THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:

PROSPECTS AND CAUTIONS

Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

June 23, 1995

 *******

The views expressed in this report are those of the author

and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of
the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may
be conveyed directly to the author by calling commercial (717)
245-4086 or DSN 242-4086.

LL
 FOREWORD

The current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is taking

place against the background of a larger historical watershed
involving the end of the Cold War and the advent of what Alvin
and Heidi Toffler have termed "the Information Age." In this
essay, Dr. Earl Tilford argues that RMAs are driven by more than
breakthrough technologies, and that while the technological
component is important, a true revolution in the way military
institutions organize, equip and train for war, and in the way
war is itself conducted, depends on the confluence of political,
social, and technological factors.

After an overview of the dynamics of the RMA, Dr. Tilford

makes the case that interservice rivalry and a reintroduction of
the managerial ethos, this time under the guise of total quality
management (TQM), may be the consequences of this revolution. In
the final analysis, warfare is quintessentially a human endeavor.
Technology and technologically sophisticated weapons are only
means to an end.

The U.S. Army, along with the other services, is embracing

the RMA as it downsizes and restructures itself into Force XXI.
Warfare, even on the digitized battlefield, is likely to remain
unpredictable, bloody, and horrific. Military professionals
cannot afford to be anything other than well-prepared for
whatever challenges lie ahead, be it war with an Information Age
peer competitor, a force of guerrillas out of the Agrarian Age,
or a band of terrorists using the latest in high-tech weaponry.

While Dr. Tilford is optimistic about the prospects for

Force XXI, what follows is not an unqualified endorsement of the
RMA or of the Army's transition to an Information Age force. By
examining issues and problems that were attendant to previous
RMAs, Dr. Tilford raises questions that ought to be asked by the
Army as it moves toward Force XXI. Warfare is, the author
reminds us, the most complex of human undertakings and the
victors, even in the Information Age, will be those who, as in
the past, are masters of the art—as well as the science—of war.

LLL
RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies
Institute

LY
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

EARL H. TILFORD, JR. is Senior Research Professor and Director of

Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He earned his BA and
MA in history at the University of Alabama and his Ph.D. in
American and European military history at George Washington
University. Dr. Tilford is the author of three books, the latest,
published by Texas A&M University Press in 1993, being
Crosswinds: The Air Force's Setup in Vietnam. He has published
more than two dozen articles in scholarly and professional
journals. His next book, Eagle in the Desert: A Look Back at the
Persian Gulf War will be published by Greenwood Press later this
year.

Y
 SUMMARY

A characteristic of the American way of war is our

fascination with technology and the search for that technological
"silver bullet" that will deliver victory quickly and with a
minimum of loss of life. The current Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) is driven by rapid technological advance fostered
by the advent of the microprocessor and by decreased defense
spending. It operates against the background of a historical
watershed brought about by the end of the Cold War.

The RMA has been embraced by all the United States' military
services; especially the Air Force and the Army. As the Army
downsizes it is seeking to change itself into Force XXI; a
strategic force, trained and ready, to fight and win the nation's
wars in the 21st century. That we are in the midst of a true
revolution in military affairs is evident. What it may mean for
the Army and the nation is not so evident.

This monograph outlines where the Army is going as it seeks

to define change rather than be defined by change. It also looks
to the past to ask what have been the results of change during
past RMAs? Accelerated interservice rivalries and over-reliance
on management systems marked the last RMA, one driven by the
advent of atomic weapons at the end of World War II and the
relatively stable and sparse defense budgets of the 1950s. The
author argues that the consequence of interservice rivalry and
the institutionalization of the managerial ethos was defeat in
Vietnam.

Finally, the author warns against becoming so entranced with

the sophisticated technologies of the RMA that we lose both our
grounding in strategic thinking and our basic warrior skills. To
do so could be potentially disastrous when two peer competitor
forces meet on the 21st century battlefield and, quite possibly,
cancel each other out electronically. Then, it will be the side
which is able to fight at the lower "gut level" of warfare that
will prevail.

YL
 THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS:
PROSPECTS AND CAUTIONS

Introduction.

Discussions of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the

Military-Technical Revolution (MTR), and Information Age Warfare
often develop along technological lines. The Department of
Defense's Office of Net Assessment defines an RMA as a major
change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative
application of technologies which, combined with dramatic changes
in military doctrine, and operational concepts, fundamentally
alters the character and conduct of operations. What is lost in
this definition and in subsequent discussions is the nature of
war, which remains a complex interaction of political objectives,
human emotions, cultural and ethnic factors, and military skills.
In pursuit of a political objective, warfare is violence
articulated through strategy which is a balance of ends, ways and
means. Technology and technological innovations, while affecting
1
the way wars are or might be fought, remain means to an end.

The Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, occurring
as they did almost simultaneously, marked an historical
watershed. Ironically, the Gulf War, with its vision of a high-
tech and extremely potent U.S. military, coincided with the end
of an era in which just such a force is most viable. One might
postulate that the Gulf War and the fall of the Soviet Union,
taken together, constitute a bookend to one end of an era of
Western political and military history that is bounded at the
other end by the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. One might then
argue that the West was engaged in a second Hundred Years War
2
between 1870 and 1989. But the era which is dawning, the post-
Cold War era, is not the end of history nor is it so radically
different from all that came before that the study of the past
has no relevancy.

The end of the Cold War and the dawning of what Alvin and
Heidi Toffler have termed "the Information Age" are the two
powerful conditions that define the environment in which the
3
United States Army and its sister services operate today. In the
Information Age, one can argue that a military-technical
revolution, brought about by the advent of the microprocessor and


precision-guided munitions, is fostering a revolution in military
affairs. That may be so, but RMAs and rapid advances in
technology are not always related. The armies of Napoleon, for
instance, were part of a revolution in military affairs that
derived from the social and political upheavals of the French
Revolution. While the armies of the French Revolution coincided
with the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, the
incorporation of the people into the war effort through the levee
en masse was more important than anything issuing from the
Industrial Revolution. Furthermore, the weapons used by the
armies of 1815 were basically the same as those available in 1789
or, for that matter, in 1715. Conversely, the military-technical
revolution that issued from the maturing Industrial Revolution at
the beginning of the 20th century did not translate into a true
RMA until after the First World War, although all the
technological elements were available during the war: the
railroad, machine guns, tanks, long-range and rifled artillery,
rapid-fire rifles, electronic means of communication, and
4
airplanes.

Dynamics of the Current RMA.

The current RMA is driven by three primary factors: rapid

technological advance compelling a shift from the Industrial Age
to the Information Age; the end of the Cold War; and a decline in
defense budgets. It entails a fundamental change in who, how,
and, perhaps even why wars are fought. It is driven not only by
new technologies but by new operational concepts, new tactics,
and new organizational structures. The impact of the current
confluence of social, political, economic, and technological
forces on American society and the armed forces may equal—or
exceed—what occurred during the 1960s and 1970s during the
turmoil associated with the war in Vietnam.

The armed services, the Army and the Air Force in

particular, are feeling the impact of changes compelled by this
historic shift from the Industrial to the Information Age. The
transition is forcing a change in the way the military services
are organized, how they are supplied, how they procure weapons
and how they are managed, and, most importantly, how they think
and fight.

Over the past five years the armed forces have gone through


a tremendous reduction or, in military doublespeak, a build-down.
This build-down, which actually began in 1987, now proceeds in
accordance with the Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) issued by Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin in October 1993. By the end of the century, the
total number on active duty in the Army, Air Force, Navy and
Marines will have fallen from 2,130,000 in 1989 to 1,445,000. The
Army continues to decline from 18 active divisions to 10, the Air
Force is dropping from 24 to 13 active fighter wings, and Navy
battle force ships are declining from 567 to 346. While the
Marine Corps will retain its structure of three Marine
Expeditionary Forces, personnel strength will fall from 197,000
to 174,000. According to the 1995 National Military Strategy,
"Nevertheless, the United States will retain formidable forces .
. . pound for pound more capable through enhancements and
5
selected modernizations." These changes have inconvenienced and
caused uncertainty among professional soldiers, sailors and
airmen.

The extent to which the armed forces have accepted these

changes, however, has been remarkable, particularly given that
the drawdowns, relocations, reorganizations and other fundamental
alterations to the way they operate began immediately following a
victory of immense proportions in the Gulf War; a victory which
confirmed the tremendous progress made in rebuilding the
services, especially the Army, after the Vietnam War. The Army is
not only restructuring as it downsizes, it also is changing the
very way it thinks about war. As former Army Chief of Staff
General Gordon R. Sullivan stated, "We have to prepare ourselves
for wars we haven't seen yet and that we don't understand. We are
6
not just changing what we think. We are changing how we think."

The Army and the RMA.

The Army is changing from a forward-deployed and Industrial

Age army trained, equipped, and postured to stop a Soviet advance
in Europe, to an Information Age, power projection army. The Army
is drawing on the past and the present to make this transition.
Historically, the Army has a tradition as a power projection
force dating from the Spanish American War and the birth of the
7
American Empire. In fact, during the Cold War, although there
were significant forces deployed in Europe, the Army was still a
power projection force with most of its divisions stationed in
the continental United States. Although power projection is very


much a part of the new Army's past, what is different is the
rapidity with which forces must be deployed, where they may be
sent, and the reasons for going there. According to the National
Military Strategy of 1995, "The existence of a credible power
projection capability complements our overseas presence acting as
8
a deterrent to potential adversaries." The Army is drawing on
the Military Technical Revolution as it structures, equips, and
trains an RMA force that will make this concept a reality. The
transformation of the Army into Force XXI, a power projection
army for the Information Age, will be achieved by implementing a
vision built on five modernization objectives.

The first is to reorganize and restructure the Army into the

kind of force that can be deployed rapidly and then sustained in
the theater. As a part of the the Army's Force XXI initiative, it
is studying the way battalions, brigades, divisions, and corps
should be organized as these entities evolve into the size and
9
composition needed to succeed on Information Age battlefields.
An experimental Force XXI brigade, designated EXFOR XXI, was in
place early this spring at Ft. Hood, Texas. In 1996, the Army
10
plans to stand up EXFOR XXI at the division level.

Second, Force XXI must be able to survive on the Information

Age battlefield against any foe, whether that may be a peer
competitor capable of fighting in the digitized arena or an
Agrarian Age or Industrial Age force, opponents which
historically have proven most troublesome. Survival and
sustainment will be as much elements of operational power in the
future as they were in the past. Force XXI must be considered in
relation to the capabilities needed across a spectrum military
operations which may also include relief operations,
peacekeeping, and humanitarian interventions.

Third, the Army must be modernized to win the information

war. In information warfare, the objective is to deny the enemy
critical knowledge while achieving and retaining the decisive
advantage of battlefield awareness. The actual weapons used by
Force XXI: the tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery
pieces, rocket launchers, helicopters, command and control vans,
and support vehicles will look a lot like the Industrial Age
weapons of today. But they will be much smarter, deriving their
intelligence from computers and advanced technologies joined in a
digitally-integrated force that, taken as an entity, will be


qualitatively superior to the Army that won a decisive victory in
the Gulf War.

Fourth, the Army of the 21st century—Force XXI—must be

capable of precision strike. Precision strike will blind,
immobilize, and maintain the enemy at a distance while critical
targets are identified, struck and destroyed. Strike has to be
considered in terms of the degree of coercive capability
necessary to support the execution of a given mission.
Additionally, the strike function will be defined by the Army's
ability to mass the effect of its instruments (troops, tanks,
helicopters, artillery pieces, and rocket launchers) at the
critical places and at the proper time. "Decisive victory" will
be defined in terms of the objective, which may be anything from
the destruction of an enemy force to the stabilization of a local
situation brought about by natural disaster or ethnic and tribal
conflict, curbing the excesses of intrastate conflict, or
countering the more traditional forms of interstate aggression.

Finally, the modernized Information Age Army, Force XXI,

must be capable of dominating and winning the maneuver battle.
Through dominating maneuver, the right forces will be gotten to
the right place at the right time to effect the enemy's
operational and strategic collapse. The key to winning on the
fluid and multidimensional battlefield of the 21st century will
be simultaneity; the simultaneous employment of overwhelming
combat power throughout the breadth and depth of the operational
area to paralyze the enemy. Simultaneity is linked to surprise
and the disruption of the opponent's decision cycle. The
objective is, through dominating maneuver, to make the enemy
incapable of responding to a rapid succession of initiatives
devised to win quickly and decisively. If the Army does these
things right, the result will be a smaller, highly sophisticated
force, yet one able to overwhelm and defeat a foe superior in
11
numbers.

Digitization is one key to unlocking the capabilities of

Force XXI, and the digitized battlefield is becoming a reality.
By integrating advanced technologies into already existing
systems, the Army is upgrading its intelligence gathering and
processing capabilities along with its command and control
mechanisms, tanks, and fighting vehicles. As Andrew Krepinevich
put it, "Establishing information dominance could well be the sin


 12
qua non for effective military operations in future conflicts."

Barring an unforeseen technological leap of fantastic

dimensions, no single technological advance is likely to foster a
revolution in military affairs–at least not by itself. Rather it
is the integration of capabilities, those that exist along with
new ones as they arise, that makes for an RMA. War is still a
matter of ideas, emotions and will. Weapons and technology are
tools. The masters of the art of war in the 21st century will be
those individuals who can put capabilities together in innovative
ways to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives.
For instance, the first blow in the Gulf War was struck by nine
Army Apache AH-64 attack helicopters from the 101st Airborne
Division (Air Assault) led by three U.S. Air Force MH-53J Pave
Low helicopters from the 1st Special Operations Wing. Just before
H-Hour, the helicopters, organized as Task Force Normandy, flew a
long, earth-hugging mission to blast two early warning radar
sites deep inside Iraq. The MTR provided the technological
advances in night-and-low-light vision devices and precise
navigational capability resulting from space-based systems such
13
as the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites. What
indicates an RMA is the operational integration that brings
together the technologies available to Air Force and Army
helicopters and employs them to pave the way for what was
predominantly an Air Force and Navy air campaign.

Looking Back as We Look Ahead.

History is the only reliable guide mankind has to the

future. Nearly a century ago, A.T. Mahan wrote, "While many of
the conditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of
weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history
which remain constant . . . It is wise to observe things that are
14
alike, it is also wise to look for things that differ."

The world is as dangerous today as it was when the Cold War

began. Over the past 50 years, the major peer competitors in the
RMA fostered by the advent of the atomic and nuclear era managed
to avoid war with each other. Nevertheless, while the United
States was ready for war at the high end of the technological
spectrum, "atomic war, eyeball-to-eyeball and toe-to-toe with the
Rooskies" as Maj. King Kong, the demented B-52 pilot in the movie
"Dr. Strangelove" put it, some 100,000 Americans died in lower


order conflicts from Korea and Vietnam to Lebanon, Grenada,
Panama and the Persian Gulf. In 1962, at the start of the U.S.
commitment to the war in Vietnam, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Army General Lyman L. Lemnitzer claimed that forces
constituted for war in Europe could just as easily fight and win
15
against guerrillas in Indochina. In the Army and the Air Force,
there was a general acceptance of the notion that unconventional
or limited war was merely a subset of the kind of general and
conventional wars for which the services were structured and
equipped. If American forces could fight and prevail over Soviet
or Chinese forces in conventional or nuclear war, they could
certainly win any lesser order conflict quickly and with less
16
application of more or less the same kind of force. In Vietnam
that notion proved tragically flawed.

The end of the Cold War and the dawn of the Information Age
do not mark the advent of a technologically-based millennium of
peace and democracy. Since the Berlin Wall came down in November
and December 1989, the U.S. Army has issued over 700 Purple
Hearts and two Congressional Medals of Honor. That is more Purple
Hearts than were issued at any time between 1946 and 1989 except
17
when U.S. forces were engaged in Korea and Vietnam.

Interservice Rivalry.

The current Revolution in Military Affairs, no less than the

one driven by the atomic revolution, brings with it both
opportunities and challenges. In the periods between 1947 and
1950, 1954 and 1960, and from 1961 to 1965, precipitous
technological change and the competition for defense
appropriations drove bitter interservice rivalries. The atomic
bomb and how the services adapted to its implications for
strategy, force structure, weapons acquisition, and doctrine
operated on the one hand. The defense budgets operated on the
other. Between 1947 and 1950 and from 1954 through 1960, the
competition was driven by the atomic revolution and the scarcity
of defense dollars. From 1961 to 1965, interservice rivalries
were the result of an expanding defense budget, a squabble over
roles and missions in Vietnam, and a shift in strategy from one
based on massive retaliation, which favored the Air Force and its
large nuclear retaliatory forces, to one based on flexible
response, which expanded the roles of the other services and
their conventional, nonnuclear forces. Interservice rivalry is a


part of the current RMA as well.

In the U.S. Air Force, from before 1947, an article of faith

has been that offensive strategic air power possesses the virtues
necessary to obtain a complete and unambiguous victory. Strategic
bombing and victory through the decisive use of air power are
concepts precious to air power enthusiasts. The current
international environment, however, no longer favors such a
proposition. Air Force Colonel Richard Szfranski, writing in the
Spring 1995 Joint Forces Quarterly, argues that the end of the
Soviet threat may well mark the end of the Air Force's raison d'
etre as an independent service and that, "Unless the Air Force
18
becomes the space force, it may not survive beyond 2010." Today
the competition over space is only one area in which interservice
rivalry is intense.

Additionally, the Military Technical Revolution has provided

the weapons that conceivably could turn the theory of strategic
paralysis into reality. Theoretically, the more technologically
advanced the enemy, the more susceptible the nation and its armed
forces will be to the kind of attack that will result in
strategic paralysis. Retired Air Force Colonel John A. Warden is
the most articulate advocate of this kind of warfare. He has
posited a definition of the enemy as a system of five "strategic"
rings. Listed in descending importance to the proper functioning
of the enemy system, these rings are as follows: leadership,
organic essentials (i.e., electrical power), infrastructure,
population, and fielded military forces. According to Warden, air
power is uniquely qualified to bring quick and decisive victory
because planes and missiles can transcend earthly barriers of
distance and topography to strike at the innermost ring—
leadership—to incapacitate the opponent by destroying his brain:
the command and control system. If, for political or moral
reasons decapitation is not possible, then air power can induce
strategic paralysis by attacking the outer rings to achieve a
desired level of immobility or insensibility consistent with the
19
objective intent.

The MTR and the integration of precision-guided munitions

(PGMs) with the F-117A stealth fighter and into the B-1 and B-2
bomber fleets is to the current RMA what the wedding of the
atomic bomb with the Convair B-36 intercontinental bomber was to
the previous Revolution in Military Affairs. The Air Force's


dominance of the budget then was based upon the implicit
contention that its long range nuclear delivery capability made
it the dominant and decisive force in war. Air power enthusiasts
and advocates of the air campaign as depicted by John Warden have
gained impetus from the perceived "decisiveness" of air power in
the Gulf War. While air power was, indeed, critical to the final
outcome and pivotal to the success of the Allied forces, it was
not decisive.

The Army, for its part, argues that historically wars are
won on the ground and that it is the only service capable of
prompt and sustained land combat operations. It portrays Force
XXI as a technically-enhanced land combat force that can deter
potential adversaries and protect U.S. interests around the
globe. Land power advocates claim that only the Army has the
assets and staying power to operate over the entire battlefield
anywhere in the world. While successful military operations
involve controlling the air, sea and land, a nation's ability to
impose its will can only be assured if it is capable of
20
controlling the land.

Currently the services, but especially the Army and the Air
Force, are engaged in a spirited dialogue over roles and
missions. Both services are in competition for funds in a
decreasing defense budget while they are also modernizing and
restructuring their forces to accommodate new technologies. For
the present, however, an unfortunate result of the current RMA
will be heated interservice rivalries.

Technological Backfire.

Technology is extremely seductive and it is easy to get

caught up in the exotic potential of the RMA. But in pursuit of a
new way of making war, one cannot allow technological romanticism
to engender visions of a mystical silver bullet which promises to
sanitize war by erasing its human dimensions. The tendency to
chase silver bullets was evident in the Vietnam War. At the
beginning of the war, during the advisory phase, Operation Ranch
Hand was one such endeavor. This involved the aerial spraying of
chemical herbicides like Agent Orange on the jungles and mangrove
swamps of South Vietnam and Laos in an effort to deny cover to
the enemy. The sad result was threefold. First, defoliation did
not work very well and the ability of the enemy to conceal its


movements was not inhibited. Second, the ill-effects of aerial
spray, not only on the people and the ecology of Indochina but
also on American troops, fed the more exotic claims of the anti-
war movement, especially the contention that a cruel and unusual
technology had been unleashed on a peaceful and peace-loving
people. Third, there is the actual medical legacy of affected
21
veterans–American and Vietnamese.

University of Rochester historian, Professor Loren Baritz,

in his book Backfire: Vietnam, The Myths That Made Us Fight, The
Illusions That Helped Us Lose, The Legacy That Haunts Us Still,
argued that, "One of the major by-products of technology is faith
22
in technology." In the Spring 1995 Airpower Journal, the authors
of an article, "Weapons of Mass Protection," maintained that,
"Acquiring weapons of mass protection, nonlethal, anti-lethal,
and information warfare weapons, and integrating them into
current force capabilities, may be the way that airpower can
23
secure for years . . . its primacy in strategic utility." The
Gulf War, with the rapidity of victory and low casualty rates,
may or may not be repeated in the next large-scale engagement of
American forces. But whether it is or not, one can count upon the
expectation of many Americans that it should be. And if the war
is bloody and long rather than quick and relatively casualty-
free, unless the objectives are clearly worth the cost, public
support will erode quickly.

Our national fascination with technology in the 1950s

transferred to Vietnam in the 1960s, where the Air Force, and to
a lesser degree the Army, searched in vain for a technological
silver bullet. Cluster bombs, napalm, and herbicide defoliants,
and the first manifestations of the current MTR, the electronic
battlefield, laser and electro-optically guided bombs, all
promised much. While some delivered a good deal of destruction,
in the end technologically- sophisticated weapons proved no
substitute for strategy. What technology did do, however, was to
enforce, compel, and solidify the military's managerial mindset.
Vietnam was the best-managed war in American history;
unfortunately it was also a well-managed defeat.

From PRIDE to TQM.

Resources are an integral part of the equation in affecting

the RMA. The defense budget decline is not an insurmountable


barrier. Historically, revolutions in military affairs have
occurred during times of both plentiful and scarce economic
resources. Indeed, the last two RMAs occurred during the Great
Depression and after the Korean War; both were times of
constrained budgets. In some ways poverty is the father of
ingenuity.

In the seminal 1992 study of the MTR conducted for the

Office of Net Assessment, Andrew Krepinevich made the point that
the U.S. Navy developed the concept of carrier task forces, the
U.S. Marines worked out the basics of amphibious warfare, and the
Army Air Corps laid the theoretical foundations for strategic
24
bombing during the Great Depression. In Germany, despite
economic chaos and the restrictions imposed by the Versailles
Treaty, by 1935 the theoretical and operational foundations for
blitzkrieg had been established. Furthermore, as the German
experience indicates, frequently the RMA is not a matter of some
revolutionary technological breakthrough, but the development of
doctrines and organizations that can integrate existing
technologies in a new and innovative way.

Taken together, however, technology and management

historically have constituted a challenging combination for the
U.S. Department of Defense. The managerial ethos, engendered
during World War II and institutionalized in the 1950s, took hold
in the 1960s. High-tech weapons demand effective and efficient
management, from initial research and development through
procurement and deployment. Management depends upon bureaucracies
to insure efficiency, and bureaucracies abhor the unpredictable
and the uncontrollable. Therefore, managers and bureaucrats will
promote the objectivity of the quantifiable at the expense of the
subjectivity of the creative but unpredictable.

The Vietnam War solidified the managerial ethos making it

fundamentally a part of the value systems of all the services,
but especially that of the Air Force and, to only a lesser
degree, that of the Army, Navy and Marines. In the Air Force the
managerial approach to warfare evidenced itself in the way
success was measured in Operation Commando Hunt, the aerial
interdiction campaign along the Ho Chi Minh Trail from November
1968 to April 1972. The truck count, a running compilation of
trucks damaged or destroyed by air power, was an effort to assess
victory in terms of statistical success. The Army equivalent was


the infamous body count, whereby any ground operation in Vietnam
might be evaluated in terms of the number of enemy supposedly
killed or wounded. In both cases, however, statistics proved to
be no substitute for strategy and what the Air Force and the Army
succeeded best at was fooling themselves into thinking that they
25
were winning the war.

The tendency to confuse efficiency with effectiveness

continued after the Vietnam War and through the 1980s. Military
managers devised a succession of efficiency-oriented programs
with snappy acronyms like "Zero Defects" and Professional Results
in Daily Efforts (PRIDE). Management by Objective (MBO) and the
"Productivity Program" took root in the mid-1980s. Zero Defects,
PRIDE, and MBO were management systems devised for Industrial Age
military bureaucracies. The RMA is changing the military
bureaucracy just as the Information Age is changing industrial
and business bureaucracies. In the armed forces as well as in
industry, middle management positions are disappearing as their
main functions, information transfer and worker supervision
decline in importance. Computers transfer a great deal of
information digitally by "talking" to one another. In accordance
with Total Quality Management (TQM) principles, workers are more
self-regulating. Staffs and staff responsibilities are changing
as bureaucratic spans of control grow while organizations become
26
flatter and "process action teams" increase in importance. The
challenge to the military is to retain its system of values and
to enforce traditional respect for rank and order while changing
the hierarchial system of command.

If TQM is to the Information Age what PRIDE and MBO were to

the Industrial Age, there is reason to be cautious as the Army
and the other services transform their structures. The Department
of Defense has adopted total quality management concepts with an
enthusiasm that perhaps exceeds that accorded to earlier systems.
Throughout the services, officers and non-commissioned officers
have accepted the contentions made by W. Edwards Deming that TQM
is largely responsible for the post-war Japanese economic
27
recovery. After almost total destruction of Japan's industrial
base by bombing in World War II, the Japanese auto industry rose
like Phoenix from the ashes to achieve phenomenal success. The
program has been oversold to the military by people who forget
that Japan had the advantage of rebuilding its industrial base
and structuring it to incorporate the latest technologies. It


also ignores the unique characteristics of Japanese culture and
society that facilitated rapid adaptation to the Industrial and
Information revolutions over the past 120 years.

Parts of the military that resemble civilian industry could

profit from a businesslike culture; acquisitions and finance in
particular. But TQM may be as threatening to military culture as
Zero Defects, PRIDE, and MBO were earlier. War is, and in the
information age is liable to remain, a bloody, horrific, and
passionate undertaking. The bottom line is always victory, and
that sometimes comes at an exorbitant price in human suffering
and resources. The Defense Department's general managers, and the
services' manager generals, did not serve the nation well when
they took the world's premier Industrial Age military to war (and
defeat) in Vietnam. In the RMA we must ensure against raising up
28
a generation of leadership composed of techno-wonk managers.

The RMA, Force XXI and the Future.

Reservations aside, the American military, especially the

Army and the Air Force, are embracing the RMA. As the services
move into the Tofflerian Third Wave as Information Age
militaries, they are preparing to fight other Information Age,
Third Wave armed forces. Just as it was necessary for the Air
Force, Army, Navy and Marines to be prepared to fight their
Soviet counterparts during the Cold War, it may be just as
prudent to prepare for the most potent possible future threat.
But will being able to fight in the Third Wave also ensure that
the armed forces will be able to fight effectively against First
and Second Wave foes? Historically, the record has not been good.

Since World War II, U.S. military failures have come at the
hands of opponents who had little or no air or sea forces and
whose ground forces were composed largely of light infantry.
During the Korean War, and on those occasions during the Vietnam
War when the enemy was good enough to confront American forces
conventionally, they were almost always drubbed. First and Second
Wave forces, however, often prevailed over first-class Industrial
Age forces when they employed a combination of unconventional
strategy and tactics with a willingness to sustain higher
casualty rates. Defense analyst Dr. Jeffrey Record, in a paper
delivered at the Army War College, made the point that American
forces were stalemated in Korea, defeated in Vietnam, and


humiliated in Lebanon and Somalia when their opponents took the
strategic initiative and forced the kind of fight where high
29
firepower and air power could be used effectively. The French
experience in Indochina and the Soviet experience in Afghanistan
were similar. Even in the Information Age, the dialectic is at
work. There may well be another Mao Tse Tung or another Vo Nguyen
Giap capable of developing a counterstrategy or devising a
tactical solution that may reduce or even eliminate any Third
Wave force's supposed advantage in Information Age warfare. Given
the inevitability that this will occur, any strategy that may be
developed during the RMA that does not anticipate and plan for
these counterstrategies will not serve the nation well.

Then there is what Krepinevich described as the "dreadnought

factor." What if the United States is not the nation that makes
the next dramatic technological leap? What if someone else takes
that giant step that renders everything else irrelevant? As the
future unfolds it may be easier to do that than in the past,
especially if the breakthrough involves harnessing the mind to an
already available, off-the-shelf technology. What if one, two, or
ten exceedingly bright and innovative techno-wonks figure out how
to electronically "blow up" the New York Stock Exchange or the
30
Federal Reserve System? What would be an appropriate response?

There is danger here in cultural myopia. The atomic bomb may

have been invented in the United States, but it might not have
been if Albert Einstein and others had remained in Germany. We
must keep in mind that we are raising up a generation of
Americans dependent on hand-held calculators to do their basic
math.

Finally, the possibility of the rise of a peer force

competitor cannot be discounted. Despite political instability
and economic chaos, Russia is still moving ahead in its military
modernization programs. Despite the loss of the Ukraine, it is
rich in natural resources and its population has produced an
abundance of premier physicists. The collapse of the Soviet Union
will be more likely to affect Russia's ability to engage in the
RMA than it will to continue its participation in the MTR. If
Russia reconstructs itself politically, especially in the form of
a military dictatorship, its participation in the RMA could bring
31
it to peer status with the United States relatively quickly.
Currently, other than Russia, the only nations that can


participate even partially in the RMA are France, Germany, the
United Kingdom, Israel, and Japan. They are friendly.

It takes more than technology to become a full participant

32
in the RMA. The national and military culture have to be
accommodating to change and decentralized execution. For
instance, while Japanese business culture may be able to operate
under TQM principles, the Chinese might find it culturally more
difficult to accept and employ. The technological barriers to
full participation are themselves significant, and only a
handfull of countries have the necessary advanced data-processing
systems, space-based sensors, and access to usable stealth
33
technologies–to name a few required basics. Not many nations
possess the right combination of culture, wealth, and access to
technologies. And military cultures may be more resistant to
change than the societies which support them.

But the number of those nations that can participate in the

MTR in a limited way is much larger and the list is growing.
Today some 20 nations can produce precision-guided munitions.
That number may well double within a decade. And the pace of
technological evolution is likely to increase, with the
possibility of a dramatic breakthrough on the part of someone
other than ourselves.

If and when an Information Age force meets a peer

competitor, contesting forces could cancel each other out at the
electronic level early on. Alternatively, one side may
electronically zap its opponent in the cyberwar equivalent of a
Pearl Harbor. What then would be the alternatives?

If both sides cancel one another out, the alternatives are

twofold. First, a war of attrition might develop, perhaps
resembling what happened on the Western Front in World War I.
Then the two sides are likely to fight to exhaustion, especially
if the leadership on both sides has been so focused on
Information Age warfare that they have forgotten—or never
learned—basic military strategy or the operational art extant in
the 1980s and 1990s. The second alternative would be to fight a
Second Wave or even First Wave kind of war. The side which can
fight at that lower level, at the Industrial Age or Agrarian Age
level where superior strategy, innovative tactics, and human
courage and determination are the critical—often decisive—


factors, will win. The danger is that in the current RMA we may
be neglecting the warrior skills and relinquishing the kind of
military culture that would be needed to pursue warfare at the
gut level.

If one peer competitor gains an immediate advantage by

establishing cyberspace dominance and Information Age superiority
over the other, there again will be two alternatives. First,
surrender is always an available solution. Second, if the
victimized forces are able to fight at the lower level, and if
they can take the offensive, they may well win. There is no
reason to believe that in the Information Age victory will not
accrue—as it has in the past—to the side which develops the
superior strategy and which has the greater capacity for
enduring suffering. Historically, that has not always been the
side which has possessed the edge in technology and weaponry.

In conclusion, strategic thinkers in all the services need

to address the nature of war in the Information Age. The U.S.
Army, and the military in general, still view war as combat—the
clash of forces to establish superiority on land, in the air, or
at sea. War in the future may well be waged in any one or all
three of these arenas but it may also be fought across the
spectrum to include economic warfare, ecological warfare, and
terrorism. Clashing titans on the battlefield may be the
exception rather than the rule, with future war dominated instead
by wire-heads on the Internet. That brings us back to the central
question of strategy: how do we balance ends, ways and means in
the Information Age?

ENDNOTES

1. General Gordon R. Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel James

M. Dubik, Land Warfare in the 21st Century, Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1993, pp. 22-24.

2. A similar argument is made by John Lukacs in The End of

the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age, New York:
Ticknor and Fields, 1993, pp. 4-9. Lukacs, however, claims that
the 20th century lasted only 75 years, from 1914 to 1989. I would
suggest that World War I was the inevitable result of the Franco-
Prussian War, much as World War II was historically determined by
the First World War and the Versailles Treaty.


 3. See Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival
at the Dawn of the 21st Century, Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1993, pp. 15-17.

4. See Richard A. Preston and Sidney F. Wise, Men in Arms:

A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with Western
Society, 4th edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979,
pp. 238-250; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Military-Technical
Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment," Office of Net Assessment
unpublished manuscript, July 1992, pp. 2-5.

5. National Military Strategy of the United States of

America: A Strategy of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with
Western Society, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 1995, p. 17. Hereafter referred to as National Military
Strategy, 1995.

6. Sullivan quoted in David Wood "Unlikely Radical Inspires

Army to Do More With Less," Sunday Patriot News, Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, April 2, 1995, p. A-12.

7. Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, For the Common

Defense: A Military History of the United States of America, New
York: The Free Press, 1984, pp. 273-289 and 299-325.

8. National Military Strategy, 1995, p. 2.

9. See The Honorable Togo D. West, Jr., and General Gordon

R. Sullivan, A Statement on the Posture of the United States
Army, Fiscal Year 1996, Washington: U. S. Government Printing
Office, April 1995, p. 55; and Sullivan and Dubik, War in the
Information Age, p. 19.

10. General Gordon R. Sullivan, "America's Army: Strategic

Force for Today and Tomorrow," Defense 95, Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, April 1995, p. 14; and conversation
with Professor Doug Lovelace, Strategic Studies Institute, May 3,
1995.

11. See General Gordon R. Sullivan and Lieutenant Colonel

Anthony M. Coroalles, The Army in the Information Age, Carlisle
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 1995, pp. 7-8


and pp. 12-13; and West and Sullivan, The Army Posture Statement,
1996, p. 57.

12. Krepinevich, "The Military-Technical Revolution," p. 22.

13. Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf

War, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 115.

14. A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower Upon History, 12th

edition, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980, p. 2.

15. JCSM-33-62, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 13

January 1962, Subject: The Strategic Importance of the Southeast
Asian Mainland," in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department
History of the United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Vol. 2,
Senator Mike Gravel edition, Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, pp. 663-
666.

16. The Army and the Air Force were never truly committed to
the counter-guerrilla or, as it was known after 1961,
"counterinsurgency" effort in Vietnam. The leadership in both
services seemed convinced that once regular forces were
committed, the war could be won. See John F. Loosbrook, "What
Kind of War?" Air Force Magazine, November 1956, pp. 44-49; and
Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Trumbo, Jr., Director of Plans, 2d
Air Division, interview with Joseph W. Grainger, Ton Son Nhut Air
Base, Vietnam, July 13, 1963, Interview No. 271, USAF Oral
History Program, U.S. Air Force Historical Research Center,
Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

17. Sullivan, Defense 95, p. 8.

18. Colonel Richard Szfranski, Joint Forces Quarterly,

Spring 1995, p. 79, emphasis in original.

19. See Colonel John A. Warden, III, "The Enemy as a

System," Airpower Journal, Spring 1995, p. 43; and Major David S.
Fadok, "John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power's Quest for
Strategic Paralysis," Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,
February 1995, p. 2.

20. "Report of the Secretary of the Army," in William J.

Perry, Annual Report to the President and Congress, Washington:


U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 279.

21. William A. Buckingham, Jr., Operation Ranch Hand: The

Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971,
Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, pp. 183-185.

22. Loren Baritz, Backfire: Vietnam, The Myths That Made Us

Fight, The Illusions That Helped Us Lose, The Legacy That Haunts
Us Still, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984, p. 32.

23. Chris Morris, Janet Morris, and Thomas Baines, "Weapons

of Mass Protection: Nonlethality, Information Warfare, and
Airpower in the Age of Chaos," Airpower Journal, Spring 1995, p.
16.

24. Krepinevich, "The Military-Technical Revolution," p. 34.

25. See Raphael Littauer and Norman Uphoff, editors, The Air
War in Indochina, Revised Edition, Cornell War Study Group,
Boston: Beacon Press, 1971, pp. 67-75; and USAF Operations in
Laos: January 1, 1970-June 30, 1971, Honolulu: Headquarters
Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), May 31, 1972, pp. 25-27, in USAF
Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, AL, K717.0432.6.

26. Sullivan and Dubik, War in the Information Age, p. 8.

27. Too much credit may be given to TQM and not enough to
Curtis LeMay. Japanese heavy industry, totally destroyed during
the war, was rebuilt by American largess and that rebuilding had
the advantage of beginning at a higher level of technological
sophistication. In that regard, the bombs of XXth Air Force had
as much to do with the post-war Japanese recovery as W. Edwards
Deming.

28. Dennis M. Drew, "Air Force Should Pull the Plug on its
TQM," Air Force Times, September 26, 1994, p. 2.

29. See Larry E. Cable, Unholy Grail: The U.S. and the Wars
in Vietnam, 1965-68, London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 33-35; and
Jeffrey Record, Ready for What and Modernized Against Whom?,
Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, April 1995,
p. 7.


 30. I want to acknowledge the ideas and thoughts of my
colleagues Dr. Steven Metz and Dr. William Johnsen. They are on
the cutting edge of thinking in this area. I am grateful to their
patience and generosity in sharing many of the ideas expressed
throughout this portion of the paper.

31. "The Defense Technology Gap," unpublished speech by

Senator Joseph Lieberman, March 3, 1995.

32. It is difficult to say for sure that only "modern" and

technically-advanced nations can participate in the MTR and RMA.
Germany, in the throws of political and economic chaos, and
limited by the Versailles Treaty, would not have been a logical
candidate to bring together the elements of an RMA by laying the
foundations for blitzkrieg in the 1920s and early 1930s.

33. Krepinevich, "The Military-Technical Revolution," p. 40.


 U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Richard A. Chilcoat

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director
Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon

Director of Research
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary
Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition
Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler