CASE DIGEST FOR LEGAL RESEARCH – 9/10/2021

ARTHUR D. LIM and PAULINO R. ERSANDO, petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY as alter ego of HER EXCELLENCEY
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, and HONORABLE ANGELO REYES in his
capacity as Secretary of National Defense, respondents.

JURISPRUDENCE:

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be

invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of
Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be deprived "of its
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or
writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and
decrees of inferior courts in -( I) All cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order
or regulation is in question." In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental
law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

FACTS:

Beginning January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States
of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part in "Balikatan 02-1." These
so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations
involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint
military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

Prior to the year 2002, the last "Balikatan" was held in 1995. This was due to
the paucity of any formal agreement relative to the treatment of United States
personnel visiting the Philippines. In the meantime, the respective governments
of the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack
of consensus was eventually cured when the two nations concluded the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in 1999.

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On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed

this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the
joint exercise.

ISSUE:

Whether Balikatan 02-1 in accordance with the VFA is valid in the context of
the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. Balikatan 02-1 exercises in accordance with VFA is valid.

Both the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement, as in all
other treaties and international agreements to which the Philippines is a party,
must be read in the context of the 1987 Constitution. In particular, the Mutual
Defense Treaty was concluded way before the present Charter, though it
nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of international obligation. The
present Constitution contains key provisions useful in determining the extent
to which foreign military troops are allowed in Philippine territory. Thus, in the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is provided that:

SEC. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national

policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

SEC. 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its

relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-
determination.

SEC. 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts

and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in the country.

The Constitution also regulates the foreign relations powers of the Chief
Executive when it provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of the Senate."

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From the perspective of public international law, a treaty is favored over

municipal law pursuant to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. Hence, "[e]very
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them
in good faith."14 Further, a party to a treaty is not allowed to "invoke the
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty." 15

Our Constitution espouses the opposing view. Witness our jurisdiction as

stated in section 5 of Article VIII:

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as

the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and order of
lower courts in:

(A) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

The foregoing premises leave us no doubt that US forces are prohibited / from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory.

The Supreme Court found that the holding of "Balikatan 02-1" joint military
exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of error that would otherwise call
for correction on our part. In other words, respondents in the case at bar have
not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Case Digest by Janna Rosita Patricia D. Paragas

ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, PETITIONER

VS.
HON. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLO-MARIGOMEN, IN HER CAPACITY AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY,
BRANCH 101 AND ANTONIO L. TIU, RESPONDENTS.

JURISPRUDENCE:

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The Speech or Debate Clause cannot be successfully invoked to insulate his

statements, uttered outside the "sphere of legislative activity," from judicial
review.

FACTS:

Trillanes, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate

Resolution No. 826 directing the Senate's Committee on Accountability of
Public Officials and Investigations to investigate, in aid of legislation, the
alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City Hall II
Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall
Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and related
anomalies purportedly committed by former and local government officials.

Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014 Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-
Committee (SBRS) hearing on P.S. Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice
Mayor Ernesto Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped former Vice
President Jejomar Binay (VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350-
hectare estate in Barangay Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as
the Hacienda Binay, about 150 hectares of which have already been developed,
with paved roads, manicured lawns, a mansion with resort-style swimming
pool, man-made lakes, Japanese gardens, a horse stable with practice race
tracks, an extensive farm for fighting cocks, green houses and orchards.

Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly

during gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings,
and in reply to the media's request to respond to private respondent's claim
over the estate, he expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of the
documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is acting
as a "dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP Binay.

On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for

Damages against petitioner for Trillanes’ alleged defamatory statements before
the media from October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his repeated accusations
that private respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay.

Claiming that petitioner's statements besmirched his reputation, and caused

him sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and
social humiliation, private respondent sought to recover P4 Million as moral

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damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the

amount of P500,000.00.

The petitioner in his Motion to dismiss invoked his privileged immunity under
Article 6 Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether the statements made by the petitioner in response to media interviews

during gaps and breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate falls
within the purview of the privilege of speech and debate under Article 6 Section
11 of the 1987 Constitution.

HELD:

No, the petitioner’s statements do not fall within the Speech and Debate Clause
of the Constitution.

The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators
and Congressmen into "super-citizens" whose spoken words or actions are
rendered impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred
the privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for
the public good." It was intended to protect them against government pressure
and intimidation aimed at influencing their decision-making prerogatives. Such
grant of legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose
and plain language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, which may
"(enable) reckless men to slander and even destroy others," is not a cloak of
unqualified impunity; its invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating
inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department”. As this Court
emphasized in Pobre "the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to
members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own
benefit, but to enable them, as the people's representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the
courts or other forums outside the congressional hall."

An action for damages on account of defamatory statements not constituting

protected or privileged "speech or debate" is a controversy well within the
courts' authority to settle. evidence. In fine, petitioner cannot successfully
invoke parliamentary nonaccountability to insulate his statements, uttered
outside the "sphere of legislative activity," from judicial review.

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Case Digest by Janna Rosita Patricia D. Paragas

DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,

vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL,
COL. JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may
be appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondents.

G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:

JURISPRUDENCE:

Sec. 17 of Art. VI provides that the Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests in relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members.
It is created as non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial
tribunal for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and
manipulate the political component for their benefit and interests.

FACTS:

On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates
for Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
the winner having garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s
28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a protest with the HRET, composed of 9
members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members of the House chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision was
reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was
insisted by the LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107
votes more than Pineda’s. Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the
Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the winner. Thereafter, Congressman
Camasura received a letter informing him that he was expelled from the LDP
for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and
inviting LDP members to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal
from the HRET and that his vote be withdrawn. 

ISSUES:

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1. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant

political party therein, change that party's representation in the House
Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached
by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein?

2. May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?

HELD:  

No, the House of Representatives cannot interfere with election protests in the
HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET.

Sec. 17 of Art. VI provides that the Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all
contests in relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members.
It is created as non-partisan court to provide an independent and impartial
tribunal for determination of contests. The House cannot just shuffle and
manipulate the political component for their benefit and interests. The alleged
“party disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for his removal from the
party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the
HRET. Such members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be
replaced in cases of term expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation
from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause of termination. 

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is

granted. The decision of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and
void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita
G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-
0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set
aside. Considering the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of
that decision to the prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the
Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of justice,
hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service

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of copies thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs

against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.

Case Digest by Janna Rosita Patricia D. Paragas

WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of

Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET
AL., respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-10405           December 29, 1960

JURISPRUDENCE:

A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or

benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of
a particular enterprise.

"It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public

revenue for anything but a public purpose. * * * It is the essential character of
the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public
welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental advantage
to the public or to the state, which results from the promotion of private
interests and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify
their aid by the use of public money."

FACTS:

On August 31, 1954 Provincial Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal, instituted

this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that

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Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works",
approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item (43
[h]) of P85,000.00, "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of "Pasig feeder road terminals.

At the time of the passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder
roads were "nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet
constructed within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig, Rizal". This
projected feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any
important premises to the main highway" and that the aforementioned Antonio
Subdivision were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the
time of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of
the Philippines.

Petitioner prayed that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared
null and void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question
be "declared unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal"; that a writ of injunction
be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the
Director of the Bureau of Public Works, the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Public Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from ordering or allowing the
continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project, and from making and
securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic
Act No. 920, and the disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and
Communications, the Bureau of Public Works and the Bureau of Public
Highways from making any further payments out of said funds provided for in
Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on the merits, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties
respondent from making and securing any new and further releases on the
aforesaid item of Republic Act No. 920 and from making any further payments
out of said illegally appropriated funds.

Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the decision,
dated October 29, 1953, holding that the legislature is without power to
appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose and that the
construction and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads
were private property, would not be a public purpose;

The respondents, in their motion to dismiss contends that a law passed by

Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because Congress
is the source of all laws.

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ISSUE:

Whether appropriation laws be made for purposes other than for public
purpose.

HELD:

No, the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything
but a public purpose.

It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which must

determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interests
to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community,
and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion. Incidental advantage to the public or to the state, which results
from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private enterprises
or business, does not justify their aid by the use of public money."

The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is
whether the statute is designed to promote the public interests, as opposed to
the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public.

Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be

constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void. The
donation to the Government, over five (5) months after the approval and
effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose of giving
a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not
cure its basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation
need not precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.

Case digest by Janna Rosita Patricia D. Paragas

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SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL
MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affais, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as
Executive Secretary, respondents

G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990

DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION
TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL
ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING
COMMITTEES ON THE UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES IN JAPAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990

JURISPRUDENCE:

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on
his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence.

FACTS:

The petitions above are consolidated for the purpose of preventing the sale of
the Roppongi Properties of the Philippines under the Reparations Agreement
with Japan.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered with Japan on May 9, 1956.

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The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to
the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering
during World War II.

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the
Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector",
through Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi
property consists of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to
Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs.
Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi
property has remained undeveloped since that time.

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine

Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a
lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — which shall
construct two (2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and
renovate the present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of
the construction would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the
buildings to be constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in
Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine
Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased
buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change
of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The
Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period and
thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on this proposal
which is pending approval and ratification between the parties. Instead, on
August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe,
Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders
Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.

On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in
the event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including
the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.

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Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government

has been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations
properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a
failure since only one bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements,
has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990,
was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were changed such
that the $225 million floor price became merely a suggested floor price.

ISSUE:

Whether the President, her officers and agents, have the authority and
jurisdiction, to sell public property?

HELD:

No, the Chief Executive and her officers do not have the authority to sell the
Roppongi Property.

It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on
his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and
approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative
concurrence.

It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of
the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its
symbolic value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not
the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy
determination where both the President and Congress must concur.
Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

Case digest by Janna Rosita Patricia D. Paragas

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