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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

*
G.R. No. 117890. September 18, 1997.

PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL and DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and NATIONAL
FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS-FOOD and
GENERAL TRADE (NFSWFGT)/JESUS PASCO, MARTIN
BONARES, EVANGELINE PASCO, TERESITA NAVA,
FELIXBERTO NAVA, JOHNNY GARRIDO, EDUARDO
NUÑEZ and DELMA NUÑEZ, respondents.

Administrative Law; Actions; Summons; Procedural Rules;

Pleadings and Practice; In quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed—

substantial compliance thereof is sufficient.—At the outset, we
must stress that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural rules
governing service of summons are not strictly construed.
Substantial compliance thereof is sufficient. Also, in labor cases,
punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be relaxed
in the interest of the working man; it should not defeat the
complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of
the parties. This Court is ever mindful of the underlying spirit
and intention of the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each case
speedily and objectively without regard to technical rules of law
and procedure, all in the interest of due process. Furthermore, the
Labor Code itself, as amended by RA 6715, provides for the
specific power of the Commission to correct, amend, or waive any
error, defect or irregularity whether in the substance or in the
form of the proceedings before it under Article 218(c).

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Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Labor Law; Due Process;

Trade Names; An employer-corporation is deemed to have been
heard even if it is only its unregistered trade name and its
administrator/manager which were impleaded in a case before a
labor tribunal—the non-inclusion of the corporate name of such
employercorporation is a mere procedural error which did not
affect the jurisdiction of the labor tribunal.—Consistent with the
foregoing principles applicable to labor cases, we find that
jurisdiction was acquired over the petitioner. There is no dispute
that Hacienda Lanutan, which was owned SOLELY by petitioner,
was impleaded and was heard. If at all, the non-inclusion of the
corporate name of petitioner in the case before the executive labor
arbiter was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals. Petitioner was adequately
represented in the proceedings conducted at the regional
arbitration branch by no less than Hacienda Lanutan’s
administrator, Jose Edmundo Pison, who verified and signed
his/Hacienda Lanutan’s position paper and other pleadings
submitted before the labor arbiter. It can thus be said that
petitioner, acting through its corporate officer Jose Edmundo
Pison, traversed private respondents’ complaint and controverted
their claims.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Service of summons

upon the administrator and representative of a corporation in its
property and recognized as such by the workers therein is deemed
sufficient and substantial compliance with the requirements for
ser-

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

vice of summons and other notices.—Also, it is undisputed that

summons and all notices of hearing were duly served upon Jose
Edmundo Pison. Since Pison is the administrator and
representative of petitioner in its property (Hacienda Lanutan)
and recognized as such by the workers therein, we deem the
service of summons upon him as sufficient and substantial
compliance with the requirements for service of summons and
other notices in respect of petitioner corporation. Insofar as the
complainants are concerned, Jose Edmundo Pison was their
employer and/or their employer’s representative. In view of the
peculiar circumstances of this case, we rule that Jose Pison’s
knowledge of the labor case and effort to resist it can be deemed
knowledge and action of the corporation. Indeed, to apply the
normal precepts on corporate fiction and the technical rules on
service of summons would be to overturn the bias of the
Constitution and the laws in favor of labor.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Trade Names; A

corporation may be sued under the name by which it makes itself
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known to the workers.—Comparable to Eden, Hacienda Lanutan

is an arm of petitioner, the organism of which it is an integral
part. Ineluctably, the real party in interest in this case is
petitioner, not “Hacienda Lanutan” which is merely its non-
juridical arm. In dealing with private respondents, petitioner
represented itself to be “Hacienda Lanutan.” Hacienda Lanutan is
roughly equivalent to its trade name or even nickname or alias.
The names may have been different, but the IDENTITY of the
petitioner is not in dispute. Thus, it may be sued under the name
by which it made itself known to the workers.

Actions; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; A party who has not

appealed an adverse decision cannot obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than those granted, if there is
any, in the decision of the lower court or administrative body.—
Jose Edmundo Pison did not appeal from the Decision of public
respondent. It thus follows that he is bound by the said judgment.
A party who has not appealed an adverse decision cannot obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than those
granted, if there is any, in the decision of the lower court or
administrative body.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Hessia and Atotubo Law Office for petitioner.
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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

     Abenir G. Chavez for private respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the proceedings before the labor arbiter, only the

unregistered trade name of the employer-corporation and
its administrator/manager were impleaded and
subsequently held liable for illegal dismissal, backwages
and separation pay. On appeal, however, the National
Labor Relations Commission motu proprio included the
corporate name of the employer as jointly and severally
liable for the workers’ claims. Because of such inclusion,
the corporation now raises issues of due pro-cess and
jurisdiction before this Court.

The Case

Assailed in this petition for certiorari

1
under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision of 2 Public Respondent
National Labor
3
Relations Commission in NLRC Case No.
V-0334-92 4 promulgated on September 27, 1993 and its
Resolution promulgated on September 12, 1994 denying
5

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5
reconsideration. Affirming the decision dated September 2,
1992 of Executive Labor Arbiter
6
Oscar S. Uy, the impugned
NLRC Decision disposed thus:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the

decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, dated September
2,

_______________

1 In “National Federation of Sugar Workers-Food and General Trade (NFSW-

FGT)/Jesus Pasco, et al. vs. Hda. Lanutan/Jose Edmundo Pison (And Pison-Arceo
Agricultural and Development Corporation)”; rollo, pp. 43-65.
2 Fourth Division composed of Commissioner Bernabe S. Batuhan, ponente, and
Commissioner Irenea S. Ceniza, concurring. The third member is not named in the
assailed Decision.
3 Originally numbered as RAB Case No. 06-06-10202-88.
4 Rollo, pp. 78-79, with an additional concurrence of Commissioner Anchito V.
Cañete.
5 Ibid., pp. 18-25.
6 Ibid., pp. 64-65.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

1992, subject to the amendments and modification stated above

and ordering the respondent-appellant, Jose Edmundo Pison and
the respondent Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development
Corporation to pay jointly and severally the claims for backwages
and separation pay of the complainant-appellees in the above-
entitled case, except the claims of Danny Felix and Helen Felix, in
the amount specified below:

Name Backwages Separation Pay Total

1. Jesus Pasco P14,729.00 P12,818.06 P27,547.06
2. Evangeline Pasco - 14,729.00 12,874.81 27,603.81
3. Martin Bonares - 14,729.00 9,035.06 23,764.06
4. Mariolita Bonares - 14,729.00 8,455.00 23,184.00
5. Felixberto Nava - 14,729.00 13,505.31 28,234.31
6. Teresita Nava - 14,729.00 3,417.31 18,146.31
7. Johnny Garrido - 8,489.00 4,463.94 12,952.94
8. Eduardo Nuñez - 8,489.00 11,399.44 19,888.44
9. Delma Nuñez - 8,489.00 9,507.94 17,996.94

In addition, the respondent-appellant and the respondent

corporation are ordered to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the total award.”

The dispositive portion

7
of the assailed Resolution, on the
other hand, reads:

“WHEREFORE, the decision in question is hereby modified in the

sense that the monetary award of Mariolita Bonares be [sic]

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deleted. Except for such modification, the rest of the decision

stands.”

Arguing that the National Labor Relations Commission did

not have jurisdiction over it because it was not a party
before the labor arbiter, petitioner elevated this matter
before this Court via a petition for
8
certiorari under Rule 65.
Acting on petitioner’s prayer, this Court (First Division)
issued on January 18, 1995 a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondents from executing the assailed
Decision and Resolution.

_______________

7 Ibid., p. 78.
8 Ibid., p. 11.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

The Facts
9
As gathered from the complaint and other submissions of
the parties filed with Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy,
the facts of the case are as follows:
Together with Complainants Danny and Helen Felix,
private respondents—Jesus Pasco, Evangeline Pasco,
Martin Bonares, Teresita Nava, Felixberto Nava, Johnny
Garrido, Eduardo Nuñez and Delma Nuñez, all represented
by Private Respondent National Federation of Sugar
Workers-Food and General Trade (NSFW-FGT)—filed on
June 13, 1988 a complaint for illegal dismissal,
reinstatement, payment of backwages and attorney’s fees
against “Hacienda Lanutan/Jose Edmundo Pison.”
Complainants alleged that they were previously employed
as regular sugar farm workers of Hacienda Lanutan in
Talisay, Negros Occidental. On the other hand, Jose
Edmundo Pison claimed that he was merely the
administrator of Hacienda Lanutan which was owned by
Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation.
As earlier stated, the executive labor arbiter rendered on
September 2, 1992 a decision in favor of the workers-
complainants, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering respondent Jose Edmundo Pison/Hda.
Lanutan, Talisay, Negros Occidental, to PAY the following
complainants their backwages (one year) plus separation pay in
the following amounts, to wit:

  BACKWAGES SEPARATION PAY TOTAL

1. J. Pasco P14,729.00 P12,818.06 P27,547.06

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  BACKWAGES SEPARATION PAY TOTAL

2. E. Pasco 14,729.00 12,784.81 27,603.81
3. Bonares 14,729.00 8,404.56 23,133.56
4. F. Nava 14,729.00 13,505.31 28,234.31
5. T. Nava 14,729.00 3,427.31 18,146.31
6. J. Garido 8,489.00 4,463.94 12,952.94
7. E. Nuñez 8,489.00 11,399.44 19,888.44
8. D. Nuñez 8,489.00 9,507.94 17,996.94

_______________

9 Rollo, pp. 15-17.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

plus ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorney’s fees in

the amount of P17,550.34 or in the total amount of ONE
HUNDRED NINETY THREE THOUSAND FIFTY THREE AND
71/100 (P193,053.71), all these amounts to be deposited with this
Office within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. The claim
of complainants Danny and Helen Felix are hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.”

In affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter,

public respondent ordered “respondent-appellant, Jose
Edmundo Pison and the respondent Pison-Arceo
Agricultural and Development Corporation to pay jointly
and severally the claims for backwages and separation pay”
of private respondents. The motion for reconsideration
dated October 14, 1993 was apparently filed by Jose
Edmundo Pison for and on his own behalf only. However,
Pison did not elevate his case before this Court. The sole
petitioner now before us is Pison-Arceo Agricultural and
Development Corporation, the owner of Hacienda Lanutan.

The Issue
10
Petitioner submits only one issue for our resolution:

“Public Respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion when it included
motu proprio petitioner corporation as a party respondent and
ordered said corporation liable to pay jointly and severally, with
Jose Edmundo Pison the claims of private respondents.”

In essence, petitioner alleges deprivation of due process.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

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Petitioner contends that it was never served any

summons; hence, public respondent did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. It argues that “from the time the
complaint was filed before

_______________

10 Ibid., p. 7; original text in upper case.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI up to the time the

said case was appealed by Jose Edmundo Pison to the
NLRC, Cebu, petitioner Corporation was never impleaded
as one of the parties x x x.” It was only in the public
respondent’s assailed Decision of September 27, 1993 “that
petitioner Corporation was wrongly included as party
respondent without its knowledge.” Copies of the assailed
Decision and Resolution were not sent to petitioner but
only to Jose Edmundo Pison, on the theory that the two
were one and the same. Petitioner avers that Jose
Edmundo Pison “is only a minority stockholder” of
Hacienda Lanutan,
11
which in turn is one of the businesses
of petitioner. Petitioner further argues that it did not
“voluntarily appear before said tribunal” and 12that it was
not “given (any) opportunity to be heard”; thus, the
assailed Decision and Resolution in this13case are void “for
having been issued without jurisdiction.”
In its memorandum, petitioner adds 14
that Eden vs.
Ministry of Labor and Employment, cited by public
respondent, does not apply to this case. In Eden,
“petitioners were duly served with notices of hearings,
while in the instant case, the petitioner was never
summoned nor was served 15
with notice of hearings as a
respondent in the case.”
At the outset, we must stress that in quasi-judicial
proceedings, procedural rules governing service of
summons are not strictly 16construed. Substantial
compliance thereof is sufficient. Also, in labor cases,
punctilious adherence to stringent technical rules may be
relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should not
defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights
and obligations of the parties. This Court is

_______________

11 Ibid., p. 8.
12 Ibid., p. 9.
13 Ibid., p. 11.
14 182 SCRA 840, February 28, 1990.
15 Rollo, pp. 200-201.

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16 Eden vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 182 SCRA 840, 847,
February 28, 1990; citing Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69
Phil. 635, February 27, 1940.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of the

Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and
objectively without regard to technical rules 17
of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process. Furthermore,
18
the Labor Code itself, as amended by RA 6715, provides
for the specific power of the Commission to correct, amend,
or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether19 in the
substance or in the form of the proceedings before it under
Article 218(c) as follows:

“(c) To conduct investigation for the determination of a question,

matter or controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and
determine the disputes in the absence of any party thereto who
has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct its
proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private, adjourn its
hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or
accounts to an expert and to accept his report as evidence after
hearing of the parties upon due notice, direct parties to be joined
in or excluded from the proceedings, correct, amend, or waive any
error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form, give
all such directions as it may deem necessary or expedient in the
determination of the dispute before it, and dismiss any matter or
refrain from further hearing or from determining the dispute or
part thereof, where it is trivial or where further proceedings by
the Commission are not necessary or desirable; x x x” (Italics
supplied)

In this case, there are legal and factual reasons to hold

petitioner jointly and severally liable with Jose Edmundo
Pison.

Jurisdiction Acquired over Petitioner

Consistent with the foregoing principles applicable to labor
cases, we find that jurisdiction was acquired over the peti-

_______________

17 Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association vs. NLRC, 241 SCRA

643, 656-657, February 23, 1994; citing YBL (Your Bus Lines), et al. vs.
NLRC, et al., 190 SCRA 160, September 28, 1990; Rada vs. NLRC, et al.,
G.R. No. 96078, 205 SCRA 69, January 9, 1992.
18 The New Labor Relations Law.
19 City Fair Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 243
SCRA 572, 576, April 21, 1995.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

tioner. There is no dispute that Hacienda Lanutan, which

was owned SOLELY by petitioner, was impleaded and was
heard. If at all, the non-inclusion of the corporate name of
petitioner in the case before the executive labor arbiter was
a mere procedural error which did not 20
at all affect the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals. Petitioner was
adequately represented in the proceedings conducted at the
regional arbitration branch by no less than Hacienda
Lanutan’s administrator, Jose Edmundo Pison, who
verified and signed his/Hacienda Lanutan’s position paper
and other pleadings submitted before the labor arbiter. It
can thus be said that petitioner, acting through its
corporate officer Jose Edmundo Pison, traversed private
respondents’ complaint and controverted their claims.
Further unrebutted by 21
petitioner are the following findings
of public respondent:

“It should further be noted that two responsible employees of the

said corporation, namely, Teresita Dangcasil, the secretary of

_______________

20 This should be distinguished from the case of Laureano Investment &

Development Corporation vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Bormaheco, Inc.,
(G.R. No. 100468, p. 13, May 6, 1997) where we ruled:

“Examining the records of the case, we observe that the motion adverted to indeed made use
of LIDECO as an acronym for Laureano Investment and Development Corporation. But
said motion distinctly specified that LIDECO was the shorter term for Laureano
Investment and Development Corporation. It is obvious that no false representation or
concealment can be attributed to private respondent. Neither can it be charged with
conveying the impression that the facts are other than, or inconsistent with, those which it
now asserts since LIDECO, as an acronym, is clearly different from ‘Lideco Corporation’
which represented itself as a corporation duly registered and organized in accordance with
law. Nor can it be logically inferred that petitioner relied or acted upon such representation
or private representation of private respondent in thereafter referring to itself as ‘Lideco
Corporation’; for petitioner is presumed to know by which name it is registered, and the
legal provisions on the use of its corporate name.”

21 NLRC’s Decision, pp. 19-20; rollo, pp. 61-62.

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the administrator/manager, and Fernando Gallego, the

hacienda overseer, had submitted their affidavits, both dated July
20, 1988, as part of the evidence for the respondent, and that, as
shown by the records, the lawyer who appeared as the legal
counsel of the respondent-appellant, specifically, Atty. Jose Ma.
Torres, of the Torres and Valencia Law Office in Bacolod City,

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(Rollo, p. 17) was also the legal counsel of the said corporation.
(Rollo, p. 23)”

Also, it is undisputed that summons and all notices of

hearing were duly served upon Jose Edmundo Pison. Since
Pison is the administrator and representative of petitioner
in its property (Hacienda Lanutan) and recognized as such
by the workers therein, we deem the service of summons
upon him as sufficient and substantial compliance with the
requirements for service of summons and other notices in
respect of petitioner corporation. Insofar as the
complainants are concerned, Jose Edmundo Pison was
their employer and/or their employer’s representative. In
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, we rule that
Jose Pison’s knowledge of the labor case and effort to resist
it can be deemed knowledge and action of the corporation.
Indeed, to apply the normal precepts on corporate fiction
and the technical rules on service of summons would be to
overturn the bias of the Constitution and the laws in favor
of labor.
Hence, it is fair to state that petitioner, through its
administrator and manager, Jose Edmundo Pison, was
duly notified of the labor case against it and was actually
afforded an opportunity to be heard. That it refused to take
advantage of such opportunity and opted to hide behind its
corporate veil will not shield it from the encompassing
application of labor laws. As we 22held in Bautista vs.
Secretary of Labor and Employment:

“Moreover, since the proceeding was not judicial but merely

administrative, the rigid requirements of procedural laws were
not strictly enforceable. It is settled that—

_______________

22 196 SCRA 470, 475, April 30, 1991, per Cruz, J.

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While the administrative tribunals exercising quasijudicial powers are

free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements they are bound
by law and practice to observe the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in justiciable cases presented before them.
However, the standard of due process that must be met in administrative
tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is
not ignored. (fn: Adamson & Adamson, Inc. vs. Amores, 152 SCRA 237).
xxx
It is of course also sound and settled rule that administrative agencies
performing quasi-judicial functions are unfettered by the rigid
technicalities of procedure observed in the courts of law, and this is so
that disputes brought before such bodies may be resolved in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner possible. (fn: Rizal Workers Union
vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 186 SCRA 431).

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Given all these circumstances, we feel that the lack of

summons upon the petitioners is not sufficient justification for
annulling the acts of the public respondents.”

Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the principles laid

down in Eden are relevant to23this case. In that case, a
religious organization, SCAFI, denied responsibility for
the monetary claims of 24
several employees, as these were
filed against SCAPS and its officer in charge—the
employees believed that SCAPS was 25their employer. In
rejecting such defense, this Court ruled:

“With regard to the contention that SCAPS and SCAFI are two
different entities, this lacks merit. The change from SCAPS to
SCAFI was a mere modification, if not rectification of the caption
as to respondent in the MOLE case, when it was pointed out in
the complainant’s position paper that SCAPS belongs to or is
integral with SCAFI as gleaned from the brochure, Annex ‘A’ of
said position paper, which is already part of the records of the
case and incorpo-

_______________

23 Share and Care Apostolate Foundation, Inc. (SCAFI).

24 Share and Care Apostolate for Poor Settlers (SCAPS).
25 Eden vs. Ministry of Labor and Employment, supra, p. 847.

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

rated in the Comment by way of reference. The brochure stated

that SCAPS is the implementing and service arm of SCAFI, with
Bishop Gaviola as National Director of SCAPS and Board
Chairman of SCAFI, both their address: 2655 F.B. Harrison, St.,
Pasay City. Thus, the real party in interest is SCAFI, more so
because it has the juridical personality that can sue and be sued.
The change in caption from SCAPS to SCAFI however does not
absolve SCAPS from liability, for SCAFI includes SCAPS, SCAPS
—the arm, SCAFI,—the organism to which the arm is an integral
part of the rise and fall of SCAPS, and vice-versa. Thus, SCAFI
has never been a stranger to the case. Jurisprudence is to the
effect that:

‘An action may be entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an

indispensable party where it appears that the naming of the party would
be a formality.’ (Baguio vs. Rodriguez, L-11078, May 27, 1959)”

Comparable to Eden, Hacienda Lanutan is an arm of

petitioner, the organism of which it is an integral part.
Ineluctably, the real party in interest in this case is
petitioner, not “Hacienda Lanutan” which is merely its
non-juridical arm. In dealing with private respondents,
petitioner represented itself to be “Hacienda Lanutan.”
Hacienda Lanutan is roughly equivalent to its trade name
or even nickname or alias. The names may have been
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different, but the IDENTITY of the petitioner is not in

dispute. Thus, it may be sued under the name by which it
made itself known to the workers.

Liability of Jose Edmundo Pison

Jose Edmundo Pison did not appeal from the Decision of
public respondent. It thus follows that he is bound by the
said judgment. A party who has not appealed an adverse
decision cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than those granted, if there is any,
26
in the decision of the lower court or administrative body.

_______________

26 Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. vs. Court of

Appeals, 247 SCRA 606, 612-613, August 23, 1995, citing cases of Makati
Haberdashery, Inc., et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 83380-81, November 15, 1989, 179

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Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corp. vs. NLRC

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED, for its failure to show grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the National Labor Relations Commission. The
assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED. The
temporary restraining order issued on January 19, 1995 is
hereby LIFTED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Melo and

Francisco, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—The imposition by the Court of Appeals of legal

interest on the amount due was made not because the
appellees sought affirmative relief but because the award
of interest is a necessary consequence of the finding that
the Contract of Sale is void in its entirety, and that, in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, it may resolve or
consider errors not assigned in the appellant’s brief when it
is necessary for a just, fair and equitable resolution of the
case. (Ines vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 312 [1995])
A party who has not himself appealed cannot obtain
from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than
those granted in the decision of the lower court. (Atlantic
Gulf and Pacific Company of Manila, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 247 SCRA 606 [1995])

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SCRA 448; Dizon, Jr. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.,
G.R. No. 69018, January 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 472; Lumibao vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 64677, September 13, 1990,
189 SCRA 469; SMI Fish Industries, Inc., et al. vs. National Labor
Relations Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 96952-56, September 2, 1992, 213
SCRA 444; Alba vs. Santander, et al., L-28409, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA
8; Nessia vs. Fermin, et al., G.R. No. 102918, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA
615.

326

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