POLICY STUDIES, 2017

VOL. 38, NO. 6, 571–588

https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2017.1384543

Coping, taming or solving: alternative approaches to the

governance of wicked problems
Falk Daviter
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Universitat Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

One of the truisms of policy analysis is that policy problems are Received 20 April 2017
rarely solved. As an ever-increasing number of policy issues are Accepted 13 September 2017
identified as an inherently ill-structured and intractable type of
KEYWORDS
wicked problem, the question of what policy analysis sets out Wicked problems; complex
to accomplish has emerged as more central than ever. If solving problems; governance;
wicked problems is beyond reach, research on wicked problems problem-solving; policy
needs to provide a clearer understanding of the alternatives. analysis
The article identifies and explicates three distinguishable
strategies of problem governance: coping, taming and solving.
It shows that their intellectual premises and practical
implications clearly contrast in core respects. The article argues
that none of the identified strategies of problem governance is
invariably more suitable for dealing with wicked problems.
Rather than advocate for some universally applicable approach
to the governance of wicked problems, the article asks under
what conditions different ways of governing wicked problems
are analytically reasonable and normatively justified. It
concludes that a more systematic assessment of alternative
approaches of problem governance requires a reorientation of
the debate away from the conception of wicked problems as a
singular type toward the more focused analysis of different
dimensions of problem wickedness.

Introduction
One of the truisms of policy analysis is that policy problems are rarely solved. As some of
the most notable early proponents of this field of research have emphasized, ‘problems
are not so much solved as alleviated, superseded, transformed, and otherwise dropped
from view’ (Wildavsky 1979, 386). With the emergence of post-positivist perspectives
in policy research, problem-solving was rejected even more resoundingly as a ‘long-
standing fantasy’ (Rein and White 1977, 269). Yet despite the fact that ‘problem-
solving’ has become increasingly contested over the past decades, it has remained a
powerful image that continues to orient, and disorient, important debates in policy
research and analysis.

CONTACT Falk Daviter [email protected]

© 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
572 F. DAVITER

Nowhere has the question of what policy analysis sets out to accomplish emerged as
more central than in the context of the current debate on wicked problems (e.g. Durant
and Legge 2006; Head 2008; Head and Alford 2015; Levin et al. 2012; Roberts 2000;
Termeer et al. 2015; Weber and Khademian 2008a). While wicked problems originally
referred primarily to complex and enduring issues of social policy, such as crime and
poverty, an ever-increasing number of policy problems are identified as inherently ill-
structured and intractable. This type of policy problem is frequently seen to defy
problem-solving by definition. As Rittel and Webber (1973, 160) clarify at the outset of
their classic contribution, wicked problems ‘are never solved’. This not only raises the
question of how public authorities should address this challenge, but also to what end.
The present debate on wicked problems suffers from a discernable lack of appreciation
of the second part of this question. If solving wicked problems is beyond reach, research
on wicked problems needs to provide a clearer conceptual understanding of the alterna-
tives. Failure to clarify what the governance of wicked problems aims to achieve would
render both the analytical and practical exercise futile.
The question becomes even more pressing as the governance of wicked problems is fre-
quently understood to require potentially far-reaching reforms of public administration
and management. Much of the current debate on wicked problems in public adminis-
tration research, for example, projects a need for public authorities to not only overcome
traditional forms of hierarchical organization and functional specialization, two of the
defining features of modern bureaucracy. It also proposes to reverse significant efforts
at administrative decentralization and retrenchment undertaking during previous
periods of public sector reform (Christensen and Lægreid 2008; Peters 2015, 100–101).
Any meaningful assessment of these reform proposals would greatly profit from a
better understanding of what they aim to accomplish, how reasonable it is to expect
that they will work, and how they compare with alternative strategies of dealing with
wicked problems.
In order to address these questions, the article takes a more systematic look at how we
can usefully distinguish between different approaches to the governance of wicked pro-
blems. By making the more tacit foundations of this literature explicit, it shows that the
intellectual premises and practical implications of different ways of addressing wicked
problems clearly contrast in core respects. Based on a discussion of the extant literature,
the article identifies and explicates three approaches to the governance of wicked pro-
blems: coping, taming and solving. The discussion reveals how coping, taming and
solving, respectively aim to reflect, reduce, or resolve wicked problems according to dis-
tinguishable logics of problem governance. Rather than aiming to provide a fully devel-
oped typology of problem governance, the main interest of this study is to show that in
the present debate there exist at least three empirically distinguishable alternatives
rooted in fundamentally contradictory understandings of how wicked problems can
and should be addressed. The analysis reveals that, paradoxically, the most frequently
discussed responses to wicked problems in the current literature aspire to the ideal of
problem-solving. The article then contrasts these holistic approaches of problem-
solving with the largely antithetical approach of taming and introduces coping as a
way of addressing wicked problems that builds on insights from the incrementalist
tradition in policy analysis.
 POLICY STUDIES 573

The discussion of the three alternatives shows that none of the identified ways of gov-
erning wicked problems is inherently superior. The last part of the article therefore argues
that instead of trying to fit the governance of wicked problem into the prisms of preexist-
ing public sector reform agendas or seeking out universally applicable governance sol-
utions, the more productive way forward is to ask under what circumstances different
ways of governing wicked problems are analytically reasonable and normatively justified.
As Termeer et al. (2015, 685) argue, governing wicked problems is a balancing act. Yet
striking a balance may not always be possible or even advisable. The discussion, therefore,
recasts the question not as one of balance but of trade-offs. This points to the question of
the most relevant evaluative criteria we use to assess and compare the benefits of different
ways of problem governance.
The article proposes that one useful way of addressing this question is to distinguish
between the analytical and administrative challenges wicked problems present. A focus
on analytical challenges points to aspects such as the causal complexity and interdepen-
dence of policy problems, and the difficulty of scoping and framing policy issues that
can be legitimately perceived as problematic from different vantage points. Looking at
wicked problems as an analytical challenge also brings into focus the frequent lack of
any single body of knowledge or expertise that speaks to the problem authoritatively. Gov-
erning wicked problems thus raises the prospect of having to find ways to incorporate
potentially conflicting or incommensurable types of knowledge from diverse and often
locally dispersed sources to corroborate competing claims and characterizations of the
issues at stake. This perspective strongly informs a literature that argues that tackling
wicked policy problems has ‘more to do with problem setting than with problem
solving’ (Schön 1993, 138).
A focus on the administrative challenges of dealing with wicked problems, on the other
hand, points to aspects such as the multiplicity of policy sectors and levels of government
involved in addressing these issues. This perspective emphasizes the requirement of hori-
zontal and vertical coordination and collaboration, as well as the unusually high demands
on government to ensure policy coherence. Much of the more recent debate on wicked
problems draws primarily or exclusively on this perspective. At the same time, wicked pro-
blems are frequently seen to elude the autonomous capabilities of public authorities and
are linked to calls for more public participation as well as the need to address issues
through some form of networked or collaborative decision-making arrangement that
devolves policy authority and accountability to non-governmental actors. Each of these
responses poses its own unique challenge (see Daviter, Hustedt, and Korff 2016).
While the analytical and administrative challenges of addressing wicked problems
can be understood as different sides of the same coin, distinguishing between them
can be useful for analytical reasons. One key advantage of making such a distinction
at the outset is that it allows us to see more clearly how different ways of governing
wicked problems predominantly speak to one or the other side of the challenge.
While this perspective helps to clarify the trade-offs involved in choosing one strategy
over another, the following discussion will also highlight that assessing the relevance of
competing evaluative criteria in the abstract frequently fails to produce satisfactory
answers. The article, therefore, concludes that focusing on how wicked problems
differ along select dimensions may offer a way out of the dilemma and help to
advance the debate in a more systematic way. This would require a more fundamental
574 F. DAVITER

reorientation of research away from the conception of wicked problems as a singular

type of highly complex and interrelated policy issue to the analysis of different types
of problem wickedness.

Problem-solving and the holistic governance agenda

Most if not all research on wicked problems implicitly or explicitly departs from the obser-
vation that this type of policy problem cannot be solved in a traditional sense. Frequently,
however, this issue is treated rather lightly. Conklin (2006, 38–39), for example, asserts
that wicked problems do not actually have solutions in a footnote, and then moves on
to clarify that by solution ‘we simply mean a proposal that might resolve some part or
aspect of a wicked problem’. Even more puzzling than the lack of analytical attention
devoted to the problem-solution nexus in wicked problems is the lack of concern for its
prescriptive implications. In stark contrast to the widely shared notion that solving
wicked problems is not a viable option, a sizable part of the more recent debate appears
to promote strategies that are designed to accomplish exactly that. This section scrutinizes
two of the most widely promoted administrative responses to wicked problems, joined-up
or whole-of-government and collaborative governance, in terms of the problem-solving
strategies they advocate.
Possibly the most commonly promoted response to the challenges of governing wicked
problems is some form of a collaborative or networked type of governance (e.g. APSC
2007; Durant and Legge 2006; Roberts 2000; van Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003;
Weber and Khademian 2008b). According to this literature, wicked problems can only
be addressed successfully if public authorities reach out and incorporate into the
decision-making process a vast network of societal stakeholders and non-governmental
actors with the aim to reflect the diversity of relevant views and affected values. Collabora-
tive arrangements are also seen as critical means to gain access to fragmented and local
knowledge, mobilize dispersed resources, and build up legitimacy through the construc-
tion of common purpose and communal problem-ownership. Knowledge is frequently
described to be not only shared but also created in collaborative settings (e.g. Feldman
et al. 2006), greatly expanding the possibilities to address wicked problems in a more com-
prehensive fashion. Some parts of this literature especially highlight that addressing
wicked problems requires a more discursive and inclusive type of policy discourse.
Fischer (1993, 175–176) therefore calls it the ‘paradox of wicked problems’ that broaden-
ing the participatory base of policy formulation is not a curse, but the cure.
A second, similarly widely discussed response to wicked problems is the reform agenda
of joined-up or whole-of-government (e.g. Askim et al. 2009; Christensen and Lægreid
2007; Davies 2009; Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Perri 6 2004; Pollitt 2003). As
O’Flynn et al. (2011, 246) summarize, intricate and cross-cutting policy problems are
increasingly considered ‘primed for a joined-up solution’ (see also Lægreid and Rykkja
2015, 478). In response, administrative reforms that were principally designed to repair
the damages of decentralization and administrative retrenchment sustained under pre-
vious periods of public sector reform are now increasingly advocated as tools for the
better governance of wicked problems as well (Christensen and Lægreid 2008, 99).
Peters (2004), for example, discusses the structural limits of decentered forms of govern-
ance in providing coordination and coherence and deduces the need to reinstate new
 POLICY STUDIES 575

forms of centralized control. While the literature on joined-up government tends to high-
light managerial issues of public administration over structural issues (Pollitt 2003, 35), it
has become ‘associated with centrist administrations’ (Perri 6, Leat, Seltzer, and Stoker
2002, 16–18) and generally reflects the idea that collaborative administration will ‘not
be effective unless there are also hierarchical mechanisms for enforcing the cross-
cutting ideas’ (Peters 2015, 100; see also Dahlström, Peters, and Pierre 2011). The main
focus is therefore on ways of empowering central government to regain control of the
various horizontal and vertical levels of administration, ensure effective cooperation
across organizationally fragmented and functionally specialized departments and agencies,
and provide policy coherence across jurisdictional boundaries. One important administra-
tive tool to this effect is vertical and horizontal de-specialization, such as the reintegration
of previously independent specialized administration units or agencies into the direct line
of political control at the vertical level, and the erosion of functional or sectoral boundaries
between administrative units at the horizontal level (see Egeberg 1999). From the perspec-
tive of much of the holistic literature on wicked problems, horizontal specialization has
become synonymous with the debilitating effects of compartmentalization or department-
alism (e.g. Kavanagh and Richards 2001) that stand in the way of effective cross-sectoral
coordination and comprehensive problem-solving.
Taken together, these two approaches not only cover a substantial part of the current
debate on how public administration should address wicked problems. They also appear to
be informed by a shared understanding that the successful governance of wicked problems
requires public authorities to devise policy responses that are comprehensive in scope,
expand or cross formal institutional boundaries in attempts to facilitate deeper delibera-
tion and debate, and form new alliances and new forms of partnership. At the same time,
they aim to provide greater coherence and consistency of policy goals through better
coordination and enhanced performance, and by acquiring new structures and capacities
at the center of government. There is little in these literatures that would serve as a stop-
ping rule, or help to define a level of goal attainment that is considered either sufficient or
plainly unrealistic. As Peters (2015, 101) notes, the logic of joined-up government taken to
the extreme would make ‘it difficult to determine just how government could be orga-
nized’. The risk, in short, is that this strategy calls for adapting governance arrangements
to the challenges of wicked problems by reaching far beyond what public administration
and management are traditionally expected to accomplish, both procedurally and substan-
tively, even under more benign circumstances. While much of the debate insists that
wicked problems cannot be solved in a traditional sense, lacking any type of stopping
rule, these reform agendas can appear to advocate a strategy that essentially asks public
administrations to try anyhow. In terms of their integrative analytical ambition and
high demands on centralized coordination and steering capabilities, some elements of
the holistic literature on wicked problems, in fact, bear striking resemblance to the
notion of synoptic problem-solving that characterized some of the early research in
policy analysis (e.g. Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, 37–57).
At the same time, central parts of this literature and their presumptive applicability to the
case of wicked problems have come under scrutiny within their own fields of research. Some
of these studies warn that wicked problems pose impossible challenges for collaborative
forms of governance. Durant and Legge (2006, 314) for example highlight the importance
and difficulty of building trustful relations among all participants as a precondition for
576 F. DAVITER

legitimate and successful collaboration and deliberation. Observing that the important
issues facing the public sector today are ‘highly complex and cross-cutting’ (Huxham,
Vangen, and Eden 2000, 338), some authors argue that under such conditions ‘collabor-
ations as a form of governance must be expected to flounder and are unlikely to deliver
fully any of the expected benefits’ (Huxham, Vangen, and Eden 2000, 352). A recent
review of the extensive literature on collaborative governance reinforces the more general
point that ‘crosssector collaborations are difficult to create and even more difficult to
sustain’ (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006, 52). Collaboration is instead frequently described
as ‘notoriously conflict ridden and challenging to manage’ (Vangen and Huxham 2012,
731). As Kenis and Provan (2006, 240–241) note with respect to the performance of colla-
borative networks as a tool of governance, ‘we have hardly any idea about whether or not
they are really effective. What is clear is that they do not perform effectively simply
because they are not hierarchies, in contrast to what policy makers often seem to believe’.
In large parts of the literature, networks of public organizations are instead ‘generally
seen as uncontrollable’ (Milward, Kenis, and Raab 2006, 205) and prone to producing
unintended consequences, goal displacement, conflict, shirking and resistance to inno-
vation. Reflecting on the inherent inefficiencies of more open, network-based types of
decision-making structures as well as the onerous effects of more inclusive, deliberative
decision-making procedures, Huxham (2003) coined the term ‘collaborative inertia’ to
emphasize how in spite of theoretical enthusiasm, collaborative public administration is
typically slow and ineffective in practice. Much of this literature describes a mode of gov-
ernance that is predominantly self-coordinated, consensus-oriented and based on volun-
tary participation and interaction. Aiming to enable dynamics of social learning, critical
self-reflection, and behavioral adjustment, its success frequently hinges on the possibility
to change the prevailing norms of a large group of heterogeneous actors, inspire trust and
create goal consensus (e.g. Putansu and Gable 2015, 28). Short of clearing that bar, collab-
oration suffers from collective action problems and easily produces gridlock (van Bueren,
Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003). All of this leads more critical students of collaboration to the
‘overwhelming conclusion … that collaboration as a governance tool should be used spar-
ingly’ (Huxham, Vangen, and Eden 2000, 353). Recent empirical studies further support
the conclusion that increasing participation ‘is not a panacea for addressing wicked policy
problems’ (Duit and Löf 2015, 22). Their study addresses recent reforms in the way the
Swedish government deals with wildlife management. The reforms aimed at both decen-
tralization of decision-making competencies and increasing stakeholder participation and
deliberation. Instead of resulting in more trust-based interaction, the formulation of a con-
sensual problem definition and an overall increase in the deliberative quality of inter-
actions, the authors find evidence of the deterioration of the quality of policy
deliberations. They conclude that ‘participation and decentralization reforms themselves
can have wicked and unintended consequences’ (Duit and Löf 2015, 22), many of
which undermine problem-solving capacity.
While there remain serious questions as to the effectiveness of more collaborative forms
of governance in the case of wicked problems, what seems clear is that these approaches
easily conflict with the aim of providing more cohesive and coherent policy responses.
Both participation and decentralization, Peters (1998, 296) concludes, make administra-
tive coordination more difficult to achieve. Yet even beyond this conundrum, more cen-
trally controlled governance has its own limitations. A focus on building up central
 POLICY STUDIES 577

administrative capacity to coordinate, control and secure specific outcomes and targets
‘risks actually reducing the capacity for flexibility, innovation and adaptability which is
vital for policy-making in a runaway and uncertain world’, Parsons (2004, 48) submits.
More recent empirical research moreover shows that centralization easily produces over-
load at the top of the administrative hierarchy. The core finding of this literature is that
‘control over decision making gained via centralization drains away under the limits of
attention’ (May, Workman, and Jones 2008, 538). What research on the ‘paradox of atten-
tion’ primarily shows is that gains in organizational performance in one highly salient
policy area are often paid for in unpreparedness and lack of analysis concerning non-pri-
ority areas of administrative activities. The way in which the US government responded to
the terrorist attacks of 2001 by centralizing much of its crisis-related administrative
capacity under the roof of the Department of Homeland Security has become a critical
reference point for this type of research. These studies frequently show how a singular
focus on terrorism prevention diverted analytical and operational resources from an
organizational field that was previously characterized by much more diversified remits
and routines, and left the country more vulnerable and less prepared as a result (e.g.
Kettl 2003; Wise 2006). In much the same way, the benefits of centralization reverse them-
selves in the case of highly complex issues when administrative attention is geared nar-
rowly towards a select number of targets or indicators that easily conceal the
complexity of the task environment and the degree of ignorance about the changing
nature of the problem. More tentative attempts at centralization and networked govern-
ance, such as in the case of the reform of internal security in Norway (Lægreid and
Rykkja 2015), especially highlight problems resulting from the fact that the organizational
loyalties of network participants often remain with their respective home department or
agency, formal mandates remain murky, policy authority remains fragmented and
resources are shifted only hesitantly (Lægreid and Rykkja 2015, 484). Even if these pro-
blems were overcome successfully, the authors caution, the problem remains how to
ensure the right balance between newly established central steering capacities and the
requisite ‘level of improvisation and organizational flexibility’ necessary to tackle highly
uncertain und unpredictable problems when they occur.
The more general conclusion especially of the literature on the ‘paradox of attention’ is
that addressing ill-defined and complex policy problems ‘works best in decentralized
organizational structures with an element of confusion and overlap in their jurisdictional
boundaries’ (Baumgartner and Jones 2015, 52), so that they can ‘incorporate and institu-
tionalize consideration of more, rather than fewer, dimensions of the issue’ (Baumgartner
and Jones 2015, 49). This research echoes another prominent line of argument that advo-
cates for ‘messy institutions’ to solve wicked problems (Ney and Verweij 2015; Verweij
et al. 2006). At the very least, Peters (2015, 101) concludes, the notion of holistic and
joined-up government is ‘perhaps excessively optimistic’ in the face of complexity. Ignor-
ing the limits of holistic governance, O’Flynn et al. (2011, 253) warn, means that ‘joined-
up approaches in any setting will be bound to under-perform’.

Coping and taming: clarifying the alternatives

The preceding section has argued that some of the most prominent holistic strategies of
solving wicked problems are partially contradictory. Important parts of the corresponding
578 F. DAVITER

literatures also view them as analytically implausible and ineffective in practice. There is,
therefore, reason to reconsider alternative strategies for dealing with wicked problems.
This section discusses two alternative strategies of problem governance, coping and
taming, and contrasts them with holistic approaches. At the risk of oversimplification,
the three strategies respectively aim to reflect, reduce or resolve wicked problems. Holistic
strategies aim to resolve wicked problems as comprehensively as possible, often without
specifying any stopping rules. Taming strategies aim to reduce wicked problems to
make them more controllable and manageable, and coping strategies aim to reflect the
fragmented, uncertain and ambiguous nature of wicked problems by relying on a more
disjointed and tentative process of formulating policy responses. As the following
section will show in more detail, the strategy of problem taming is almost antithetical
to the holistic ideal of problem-solving. It is also by far the least theorized and most
widely practiced way of addressing wicked problems. The discussion of coping strategies,
in contrast, has deep theoretical roots in the early incrementalist literature in policy analy-
sis. This literature proves a well of insights that has largely failed to leave a mark on the
present debate.

Taming wicked problems

In sharp contrast to the holistic ideal of problem-solving, problem taming aims to trans-
form an ill-structured or wicked problem into a more manageable and well-structured
problem for the purpose of decision-making. Taming wicked problems proceeds ‘by
hiving off a relatively simple component of a wicked problem’ (Wexler 2009, 535).
Rather than resolve the problem, the aim is to reduce and control it. The main way to
accomplish this is by scoping and framing the problem in such a way as to align it with
existing administrative expertise and policy responsibilities. As Roberts (2000, 4) outlines,
this typically entails the transfer of authority to define the problem and devise a solution
into the hands of a few select actors or decision-making bodies identified based on their
‘knowledge and expertise, organizational position in the hierarchy, information, or coer-
cive power’. Taming strategies therefore typically imply that wicked problems are defined
and delimited either along preexisting organizational lines of functional specialization or
jurisdictional authority, or some combination of both. Alternatively, in the case of new or
highly technical issues, an independent agency or epistemic community can be created
and put in charge of the problem, such as central banks in the field of monetary policy
(e.g. Vibert 2007). Taming wicked problems, in other words, typically means that pro-
blems are defined and processed so as to align them with some preexisting organizational
or epistemological structure, rather than based on an independent process of policy
inquiry. Based on a strategy of taming, the question is not, for example, what type of
knowledge would be required to address the issue comprehensively, but which department
or agency has the most readily usable expertise to assume ownership of the problem as it
stands. Taming, therefore, necessitates an act of objectification that settles and at least tem-
porarily institutionalizes an answer to the question of what the nature of the problem is
and what type of knowledge is needed to address it.
The advantages of problem taming are abundantly clear, especially from the viewpoint
of problem governability. Treating ill-structured problems as if they were tame allows
public authorities to limit participation and debate, assign administrative responsibility,
 POLICY STUDIES 579

reduce the need for cross-sector coordination, take swift action, draw on the available
expertise, and apply preexisting policy instruments and evaluative criteria. The disadvan-
tages of taming strategies, in contrast, are almost entirely on the side of problem analysis.
Taming wicked problems accepts that competing problem perspectives are cast aside
rather than explored. Policy objectives and evaluative criteria need to be set early to artifi-
cially simplify the problem-solution link and allow the policy process to focus on means
rather than ends. To the extent that problem taming requires delegation of policy auth-
ority, such as by empowering a panel of experts or a specialized agency that narrowly
relies on a specific body of epistemic knowledge or technical expertise for problem analysis
and policy recommendation, this way of addressing complex policy problems likely
reduces the possibilities for social learning and problem reflexivity (May 1992).
In addition to the predominantly adverse effects taming strategies can have on the
analytical task of understanding wicked problems, these strategies also raise the more fun-
damental question of how to assess responses to wicked problems that only aim to address
some select aspect of a wicked problem, but ignore or even aggravate problem interdepen-
dencies. A classic example would be the criminalization of drug use and the delegation of
problem responsibility into the hands of law enforcement agencies. Clearly, spiking
numbers of arrests and skyrocketing rates of incarceration provide little proof of
problem-solving and may, in turn, generate or amplify detrimental effects of their own
(see also Alford and Head 2015). While there may be many circumstances under which
taming wicked problems can be justified, there are few if any well-established policy
analytical perspectives designed to consciously incorporate this type of consideration
into the analysis. Instead, unreflective or purely accidental problem taming is one of the
most common pathologies of bureaucratic politics (Allison and Halperin 1972; Egeberg
1999; Moe 1989). As a result, applying taming strategies to fundamentally indivisible or
poorly understood policy problems can easily produce highly uncertain and potentially
volatile results. As Churchman (1967, B-141) warns, under most circumstances taming
strategies simply achieve that ‘the wicked problem no longer shows its teeth before it bites’.

Coping with complexity

While taming strategies are widely practiced but poorly theorized, the reverse is true for
strategies of coping. This type of strategy has deep roots in policy research and analysis.
When Rittel (1972) introduced the concept of wicked problems, an attack on the
notion of comprehensive policy planning and analysis was long underway (see Hirschman
and Lindblom 1962 for an early summary). During this period, policy analysis became
more reflective of the inherent intricacies of public problems and simultaneously took
stock of the limits of administrative capacities for information processing and analysis
(Simon 1983, 1987; Wildavsky 1973). Under these conditions, Lindblom (1979, 519)
argued, attempts at holistic problem-solving almost inevitably fail to deliver encompassing
solutions and instead produce ‘ill-considered, often accidental incompleteness’. How to
design policy strategies that are reflective of the ‘tragic discrepancy’ (Lindblom 1990,
14) between problem complexity and the limits of policy analysis and planning
emerged as a central research question.
Along these lines, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963, 48) argued that policy analysis and
public administration suffer from a lack of ‘adaptation of the problem-solving method to
580 F. DAVITER

certain troublesome characteristics of problems and problem-solving situations’. The

problem characteristics they drew particular attention to ring very familiar in the
context of recent debates on the wicked problem. They include the impossibility to
arrive at a definitive understanding of problems ‘susceptible of infinite variation as atten-
tion shifts among different values and different facts’, unclear evaluative standards against
which to judge possible courses of action, interdependencies between facts and values,
especially the impossibility of separating the continuous contemplation of values from
the ongoing search of policy alternatives, and a lack of criteria to help define the bound-
aries of what is, more often than not, ‘a cluster of interlocked problems with interdepen-
dent solutions’ rather than a single identifiable problem (Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963,
47–57, 113; see also Premfors 1981, 205). Yet while the early incrementalist literature
clearly preempted the emerging debate on wicked problems in core respects, the insights
this intellectual tradition in policy analysis has to offer have largely failed to make an
impact on the present debate on wicked problems. This is especially troubling because
the strategies of coping with the challenge of complexity this literature advances funda-
mentally differ from the prevailing problem-solving ideal and the holistic ambitions of
the more recent debate. Coping with complex and ill-structured policy problems is
instead seen to benefit from a way of problem governance that is fragmented, remedial,
serial and reconstructive (e.g. Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, 112–113, 141).
A core feature of coping strategies is that fragmented policy responses and the division
of policy responsibility are not seen as inherently detrimental (Braybrooke and Lindblom
1963, 105), especially in light of the alternatives. Following Simon’s (1973, 271) warning
that in the face of complexity ‘there is no magic in comprehensiveness’, coping strategies
allow for the analytical and administrative tasks to be divided up even if problem interde-
pendencies are observed. Coping strategies therefore initially demand less coherence and
coordination across policy responses and regimes than the more recent holistic literature.
This type of policy strategy instead aims to provide ‘multiple approximate solutions to ill
structured problems which arise from the organized complexity of the knowledge system’
(Dunn 1991, 49). Policy responses that remain only partially integrated also allow for
redundancies and overlap. They may consist of partially contradictory components
rooted in incommensurable knowledge and incompatible problem perspectives. The
fact that wicked problems can be understood through multiple problem frames hence
does not necessitate ambitious attempts at bridging or consensualizing competing per-
spective and conflicting evidence. Instead, the aim is to incorporate competing problem
perspectives and enable ‘multiple ways of seeing’ (Bell 2004, 24). As a result, coping
does not bet on the benefits of centralization and hierarchical control, but relies on the
organizational intelligence produced by decentered and delegated expertise. According
to this perspective, Termeer et al. (2015, 700) sum up, ‘only variety can beat variety’.
This approach is more likely to find structural expression in governance arrangements
that are polycentric and loosely coupled. In contrast to the holistic view of problem gov-
ernance, this strategy is informed by the view that organizational differentiation and the
fragmentation of administrative tasks and structures are necessary buffers against the
unmitigated onslaught of complexity that would otherwise hopelessly overwhelm any pur-
poseful attempt at addressing wicked problems.
This way of problem governance is furthermore remedial in the sense that it advances
policy responses even if the ultimate objective remains unclear or in dispute, or is considered
 POLICY STUDIES 581

at least partially unattainable. In such cases, the governance of policy problems ‘aims at sup-
pressing vice even though virtue cannot be defined, let alone concretized as a goal’ (Bray-
brooke and Lindblom 1963, 102). Trying to move away from rather than toward an
identified state or condition further relaxes the need to form a consensual understanding
of the complete problem-solution link to legitimize public responses to wicked problems.
While the demands on analysis thus appear more limited in some respects, they are more
demanding in others. In stark contrast to taming strategies, coping strategies do not seek
to freeze the problem-solution link. To the contrary, they aim for the process of policy-
making to unfold as ‘a never-ending discourse with reality, to discover yet more facets,
more dimensions of action, more opportunities for improvement’ (Dery 1984, 6–7). This
form of reconstructive policy analysis understands means and ends as concomitant
elements of inquiry and exploration. The impossibility to resolve a policy problem compre-
hensively and definitively is taken for granted, as is the resulting need for continuous policy
analysis and adaptation. The objective is to avoid ‘premature closure’ (Peters 2015, 133) and
remain cognizant of the fact that ‘in ill-structured problems the criteria of “good” and
“rational” are themselves part of the problem, part of what is in dispute’ (Turner 1989,
180). As a strategy of policy-making, coping, therefore, implies a stronger emphasis on
process, or the serial nature of policy, than both taming and problem-solving. Wildavsky’s
(1979, 23) writings on policy analysis, for example, are in large part driven by the desire ‘to
alter the prevailing conception of policy analysis from problem solving to problem succes-
sion’. One of the most important measures of intelligent policy design is therefore not initial
goal attainment, but the speed and ease with which errors and aberrations are detected and
corrected (Wildavsky 1979, 16, 41). A similar view of wicked problems as chronic con-
ditions and constantly evolving challenges also informs Hoppe’s (2010, 9) contention
that wicked problems ‘can only be settled, never solved’ (see also Harmon and Mayer
1986, 9). This point resonates strongly with Rittel and Webber’s assertion that at best,
wicked problems are ‘re-solved over and over again’ (1973, 160).

Rethinking the governance of wicked problem

Short of providing a comprehensive or conclusive assessment of the alternatives ways of
addressing wicked problems, the previous discussion has served a more moderate two-fold
objective. Its first aim was to dispel with the notion that there is one appropriate way of
organizing governance responses to wicked problems. Instead, one core argument the pre-
vious section has aimed to sustain is that there is no instructive way to think about the
functionality or dysfunctionality of governance arrangements in addressing wicked pro-
blems without asking what strategy of problem governance is pursued in the first place.
The second argument, to which the remainder of the article will now return, is that
none of the identified strategies of governing wicked problems is invariably more suitable
for dealing with this type of problem. Rather than engaging in futile attempts of advocat-
ing for some universally applicable approach to the governance of wicked problems, a
more promising possibility to advance this debate in a systematic way may be to ask
under what circumstances different ways of governing wicked problems are analytically
reasonable and normatively justified. Two considerations appear central to this type of
argument: the most relevant evaluative criteria used to compare different ways of
problem governance, and the specific nature of the wicked problem in question.
582 F. DAVITER

The first consideration points to the questions of trade-offs. As the preceding discus-
sion has made clear, no one way of governing wicked problems is consistently superior
if we sufficiently expand the number of evaluative criteria. Consider just two of the
most commonly invoked evaluative standards, the manageability or governability of
policy responses and problem reflexivity. Broadly speaking, these criteria correspond to
the analytical and administrative challenges of governing wicked problems discussed
further above. Based on the previous analysis, it appears reasonable to conclude, for
example, that taming trumps the other two strategies in terms of governability, but at a
high cost of problem reflexivity. Problem taming appears far less challenging to manage
and implement than both the more participatory and discursive decision-making style
of collaborative governance and the attention-intensive work of controlling effectively
run joined-up government operations. Problem taming should also prove easier to
manage and implement than the more open and disjointed strategies of coping. Yet the
picture becomes more complicated if we add additional evaluative dimensions, or
convert the initial two criteria into more fine-grained ones. Termeer et al. (2015), for
example, propose a list of four essential criteria to assess governance capabilities in the
case of wicked problems. While their list includes problem reflexivity, the remaining
three criteria of resilience, responsiveness and revitalization provide a more detailed
and expanded way to assess administrative and managerial performance. Already this
four-fold roster renders the comparison of alternative strategies not only a highly demand-
ing task. It almost guarantees very mixed outcomes for each individual way of addressing a
wicked policy problem. If all ways of governing wicked problems force making conces-
sions in terms of how well they enable analytical problem understanding and help to
ensure the effectiveness of administrative responses, how are we to decide which criteria
should matter most in determining the appropriate course of action?
Rather than providing abstract answers, a different way forward is to inquire into the
ways certain problem characteristics influence the extent to which each strategy works as
intended. Yet the literature has thus far failed to produce any meaningful consensus in this
respect, even on core issues. Turner (1989, 180), for example, views coping strategies as
most reasonable and legitimate if the nature of the problem makes it possible to ‘limit
the choices to relatively well-understood options, with limited or understood error costs
and a relatively strong information base, for which consequences can be monitored and
corrections made’. For much the same reason, Metlay and Sarewitz (2012) view coping
strategies as fit for addressing only well-structured problems, but not wicked problems.
Their main concern appears to be that in the case of wicked problems, detectability of
deviations between expected and actual consequences of problem governance may
simply never become sufficiently easy to observe to allow for the continuous process of
incremental adjustment and adaption of policy responses to function. This brings the dis-
cussion to the second possible way to advance the debate on how to assess different strat-
egies of problem governance: a more decisive move away from the conception of wicked
problems as a singular type of highly complex and interrelated policy issue to the analysis
of different types of problem wickedness. The work of Levin et al. (2012) draws attention
to the analytical utility of problem subtypes, such as the ‘super-wicked’ problems that colo-
nize the imagination of international relations scholars (see also Lazarus 2009). This
research shows how particular empirical expressions of problem wickedness force the
analysis to consider different and partially novel ways of dealing with them. Current
 POLICY STUDIES 583

research has so far stopped short of making a more comprehensive argument for the re-
conceptualization of wicked problems. Head and Alford (2015; see also Alford and Head
2015), however, contend that this may be necessary because the predominance of a single
generic concept of wickedness in the literature ‘has in turn given rise to a “one best way” to
tackle problems’ (Alford and Head 2015, 2), a research agenda they perceive as largely
futile. In a recent attempt to refocus the debate, Head and Alford (2015, 718) therefore
tentatively propose that ‘there are different kinds of wicked problems, and by implication
there could be different types of appropriate responses to them’.
There is no doubt many different ways of breaking down the monolithic notion of
wickedness into more analytically useful units. Building on the above discussion, one
obvious way of advancing this debate is by focusing on those dimensions of problem
wickedness that makes them more or less amenable to the different ways of problem
governance we can identify and distinguish. Such an approach would also provide a
clearer sense of theoretical orientation. It would allow research on wicked problems
to move beyond the monolithic concept, or some typological alternative thereof, and
instead speak more directly to the question under what circumstances different ways
of governing wicked problems make sense. In the face of certain types of risks, for
example, a strategy of incremental adjustments and reconstructive analysis may be ill-
advised if it means to accept potentially irreversible repercussions (Pollitt 2015; van
Bueren, Klijn, and Koppenjan 2003, 194). Problem indivisibility is another case in
point. Some wicked problems, notably those in the field of urban planning that informed
much of the original literature on this topic, appear far less amenable to piecemeal sol-
utions, multi-track processing and serial attempts at providing approximate solutions,
the hallmarks of coping strategies. In such cases, there may be few reasonable alterna-
tives for policy planners than to cast the net widely, incorporate or collaborate with
diverse stakeholders and aim to consolidate initially contradictory viewpoints and con-
flicting interests in a comprehensive attempt to address the problems as holistically as
possible. Yet as much as wicked problems of this type may have informed the early writ-
ings on the topic, the concept now encompasses a more diverse class of problems. Many
wicked problems currently debated are highly interrelated at some empirical level, but
the vast majority of them do not exhibit the same degree of indivisibility. Policy pro-
blems such as drug abuse, forced migration or food safety are all complex, perpetual,
interconnected, multi-causal and multi-layered. Yet they appear to lack the same
quality of indivisibility that would mean that reconstructive analysis, fragmented
responsibilities and remedial responses could not produce analytically plausible and
normatively defensible ways of governing these types of policy problem – especially if
the alternatives are most probably ill-fated and unmanageable attempts at solving the
problems comprehensively.
The fact that this last line of argument remains tentative and explorative speaks to the
more general lack of theorizing in the current debate on wicked problems. If the concept
of problem wickedness is to be convincingly used to inform or support far-reaching
research agendas in policy planning or public sector reform, the focus of the debate
needs to be more squarely on the theoretical foundations on which the arguments
rest. This article has tried to show how focusing on the so far predominantly implicit
strategies of problem governance can help to link the analysis of problem wickedness
to a less discretionary assessment of the different ways of tackling wicked problems
584 F. DAVITER

and to a better understanding of the circumstances under which different approaches

can make sense.

Conclusions
This article started from a simple question. If wicked problems cannot be solved, what
should the governance of wicked problems aim to accomplish? The current debate on
the governance of wicked problems strongly champions the view that this type of
problem resists efforts at taming or containing them, and that such strategies will only
confound the problems further rather than contribute to their resolution. The result has
been a one-sided debate ripe with recommendations that often raise serious questions
as to their governability and the range of conditions under which they can be expected
to perform successfully. Theoretical promises notwithstanding, the governance of
wicked problems can neither be expected to succeed if policy authority is overextended
both vertically and horizontally, nor will public administrations be able to handle more
than a few prioritized tasks effectively if the central coordination functions in public
administration are overwhelmed by highly complex and interrelated matters of policy.
In contrast to the trend toward ever more comprehensive or holistic ways of addressing
wicked problems, the article, therefore, advocated for a critical reassessment of different
ways of governing wicked problems. It identified problem-solving, taming and coping
as alternative strategies of problem governance that each follow a distinct logic of how
to address wicked policy problems. This part of the analysis concluded that holistic
approaches to wicked problems risk reviving the ideals of synoptic problem-solving
despite decades of research that shows why this route is often ill-advised and potently
counter-productive, especially in the case of complex and cross-cutting policy problems
(e.g. Braybrooke and Lindblom 1963, 37–59; Lindblom 1959, 1979; Woodhouse and Col-
lingridge 1993). The following assessment of the alternative strategies did not seek to
present a panacea for the governance of wicked problems. To the contrary, as the analysis
has aimed to show, there should be no ambiguity as to the fact that in dealing with wicked
problems the choice is between approaches that offer well-known but potentially calcul-
able deficiencies and those that offer high expectations but even more uncertain prospects.
Wicked problems are called wicked for a reason. Debating how to tackle this type of
problem, Wexler (2009, 539) warns, invites knowledge hypes and false assurances. It
motivates those in the business of selling solutions to ‘downplay the intractable and unsol-
vable nature of these problems’ (Wexler 2009, 538) for fear of losing their audience.
Rather than make sweeping but ultimately unsustainable claims about one best way to
govern wicked problems, the last part of the article developed two lines of argument that
can help to advance our understanding of the conditions under which different ways of
governing wicked problems appear analytically reasonable and normatively justified.
The first highlighted the importance of considering the trade-offs each alternative way
of governing wicked problems necessarily involves based on the choice of evaluative cri-
teria. This discussion was informed by the more general view that wicked problems
encompass both analytical and administrative challenges, and that any strategy for the
governance of wicked problems must be judged with both challenges in mind. The
second line of argument concluded that a systematic assessment of alternative approaches
to wicked problems depends on a more fundamental reorientation of the debate away
 POLICY STUDIES 585

from the conception of wicked problems as a singular type toward the more focused analy-
sis of different dimensions of problem wickedness. Given that the concept of wicked pro-
blems has noticeably evolved over the past decades, and in light of the fact that even in
more recent research the emphasis placed on specific characteristics of wicked problems
often varies considerably, a more concerted and systematic effort at theorizing dimensions
of problem wickedness may indeed be the only plausible way forward. At the very least,
such a move would likely raise attention to the fact that by focusing on different dimen-
sions of policy problems, our understanding of problem-solving necessarily shifts as well.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor
Falk Daviter is Assistant Professor of Public Administration and Policy at the University of
Potsdam. His research focuses on questions of policy framing, knowledge use and the politics of
expertise.

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