Classical Philosphy of India
Classical Philosphy of India
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
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FOREWORD
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speculations ofthe poet-philosophers ofthe Rig Veda, regarding the v
.mysteries ofnature and closing around the fourth century B .C., that clai~s the monopoly over truth. Like the six blind men ofHindustan
/ is followed by the logical period, extending up to the establishment of d~finmg the elephm~t, limited human intellects can have only partial
the Muslim rule in Delhi, circa1000 AD., and thirdly, theJ,!tlndogical VIews of.truth. In this context, Aristotle says in his Politics: " Som e
stage, extending, roughly, to the beginning ofthe eighteenth century. see o?e sl,~e of ~ l~atter, others see other sides, but ~Uogethersee all
Some critics trace the roots of the Sankhya and Vaiseshika systems the SIdes . ThIS IS exactly the scope and the achievement of the
to the hoary, pre-logical stage. cl~sicalIndi~phil~sophies. T?u~, while the Nyaya developed mainly
lOgIC, the Vazseshz~s speCIalIzed in cosmology, the Sankhya
The various classical systems ofIndian philosophy developed
devel~ped metaphYSICS, the Yoga took up the cause ofpsychOlOgY,
during the GoldenAge ofthe logical period. In the tenth century AD. ,
theMzmamsakas developed hermeneutics and exegesis and Vedanta ~
classical Indian philosophy scaled the zenith of its glory by the concentrated on Theology
dialectical process of a tremendous conflict between the Orthodox
and the Heterodox systems ofIndian philosophy, especially between . For the publication of this modest text of Classical Indian
the Baudhas and the Nayiyayikas. This stage saw the emergence PhI1~so.phy, lowe a great debt ofgratitude to the Bangalore Salesian
ofthe treatises ofthe Yoga-sutras, theMimamsa;.sutras, the Brahma- Provincial, Fr. Jose Kuttiyaninlattathil and to F[Thomas Anchukandan
sutras, the Nyaya-sutras, the Sankhya treatises and their numerous Rector, Kris~u Jyoti College, Bangalore. Fr. Anchu, not only readil~
commentaries and sub-commentaries. While there is fierce criticism agreed ~o bnng It out as a .KJC publication, but also painstakingly
of rival systems, within the same school, criticism is not tolerate4; went thr ough the text, making necessary corrections. I also gratefully
probably because the guru is considered as a god: guru devo bhasah: acknowledge the ~enerous help ofmy KJC student friends, Sonych en,
Here thought develops by expansion, by means ofcommentaries. So, Tomy, Tony Chenan and Bijoy, for the computer typing ofthe notes.
we have few original thinkers but a plethora of commentators or
Bhashyakaras. This is a basic weakness in Indian philosophy. During
the third period, we witness the bizarre sight ofextremely subtle logic-
chopping and highly polemical display of semantic and dialectical
acrobatics, such as had never developed in Europe at that time and
which are, in part, so difficult that few Occidental scholars have been
able to master them. Philosophy developed in ancient Greece and in
modern Europe by a dialectical process of mutual opposition and
rejection. Aristotle boldly rejected the central doctrine ofhis master
Plato. "Plato is friendly, but truth is friendlier", said Aristotle:Amicus
Plato, s;;d, magis amica veritas . Kant rejected pes cartes and Hume
rejected both! On the other hand, classical Indian philosophical systems
developed simultaneously and complementing each other. Da.I§E!!E
is the term commonly employed in India for philosophy, and it means
.§ point ofvie'JY~ a partial or p~cular in~~ ~!9~ity. Hem .nobody
CONTENTS
Foreword iii
1. The Nyaya 3
2. The Vaiseshika 19
3. The Sankhya 24
4. The yoga 34
5. The Mimamsa 44
6. The Vedanta: (I) Advaita 50
8. The Vedanta: (ii) Visishtadvaita 60
9. The Vedanta: (iii) Dvaita 64
10. The Vedanta: (iv) Suddhadvaita 67
11. J ainism 75
12. Buddhism , 84
13. The Charvakas 119
.... M
I
Part - I
ASTIKA DARSANAS
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I . THE NYAYA SYSTEM
I ""
The Nyaya Sj )stem
4 Astika Darsanas 5
the founder oflogic nor the founder of the Nyaya school. The name is not merely the study of the nature of the self and .t I
In that N . 1 S re ease.
Akshapada means one with eyes focused on feet for de~p . case, yaya cannot claim any distinction from the
concentration. (Aksha= eye, pada=feet) . We know of several U~~nzshads, .s ay Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara. Its goal is the
logicians who had lived before Gautama. Dattatreya, Atreya, ~ntlcal examlI1atlOn of the metaphysical problems. Ifavidva
Punarvasu, Ashtavakra and the female ascetic Sulabha were the more Ignorance) enslaves man and vidya liberates hrrn then there
famous of them. Jayanta Bhatta asserts that logic existed before must be a thorough co~ection between logic and m'etaphysics.
Gautama (though his is the most satisfactory work)'just as Mimamsa H~nceN'yaya also studies the objects ofknowledge m . I .
alhan ith h r r:» . , am y m
existed before Jaimini and grammar before Panini. Nyaya is some- ce WIt ·e Vaiseshika school. Thus whileNy tudi
th ld wi hi , ayas les
times called Tarka vidya (science of debate) or Vada vidya (science e. ~or WIt .1~ man, Vaiseshika studies the world outside
of discussion). Thl.s IS. the POSltIV~ goal ofNyaya. It has also anegative goal'
which IS the refutation ofrival systems especially theBa dl '
Gautama's method has its admirers and critics. Kautilya makes The theorv of ' , U 1QS.
__ __ ~-J_ Impermanence CKshanikavada) of Buddhism
logic superior to Travi (Vedas), Varta (commerce) ;ma-rXandanW had destroyed the substance theory ofreality N d
to ,. . yaya wante
(politics). Logic is censured in the Ramayana, as leading men away re-assert rea Ism by means ofpureJogic. This involved a
from the duties laid down in the Dharmasastras. Manu says that frontal attack on the Vijnanavada school of B ddhi .
. 1 ( . u Ism 111
those who misled by logic (Hetusastra) disregarded the Vedas and partlc~ arldealIsm).The Middle school (Madhyamika) of
the Dharma Sutras, should be excommunicated. But both Gautama NagarJun~ had demolished every possibility of logical or
the lawgiver and Manu prescribe a course oflogic for the kings . The m.~~aphysIc.al truth . Against Advaita of Sankara and
logicians had an important place in the state legislature called Sabha. I
I rjIshtadva.I~a of Ramanuia, Nyaya had to establish the
Logic
".. - ..__.-
when supportive of the Vedas was commended. . The sage I .emonstrablhty of God's existence by.reason alone. ~.
Vyasa is said to have arranged the Vedas in accordance with logic. ,i.
~
i
c. The Nyaya Methodology
b. The Goal of Nyaya i Vi dNya~a is SOI.n e times c.alled Tarka vidya (science of debate)
1. The ultimate goal of Nvaya is moksha or liberation. For the I or a a vI~ya (science of dIscussion). Both Socrates and Plato
ancient Hindus, logic was only a means (marga) for final 1
l ~a:etmluch Im~ort~ce to the method of dialogue in philosophising
liberation from the cycle ofbirths and deaths, sam sara, produced ! fIS ot e says 111111S Politics: "Some see one side of am tot d
by karma. So Nyaya is both philosophy and religion or others see an th id a er, an
Iczi . o . er siqe.. But all together see all the sides." Greek
spirituality. So ' it is totally different from ancient Greek ;~~;~d)U~h to th.e dial~ctics ofthe Sophists (Protagoras, Gorgias
Philosophy and Modern Western Philosophy. It is basically an r ~ w 0, while laying down the rules to discover truth also
art ofliyjng. It is a sadhana (spiritual exercise) rather than a used sophisms or tricks in argument Gautama 's N ' 1
deals wirh hi . . ' yaya sutra a so
pure science as it existed among the ancient Greeks. rr»: • WI kS~P sms. JSautI1ya gIves a list on 2 teclmical terms called
.LanIJayu ti on the art ofdebate Th Ch .
11. The proximate goal ofNyaya, according to the greatNaiyayika
philosopher Vacaspati, is the critical examination ofthe obj ects
~vailabl.e medical.text by Charaka, g~ve~~:~:;:e;;~~~~a~~~:~:~~iei~
le sectIon on lOgIC, known as Anvikshiki. '
/' ofknowledge by the canons oflogical proof The aim ofNyaya
Astika Darsanas The Nyaya System 7
6
pramanani. Aprama (non-valid knowledge) includes: doubt
d. Nyaya literature (samsaya) , error (bhrama), and hypothesis (ta..rka) .
In its vastness, Nyaya literature is se~ond only to that of
Vedanta. The following are the most outstandmg texts . . i. PERCEPTION
Nyaya sutra by Gautama (around 400 B .C) Definition: "Perception is that knowledge which arises out of
.,. . 1 . Nyaya bhashya of Vatsyayana (circa first ce~tury A.D) the contact of a sense with its object, which is well determined. not ~
~ous and not (yet) associated with a name" (Nyaya sutra, 1.1.4).
/ 2. ik: J U ddyotakara written In defence of
/ 3. Nyaya vartt a oJ ' . D' , N aya Nyaya demands at least one sense organ in order to exclude yogic
Vatsyayana against the attack ofthe Buddhist ignaga s Y
and divine perception, which are admitted by the Vaiseshikas. This
pro w w. . definition was criticised by the Advaitins who said that perception is
bi d b Dharmakirti (Buddhist) in defence ofDIgnaga possible without contact with an object, as in the case 'of a man who
4. Nyaya In It Y
against U ddyotakara:. . ' . ' mistakes a rope for a snake in semidarkness. Also no sense organ is
Nyayabinduttka by Dharmottara (BuddhIst) defendmg involved in the perception ofhunger, pain, etc . Vi~y~atha defines
5.
Dignaga. . perception as, "D irect knowledge not obtained through the other three
e..ramanas ". For others, immediate knowledge is perception.
6 . Vacaspati's Nyayayartikatatparyatika . .
Commentators include also the contact of the sense with the mind ..-'
,. . . Udayana 's Nyayavartikataparyaparzsuddhz, and
/ 7. ~d the latter with the self (atman) .
Nyayakusumanjali.
J ayanta's Nyayamanjari .. . . . Classification of Perception
Gangesa's Tattvacintamani, written 111 reply to the seve~e Perception can be external (bahya) or internal (manasa) . In
criticismlevelled"agamsttheNyaya methodology by the Vedantm internal perception there is contact of the mind with psychological
dialectician Sriharsha in his work, Khandanakhandakhadya states like pleasure, pain, etc. Again, perception can be this-worldly
(sweet food of refutation). (Iaukika) or other-worldly (alaukika) . The former includes the five
Gan esa and others ofthe New Logical school (Navya Nyaya) external senses and the internal sense (antarindriya). The·latter
-.~m Mithila and Navadvipa (Bengal) from the twelfth to includes three kinds ofperceptions:
that flouns e h t ry A D stressed the philosophy oflanguage, ....1) Samanya lakshana
the seventeent cen u . ., . hil
,/ ~~~ . ~~~~fQI~!l~eLW~e<Sl-OOJub!!l~dL!thlli!in~k;Jod]f;JLdiwn~ul!iis~t~IC::..1L!~I~O~S~0'i=""T"
centunes erore /
2)
3)
Jnana lakshana
Yogaja
e. Nyaya philosophy lid /
N a a holds that there are two kinds of kno:vledge, v~. Samanaya lakshana is the perception of the universals : e.g .,
y Y lid ~aprama) The means ofvahd knowledge man. Jnana lakshana is the perception ofan object with an improper
(prama) an d .non-va I ~. L ( )
-=--- ) . rception (pratyaksha) , inference anumana , sense organ. Thus, when we say: " I see a fragrant rose", we refer to
(pramana are. pe . (sabda) . Gautama puts sight instead of smell. We perceive smell with the nose and not with
comparison (upamana) and verbal testImony - a bd h
it in the sutra form thus : pratyakshanumanopamanas a the eye .
Astika Darsanas The Ny ay a System 9
8
YlZgqjg.--refers to the intuitive knowledge ofYogis, who can see holds that w,e have first sense-experience, then conception and thirdly
objects that are far away, out of their sight and they can also see perceptualludgen~ent. These are not three separate acts, but three
events of the future. . phases, not per~elved a~ such, but inferred. The Naiyayikas, in
general, regard mdetermmate perception as the starting -point of all
Perception is further divided into : indeterminate percePtion,
kno:,dedge, though it is not itself knowledge. It is a state of
determinate perception, and re-cognition. .undIf:fer.entia.ted, non-relational consciousness, free from analysis and
a. Indeterminate Perception (Nirvikalapa Pratyaksha) synthesis. It IS free from verbal images or names. At the determinate
level, t~ere is relational mode and differentiation and~~~g.
F or the Baudhas every perception is that of a unique particular. Accordm¥ to Parthasarathy Misra, these two stages in the process
Buddhist logicians contend that determinate perception is mediate of p ~rc~ptlO~ are.the rudimentary and the advanced types of a process
knowledge that is not free from preconceptions, while mdeterminate :~at IS IdentIcal. m nature ~ For William James , the first stage is the ,
.perception is free from preconceptions (kalpanapodham). Kalpana R aw, unverb~lIsed expenence". Uddyotakara argues that pure sense
according to Dharmakirti is the activity ofthought by which a name is kno,:ledge, Withoutany a~li.xture ofname or genus, is an impossibility.
given to the object. Says Dharm'akirti: " Th e object of perception is
Aqumas hol?s the same VIew. For him the primary object of man's
like itself (svalakshana) while that of mediate knowledge is like one knowledge IS a synthetic unity in which both the ~nses and the
of its class (samanyalakshana) . The given is the unique, the particular
understanding or mind, play their indispensable roles .
the momentary, the known is typical, the universal, the lasting. Dignaga
(Yogacara Baudha) dismisses all knowh~dge of substances, qualities II. INFERENCE (ANUMANA)
.- and actions as false.
b. Determinate Perception (Savikalpa Pratyaksha) I Anumana comes from anu and mana (anu means after and
mana n:-eans kno,:ledge). It is knowledge from knowledge. From
F or the Sabdikas. (Grammarians) every perception must be ! perceptIon comes mferenc~. E.g., from the perceived smoke, we get
determinate in the form of ajudgement, having a predicate. While knowledge of the unperceIved fire . Inference is defined as "T hat
the BaudhasJIold that what we perceive is the mere esse or bare t, kn~wl~~ge wh~ch i~,pre~ede?byanother cognition followin~ (anu)
existence of the thing, the Grammarians hold that what we perceive WhICh It ISobtained'. ThIS p_D.or knowledge is that ofthe middle term
is the essence or the nature of athing. Ramanuja agrees with this \ (~eju), e.g. smoke as.an invariable concomitant with the major term-
view. Kant and Bhartruhari deny the possibility of indeterminate t (5 a~hya) to be e~tabhshed , e.g., fire . Their inyariable concomitance
\I
perception. Says Kant: "'perceptions without notions are blind" . I (going together) IS called VJlS!lZli (pervasion). The minor term is called .
!
Bhartruhari believes that there can be no thought without language
and so, indeterminate perception, which is supposed to be independent
of all language, is for him an impossibility (N. v.:r.T.i. LA).
lI
!
-
paksha..
3. Whatever has smoke has fire, as the kitchen • tI- a) Anvaya (co-presence): when two things always go together,
! as, e.g., smoke and fire, there is vyapti.
(udaharana) i
4. The hill has smoke (upanaya) I b) Vyatireka : (co-absence): When two things are always absent
together, there is vyapti, as, e.g., there is no smoke when there
5. Therefore, the hill has fire (nigamana)
is no fire.
TheMimamsakas and the Advaitins object to this five-member c) Vyabhicaragraha (no contrary instance) : when there is no
syllogism ~ying that it is too cumbersome (bu~ky) and redundant .contrary instance, there is vyapti, as e.g., there is no instance
(repetitive). The second proposition is repeated III the fourth and the ofsmoke existing without fire.
conclusion comes at the beginning and at the end also. d) Upadhinirasa: co-existence of two things is possible when
The Nayiyayikas' reply is that the fourth proposition is brought some conditions are present, even without vyapti, as smoke is
in to avoid the fallacy of ambiguous middle. What one sees on the produced by fire only when there is the condition (upadhi) of
distant hill may be smoke or mist. This possible ambiguity is eliminated wetness. Fire is not invariably and unconditionally followed by
by the fourth proposition. The first proposition is not an ad.vanced smoke.
use of the conclusion: its purpose is to keep before the mind ~hat e) Tarim: (reductio ad absurdum): it is a negative proof: in this
which one is going to prove. Its location at the head ofthe syllogism - case , if we assume the opposite to be true, we land in absurdity,
prevents one from wandering from the point at issue. It is a watchdog The assumption that smoke can be produced by some element
proposition. Western syllogism does not have the Udaha~ana other than fire, lands us in absurdity, as fire is the only known
(example}, Its use is to ensure clarity of'thought. The Nyaya syllogism, cause of smoke.'
though it looks rather cumbersome, IS a very co.mpact ~onn ~f j) Samanyalakshana pratyaksha: (perception ofthe universals).
argument that involves b~!l:J_cl~duction an~ indu~tlOn. ,Anstotle s When we comprehend the class essence orthe universal, there
syllogism is weak because it lacks the g~ahty ofmductlOn..It may is vyapti. In the given examplevthere IS an essential link
give formal truth, but it fails to give materIal truth becau~~ of It~ lack between smoke and fire .
ofthe inductive quality. Nyaya originally had ten proposrtions; It was
a mini dialogue. Since the Charvakas deny inference, they also deny vyapti.
According to the Buddhists, vyapli is known from the principles of
VYAPT] causality and identity. Since no effect is without a cause, vyapti is
established if we can establish the cause-effect link between two
, Vyapti is the ground of inference. Vyapti'is define~ as, "That objects, Again, vyapti exists when there is identical essence in all
relation of co-existence between the maoor term and the middlatecm, members ofa class. Since the essence ofsmoke is same everywhere,
permanent and independent of all conditions" (nitya anupadhika its association with fire establishes vyapti. -
sambandhah vyaptih) . While there is vyapti b~tw~en smoke ~nd
fire there is no vyapti between fire and smoke. Fire IS accompanied
I
12 Astika Darsanas The Nyaya System 13
The Eeaanuns prove vyapti from induction, by simple Four conditions should be fulfilled for a sente~~Leal ~
enumeration. It is established by the uncontradicted experience of meanmg:
agreement in presence between two things. We can enumerate all
cases of smoke existing because of fire, and this establishes vyapti. 1. Akamksha (expectation). In the sentence, "Bring the cow",
there will be no sense without the predicate (gam anaya).
iii. COMPARISON: (UPAMANA) 2. Sannidhi (nearness): For a sentence to have sense, the
predicate must be near the subject both in space and in time.
Comparison (upamana) is, "The kn.:owledge of the relation After you utter the subject, do not wait for many days to utter
between a name and the object it stands for." It is naming of an the predicate.
obj ect through a given description.
3. Yogyata (fitness): There must be congruity between the subject
Thus, e.g., having a theoretical description ofa wild ox (gavaya) and the predicate. Thus, the sentence, "sprinkle the garden
we can name it when we actually meet such an animal in the forest. with fire", has no sense; "sprinkle with water" alone gives it
The Baudhas reduce comparison to perception or verbal testimony. sense.
Samkhya and Vaiseshika reduce it to inference. The hins reduce it 4. Tatparya (intention): When a word has two meanings, the
to re-cognition (pratyabhijnay. Though theM.imamsakas and the speaker's intention and context clarifies it. E.g. "Bring
Vedantins admitcomparison as a separate Pramana, they explain it saindhava" (salt, horse) takes the first meaning if one is at
differently. . meal, and the second, if on hunt.
iv. SABDA: (VERBAL TESTIMONY) The power of a word (pada-sakti) is derived from God
(Isvara) for the ancient Naiyayikas (Pracina Nyaya) while for
Gautama defines Sabda as, aptopadesa, instruction from an modem Nyaya (NavyaNyaya) it is from human convention. For the
apt or fit person, and later on as apta vakya. The fit person is defined Mimamsakas, this power is inherent in the eternal Vedic sounds
as, yathartha vakta, speaker oftruth. Another definition of Sabda: (sabdas). For Bhartruhari (5 th Cent. AD), language is ofDivine ori.gin
aptasya vacanam sabdah. and both syntax and meanings are innate. Chomsky also speaks of
innate structures oflanguage in the mind. 13'~t for Chomsky, only the
For the Naiyayikas, a word is a symbol (lakshana) while for
syntax is innate not the meaning.
the Mimamsakas the word is a reality. For the Naiyayikas, a sentence
is made up of an assemblage of words (pada-samuha) with a Bhartruhari says that there are three levels of meaning for
meaning; .the verb is not essentiaL But for the Mimamsakas, the sabda: the V,aikhari vak, the Madhyama vak and the Pasyanti
most importantpart of a sentence is the verb, and that too, in the '!..q.k (literal meaning, conceptual meaning and intuitive, mystical or
imperative mood. Example: Svargakamo yajeta (the one who desires spiritual mear~ng).
heaven must perform sacrifices). For Sankara, the most important
part of a sentence is the subject. The predicate is illusory (maya). The Spota Theory: The meill1,ings ofsacred texts are not man's
Explaining the second sutraofBadarayana (janmadyasya yatahy, findings: they burst forth (spota) ofthemselves. The empirical and
Sankara says that Brahman is real, and creation illusory. rational levels have only a preparatory function, viz., to clarifv the
words. External help from philology, archaeology. etc. .ome
Astika Darsanas The Nyaya System 15
14
revelatory function, since for Bhartruhari all language flows from the 2. Since there is no contact with the body, there is no cognition
and volition.
Vedas. But meditation on the Vedas alone~ll elevate man beyond
words and concepts to have an intuitive experience of the Supreme 3. Liberation is a state of eternal bliss (ananda)
word (Sabda Brahman). He is the seed of all creation, including
language. The Greek Fathers ofthe Church also spoke of Christ as SADHANAS: The means for liberation are:
~ the "SJJ..t?.r1!l-Word" (Logos spermaticos.).
1. <Sravana: listening to the Vedas.
f. Nyaya Psychology 2. /' Manana: reasoning on the sacred texts.
3. » Ntdidhya sana: meditation on the texts .
The Nature ofthe self: 4. Meditation leads to the end of false knowledge.- avidya.
1. The self is a spiritual substance. 5. As a result, man ceases to act motivated purely by attachment
2. Cognition (knowledge), volition (will), pleasure and pain belong (raga) and aversion (dvesha) .
to it as attributes. 6. Control of raga-dvesha destroys karma and the next step is
3. ~ognition is an accidental attribute ofthe self, not essential. bliss - moksha.
4. Therefore, the di§~J,11bodiedself (liberated from the body), is
h, Nyaya Theology: Isvara (God)
without consciousness.
5. The selfis infinite (vibhu) and eternal. 1. The Nyaya God (Isvara) res embles Plato 's Demiurge or
Creator God. He orders the universe out ofpre-existing atoms
Proofs for the existence of the self:
God does not create the atoms . He is just an Organizer.
a) Indirect proof: 2. Consciousness is a n~cessary attribute ofC'TQd. not his essence.
1. Rleasure and pain should have an agent. It is the self. (for Sankara and Aquinas consciousness is .God's essence).
2. From the reliable testimony oflearned men we know that the 3. God is the efficient directive cause (prayojaka karta) of man's
action, while man is the instrumental cause (nimitta karana).
self exists.
4. God is the giver ofrewards and punishments according to man 's
b) Direct proof: adrishta, i.e., the sum total ofhis merits and demerits .
The .!!!illd comprehends th~self 5. God also gives grace to man to live a good life and avoid evil.
The self perceives pleasure and pain. Proofs for God's Existence
g. Liberation (Muktl)
1. Composite objects need a supreme, omniscient, onmipotent
being, to unite the atoms: it is God.
1. Liberation of the self,' according to Nyaya , is a negative state
of no pleasure and no pain.
16 Astika Darsanas The Nyaya System 17
2. Only an omniscient, and omnipotent being can allot rewards 9. According to Nyaya-Vaiseshika, the magnitude of a dyad is
and punishments to man. The unintelligent adrishta and limited not produced by the infinitesimal magnitude ofthe two atoms
beings like gods or man cannot do this function. each, but by the number of the two atoms. Number 'one' is
3. The author ofthe infallibility ofthe Vedas cannot be man, who directly perceived, but other numbers are concept! 131 creations.
is liable to err. So it must be God who is all truth. Numerical conception is related to the mind ofthe perceiver.
At the time of creation, the souls are unconscious. The atoms,
4. We can know God's existence from Vedic testimony:
the unseen power (adrishta), space, time and minds are all
It has been obj ected that there is the fallacy ofcircular argument unconscious. Hence the numerical conception depends upon
(chakraka) involved here, viz., proving God from the Vedas and the Divine consciousness. So God must exist
proving the Veda's infallibility from God. It is not so: God does not (sankhyaviseshat).
depend on the Vedas; his existence is proved from reason. 10. We reap the fruits of our actions (karma phalay Merit and
Udayana's Arguments for God's Existence demerit accrue from our action and the stock of our merit and
demerit (adrishta) needs the guidance ofa supremely intelligent
1. The world is an effect and hence it must have an efficient being, God (adrishtat).
cause. This intelligent agent is God (karyat).
2. The order, design and co-ordination between different obj ects Criticism
must ultimately come from a supreme designer, and it is God.
All these proofs are ultimately unavailing. Reason, as Kant
Plato also has this proof.
points out while criticizing Descartes' arguments for the existence of
3. The atoms, being essentially inactive, cannot form the different God, leads to antinomies (contradictions) that are insoluble. The
combinations unless an immovable mover gives motion to them. Vedantins (Sankara, Ramanuja, Madhva, etc) have rejected the
It is God..The unseen power, adrishta, requires the intelligence Nyaya arguments and have fallen back on Scripture (Vedas) alone
of God (ayojanat). for proving God's existence. Kant in the West and the Vedantins in
4. The world is sustained by God's will. Unintelligent adrishta the East, were forced to destroy reason in order to make room for
cannot do it. The world is destroyed by God's will (dhrtyadeh). faith.
5. A word has a meaning and it signifies an object, The power of Commenting on Ke11.a Upanishad II, 4, Sankara says that the
words to signify their objects comes from God (padat). fundamental error of the Nyaya-Vaiseshika is the application of
material categories - substance - attribute - to consciousness, i.e.,
6. God is the author ofthe infallible Vedas (pratyayatah).
God. It is near to materialism; it is pseudo-spiritualism. The error of
7. The Vedic sentences deal with moral injunctions and Jayanta Bhatta and Descartes lies in this that they tried to translate
prohibitions. The Vedic commands are the Divine commands. consciousness in terms of something other than itself and posited a
God is the creator and promulgator ofthe moral law (vakyat). substance behind the self. Proofs pertain to what is adventitious
8. The Veda testifies to the existence of God (sruteh). (aguntaka) and not to what is self-established (svayamsiddha).
True, allprameyas (objects) need proof. But Nyaya went wrong in
lei
18 Astika Darsanas
I
j
20 Astika Darsanas The Vaiseshika System 21
Proof for the atomic theory: The Self (atmall):
Whatever exists is a composite reality. So its ultimate particle The selfin man is an eternal, all-pervading substance, which is
must be atomic, else we land in the fallacy of infinite regress the substratum of consciousness. The selfis finite or infinite. The..
(anavastha). infinite self is God . The Vaiseshikas accepted God after it allied
itself with the Ny ay a system around lOth C. AD . The influence of
Properties of the atom: Naiyayikas like Udayana might have been decisive.
a) Atoms cannot be created or destroyed. To create is to join the
constituent parts of an object. But atoms have no parts, and 2. GUlla (quality)
hence atoms cannot be created. They cannot also be destroyed, Quality is that which exists in a substance and it has no quality . .
for to destroy means to separate the parts. But atoms are of its own and no action. There are 24 gualities. They are: colour,
partless. So they cannot also be destroyed. That is, atoms are -taste, smell, touch, sound, number, magnitude, distinctness, conjunction,
eternal. disjunction, remoteness, nearness, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire,
b) Atoms differ from one another in quality. Democritus held aversion, effort, heaviness, fluidity, viscidity, tendency, merit and
th~t they differ in quantity. This is wrong since all atoms have demerit.
the same quantity. So to distinguish one atom of salt from one
atom ofsugar, they must have qualitative difference. 3. Karma (action)
Proofs for the existence of the mind: a) Nominalism: For the Buddhists only the particulars exist. The
universals are mere names for a bWldle ofparticulars for the sake of
1. To perceive int~rnal sensations like pain, hunger, etc., we need
.language. So the BuddhIst phIlosopher N agasena tells king Milinda
a faculty; it is the min~
(Menander) that there is neither chariot, nor Milinda nor N agasena.
2. For orderly, successive perceptions we need a faculty other They are mere names for fleeting, impermanent sense data. Ockham
than the senses. It is the mind that co-ordinates the activities was a Western Nominalist. - '-
ofthe senses. The mind is atomic, since we can perceive only
one thing at a time. b) Conceptualism: For JE-inism, Vedanta and John Locke, there are
concepts ofthe universals, like man as a rational animal. But there is
no reality called' man' , corresponding to these concepts.
;:
. . -.- .
_.0.:- < ~-<- "l. ;·~i.;,-,·jt ,!J.t~~j~ ~~~~j,iJl~~;'~~-~...lt::.':WiS.ie-lf.~~~,~~::ii:'~ ~i';: ;'~ ,'.,
22
c) Realism: For the Nyaya-Vaiseshikas, Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas
Astika Darsanas
, •.
The Vaises!Jika System
and the Scholastics, the universals have separate existence. But they t·
~xist in the particular. It is non-existence by destruction (dhvamsa) Wh th .
6. Samavaya (Inherence):
Conjunction is the union of two objects externally and
temporarily united, like a man and his dress. When the ~on is internal
and eternal, it is called inherence, like virtue or learning in man . Some
critics of the Vaiseshika reduce it to quality.
7. Abhava (Non-Existence):
It is a peculiar Vaiseshika category. Abhava is the non-
existence of a thing. There are four kinds of Abhava:
" ' ," ' . " .." " .::;. ~ , ,:"-- " ~ . , ."
, . - ; ~- ..;..........~...,..,,,,",,,,,....._.,,,,., i . ~ .-..
The Sankhya System 25
3. THE SANKHYA SYSTEM as in the case of milk turning into curd) and Vivarta-vada (apparent
transformation ofthe cause into the effect, as the rope's appearance
as snake in semi-darkness). Sankhya followsparinama-vada and
Sankara follows Vivarta-vada. The Nyaya-Vaiseshika and the
Baudhas oppose the non-origination theory ofsatkarya-vada. The
1. THE S'ANKHYA LITERATURE: Buddhist theory is called Dependent Origination (Pratitya- .r
!amutpada).
The sage Kapila is the founder of this system. His work,
Samkhya-Sutraiizs been lost. The earliest available Sankhya text 4. OBJECTIONS TO NON-ORIGINATION
is Is varakrishna's Sankhya-Karika (circa 5th century AD) . Other THEORY:
important Sankhya works are Gaudapada's Sankhya-Karika-
Bhashya, Vacaspati 's Tattvakaumudi, Anirudha 's Sankhya- The Sankhya defines cause as, "the entity in which the effect
Pravacana-Sutra-Vritti (15 th century AD) and Vijnanabhikshu 's subsists in a latent form" (S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy,
Sankhya-Pravacana-Bhashya (16 th century AD). Vol. Il, p. 256) -
5. As we observe nature, some beings tend to liberation (mukti) . 7b. The Process of Evolution: Samyoga (unioI:l) of the two
It carmot be matter (prakriti) which has no intentionality. So it disturbs the equilibrium ofthe three gunas and creation starts. Rajas
must be the spirit (purusha) , as these are the only two (energy) is disturbed first. Then the other gun as are set in motion.
categories. Thereis a struggle between the'gunas for dominance, 'Then there
ensues a process of differentiation .and integration. The gunas
6c. PLURALITY OF SELVES: combine in different proportions to form the objects ofthe universe.
A d va ita accepts only one self, the Supreme Self (Alman) .
Mahat or Buddhi (intellect) is the first to emerge out of
Buddhism does not accept any self, finite or infinite (cf. the anatta
prakriti. It is called the' Great Germ.' It has a cosmic aspect or
theory) . Nyaya-Vaiseshika, Sankhya-Yoga and Mimamsa also
macrocosm and a psychic aspect (microcosm): Satva guna dominates
accept many selves.
it. Ahamkara (ego) is the second evolute. It is the principle of 'I'
6d. Proofs for the plurality of the self: and ' m in e' . It has the nature of abhimana (pride, self-respect).
1. There are differences in birth, death, sensations and knowledge It is because of ahamkara that-man thinks that he is the agent
among men. So there must be many selves. or the cause of actions, though by nature, man (purusha) is a non-
2. It there is only one selfthe activity of one will do for all. All doer (akartay. Ahamkara rises directly out of buddhi. There are
need not strive to do good and avoid evil. three kinds of ahamkaras, the sattvika, the rajasa, and the tamasa
as the particular guna dominates them. From the sattvika ahamkara
3. Differences among gods, men, animals and plants show that
comes the ten organs and mind: the jnanendriyas (cognitive organs)
selves are many.
and the karmendriyas (motor organs). From the third arises the five
7. SANKHYAEVOLUTION subtle elements (tanmatras) .
7a. Introduction : Unlike the rigid dualism ofPlato and Zoroaster, The rajasa ahamkara supplies the energy needed for th e
there is no conflict between purusha and prakriti in the Sankhyan production ofthese evolutes. The five organs ofknowledge are sight,
scheme. On the contrary, there is co-operation and mutual help . In smell, touch, taste, and hearing. The five motor organs are the mouth,
this context, Gaudapada compares the Sankhyan categories of hands, feet, the excretory organ (anus) and the reproductive organs.
purusha and prakriti to a blind man and a lame man who get lost in
The mind is the central organ. It partakes of the nature of all
a forest.' They help each other to get out ofthe forest. The blind man
other organs. Without the mind, none ofthe other organs can function.
carries the lame man on his shoulders; the lame man gives the direction
The mind, the ego and the intellect are the internal organs
to the blind man. Thus they come out ofthe fore st. Similarly, there is
(antahkaranah). The five tanmatras are generic essences of sight,
co-ordination between prakriti and purusha. Prakriti evolves when
taste, smell, touch and sound. The gross elements (mahabhutas)
purusha comes into relation with it. Their union is known as samyoga.
are earth, water, air, fire and ether.
The activity of prakriti is guided by the intelligence of purusha.
The former is dynamic while the latter is static, a witness self. In the processes ofevolution, the mind interprets and transforms
the indeterminate sense data into determinate perceptions. The ego
32 A stika Darsanas The Sankhya System 33
owns the perceived objects and likes or dislikes them. The intellect 4. Selves are either parts ofGod (as Ramanujaheld) or dependent
(i.e., will) decides to act to attain or avoid them. on God (as Christians believe) . So there is need for God, argue
the theists. Sankhya refutes this claim by saying that both the
8. THE SANKHYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: alternatives are wrong. Man cannot be part ofGod since there
According to the Sankhya, perception takes place when the is nothing divine in him. Again, against the argument that man
- selfsees an object reflected in the intellect. The modification of the depends on God, the Sankhya argues that man is totally
intellect (citta-vritti) makes it assume the form of the object. The independent of God. He does not need God's help; he is by
self knows the object in the intellect (buddhi). The intellect is nature free, eternal, infinite, and immortal.
unconscious; so without the reflection ofthe conscious selfin it, the
self cannot know anything. 10. .THE SANKHYA THEORY OF LIBERATION:
The process of knowing consists in this: th~.Qbject throws The Sankhya holds that man can attain liberation (muktiv by
impressions on the sense which is th ' . al _ses right knowledge (tattva:jnana). Man's misery arises when he
an synthesizes them. Then the intellect is modified and assumes the ignorantly identifies himselfwith pleasure and pain that belong to the
form of the object. The blind buddhi (intellect) cannot know the mind. Virtue and vice, merit and demerit, belong to the ego
object. So it retTects the conscious self on it. But the buddhi being iahamkara}, Man's liberation can come only through discrimination
sattvic, it reflects purusha as a mirror reflects the light of a lamp. (viveka), between the self and the non-self. Liberation does not
mean any acquisition ofsome perfection (as in Christian theology) _
,
"1 .
9. .SANKHYA AND GOD: .but man's return to his original state ofinnocence. Hinduism does
not believe in man's fall. Liberation is oftwo kinds: while still in the
The Sankhya, in its anxiety to abide strictly within the limits of body 'ivanm ukti or in the disembodied state (videha muktis. Mukti
reason holds that there are no valid proofs for the existence of God or liberation is not a state 0 JOY as in Vedanta) since joy is correlative
(cf. Sa~khyapravacana Sutra, v.12). The so-called theistic passages to sorrow. These pairs of opposites (dvandvas) belong to man's
in the Vedas are really eulogies (praises) ofthe freed souls. body-mind complex, not to the self or purusha. The self is not
1. The Sankhya argues that if God is the cause of the world, it anandasvarupa or blissful, (as in Vedanta) .
would involve his activity; but activity on the part of God goes
against God's immutability.
2. The theists' argument that there is the need of a controller of
the world cannot stand the test of reason, since the act of
controlling also goes against God's immutability.
3. God cannot have an aim in creating, and nobody acts without
an aim. God being all-perfect, does not need anything for his
perfection. God also cannot act for the good ofthe creatures,
since we find so much misery in the creatures.
The Yoga System 35
4. THE YOGA SYSTEM not uniform in their attitude towards yoga: Mimamsa ignores yoga;
Vaiseshika and Nyaya give .it much value; Vedanta makes use of
yoga in its Brahman realisation (Brahma'jijnasa); Sankhya, from
the very beginning, was the firmest ally ofyoga.
three gunas in balance. In this state all the mental modifications CITTABHUMI: (LEVELS OF MENTAL LIFE)
(vrittis) come to a stand still. This brings about the isolation (kaivalya)
Kshipta: It is the agitated state ofthe mind when rajas is the
of the self (purnsha). It is the goal of yoga.
predominant guna. It causes mental distress, and tension.
4. THE VRITTISANDTHEKLESAS Vikshipta: It is a state of mental distraction, due to the
(MODIFICATIONS AND AFFLICTIONS OF THE presence oflittle rajas though the predominant guna is sattva
(goodness).
MIND):
c) Mudha It is a mental state of torpor or sloth, due to the
predominance ofthe guna of tamas (inertia, darkness).
THE FIVE VRlTTIS (MODIFICATIONS):
d) Ekagra: In this state of concentration, there is perfect
a) Pramana: It stands for means ofvalid knowledge: perception, identification of the subject and the object. He're the sattva
inference, verbal testimony. guna dominates.
b) Viparyaya: It is error, which produces the five affiictions. e) Niruddha: Here we have total self-control, when all the
c) Vikalpa: It is mere imagination that produces meaningless ideas gunas are restrained. But the hidden samskaras or dispositions
like the hare's horn, etc. or habits persist.
d) Nidra: Sleep. Kaivalya is the state of the self beyond these five < lands'
e) Smriti: Past memories and feelings . (bhumis) which itselfis not ebhumi, but the goal ofyoga. To .attain
this state ofthe isolationofthe self, Patanjali and his commentators
THE FIVEKLESAS (AFFLICTIONS):--· ·----- or bhashyakaras suggest several means (margas).
Due to erroneous knowledge, man is subjected to various
afflictions. These afflictions are: 6. VAIRAGYA-ABHYASA (DETACHMENT,
a) Avidya: It is the identification ofthe selfwith the not-self; the EXERCISES)
temporal with the eternal. These are the means that yoga suggests for attaining the
b) Asmita: It is the identification ofthe self with the mind (buddhi) . isolation ofthe spirit. Vairagya (detachment) embraces the whole
As a consequence, the self is subjected to passing pleasures gamut ofspiritual exercises (sadhana) that yoga suggests. It means
and pains which do not belong to it, but to the mind (buddhi) . non-attachment (vi-raga), something similar to the apatheia (apathy)
c). Raga: It is the uncontrolled attachment to objects, persons,or of the Greek Stoics. Abhyasa includes all the positive exercises
ideas. It is the source of all pains and sorrows. suggested by the Eight-fold yoga ofPatanjali (Ashtanga yoga). It
includes the five means (upayas) of yoga.
d) Dvesha: it is the irrational aversion from the unpleasant
which also produces pain and sorrows.
C} Abhinive sa: It i5 irrational <;;nging to ero: ,ii~ : y and of
death..
38 Astika Darsanas The Yoga System 39
7. THE FIVE UPAYAS: ' '. '. ; "
2) Arjava: It is equanimity under all circumstances;
3) Kshama: It is patience under unpleasant circumstances;
1. Sraddha: It is supernatural faith in the Vedas o~ in one's
guru. 4) Dhriti: It j s control of the mind .un de r unfavourable
circumstances;
2. Virya: It is -th e spiritual energy and moral fortitude for the
attainment of the goal ofyoga. 5) Mitahara: It is observing moderation in food and drink.
3. Smriti: It is the constant remembrance of the aim of Yoga ii) NIYAMA: (INNER PURIFICATION -GOOD'HABITS)
and the practices of yoga. . "." .' ' . .-'::;'
4. Samadhi: It is total absorption ofthe selfin oneself, which 1) Sauca (cleanliness: purity ofthought; friendliness, cheerfulness,
may be called en-stasy. . gentleness)
5. Prajna: It is the divine Wisdom, as distinguished from human 2) Santosha (contentedness)
prudence. So it is different fromjnana. 3) Tapas (austerities)
4) Svadhyaya (Scripture-reading)
8. ASHTANGA-YOGA: (THE EIGHT-LIMBED
5) Isvara-pranidhana (meditation on God, Isvara) s:
YOGA)
For some, NIYAMA also includes the following five virtues: .
Yoga combines (1) a moral training which, on the one hand,
restrains (yama) bad tendencies and on the other, develops good habits 1) Astikya: It is acceptance ofthe Vedic doctrine of merit-
and dispositions (niyama), (2) exercises ofbreath control (pranayama) demerit; ' .
to subdue the body and the senses, (3) meditation practices destined 2) Dana: It is offering of gifts to the needy;
to bring about complete mastery (samyama) over the mind (citta) .
3) Siddhanta-hisravana: It is study ofphilosophy;
They comprise eightsteps. . ' I '
9. THEAPURVA:
ForMimamsa, the end of all Vedic sacrifices is the attainment
of Heaven (Svarga). How can transitory sacrifices produce this
result? How to void the hme lag? For this purpose, the Mimam;;;;Ws
bring the theory of apurva. As soon as a sacrifice is performed,it
creates an unseen potency (apurva) in the soul of the sacrif!£er,
which endures till the reward is reaped. So, the ap~a bridges the
time lag between the sacrifice and the fruit. It is somewhat similar to
the Christian doctrine ofsanctifying grace that is produced by good
works, whose reward will be reaped in Heaven.
viz., ritual and knowledge. Then Smriti (tradition) speaks of Yoga, Reply: Sankara answers this objection by asserting that faith
Nishkama karma (disinterested action) and Bhakti (devotion to a (sraddha) indeed should be tested rationally. In fact the methodology
personal God~ as means to moksha. Sankara says that knowledge . of Sankara implies three steps:..§[avana. Manana, Nididhyasana
alone (Jnana marga) is the way to liberation. In this he rejects the (listening to Scripture, reasoning to defend it against the opponents
view ofMimamsa and Ramanuja(former for rituals and the latter for and verification by personal experience or anubhava). Hence,
devotion). ultimately, for Sankara, anubhava is the onlypramana or source of
the ultimate truth. Sravana and manana are mere preliminaries and
2. THE COMPARATIVE VALUE OF THE ancillaries to arrive at truth. Once one has realized one's true Self
PRAMANAS: (Brahman-Atman), even Scripture has no relevance for Sankara.
Thus for Sankara and his followers, Sruti has only a pragmatic value.
For Western Philosophy, reasoning is the greatest source of
Sruti or the veda is a mere tool to arrive at the knowledge ofBrahman.
truth. For Advaita, there are six sources of truth (Perception,
Inference, Comparison, Implication, Non-observation and Verbal
5. THE PRIMACY OF RENUNCIATION OVER
Testimony or Sabda). For Sankara, only Sabda (Sruti) or the
ACTION:
Scriptural testimony gives the truth about the Ultimate Reality. The
first five are onlysecondary sources .oftruth, i.e., they enable one to Though realisation is within the reach of every one, Sankara
prove the errors ofthe opponents. They do not show what Brahman believed that the sanyasin and that too of the highest order of the
is: they show what Brahman is not. Thus Sankara believes in the Paramebemsas (great Swans) was most disposed to attain self-
- primacy of Sruti. realisation. Now, the central theme of the Gita is the greatness of
the way of action (karma marga). But Sankara twisted the whole /
3. AN OBJECTION ANSWERED: text to give it a gnostic sense. In other words: he says that the central
But is not Sruti that which has been heard by rishis and hence theme ofthe Gita isjnana marga. This is doing violence to the text,
also subject to error? No, the essence of Sruti is the Sabda Brahman as R. C. Zaehner has pointed out in his commentary ofthe Gita.
or Brahman in the form ofeternal sound. The variety of the words
6. THE PRIMACY OF INDICATIVE SENTENCE
used bythe rishis are mere accidentals. The Bible contains elements
that are proper to the sacred writers, but the Veda is eternal word, OVER VIDHIANDARTHAVADA:
identical with the transcendental consciousness or the Absolute. The The Mimamsakas had divided Sruti into injunctions and
privilege ofthe rishi is to have "SEEN" it directly on account ofthe eulogistic sentences (Vidhi and Arthavada). The former enjoins the
purity ofhis intellect. Thus the rishis were mere seers not intermediary performance of Vedic sacrifices, while the latter are praises of the
revealers like the Biblical Prophets and Evangelists. sacrifice, the gods, etc. For theMimamsakas the only important part
ofthe Vedas are the Vidhis or injunctions. Sankara, however, reversed
4. THE PRIMACY OF TRANSCENDENTAL this order. Here too, he brought in a new distinction between artha
EXPERIENCE: and arthavada. According to the Bhashyakara (I. e., Sankara), the
An objection; Faith cannot be our ultimate source of truth. Vedas are primarily concerned with the indicative assertions which
Faith cannot be valid unless it is rationally tested. point directly to its proper object (artha); these are by
54 Astika Darsanas The Vedanta Philosophy 55
declaratory assertions (arthavadas) such as introduction, praising ,. As for the negative definitions of Brahman (such as neti, neti
comments, sacrificial injunctions etc. The arthavadas, according to = not.t~is , not this) they tell us what Brahman is not rather than say
Sankara, have only a secondary and pedagogical value. what It IS. SO, we are confined to the Svarupa lakshana of Brahman.
Svarupa, i.e., the proper forms of Brahman according to the Vedas
7. THEDOCTRINEOFTHEMAHAVAKYASOR are SAT- CIT-ANANDA - (existence, knowledge, bliss). But
GREAT SAYINGS: even u:ese concepts do not say what Brahman is: they are ultimately
~tlve. Thus, SAT means that Brahman is not non-existence:
Sankara says that even the indicative statements of the Veda (asat) . CIT means that Brahman is not body {jada) andANANDA
(Sniti) move on two different lines: that of inadequate knowledge mans that Brahman is not of the nature of misery (dukha). In fact,
(avidya) which is suited to the beginner, and that of adequate no concept is ever able to reach out to the Absolute, about whom the
knowledge (vidya) . Examples of the Mahavakyas are: TAT TVAlvf Scripture says: ''Yato vaco nivartante, aprapya manasa saha ":
ASI: That thou artL(Chandogya Upanishad); AHAM (Brahman is that whence words return, together with the mind, not
BRAHMASMI: (I am Brahman). Examples of inadequate pointers having attained it). iTaittiriya Upanishad, II, 4; cf. also I Tim .,
are the descriptions and definitions of Brahman as Light, the Inner 6:16) .
Space in the heart, the Purusha in the pupil of the eye , the symbol
OM, or even the Creator, Redeemer, Saviour, Spirit etc. The true 9. THE EXEGESIS OF AMAHAVAKYA:
definition of Brahman should lead to the Nirguna Brahman or
Brahman without secondary characters such as qualities, powers, T.AT TVAM ASI (That art thou: Chandogya Up. 6.8.6).
activities, bodies etc. The inadequate pointers towards Brahman are Accordmg to Sankara's hermeneutics, the two personal pronouns
only provisional ; they are finally to be superseded by the true definitions 'that' and 'thou ' do not refer to human beings: the primary meaning
of the N irg una Brahman (i.e. Brahman without qualities). ?r mukhyartha of ' that' is I svara, the Creator. Its secondary meaning
IS Isvara (Lord) minus his cosmic creative aspects, i.e., Brahman,
8. THE PRIMACY OF SVARUPA LAKSHANA: the pure Consciousness. And the pronoun 'thou ' does not mean the
~dividualh~anbeing, but the fini!e.selfminus his body-mind complex,
Even among the adequate definitions of BrahmanSankara 1. e., the Infinite Selfor Paramatman. Tat primarily means the Saguna
makes a distinction between relational definitions, negative Brahman and secondarily the Nirguna Brahman : Tvam primarily
definitions and essential definitions. means the Saguna Brahman and secondarily the Nirguna Brahman;
The term lakshana does not exactly mean definition: it comes Tvam primarily means the finite self, and secondarily the Infinite Self
from the Sanskrit root laksh, meaning, to indicate, to point. Now a Sankara says that these two are ultimately identical , and he uses the
relational definition points to its object as to an existent which it merely equational sign "asi' (art); THAT THOU ART: TATTVAMASI.
determines by reference to something else which is more immediately
known. Thus a river is defined by reference to the riverbank, with II. SANKARA'S THEORY OF THE UNREALITY OF
which it is related. But since Brahman is not related to anything else , THE WORLD:
we cannot have any relational definition of Brahman. For Christian philosophy the reality ofthe world is a fact. It is
the starting point. Says St. Paul : "Ever since the creation of the
56 Astika Darsanas The Vedanta Philosophy 57
world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has association with Brahman, whose power it is. The reason is simple:
been clearly perceived in the things that have been made" (Rom., I, an independent principle besides Brahman would destroy the very
20). Both Aquinas and the Nyaya philosopher Udayana start their notion of Advaita, which says that Bral!man is the ONLY reality,
proof for God's existence from the contingent world. For Advaita, without a secQna: a-avaita. And witho~tMayath'~ ;orld-remalns
God's existence is a fact of personal experience. For Sankara the unexplained. Says Vacaspati: "Avidya-sahita brahmo 'padanam
world is a mystery, not God. (Ehamati). i.2)". It means: Avidya (Maya) together with Brahman
is the material cause (upadana karana) of the world.
I Nyaya,Sankara's main objective was to demolish the realism of the
the idealism ofthe Buddhist Vijnanavadins, and the nihilism Prakasatman, the founder ofthe Vivarana school ofAdva ita,
ofthe Madhyamikas. Now, the Vedas do not and cannot say anything says that the creative functions spoken of here do not essentially
about the world. So we get our knowledge about the world from the appertain to Brahman. SarvajnatrnaMuni believes that pure Brahman
senses. Can we trust our senses? No, because sense knowledge conceives Maya not as a joint material cause of the world with
may be confused with illusion. Since reasoning depends on sense Brahman, but as an instrument, through which pure Brahman appears
knowledge, not even reasoning can give us any truth about God. So, as the manifold of the phenomenal world. Prakasatman is very
Sankara makes a distinction between eternal truth and phenomenal emphatic in saying that, apart from the cause, there is nothing speakable
truth (paramarthika satyam and vyavaharika satyam). in the effect. In other words, without the ultimate Ground of the
world ofappearance, the latter is not even describable. Surendranath
The former is always true and it can never be set aside by any
Dasgupta summarises the three Vedantic theories of Brahman s joint
higher kind of truth, while the latter is true as long as we are at the
causality in the production ofthe world thus:
phenomenal plane. But when it is sublated by the higher truth, it
ceases to be true, just as the truth ofthe dream -life is true until one i) As two threads twisted form one thread;
awakens. Sankara in his attack on the Vijnanavadins rejects the ii) Brahman withMaya as his power (sakti) as the cause ofthe
assimilation of wake perceptions to dreams (cf. Brahma-sutra world;
bhashya, II. 2.28). Says Sankara: "Jars, as far as they are names iii) Brahman being the support (asraya) ofMaya, it is indirectly
(i.e., quajars) are untrue (anrutam). In-so-far as clay, they are true the cause ofthe world.
(satyam)". And yet, it is not utterly non-existent (tuccha). According
to the Pancadasi, the jar, cannot be said to exist or not to exist (xiii. Hence, it follows that though Brahman is the basis (adhara
35). According to the Bhamati it is inexplicable (anirvacaniyam). or adhishtanay of the world, yet the stuff of the world is not real
Sankara clearly says that there is no difference between cause and Brahman material, but Maya and though the phenomenal world has
effect (karana-karyasya ananyatvam). a relative reality, it has no reality in the true sense of the world, in
which Brahman is real.
ill. a)MAYA
Regarding the relation between Brahman and Maya
In order to escape the dilemma ofthe world, Sankara brought Prakasatman refers to several ways in which this relation has been
in the theory ofMaya. According to Advaita, Maya is the stuff out thought of. The existence of Maya cannot be proved from,S'mti or
ofwhich thewQrld has evolvred. Maya, however, can do it
..--
in Scripture (B rahman alone is the subject matter of fro m
58 Astika Darsanas The Vedanta Philosophy 59
sensation, whose subject matter is material things, andMaya is not a Jiva or the finite self, is not denied in true knowledge; only
material reality. Maya is a mere working hypothesis (kalpyate) to certain aspects of the jiva are lost, i.e., its finiteness and its
account for the inexplicable world. But we cannot account for its separateness from other selves, which do not pertain to the true
existence apart from its relation to the Sakshin (Witness, i. e., self; these are the results oflimiting adjuncts (upadhis) like the antah-
Brahman). Maya has had no beginning; it ends when all avidya is karana (mind). So too, the liberated Jiva is not lost in Brahman, nor
destroyed by vidya. is it preserved. It continues as Brahman only, losing its limitations,
which are false. In the final analysis, Brahman is the real transmigrator,
b) THE VIVARTA VADA says Advaita: satyam na Isvarad anyah samsari
Since appearance is ofReality, the phenomenal world ofnames
and forms (nama-rupay must come from Brahman (cf. Sankara on v CONCLUSION
S.B.I.1.2). But Brahman being one, it cannot be identical with The world is the illusory manifestation of Brahman. At the
multiplicity, and as Brahman is immutable, it cannot be transformed dawn ofknowledge, this world vanishes like a dream. The individual
into the world (rejection of Brahma-parinama-vada theory of
selfis nothing but Brahman itselfappearing under the limitations which
Bhar-tr'upr-apanca; i.e., Brahman is really transformed into the
form part of the illusory universe (i.e., antah-karana). From the
world). Sankara also rejects the Arambha-vada theory of Nyaya,
point ofview of Brahman, there is noMaya, no world, no finite self,
which says that God creates the world as something totally new. The
and no liberation. It is only from our point ofview that there is Maya
Advaita view of the world is called the Bralima-vivarta-vada. It
and consequently the finite self and the universe. Brahman is nitya
means that the world is the apparent manifestation ofBrahman, while
siddham, nitya buddham, nitya muktam: ever given, ever known,
he undergoes no change in himself, just as the rope in the famous
ever free. Maya has a two-fold function around Brahman: concealing
rope-snake example. Just as it was ignorance that produced the
snake, so too it is a cosmic illusion called Maya that produces the Brahman So true nature and projecting the false self on Brahman
(avarana sakti and vikshepa saktl)
phenomenal world. This ignorance is not mere privation, but something
positive (bhava-rupam) though inexplicable (anirvacaniyam).
VI. AN UNANSWERED QUESTION:
IV. SANKARA'SDOCTRINEABOUTMAN Neither Sankara nor his disciples have told us why the supreme
Sankara believes thatMaya-Avidya obscures the original nature Brahman who is absolutely free, should come under this evil influence
of man, and makes him appear as an individual, endowed with the of Maya. Is Maya superior toBrahman? That is inconceivable,
body-mind complex, making him an agent of actions and an enjoyer since Maya for Sankara is Brahman So power or sakti, just as magic
of fruits (kartru and bhogtru). But when Avidya is destroyed by is the power ofthe magician. But the analogy of Sankara is weak; it
means of meditation on the Great Sayings or the Mahavakyas, the is only the spectators that come under the influence ofthe magic not
self appears in its pure form of Pure Consciousness. For Sankara the magician. But here, Brahman himself seems to be under the
the world is mithya (utter nothingness), but not the finite self. Looking influence ofMaya, the great inexplicable mystery ofAdva ita. What
at a shell (sankhu) with coloured glasses makes it appear as coloured, is Maya So origin?
though in itselfthe shell is not coloured, but pure white. It is the case
with the self also.
The Vedanta Philosophy 61
60 Astika Darsanas
we cannot take the primary meanings ofVedic terms when applied to
ii) VISISHTADVAITA (Qualified Non-Dualism) of
Brahman. Ramanuja takes only the primary meanings ofVedic
RAMANUJA
terms for Brahman. Thus in the mahavakya (great saying), tat
tvam asi, for Sankara tat means nirguna Brahaman, while for
1. INTRODUCTION Ramanuja it means Saguna Brahman. Modelling divine nature too
Ramanujamade a wonderful synthesis offaith, intuition and closely on the model of human language, Ramanuja.lands in the
reason. He avoided the twin extremes ofblind irrational faith, found impossible position oftelling us that all judgements must be relational.
in Luther and some Hindu and Christian mystics and total autonomy So, no reality is perfectly simple. It destroys God's simplicity.
of reason as we find in Western rationalists, like Voltaire. Faith is Importing relationality in God's nature makes him composite, and
what is revealed in the Veda and this has to be verified by one's own no composite reality can be supreme. Ramanuja's relational unity
personal intuition and this experience has to be tested in the light of (samanadlzikaranya) that binds the subject and predicate intimately
,,y '
reason in order to avoid the dangers ofillusion and pure subjectivism. and inseparably, can never be overcome by pure unity as Sankara
Ramanuja's genius for synthesis is seen in his liberal interpretation of believed. Clearly, Ramanuja's position of divine relationality is both
scripture. He accepts as revelation not only the Vedas-but also the logically and metaphysically weak, ifnot erroneous.
Pancharatras and the mystical writings ofthe A lvars. The veracity
ofthe later texts are to be tested by the principle ofverifiability, i.e.,
3. RAMANUJA'S EPISTEMOLOGY:
from one's own personal experience. The entire range of reality is Ramanuja accepts, like Sankara, the threepramanas (means
brought within the wide sweep of Ramanuja's system of ofvalid knowledge) ofperception, inference and verbal testimony.
Visishtadvaita, viz., tattva, hita and purusharthas. By tattva is Reason however, has only a limited scope in the system ofRamanuja,
meant the philosophical apprehension of reality, hita means moral ~.
~.
as in Sankara, since knowledge ofGod is had only through revelation
and spiritual practices; the purusharthas embrace man's social, (sruti). Reason is useful, and even necessary, for refuting the
political and economic life. opponents ' theories and for empirical knowledge. Against the
Buddhists, Ramanuja holds that reality is determinate (savikalpav
2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD of and it can be defined by stating its essential qualities. Thus, the
RAMANUJA: (Based on De Smet) Upanishads decIarethatBrahman is existence, knowledge and eternal:
In its essentials, Ramanuja retained the insights of Sankara Saty am , jnanam, anantam Brahmah ,
especially in his belief in the non-dual nature of Brahman. Both Ram'lmtia avo ids the twindan~ers ofrealism and idealism by
Sankara and Ramanuja were srutivadins, i.e., theologians who based his doctrine ofrelationality or dlzarmabhutijnanll. Fo r him, reality is
their doctrines not on pure reason like the ancient Greek and Modem distinguished as cit and acit (subject and object) only logically and
Western philosophers, but on Scriptural authority, sabda-pramana. not ontologically. Realism, according to Ramanuja, fails to explain
Smriti or traditionhelps to corroborate the arguments of Sruti. For the gap between subject and object, between thought and reality of
both Sankara and Ramanuja, reasoning (yukti) serves to support truths the external world. For Ramanuja, there is no real distinction between
already established by revelation (sruti). Ramanuja totally rejects subject and object. They are both one in Brahman, though :-he './ exist
the lakshana theory of Sankara, By lakshana Sankara meant that relationally. .-
62 Astika Darsanas The Vedanta Philosophy 63
the South in the 12 th century. He was their Pontiff at Srirangam in that by the very fact that a being is itself, it is also different from all
Tamil Nadu. the rest. Inner unity implies distinction from the rest. By their very
nature, things are diverse, padartha svarupatvad bhedasya. As
iii) THE DVAITA VEDANTA (pluralism) of a result, Madhva taught the famous five-fold distinction:
MADHVACHARYA (1199 - 1278)
i) God is different from humans,
ii) God is different from the world,
1. INTRODUCTION:
iii) Souls are different from other souls,
Madhva was a Brahmin born near U dipi ( in Kamataka) in the iv) Souls are different from the world,
th
13 century. He became the head of a new Vaishnava Order of
v) Objects are different from other objects.
monks started by him. As a sanyasin, he followed the Advaita
Vedanta of Sankara. But he soon broke away from Advaita and By this distinction of mere external relationship, Madhva
taught radical pluralism. Though he admitted the classical triple endangered the inner relationship between the Creator and the
source of inspiration. viz, the Upanishads, the Brahma Sutra of creature.
Badarayana and the Gila, he extended inspiration to a wider range of
sacred texts like the Vedas, the Brahmanas, the Puranas, especially Madhva divided all categories into: svatantra (independent)
the Bhagavata Purana, the Vishnu Purana, and the Pancharatra and a-svantantra or paratantra (dependent). For him, God alone
Tantra. is radically independent: Svatantro Vishnuh, said Madhva. The
being, the activity and the knowing ofall souls depend on God. Madhva
Madhva was a prolific writer; some 37 works are usually quotes a passage from the Bhagavata Purana to this effect: "The
attributed to him. Though he made fierce attacks on Sankara, he individual self, matter, time, and all that are, exist only by his grace
never made any direct attack on Ramanuja. and they would at once come to nothing if that grace were withdrawn".
The Lord is in charge of eight activities: creation, preservation,
2. MADHVA'S DOCTRINE: destruction, control, giving knowledge and ignorance, binding
The problem of the one and the many is the most basic one and emancipating.
in philosophy both in the West and in India. One tendency is to stress
unity and the other to stress difference, bheda. While classical 3. THELORD
Upanishads stress unity, the Epics, the Puranas and the Brahmanas a) For Madhva, God is the only absolutely independent being.
stress plurality. Sankara stresses the element of unity found in b) But total independence requires total perfection as well.
the Upanishads, while Ramanuja stressed difference; but he
reduced it to mere intrinsic modality of the substantial identity.
c) In his deepest essence, God is pure consciousness: tat
Madhva was more radical and he brings into its own the sarvabhutam cinmatram.
elements of difference. He comes closest to Christian philosophy d) God p.ossesses an infinite number of qualities.
by stressing the radical difference between God, the world and
They are all identical in him, as Aquinas also taught.
humans. Madhva clearly perceived a fundamental philosophical truth
Astika Darsanas The Vedanta Philosophy 67
66
He possesses a purely spiritual body, which he manifests . Another strange doctrine ofMadhva is eternal damnation of
e)
in vyuha (manifestation) and avatara bodies, while remaining the wicked, which also is totally alien to ancient Hindu thought. We
one and undivided. find it in Calvin. Did Madhva borrow it from Christianity? We are not
certain.
f) As a radical efficient cause, God can penetrate even into
the human souls and reside there as their inner witness
iv) SUDDHADVAITA (PURE NON-DUALISM) OF
(Antaryamin ). VALLABHACHARYA
g) In Nature he is their inner controller.
h) Madhva's God gives room for human freedom and for divine
1. INTRODUCTION:
grace. Man's freedom is the measure of God's grace.
Sri Vallabhacharya occupies a unique place in.the history of
4. THE WORLD: Indian thought and Philosophy. He was born in 1479 in Andhra
Pradesh but lived most of his life in the North. The age in which
In Madhva, Nature is characterized by passive dependence,
Vallabhacharya lived was one ofsocial and intellectual turmoil. The
paratantratva. The world existed eternally and it does not owe its
Hindu ~gdor:ns,~ven with internal strife, were unable to resist foreign
existence to God, but its nature is to be a mere instrument, totally
aggression, Hinduism had stagnated into a medley ofconflicting sects.
docile to God's pleasure. The material cause of the world is
Vallabhacharya with his towering personality and intellect was able
Prakriti (Nature), while God is its efficient cause.
to reaffirm the thoughts contained in the Vedas and the Upanishads
and rekindle f~ith in the Sanatana Dharma (eternal religion).
5. SOULS:
As Dr. Radhaknshnan says, Vallabhacharya accepted the authority
a) For Madhva, since difference is the very nature of things, not only of the philosophical treatises, like the Upanishads, the
souls are totally different from God. Bhagavadgita and the Brahma Sutra, but also Of the Bhagavata
b) Avidya (ignorance) enslaves souls but bhakti (devotion) Purana. In his works, Anubhashya, Sidhantarahasya and
saves them. Bhagavatatikasubodhini, Vallabha offered a theistic interpretation
c) God is known only through revelation (Srllti) not through o~ Ve~an~a which differed from those of Sankara and Ramanuja.
reason. His VIew IS called Suddhadvaitar, Pure non-Dualism (also known
d) God controls the human selves from within, but they are free. as Brahma Veda).
e) There are three kinds of souls: those eternally free (nitya 2. THEWORLD
mukta), those who have been freed (mukta) and the enslaved
a) Vallabha declared that the whole world was real.
(bandha) .
b) Brahman is the efficient and material cause ofthe universe.
Madhva over-stressed his doctrine of difference (bhedavada)
c) God is not only the Creator ofthe universe but is the universe
to say that even in the liberated or moksha state, souls have differences
itself.
in knowledge and bliss, a doctrine which is taught by no other Hindu
philosopher.
~-- - - - -- --- - - - -~ -~ - --
68 Astika Darsanas The Vedanta Ph ilosophy 69
d) Vallabha exhorts us not to reject the world as a work of b) It calls for complete dedication of one's life at the feet of
nescience. Srinathji, the special manifestation of Krishna, who is the
e) Instead, we should accept it, as the expression of tile Divine highest divinity in this marga.
vviU. '
c) Here, there is no difference between Saguna and Nirguna
f) It is in and through this world that we have to move towards ;~,: Brahman.
realisation. ~
, d) God as a mere metaphysical abstraction is a conception foreign
g) Renunciation ofthe world was not advocated for all. to Pushtimarga. Its God is a concrete reality, a living presence
h) The world is meant for our advancement in spiritual life. with which a devotee can enjoy eternal bliss. Spontaneous
and ceaseless flow oflove towards God constitutes the means
3. GOD and end in Pu shtimarga.
a) According to Vallabha, God is personified in Krishna or e) The pursuit of nirguna bhaktimarga does not depend upon
Srinathji. external factors for its efficacy because the assumption is that
b) God is endowed with the qualities ofwisdom (Jnana) and love towards God comes from within, not from outside.
action (kriya). f) The Grace of God is vital to the sprouting oflove or bhakti.
c) He is the Creator ofthe world g) According to Vallabha, nirguna bhakti is the highest form of
d) God has no body, since what applied to us need not apply to devotion .
him. 'it h) A true devotee believes that God is everything and he , the
e) God creates the whole world by the force of his will. devotee, becomes an instrument of divine dispensation .
f) Not only is he karta or agent but also enjoyer or bhokta. i) The bhakta's life vibrates with living faith in God.
g) God appears in various forms to please his devotees. j) He sees God in all and all in God.
h) God's highest form , when associated with action only, is
5. THE SOULS:
yajna-rupa in which form he can be propitiated by karmas or
cultic acts (as stated in the Brahmanas) . When associated Vallabhacharya classifies the individual souls and grades them
with wisdom, he is Brahman and he can be approached as Pushti, M aryada and Pravaha. -
through knowledge tjnana).
a) Pravaha, means current. It refers to those souls who move
i) Krishna, the Supreme Being, has to be worshipped according aimlessly in the world and are engrossed in it. They are
to the principles of the Gita and the Bhagavata Purana. bound for eternity in a cycle of births and deaths and cannot
find the path ofrealisation.
4. PUSHTIMARGA
b) The Maryada souls follow the Scriptural injunctions and
a) The Pushtimarga or the path of Divine grace is the practical they understand the nature of God and through their insights,
aspect of Suddhadvaita . get into truth (vidya) and attain release.
70 A stika Darsanas The Vedanta Philosophy 71
c) The Pushti souls follow the bhakti marga and attain b) No spiritual progress worth the name is possible, unless
salvation. the mind is cleansed of egoism and passions.
c) A spiritual life regulated by self-control, non-attachment
6. THE CHOSEN PEOPLE OF GOD
and disinterested performance of duties, is an absolute
a) The pushti souls are the chosen people of God. necessity in this marga.
b) They worship God with intense love and longing and thus d) Any lapses in the observance ofthe rules of normal conduct
attain the unbounded joy ofwitnessing the eternal sport (lila) are condemned as non-ethical.
ofKrishna. In other words, Vallabha recognises the primacy e) The pusluimarga rejects differences based on caste, creed
of pushti bltakti over jnana marga and karma marga. and sex.
To attain the highest ideal ofsupreme devotion (para bhakti), f) It unites all humans through a bond of love, harmony
Krishna should be worshipped with one's whole heart and social service.
and soul.
d) Steadfast devotion is the easiest way to God-realisation, for
has not the Lord said:
"Those who , laying all their actions on Me, intent on Me, worship
meditating on Me, with unswerving devotion, those whose thoughts
are set on Me, I straight away deliver them from the ocean of death-
bound existence, 0 Partha (Gita) ."
e) Pushtimarga is the way to God's grace (in this case Srinathji).
f) Everybody has a right to follow the spiritual path. Love of God
knows no bounds. No one is debarred from themarga
because of one's caste, creed, gender or nationality.
g) The only requirement of the pushtimarga is unswerving
love towards God. Its votaries are exhorted to dedicate their
lives to the service ofSri Krishna for the highest fruit. Vallabha
was a prophet of love. He preached absolute surrender
to Krishna. He showed us the true meaning of life , a life
spiritualised by pure love and selfless devotion to God .
7. ETHICS:
a) The ethical aspect of Pushtimarga puts emphasis on the
fundamental necessity ofliving a simple, pure life.
Part -II
NASTIKA DARSANAS
-(THE HETORODOX SYSTEMS)
I JAINI8M
; I
Jaini sm 77
76 Nastika Darsanas
3. LOGIC:
Bahubali or Gomateswara is the greatest Jaina Digambara ascetic,
whose 57 feet high colossal monolithic statue at Sravanabelagola in Mahavira explained the theory of anekantavada to Gautama
Hassan Dt. Karnataka, in deep meditation posture, has attracted lakhs Ganadhara thus: "The souls, 0 Gautama, are eternal in some respect
ofpilgrims'from allover the world. This statue gets a costly anointing and non-eternal in some other respect. They are eternal from the
once in twelve years, called Mahamastakabhishekam . viewpoint ofsubstance and non-eternal from the view-point ofmodes"
(Bhagavati sutra ). Anekanta respects others ' point of view; it is
2. EPISTEMOLOGY: Anekanta-vada anti -dogmatism. It is the most tolerant ofphilosophical views. It is in
sharp contrast to some Christian philosophical views that had
Jainism is the most tolerant of all philosophies and religions.
condemned all opposing views as heretical. The Medieval Catholic
While Aristotle admitted only two values in logic, viz., affirmation and
philosopher and Dominican monk Giordano Bruno was burned to death
negation, which he bolstered up with the principle oft?e Exclud~d
in Rome for his alleged heretical philosophical views in 1600 AD., by
Middle, Jaina logic had ushered in the novelty of a multl.-value lOgIC,
the order of the Pope.
which Western philosophy admitted only in the twentieth century.
Jaina epistemology is known as Anekantavada (relative pluralism) Anekanta s logical expression is called Syatvada. According
and modified skepticism (syatvada). According to anekantavada, to this view, a truth has seven aspects. So it is called saptabhangi. It
an object can be viewed from seven different points ofvie~ ~al.led is described in the book, Paneastikayasara of Kundakunda.
nayas. According to the Jains, perception can give only a partial V1~w Syatvada is based on the theory that there are three values in logic:
of reality. They categorize seven perspectives. We may summanze affirmation, negation and indetermination. These three lead to seven
Jaina logic in comparison with other systems: permutations or variations. Syat means, 'in a particular context,' ' from
a particular point of view. 'It can be expressed in terms of modern
i) For the Jains, reality is pluralistic, permanent and changing.
Western Symbolic Logic thus, with the symbols ofS and P (S=subject,
ii) For the Upanishads, the Absolute or Brahmanis"imrrnitilble, P=predicate):
a view held by the Ionian philosophers, especially Zeno and
Parmenides. 1. S is P (asti) E , g., man is mortal from the point of view of
iii) But the Buddha and Heraclitus rejected this view, and for them bodily existence.
there was only change or becoming (bhavachakra) or the 2. S is not P (nasti). Thus, from the point ofview ofhis soul, man
wheel ofbecoming. is not mortal.
iv) But Jainismrejected both absolute permanence and absolute 3. S isP and S is not P (astiea nastiea). (ea means ' an d ' in
change. For Jainism, reality is complex and we can look upon it Sanskrit).
from different points of view. 4. S is Indescribable (avaktavyam)
v) Truth is like a multi-coloured crystal, with each facet having a 5. S is P and indescribable (astiea avaktavyamea)
separate colour. 6. S is not P and indescribable (nastica avaktavyamea)
vi) It is known as Anekanta vada -the theory of non-oneness . 7. S is P and S is not P and indes cri bable (astica nastisca
It is just the opposite of Sankara's Advaita Vedanta (truth is avaktavyamea).
non-dual or a-dvaita).
78 Nastika Darsanas Jainism 79
From the point ofview ofParticle Physics, our human body is but due to their association with karma, they become miserable. Karma
indescribable. So too, the origin and destiny of our soul is a mystery is a subtle material evil force. The souls expand and contract to fit
from the rational point ofview. into the material bodies that they successively animate. Karma weighs
down the souls like heavy bags. The goal of J ainism is to eliminate
Modem science has realized that the methodology of syatvada this karmic matter.
is very useful for the study ofprobability theory in Quantum Physics
propounded by Max Planck and Werner Heisenberg. This was 6. JAINAMETAPHYSICS-PLURALISMVERSUS
emphasized by Dr. Haldane and Prof Mahalanobis. Quantum physics MONISM:
had shattered the two-value logic ofAristotle and Newton's theory
According to Jaina philosophy, two world-views are possible:
of Determinism. Newton had stated categorically that we could
generalization and particularization: samanya gamini and
measure distances and weigh of objects with exact precision.
vishesha gamini. The former sees only similarities and finally arrives
Einstein's relativity theory has rejected this claim. at identity. For the latter, no two things are similar. Unlike the
Advaitins, for the Jains there is no unifying element at the root of
4. UMASVATI'S EPISTEMOLOGY: diversities. There is no real similarity between one object and another.
Umasvati (circa 4th C. B. C.) gave the first systematic exposition The former is the synthetic outlook while the larter is the analytic
of Jaina epistemology in his Tattvarthasutra. For Jainism knowledge outlook. the first led to Monism, and the second to Pluralism. For
takes place in the soul (jiva) which is omniscient in its pristine pre- Advaita Vedanta ofSankara, Brahman is the only reality. For Jainism
karma stage. Umasvati speaks offive kinds of knowledge: reality is multiple or many.
Pragmatism came to Europe only at the outset ofthe last century The famous Greek sceptic Protagoras had said that, "Man is
with the great American psychologist William James, but the Buddha the measure of all things" . So too Buddhism is 1!..I.!.!-I:!!"2'p- o- cen t r ic
preceded him by 26 centuries! The Buddha was against all kinds of and not theo-centric. The Sakya muni was mainly interested in man
theorization. He wanted to give a practical solution to the problem of and his problems, especially the central problem ofpain.
pain. His method is a praxis rather than a theoria. Plato gave
11. . Phenomenalism of the Buddha:
importance to speculation (theoria) while Karl Marx. stressed praxis.
The Buddha gave the analogy ofthe poisoned arrow that struck on While the Upanishads and Plato were interested in the
the chest of a man. His main preoccupation would be how to extract transcendental world, the Buddha's concern was with the
it in the safest and quickest way, rather than speculate on the source _phenomenal world, the world of becoming, and not the world of
ofthe arrow, or the material out ofwhich it was made, or the depth of being. The reason is simple: scientific verification is possible only
the wound. Now, pain is the deadly arrow that strikes every man. It is about phenomenal reality.
a moral problem and not a metaphysical one . The Brahmins could not
solve it with rituals or metaphysics. But the Buddha found an ethical 12. Positivism ofthe Buddha:
solution. Until the time of the Buddha, Hinduism had not found a Like Comte, the great French sociologist, the Buddha showed
satisfactory solution tothe problem ofpain with their rituals or the no interest in dogmas, philosophical presuppositions, the supernatural
metaphysical systems. Hence the Buddha had drawn up a list often world, or superstitions. He told his disciples to accept no truth on
questions that are logically uncertain and ethically unprofitable. They auth.ori~, divin~ or human. They.must experiment everything with
are: a sClen~Ific mind, observe things scientifically, and analyze
everythmg.
1 Is the world eternal?
2 Is it non-eternal? 13. Rationalism ofthe Buddha:
3 Is the world finite? Like the French rationalist Voltaire, the Buddha gave no value
4 Is it infinite? to religious faith or sraddha: Being the first to question the authority
5 Is the soul same as the body? of the Vedas, the Buddha is India's first rationalist. He also
6 Is it different from the body? rejected the Brahminic ritualism as irrational and challenged the
caste system .
7 Does the one who knows the truth (Tathagata) live after
his death? 14. Buddhist Psychology:
8 Does he not live after death? The Buddha is the earliest psychologist of the world. In his
9 Does he both live and not live after his death? analysis of pain, the Buddha had shown elements of depth-
10 Does he neither lives , nOT not live aft er his death? ~sychology by a process ofpsychological regress involving twelve
link s. In fact, C.G Jung had shown ('A)ns idemble interesri -. -. ;·Jcient
B
.. uddhi ..........
,; , r p<,"
....,] "'~hnlr.r.-."
'....... ~~_V ;"';';)! '
90
Nastika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 91
15. Buddhist Paradox: Sthiramati, Paramartha, and Jayasena. Ofthese, Dignaga is one of
the greatest logicians the world has produced. Berkleyan Idealism -
A paradox is a figure of speech, expressing an apparent
seems to be the direct result ofthe inner dialectic ofDualism since
contradiction, with the aim ofhighlighting a truth. Zen Buddhism,
Repr~sen~ationis~,the inevitable epistemological counte~art of
whose origin is traced back to the Buddha himself, makes use of Dualism, IS from ItS very nature, unable to hold its own, and what is
paradox as a method of spiritual instruction and meditation. Thus we
more, to save itselffrom absorption in Mentalism. This explains the
come across the expression, " !fyou meet the Buddha on the way, natural transition from Locke to Berkeley and from Descartes to
kill him" , wants to teach that each one must save himself. "No one
Malebranche. A similar development took place also .in India. The
saves another", said the Buddha (Dhammapda). Commonse~se. Realism of the Vaibhasikas was followed by the
Another paradox says : "!fyou utter the name ofthe Buddha, Repres~~tatIomsn:ofthe Sautrantikas, with the inevitable prospect
wash your mouth twice"! It means that real prayer is beyond words of transition from It to Idealism in the hands ofthe Yogacaras.
and deeds, in deepest silence. In fact, Zen had its real origin in the
But there was an important difference between Western
Buddha's silent gaze at the flower offered by Dharmaraja, a disciple.
Ideali~m and In~an Idealism. The Buddhists, right from the beginning
oftheir speculation, were inclined to Idealism, because oftheir silent
II BUDDHIST IDEALISM
denial ~f qod and the soul. They denied the independent reality of
s~ch thmgs as substance, permanence, universality, etc., which in
a) Introduction: VIew of many ofthe Hindu philosophers, were unquestionably real.
Today scholars tend to discard the distinction between The Sautrantikas, who were Representationists, denied these things.
Subjective and Objective Idealism, because the so-called Objective The vestiges ofRealism that survived the ravages ofthe Sautrantikas
Idealism is, properly speaking, nothing other than a form ofAbsolutism, totally disappeared with the emergence ofthe full-fledged Idealism
qualified by the adjective Spiritualistic. This being so, there is no of the Vijnanavadins.
need to retain the adjective subjective when we speak ofIdealism
But neither in the West nor in the East, Idealism was the end of
(c .f. N .V. Banerjee, The Spirit ofIndian Philosophy, p. 197).
the philosophical dynamics. It had to end up with Scepticism. In the
Now, idealism is a metaphysical doctrine with a negative as West, Hume pushed the premises of Berkeley to their logical
well as positive connotation, According to the former, there is no conclusions in his Empiricism and in India it led to the Empiricism of
such thing as an objective, independently existing world and the latter the Latent Idealism ofAsvaghosha.
holds that the so-called external reality is _re~y internal, being
The roots ofIndian Idealism can be traced still farther back
constituted by the ideas of one's mind. In this sense, Idealism was
than that ofthe Sautrantikas. Mahayana Buddhism itself is built on
represented in the West by such eminent philosophers as Malebranche the ~n principles of Tathata (Such-ness) and .Alaya-vijnana (Store-
and Berkeley, and in India by the Vijnana-vada or Yogacara school
~on~clOusness). The former doctrine was developed by Asvaghosha
of Buddhism that flourished in the fifth century A.D ., whose most m hIS book, Mahayanasraddhotpadakasastra . According to this
prominent representatives were Asanga (the founder ofthe school), doctrin~, the ultimate reality is Suchness, which is trans-empirical
his younger brother Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmapala, Gunmathi, and undifferentiated, being devoid of all kinds ofdistinction, between
~ -- -- - - - -
92 Nasti k a Darsanas
Buddhist Philosophy 93
the subject and the object, or between the discriminator and the
appears, and nothingness cannot appear; it cannot be both real and
discriminated. Suchness, then, is just Void (Sunyata) . But it has two
~real, as it go~s against the logical principle of excluded middle; it
aspects, in one of which it is conditioned, and in the other it is
cannot either be real or unreal, since these two positions have already
unconditioned. In both these aspects, Suchness is the mind. In the
been refuted). But Nagarjuna holds no theory of his own, as that
unconditioned, it is the Absolute Mind and in the conditioned aspect, it
would ruin his scepticism. He is not even a 'Sceptic'; he just refutes
is the empirical mind. The latter is subject to change, Asvaghosha all schools ofphilosophy.
could not give an answer to the question as to why the Absolute,
unconditioned Mind, should at all become conditioned. He simply says Against the Madhyamikas, who held ideas (Vijnanas) to be
it is due to Ignorance (Avidya) . The origin ofAvidya also remains nothing but illusions, the Idealists (Yogacaras) maintained that the
unexplained. illusions did survive their dialectical onslaught, but what else are
illusions, but a sort of cognition? Moreover, both the Vijnanavadins
b) Alaya-vijnana: and the Madhyamikas hold the doctrine of Sunyata or Void. Now,
According to Asvaghosha and the author of the !ogacara. ~gues against the pure consciousness or knowledge,
Lankavatarasutra, the Absolute or Transcendental Mind is the i.e., cogrution devoid of the distinction between the knower and the
repository, also of the dispositions or Vasanas, which are ~ctio?s known, the subject and the object. Against the Realists (Vaibhasikas
accumulated during beginningless time and which produce an infimte and Sautrantikas) the Yogacara hold that objects are depending on
variety of object-cognitions, known as Vijnana . In other words, the the mind (i.e., they are mere illusions). But against the Sceptics (like
multiplicity ofobject-cognition brought about by the external objects, Nagarjuna) they hold that ideas (Vljnana) are self-sufficient.
is brought out by Alayavijnana from within itself, owing to the
maturation ofthe dispositions lying dormant within it throughout the d) Answer to the Realists (like the Nyaya- Vaiseshikas):
ages. In their main thrust against the Realists, the Yoga cara s
argument is the same as that of Berkeley, namely, the existence of
Asvaghosha's Idealistic thought was very much influenced by
a totally unknown object is unthinkable.
the doctrine of Cittamatra . (mind only) propounded by the
Lankavatarasutra. According to this text, the Mind alone is real; the i) Firstly, there is an inner link between the subject thinking, and
rest are dreamlike (maya-svapna). the object thought of. The Scholastic dictum says : Esse est
percipi, (to exist is to be perceivedj.Berkeley also said the
c) Answer to the Sceptics: (Madhyamikas or Sunyavadins): same thing.
One Buddhist school ofphilosophy occupied a middle position ii) Secondly, ifthe object is external, there can be no relation of its
in metaphysics (madhyama marga), avoidingextreme realism and identity (svampya) with cognition which is demanded by the
absolute nihilism or nothingness. They were ' known as the possibility ofits being cognised.
Madhyamikas. Nagarjuna, the founder of the Madhyami~a iii) Thirdly, if there be complete agreement between the form
scepticism, had demolished the possibili~ of a~l knowledge b,y hIS cognition and the form of the object, then, there would arise
famous Chatushkoti or Four-membered Dialectic: (Th~~orld IS not the absurd situation that the cognition would resemble the object
real because it is changing always; it is not totally unreal, since it in being unconscious.
94 Nastika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 95
iv) Fourthly, if such cogrutions as dreams , illusions, and karmic impressions from our past experience. According to
hallucinations are mere mental products, without the existence Yogacara, the practice ofYoga, coupled with right conduct; enable
of external objects, the Vijnanavadin argues that all objects men to put an end to the rising of harmful mental states, and thus
are mental products. attain final release or Nirvana .
v) Fifthly, the Vijnanavadin holds that the dismissal ofthe external Yogacara falls into illogicality by bringing in the concept of an
world does not lead to any difficultywith regard to the distinction immutable principle called Suchness in order to explain the existence
between true and false knowledge. of the ever-changing phenomenal world. And the sceptic
vi) Sixthly, the external object must be either atomic i.e.,.partless Madhyamika made use of this opening in the fort of Yogacara to
and indivisible or divisible and composite. Ifit is the former, it demolish its defences by pointing out that such a suchness goes against
can't be perceived, since the atom is invisible; if it is the latter, human experience, and according to the Buddha, experience alone
it cannot be fully known, since we cannot see all parts should be the criterion oftruth. What one experiences is a continuous
simultaneously, (See Dignaga'sAlambanadapariksha) . but disconnected stream ofimpressions. Thus, both Berkeley and the
Seventhly, since objects are momentary in their existence, they Yogacara landed in the net ofempiricism, propounded by Hume and
vii)
cannot be the cause of knowledge, as that would involve a Nagarjuna.
time lapse between the arising ofthe objects and its perception.
But such a time lapse is impossible on two counts : (1) the object III THE BUDDHA'S TEACHINGS:
is duration-less, and hence it cannot be causally efficacious ;
(2) the object and the consciousness of it are experienced by a) The Four Noble Truths:
us simultaneously. That is, it is consciousness itself Says The Buddha lived in a rich (royal?) family with no experience
Stcherbatsky: "The object ofcognition is the object internally of suffering until the age of thirty. One day he noticed an old man
cognised by introspection and appearing to us as though it were walking along the street below his palace. Then a sick man also passed
external. The ultimate reality is thus the 'idea' consciousness" by; then he saw a dead body being carried for cremation. This made
(Buddhist Logic, Vol. I. Pp. 519-20). Th~ conscio~s.... ess- him sad and he began to reflect on human sufferings. Then he saw a
store (Alaya-vijnana) or Cosmic Consciousness IS Itself monk passing by, with a serene and calm face . Immediately he
not a substance that remains fixed, but it is ever changing resolved to follow the life of a mendicant or samana, leaving his wife
(kshanika) and momentary (cf. Takakusu: Es sentials of and child and parents. Siddhartha became a renouncer and a wanderer.
Buddhist Philosophy, p. 90). It is known as Mahabhinishkramana (great-going-forth). For six
years, he practiced severe bodily penances. He was also tempted by
e) Refutation of Yogacara: the demon Mara to possess empires. Then he began to practice
If external objects are identical with consciousness, how is it meditation, which led him to enlightenment and he became the Buddha
that we cannot perceive whatever we want? We are evidently or the Enlightened One .
powerless over the appearance, change and disappearance ~f objects What was his discovery? He analysed pain and found out that
of perception. Yogacara answers this ~bjection b~ ~ppea~m? t? the pain had an origin, a cessation and also a means of cessation. He
law of Karma. The mind is a stream of Ideas contammg within It the stated it thus :
- - - - - - - - - -- - - - --- - - - -
96 Nastika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 97
1. Dukha 2. Dukha samudaya 3. Dukha nirodha 4. Dukha 3. Samkhara -dukha: it is the aggregate or sum total of man's
nirodha marga. It means that pain is a universal fact, that pain has existence.
an origin, that it has an end and that there is a means to end pain.
The Buddha briefly summed up his idea on pain thus:" Sarvam
b) The 12 Links of Pain: dukham dukham, sarvam kshanikam kshanikam (everything is
pain and pain, because everything is momentary and momentary).
The Buddha made a depth- analysis of pain and found out
that pain was the last of a chain of twelve links. The root cause of d) The Buddhist Theory of Causality: The Theory of
pain was ignorance ofthe momentariness of all phenomenal existence Dependent Origination (Pratitya-samutpada).
and man's craving for them. He states it thus:
a) The Nyaya School believed that an immutable God (Isvara)
1 Ignorance (avidya) created the phenomenal world, out ofpre-existing elements.
2 Volitions (samskara) This theory of causality is known as the Origination theory
(Asatkarya-vada or Arambha-vadas.
3 Consciousness (vijnana)
b) The Sankhya believed in Non-origination theory
4 Body-mind (nama-rnpa)
($atkarya vada).
5 Sense organs
c) Advaita Vedanta (Sankara) believed in the Transfiguration
6 Sense contact theory iVivarta- vada).
7 Sense experience d) The Buddha believed in the Dependent oligination theory
8 Desires (Pratitya samutpada), which is mid-way between Realism
9 Clinging to life and Nihilism.
10 Tendency to rebirth f) Sceptics like Protagoras, Gorgias, Nagarjuna and David
11 Rebirths Hume, rejected causality itself They held that nothing existed
and that even if anything existed, it cannot be known.
12 Sickness, old age, death
Like Heraclitus, the Buddha believed in a continuous flux
c) The Analysis of Pain: (samtana] or perpetual becoming. It is similar to the process
Here pain (Dukha) is not bodily pain, or mental pain; it stands philosophy of Bergson, Whitehead and Aurobindo.
also for pleasure or sukha.
Origination is conditioned by some realities. Life's sufferings,
There are three kinds of pain for the Buddha: . briefly known esjara-marana; are conditioned by birth Oan), which
in tum is conditioned by the will to become. This thirst, in tum, is
1. Dukha- dukha (Natural pain like sickness, old age, death). caused by previous sense-experience, tinged with some pleasant
2. Viparinama- dukha: itis pain caused by the momentariness feelings (vedana). This arises from sense-contact (sparsa), which
ofthings. in tum is caused by the sense organs and mind. These depend on
the body-mind complex (nama-rupav which is caused by
N astika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 99
98
consciousness (vijnana) . This consciousness is caused by the IV MEDITATION
impressions (samskaras) of our previo~s existence' . These One who meditates on the Buddha'svirtues is not obsessed by
impressions that cause rebirth are caused.by Ignorance (avldy' a) of greed, hatred, delusion and lust and his mind becomes quite straight.
the nature of reality. If only man realizes the momentanness Also, the cares of the body and mind subside. He overcomes fear,
(ksh.anika) of the phenomenal existence, he will not be d~lud~d .by and he can endure any amount ofpain. Since there is no cult in
this cosmic ignorance, and there will not be any karma m hI~ to Buddhism, meditation is given the highest place in Buddhist spirituality.
cause his rebirth. This state of bliss is called Nirvana (Sansknt) or In Buddhism, especially in the Theravada or Hinayana tradition,
Nibbana (pali) meaning permanent bliss. prayer is practically reduced to meditation.
e) The Means to End Pain: The Ashtangika Marga a) The Boddlt.isattvas:
After having analyzed the problem of pain, the Buddha also Boddlt.isattvas likeAvalokitesvara (compassion) andManjusri
gave the means of ending pain. He taught.this fro~ ~is own person~l (wisdom) are not gods or historical saints, but mere points for
experience. They are all ethical ways~ In OPP.ositlOn to thecu~tIc meditation. Even the Buddha is not an essential meditation point.
way (Yajna) ofthe Brahmins and the phIlo~ophic.al or meta~hyslcal Hence, we have the famous Zen paradox, "If you meet the Buddha
way of the Upanishads . They form a cham of eight remedies. in meditation, kill him"! It simply means that for correct meditation,
1. Right knowledge (the four noble truths) it is not necessary either to focus one's attention on the name ofthe
Buddha or to invoke his name. But when one meditates on the virtues
2. Right resolve to change one's life
of the Buddha, the mind expands, the cosmos is absorbed into the
3. Right speech (truthfulness) mind, and one experiences cosmic consciousness, what Freud calls
4. Ri ght conduct: (pancha sila) the oceanic feeling. There is no prayer ofthanks, petition or adoration
a. No killing in Buddhism since there is no place for God. There is contrition for
b. No stealing one's sins , but no absolution for no one can absolve or sanctify another.
c. Not being unchaste The Theravadin's goal ofprayer is the emulation ofthe Buddha,
d, Not speaking untruth or lie while the Mahayanin strives to attain the state ofthe Boddhisattva
(future Buddha).
e. Not getting drunk
5. Right livelihood (honesty) b) Vows In Meditation
6. Right effort to change evil habits
The Buddhists take four vows: to save others, to uproot one's
7. Right remembrance (the thought that .everything is faults, to comprehend truths, and to follow the Buddha. It is expressly
perishable) stated that without the first, the other three cannot be achieved. Prayer
8. Right concentration (meditation) enabled the monks in propagating Buddhism allover Asia, and it gave
them courage to endure hate, ridicule and persecution. In the Vietnam
and Korean wars, it was the meditation of the monks that won the
B uddh is t Phi losophy 101
100 , Nastika Darsanas
g) -The great Buddhist philosopher Chandrakirti defmes Nirvana
wars. Today, the Tibetan monks get strength to resist the might of thus: Paramartho hyaryanam tushnimbhavah (for the son
China through meditation (Zen and Vipassana). ' of a good family, Nirvana is silence only).
f) Nagasena's Nominalism: No Chariot! . Thi~ eternal cosmic becoming was the secret, the philosophy
This concept of the momentariness of all realities was th~t Siddhartha had learned from the river. It was a relentless process,
illustrated very clearly in the famous dialogue of the Buddhist a hfe-flow (jiva dh ara), and only a fool would try to stop it. But
philosopher N agasena and the Greek King Milinda or Menander of beneath the thousands ofvoices ofpleasure and pain, evil andgood,
N .W. India, described in the Buddhist text called The Questions of laughter and l~enting, Siddhartha could hear the mystic syllable Om,
King Milinda (Milinda Panha) . Max Muller had published it at the VOIce of umty, of perfection, of the real self, of Nirvana.
Oxford, in his collection of The Sacred Books ofthe East.
h) Buddhism Not Pessimistic
Says N agasena:"There is no question ofa permanent individual The Buddhist idea ofman is certainly not pessimistic, as some
implied in the use ofthe term, 'Nagasena.' Western Orientalists, like Oldenberg, had wrongly interpreted. For
By his subtle dialectic, N agasena convinced King Milinda that, th~ Buddhists, each one is the maker ofhis/her future happiness or
apart from its various parts, there was no chariot as such. rrusery. The Buddha believed in the fundamental justice and
righteousness of the world order more than Job. People ofBuddhist
So too, the so-called self is nothing but the amalgam or countries are as happy and cheerful as any other country and the
combination ofthe five 'aggregates ofexistence' : matter, sensations, Buddhist monks are, generally,very serene and cheerful. The Burmese
perceptions, mental formations and consciousness. are, "World-famed for their gaity and light-heartedness", says Wright.
g) The Secret of the River ~u~dhists believe that man's future is not governed by fate or
The human soul is compared to an ever-flowing, deep river by by whimsical and revengeful devils or gods, as the ancient Greeks
Buddhist spiritual masters. Thus, Hermann Hesse in his novel, believed, as recorded by Homer. There are no superstitions to instil
Nastika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 105
104
fear into them. Buddhism is not a fear-inspiring religion like Hinduism, give such a name as Nagasena, Surasena, or Virasena, yet this , Sire,
Christianity, or Islam. - Nagasena and so on - is only a generally understood term, a
designation in common use. For there is no permanent individuality
i) The True Brahmin (no soul) involved in the matter."
Buddhism rejected the Hindu social philosophy of caste. T~e Then Milindacalled upon the Yonakas (Greeks) and the brethren
Buddha said that a true Brahmin was not born, but made by one s to witness: "This Nagasena says there is no permanent individuality
own conduct. Says the Tathagata (i.e., the Buddha) : "I do n?t call a (no soul) implied in his name. Is it now even possible to approve him
man Brahmin because of his origin.. . Him I call a Brahmm, who in that? And turning to Nagasena, he said: "If, most reverend
though committed no offence, endures reproach, strip~s and bonds: .. Nagasena, there be no permanent individuality (no soul) involved in
Him I call indeed a Brahmin who is tolerant With the mtole:ant, mild the matter who is it, pray, who gives to you and to the members ofthe
with the violent and free from greed among the greedy. HlI~ I call a Order robes, food and lodging and necessaries for the sick? Who is it
Brahmin, from'wh~m anger and hatred, pride ~d hypocnsy hav~ who enjoys such things when given? Who is it who lives a life of
dropped like a mustard seed from the point of a needle righteousness? Who is it who devotes himselfto meditation? Who is
(Dltammapada). it who attains to the goal of the Excellent Way, to the Nirvana of
Arahatship? And who is it who destroys living creatures? Who is it
VII MILINDAPANHA(LAKKHANAPANHA) who takes what is not his own? Who is it who lives an evil life of
worldly lusts, who speaks lies, who drinks strong drink, who (in a
The Distinguishing Characteristics of Ethical Qualities. word) commits anyone of the five sins which work out their bitter
fruits even in this life"? Ifthat be so there is neither merit nor demerit,
1. :v
[25] Now Milinda the king went up to h ere the ven~rable there is neither doer nor causer ofgood or evil deeds"; there is neither
Nagasena was, and addressed him with the greetmgs and comphments fruit nor result ofgood or evil karma', [26] Ifmost reverent Nagasena
of friendship and courtesy, and took his seat respectfully ap~. And
Nagasena reciprocated his courtesy, so that the heart ofthe king was
2. Na puggalo upalabbhati. This thesis, that 'there is no individual,' is
propitiated. discussed at the opening of the Kathd Vatt u (1eafka of my MS). Put
Arid Milinda began by asking,' ;How is your Reverence known, into modern philosophical phraseology it amounts to saying that
there is no permanent subject underlying the temporary phenomena
and what, Sir, is your name?' in a man 's individuality. But I doubt whether, even in our author 's
time, the conception 'subject ' was common ground, to th at the word
'1 am known as Nagasena, 0 king, and it is by that name ~hat Puggala had acquired that special connotation.
my brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, 0 kmg, 3. Pankanantariya-Kammam Karoti . See my note on Kullavagga VII ,
3,9 (' Vinaya Texts ' ,' vol. iii , p. 246, in the Sacred Books ofthe East) .
There is a free translation of the Simhalese version of the following
1. 4. This is no doubt said in these words with allusion to the opinion
dialogues (down to the end of our § 4) in Spen.ce Hardy 's ' M anual of ascribed in the Samafifia Phala(D . II 17) to Purana Kassapa .
Buddhism,' pp . 424-429. But it is very unreahable as a reproductIon
of either ' the Simhalese or thePa li , and slurs over the do ubtful 5. This is th e opinion ascribed in identical word in the Sam af,";-h, .: ;ala
(D. n 2 ) to Agita of th e ga rrncDf of hair.
passages.
Nastika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 107
106
, And to each to these he answered no. '
we are to think that were a man to kill you there would no murderer,"
then it follows that there are no real masters or teachers in your 'Then is it all these Skandhas combined that are Nagasena,'
Order, and that your ordinations are void - you tell me that your 'No! Great king .' .
brethren in the Order are in the habit of addressing you as Nagasena; ' B~utis there anything outside the five Skandhas that is
now what is that Nagasena? Do you mean to say that the hair is Nagasena?'
NagasenaT' , And still he answered no .'
"1 don't say that, great king." . 'Then thus, ask as 1 may, 1can discover no Nagasena, Nagasena . '
'Or the hair on the body perhaps?' IS ~ m~re empty sound. Who then is the Nagasena that we see before
'Certainly not. ' us. It IS a falsehood that your reverence has spoken, ~ untruth!'
'Or is it the nails, the teeth, the skin, the flesh, the nerves, the . 'And the venerable Nagasena said to Milinda the king: 'You
bones, the marrow, the kidneys, the heart, the liver, the abdomen, the S~re, have been brought up in the great luxury, as beseems your noble
spleen, the lungs, the larger intestines, the lower intestines , the stomach, birth, If you ~ere to walk this dry weather on the hot and sandy
the fseces , the bile, the phlegm, the pus, the blood, the sweat, the fat, ground t~amphng under foot the gritty, gravelly grains of the hard
the tears, the serum, the saliva, the mucus, the oil that lubricates the sand, Y?Uf feet would hurt you. And as your body would be in pain
joints, the urine, or the brain, or any or all ofthese, that is Nagasena?" you: mmd w~uld be disturbed, and you would experience a sense of
bodily suffermg. How then did you come, on foot or in a chariot?'
, And to each of these he answered no. '
'I did not come, Sire, on foot. I came in carriage. '
'It is the outward form, then, (Rfrpa) that is Nagasena or the
~ The~ ifyou came, Sire, in a carriage, explain to me what that
sensation (Vedana), of the ideas (Safifia), or the confections (the
IS. Is It the pole that is the chariot?'
constituent elements of character, (Sarnkh ara) , or the consciousness
'I did not say that.'
(Vinfiana), that is Nagasena?8'
'Is that axle that is the chariot?'
'Certainly not. '
'Is it the wheels, or the frame-work or the ropes or the yoke
or the spokes ofthe wheels, or the goad, that are'the chariot?:
6. This is practically the same opinion as is ascribed in the Samafiiia
Phala (D .II, 26) to Pakudha I<.ak.k3yanna. And to all these he still answered no .
7. This list of the thirty-two forms (akaras) of organic matter in the 'Then is it all these parts of it that are the chariot?'
human body occurs already in the Khuddaka Patha, § 3. It is the 'No, Sir.'
standard list always used in similar connections; and is, no doubt,
supposed to be exhaustive. There are sixteen (half as many) akaras ' B ut is there anything outside then that is the chariot?'
ofthe mind according to Dipavamsa I, 42. And still he answered no.
8. These are the five Skandhas, which include in them the whole bodily
and mental constituents on any being.
I
108 N astik a Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 109
'Then thus, ask as I may, I can discover no chariot. Chariot is . ' M ost wonderful, Nagasena, and most strange. Well has the
a mere empty sound. What then is the chariot you say you came in? puzzle put to you, most difficult though it was, been solved. Were the
It is a falsehood that your majesty has spoken, an untruth! There is no Buddhahimselfhere he would approve your answer. Well done. Well
such thing as a chariot! You are king over all India, a mighty monarch. done Nagasena!'
Ofwhom then are you afraid that you speak untruth? And he called
upon the Yonakas (Greeks) and the brethren to witness, saying: How many years of seniority have you, Nagasena?
'Milinda the king here has said that he came by carriage. But when 'Seven, your Majesty.'
asked in that case to explain what a carriage was, he is unable to 'But how can you say it is your "seven?" Is it you who are
establish what he averred. Is it, forsooth, possible to approve him in "seven" or the number that is " seven?' ''
that?'
Now that moment the figure ofthe king, decked in all the finery
When he had thus spoken the hundred Yonakas shouted their of his royal ornaments, cast its shadow on the ground, and was
applause, and said to the king : ' N ow let your majesty get out ofthat if reflected in a vessel ofwater. And Nagasena asked him: 'your figure,
you can' o king, is now shadowed upon the ground, and reflected in the water,
how now, are you the king, or is it the reflection ofthe king?'
And Milinda the king replied to Nagasena, and said : '1 have
spoken no untruth, reverend sir. It is on account ofits having all these "1 am the king , Nagasena, but the shadow comes into existence
things - the pole, and the axle, the wheels, and the framework, the because of me."
ropes, the yoke, the spokes, and the goad - that it comes under the
' Just even so , a king, the number of the years is seven 1 am
generally understood term, the designation in common use, of
not seven. But it is because of me, 0 king, that the number seven has
"Chariot."
come into existence; and it is mine in the same sense as the shadow
'Very good! Your majesty has rightly grasped the meaning of is yours.'
"chariot" and just even so it is on account of all those things you
questioned me about - the thirty two kinds of organic matter in a VIII THE BUDDHA AND GOD
human body, and the five constituent elements of being - that come
under the generally understood term, the designation in common use, 1) Introduction:
of "Nagasena." For it was said, Sire, by our Sister Vagira in the a) The central problem of Buddhism is not God but the
presence ofthe Blessed One: problem of pain.
"'Just as it is by the condition precedent ofthe co-existence of b) Even orthodox Brahminical schools like the Sankhya and
its various parts that the word "chariot" is used, just so.is it that when Mimamsa were atheistic and their main problem too was not
the Skandhas are there we talk of a 'being. 9" " God but liberation (moksha).
c) The Tathagata (Buddha) had enumerated ten m etaphysical
questions th at are logically uncertain an d ethically usr=h" '::~ an d
9. From the Samy utta Ni kdya V, i 0 . 6 . some of th em.are related >.j God.
L
110 N astik a Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 111
d) On the other hand, the Sakyamuni's preoccupation was with this saying go?" The Buddha replied: " It crumbles away
the burning problem of pain; its origin, its cessation and the brethren. Therefore, it is called the world". It refers to
means to terminate it (dukhas atya, samudaya satya, impermanence not contingency.
nirodhasatya, margasatya). c) The Buddha believed that the world is self-explanatory,
e) These are the four noble truths (arya satya) that he discovered without needing God for its creation and existence. Aquinas'
about which he said: "This does profit, has to do with argument for God from the contingent nature of creatures is
fundamentals of religion, and tends to aversion, absence of amply refuted by the famous Buddhist scholar Gunapala
passion, cessation, quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom Dharmasiri ofSri Lanka.
and Nirvana." d) Buddhaghosha says that the four root causes ofthe world are:
f) God does not come into this picture ofhuman salvation. The ignorance, craving, clinging, and karma. For the Buddha, the
fact that he did not speculate on God does not make him a world is not a permanent, immutable thing. It 'is a series of
rebel before his contemporaries. The Sankhya, Mimamsa and sensations.
probably also the early Yoga philosophers were all atheists. e) The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus, David Hume and
g) Even some of the Upanishadic rishis could not say anything modem quantum physics of Werner Heisenberg agree with
positive about God other than saying, neti, neti (not this, not the Buddha's idea. Buddhaghosha thinks that empirical
this) . causation and causal regularity can explain the causal
h) This apopltatic or negative theology is to be met with even series.
in Christian tradition, especially in Pseudo-Dionysius, Scotus
Erigena, Evagrius Ponticus and Eckhart. 3) The Buddha's Rejection of the Brahminical ideas of
Scholastic rational theology based on Aristotle, did not foster God:
i)
this trend in Western theology. Theology became a a) The Buddha's religious context is very important to
demonstrative science from being an ineffable mystery in understand his attitude to God.
St. Paul, who tells his disciple Timothy: "God dwells in b) Polytheism and expensive, cruel Brahminical sacrifices had
un approachable light whom no man has ever seen nor can see" alienated people from religion,
(lTim .,6,16). c) So the Buddha relegated the gods to the empirical level.
2) Rejection of the argument from Contingency: d) The Buddha said that the Hindu gods themselves were in
need of salvation!
a) The contingency ofthe world was the main basis ofAquinas'
e) These gods were even envious of the Buddhist monks
proof for God's existence.
and were considered inferior to them.
b) For the Buddha, the world was indeed impermanent but not
f) So, the. Buddha refused to give any name to the
contingent: the Buddha had known the theory of God creating
the world but he rejected it. One disciple asked the Buddha: transcendental reality, other than describing it as Nirvana
(Nibbana in Pali) .
"The world, the world, Lord, is the saying. How far, Lord, does
N astika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 113
112
k) He described the famous eight-fold path (Ashtanglka marga)
g)
The Upanishadic rishis also had said that God was beyond
both as Dharmayana and Brahmayana.
human concepts and ideas. The Taittiriya Upanishad says:
"Yalo vaco nivartante aprapya manasa salta" (2 ,4). 1) Therefore, if the Upanishadic Brahman is one with the
(Whence words return together with the mind, not having Buddha's Dharma, how could any-one call the Buddha
an atheist?
attained it).
Jesus told Philip that no one could see the Father, when the m) Both Brahman and Dharma are not persons.
h)
latter asked him to show him the Father. n) Both Nagarjuna and Sankara located the supreme Reality
above the limitations of personality.
4) Dharma as God: 0) The great Christian mystic Pseudo-Dionysius also denied
The Buddha had never denied God or the ultimate Reality. personality to God.
a)
b) The cunning Brahmins were jealous ofthe great popularity
of the Buddha who attracted huge crowds and many Hindus
5) Nirvana:
embraced Buddhism. Nirvana, the ultimate reality in Buddhism, is described as,
So in order to prevent mass conversions to Buddhism, " eternal bliss, attainable after blowing out of all passions" . It also
c)
th; Brahmins dubbed the Buddha as an atheist. denotes the unspeakable experience ofreunion with the Supreme or
Surely, God lies hidden behind the Buddha's enigmatic Brabma-nirvana. The Buddha accepted the Upanishadic goal of
d) man, viz., Brahmabhuta (dwelling in Brahman) as a state where
terms like Dharma, Nirvana, etc.
the mind is free from hatred and malice and loves everything. For the
e) The Buddha called Dharma the king of kings. Buddha, Nirvana is higher than Bralimabhuta. It is that state ofthe
f) The Tathagata (i.e., the Buddha) had insisted that reverence mind that can be obtained only through the eight-fold path ofDharl1Ul
and honour were to be bestowed not on the gods but on taught by him. Hence, it is not the Biblical Heaven. Nirvana can be
Dharma, meaning the Supreme Being. experienced here on earth. Sankara would call u jivanmukti. Some
g) In the Samyutta Nikaya we read that Dharma .i~ the Western Indologists had misrepresented Nirvana as the extinction
unwavering law of causality (karma) or unconditioned ofthe ultimate reality; extinction of man's self, or the extinction ofall
origination and its recognition is the most precious jewel (ratna) our emotions. For this , consult the wrong translation ofthe Buddha's
ofknowledge. Hymn a/Victory by Henry Warren. The Buddha demanded only our
The Buddha himselfcompared Dharma to the Upanishadic mastery or control of our empirical self or ego (gahakaraka,
h)
ahamkara, hubris). Jesus also demanded the denial ofour empirical
Brahman.
The Buddha also claimed that the way of Dharma was the selffor becoming his disciple. The Nirvana Sutra speaks of a Mind/
i) Alman that is freed of its binding conditions (sankhara). Earlier
way ofthe Brahman and that to dwell in the Dharma was to
Buddhists' denial ofAlman refers to the empirical ego, not Nirvana.
dwell in the Brahman. Says D .T. Suzuki, the great Japanese Buddhist philosopher: "T he
He further said that the Tathagata (i.e, himself) was one
j) Absolute Ego creates the relative ego in order to see itselfreflected
with Dharma and one with Brahman. in it", The Buddha said: "Since, 0 M onks, there is an -cJnbom ,
114 Nastika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy
115
Unoriginated, Uncreated, Unformed, there is an escape from the born,
Because a man is rid of evil, therefore he is called Brahmana:
o
Stop the stream valiantly; drive away the desires, 0 Brahmana! ~at i~ tl~e use ofplatted hair, 0 fool! What ofthe raiment of
When you have understood the destruction of all that was made, you goatskms? Within thee there is ravening, but the outside thou makest
will understand that which was not made. clean.
If the Brahmana has reached the other shore in both laws (in Th~ m~ who wears dirty raiment, who is emaciated and
restraint and contemplation), all bonds vanish from him who has covered Withvems, who meditates alone in the forest, him I call indeed
obtained knowledge. a Brahmana.
He for whom there is neither the hither nor the further shore, I do ~o~ call a man a Brahmana because ofhis origin or ofhis
nor both, him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed a Brahmana. mother. He IS mdeed arrogant, and he is wealthy; but the poor, who is
free from all attachments, him I call indeed a Brahmana.
The sun is bright by day, the moon shines by night, the warrior
is bright inhis armour, the Brahmana is bright in his meditation; but Him I call indeed a Brahmana who after cutting all fetters
Buddha, the Awakened, is bright with splendour day and night. never trembles, is free from bonds and unshackled.
116 Nastika Darsanas Buddhist Philosophy 117
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who after cutting the strap and Him I call indeed a Brahmana who has no interests, and when
the thong, the rope with all that pertains to it, has destroyed allobstacles, he has understood (the truth), does not say, "How, how?" And who
and is awakened. has reached the depth of the Immortal.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who, though he has committed Him I call indeed a Brahmana who in this world has risen above
no offence, endures reproach, stripes, and bonds, who has endurance ties, good and evil, who is free from grief, from sin, and from impurity.
for his force, and strength for his army.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who is bright like the moon,
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who is free from anger, dutiful, pure, serene, and undisturbed and in whom all gaiety is extinct.
virtuous, without appetites, who is subdued, and has received his last
body. Him I call indeed a Brahmana who has traversed this miry
road, the impassable world, difficult to pass, and its vanity, who has
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who does not cling to sensual gone through, and reached the other shore, is thoughtful, steadfast,
pleasures, like water on a lotus leaf, like a mustard seed on the point free from doubts, free from attachment, and content.
ofaneedle.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who in this world, having
Him I call indeed a Brahmana whose knowledge is deep, who abandoned all desires, travels about without a home, and in whom all
possesses wisdom, who knows the right way and the wrong, and has concupiscence is extinct.
attained the highest end.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who, after leaving all bondage
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who without hurting any creatures to men, has risen above all bondage to the gods, and is free from all
whether feeble or strong, does not kill nor cause slaughter. and every bondage.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who is tolerant with the intolerant, Him I call indeed a Brahmana who has left what gives pleasure
mild with the violent, and free from greed among the greedy. and what gives pain, who is cold, and free from all germs (ofrenewed
life), the hero who has conquered all the worlds.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana from whom anger and hatred,
pride and hypocrisy have dropt like a mustard seed from the point of Him I call indeed a Brahmana who knows the destruction and
a needle. the return ofbeings everywhere, who is free from bondage, welfaring
(Sugata), and awakened (Buddha).
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who utters true speech,
instructive and free from harshness, so that he offends no one. Him I call indeed a Brahmana whose path the gods do not
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who takes nothing in the world know, nor spirits (Gandharvas), nor men, whose passions are extinct,
and who is an Arhat (venerable).
that is not given him, be it long or short, small or large, good or bad.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who calls nothing his own,
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who fosters no desires for this
whether it is before, behind, or between, who is poor, and free from
world or for the next, has no inclinations, and is unshackled.
the love ofthe world.
Nastika Da rsanas
118
. 3 . THE CHARVAKA PHILOSOPHY
Him I call indeed a Brahmana, the manly, the noble, the hero,
the great sage, the conqueror, the indifferent, the accomplished, and
the awakened.
Him I call indeed a Brahmana who knows his former abodes,
who sees heaven and hell, has reached the end ofbirths, is perfect in 1. ITS ORIGIN:
knowledge, a sage, and whose perfections are all perfect.
The origin of ancient Indian materialism is uncertain. All our
AN EASTER REFLECTION: knowledge ofthis school ofphilosophy is derived.from other.sources.
- £.harvaka is the term used for Indian materialism. The meaning of
For the Buddha, a true Brahmin is any human being who has this term is also uncertain.
gone beyond caste considerations, w~o is free from uncontrolled
attachments and aversions to earthly things , persons, and places and a) Some say that it refers to the founder ofthe school.
who maintains equanimity in success and failure, joy ~d ~orrow, b) Others say that it means a philosophy ofpleasure: carv = eat;
pleasure and pain, health and sickness, acceptance or reJectIon. and chew.
who is free from guilt for the past and worry for the future . H~ IS ~ c) Still-others say that it is derived from two Sanskrit words, charu
Arhat, one who has attained nirvana or resurrection even m this = pleasant, and vak = word. These philosophers used only
life. It is the Passover (Pasch), the Exodus beyond the R~d Sea .of ..pleasant words.
an utterly selfish life (Samsara Sagara). It means death WIth Christ
to our ego (ahamkara) and entering with ~he Ri~en ~ord the ~ew A certain sage called Brihaspaths saidtohave been the founder
Life ofuniversal compassion (karuna} and friendship WIth all (mann), of this system. His work, Brihaspati sutra has been lost. Probably
washing the feet ofthe enemy (pudasevanam}, feeding the hungry the Brahmins, whom this school had violently criticized, might have
(diakonia), consoling the afflicted, liberating the opp.res~ed,. nsk~ng destroyed this text. Our knowledge of this school is derived mainly
one's life and even shedding one 's blood for SOCIal justice like from some quotations found in the medieval philosopher Madhava's
Archbishop Romero of'El Salvador. Sarvadarsanasamgraha . This school is also known as
Lokavatamata, i.e, people's philosophy: loka = people; mala =
doctrine. So, a materialist philosopher is known as Lokayatika. The
doctrines ofthis school are divided into three sections: epistemology
(theory of knowledge) metaphysics (theory of reality) and ethics
(human conduct or behaviour).
2. EPISTEMOLOGY:
The Nydya school ofGautama Akshapada accepts four means
ofvalid knowledge or pramanas: perception (pratyaksha) inference
(anumana) comparison (upamana) and verbal testimony (sabda) .
Ii)
f