents, realizing the
weakness of their position under P.D. No. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might be a
wrong forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that on 20 April 1993 Atayde
"filed a complaint against petitioner before the barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, in
compliance with the requirements of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the Local Government
Code." 20 Yet, in a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it disregards the
virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not applicable to their cases before the court a quo
because (a) the petitioner and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or
municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said cases, may otherwise be barred by
the statute of limitations; and (c) even assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she
has substantially complied with it.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted enough diligence to inquire from the
private respondents if prior referral to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.

Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the Local Government Code of 1991,
more specifically on the provisions on the katarungan pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken
judicial notice thereof; ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts are
mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines." We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. 21 He should have applied the revised
katarungang pambarangay law under the Local Government Code of 1991. Had he done so, this petition
would not have reached us and taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more
important cases.

In view of the private respondents’ failure to appear at the first scheduled mediation on 28 April 1993 for
which the mediation was reset to 26 May 1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly
filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section
412 of the Local Government Code, respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to
dismiss the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508
(more properly, Section 412(b) (4) of the Local Government Code of 1991) which states that the parties
may go directly to court where the action is about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant
to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a
maximum period of sixty days from 23 April 1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with
the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati.

Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private
respondents are estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which they themselves had sought.
Their act of trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the scheduled
mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away with the trial court cannot be countenanced
for to do so would wreak havoc on the barangay conciliation system.

Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical injuries, the offense for which she may
be liable would only be slight physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code,
considering that per the medical certificates 22 the injuries sustained by the private respondents would
"heal" in nine days "in the absence of complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries
incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for such period. The penalty therefor
would only be "arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure." These penalties are light
under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two months pursuant to Article
90.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 were
allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months
thereafter. Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private respondents’ complaints with
the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April 1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days,
or until 22 June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said period of suspension
and, accordingly, a certification to file action is issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six
days within which to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there was no basis
for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of
the Local Government Code.

Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that the petitioner "had already
waived the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering
that the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays." The petitioner did not waive
the reconciliation proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended
the scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her
counter-affidavit. 23

Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondents that the parties could not agree on
a compromise and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. 24
The request is dated 23 June 1993, 25 or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases Nos. 145233
and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this was done to support their contention in the
said court that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to the
lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to appear at the initial confrontation
and long after the criminal cases were filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file
action.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234.

Before closing these cases, this Court wishes to emphasize the vital role which the revised katarungang
pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in promoting peace, stability, and
progress therein, and in effectively preventing or reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to
disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law,
government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts
should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge of 2 July 1993 and 5 August
1993 in Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 1452334, both entitled "People of the Philippines v. Felicidad Uy"
are hereby SET ASIDE and the respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to DISMISS said cases within ten (10)
days from receipt of a copy of this decision.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Costs against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-62339 October 27, 1983

SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P. MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR., Judge, Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, respondents.

Amado G. Olis for petitioners.

Paul G. Gorres for private respondents.

ESCOLIN., J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, the Court is
called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall within the coverage of Presidential Decree No.
1508, 1 otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory process of
arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, Petitioners contend that
said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and
municipal courts, now known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the
courts of first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit its
coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial courts and
municipal trial courts.

The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in
the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a
complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus
damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.

On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of Cebu City,
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior
availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the
absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been
reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents.

On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order dated October 3, 1982,
as follows:

Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of
P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat, shall be elevated for nullification of the award or for execution of the same, and considering that
from the provision of Section 14 of the same law, the pre- condition to the filing of a complaint as provided
for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the considered opinion of this Court that the
provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in
Sections 11 and 12 of the law.

In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants, of the order of September
2. 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby denied. [Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].

From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated December 2, 1982, We
required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their answer and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-
22154.

We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:

SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint.— No complaint, petition, action for

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be
filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary attested by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to
court in the following cases:

[1] Where the accused is under detention;

[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;

[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support pendente lite; and

[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations

Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:

SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority
to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine
upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.

Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the authority to
settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality.
The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that
should be compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the
Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining
the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which
usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory
construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not distinguish. 2 By compelling the
disputants to settle their differences through the intervention of the barangay leader and other respected
members of the barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of
the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in
mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage indiscriminate
filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of
justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-
defeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the
instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior
court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek
to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the log-
jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not have intended such half-measure and
self-defeating legislation.

The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:

WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored tradition of amicably settling
disputes among family and barangay level without judicial resources would promote the speedy
administration of justice and implement the constitutional mandate to preserve and develop Filipino
culture and to strengthen the family as a basic social institution;

WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice contributes heavily and unjustifiably to
the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a deterioration in the quality of justice;

WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion and thereby enhance the quality of
justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed desirable to formally organize and institutionalize a system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level.

There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its
obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as
would bring about the optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be
half-met and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts.

Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior
courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit:

Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is situated.

for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases involving real property or
any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has always been vested in the courts of first
instance [now regional trial court].

But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5 of the law speak of the city
and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration
award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the
scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in
Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the
nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These
sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or
actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of
the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said
sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies
exclusively to said inferior courts.

Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:

TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS
AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT

SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community
Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in
implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.

Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro is to that extent
modified.

This Circular takes effect immediately.

It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from receiving
complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has
been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of
first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now
known as regional trial courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E.
Marcos in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which reads as
follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of
all government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered
that immediate implementation be made by all government officials and offices concerned of the system
of amicably settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
[Presidential Decree No. 1508]."

Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the conciliation process at the
barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not
only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but
for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying petitioners' motion to
dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained from conducting further proceedings in Civil
Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, CJ Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ
concur.

Makasiar and Teehankee, JJ., reserves his vote.

De Castro, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.: concurring:

I concur. The case filed by the Go spouses in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the collection of
P49,400 from the Morata spouses, Civil Case No. R-22154, is covered by the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, Presidential Decree No. 1508. The impression that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts
does not seem to be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or among persons
actually residing in the same barangay or to those involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality (Sec. 3).

Cases between or among those persons should undergo the conciliation process, whatever may be the
amount involved or the nature of the issue involved as long as they do not belong to the following cases:

(a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities unless such
barangays adjoin each other;
(b) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities;

(c) Where one party is the government or any sub-division or instrumentality thereof;

(d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

(e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a
fine exceeding two hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus, physical injuries requiring medical attendance for not
exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light threats, unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters
for settlement;

(f) Offenses where there is no private offended party, for example, littering, gambling, jaywalking,
public scandal, vagrancy and prostitution; and,

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in the interest of justice, determine
upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government and Community
Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan Pambarangay Rules).

The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in section 6 of the law.

Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9, 1979 has enjoined all Judges of the Courts
of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian Courts, city
courts, municipal courts and their clerks of court to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon their receipt of the
certification of the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays
within their respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.

The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies to the cases in
Regional Trial Courts or Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a complaint for damages in the sum of
P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority of the Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1508 (Opinion No. 81, Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series of 198 1).

The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court contemplates situations for the enforcement or
nullification of settlement or arbitration award. If there is no award, the city or municipal court will have no
occasion to intervene.

Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and should receive commensurate
remuneration for their work is another question.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.: concurring:

I concur. The case filed by the Go spouses in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the collection of
P49,400 from the Morata spouses, Civil Case No. R-22154, is covered by the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, Presidential Decree No. 1508. The impression that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts
does not seem to be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or among persons
actually residing in the same barangay or to those involving actual residents of different barangays within
the same city or municipality (Sec. 3).

Cases between or among those persons should undergo the conciliation process, whatever may be the
amount involved or the nature of the issue involved as long as they do not belong to the following cases:

(a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities unless such
barangays adjoin each other;

(b) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities;

(c) Where one party is the government or any sub-division or instrumentality thereof;

(d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

(e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a
fine exceeding two hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus, physical injuries requiring medical attendance for not
exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light threats, unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters
for settlement;

(f) Offenses where there is no private offended party, for example, littering, gambling, jaywalking,
public scandal, vagrancy and prostitution; and,

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in the interest of justice, determine
upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government and Community
Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan Pambarangay Rules).

The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in section 6 of the law.

Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9, 1979 has enjoined all Judges of the Courts
of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian Courts, city
courts, municipal courts and their clerks of court to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon their receipt of the
certification of the Minister of Local Government and Community Development that all the barangays
within their respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.

The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies to the cases in
Regional Trial Courts or Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a complaint for damages in the sum of
P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority of the Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No.
1508 (Opinion No. 81, Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series of 198 1).

The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court contemplates situations for the enforcement or
nullification of settlement or arbitration award. If there is no award, the city or municipal court will have no
occasion to intervene.
Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and should receive commensurate
remuneration for their work is another question.

Footnotes

1 Promulgated June 11, 1978.

2 Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. v. Gimenez, I SCRA 267.
3 SECTION 11. Effect of amicable settlement and arbitration toward the amicable settlement and
arbitration award shall have the force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the expiration of ten
(10) days after the date thereof unless repudiation of the settlement has been made or a petition for
nullification of the award has been filed before the proper city or municipal court.
4 SECTION 12. Execution.The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
execution within one (1) year from the date of settlement. After the lapse of such time, the settlement may
be enforced by action in the appropriate city/municipal court.
5 SECTION 14. Transmittal of settlement and arbitration award to court.- The Secretary of the
Lupon shall transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the local city or municipal court within five
(5) days from the date of the award or from the lapse of the ten-day period for repudiating the settlement
and shall furnish copies thereof to each of the parties to the settlement and the Barangay Captain.
6 Dated November 9, 1979.

G.R. No. 183623 June 25, 2012

LETICIA B. AGBAYANI, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

On petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court is the Decision1 dated March 27, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated July 3, 2008
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof in CA-G.R. SP No. 99626. Petitioner Leticia B. Agbayani
(Agbayani) assails the resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ) which directed the withdrawal of her
complaint for grave oral defamation filed against respondent Loida Marcelina J. Genabe (Genabe).

Antecedent Facts

Agbayani and Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Piñas City,
working as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani
filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City, docketed as I.S. No. 07-0013, for allegedly uttering against her, in the
presence of their fellow court employees and while she was going about her usual duties at work, the
following statements, to wit:

"ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA TINAPOS MO YUNG MARVILLA CASE, ANG GALING MO. FEELING
LAWYER KA KASI, BAKIT DI KA MAGDUTY NA LANG, STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA NA LANG, ANG
GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG KASO, TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE HIGH
BLOOD DIN KA, MAMATAY KA SANA SA HIGH BLOOD MO."3
In a Resolution4 rendered on February 12, 2007, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City5 found
probable cause for the filing of the Information for grave oral defamation against Genabe.

However, upon a petition for review filed by Genabe, the DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda (Pineda)
found that:

After careful evaluation and consideration of the evidence on record, we find merit in the instant petition.

Contrary to the findings in the assailed resolution, we find that the subject utterances of respondent
constitute only slight oral defamation.

As alleged by the [petitioner] in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of her complaint-affidavit, respondent uttered the
remarks subject matter of the instant case in the heat of anger. This was also the tenor of the sworn
statements of the witnesses for complainant. The Supreme Court, in the case of Cruz vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. L-56224-26, November 25, 1982, x x x held that although abusive remarks may ordinarily be
considered as serious defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case, there having been
provocation on complainant’s part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of
unrestrained anger and obfuscation, such utterances constitute only the crime of slight oral defamation.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we believe that the instant case should nonetheless be dismissed for non-
compliance with the provisions of Book III, Title I, Chapter 7 (Katarungang Pambarangay), of Republic Act
No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991). As shown by the records, the parties herein are residents
of Las Piñas City. x x x

The complaint-affidavit, however, failed to show that the instant case was previously referred to the
barangay for conciliation in compliance with Sections 408 and 409, paragraph (d), of the Local Government
Code, which provides:

Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. – The lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes except: xxx

Section 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or
xxx shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

The records of the case likewise show that the instant case is not one of the exceptions enumerated under
Section 408 of the Local Government Code. Hence, the dismissal of the instant petition is proper.

It is well-noted that the Supreme Court held that where the case is covered by P.D. 1508 (Katarungang
Pambarangay Law), the compulsory process of arbitration required therein is a pre-condition for filing a
complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of the excepted cases, or (b) it did
not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation
or settlement had been reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed x x x. While the foregoing
doctrine is handed down in civil cases, it is submitted that the same should apply to criminal cases covered
by, but filed without complying with, the provisions of P.D. 1508 x x x.6

Thus, in a Resolution7 dated May 17, 2007, the DOJ disposed, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City is directed to move for the withdrawal of the information for grave
oral defamation filed against respondent Loida Marcelina J. Genabe, and report the action taken thereon
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.8

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution9 dated June 25, 2007.

Consequently, Agbayani filed a petition for certiorari with the CA alleging that the DOJ committed grave
abuse of discretion in setting aside the Resolution dated February 12, 2007 of the City Prosecutor of Las
Piñas City in I.S. Case No. 07-0013. She averred that the respondent’s petition for review filed with the DOJ
did not comply with Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70, or the "2000 National Prosecution Service
(NPS) Rules on Appeal," and maintained that her evidence supported a finding of probable cause for grave
oral defamation against respondent Genabe.

On March 27, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the DOJ. Citing Punzalan v. Dela Peña,10 the CA stated that for grave abuse of discretion to exist, the
complained act must constitute a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as it is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction, or when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law. It is not sufficient that a tribunal, in the exercise of its power,
abused its discretion; such abuse must be grave.

On motion for reconsideration by the petitioner, the CA denied the same in its Resolution11 dated July 3,
2008. Hence, the instant petition.

Assignment of Errors

Maintaining her stance, Agbayani raised the following, to wit:

I. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RESPONDENT DOJ DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE RESOLUTION OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF
LAS PIÑAS CITY.

II. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT DOJ'S FINDING THAT WHAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT COMMITTED WAS ONLY SLIGHT ORAL DEFAMATION.

III. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT DOJ'S DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF
1991.

IV. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER DOJ CIRCULAR
NO. 70 (2000 NPS Rule on Appeal) ARE NOT MANDATORY.12

Ruling and Discussions

The petition is bereft of merit.

We shall first tackle Agbayani's arguments on the first two issues raised in the instant petition.
1. Petitioner Agbayani alleged that Undersecretary Pineda unfairly heeded only to the arguments
interposed by respondent Genabe in her comment; and the CA, in turn, took his findings and reasoning as
gospel truth. Agbayani’s comment was completely disregarded and suppressed in the records of the DOJ.
Agbayani discovered this when she went to the DOJ to examine the records, as soon as she received a copy
of the DOJ Resolution of her motion for reconsideration.

2. Further, petitioner Agbayani maintained that respondent Genabe’s Petition for Review13 should have
been dismissed outright, since it failed to state the name and address of the petitioner, nor did it show
proof of service to her, pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70. Also, the petition was not
accompanied with the required attachments, i.e. certified copies of the complaint, affidavits of witnesses,
petitioner's reply to respondent's counter-affidavit, and documentary evidences of petitioner. Thus, a
grave irregularity was committed by the DOJ in allowing the surreptitious insertion of these and many
other documents in the records of the case, after the petition had been filed.

In particular, petitioner Agbayani alleged that when the petition was filed on March 22, 2007, only five (5)
documents were attached thereto, namely: (a) the Resolution of the City Prosecutor; (b) the respondent's
Counter-affidavit; (c) Letter of the staff dated January 2, 2005; (d) her Answer; and (e) the Information filed
against respondent Genabe with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City. However, at the time
the Resolution of the DOJ was issued, a total of forty-one (41) documents14 formed part of the records of
the petition. Besides, respondent Genabe's Motion to Defer Arraignment (Document No. 40) and the court
order relative to the granting of the same (Document No. 41) were both dated March 23, 2007, or a day
after the petition was filed. Agbayani asserted that these thirty-six (36) documents were surreptitiously
and illegally attached to the records of the case, an act constituting extrinsic fraud and grave
misconduct.15 At the very least, the DOJ should have required respondent Genabe to formalize the
"insertion" of the said documents.

Petitioner Agbayani reiterated that her version of the incident was corroborated by several witnesses
(officemates of Agbayani and Genabe), while that of Genabe was not. And since the crime committed by
respondent Genabe consisted of her exact utterances, the DOJ erred in downgrading the same to slight
oral defamation, completely disregarding the finding by the Investigating Prosecutor of probable cause for
the greater offense of grave oral defamation. She denied that she gave provocation to respondent Genabe,
insisting that the latter committed the offense with malice aforethought and not in the heat of anger.

We find no merit in the above arguments.

It is well to be reminded, first of all, that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when
such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules
of Court reflects this principle.16

Anent the charge of non-compliance with the rules on appeal, Sections 5 and 6 of the aforesaid DOJ
Circular provide:

SECTION 5. Contents of petition. - The petition shall contain or state: (a) the names and addresses of the
parties; (b) the Investigation Slip number (I.S. No.) and criminal case number, if any, and title of the case,
including the offense charged in the complaint; (c) the venue of the preliminary investigation; (d) the
specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (e) a clear and concise statement of the facts, the
assignment of errors, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; and (f)
proof of service of a copy of the petition to the adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned.
The petition shall be accompanied by legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the resolution
appealed from together with legible true copies of the complaint, affidavits/sworn statements and other
evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation/ reinvestigation.

If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the motion to defer
proceedings filed in court must also accompany the petition.

The investigating/reviewing/approving prosecutor shall not be impleaded as party respondent in the

petition.1âwphi1 The party taking the appeal shall be referred to in the petition as either "Complainant-
Appellant" or "Respondent-Appellant."

SECTION 6. Effect of failure to comply with the requirements. – The failure of petitioner to comply WITH
ANY of the foregoing requirements shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Contrary to petitioner Agbayani's claim, there was substantial compliance with the rules. Respondent
Genabe actually mentioned on page 2 of her petition for review to the DOJ the name of the petitioner as
the private complainant, as well as indicated the latter’s address on the last page thereof as "RTC Branch
275, Las Piñas City." The CA also noted that there was proper service of the petition as required by the
rules since the petitioner was able to file her comment thereon. A copy thereof, attached as Annex "L" in
the instant petition, bears a mark that the comment was duly received by the Prosecution Staff, Docket
Section of the DOJ. Moreover, a computer verification requested by the petitioner showed that the
prosecutor assigned to the case had received a copy of the petitioner’s comment.17

As to the charge of extrinsic fraud, which consists of the alleged suppression of Agbayani's Comment and
the unauthorized insertion of documents in the records of the case with the DOJ, we agree with the CA
that this is a serious charge, especially if made against the Undersecretary of Justice; and in order for it to
prosper, it must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. However, petitioner Agbayani's only proof
is her bare claim that she personally checked the records and found that her Comment was missing and 36
new documents had been inserted. This matter was readily brought to the attention of Undersecretary
Pineda by petitioner Agbayani in her motion for reconsideration, who however must surely have found
such contention without merit, and thus denied the motion.18

Section 5 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal also provides that the petition for review must be accompanied
by a legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the resolution appealed from, together with legible
true copies of the complaint, affidavits or sworn statements and other evidence submitted by the parties
during the preliminary investigation or reinvestigation. Petitioner Agbayani does not claim that she was
never furnished, during the preliminary investigation, with copies of the alleged inserted documents, or
that any of these documents were fabricated. In fact, at least seven (7) of these documents were copies of
her own submissions to the investigating prosecutor.19 Presumably, the DOJ required respondent Genabe
to submit additional documents produced at the preliminary investigation, along with Document Nos. 40
and 41, for a fuller consideration of her petition for review.

As for Document Nos. 40 and 41, which were dated a day after the filing of the petition, Section 5 of the
2000 NPS Rules on Appeal provides that if an Information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed
resolution, a copy of the Motion to Defer Proceedings must also accompany the petition. Section 3 of the
above Rules states that an appeal to the DOJ must be taken within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
resolution or of the denial of the motion for reconsideration. While it may be presumed that the motion to
defer arraignment accompanying the petition should also be filed within the appeal period, respondent
Genabe can not actually be faulted if the resolution thereof was made after the lapse of the period to
appeal.

In Guy vs. Asia United Bank,20 a motion for reconsideration from the resolution of the Secretary of Justice,
which was filed four (4) days beyond the "non-extendible period of ten (10) days", was allowed under
Section 13 of the 2000 NPS Rules on Appeal. The Supreme Court held that the authority of the Secretary of
Justice to review and order the withdrawal of an Information in instances where he finds the absence of a
prima facie case is not time-barred, albeit subject to the approval of the court, if its jurisdiction over the
accused has meanwhile attached.21 We further explained:

[I]t is not prudent or even permissible for a court to compel the Secretary of Justice or the fiscal, as the
case may be, to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the
evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. Now, then, if the Secretary of Justice possesses
sufficient latitude of discretion in his determination of what constitutes probable cause and can legally
order a reinvestigation even in those extreme instances where an information has already been filed in
court, is it not just logical and valid to assume that he can take cognizance of and competently act on a
motion for reconsideration, belatedly filed it might have been, dealing with probable cause? And is it not a
grievous error on the part of the CA if it virtually orders the filing of an information, as here, despite a
categorical statement from the Secretary of Justice about the lack of evidence to proceed with the
prosecution of the petitioner? The answer to both posers should be in the affirmative. As we said in Santos
v. Go:

"[C]ourts cannot interfere with the discretion of the public prosecutor in evaluating the offense charged.
He may dismiss the complaint forthwith, if he finds the charge insufficient in form or substance, or without
any ground. Or, he may proceed with the investigation if the complaint in his view is sufficient and in
proper form. The decision whether to dismiss a complaint or not, is dependent upon the sound discretion
of the prosecuting fiscal and, ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Findings of the Secretary of Justice
are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion.

xxx

[T]o strike down the April 20, 2006 DOJ Secretary's Resolution as absolutely void and without effect
whatsoever, as the assailed CA decision did, for having been issued after the Secretary had supposedly lost
jurisdiction over the motion for reconsideration subject of the resolution may be reading into the
aforequoted provision a sense not intended. For, the irresistible thrust of the assailed CA decision is that
the DOJ Secretary is peremptorily barred from taking a second hard look at his decision and, in appropriate
cases, reverse or modify the same unless and until a motion for reconsideration is timely interposed and
pursued. The Court cannot accord cogency to the posture assumed by the CA under the premises which,
needless to stress, would deny the DOJ the authority to motu proprio undertake a review of his own
decision with the end in view of protecting, in line with his oath of office, innocent persons from
groundless, false or malicious prosecution. As the Court pointed out in Torres, Jr. v. Aguinaldo, the
Secretary of Justice would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of
an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence warrants the filing of
the action in court.22 (Citations omitted and underscoring supplied)

The Court further stated in Guy that when the DOJ Secretary took cognizance of the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, he "effectively excepted such motion from the operation of the aforequoted Section 13 of
DOJ Circular No. 70, s. 2000. This show of liberality is, to us, within the competence of the DOJ Secretary to
make. The Court is not inclined to disturb the same absent compelling proof, that he acted out of whim
and that petitioner was out to delay the proceedings to the prejudice of respondent in filing the motion for
reconsideration."23

The case of First Women's Credit Corporation v. Perez,24 succinctly summarizes the general rules relative
to criminal prosecution: that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction,
preliminary or final, albeit in extreme cases, exceptional circumstances have been recognized; that courts
follow the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by the DOJ, and of leaving
to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of an information against a supposed
offender; and, that the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined to a determination of whether the
assailed executive or judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.

But while prosecutors are given sufficient latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause,
their findings are still subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. Surely, this power of the Secretary of
Justice to review includes the discretion to accept additional evidence from the investigating prosecutor or
from herein respondent Genabe, evidence which nonetheless appears to have already been submitted to
the investigating prosecutor but inadvertently omitted by her when she filed her petition.

3. Coming now to the DOJ's finding that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the CA held that the
DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion in causing the dismissal thereof on the ground of non-
compliance with the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, on the Katarungang Pambarangay
conciliation procedure.

Undeniably, both petitioner Agbayani and respondent Genabe are residents of Las Piñas City and both
work at the RTC, and the incident which is the subject matter of the case happened in their workplace.25
Agbayani’s complaint should have undergone the mandatory barangay conciliation for possible amicable
settlement with respondent Genabe, pursuant to Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No. 7160 or the
Local Government Code of 1991 which provide:

Sec. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception thereto. – The lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes, except: x x x

Sec. 409. Venue. x x x (d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or x x
x shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is located.

Administrative Circular No. 14-93,26 issued by the Supreme Court on July 15, 1993 states that:

xxx

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law
[formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec.
515, Title I, Book IV, R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991], and prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any government offices, except in
the following disputes:

[1] Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

[3] Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities, unless the
parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

[4] Any complaint by or against corporations, partnerships or juridical entities, since only individuals shall
be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or respondents [Sec. 1, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules];

[5] Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

[6] Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one [1] year or a
fine of over five thousand pesos ([₱]5,000.00);

[7] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[8] Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or further
continued, specifically the following:

[a] Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention [See Sec. 412(b)(1), Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law];

[b] Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful custody over another or a
person illegally deprived of or on acting in his behalf;

[c] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of
personal property and support during the pendency of the action; and

[d] Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

[9] Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;

[10] Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) [Secs. 46 & 47, R. A.
6657];

[11] Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations [Montoya vs. Escayo, 171
SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over
conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to certain offices of the Department of
Labor and Employment];

[12] Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court [See Sanchez vs.
[Judge] Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459]."

xxx
The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the filing of the complaint in court. Where the
complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said
conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation had been reached by the parties,
the case should be dismissed.27

Here, petitioner Agbayani failed to show that the instant case is not one of the exceptions enumerated
above. Neither has she shown that the oral defamation caused on her was so grave as to merit a penalty of
more than one year. Oral defamation under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
penalized as follows:

"Article 358. Slander. – Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty
shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos."

Apparently, the DOJ found probable cause only for slight oral defamation. As defined in Villanueva v.
People,28 oral defamation or slander is the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to
prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood. It is grave slander when
it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity depends upon: (1) the expressions used; (2) the personal
relations of the accused and the offended party; and (3) the special circumstances of the case, the
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the
intention of the offender at the time. In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of
anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.29

We recall that in the morning of December 27, 2006 when the alleged utterances were made, Genabe was
about to punch in her time in her card when she was informed that she had been suspended for failing to
meet her deadline in a case, and that it was Agbayani who informed the presiding judge that she had
missed her deadline when she left to attend a convention in Baguio City, leaving Agbayani to finish the task
herself. According to Undersecretary Pineda, the confluence of these circumstances was the immediate
cause of respondent Genabe's emotional and psychological distress. We rule that his determination that
the defamation was uttered while the respondent was in extreme excitement or in a state of passion and
obfuscation, rendering her offense of lesser gravity than if it had been made with cold and calculating
deliberation, is beyond the ambit of our review.30 The CA concurred that the complained utterances
constituted only slight oral defamation, having been said in the heat of anger and with perceived
provocation from Agbayani. Respondent Genabe was of a highly volatile personality prone to throw fits
(sumpongs), who thus shared a hostile working environment with her co-employees, particularly with her
superiors, Agbayani and Hon. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she
claimed had committed against her "grievous acts that outrage moral and social conduct." That there had
been a long-standing animosity between Agbayani and Genabe is not denied.

4. Lastly, petitioner Agbayani insists that the DOJ should have dismissed respondent Genabe's petition for
review outright pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70. It is true that the general rule in
statutory construction is that the words "shall," "must," "ought," or "should" are words of mandatory
character in common parlance and in their in ordinary signification,31 yet, it is also well-recognized in law
and equity as a not absolute and inflexible criterion.32 Moreover, it is well to be reminded that DOJ
Circular No. 70 is a mere tool designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice through appeals
taken with the National Prosecution Service. Thus, technical rules of procedure like those under Sections 5
and 6 thereof should be interpreted in such a way to promote, not frustrate, justice.

Besides, Sections 7 and 10 of DOJ Circular No. 70 clearly give the Secretary of Justice, or the
Undersecretary in his place, wide latitude of discretion whether or not to dismiss a petition. Section 6 of
DOJ Circular No. 70, invoked by petitioner Agbayani, is clearly encompassed within this authority, as shown
by a cursory reading of Sections 7 and 10, to wit:

SECTION 7. Action on the petition. The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the
same to be patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are
too unsubstantial to require consideration.

SECTION 12. Disposition of the appeal. The Secretary may reverse, affirm or modify the appealed
resolution. He may, motu proprio or upon motion, dismiss the petition for review on any of the following
grounds:

– That the petition was filed beyond the period prescribed in Section 3 hereof;

– That the procedure or any of the requirements herein provided has not been complied with;

– That there is no showing of any reversible error;

– That the appealed resolution is interlocutory in nature, except when it suspends the proceedings based
on the alleged existence of a prejudicial question;

– That the accused had already been arraigned when the appeal was taken;

– That the offense has already prescribed; and

– That other legal or factual grounds exist to warrant a dismissal.

We reiterate what we have stated in Yao v. Court of Appeals33 that:

In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of
compliance, may be relaxed.1âwphi1 In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would
result in absurdity and manifest injustice, or where the merit of a party's cause is apparent and outweighs
consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements, procedural rules should definitely be
liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities.34
(Citations omitted)

All told, we find that the CA did not commit reversible error in upholding the Resolution dated May 17,
2007 of the DOJ as we, likewise, find the same to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision
dated March 27, 2008 and the Resolution dated July 3, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
99626 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Hakim S. Abdulwahid and Mariflor
Punzalan Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-45.

2 Id. at 46-50.

3 Id. at 29-30.

4 Id. at 69-71.

5 Through Prosecution Attorney II Carlo DL. Monzon.

6 Rollo, pp. 91-93.

7 Id. at 90-93.

8 Id. at 93.

9 Id. at 109-110.

10 478 Phil. 771 (2004).

11 Supra note 2.

12 Rollo, p. 13.

13 Id. at 72-81.

14 Id. at 97-99.
15 Judge Almario v. Atty. Resus, 376 Phil. 857 (1999).

16 Ginete v. CA, 357 Phil. 36, 51 (1998).

17 Rollo, p. 37.

18 Id.

19 Doc Nos. 12, 13, 25, 27, 36, 37, 38, per petitioner Agbayani’s Motion for Reconsideration from the
Department of Justice Resolution; id. at 97-99.

20 G.R. No. 174874, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 703.

21 Crespo v. Judge Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987).

22 Supra note 20, at 712-714.

23 Id. at 714.

24 G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774.

25 Rollo, p. 92.

26 Guidelines on the Katarungang Pambarangay Conciliation Procedure to Prevent Circumvention of the

Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Sections 399-442, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, R.A. No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991].

27 Morato v. Go, et al., 210 Phil. 367 (1983).

28 521 Phil. 191 (2006).

29 Id. at 204, citing the Revised Penal Code.

30 Buan vs. Matugas, G.R. No. 161179, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 263.

31 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 Edition, at 238.

32 Id. at 239-240.

33 398 Phil. 86 (2000).

34 Id. at 107-108.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265 April 6, 2000

VALENCIDES VERCIDE, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and Tudela, Misamis
Occidental, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint filed against Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez of the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin
and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, charging her with grave abuse of authority and ignorance of the law for
her dismissal of a case which complainant Valencides Vercide and his wife had filed against Daria Lagas
Galleros for recovery of possession of a piece of land. The land is located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis
Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same municipality, while complainant and his wife are
residents of Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the case was filed in court without prior referral to the
Lupong Tagapamayapa.
However, this matter was raised by defendant in her answer as an affirmative defense, and respondent, in
her order of July 15, 1997, ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to the prosecution of the
counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in her answer. In support of her order, respondent cited P.D. No.
1508, §3 of which provides:

Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought for
amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of different
barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or
any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all disputes which
involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or
any part thereof is situated. (Emphasis added)

Complainant and his wife moved for a reconsideration, citing the following provisions of R.A. 7160, "The
Local Government Code of 1991":

SEC. 408. Subject matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each barangay shall
have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos
(P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. marie

The court in which the non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code are
filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable
settlement.

SEC. 409. Venue. - (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be brought
for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city of municipality shall be
brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election
of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution where
such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay; otherwise,
the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong barangay in
resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly
designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

They argued that under §408(f), in relation to §409(c), where the parties to a dispute involving real
property or any interest therein are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of adjoining
barangays, prior resort to barangay conciliation is not required.

However, respondent denied the motion. In her order dated September 9, 1997, respondent stated:

The Court after taking into consideration the Motion for Reconsideration and the ground relied upon by
the counsel finds that counsel for the plaintiffs failed to correlate Sections 408 and 409 of Republic Act No.
7160 and to consider Rule VIII, paragraph (a) of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules, the rules and
regulations [of] which were promulgated to implement Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One Book III
and Section 515, Book IV of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, to wit:

"RULE VIII - PRE-CONDITION FOR FORMAL ADJUDICATION

Conciliation, pre-condition for filing of complaint in court or government office. novero

(a) No individual may go directly to court or to any government office for adjudication of his dispute with
another individual upon any matter falling within the authority of the Punong Barangay or Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo to settle under these Rules, unless, after personal confrontation of the parties before
them earnest efforts to conciliate have failed to result in a settlement or such settlement has been
effectively repudiated."

and also Rule VI, Section 3 paragraph (c) of the same Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which provides:

"Rule VI - Amicable Settlement of Disputes

Section 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:

....

(c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the Barangay where the real property
or larger portion thereof is situated.

From the provisions of the above-cited Rules it was very clear that parties whose disputes involved real
property should first br[ing] the said dispute before the barangay where the property was located, and
that [because of] failure to bring the dispute before the Barangay for conciliation no action may be filed in
court for final adjudication of the said dispute.
That parties should first comply with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law before the Court
can acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. That non-compliance of the plaintiff to the requirement of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law was admitted by her in paragraph 3 of the complaint. Her allegation of
non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Lupon Conciliation before the filing of the complaint,
in a way divest[s] the Court of its jurisdiction over the case. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16,
Section 1, paragraph (j) provides:

"That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with"

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.

Complainant alleges that in dismissing Civil Case No. 295, respondent judge committed "(a) Grave abuse of
authority by knowingly rendering an unjust and unlawful order; (b) Ignorance of the law in its highest
order, she being a judge; (c) Grave disobedience to the jurisprudence laid down by the Supreme Court of
the Philippines on the matter of exemption of lupon conciliation of contending parties who are not
residen[ts] of the same city or municipality." He states that respondent "practically threw several decisions
of the Supreme Court on the matter out of the window and obviously followed hook, line and sinker the
arguments of the [defendant] Daria Galleros."

In answer, respondent judge claims that she merely followed the law in dismissing the case. She prays that
the complaint against her be dismissed and that complainant be ordered to stop harassing her just because
he had not been able to obtain the relief he wanted in Civil Case No. 295. nigel

In its memorandum dated February 29, 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends the
dismissal of this case on the ground that the "issue [raised] is purely judicial and is best resolved by a court
of competent jurisdiction" and that, even if respondent had erred, she should not be held administratively
liable since there is no allegation that she acted in bad faith or knowingly rendered an unjust judgment.

In Tavora v. Veloso,1 this Court already ruled that where parties do not reside in the same city or
municipality or in adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute involving
real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. As explained in that case:

The sole issue raised is one of law: Under the given facts, is the respondent judge barred from taking
cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1508 establishing a system of amicably settling
disputes at the barangay level? The section reads:

"SECTION. 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. - No complaint, petition, action or proceeding

involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or
instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has been reached
as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . ." (Italics supplied)

For the above provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the jurisdiction of the Lupong
Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the relevant provisions of PD 1508 are:

"SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. - The Lupon of each barangay shall have authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all
disputes except:
(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

(4) Offenses were there is no private offended party;

(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice determine, upon
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government. ella

"SECTION 3. Venue. — Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the
respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all
disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the
real property or any part thereof is situated.

"The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where
such barangays adjoin each other; and

(2) involving real property located in different municipalities." (Italics supplied)

The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of a
barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute:
The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time, Section 3 —
while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or in "different
barangays within the same city or municipality" — unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have "no
authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.

Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over disputes
where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the barangays in
which they actually reside adjoin each other.

It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a given
dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:

"However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the barangay
where the real property or any part thereof is situated."

Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such. marinella

The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary
the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear indication to
the contrary.2
To be sure, the Court was interpreting in that case the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 which, except for some
modifications, are applicable to the case before respondent judge because they are now found in §§408-
409 of R.A. No. 7160 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The ruling in Tavora v. Veloso, reiterated in
other cases,3 should be familiar to the bench and the bar. As we have held in Espiritu v. Jovellanos,4 the
phrase "Ignorance of the law excuses no one" has a special application to judges who, under the injunction
of Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence." In Bacar v. De Guzman,5 it was held that when the law violated is basic, the failure to
observe it constitutes gross ignorance. Reiterating this ruling, it was emphasized in Almeron v. Sardido6
that the disregard of an established rule of law amounts to gross ignorance of the law and makes the judge
subject to disciplinary action.

In the case at bar, respondent showed patent ignorance ¾ if not disregard ¾ of this Court’s rulings on the
jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapamayapa by her erroneous quotations of the provisions of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing R.A. No. 7160. While a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders, his error may be so gross or
patent that he should be administratively disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

In this case, respondent at first cited P.D. No. 1508, §3 as basis of her action. When her attention was
called to the fact that this had been repealed by §409(c) of R.A. No. 7160, respondent, who obviously was
more intent in justifying her previous order than correcting her error, quoted out of context the provisions
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing the Katarungang Pambarangay provisions of R.A. No.
7160. She thus violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that "In every case, a judge
shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public
opinion or fear of criticism."

Contrary to respondent’s interpretation, it is clear even from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules that
recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside in the same
municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. Rule VI of the same states in pertinent part:

SECTION 2. Subject matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of proceedings for amicable
settlement under these rules except the following enumerated cases:

(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; alonzo

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance of his
official functions;

(c) Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a
fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities unless the parties
thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto to agree to submit their differences
to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The foregoing exceptions notwithstanding, the court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under these Katarungang Pambarangay Law and Rules are filed may, at any time
before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

SECTION 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:

(a) Where the parties reside in the same barangay, the dispute shall be brought for settlement in said
barangay;

(b) Where the parties reside in different barangays in the same city or municipality, the dispute shall be
settled in the barangay where the respondent or any one of the respondents actually resides, at the choice
of the complainant;

(c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the barangay where the real property
or larger portion thereof is situated;

(d) Disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the institution
where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or
institution is located;

(e) Any objection relating to venue shall be raised before the Punong Barangay during the mediation
proceedings before him. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver of such objection;

(f) Any legal question which may confront the Punong Barangay in resolving objections to venue herein
referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated representative, whose
ruling thereon shall be binding. brando

(Emphasis added)

Indeed, these provisions, which are also found in P.D. No. 1508, have already been authoritatively
interpreted by this Court, and the duty of respondent judge was to follow the rulings of this Court. Her
insistence on her own interpretation of the law can only be due either to an ignorance of this Court’s ruling
or to an utter disregard thereof. We choose to believe that her failure to apply our rulings to the case
before her was simply due to gross ignorance which, nevertheless, is inexcusable. In accordance with the
ruling in Ting v. Atal,7 in which a judge who was similarly found guilty of gross ignorance of the law was
fined P2,000.00, respondent judge should likewise be fined the same amount.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby ordered to pay
a FINE of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS with a WARNING that repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. micks

Footnotes
1 117 SCRA 613 (1982).
2 Id., at 615-617.
3 E.g., Peñaflor v. Panis, 117 SCRA 953 (1982); Agbayani v. Belen, 145 SCRA 635 (1986).
4 280 SCRA 579 (1997).
5 271 SCRA 328 (1997).
6 281 SCRA 415 (1997).
7 231 SCRA 80 (1994).

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