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Ao Coe U Jfac Estimate Functional Planning Guide

This document provides guidance for air planners contributing to the operations planning process as part of a joint force air component headquarters. It details the key steps and considerations for developing the joint air component estimate, including mission analysis, course of action development, and operational planning. Recommendations and examples are provided throughout to assist planners.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)

475 views152 pages

Ao Coe U Jfac Estimate Functional Planning Guide

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sergiobicho1960

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It is with great pleasure we provide you, and NATO, with a guide to support the Operations
Planning Process in a JFAC HQ.
With this document, we, the Air Operations Centre of Excellence (Air Ops CoE), attempt to
provide planning guidance specific to the Air functional area, and tailored particularly to the
JFAC estimate part of the process.
This JFAC Estimate Functional Planning Guide (JFAC-E FPG) is a tool that assists air
planners with their contributions to the operations planning process, as part of a
headquarters cross-functional planning body.
This guide is a reflection of the AO CoE staff’s expertise based on many years of planning
experience in both operations and exercises, as well as a tailored tool pulled from NATO’s
OPP.
This guide can provide planners with an understanding of the JFAC estimate process, while
also providing useful, tested processes (check-lists) to help with the creation of AOPG
products in support of Joint OPLAN development.
It also offers the COMJFAC ideas on the typical direction and guidance they should provide
to an AOPG during the JFAC estimate process.
If we envision the AOPG as a combat aircraft during a mission, which entails the decision-
making process, the COMJFAC must fuel this combat system with their guidance at each
step of the JFAC estimate. This interaction will help to guarantee a safe and successful flight
that follows the COMJFAC’s desired flightpath.

This guide provides planners and commanders with relevant advice and recommendations
for an efficient development of the JFAC estimate.
They will be italicized in blue as follows:
 Air Operations COE recommendation, advice or guidance
Examples will be underlined:
Example for more understanding.

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Table of contents
COMJFAC DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE ...................................................................... 7
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT AIR OPERATIONS FOR PLANNING ............................ 10
LOGISTICS IN PLANNING ACTIVITIES ....................................................................... 15
LEGAL ASPECTS IN AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING .................................................. 17
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT & AIRSPACE CONTROL PLAN (ACP) ........................... 19
AIR DEFENCE DESIGN AND AIR DEFENCE PLAN (ADP) ......................................... 22
OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS (OPP) AND AOPG OVERVIEW...................... 25
JFAC ESTIMATE PART 1 (Mission analysis) ............................................................... 33
FACTORS ANALYSIS ................................................................................................... 36
CHECK LIST FOR FACTORS ANALYSIS .................................................................... 43
CENTRE OF GRAVITY (COG)...................................................................................... 46
CHECKLIST FOR CoG DEVELOPMENT OR ANALYSIS ............................................ 52
JFAC LIMITATIONS ...................................................................................................... 55
CHECK LIST FOR JFAC LIMITATIONS DEVELOPMENT ........................................... 57
JFAC (PLANNING) ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................. 58
CHECK LIST FOR ASSUMPTIONS .............................................................................. 60
CRITICAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (COR) .................................................. 61
CHECK LIST FOR CRITICAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................... 64
OPERATIONAL RISKS ANALYSIS ............................................................................... 66
CHECK LIST FOR RISK ASSESSMENT ...................................................................... 69
CONDITIONS TO ESTABLISH ..................................................................................... 71
OPERATIONAL DESIGN .............................................................................................. 75
CHECKLIST FOR OPERATIONAL DESIGN DEVELOPMENT .................................... 82
TIMINGS, FORCES/CAPABILITY ESTIMATE AND C2 REQUIREMENTS ................. 83
CHECKLIST FOR CRITICAL TIMINGS ........................................................................ 88
CHECK LIST FOR FORCE/CAPABILITY ESTIMATE .................................................. 89
CHECK LIST FOR C2 ARRANGEMENTS DEVELOPMENT ........................................ 90
TYPICAL MAB ............................................................................................................... 91
JFAC ESTIMATE PART 2: COA DEVELOPMENT ....................................................... 93
COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPEMENT .................................................................. 95

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CHECK LIST FOR COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT...................................... 100

WARGAMING AND COA COMPARISONS ................................................................ 102
CHECK LIST FOR WARGAMING ............................................................................... 108
CHECK LIST FOR COA COMPARISON .................................................................... 110
TYPICAL COA DB ....................................................................................................... 112
AFTER THE AOPG … OPERATIONAL PLAN DEVELOPMENT ............................... 115
AIR OPS DIRECTIVE - AOD ....................................................................................... 119
CHECK LIST FOR FACTORS ANALYSIS .................................................................. 121
CHECKLIST FOR CoG DEVELOPMENT OR ANALYSIS .......................................... 124
CHECK LIST FOR JFAC LIMITATIONS DEVELOPMENT ......................................... 127
CHECK LIST FOR ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................ 127
CHECK LIST FOR CRITICAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................. 128
CHECK LIST FOR RISK ASSESSMENT .................................................................... 130
CHECKLIST FOR OPERATIONAL DESIGN DEVELOPMENT .................................. 132
CHECKLIST FOR CRITICAL TIMINGS ...................................................................... 133
CHECK LIST FOR FORCE/CAPABILITY ESTIMATE ................................................ 134
CHECK LIST FOR C2 ARRANGEMENTS DEVELOPMENT ...................................... 135
TYPICAL MAB ............................................................................................................. 136
CHECK LIST FOR COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT ...................................... 138
CHECK LIST FOR WARGAMING ............................................................................... 140
CHECK LIST FOR COA COMPARISON .................................................................... 142
TYPICAL COA DB ....................................................................................................... 144
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS - PLANNING ....................................................... 147
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS - AIR OPERATIONS ........................................... 150

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 Considering their AOPG as a flexible tool to help them in the decision making process,
COMJFAC should provide the AOPG with initial direction and guidance such as the following,
including at a minimum:
1. Recommendations for abbreviating the JFAC estimate due to time constraint.
2. Framing of the problem (principal characteristics of the operation).
3. Key issues and areas of specific attention.
4. Coordination and liaison requirements.
5. Time critical requirements.
6. Contribution to the OLRT/enabling forces.
7. Command group activities that could affect planning.
8. Planning milestones, including specifically when the Commander will be available for
a Mission Analysis Briefing (MAB) and COA Decision Briefing (COA DB).

COMJFAC may have to review its guidance during mission analysis when AOPG highlight
new issues that may be considered by the JFAC.
The AOPG should enable the commander’s vision. For that reason, COMJFAC should
ensure that planning staff understand the way he thinks and operates.
COMJFAC should provide the AOPG with insights regarding its own intent about JFAC
mission. The Commander’s intent is a critical element that contribute to developing the
operational design.

Cdr’s Approvals
The aim of the Mission analysis brief is to seek COMJFAC approval of:
 Operational Framework;
 JFAC Mission updates and Commander’s intent;
 Preconditions for Success;
 Proposed Planning Guidance;
 ROE requirements;
 Additional CRMs;
 Submissions to JFC/JTF.
Cdr’s planning guidance
The AOPG should receive guidance from the COMJFAC to begin the second stage of the
JFAC estimate (COA development).
 The level of detail of guidance will typically depend on the nature of the mission, the
operational circumstances, the time available, and the experience of the AOPG.
On this basis the COMJFAC may:
Specify opposing actions to be considered;
Indicate the opposing COAs to be developed. This is normally a joint level task.
Establish criteria for COA development and selection.
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Describe, in broad terms, the COAs to be developed.

Direct the JOPG to focus its efforts on developing a single COA due to the urgency and
nature of the situation
It is of great value to provide AOPG with an explanation of each criteria in order to have the
relevant analysis when comparing COAs through commander’s criteria.
Examples of criteria with explanation
1. PROTECTION (protects country X population, government and key facilities)
2. RISK TO FORCE (minimises the risk of loss of NATO force personnel and resources)
3. DETERRENCE (Earliest possible visible & credible multinational presence to prevent the
enemy from launching direct attacks against country X)
4. LOGISTICS SIMPLICITY (minimises impact on overall Joint Logistic effort allowing sustained
operations; Ability to maintain resilient logistic/medical support throughout the JOA)
5. FLEXIBILITY (Allows enough reserve force and assets to exploit success and opportunity in
the JOA)
6. INITIATIVE (Capability of the Air component to act based on own mission requirements (Time
& Space))
7. EARLY VISIBLE SUCCESS (Ability to show early and visible success by NATO; Supports
compelling enemy regime to withdraw from contested region and agree to organise democratic
elections before date DD.

At the end of the COA DB, the COMJFQC should express their decision, including:
Clear expression of COM intent
Clear direction on the CoA to be developed for CONOPS development
Approval of a final operational design.
Additional guidance and milestones for the development of the CONOPS.
Issues to be raised with JFC.
Priority issues requiring liaison, coordination or reconnaissance in theatre.
Guidance on coordination with relevant national / international actors, for Phase 4 -
Operational Supporting Plan Development

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NOTES
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 The successful planning of military operations requires clearly understood and widely
accepted doctrine. This requirement is especially important for joint air operations that will
be conducted by multinational forces.

Whilst the Alliance can use a variety of military and non-military tools to change the behaviour
of decision-makers, state and non-state organisations, this JFAC FPG focuses on air power.
The particular attributes of air power offer specific, flexible and responsive ways to create
and exert influence; ranging from direct physical attacks to more nuanced, psychological
effects.
The air environment is very different than that of maritime or land. Air surrounds the globe
and overlays both land and sea. Consequently, air power is inherently Joint. Further, air
power is most decisive when orchestrated along with land, maritime, space and cyberspace
power.
The COMJTF will delegate the responsibility of developing an Air Tasking Order (ATO) to a
Component Commander. Considering that the majority of assets and C2 means that follow
an ATO are air units  90% of the time, authority to task air assets will be delegated to the
COMJFAC
 Think about integrating the other CCs air assets when developing courses of action.
Air power attributes
Speed. The speed of aircraft allows military power to be projected rapidly and
responsively and to complete missions quickly. This creates a high tempo and the
potential to exploit time.
 Use this attribute to increase the contribution of Air Power to Joint plans.
Reach. About 70% of the Earth’s surface is water, but all of it is covered by air. This
provides aircraft with unrivalled reach, mostly unimpeded by terrain, and opens up all of
an adversary’s resources to attack or influence, however distant or isolated.
 Air power is pervasive, as aircraft are rarely physically constrained by national
boundaries or terrain, potentially obtaining access to any point on Earth.
Height. The advantage of height is an enduring military reality. Air power offers an
unparalleled vantage point, facilitating observation and thereby enabling operations
within the land and maritime domains.
The speed, reach and height attributes of air power provide the foundation and enhance air
power’s additional attributes of ubiquity, agility and concentration. In combination, these
provide air power’s characteristic flexibility as the most responsive and easily scaled tool of
national force.
Ubiquity. Air power’s reach, combined with the growing persistence available through
air-to-air refuelling and high endurance unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), creates the
sense of being everywhere all the time. This enables the Alliance to use air power to
pose or counter threats simultaneously, and across a far wider area than surface
capabilities. Unlike land forces, air power is not fixed at specific locations and its light
footprint makes it easier to commit in politically ambiguous circumstances.

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Agility. Air power’s agility stems from its speed and reach, enhanced by the capabilities
of genuinely multi-role platforms. Agility means the Alliance can quickly switch the point
of application within and between operational theatres, sometimes during the same
mission, and create tactical to strategic effects in a variety of air power operational roles.
Agility also means the JTF can easily scale the scope of operations up or down in
response to a change in political guidance or political strategic objectives, from air-
policing at one end of the spectrum to full-scale war fighting at the other.
Concentration. Air power’s speed and reach also enables the JTF to concentrate air
assets in time and space to deliver military force when and where it is required. Precision
technology means that significant air power effects can be created without the need for
large numbers of aircraft; imposing psychological shock that may be crucial to military
success.
Air power limitations
 Air planners must consider the air power’s limitations and strengths at any time and
specifically when developing courses of action.
Impermanence. Although high endurance UAS and air-to-air refuelling have increased
individual air assets’ persistence; aircraft still require ground servicing and rearming.
 Consider logistics challenges from the beginning of the component estimate.
Limited Payload. Aircraft design places a practical limit upon the payload that can be
carried such as considerations of aircraft payload weight versus speed and reach.
Miniaturisation and precision technology now enables greater impact with fewer and
smaller weapons.
 The need for optimisation of air power capabilities is critical as it enables fewer assets
to achieve the same results.
Vulnerability. The nature of the air environment creates specific vulnerabilities: the
relative fragility of air assets; the effects of weather on air operations, and the
requirement for basing.
 Planners must consider these vulnerabilities during air component estimate, as well
as the following:
Fragility. Air platforms are comparatively lightly armoured which limits the extent to
which it is sensible to expose them to hostile fire. Whilst tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTPs), low observable technology and platform protection can be used to
mitigate the operating risk, air planners must be cognisant of the capabilities (and
limitations) of the platforms assigned to a campaign or operation.
Weather. Poor weather can hamper air operations and commanders require accurate,
timely and relevant environmental information in order to maximise the effectiveness of
air systems and missions. However, technological developments have enabled Alliance
air power to operate day and night in adverse conditions, providing a potential operational
and tactical advantage that can be exploited against less capable adversaries.
Basing. Most air capabilities depend on regional bases for support. Consequently,
diplomacy and upstream engagement may be a key enabler for air operations in order
to secure the necessary access, basing and over-flight permissions. Deployed land-

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based air operations also bring a specialist force protection requirement that member
nations need to consider when assigning air assets to an operation or campaign.

In order to accomplish the assigned mission, the COMJTF develops a concept of operations
(CONOPS), provides commander’s intent for the assigned mission and then organizes
assigned forces based on the CONOPS. The CONOPS will be further developed into an
OPLAN.
COMJTF plans and executes specific missions in the Joint Operational Area (JOA),
supported by component commanders.
 Planners must consider the JOA as the area in which military effects are achieved. With
this definition, they must then analyse the provided JOA to assess the capabilities of the air
assets and the required air component mission in order to provide the COMJFAC with any
JOA amendment requirements.
ADC: COMJTF can delegate the responsibility for Air defence and, usually COMJFAC
is appointed as the Air Defence Commander (ADC).
 While building the Air Defence Plan, planners must consider all supporting
components.
ACA: Often designated as the Airspace Control Authority (ACA), the COMJFAC will
assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in his/her
assigned JOA.
 To support these responsibilities, planners must assign clear organisational airspace
guidelines within an Airspace Control Plan (ACP). Cf. Chap. 4 of this guide.
Unity of effort and command
Unity of effort: From the onset of operations, air forces can pursue strategic, operational
and/or tactical objectives, individually or simultaneously. It is therefore essential that a
degree of unity of effort is taken to allow air assets to be concentrated at the right time
and place to achieve desired results, maximising joint synergy. Unity of effort is of
increased importance during multinational operations and/or when forces are not part of
the same command structure.
Unity of command: Unity of the air effort is best achieved when assets are commanded
from the highest practical command level where the relative priority for air assets can be
best established and assessed whilst considering conflicting demands
 NATO air power delivery will, in most circumstances, be vested in a COMJFAC.
This is accomplished through one single ATO per day for all flying air assets. This ATO
effectively integrates effects in the JOA and is published by the COMJFAC.
Centralised control and decentralised execution
Centralised control places the responsibility and authority to plan, direct and coordinate
air capabilities with a single commander and his staff. It maximizes operational
effectiveness and avoids duplication of effort by allowing commanders to prioritize,
synchronize, integrate and deconflict actions of assigned or attached capabilities in time,
space and purpose to achieve assigned objectives as rapidly and as effectively as
possible.

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Decentralised execution is the delegation of execution authority to responsible and

capable subordinate commanders to make on-scene decisions that exploit opportunities
in complex, rapidly changing or fluid situations. It provides for maximum responsiveness
to cope with the uncertainty, disorder and fluidity of operations and makes it possible to
generate the tempo of operations.
 To implement these 2 concepts, planners must consider the need for appropriate C2
structure and relevant liaison elements to the JTF and other Ccs.

A crisis leads to a set of unacceptable conditions, which in turn triggers international

reactions (e.g. UN resolutions) setting the legal framework for international intervention, in
order to reach a mutually agreed end state.
The path from the initial unacceptable situation to the end state is represented by the
Operational Design: Lines of Operations (Operational Objectives) ; Campaign Phases ;
Decisive Conditions (Desired Effects or Tactical Objectives) ; Tactical Tasks
 Developing the Operational design is a key task during component estimate
Strategy-to-Task. In order to optimise finite resources, every air task must be linked to the
operational level and meet the aim of the overall strategy. The strategy must also be linked
through the operational level to what is actually realistic. Of prime importance is for the
operational level commander to understand clearly how his/her activities mesh with the other
strategic-level lines of operation. Selection and maintenance of the aim is therefore critical
to the generation of a coherent air plan.
 Defining measures of effectiveness (MOEs) is a task included in the planning process,
which supports our ability to conduct operations assessment throughout the campaign.

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 Supply
 Services
 Maintenance
 Medical support
 Petroleum Logisctics (POL)
 Infrastructure Engineering for Logistics (IEL)
 Movement and Transportation (M and T)

The JLSG is a deployed, executive, theatre-level logistic organisation focusing on greater

reliance on multinational solutions. JLSG should allow a corresponding reduction in the
requirements placed upon each National Support Element (NSE), so reducing their size and
the overall logistic footprint.
JLSG missions are:
 Conduct RSOM/RMSD operations in order to enable, sustain and maintain Alliance
freedom
 Planning, coordination and execution of operational-logistic support
 Coordinate HN/MILENG/MED/CONTRACTOR SUPPORT

Logistic activity has an important role in enabling the following phases of the campaign:
deployment, sustainment and redeployment.
It is necessary to analyse the situation, especially: the political, economic, social and military
aspects; the geography of the theatre; the support requirements and the potential options.
Planners will need to determine generally the overall logistic support requirements for an
operation in order to prepare a coherent plan. They will determine the JOA level support and
sustainability requirements. The Operational Planning Process is determined with the
following considerations.
Movement planning
Development of movement plans will be an iterative process in order to arrange the arrival
of forces into the area in accordance with the NATO Commander’s priorities.
Medical planning
The plan must provide medical capabilities throughout the force structure, which must
balance the size of the deployed force and the assessed risk. Planning must ensure that the
standard of medical care is maintained as closely as possible to peacetime medical
standards, taking into account the operational environment.
Host Nation Support (HNS) planning

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Coordination of HNS planning and execution is essential for operational effectiveness,

efficiency and the avoidance of competition for resources. HNS facilitates the introduction of
forces into an area of operations by providing essential RSOM support. HNS may also
reduce the amount of logistic forces and material. The NATO Commander’s logistic staffs
are responsible for the development of HNS arrangements.
Infrastructure planning
Infrastructure planning evaluates operational and logistic requirements against existing
infrastructure. Shortfall to the requirements may be met by organisational re-arrangements,
HNS, contractors and/or engineer support. It includes security issues such as ammunition
storage.
Contracting and funding
The logistics staff will need to work closely with the financial staff to arrange contracts for
required services not provided by military means.Contributions of Non-NATO Nations (NNN)
Contributions of NNN
NNN should be brought into the force generation process at the earliest possible stage and,
where appropriate, their logistic capabilities should be identified within the force planning
process.
Concluding the operation
Planning for the conclusion and long-term consequences of the operation must be
considered from the onset. Re-deployment may involve environmental issues, real estate
management, repackaging of ammunition stocks and equipment, and the accounting for and
disposal of NATO-owned equipment.
NOTES
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Military power is applied to implement international legal framework to solve a crisis when
politicians had not succeeded in solving the problem.
According to the situation United Nations (UN) Charter provides military organisations with
instruments to settle disputes or to counter act against acts of aggression or breaches to
peace.
Military actors must comply with international laws of armed conflict, as well as local laws
and mandates. This should be reflected in Rules of Engagement (ROE).

United Nations charters

UN Chapter VI : « Pacific settlement of disputes » :  non-coercive action.
UN Chapter VII: « Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace,
and acts of aggression »  Non-military and military coercive measures;
UN Chapter VIII: « Regional arrangements »  non-coercive or coercive actions.
UNSCR
When analysing UNSCRs, planners must understand what to pay attention at:
 Preamble: Context, Object and purpose of the resolution, what basis? Threat to peace
: "Breach of peace and security"?
 Operative paragraphs: Contain a Security Council opinion or requested action;
Actions/decisions: "use of all necessary means" ;
 Peacekeeping mandates  impacts on ROEs. Consent of the host Party?
ROE
 A Set of ROEs should be provided by higher HQs. Planners must challenge them to have
the legal framework in accordance with Air mission types to deal with the mission
requirements. ROEs are the result of political, legal and military inputs.
ROE and other legal issues are normally developed as part of an OPLAN’s Annex E and
should result in a suitable ROE profile being available prior to the beginning of operations.
ROE provide boundaries for Commanders concerning the use of force (the circumstances,
degree and manner in which force, or actions which might be provocative may or may not,
be applied). A ROE profile may contain the following information:
 Definition of the Joint Operations Area (JOA),
 Reserves (CAVEATS): To ensure compliance with their own national laws/ policies,
each nations may issue reservations regarding the coalition approved ROE profile.
 ROE specified authority delegations.
COMJFAC may ask for a ROE modification through ROE Request (ROEREQ):
 ROE request (ROEREQ)
 For authority delegations;
 Dormant ROE activation.
MCC 362.1 is the reference material for the development of ROEs.

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In many operations, wide-ranging interagency and nongovernmental organisation (NGO)

operations may be involved and challenge unity of command.
A coordinated and integrated Air control system is essential to the conduct of successful
operations because any airspace user’s action may affect other users.
An Airspace Control Authority (ACA) establishes this air control system, supports JFC
objectives and facilitates unity of effort.
In accordance with NATO doctrine, having one Commander with the responsibility and
authority to coordinate and integrate air defence and airspace control greatly enhances the
ability to achieve a favourable air situation. The planned and coordinated use of airspace
increases the flexibility of defending forces and helps to prevent inadvertent attacks on
friendly forces or third parties, such as civilian air traffic. Coordinated air defence and
airspace control also enables the execution of offensive attacks against an enemy. Those
elements are integrated in a single Airspace Control Plan (ACP), delivered by the ACA.
Once COMJFAC is delegated authority as ACA, air planners must immediately consider the
safest and most efficient means to manage the airspace considering its integration and
coordination with other components and civilian entities within the JOA.
Through the Airspace Control Plan, the COMJFAC is responsible for providing an air
environment, which supports the achievement of the Joint campaign.

Airspace Control Authority (ACA): The Commander responsible for the coordination,
integration, regulation, use of the JOA airspace, and for the aid in identifying all airspace
users. ACA is a JFC responsibility usually delegated to the COMJFAC.
Country’s sovereign airspace: according to article 1 of the Chicago Convention, each
nation has authority of its national airspace: “The contracting States recognise that every
State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory”.
For the purposes of Chicago Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be
the land areas and territorial waters (12 nautical miles (NM) out from a nation’s coastline).
 ACA can’t supersede Nations’ rights and has no legal authority on Nations’ airspace.
Only the United Nations Security Council can supersede the Nations’ rights on their airspace
by issuing a resolution (UNSCR) for the creation of a No Fly Zone.
 UNSC usually creates a NFZ only to protect populations when they are threatened by air
forces.
Conflict Zone Information Repository: ICAO centralised repository meant to enhance
the existing global framework whereby each State is responsible for assessing risks to
civil aviation in their airspace, and for making that information promptly available to other
States and airlines.

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Conflict Zone Information Bulletin (CZIB): The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA) is setting up an alerting system on risks to civil aviation flights over conflict zones,
published on this bulletin.

What is the issue?

ACA must shape the airspace in support of the joint campaign in order to minimise the risks
(fratricide or collateral damage) and ensure freedom of movement of friendly/neutral
airspace users.
 This is done through the definition of a coordinated airspace in the JOA, with civilian
aviation authorities (national and international) and with other component Commanders.
Actors to engage
Two different situations exist:
Response to the request of a Nation. In this favourable situation, it is the responsibility
of the ACA to engage the Nation’s aviation authorities to enter into an agreement in order
to manage the airspace (responsibilities, organisation of the airspace) during the
operations.
Conduct of operations over a non-collaborative state. The ACA has not legal
authority over the airspace. The only avenue provided is to issue recommendations
concerning the flight safety risks inherent to military operations in an attempt to avoid the
presence of civilian flights.
 Stakeholders should act via ICAO repositories, whom issue warnings on their website,
(https://www.icao.int/czir/Pages/default.aspx) or via regional agencies such as EASA
(European Aviation Safety Agency) which provide:
- a CZIB (https://ad.easa.europa.eu/czib-docs/page-1
a map of conflict zones (https://www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/international-
cooperation/easa-by-country/conflict-zones).

 When issuing the Airspace Control Plan, planners should consider at least these topics:
 Airspace Control System area
 Transition Peace-Crisis-Peace
 C2 architecture (Cf. Chap. 15 for C2 requirements)
 Duties/responsibilities
 Means (radar, Communications, data links)
 Airspace control methods
 Integration of civil-military activities
 Integration of Air Defence (Cf. Chap. 5)
 Joint Fire
 Planning the airspace (ACO-ACM)
 Emergency (aircraft failure)
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 Operations in a degraded environment (radar failure, radio jamming).

A notional ACP is provided in AJP 3.3.5 Annex A.
NOTES
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COMJTF can delegate the responsibility of air defence design (the Air Defence Commander
(ADC)) to the commander, which has the preponderance of AD assets and C4I. It is usually
the COMJFAC. The OPP, specifically during estimates, is the period of time to challenge
such a design and identify limitations, risks, and opportunities to propose an Air Defence
Plan (ADP), which supports the Joint campaign.
COMJFAC should commit the AOPG staff to develop this plan during JFAC estimate work
supporting ADC responsibilities. Any level is to provide a Critical Assets List (CAL), which
becomes the JPCAL when validated by COMJTF. Once validated by higher levels (SACEUR
and political level), the JPDAL is approved by COMJTF.

(JP)CAL: (Joint Prioritised) Critical Assets List. A prioritised list of assets or areas
normally identified by phases and released by COMJTF after SACEUR approval. This
list should be defended against air and missile threats. Joint Forces assets (e.g.: APODs,
SPODs, DOBs, FOBs, HVAAs, HQs, etc.); HN and coalition assets; geopolitical assets;
highly populated areas; etc.
(JP)DAL (Joint Prioritised) Defended Assets List: The list of those assets from the
(JP)CAL that receive theatre level protection.
ADP (Air Defence Plan): The Air Defence Commander (ADC) plans for a comprehensive
theatre Integrated Air and Missile Defence, which is approved by COMJTF. That plan
integrates the entire components AD sensors and weapon systems, active air defence
design as well as passive defensive measures and C2 system enabling efficient defence.
It should include Orders of Battle, Air and Missile Defence CONOPS, CAL and DAL.

 Performed in the JFAC Combat Plan division.

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To cope with General Air Traffic (GAT) and position/capacity of assets, region control sectors
are defined with associated responsibilities and ROEs.
Location of sensors, C2 platforms, SAMs and MEZs, CAPs, QRAs and FEZs are fixed at the
joint level based on: threat nature and location, CAL/DAL, force availability, C2 organisation
and management, civilian radars, ground/sea based or airborne TAC C2 and data link
availability.

1 Components and Nation at risk provide their Critical Assets List

2 Prioritisation set up at the Joint Defended Assets Working Group (JDAWG)
3 COMJTF release the JPCAL
4 JFAC develop the defence design and draft the JPDAL based on JPCAL and available
defence resources
5 COMJTF validate the JPDAL
 Then SACEUR and the NAC endorse a part of JPDAL.

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The NCMP is the process, described in the NCRSM (NATO Crisis Management System
Manual), by which the Alliance addresses and, subject to decisions by the NAC, aims to
manage and resolve a crisis. NCMP ensures that the Alliance is prepared to perform the
whole range of possible Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions.

Planning activities and processes are integrated and coordinated to support decision-making
and the production of plans, orders and directives for Allied joint operations in any type of
environment.
Military Operations Planning addresses both advanced planning and Crisis Response
Operations (CRO) planning. The process for Military Operations Planning, known as the
Operations Planning Process (OPP), is articulated in the in the Comprehensive
Operational Planning Directive (COPD).
NATO’s operations planning should conform to the principles of coherence, comprehensive
understanding of the environment, efficient use of resources, flexibility and adaptability
(adjusting to evolving political guidance, civil and military advice), and credibility.

Crisis response operations planning are conducted in response to an actual or developing

crisis (Article 5 and Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO) and calls for the
development of an OPLAN. The NATO Crisis Management Process (

The Operations Planning Process (OPP)

When well synchronised with the NCMP, the OPP provides for the timely and efficient
development of OPLANs in response to an actual or developing crisis.
OPP enables the different levels of command to use the same process for a collaborative
approach to planning. OPP is oriented towards a NATO end state and strategic objectives,
established by NATO’s political and military authorities and carried out within the political
limitations and resource constraints set by these authorities.
Changing conditions to an acceptable state will require the creation of required effects to
achieve planned objectives and contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state. This
central idea of planning determines the combination and sequence of actions in time and
space using available resources with the greatest potential to create the required effects.
Keys to success:
 Information sharing between all levels
 Any promulgated document of a higher level integrates lower level advice
 Almost parallel working process
OPP from Crisis to the Transition phase
The NCMP is made of 6 linked phases to enable a relevant series of planning activities: Initial
situation awareness, appreciation of the situation, Military Response Options (MROs) and
estimates, plan development, execution, and transition.
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An estimate is a command-led military problem solving process which is applied to ill-

structured systems in uncertain and dynamic environments against shifting, competing or ill-
defined goals, often in high-stake, time critical situations. The component estimate is
conducted in parallel with the operational estimate (joint level). It combines an objective
analysis with the power of intuition (a combination of experience, intelligence, creativity and
innovation), and its output is SUPPLAN based upon the selection of a Course of Action by
the COMJFAC.

NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP)

Process by which the Alliance addresses and, subject to decisions by the NAC, aims to
manage and resolve a crisis.
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)
COPD addresses all aspects of an OPLAN and provides guidance on the conduct and
methods of planning as well as the factors to be taken into consideration during the
development of a plan.
COPD articulates, in separate chapters, the operations planning process (OPP) for the
NATO Strategic and Operational levels, in support of the NCMP, in a collaborative approach.
COPD Chapter 4 corresponds to the Operational estimate, which is made collaboratively
with the component estimate.
COPD can be adapted to any specific environment to expedite the planning process or focus
it on specific issues.
Functional Planning Guides (FPG)
FPG provide planning guidance in specific functional areas: maritime, air, space,
cyberspace, land, intelligence, ROE, logistics, CIS support. This JFAC estimate FPG is one
of these guides.
 This JFAC estimate Functional Planning Guide (JFAC-e FPG) provides air planners with
a practical tool to contribute efficiently to the overall joint air plan development.

Political Level:
North Atlantic Council (NAC): the principal political decision-making body of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), consisting of Permanent Representatives from its
member countries. NAC provides political strategic guidance
Military Committee (MC): advises the NAC on military policy and strategy
Military level
Allied Command Operations (ACO) is responsible for the planning and execution of all
operations. It consists of permanently established headquarters, each with a specific role.

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7.6.2.1. Strategic level.

This level translates political guidance into military strategic direction for the operational
commander and establishes the conditions necessary to plan and execute the mission.
SACEUR: The Supreme Allied Commander Europe assumes the overall command of
operations at the strategic level and exercises his responsibilities from SHAPE.
SHAPE: The Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, at Mons, Belgium.
COP: The Crisis and Operations Panel facilitates the provision of SACEUR direction and
guidance to the SHAPE staff, for an effective management of the military aspects of the
crisis.
CCOMC: The Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre is the focal
point for crisis and operations management at SHAPE.
RDG: The Response Direction Group is a cross-functional staff organisation activated in
SHAPE for all aspects of crisis response planning deliverables.
7.6.2.2. Operational Level
COMJTF activates a JOPG to transform strategic direction into a scheduled series of
integrated military actions. JOPG will be staffed by personnel from NCS JFC and single
services command (NCS Land, Maritime and Air Command) to constitute the JHQ, and will
be named JTF when activated. The COMJTF and the JOPG constitute the key elements of
the operational estimate.
7.6.2.3. Component levels
COMJFAC, AOPG, COMMCC, COMLCC, COMSOCC, and Operations Planning groups.

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 The following materials and guidance are issued in sequence during the OPP.
Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE)
The CPOE is a process enabling the development of an initial understanding and monitoring
of a crisis. It is crisis-specific and a cross-headquarters process, led by the
intelligence/knowledge staff. The goal is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the
operational environment covering land, air/space, maritime dimensions, as well as the
PMESII systems of main adversaries, friends and neutral actors that may influence joint
operations, including associated potential threats and risks, in support of the planning and
conduct of an operation.
SACEUR Strategic Assessment (SSA)
With its assessment, SACEUR provides relevant military advice for the particular crisis/issue
to the Military Committee (MC). SSA provides the NAC with:
A basic understanding of the nature of the crisis, including its key PMESII aspects.
An appreciation of the implications for NATO, including strategic risks and threats.
An appreciation of potential strategic ends, ways and means.
Military considerations relevant to the situation.
NAC Initiating Directive (NID)
Once an MRO is selected among the ones proposed by SACEUR, the NAC will promulgate
a NID with the NATO mission statement.
Strategic Planning Directive (SPD)
JAPCC FPG: The Strategic Planning Directive (SPD), based on SACEUR’s intent,
provides essential direction and guidance to JFC, and other supporting commands, to guide
the development of the estimates at the joint and component levels.
COMJFAC initial Direction and Guidance
Initial Commander’s direction and guidance allow the AOPG to commence mission analysis.
Commander’s guidance should include planning milestones, including specifically when the
Commander will be available for the Mission Analysis Brief (MAB). An overview of COMJFAC
initial D&G for planning can be found at the end of this FPG (See checklists).

Operational Planning Guidance (OPG)

An OPG is issued to formally trigger the Mission Analysis at the component level. With
appropriate staff preparation, COMJTF will issue an OPG to capture the output from the Joint
MAB (incl. initial operational design.
 Air planners should wait for the OPG release before presenting the MAB to COMJFAC.
COMJFAC post MAB guidance
Following the presentation of the MAB, the COMJFAC should provide the AOPG with
direction and guidance for the development of the courses of action. See Chapter
“Component estimate Part 1”.

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Operational Planning Directive (OPD)

An Operational Planning Directive (OPD) is released to formally trigger COA development
at the component level. With appropriate staff preparation, the Commander will issue an
OPD to formally promulgate the output of the COA decision briefing including the refined
COA, Commander’s intent, final operational design, and CC missions. The JOPG should
anticipate the Commander’s requirement and begin to draft an OPD in parallel with
preparations for the COA decision briefing, facilitating its rapid release following approval by
the Commander of the refined COA and operational design.
COMJFAC Post COA DB guidance
Following the presentation of the COA DB, the COMJFAC should provide the AOPG with
direction and guidance for CONOPS development with the selected, and potentially
amended, course of action.
See chapter “COMJFAC direction and guidance” of this guide.
Supplementary Plan (SUPPLAN) or OPLAN air
A SUPPLAN is a supporting plan of the OPLAN developed by a component. It enables the
component commander to outline the relevant activities of its component.
Air Operations Directive (AOD)
This is the COMJFAC directive for tactical units, C2 elements and JFAC HQ for a period of
time, during the execution of an Air operation. It includes the Commander’s intent, joint air
apportionment, air PTL, and specific direction and guidance for a focused period of time.

An AOPG is a temporary group of planners activated by the COMJFAC and set up at a

certain stage of the planning process, in order to support the COMJFAC in the decision-
making process. Using the OPP specified in the NATO Directive (COPD), the AOPG
analyses both the environment and the mission to provide the Commander with a series of
appropriate courses of action for selection. An AOPG is a practical and flexible team; put
into action to deliver a coherent plan having been attributed a complex situation.
Usual NATO prerequisites
The AOPG’s work starts in phase 3 of the OPP (JFAC Estimate), in parallel with the JOPG
(operational estimate). At this stage, political issues have been identified and some
resolutions may be released by the United Nation to express disagreement/condemnation.
When politicians have failed with diplomatic solutions to resolve a crisis, they turn to the use
of military force. In a scenario where NATO is asked to offer forces to intervene and when
agreed upon, the NAC decides that NATO will conduct said operation.
During the first 2 phases of the OPP, the CPOE process is ongoing. the force-contribution-
process has started with the IRF and NRF involvement; the Joint Task Force Commander
(COMJTF) has issued his/her initial advice and the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG)
has started its works and drafted the COMJTF’s initial direction and guidance into a general
scheme of manoeuvre of the operation, called the Operational Planning Guidance (OPG).
 In terms of initial documentation, the AOPG ideally requires: the SSA, SPD, CPOE, a
draft OPG and COMJFAC initial guidance.

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AOPG activities and COMJFAC interaction

The AOPG director is responsible for informing the Commander potential conflicting themes
to his/her vision or raise any other important issues that may impact the working process or
require clarification from higher levels.
 It is a bilateral work between the AOPG and the COMJFAC,
The AOPG must address critical issues with the commander ‘s vision,
COMJFAC must select a COA, based upon experience and AOPG recommendations.
The COMJFAC should be involved at any time in the process to be informed on key issues
and to be able to provide relevant advice to COMJTF for Air force employment. During the
process, COMJFAC should be made aware of any risk of not being able to adequately
resource an operation prior to SUPPLAN approval.
AOPG composition
 The composition of the AOPG depends on the requirements in terms of the operation
planning and is to be approved by the COMJFAC
 Normally the core of the AOPG consists of members from a standing JFAC augmented
with specialists and liaison officers from other forces.
Other than the AOPG director and AOPG coordinators, which manage the group through the
process, an AOPG is comprised of:
Planners (Core JFAC) to lead JFAC estimate and assessment development;
Functional SMEs (depending on the mission requirements): AEW, ISR, AAR, PR,
IAMD (AD, SBAD), Bombers, Targeters, ICC DBM, Airlift, Log planners and Movers,
Intelligence pers., Information operations, TDL, Space, Airspace controllers, CIS
specialists, FP, CBRN, Cyber…
Advisors (LEGAD, POLAD, MEDAD) and Liaison Elements (other CCs).
7.9.3.1. AOPG Director and coordinator(s)
The AOPG director leads the group and is the point of contact for the COMJFAC. They are
to seek COMJFAC guidance when required and provide the commander with any relevant
issues to be raised up to the COMJTF.
The AOPG coordinator(s) role is to manage the group, the battle rhythm of the planning
activities and the component estimate as it relates to the operational estimate.
AOPG outputs
The AOPG provides the commander with a comprehensive mission analysis, recommended
and compared courses of action. This materialises in the form of two main briefings to the
COMJFAC during which the AOPG must provide the commander an understanding of the
problem in the joint environment and propose the best option possible to conduct the
operation.
It is absolutely vital that the Commander is provided all relevant information needed to make
the best decisions. After the COMJFAC decides on a course of action (CoA), the AOPG will
develop a CONOPS back brief, synthesising CoAs for COMJTF.

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 All the steps described are collaboratively realised with the JOPG and other CCs OPG.

Mission analysis is the first step of the estimate in which the AOPG is involved in order to
support the COMJFAC in the decision-making process. If the mission analysis is to assist
the COMJFAC in determining what must be done for mission success, the AOPG must:
Determine precisely the operational problem that must be solved;
Appreciate the specific operational conditions that must be established.
Identify the key factors that will influence the achievement of those conditions,
Identify the critical operational requirements;
Identify limitations to the Commander’s freedom of action and the inherent risks.
 Analysing the crisis situation in depth is key to enabling the commander in his
understanding of the circumstances. This analysis step of the JFAC estimate is critical and
the AOPG director should consider spending a considerable amount of time on this reflection
work

To begin with this step, planners should be provided with the SSA, NID and SACEUR SPD
to the JTF and Components commanders. The OPG, issued at the joint level is the key
reference in support of the JFAC estimate. As it is usually provided later in the process,
planners should liaise with the JOPG to receive draft guidance before OPG release.
 To commence mission analysis, COMJFAC should provide the initial direction and
guidance. See chap. “COMJFAC initial guidance” in this guide to have an overview of them.

Based on the SPD and OPG (when issued) the AOPG director must direct Air planners to:
Initially focus on higher guidance in order to identify planning requirements and
milestones required to manage planning efforts.
Identify key issues for Commander consideration.
 The AOPG director must manage the AOPG in its planning efforts, particularly to evaluate
time constraints based on earliest possible deployment.
In addition, the AOPG must:
Prepare and contribute to the deployment of the OLRT.
Direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors.
Develop requirements for the pre-deployment of enabling and initial entry forces.
Highlight any issues for immediate clarification.

During mission analysis, planers should provide the COMJFAC with an overview of:
Factors analysis and Centres of Gravity (CoGs);
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Limitations and Assumptions;

Critical Operational Requirements (COR) and Risk analysis;
Initial Operational framework and Initial force, capability and C2 requirements;
Statement of Requirement (SOR)

MAB objectives
The main objectives of the MAB presentation to the COMJFAC are the approvals of previous
work. The aim is also to receive commanders’ planning guidance for the development of
courses of action
The COMJFAC may provide direction to the AOPG due to the urgency of the situation.
 See chap. “COMJFAC direction and guidance” of this guide for more details.

This planning stage should end with the Mission Analysis Brief (MAB), which should
synthetize the brainstorming of the AOPG.
 Building the MAB should be a continuous objective of the AOPG director.
As the key advisor for the COMJTF and because they may attend VTCs during planning
activities, the COMJFAC should be provided with any daily updates to MAB slides before the
final presentation.
 For a typical MAB, see Chap. « MAB template » of this Functional Planning Guide.

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The factors analysis portion constitutes the first step of the mission analysis and should
provide the basis for further development.
The AOPG must analyse CPOE, SSA, SPD and OPG in order to:
- Identify the relevant facts related to the strategic context and the operational
environment,
- Make deductions about mission implications,
- Draw conclusions related to the mission requirements that must be addressed in
planning and/or in further analysis,
- Review the framing of the problem.
 All the actors/groups of actors and the environment are analysed to determine the key
factors to be presented to the COMJFAC during the MAB.

With a broad understanding of the operational environment provided by the CPOE briefing,
the AOPG must examine specific aspects, facts or conditions and the capabilities, goals and
relationships between actors to determine possible impacts to air operations success. The
AOPG must also consider the effects of the operational environment.
Facts
There is generally a significant amount of information that will be known to be true and that
may have tactical implication.
 Planners should assess the relevance of these facts to the air component.
Deductions
The implications, issues and/or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have tactical
significance should lead to a set of logical conclusions. It may be necessary to continually
review some deductions throughout the process as things may evolve unexpectedly.
 Deductions must be concise, relevant and expressed as building blocks of information.
Conclusions
Conclusions are drawn from deductions and represent the outcome or undesired result that
requires action in planning or further analysis.
Conclusions must be relevant and useful in determining military requirements and specific
operational conditions that must be established with respect to forces/actors, time and
space.
 Conclusions should be air component focused.
Domains of assessment
For each main actor or group of actors the AOPG must analyse the operational environment
factors from the CPOE, understand the opportunities, threats, operational limitations and
other considerations that affect the execution of Air Operations, and consider the impact of

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time, space, forces and all other aspects on air operations. The syndicate in charge of Allied
forces is also responsible for the provisional JFAC mission statement. If it has been provided
by Higher HQ or the COMJFAC, the syndicate assesses the impact of Time, Space, Forces
and Others aspects on the JFAC mission. In the case the provisional JFAC mission
statement has not been provided, the syndicate will gather all factors that could influence the
JFAC mission statement to write a provisional mission statement for the Commander’s
review in the Mission Analysis Brief.
9.2.4.1. Impact of time
Time is to be considered as it impacts the development of courses of action.
 Speed is a critical characteristic to air activities that planners should consider.
9.2.4.2. Impact of space
 The following considerations should be explored when elaborating on the space domain:
spatial, geographical, meteorological, airspace (vertical and horizontal boundaries), impact
to joint air operations, resources, basing, etc…
9.2.4.3. Impact of forces
If initial forces are provided for planning, it is critical to assess them as well as the Order of
Battle (ORBAT) of others involved.
 When information or intelligence is missing, it is critical to develop RFIs (Requests for
Information) of friendly forces or PIR (Priority Intelligence requirements) of the enemy.
The impact of forces can be assessed using a question matrix.
9.2.4.4. Impact of other domains
Other domains are included under PMESII (Political, Military, Environment, Social,
Infrastructure, and Information). It is critical to analyse an actor from that angle with a lens
towards its impact to the air operation as well as course of action development.

Key factors and conclusions

The main outcome of the factors analysis will require actions or planning guidance for further
development. The matrix from the COPD is an example of how to gather the information via
an excel matrix. This tool will enable efficient sorting for further mission analysis
requirements.
Conclusions should be relevant and useful in determining military requirements and specific
operational conditions that must be established at the air component level.

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Fig 8.1 – Factors analysis matrix

 Conclusions should be categorised to facilitate their future use during planning and course
of action development. See following paragraph for the list of categories.
From this tool, the AOPG will identify key factors to be highlighted to the COMJFAC.
 This selection is based upon COMJFAC initial guidance, planners experience and when
the drawn conclusions lead to major risks or critical requirements (Forces, C2, Log.,
Protection, Branch Plan…)
 Only those key factors will be mentioned in the MAB.
 It is critical to review the syndicates’ work before going on the next step. As each syndicate
focuses its brainstorming on a domain (time, space, forces, other) or an actor, this review is
also an opportunity for everyone to have a comprehensive understanding of the overall
factors analysis outcome.
Categorising conclusions
 Key issue as conclusions are the basis for further planning activities
The conclusions can be tagged according to the following categories:
AS - Assumption: Information based on an educated guess that is made in order to
continue planning, where gaps in knowledge and information may be revealed.
 Never make assumptions about the enemy. Example: Actor Z will remain neutral.
BP - Branch Plan: A plan for an alternative direction required under specific conditions.
Example: Counter offensive before D+20
CC - Critical Capabilities: Primary ability to gain and maintain dominant influence over
an opponent or a situation. Examples: Detect Actor Y air assets; Provide RAP.
CCIR - Commander’s Critical Information Requirements: A critical operational
requirement for the commander to make timely decision. CCIR are made of PIR and
FFIR. Example: SCUD attack on country X; loss of a JFAC capability.
CR - Critical Requirements: specific conditions, components or resources which are
essential to sustain a critical capability. Example: AEW; RDRs
CV - Critical Vulnerability: weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system
elements and essential conditions, characteristics or capabilities.
Example: Lack of AEW, RDRs detection hampered by mountains

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DC - Decisive Condition: specific sustainable conditions deemed critical to gaining or

retaining freedom of action or achieving an objective.
Example: NATO Force defensive capability IOC.
DP - Decision Point: In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute
to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed.
Example: Actor X attacks actor Y before D+20
LC - Limitation-constraint: A requirement placed on a commander that dictates
Ex.: Use YY base as pre-deployment base.
LR - Limitation Restraint: A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits action
Example: No cross border before D+20
PG - Planning Guidance: Any guidance to planners for COA development or to be
considered for the plan development.
Examples: Include SCUD in TST matrix; prioritise the deployment of SBAD
PIR - Priority Intelligence Requirement: Gap in the intelligence on the enemy activity
or ORBAT. PIR is a category of CCIR. Identifying a PIR should conduct to questions to
the higher level. - Example: SCUD location or SCUD attack.
RFI - Request For Information: A request to fill an information gap.
Example: Where are located IDP (Internal Displaced Pers.) camps in actor Y?
RISK - Risk: possibility and consequences of failing to achieve an action. Consider risk
to the mission and risk to the force. – Ex.: SCUD launch against JFAC DOBs/APOD
SOR - Statement of Requirement: An operational requirement that will be submitted to
higher level. - Ex.: 7 AEW a/c; 4 SBAD battalions.
SPT - Support and Resources requirements: military requirements, sustainment and
Joint support required to accomplish the mission. Those requirements include: logistics,
medical, POL, HNS, human resources aspects. Ex.: HNS for POL on DOBs
T - Task: An action for air units. - Example: Deploy GBAD in Country XX

See the checklist at the end of this guide.

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Ex1. Factors analysis of the JFAC mission through time, space and force domains.

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Example 2. Enemy factors analysis / Force domain.

FACTORS DEDUCTIONS TYPE CONCLUSION

T 1.1.1 Deploy TBMD asset for cities protection

CC 1.1.2 Ability to protect Actor X cities

CR 1.2.2. TBMD assets

1.1. Actor Y may SOR 1.1.4 need for XX TBMD assets

use it against cities PG 1.1.5 include actor X main cities into JPCAL
of Friendly actor X.
PG 1.1.6 include SCUD B in TST matrix

1.1.7 Cities of Actor X has suffered a SCUD

Risk
attack
1. Enemy actor Y is
equipped with CCIR 1.1.8 localisation of / use of SCUD
SCUD B
T 1.2.1 Deploy TBMD to protect APOD/DOBs

CR 1.2.2. TBMD assets

CC 1.2.3 Ability to protect APOD/DOBs

1.2. JFAC location
may be under the CV 1.2.4 small Nbr of TBMD assets
threat depending on
SOR 1.2.5. XX TBMD assets
their location in
Country X PG 1.2.6 include APOD/DOBs in JPCAL

PG 1.2.7 include SCUD B in TST matrix

1.2.8 prioritise deployment outside SCUD

PG
range

1.2.9 DOBs are under the threat of SCUD

RISK
attack

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Those materials are required: CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued,
OPG.

 1- Split the AOPG into syndicates, each focusing on one actor (or group of actors)
 2- Split your syndicate into sub-syndicates focusing on Time, Space, Forces, Others
aspects.
NB: The syndicate in charge of Allied forces assesses the impact of Time, Space,
Forces and Others aspects on the JFAC mission if it has been provided or gathers all
factors that could influence the JFAC mission statement to write a provisional mission
statement for the Commander’s review in the Mission Analysis Brief
 3- Review the materials (SSA, SPD, CPOE, OPG) and identify the facts. Use the
following questions to identify potential factors to analyse.
 3.1 - Impact of time
 What are the time imperatives for the deployment and employment of forces?
 What are the likely consequences of current trends in the crisis compared to NATO’s
capability to project forces into the area?
 What are the operational risks and opportunities if time imperatives cannot be
achieved?
 Is there a point in time when a specific condition will be decisive for the success or
failure of the operation?
 3.2 - Impact of space
 Are the lines of communication into and within the theatre adequate, secure and
sustainable?
 Can key terrain and vital areas be effectively secured and what are the risks if they
cannot be?
 Are our required operating areas within the operational reach of enemy forces?
 What are the implications of deploying forces to required operating areas in terms of
speed, mobility, vulnerability, supportability and control?
 Are there critical areas where conditions will decide on the success/failure of the
operations?
 3.3 - Impact of forces
 Are the force capabilities and capacities ready to meet mission requirements?
 Can the required force capabilities be projected and prepared for employment to
required operating areas within the required time scale?
 Can the required force capabilities be sustained in required operating areas?
 What are the risks to the force and the mission?

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 3.4 - Impact of other domains

Political
 What interests of the adversary are at stake in the conflict?
 Which nations are allied with or supporting the adversary? What degree of support?
 Are any resolutions pending?
Economic
 What are the economic interests of the adversary in this conflict?
 What are the economic interests of nations supporting the adversary?
Military
 What are the military capabilities of the host nation? Have they trained with NATO
forces?
 What are the AD capabilities of the host nation?
 What are the air base defence capabilities of the host nation?
 What are the potential threats to our forces in each of the bed down countries?
Social
 How supportive are the people of the adversary country of using force to achieve their
interest?
Infrastructure
 Are there any hangars/hardened a/c shelters that might be made available for NATO
force?
 Does the host nation have a robust or limited communications infrastructure?
 From what location the COMJTF will direct the NATO operation?
Information
 Is the StratCom policy sufficiently robust for the mission?
 Are global and local communication links sufficient to support the information strategy?
 4- Make deductions (at least one, several may be possible) relevant to the JFAC

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 5- Draw conclusions and categorise them in the Excel matrix.

For each deduction try to provide answers to the following questions:
 5.1- What can we do regarding this fact?  (T) Task
 5.2- What Critical Capability do we want to implement?  (CC)
 5.3- Which critical assets do we need to sustain a critical capability?  (CR)
 5.4- Do we have sufficient number of assets or are they well protected?
 (CV) vulnerability + Assets required  (SOR) Statement of requirement
 5.5- Do we require specific support for these assets (medical, logistics, maintenance,
POL, HNS,etc.?  (SPT) Support and Resources requirements
 5.6- Do we need to add Planning Guidance for the AOPG?  PG
 5.7- Is the JFAC or the protected country under a threat? Do our actions potentially
have undesired effects? Is a JFAC capability subject to loss?  Risk
 5.8- Is that risk critical so that when happening, one is to alert ASAP the COMJFAC?
 (CCIR) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements
 5.9- Is the COMJFAC to decide something regarding this CCIR?  (DP) / (BP)
 5.10- Is there any limitations posed on the JFAC/COMJFAC freedom of action
regarding the fact or deduction?  (LC) / (LR)
 5.11- Do we have a gap in the information / intelligence?  (RFI) or (PIR)
 5.12- Can we make a reasonable Assumption to fulfil this gap of information (NB: no
assumption on enemy)?  (AS)
 6- Select the KEY FACTORS only the one that are critical to be presented to
COMJFAC;
 7- Do a rehearsal presentation of these key factors with their conclusions to check for
their relevance to the MAB and to share a comprehensive understanding of the different
actors within the AOPG.
 8- Create the key factors slide(s) for the MAB;

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CoG and Operational planning process

The essence of operational art is described as follows:
Identify the enemy’s centre of gravity and neutralise it.  Get it right  you win
Identify your own centre of gravity and protect it.  Get it wrong  you lose
 Identifying the COG is the most important task for planners and should not be determined
haphazardly.
Faulty analysis of a friendly or enemy CoG may have very serious consequences:
 Inability to accomplish military objectives at an acceptable cost,
 Unacceptable expenditure of lives, time and/or materiel that do not produce decisive
strategic or operational results.

All energy can and should be directed against the CoGs.

The neutralisation of the enemy’s CoG leads to the realisation of the objective and is a
prerequisite for negotiations on favourable terms. A COG is directly derived from the aim or
desired outcome of the actor, therefore:
An actor’s COG may change during an operation if their objectives or available source
of power change.
Different COGs can be considered in different operational phases,
COGs exist at different levels of operations.

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COPD dictates that planners must consider limiting to:

- one actor’s Strategic COG for the operation
- one actor’s Operational level COG per phase.
CoG and Component estimate
CCs supports the JTF HQ during planning. The development of CoGs at the component
level are limited to own forces. For other actor’s CoG, the component will analyse the CoG
developed by the JOPG to determine how to influence the Critical Vulnerabilities with air
assets or processes.
 For the JFAC, the CoG should be a Critical Requirement of the joint level CoG.
At the component level, planning staff should analyse the operational level CoGs to assess
their vulnerabilities to opposing force attack in order to provide elements for their protection
(own vulnerabilities) or focus on them for attack (enemy vulnerabilities).
 It is nevertheless critical to understand how to develop a CoG, to be able to assess the
one developed by higher level of command, and propose amendments.

Centres of Gravity (COG): Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation,

an alliance, a military force or other groups derive its freedom of action, physical strength
or will to fight (AAP 6).
 Source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to
act. In order to have a complete Operational Design you must analyse adversary and
friendly COGs (USAF JOPPA).
 Proposed simple definition: “A system source of power to act towards one’s aim”
Critical Capability (CC): Crucial enabler that allows a COG to remain a COG. Critical
Capabilities are essential to accomplishment of objectives or assumed objectives.
Critical Requirement (CR): Conditions, resources and/or means that enable full
operability of a CC.

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Critical Vulnerability (CV): The aspects or components of a CR that are deficient or

vulnerable to direct or indirect attack. Attack of a Critical Vulnerability will destroy the
COG leading to decisive or at least significant results.

Fig 9.1 Centre of Gravity Matrix

Actors to be analysed
Each actor/system of actors is to be considered when determining or analysing the CoGs.
Process for CoG development
Focusing on one actor/group of actors, planners should determine their aim or desired
outcome, which is the goal of the COG.
This system or actor has a source of power to act towards this aim.
This source of power is the Centre of Gravity (CoG).
Sources of power possess abilities to generate force, persuasion or ability to gain and
maintain dominant influence over an opponent or a situation in order to establish the aim
and desired outcome of the actor.
 These abilities are Critical Capabilities (CC).
Essential conditions, resources and means are enablers or elements that sustain the COG
to be fully operative.
 These enablers are Critical Requirements (CR).
These requirements may have weaknesses, deficiencies and vulnerabilities.
 They are known as the Critical Vulnerabilities (CV).
Planners should exploit the opportunities within vulnerabilities as conclusions for the JFAC.
 These conclusions will become new tasks for the component to be included in the
CONOPS.

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CoG validity test

To validate a CoG, planners should test their character and aptness to be a CoG.
Character of a CoG:
 Is it a dominant characteristic?
 Does it provide power to achieve the objective or the aim of the actor?
 Does it provide resistance against opposing objectives?
Aptness of a COG, with “Does/Uses” test (See Checklist for CoG).

When analysing the Joint CoG, the AOPG should consider the CV to be able to identify the
ones to be influenced or targeted by the Air component. The AOPG is then to provide air
component conclusions: the air tasks to influence or target the CoG CV.
 Those conclusions should consist of air component contribution to the collapse/the
protection of the CoG developed by the JOPG.

According to AOPG director, you may have to:

Determine the CoGs (for actors outside NATO force, thinking with « Joint » mindset);
Assess how to influence their Critical Vulnerabilities (with an “air” mindset).
The workflow and its duration will vary consequently.
See the « checklist for COG development » at the end of this book.
When CoGs are provided by the JOPG, the AOPG staff examines them to:
Confirm their validity  do not hesitate to challenge the proposed COG;
Understand their implication for Air operations;
If necessary, expand the analysis to be more applicable to air operations
Generic examples of CoGs
The following are often centres of gravity at joint level:
 Joint forces; Nuclear forces; Land power; Sea power; Air power; Special ops forces;
 Unconventional forces, including terrorists; State security forces; Specific units.
The following are often centres of gravity at the air component level:
 C4ISR
 Air defence system
Mistaken CoGs
The following are things often mistakenly identified as centres of gravity:
 The will of the people.
 This might be a requirement. If the will creates a force, the force could be a COG.
 Leadership/key personality.

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 This is just another potential requirement. (Churchill still needed military force to
enact his will).
 Airports or seaports of debarkation.
 Is the Port of Pusan the force holding back the North Korean Army?
 Strategic mobility.
 This would make FedEx a centre of gravity.
 Lines of communication.
 Lines of communications are just the rails of the railroad which needs of a locomotive.
 Resources.
 By themselves, resources are not COGs. The COG would be the control of the
resource market. Otherwise resources might be requirements for a COG.
 Time.
 Time is perhaps a requirement, or even a strategy, but you can’t try to stop your
opponent by calling a time out.
 The media.
 The media is a tool to influence the will of the people and key leaders, which is only
a requirement.
 Coalition/allies.
 Coalition partners or allies might be required to bring or add to the real COGs [military
or economic might].”

Reference: CoG Analysis by Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, US Army in Military Review, July-
August 2004.

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Factors analysis conclusions, CPOE (actors or system of actors to analyse), CoGs

developed by the JOPG.

Due to the situation, you may develop a CoG from scratch or develop JFAC CoG from Joint
Forces CoG (see. 22.2.2) or analyse a joint CoG with air vision (see 22.2.3).
CoG development from scratch
 1- Split the AOPG into syndicates, each focusing on one actor (or group of actors)
 2- Select one actor/ system of actors. Planners must think with a “Joint” mind set.
 3- Express clearly the aim or desired Outcome. Answer the following question: What is
the actor’s main goal and what conditions he seeks to achieve by its actions?
 4- Sort the CC, CR and CV from the factors analysis excel matrix. Those elements
constitute a basis but they are not the final outcome of this analysis.
 5- Determine the required Critical Capabilities (CC) to have the CoG acting towards the
actors’ aim. Write them with a verb: the ability to…
 What are the primary means or functions that enable the COG to gain and maintain
dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an
opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system? (to be
influenced/denied to an opponent and exploited in a friend)
 6- Identify the Critical Requirements (CR): those specific conditions, components or
resources that are essential to sustain those capabilities.
 What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics,
capabilities and influences required to generate and sustain the COG’s CC such as
specific assets, physical resources, or relationships with other actors.
 7- Identify Critical Vulnerabilities: it exists when a critical requirement is deficient,
degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss. Express is by
a noun with modifiers.
 What are the CR that are vulnerable to attack or disruption?
 What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential
conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences
through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised? (to be attacked in an
opponent and protected in a friend)
 8- Identify the actor Critical Capabilities’ source of power, which is the actor COG.
 What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his
operational objectives (to be targeted in an opponent and protected in a friend)
 9- Express the conclusions about the vulnerabilities: actions verbs or forces
requirements to face the vulnerabilities.
 What to do to exploit the CV of the enemy or deny its CR?
To degrade a CR, use C2 or information operations; to reduce its power, use attrition.
 What to do to protect our own CV or to secure our own CR?

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 To protect a CR, reinforce it and to defend it, provide it with assistance.

 10- Aptness of a COG.
Assess the aptness of the CoG with the following test.
If the test has failed for one question, you may challenge the designated CoG.
DOES (Yes=OK for COG aptness)
A- Does designated COG action is to gain and maintain dominant influence over an
opponent or situation?
B- Is/Are designated COG the source of power to gain and maintain dominant influence
over an opponent or situation?
C- Can you defeat designated COG by weakening/destroying determined specific
conditions, components or resources (CR)?
USES (No=OK for COG aptness)
D- Is designated COG used/consumed by another entity to be able to gain and maintain
dominant influence over an opponent or situation?
E- Does/Do designated COG contribute to gain and maintain dominant influence over
an opponent or situation without participating directly in the action?
JFAC CoG development from Joint CoG (only for Own Forces)
 1- The syndicate in charge of the actor “NATO force” is to review the CoG matrix
developed at joint level. This syndicate is to brainstorm with a JFAC mindset to develop
the CoG.
 2- State clearly the aim/desired outcome of the JFAC in support of the joint level aim.
 What is the JFAC’s main goal and what conditions are to be achieved by its actions?
 3- Sort CC, CR and CV from the factors analysis matrix. Those elements constitute a
basis for further development but they are not the final outcome of this analysis.
 4- Determine the required Critical Capabilities (CC) to have the CoG acting towards the
JFAC’s aim. Write them with a verb: the ability to… Ex.: detect enemy air assets
 What are the primary means or functions that enable the COG to gain and maintain
dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an
opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system? (to be
exploited for the air component)
 5- Identify the Critical Requirements (CR): those specific conditions, assets or
resources that are essential to sustain those JFAC capabilities.
 What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics,
capabilities and influences required to generate and sustain the COG’s critical
capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, or relationships with other
actors.
 6- Identify Critical Vulnerabilities (CV): it exists when a JFAC critical requirement is
deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss.
Express is by a noun with modifiers.
 What are the JFAC CR that are vulnerable to attack or disruption?

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 What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential
conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences
through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised? (to be protected)
 7- In order to identify the CoG, review the Joint CoG CR and try to determine the one
that could be considered as the JFAC CoG.
 What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to accomplish his
operational objectives (to be targeted in an opponent and protected in a friend).
 8- Express the conclusions about the JFAC vulnerabilities: actions verbs or forces
requirements to face the vulnerabilities.
NB: To protect a CR, reinforce it and to defend it, provide it with assistance.
 9- Aptness of a COG.
Assess the aptness of the CoG with the tests at chapter 22.2.1
AOPG analysis of Joint CoG
 1- Split the AOPG into syndicates, each focusing on one actor (or group of actors)
 2- Syndicate leader briefs its team on the work to perform and the required issue.
 3- Review the CoG matrix developed at Joint level.
 4- Challenge the Critical Capabilities (CC) against Air component capabilities to enable
the Actor’s objectives.
 5- Challenge the Critical Requirements (CR) against Air component assets and propose
CR for any new CC developed during the previous step.
 6- Challenge the CV against Air component assets/infrastructures deficiencies or
vulnerabilities. Identify potential CV for new CR developed (previous stage).
 7-If new CC, CR or CV developed; AOPG is to push this improvement to the JOPG.
 8-Identify Critical Vulnerabilities: it exists when a critical requirement is deficient,
degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss. Express is by
a noun with modifiers.
 What are the CR that are vulnerable to attack or disruption?
 What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential
conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationships, specific resources or influences
through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised? (to be attacked in an
opponent and protected in a friend)
 9- Express the conclusions about the vulnerabilities: actions verbs or forces
requirements to face the vulnerabilities.
 What to do to exploit the CV of the enemy or deny its CR?
To degrade a CR, use C2 or information operations; to reduce its power, use attrition.
 What to do to protect our own CV or to secure our own CR?
To protect a CR, reinforce it and to defend it, provide it with assistance.

The filled formatted matrix to be presented to the COMJFAC during Mission Analysis Brief with a highlight on
the conclusions for the Air component.
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The AOPG should identify limitations to COMJFAC’s freedom of action in its ability to
accomplish the mission. This will shape the framework for the courses of action.
Limitations are made of constraints and restraints drawn from outside entity requirements or
rules. However, they may also be drawn from factors analysis conclusions, when outcomes
dictate time, place and forces to be used. The review of factors analysis will be conducted
to identify specific limitations to the JFAC.
 The AOPG should compare limitations with other outcomes of mission analysis (Risk,
CCIRs, assumptions) as they may interact and pose some changes to the development of
the plan.

Constraints (Things the JFAC must do)

Requirements placed on the COMJFAC by a higher command that dictate an action.
Limitation posed on COMJFAC by:
Law (LOAC, other…)
Mandate (UNSCR, …)
Diplomatic agreements
Political or economic conditions in affected countries
Host nation
NATO political or military authorities
Higher command
Example: JFAC is to operate under NATO ROEs.
Restraints (Things JFAC cannot do)
Requirements placed on the COMJFAC by the COMJTF or SACEUR that prohibit an
action
Restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action
Example: No cross-border activities with country XX before date DD.

The syndicate in charge of developing the JFAC limitations will gather all the possible
material from which limitations can be drawn. It is critical to understand the difference
between constraints and restraints.
Consider once again the key factors whilst focusing on limitations. This may drive the AOPG
to review some points already discussed during the factors analysis. This is normal and
shows that finishing one step does not mean you are really done with it. Each new step gives
new insight/views and makes it necessary to rethink or reconsider the work already
completed.
 To proceed with limitations, see “checklist for JFAC limitations” in this guide.

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Factors analysis, CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued, OPG.
Any political material in relation with the operation (UNSCR, NAC initiating directive).

 1- Identify the syndicate in charge of the limitations.

 2- To initiate the process, sort the limitations (LC and LR) from the Factors analysis
matrix
 3- List the limitation given in the SPD and in the OPG.
 4- Identify the limitations for the air component and for the COMJFAC freedom of action.
 5- Sort the restraints and the constraints.
 6- Fulfil the MAB template slide.

One slide with identified restraints and constraints for the JFAC.
Highlight the one developed by the AOPG from the one coming from other entities.

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 Planning requires a comprehensive knowledge of actors and their environment.

Factors Analysis may reveal gaps in knowledge and information. Planners may consider
necessary for planners to make an assumption in order to continue the component estimate
process.
There may be some conditions we take for granted, but which actually are not to be
considered as a fact. However, some of the “non-factual” conditions are necessary to
continue planning. If for example a nation or state inside the JOA is considered neutral in a
conflict, this condition is not a fact, but an assumption. Assumptions might be necessary to
continue planning because the position of that nation as a neutral, friendly or an opponent
can impact the operation.
 Always keep in mind that assumptions are often the reason a plan can fail and they must
be avoided unless absolutely necessary.
An assumption will always be the basis for the follow-on decisions and therefore it exposes
the Commander to risk because the assumptions can be wrong.
It is for this reason that the AOPG director and coordinators must control assumptions and
ensure that they are regularly reviewed. Any changes in assumptions must be evaluated in
respect to their impact to planning conducted previously.

Assumption: Assumed fact, used in place of an information gap. To be valid, it must be

logical, realistic and necessary for the planning to continue.
Assumptions are treated as facts and therefore need to be analysed (factors analysis).

Review the factors analysis by sorting assumptions identified by planners and analyse them
to determine their absolute necessity.
While developing assumptions, take into considerations the following elements:
JOPG assumptions should be considered as fact by the components.
 Never make assumptions on adversary capabilities or assumed intentions.
Never make assumptions on alteration of challenging aspects of the situation.
Never make assumptions on a presumption of our own success.
An assumption will apply throughout planning until verified as fact or discarded.
Each assumption needs to have a risk evaluation.
 Coordinate with the syndicate in charge the risk analysis.
Each assumption must be evaluated to determine if the requirement for the development
of a branch or sequel exists. For that reason an assumption may highlight a potential
CCIR.  Coordinate with the syndicate in charge of the CCIRs.
In addition, to assist in their verification, assumptions will generate information, knowledge
or intelligence requirements (RFI, CCIRs).

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 Factors analysis, CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued, OPG.
 Any political material in relation with the operation (UNSCR, NAC material).

 1- Identify the syndicate in charge of the assumptions development.

 2- To initiate the process, sort the assumptions (As) from the Factors analysis matrix
 3- List the Assumptions given in the SPD and in the OPG.
 4- Identify the Assumptions for the air component planning.
Do not make assumptions on enemy course of action or will to fight.
Limit to the maximum extent the assumptions as they pose your plan at risk
 5- Interact with syndicates in charge of Risk assessment and CCIRs as any Assumption
may require an analysis regarding those topics.
 6- Fulfil the MAB template slide.

For the MAB, create a slide with identified restraints and constraints for the JFAC.
Highlight the one developed by the AOPG from the one coming from other entities.

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Throughout the conduct of the mission analysis, the AOPG must be continually attuned to
the need to identify specific operational requirements that are critical for operational success
of Joint air power. Some of those requirements are critical to the COMJFAC and others need
to be raised up to the Joint level for consideration or decision.

Information, knowledge and intelligence requirements (CCIRs)

Expected and more critically, unexpected events, may require the COMJFAC to react
immediately to cope with a new critical situation. CCIRs are essential to the COMJFAC’s
decision-making and development of the plan, particularly as it is related to a plan’s
assumptions. CCIRs are also related to decisions for plan execution, including Decision
Points for branches or sequels, or the transition between phases.
During the execution phase, the COMJFAC should be advised as soon as a situation
described within CCIRs occurs.
The AOPG proposes a list of information requirements to the COMJFAC, which are deemed
critical to maintain situational awareness. The COMJFAC will express his preferences on
them. CCIRs are to be split into sub-categories: PIR and FFIR.
17.2.1.1. Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)
PIRs are key questions to be answered about an adversary’s capabilities or intentions,
necessary for planning and decision making. They concern both the enemy (including the
time available to the enemy) and the environment (terrain, weather and some civil
considerations). PIRs are divided into categories called Essential Elements of Information
(EEIs) which friendly forces try to collect via ISR means. Intel personnel should be part of
the “CCIR syndicate” to integrate intelligence collection from the onset.
 When planning, if the AOPG requires higher-level direction in regards to the enemy, this
element could be considered as a PIR.
17.2.1.2. Friendly Forces Information Requirements (FFIR)
FFIRs are what commanders needs to know about their own forces’ ability to accomplish
their mission. FFIRs consist of requirements of information on the mission, troops, support,
and time available for friendly forces. Some information, Essential Elements of Friendly
Information (EEFIs), must be protected from enemy detection through OPSEC.
Critical operational support and resources requirements
These must capture military requirements, sustainment, and the Joint support required to
accomplish the mission. These elements must be requested of COMJTF.
Preconditions for success
The AOPG must identify essential conditions that are beyond the influence of the COMJFAC
that must be established to allow operational success. These may include establishing transit
authorities, HNS and legal agreements (Such as status of forces, HNS, and/or any additional
agreement (third nations arrangement) aimed at specific mission support).

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Preconditions may also address changes needed in non-military domains that facilitates the
achievement of the operational commander’s objectives.
The JOPG should provide operational guidance on strategic conditions that must be
established or fostered by the political level in order to achieve operational success.
However, at the component level, preconditions should be reviewed and modified if their
outcome lacks elements from an air perspective. Additionally, the AOPG may highlight
preconditions exclusive to the conduct of air operations and should bring them to the
attention of the COMJTF.
Rules of Engagement (ROEs)
The Rules of Engagement are critical to enable the use of force during situations requiring
rapid reaction. The RoEs should match those of any potential situation during which the Air
Component assets may use force. The ROEs must specify a release authority at the
appropriate level to ease the decision-making according to COMJTF guidance. Air planners
must assess ROEs provided by the higher level in order to appreciate their robustness and
the delegate authority required.
Requirements for interaction with relevant International and national actors
In regards to potential COMJFAC responsibilities (ACA and ADC), the AOPG should
consider any actor which could impact airspace management or the air defence design.
National organisations with a civilian aviation focus should be contacted to organise the use
of airspace above its territory within the JOA. NGOs or IOs in the JOA should be addressed,
as they may also need to use the airspace.
 This is the responsibility of the AOPG to identify those actors/services and to establish
liaison with at an early stage in the planning process.
StratCom and information Strategy requirements
The AOPG must identify specific audiences, InfoOps and PsyOps key leaders, as well as
the basic themes that may be required to achieve operational and military strategy.
Crisis Response Measures (CRM)
CRMs are detailed actions which are available to be immediately implemented at the
appropriate levels. Detailed implementation procedures apply. CRMs are listed through
trigrams addressing different domains of interest. CRMs are a part of the NATO’s Crisis
Response System (NCRS), which purpose is to be prepared for crisis and conflict prevention
for crisis management across the range of possible NATO interventions.

This stage requires different syndicates to work on the topics. The CORs are developed at
the same time as risk analysis and assumptions development. Since assumptions may alter
the plan, it behoves COMJFAC to act in a timely manner.
 The AOPG coordinators, responsible for the coherence of results, have to coordinate
between syndicates because potential connections between topics.
See chap. relative to COR check list for more details.

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 Factors analysis, CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued, the OPG.
If an OLRT is deployed on the theatre: initial OLRT report.

 1- Identify the syndicates in charge of the CORs and split them to focus on one on
several aspects depending on the number of planners in the AOPG;
 2- CCIRs:
 2.1- Develop the CCIRs at the same time of assumptions and risk assessment
 2.2- Sort CCIRs from the conclusion of the factors analysis
 2.3- Take a look at the Joint mission. Since the air Component contributes to the
overall end-state, everything that concerns the achievement of the overall mission,
will likely concern as well the air component mission.
 2.4- Identify the elements COMJFAC should estimate necessary to bring to his
attention as soon as they occur (during execution phase) in order to give him the
possibility to adapt quickly to the new situation and to take the timely appropriate
decisions.
 What are the elements for which you must wake up immediately the COMJFAC?
 2.5- coordinate with “Assumption” and “Risk analysis” syndicates as you may
highlight new CCIRs from their analysis.
 3- Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements:
 3.1- The syndicate in charge of those focus area should include logistics, CIS,
medical, finance and human resources experts;
 3.2- From the factors analysis matrix, sort the “SPT” conclusions
 3.3- Identify the service support requirement concerning:
 Logistic Support; Movement; Host Nation Support; Supply and Maintenance;
Contractor Support; Military Engineering; Medical Support; Finance and
Manpower.
 4- Pre-conditions for Success.
 4.1- Get the preconditions for success from the JOPG;
 4.2- Review them and modify them if needed to address the JFAC
 4.3- Identify preconditions exclusive for the conduct of air operations, including:
 transit authorities’ establishment,
 Host Nation Support for air operations
 Legal agreements, such as on the status of forces, HNS, and/or any additional
agreement -including with third nations - aimed at specific mission support).
 4.4- Bring to the COMJTF the modification on the joint preconditions and the JFAC
exclusive preconditions developed by AOPG
 5- Rules of Engagement/Use of Force.
 5.1- The syndicate in charge of that focus should integrate an AD and an offensive
fighter pilot and be in touch with the LEGAD;
 5.2- Get the declared ROEs to review them and the delegation authority;
 5.3- Identify the need for other ROEs;
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 5.4- review the Delegation authority for each of them and propose required
amendments;
 5.5- insert in the MAB the ROEREQ to be raised up to the COMJTF for approval.
 6-Requirements for interaction with international or national actors.
 6.1- Identify the actors that JFAC need for the air operations;
 6.2- List the complementary non-military activity in support of Military actions;
 Ex: Servicing a catering in civil airports for tactical air transport aircraft.
 6.3- List the complementary military actions in support of non-military activity
 Ex: Protection of IDP camps, of LLOCs for HA
 6.4- Identify the required mutual support and de-confliction of critical activities
 Ex.: NGO flight deconfliction with NATO air assets
 6.5- List the interaction requirements for these actors to be brought to COMJTF
 7-Requirements & guidance for CIMIC (Civil and Military Cooperation).
 7.1- Identify the civil entities to address in accordance with COMJFAC
responsibilities regarding airspace management and coordination.
 7.2- Identify the civil entities (IOs, NGOs) requiring the use of the airspace and with
which JFAC is to liaise and cooperate.
 8-STRATCOM/Information (Pol. guidance: Msg, themes to avoid, audiences)
 8.1- Identify the key audience to target/influence for Air operations support.
 8.2- Raise that information to COMJTF and insert them in the appropriate slide of
the MAB
 9- CRM: Declared CRMs. / Additional CRM requirements.
 9.1- review the declared CRMs to assess their validity;
 9.2- Identify the required CRMs in support of Joint air power that are not in that list;
 9.3- Create the MAB slide with additional CRMs for COMJTF approval.
 10- Other Critical Operational Requirements.
 10.1- Identify the targeting requirements for the JFAC;
 10.2- Identify PR requirements for the JFAC;
 NB: this should include discuss with JOPG about JPRC location and
responsibilities;
 10.3- Identify TST requirements and list for JFAC operations;
 NB: this should include discuss with JOPG about Joint TST cell location and
responsibilities.
 10.4- List any other requirements not addressed before.

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During mission analysis, the AOPG may reveal risks likely to hamper the accomplishment of
the Air objectives or risks to the JFAC forces that could be a result of the operational
environment or the capabilities and actions of the main actors in the JOA.

Risk: A danger is something that poses a threat to personnel or infrastructure whereas

a risk is a situation involving exposure to danger.
 Risk should not be confused with danger.
 “Risk to forces” is used when “the enemy uses a system that poses a danger for the
force or that prevents the force from acting efficiently”.
Example: a SCUD system is a danger; therefore, a threat for anybody who is within its range
and puts the force at risk, potentially targeted when deployed within the SCUD range. In a
situation as such, the “SCUD launch against own forces” is a risk.
Probability: This is the chance that something will go right or wrong. It is assessed as
low, moderate or high.
Severity: Severity of a risk represents a consequence level or a potential level of impact
to an air operation.
Severity is identified as:
 Extremely high - could result in failing to accomplish the mission.
 High - could result in failing to achieve one or more objective or decisive condition.
 Moderate - could result in failing to meet a criterion for success, operational effect or
exceed a time, space, or force actor limit.
 Low - minimal impact to mission accomplishment.
Mitigation measures: additional tasks, capability requirements and limitations, which
reduce the probability and/or severity of a risk. These measures can also be addressed
directly at the source of the danger that poses a risk.
Conclusions – risk acceptability: Conclusions should reflect acceptability of residual
risk attributed to COMJFAC after mitigation measures. The following considerations must
be taken to assess the acceptability of residual risk:
 Unacceptable - risk mitigation cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level.
 Conditionally acceptable - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking
action (modifying force disposition/posture/composition, adjusting current operations,
preparing for branch or sequel plan).
 Acceptable - no risk mitigation action required.

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Risk is assessed by quantifying the likelihood by which it could occur (probability) and the
gravity of its impact (severity). Risks are captured during the factors analysis (risks as it is
related to time, space, forces and information factors).
 It should be noted that the risk assessment process may highlight other risks to be
evaluated.
Determining the probability of a risk should enable development of appropriate mitigation
measures.
 When a probability is high, planners should mitigate the risk by acting directly at the
source of the risk (eliminating the danger its self (targeting), the exposure to it (Defence) or
the will of an actor to use it (Info ops)).
The resulting level of impact on the operation is considered to assess the severity.
Evaluating severity should also help the AOPG develop mitigation measures which limits the
scale and severity of consequences.
 The AOPG should not assess “low” risks in terms of probability and impact.
Once risks have been identified, the AOPG will consider ways to mitigate them, addressing
probability, severity or both. This action may highlight additional tasks, capability
requirements and/or limitations resulting from considering of the following questions:
 How can we reduce exposure?
 How can we reduce the probability of occurrence?
 How can we limit the scale and severity of the consequences?
With mitigation measures implemented, the group is to evaluate the acceptability of the risk
using the considerations for risk acceptability. COMJFAC should be involved as residual risk
should be compared with acceptable risk determined by him/her.
The conclusions of the risk assessment process are critical, as they constitute key outcome
of this process. Additional tasks or capability requirements are often the results of this
assessment.

Risk assessment highlights critical issues and the mitigations measures necessary to
address them.
 See the Check-list for risk assessment to have some examples.

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Factors analysis conclusions, COMJFAC risk level acceptability (NB: this is not the risk to
the force but to the JFAC mission accomplishment).

 1- Identify and list potential risks to assess:

 1.1 Sort the risks from the factors analysis excel matrix. It can be actions of the
opponent, of friendly forces or operational environment factors.
 1.2 Augment this list with the different dangers that pose the enemy on the JFAC force
or mission accomplishment.
 2- Write down (eventually reword) the risks identified.
 3- Gather risks with similar outcomes.
 4- Determine the probability of occurrence or likelihood: High(H), Moderate(M), Low(L).
NB: Use colors to ease the reading (H Red, M Yellow, L Green)
NB: As this determination is subjective, prepare arguments to justify your choice to the
COMJFAC and to be prepared to be challenged on it.
 5- Determine the severity of that risk by assessing it.
 (EH) Extremely high - could result in failure to accomplish mission.
 (H) High - could result in failure to achieve one or more objectives, or decisive
conditions.
 (M) Moderate - could result in failure to meet criteria for success or create
operational effect, or exceed time, space, forces / actors limits.
 (L) Low - minimal impact on mission accomplishment.
 NB: You should be able to explain why you assessed the severity level as such.
 NB: Use colors to ease the reading (EH Black, H Red, M Yellow, L Green)
 6- Eliminate risks with both severity and probability assessed as “Low”.
 7- Determine the consequences of the risk on the mission.
 8- Determine mitigation measures for risk out of both low probability and severity.
 9- Evaluate risk level acceptability with mitigations measures.
 Risk Level = Severity x
Probability
 10- If the risk level is unacceptable (risk mitigation cannot reduce risk to an acceptable
level (determined by COMJFAC), the commander should be advised immediately.
 11- Provide the COMJFAC with a relevant risk evaluation matrix with mitigations
measures.

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Risk Prob Severity Consequences Mitigation Measures Conclusion

 Loss of Actor X
1-SCUD  Provide TBMD in
Support Conditionally
launch Med High pro. of Actor X
 Loss of NATO acceptable
against X  SCUD  TST matrix
credibility

The matrix above is a way to deal with risk, mitigations and acceptability.

In the above example, risk evaluation is a multiplier of probability and severity.

Risk Level = Severity x Probability
Then, with the matrix “risk level acceptability” validated by the COM JFAC, the risk level is
determined.
The image below is a way to display how the risk is addressed.

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The analysis of the provisional mission and air objectives supports the COMJFAC and the
AOPG to:
 Consolidating what is known about the assigned mission;
 Developing a clear understanding of the operational problem;
 Identifying which system need to be influenced or to change;
 Drawing out the implied conditions that must be established and sustained.
With the analysis of their CoG, the AOPG is provided with additional insight into what
changes in the behaviour and capabilities of specific actors/systems may be required.
When these changes can be maintained, they are defined as conditions to establish.
Determining these conditions will help in designing the JFAC operational framework. This
framework, the initial operational design, is composed of the decisive conditions to sustain.
 The specific process of determining conditions is part of “planning art”.
During this process, planners may highlight some point where a key decision of the
commander should be required. They will be identified as Decision Points (DP) and key
elements of the operational design. DPs should be connected with CCIRs.

Mission: A mission is a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation,
what is to be achieved, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being
conducted. It includes, by its nature, the authority and freedom of action required to
achieve the assigned objectives while clearly articulating the role of the subordinate
command in contributing to the higher command’s mission accomplishment as
envisioned in the higher commander’s intent. For every command there is only one
mission. (COPD)
Provisional JFAC mission: JFAC mission provided by COMJTF through the OPG,
pending JFAC analysis and review.
Decisive condition: “Combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event,
critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked
advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an Ops objective.”
Conditions to establish: Required physical or behavioural changes in the actors’
systems/system elements.
Criteria for success provide tests for determining when the objective has been
achieved. They can be useful to the operations assessment process and decisions
related to transition and termination of operations. They may be used to describe
conditions that must exist for the NATO end state or an objective to be achieved including
any conditions that cannot exist. Their use at the component level is not mandated;
depending on the clarity of the wording of objectives, DCs and effects, they may not be
needed in the operational design.
They may however be a useful mechanism at this point to assist the AOPG to determine the
conditions to be established and to evaluate if the wording of the provisional Air objectives
needs amendment.
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Review the Operational level conditions to be established

When framing the operational problem, the AOPG reviewed the Operational level conditions
that must be established to achieve an acceptable NATO end-state, through the application
of military means.
As a precursor to determining tactical conditions to be established, the AOPG reviews the
Operational level conditions to be established as described by the NATO end state,
Operational level objectives (and any promulgated criteria for success). This work is
performed with a focus on the COMJFAC’s intent.
The conditions to be established by the JFAC will contribute to:
 Establishment of the Operational level conditions,
 Achievement of Operational objectives
 Ultimate achievement of the desired NATO end state.
Analyse provisional COM JFAC Mission
The purpose of this analysis is to consolidate what is known about the assigned mission,
and then to determine the actor systems to be influenced.
As a part of the Mission Command approach, the mission and its objectives are assigned by
a higher commander.
COMJTF will have provided a provisional COMJFAC mission, including objectives, in the
OPG, which ultimately provides the focus for the employment of the joint Air force to influence
operational COGs and achieve changes required in the operational behaviour or capabilities
of specific actor systems.
The AOPG analyses the provisional mission and its objectives to draw out the implied
conditions to be established and/or sustained.
The AOPG can develop criteria for success for each objective, especially if their wording is
vague, to assist determining the conditions to be established.
the AOPG must continually consider the assigned mission and objectives during the mission
analysis and develop, if warranted, recommendations for change. Review of the mission is
based on JFAC capabilities, limitations, and COMJFAC ‘s intent.
 At this point, the COM JFAC mission and its objectives are still provisional.
Determine the actor systems to be influenced
Considering the JFAC mission and objectives, the AOPG reviews their appreciation of the
main actors (enemies, friends and neutrals), including their goals, relationships, strengths
and weaknesses to better appreciate what are the conditions to establish.
 Analysing the CoG CV will help in determining which system(s) to influence.
These additional conditions to be established support those required to achieve the
objectives and their appreciation is critical to the determination of effects required to establish
overall conditions.

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It should also assist identification of requirements for contributions by non-military means

and for possible military contribution to required non-military effects.
Determining the Conditions to be established
Taking in consideration the CoG analysis and the JFAC mission review, planners should be
able to state some the conditions to establish. Those conditions will be the basis for the
Operational Design development.
Considering at first own CoG CV and mission statement, planners are able to identify
conditions to be effective to protect our CV.
JFAC Mission analysis + friendly actor CoG CV review
 conditions to establish on friendly systems
Example:
- Part of mission: “JFAC will establish a favourable control of the air over country X”
- Friendly CoG CV: “Airbases in country X are close to enemy air threat
 Condition to establish: “Country X AB protection against enemy air attack”
Considering then enemy CoG CV and mission statement, planners are able to identify
conditions to be effective to influence, target, degrade enemy CV.
JFAC Mission analysis + Enemy actor CoG CV review
 conditions to establish on enemy systems
Example:
- Part of mission: “JFAC will degrade enemy capabilities”
- Enemy CoG CV: “enemy IADS is highly centralised”
 Condition to establish: “enemy IADS is ineffective”

The outcome of this stage is a list of specific conditions to establish by the JFAC to influence
systems to contribute in protecting our CoG or influencing enemy CoG.
AOPG may propose recommendations for change in the JFAC mission. The COM JFAC
may approach the COMJTF to seek their amendment if deemed required.

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The Operational Design (Ops design) is the expression of the Commander’s vision for the
transformation of the unacceptable operational situation at the start of the operation into a
series of acceptable operational conditions at its end. This transformation is done through
establishing Decisive Conditions (DCs) along different Lines of Operation (LoOs), leading to
the achievement of Air Objectives (AOs), while contributing to the achievement of operational
or strategic objectives and NATO end state.
While working through the pieces of the Ops Design, the AOPG must consult all previous
work on the Operation. The purpose of all the work previously done was to understand and
describe the problem, and to identify the possible solution to solve that problem.
The AOPG should find a way to frame the problem that aligns with the COMJFAC’s ideas
and vision, and those same items at the Joint level, and which provides a succinct and easy
to understand methodology for a coherent plan, which achieves the desired end state. The
goal is to remain very high, focusing, with an open mind, on the entire problem, instead of
simply focusing on each task. By doing this, the AOPG can find ways of achieving results
more efficiently, with less risk and hopefully less loss of life.
Therefore, Ops Design calls for collaboration, visualization, and a systems approach. As it
is commander-centric, the COMJFAC should provide guidance to the AOPG to ensure an
applicable, and accepted, Ops Design. Lastly, Ops design compliments the OPP. The AOPG
must remember that Ops design does not replace planning and COA development, but
planning and COA development are incomplete without Ops Design. Unfortunately, not only
does it sound hard, it can be hard. However, remember that this is a group-oriented activity
that will use the synergy and creativity of everyone, not just a single individual. It requires
constant reflection and reiteration as the Operation continues.

Operational Art - Application of creative imagination (thinking) by commanders and

staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience. This creative thinking used
to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations, organise, and employ military
force. Through operational art, commanders link ends, ways, and means to achieve the
desired end state
Operational Design - Conception and construction of the framework that underpins a
campaign or major operation plan and its subsequent execution. It supports operational
art with a methodology using elements of Ops design for understanding the situation and
problem. It is a process of iterative understanding and problem framing to conceive of
and construct viable approaches
Military End State - Set of conditions that define achievement of all military objectives.
They represent a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the UN/NATO no
longer requires the Military instrument of power to achieve national objectives. The
Military End State will be used to derive objectives, promote unity of effort, facilitate
synchronization, and clarify risk associated with operations.
Objectives - Clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which every military
operation should be directed. They are developed after the End State / Termination

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Criteria are defined and provide a basis for identifying tasks and describing desired
effects. They will prescribe friendly goals linked to national objectives by describing what
must be achieved to reach the end state. Further, they tie tactical tasks to the military
end state, they must be prescriptive, specific, & unambiguous, and they do not infer ways
and/or means (i.e., it is not a task)
Air Objectives (AO) - A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved by the JFAC
that will contribute to the achievement of the operational level Objectives (OO).
The AOs may be given by the Operational Level in connection with the provisional
mission for the Air Component. Beyond these explicit objectives, the AOPG will analyse
the provisional mission and its explicit air objectives to draw out the implied conditions to
be established and/or sustained. The AOPG can develop criteria for success for each air
objective to assist in determining the conditions to be established.
Effects - Physical or behavioural state of a system that results from an action, set of
actions, or another effect. For the Ops Design 2 major categories are considered:
o Desired Effect: A condition that supports attaining objectives
o Undesired Effect: A condition that may inhibit progress toward objectives
 It is important when writing the effects to ensure that they are described in a way that is
measurable. This ensures that a matrix can be used to test if the effect has been achieved.
Critical Vulnerability (CV) – The aspects or components of a CR that are deficient or
vulnerable to direct or indirect attack. Attack of Critical Vulnerabilities will destroy the
COG leading to decisive or at least significant results.
Decisive Conditions (DC) - “A decisive condition is defined as ‘a combination of
circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when
achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or
contribute materially to achieving an objective.” (AJP-01).
DCs are a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when
acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or
contribute materially to success (creating a desired effect, achieving an objective).
Decisive Conditions are determined from critical factor analysis, which will determine
whether a direct or indirect approach is required, if cumulative effects are required, and
whether a specific Decisive Condition is linked to a Critical Vulnerability (CV).
DCs are not COGs, but they are the keys to attacking or protecting them. Because of
this, DCs identification is a critical part of Ops Design development.
Lines of Operation (LoO) - Logical line linking effects and DCs to an objective. The
determination of LoOs will shape the development of the plan as well as the conduct of
operations, by arranging mainly decisive conditions in time, space and purpose.
Decision Point (DP) - an identified point, during OPP, where it is anticipated that the
Commander would need to make a decision on the course of action if it were to occur.
Branch Plan/Sequel Plan - The AOPG may be able to identify possible decision points
leading to the requirement for branches and sequels. In this case, a contingency option
will be built into the base plan IOT retain the initiative and achieve the original objectives.
o Branch Plan - Branches address the question of “what if”?

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o Sequel Plan - Sequels address the question of “what next?”.

While there is a logical sequence to Ops Design, it is also iterative and non-linear. This is
why the AOPG must use creative thinking throughout the process.
 It is also the reason that discussion must take place in order to show the way various
AOPG members are thinking, in order to highlight new areas of thought and reflection for
others. With this, the group can perform the process.
The four steps of the Operational Design process include:
 Understanding the strategic direction;
 Understanding the operational environment;
 Defining the problem;
 Developing an operational approach.
The AOPG has already performed much of the work required for steps 1 through 3, and must
simply review, refine, and make sure that all members have a common understanding of the
problem.
The first three steps, understanding the strategic direction, understanding the operational
environment, and defining the problem, will simply be a further refinement of the results of
the factor analysis, systems analysis, COG analysis, the analysis of the mission with the
objectives, and the determination of the conditions to be established. At this early stage, the
operational framework is simply based on the staff analysis of the problem, providing the
critical link between the operational problem to be solved and the required operational

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outcomes. However, the COMJFAC may, even at this point, provide guidance to the AOPG
for their operational framework development.
The AOPG, in consultation with the staff responsible for operations assessment, will prepare
the operational framework, using operational design concepts such as objectives, DCs,
effects, etc., as introduced earlier in this section).
As many operational framework elements (e.g. effects and/or actions) can communicate
strategically or influence perceptions, the AOPG should review them on a regular basis.
StratCom guidance prior the beginning of the work ensures the support of the overall intent.
The COMJFAC is normally consulted by the AOPG during the operational framework
development to ensure that it matches the Commander’s own vision.
For the last of the four steps, developing an operational approach, the AOPG must again
remember that, as with the development of the entire Ops Design, the development of the
operational framework, and its elements, is iterative, especially in the early stages. With the
consideration of each type of new operational element, the AOPG will often have to
reconsider the elements developed previously to validate if any additional ones are
warranted or if the wording of those already developed needs to be modified. While, the list
below provides a logical way to sequence to developing an operational framework, the actual
order or approach used by the AOPG could vary with the situation, guidance from the
Commander and the experience of its members.
Determine Lines of Operation (LoO)
LoO link effects and DCs to an operational objective, with normally one LoO per air
objective. The determination of LoO will shape the development of the plan as well as the
conduct of operations, by arranging operations in time (phases), space and purpose.
Nominate one team per Air Objective. Try to have all expertise present in each team.
Focus on:
 Given air objective and asks, what must be achieved exactly and what are the big
steps to do that?
 Concentrate exclusively on your own line of operation, as if it were the only LoO.
 Everything that needs to be done to achieve the AO needs to be discussed, including
all of the elements, even if they might be included by another team/LoO.
The coordination between the teams will be done later.
Determine Decisive Conditions
Focus on:
 The purpose of each LoO.
 Critical vulnerabilities to be exploited or protected. They should highlight changes in
the critical capabilities and influences of specific actors that would be decisive to our
success.
 Required DCs to retain the freedom of action and progress towards the achievement
of air objectives, while contributing to the achievement of operational objectives and
the NATO end state.

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 Required interaction with non-NATO entities (liaison, agreements, etc)

Step 1: List all the DCs you identify. Remember the DC must be achievable and sustained
during all the operation. You should not think about effects and detailed actions yet. Start
with the preparation of the deployment and consider all it takes to progress on the LoO to
finally reach their goal. Focus on a logical order, without specifying the exact timing.
Step 2: Sequence them according to the phases of the operation as described in the
OPG (Operational planning guidance). Determine if the DC is to be achieved at the
beginning, in the middle or at the end of that phase.
Step 3: Check! Afterwards the AOPG team will regroup all elements in order to refine the
most important steps. Those big steps should be the decisive conditions. The team must
recheck these Decisive Conditions to make sure they really give a considerable advantage
and that they are sustainable. Each team must remember that the Air Operation cannot
continue if it does not achieve a decisive condition. This is another check, verify that they
are achievable.
Step 4: Place the DCs along the LoO, keeping in mind that identified DCs are critical to
the overall design in terms of:
 Establishing the nature and sequence of air operations along each LoO.
 Prioritising the effects to be created.
 Synchronising and coordinating operations on different LoOs (next step).
 Determining the force/capability requirements for each LoO over time (done later).
 The ability to appreciate the progress or delay of the campaign or operation, eventually
leading to decisions related to transition and termination of operations (done later).
Sequencing is the arrangement, simultaneously or sequentially, of actions designed to
create effects to establish DCs. Although simultaneous action on multiple LoOs may be ideal,
lack of resources usually forces a commander to sequence actions; alternatively, a
commander may choose to sequence actions in order to reduce risks to an acceptable level.
Phases: If the beginning of a phase may be contingent on the successful completion of a
preceding phase, this should be clearly recognised in the operational framework. The
arrangement of supported/supporting relationships may be a valuable instrument in phasing
the operations. The Commander may designate a main effort in each phase and assign the
primary responsibility for execution of the military tasks to a subordinate commander.
Assemble the Lines of Operation
The AOPG leader will gather the team leaders to puts the LoOs together on a single board
(PPT slide will be done later). At first, the LoOs should only include the DCs. Then, all the
AOPG members will participate in the Ops Design building (refine, move, delete dual DCs,
etc). This should highlight that there are some similar DCs on different LoOs and on different
points in time. The important and difficult task now is to decide which common DC stays with
which LoO and in which order. While it will be time consuming, the AOPG must take their
time with this step as this layout with all the DCs in place will be the final Ops design of the
Air Component.
Determine Effects and Actions

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When the AOPG has decided the final layout, the LoO teams split up again and work on the
effects and the implied actions. Do not be too detailed, stick to the question “What to do?”
Later on in the planning process, the question “How to do it?” will be answered. Especially
for the effects, do not suggest ways and means. The AOPG will identify air actions required
to create the effects and establish the DCs identified above. For the creation of effects, the
use of both lethal and non-lethal means should be considered, as appropriate.
You are not required to determine the numbers or even the types of aircraft which are
necessary to achieve a DC, or to determine an attack axis. Just be certain that the
achievement of the DC is possible with the available means.
Effects and assessments
As an important side note on Effects, the AOPG must remember that the Ops Design, and
especially those Effects identified during the Design, are the foundation for Operation
Assessment. Because of this, the AOPG must make sure that Effects are both achievable
and measureable. It is important when writing effects to ensure that their description is written
in a manner that can be measured (use the passive voice). One way to evaluate effect
wording is to begin to evaluate what measures of effectiveness (MOEs) could be monitored
over time to confirm that the effect has been created. MOEs will be further developed during
the planning process and execution.
Final Verification
When finalizing the Ops Design, the AOPG must again review all its previous work. They
must recheck if all the mitigation measures, conclusions and all the bits and pieces from the
analysis are reflected somewhere in the Ops Design. Special care should be taken to find
any discrepancies between the previous details and the final result. Those must be
discussed and corrected.
Once the verification has taken place and all discrepancies have been addressed, the AOPG
should present the completed of the Ops Design in front of the whole group. The aim is to
ensure that all elements were taken into consideration, discrepancies discovered and
everybody has the same understanding of the mission. The last point is crucial as the AOPG
continues in the planning process because the build-up of the Mission Analysis Briefing and
the subsequent work on the courses of action rely upon a complete understanding of the
mission.
Determine Branches and Sequels
The AOPG may be able to identify possible decision points leading to the requirement for
branches and sequels, at this early stage, and amend the operational framework.

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NATO End State, Joint Military End State, Joint Operational Design (draft), JFAC Mission,
Air Objectives, CoGs.

 1- Understanding the Strategic Direction - Review prior work, SACEUR and Joint
Documents, and other Components documents:
 1.1 Review the NATO End State
 1.2 Review the Military End State
 1.3 Determine Joint Air Objectives=>This includes of the JFAC Mission
 1.4 Determine other Component Explicit Air Objectives ( supplied in components
documentation)
 2- Understand the Operational Environment – Review CPOE, prior work, SACEUR and
Joint Documents
 3- Define the Problem
 3.1 Determine Operation phasing from Joint level (through OPG & ACCE)
 3.2 Derive Implicit Air Objectives
 3.3 Refine COGs and CVs
 4- Developing an Operational Approach:
 4.1 Determine LoOs according to AOs
 4.2 Determine Decisive Conditions, including timing or coordination requirements
 4.3 Assemble the Lines of Operation
 4.4 Determine Effects and Actions
 4.5 Final Verification
 5- Determine Potential Decision Points
 6- Prepare initial Branch and Sequel Plan ideas based on Decision Points
 6.1 Determine associated Branch (BP) or sequel plans (SP)
 6.2 Place the BP on the most appropriate LoO and timing
 6.3 Name the BP / SP in order to give a rough idea of what must be developed
 7- Final Verification

At the end of the Mission analysis step, the AOPG must propose an initial operational
framework.
Merged with the COMJFAC intent, it will become the initial Operational Design.
It represents an overview of the COMJFAC vision to deal with the crisis.

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Operations Planning process requires a comprehensive knowledge of different timings that

are critical for decision-making process and conduct of the operations.
Besides timings, it is important to estimate initial force or capability required for the JFAC
mission.
Finally, COMJFAC need a comprehensive approach for the C2 requirements to be able to
develop CIS architecture and command and control procedures for the joint air operations
according to the JTF structure, location and other CCs specificities.

Critical timings
Those timings, critical for planning, are related to crisis management, activation of forces,
pre-deployment of enabling forces, initial entry, transfer of authority and, when known, the
transition to follow on forces. Those timings are composed of planning milestones and
operational timings.
Initial force/capability estimate
For that purpose, AOPG must conduct a high level troops-to-tasks analysis to identify the
major force/capabilities required for the operation.
This will allow identification of any significant differences that may reflect an imbalance
between required objectives and the means likely to be available. Significant issues may
constitute operational risks and should be brought to the attention of the Commander.
C2 Requirements.
C2 requirements are driven by several factors determined during the mission analysis and
the development of the operational framework, in close coordination with JOPG. They should
include:
The geographic dispersion of forces in the theatre and the JOA.
The different LoOs and the nature and purpose of military actions in concert with relevant
national and international actors.
The size and functional composition of the deployed force.
Critical liaison, coordination requirements and span of control.
CIS points of presence (PoP) and information exchange requirements (IER).
 CIS PoP are under NCIA responsibility while IER are under Component responsibility.
The possibilities for C2 reach back and Cyber Defense (CD) requirements.

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Critical timings
In order to identify critical timings, AOPG must highlight :
 crisis management timings (Legal issues with timings restraints/constraints and
political arrangements (ultimatum, resolution, etc.)
 Activation of forces (To have forces ready to be deployed on time)
 Pre-deployment of enabling forces (OLRT, CIS teams, etc.)
 Transfer Of Authority (TOA) (OPCON / National  Alliance)
 Initial entry and transition (if known)
Critical timings from planning milestones are commonly CoA DB to COMJFAC, CONOPS
back brief to COMJTF, SUPPLAN issued for approval and 1st AOD
Critical Operational timings are composed of JOA activation, Deployment, Operational
phases.
Develop initial force/capability estimate
The process is simply to update the estimate of required operational capabilities based on
the mission analysis, and the development of the operational framework, and to compare it
with the force capability requirements provided in the SPD.
Estimate C2 Requirements.
24.3.3.1. The geographic dispersion of forces in the theatre and the JOA.
AOPG must analyse JOA designated by SACEUR in order to determine operational
requirements, such as entry points, LOC, Ops area, force and logistic requirements, etc.
It will also assist the AOPG to determine if the provisional JOA as proposed in the SPD/OPG
meet the COMJFAC’s needs.
24.3.3.2. Required C2 Functions and Locations
To determine them, AOPG must appreciate what actions will be accomplished, where and
by what kind of forces. This should include evaluating how C2 could be phased if the JFC
will deploy (i.e. through the use of Functional and Initial Command Element (FCE & ICE) and
deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ)).
24.3.3.3. Geographical and Functional Areas of Responsibility
Based on the determination of geographical and functional areas of responsibility, the
Commander can begin to appreciate the requirements to organise the command structure.
24.3.3.4. Critical Liaison and Coordination Requirements
Based on previous works and on COMJFAC responsibilities (ACA, ADC), a need for liaison
and/or coordination with international and governmental authorities may be highlighted. The
location of those authorities in the area may require a permanent high level C2 presence
which will influence C2 requirements.

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24.3.3.5. Span of Control

Following military principles, the Commander will want to balance the advantages and
disadvantages between a relatively flat organisation and a multilevel hierarchy.
Planners will propose options to the commander.
24.3.3.6. CIS Points of Presence and IERs. (Information Exchange requirements)
Depending on the theatre location and communication infrastructures, COMJFAC may have
to rely on deployable CIS that will have a limited number of PoP, which in turn will limit the
number of deployed HQs locations. NCIA will provide the support for the C2 structure up to
the COMJFAC.
Inside the component, this is the role of the Framework nation (Standby NRF) to deal with
the CIS architecture (JFAC HQ, JFAC entities embedded in other CCs or JTF HQs and Air
units)
Depending on the nature of the operation, different Functional Area Services may be
supported.
24.3.3.7. Cyber Defence (CD)
Depending on the operational context and the crisis environment, the AOPG must consider
the possible scope of CD activities and protection measures to support the C2 organisation.
Typical JFAC HQ structure and liaison

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Critical timing from JOPG; phasing for the operation, JLSG information, Planning timings
(COA DB, CONOPS back brief, SUPPLAN delivery for approval

 1- Get Planning milestones, including:

 1.1 specifically when the Commander will be available for a Mission Analysis
Briefing (MAB) and COA Decision Briefing (COA DB)
 1.2 CONOPS back brief to COMJTF
 1.3 AIR SUPPLAN/OPLAN AIR delivery for approval
 2. Get the Operation phasing from Joint level (through ACCE)
 3- Include any critical timing regarding the operations environment or international
issues (ultimatum, referendum…)
 4- Insert any logistics timings with an impact on joint air operations
 5- Select the timings that are critical for the planning activities and for Joint air
operations.
 6- Create a slide gathering all those critical timings

A slide to be inserted in the MAB with all the relevant timings issue/deadline (planning
activities and operations) to be presented to the COMJFAC.
Example of timeline

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List of Air assets (Force generation process?), effects, operations phases.

 1- Identify the tasks or effects for the different phases (on a timeline)
 2- For each effect (or task), determine the required capability (or number of assets)
 This determination requires SME expertise
 3- Develop a matrix with the timed phases and required capability/number of assets
 4- Compare it with the forces for planning (if given)
 5- Highlight the gaps and the request for forces to meet the operational requirements

Example of capabilities estimate outcome

This matrix is to be compared with the initial force.

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JTF and other CCs C2 arrangements, COMJFAC intent on the JFAC HQ location and on its
personal location.

 1- If not decided yet, propose different options to COMJFAC for the JFAC HQ location
with pros and cons; Get from the COMJFAC its will about the HQ location.
 2- Use a standardised JFAC HQ organisation;
 3- Adapt it to the current C2 trends for this operation:
 3.1- other C2 organisations;
 3.2- required coordination with civilian entities;
 3.3- dispersion of forces in the TOO.
 4- Identify the need for liaison structures and propose liaison elements to be sent to
other structures (MCC, LCC, SOCC, JLSG, JTF HQ, Civilian aviation authorities);
 5- Identify the required CIS support for this organisation (think about NATO standards
and possibilities);
 6- Define the CIS requirements and the CIS team and network to develop
 7- Identify the Air C2 tools and Joint tools (considering the COMJFAC responsibilities
(JPRCC, JTST cell?)

A proposed location and organisation for JFAC HQ with required CIS support and
requirements (to NCIA).

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 1- Current Strategic Situation;

 2- Adversaries, Friends, Neutrals;
 3- Political Direction and Guidance. NATO end state; Strategic non-military
objectives; Political limitations; additional direction and guidance.

 1- Strategic military mission; Intent; Military strategic objectives; Military strategic

effects; Preconditions for success; Assumptions; Limitations; Provisional
operational mission (including objectives); Additional direction and guidance.

 1- Key Factors and Conclusions;

 2- Operational Limitations (Constraints, Restraints);
 3- Assumptions;
 4- Operational Risks.

 1- JFAC Mission (including Operational Objectives) and Operational COGs;

 2- Initial Commander’s Intent;
 3- Operational Framework. Possible Lines of Operation, Decisive Conditions,
Effects, Actions;
 4- Complementary Non-Military Actions and Assessment of Possible Branches
and Sequels
 5- Provisional Component Missions (including Objectives).

 1- Forces Available for Planning Purpose (If given); Estimate of Forces / Capability
Required.

 1- Preliminary C2 Arrangements; Theatre of Operations and Joint Area of

Operations.

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 1- Critical operational support and resources requirements;

 2- Pre-conditions for Success;
 3- Rules of Engagement-Use of force;
 4- Requirements for interaction with international or national actors;
 5- STRATCOM/Information Strat. Requirements. Pol. guidance: Msg, themes to
avoid, audiences;
 6- CRM.: Declared CRMs. / Additional CRM requirements;
 7- Other Critical Operational Requirements. (i.e. targeting, TST, PR).

 1- Operational timing and planning milestones.

 1- Planning Guidance to Staff including on the following sorts of issues:

 Opposing COAs to develop;
 Criteria for COA comparison;
 Broad terms on COAs to develop.
 2- Direction to AOPG;

 1- Operational Framework;
 2- JFAC Missions updates;
 3- Preconditions for Success;
 4- Proposed Planning Guidance;
 5- ROE requirements;
 6-Additional CRMs;
 7- Submissions to JFC/JTF.

 1- Commander’s Initial Intent:

 Commander’s Planning Guidance and Guidance to Planning Staff;
 2- Direction to Subordinate Commanders and Additional COM Guidance.

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After identifying the operational problem during the mission analysis, AOPG must determine
how to best carry out operations that will accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently.
The COA development consists in determining how to accomplish the mission according to
the initial air Operational Design in order to meet COMJFAC’s intent. Following the MAB,
with his own approvals and decision, the commander provides planning guidance to the
AOPG to allow planners to develop a set of COAs within the time available.
The level of detail of guidance will typically depend on the nature of the mission, the
operational circumstances, the time available, and the experience of the AOPG.
On this basis, the COMJFAC may:
Specify opposing actions to be considered and opposing COAs to be developed.
Establish criteria for COA development and selection.
Describe in broad terms the COAs to be developed.
Direct the AOPG to focus its efforts on developing a single COA due to the urgency and
nature of the situation
The operational framework produced through the application of operational art, is an
expression of the Commander’s vision for the transformation of the unacceptable operational
situation at the start of the campaign or operation into a series of acceptable operational
conditions at its end. Amended with the commander intent, It will become the JFAC
Operational Design.

This process is made of a series of steps, allowing AOPG to develop, test, wargame,
compare different COAs and assess their risks when facing enemy COAs. The outcomes
will be presented to the COMJFAC, by means of a COA Decision Briefing (COA DB), with a
coordinated staff recommendation.
After COMJFAC’s decision on the COA (with possible adaptation), the AOPG must prepare
for the CONOPs back brief to demonstrate to the COMJTF how the Air COA will support the
Joint COA.

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A course of action is a potential solution to accomplish the assigned mission.

The AOPG develops different COAs in order to provide unique choices to the COMJFAC, all
intended to achieve the air objectives, supporting the joint objectives and the end state.
 A good COA following the Commander’s guidance provides also flexibility to meet
unforeseen events during execution, and position the forces for future events.
Essential tasks identified during mission analysis MUST be common to all potential COAs
Requirements and constraints are common points applicable to all COAs and they should
be established in a list, in advance to the COA production.
The main operational activities that are critical to the operation have to be identified clearly,
in order not to lose the focus of the battle.
The major possible choices and alternatives are to be agreed directly with the
Commander well before starting each COAs: Do we attack from east? Do we start to attack
airbases or tanks first?

COA: Course Of Action: Possible ways (operations) and means (forces) by which the
mission might be achieved.
Wargame: a staff tool that allows you to play out selected friendly COAs against
selected opponent CoAs in order to:
 Determine strengths and weaknesses
 Refine the friendly COA
 Reinforce recommendation of the best COA to the COMJFAC.
Commanders’ criteria: A set of criteria determined by the COMJFAC that all COAs
should meet. The COAs will differ as to how well they satisfy the different criteria. The
COMJFAC will provide criteria weights to segregate the COAs.
COA Risk Evaluation: The COA risk evaluation provides the COMJFAC with an
appreciation of the risks for each COA against specific aspects of them (e.g. mission
(including operational objectives), DCs, desired operational effects, etc.), as well as how
those risks could be mitigated, including requirements for branches and sequels

With the initial requirement satisfied, the AOPG has to determine how to differentiate the
COAs. This is the moment in which the AOPG splits. Each COA is examined and compared
from different functional perspectives to identify inherent advantages and disadvantages, as
well as to determine key aspects to be evaluated later on during the wargaming, for example
Decision Points, risks and branch plans.
Each COA should answer the following questions:
 What is the sequence of the actions?
 What are the forces required to create the desired effects?

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 Planners should achieve a balance between tasks and resources

 Where the air operations will be conducted?
 At which systems are the air operations directed?
 What message is to be delivered to the main actors?
 What non-kinetic actions can support the COA?
The work is to be detailed enough to include EFFECTS and ACTIONS, and must also retain
a decent level of flexibility. AOPG Director is to monitor the different CoAs to assess their
exclusivity.
The results of COAs comparison, wargaming and validation are presented to the
Commander during the DECISION BRIEFING (DB), in which the Commander will choose
one single COA, depending also from information that we could or couldn’t have during the
COA development. The planners should apply the above matrix to mentally drive the
brainstorming for the CoA development.
TOPIC QUESTION NOTES
Which requirements are in
1: Requirements common for the different
COAs?
Which constraints are in
2: Constraints common for different
COAs?
What are the critical
3: Activities How to create the effects?
activities?
Coordinate with COMJFAC
4: Choices Why one or another?
and split the AOPG
Consider the DC sequence
5: When Sequence of events?
from the ops design
Mainly friendly: army / air /
6: Who
land ?
7: Where Field of battle? JOA
Effects of targeting (msg to
8: What to target Draft of targets list ready?
the enemy)

The next step for the AOPG is to test each COA through six criteria:
Suitability. Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with the planning
guidance?
Acceptability. Are the likely achievements from the COA worth the expected costs in
terms of forces deployed, resources expended, casualties suffered and levels of risk?
Feasibility. Is the COA possible given the time, space and resources likely to be
available and the operational environment?
Exclusivity. Is the COA sufficiently varied from other COAs to clearly differentiate its
comparative advantages and disadvantages?
Completeness. Is the COA complete? Does the COA answer the when, who, what,
why and how questions?
Compliance. Does the COA comply with NATO doctrine?

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COA development outcome

At the end of this test, the AOPG should prepare each COAs for the wargaming step, via an
operational graphic that illustrates the spatial aspects, using map sketches. Here we have
an example of what could be the graphic output.

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1. Commander’s approved mission analysis and JFAC Operational Design;

2. OPD and COMJFAC planning guidance including Commander’s initial intent and
orientation for COA development and selection (COMJFAC criteria);
3. Feedback from the OLRT (Site survey).

Before starting with the development of different COAs:

 1- Get from ACCE the common points and/ or information on the joint level COAs.
 2- Identify AOPG personnel to play the role of the enemy (red syndicate) and to adapt
or develop more in details the most dangerous and most likely enemy COAs developed
by JOPG in order they can be useful during wargaming.
 3- Identify the restraints and constraints regarding logistics and force protection issues.
(Measures and actions).
 4- From the COMJFAC D&G provided at the end of the MAB and according to the
number of COAs developed in the JOPG, JFAC director must identify the different
options and select the number of COAS to be developed, according to AOPG manning
and time constraints.
 5- Split the AOPG into different syndicates, each of them focusing on one COA and
including planners that were involved in friendly forces analysis in the previous step of
the component estimate.
Development of COAs:
 6- Prepare the material in support of the development of your COA:
 6.1- Sort all the PG (Planning Guidance) from the Factors Analysis excel matrix;
 6.2- Sort the friendly Forces and enemy COG conclusions;
 6.3- List the mitigations measures identified during risk analysis;
 6.4- List the different DC to achieve during the different phases;
 6.5- List the effects in support of those DC;
 6.6- List the entry point and the different airports with their characteristics;
 6.7- List the Air Assets from the different components with their capabilities;
 7- Before developing own COAs, the AOPG must assess the opposing air forces and/or
the enemy COAs.
 8- During the overall development process AOPG director and/or COA leaders must
consider these criteria to assess the viability of the COAs:
 Suitability. Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with the
JOPG?

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 Acceptability. Are the likely achievements from the COA worth the expected costs
in terms of forces deployed, resources expended, potential casualties, collateral
effects, media and public reaction, and levels of risk?
 Feasibility. Is the COA possible given the time, space and resources likely to be
available and the operational environment?
 Exclusivity. Is the COA sufficiently varied from other COAs to clearly differentiate
its comparative advantages and disadvantages?
 Completeness. Do you address all the ops design DCs in your COA (phase by
phase)? At the end of the development, is the COA complete?
 Compliance with NATO Doctrine: Does the COA implement Allied Joint Doctrine
to the maximum extent possible?
At any stage of the COA development, you must identify :
 ISR needs;
 how your COA can be supported and sustained (Log issues);
 how your assets are protected;
 other component support requirements.
 9- Start with the deployment of your assets that could be challenged from the beginning.
 10- From the friendly Forces COG conclusions develop the initial tasks to protect the
vulnerabilities of your COG;
 11- From the enemy COG conclusions develop the tasks/effects to influence/target the
enemy COG vulnerabilities.
 12- Consider developing actions for each campaign phase issued by JOPG (that will
constitute the CONOPS). As a guideline for the COA DB, consider preparing one slide
for each phase as a minimum and one slide presenting the appropriate timeline.
 13- To consider the plan complete, try to challenge it using the questions below:
 What is the sequence and purpose of the main actions required to create the
required Decisive Conditions? (WHEN? / WHY?)
 What effects are intended by the main actions? (WHAT? / HOW?)
 What system/system-elements are actions directed at? (WHERE? / HOW?)
 What are the main forces/capabilities required to carry out the main air actions and
create the desired effects? (WHO?)
 What complementary non-military actions are required? (WHAT?)
 What message must be communicated to the main actors? (WHY?)
 14- Review the enemy COAs (most dangerous and most likely) to assess the own COA
effectiveness.
 15- After this review, you should be ready to wargame your course of action against the
enemy COAs, according to AOPG director orientations.

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Before finalising the COAs it is necessary to assess them against the enemy COAs to make
sure, that all possible actions are taken into consideration.
Planners must consider wargaming as a mandatory step and must engage their commander
with this mindset.
Wargaming is a flexible instrument designed to compare, evaluate and improve COAs. It
gives an opportunity to examine each COA from a different perspective in order to
 identify inherent advantages and disadvantages;
 determine strengths and weakness.
Benefits of Wargaming are listed below:
 Play out a selected friendly COA against a selected opponent COA
 Visualize the execution of an operation
 Gain insight into opposing capabilities and potential actions
 Anticipate possible events and develop mental agility to address them
 Explain the sequence of planned operation‘s phases in time and space
 Determine strengths and weaknesses
 Determine required amount of coordination between forces
 Refine the friendly COA
 Identify potential risks and opportunities (Branches and Sequels)
 Recommendation of the best COA

Referee: Final arbiter regarding elements that require a decision (What will be
assessed?), the referee makes the final decision regarding effects that cannot be
adequately measured and enforces discipline of the participants regarding time and
‘Golden Rules’
Coordinator: Briefs on basic situation, if necessary and determines initial situation.
Enforces discipline of the participants especially regarding adherence to decisions and
content
Team leader: Illustrate the activities of the actor during a turn and react (or counter
react) during next turns.
Team deputy: Provide support to Team leader and enable to precise some points
during questions of understanding
Scribes: Document results in the cognition phase, for each team (blue and red)
SMEs: Provide expertise when asked. They are seated on the background.
Initial situation: With this statement, the referee sets the scene or operational situation
of the different actors to start the wargame.

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Illustration of activities: Provide an overview of all the activities of an actor, regarding

the full spectrum of Air mission types.
Activities reconnoitred: Activities that the actor can detect, identify or visualise
because of its capabilities or its losses. The team leader should also precise what the
actor cannot detect from the activities of the opponent.
Questions of understanding: Questions made by the opponent actor after the
illustrations of activities of a team.
Cognition phase: This phase helps in determining the resulting conclusions by the
referee after a short review of the conclusions by each team’s scribe.

Golden rules
 All participants follow the same rules;
 Wargaming is not to be used to justify or defend individual COAs;
 Wargaming is a process and not a forum for discussion;
 Keep an objective perspective;
 Wargaming serves for the presentation and collection of facts not thoughts or stories;
 Resolute and stringent direction must not lead to appreciating COAs;
 All results need to be documented;
 No change to COAs during the course of the Wargaming.
Wargaming preparation
The preparation for the wargame involves:
 Determining the desired outcomes.
 Deciding on the method and scope.
 Determining participants including subordinate commands, friendly, neutral and
opposing players (e.g. intelligence/knowledge staff who developed opposing COAs).
 Organising referees, expert arbitrators and recorders (scribes).
 Preparing the operational situation.
 Acquiring the tools for manual or computer assisted simulation and analysis.
 Preparing a suitable venue.
 Establishing rules.
 Reviewing the Commander’s COA Selection Criteria
Initiation
 Determining the appropriate action to wargame is critical.
AOPG director in coordination with the COMJFAC should decide which appropriate period
to wargame and which wargame method to implement (Decisive Conditions, Phases,
Segments, etc.). When under time pressure, AOPG director must decide which specific

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aspect of the COAS should be wargamed. So it is worth deciding for a timeframe or an area,
where the success is critical or not granted.
Wargaming turns
The standardised schedule of a wargame can be adapted to the situation. Following this
matrix helps, nevertheless, in not losing time on unproductive debates.
The referee sets up the situation and decides which side (blue or red) begins the action.
When beginning with friendly forces actions, AOPG runs the overall process (Enemy reaction
and Blue force counter reaction, as depicted in the following matrix).
When departing with the red team, AOPG will run only the Blue reaction. Red counter-
reaction will not provide AOPG with relevant results to be recorded as they will be based
upon subjective development by the red team.

During the presentation the scribe will note all remarks for later use, subject matter experts
will participate as well to give further inputs if required.

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Recording results
The recording of the results should drive to highlight:
Advantages and disadvantages of the COAs
Deficiencies in the COAs that must be corrected
Additional force capability requirements
Risks and opportunities
Decision points and supporting CCIR
With the point out of critical elements by the referee, team leaders should refine their COAs
to figure out the lessons learned and the weak points identified during the wargame.

The wargaming helps in comparing the COAs through different processes.

Advantages and disadvantages.
The AOPG highlights and consolidates the advantages and disadvantages found during the
initial analysis of COAs as well as those revealed during wargaming. The process of
comparing these should seek consistency across the different COAs.
Comparison of Friendly and Opposing COAs
Based on the results of wargaming, the AOPG is able to rate how well each own COA coped
with opposing COAs. The expected effectiveness, likely costs and potential risks for each
combination should be identified.
and third, by comparing them against the Commander’s COAs selection criteria.
Inherent advantages and disadvantages:
Comparing their performance/risks against opposing COAs
COMJFAC’s selection criteria
These criteria should reflect what the Commander considers to be most important for mission
accomplishment based on Operational level direction. All COAs should meet these criteria
since their development has been guided by the Commander’s vision.
COAs will differ as to how well they satisfy the different criteria. AOPG should rate this
difference and, with a given criteria weight provided by the COMJFAC, should be able to
objectively identify which COA better responds to the COMJFAC direction and guidance to
execute the mission.
Example for Commander’s selection criteria:

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As the COAs develop, the AOPG should be constantly looking for risks and, if necessary,
finding ways to mitigate them. The COA risk evaluation provides the Commander with an
appreciation of the risks for each COA against specific aspects of the COA (e.g. mission
(including operational objectives), DCs, desired operational effects, etc.), as well as how
those risks could be mitigated, including requirements for branches and sequels. Building on
the mission analysis risk analysis, the AOPG will evaluate additional risks that have been
identified. The figure in 3.2.2 provides a possible way of capturing and evaluating risks.

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Own CoAs, enemy CoAs (Most likely and Most dangerous) and period of time, area or
Decisive condition to be wargamed.

 1- The AOPG director must decide which period of time, which area or Decisive
condition to wargame in order to assess own CoAs strenghs and weaknesses.
 2- The AOPG director will appoint a wargaming team, including a referee
 3- Own CoAs leaders must prepare for the wargaming with supporting material like
beddown, actions to be performed, achieved DC, ISR collection…
 4- Each CoA leaders (blue and red) will designate a team for the wargaming including:
 a leader, a deputy, a scribe,
 5- SMEs of the CoA and Advisors of the AOPG will be part of the wargaming that can
be addressed by COA leaders.
 6- Referee will remind the wargaming rules and timeline.
 7- All teams must keep in mind that recording the results is a critical issue of the
wargaming
 8- Referee will describe the initial situation with the wargamed period, area or DC.
 9- Referee decides which side (team 1) will initiate first turn.
 10- Team 1 initiate first turn by describing activities from their COA.
 11- Team 2 gets the opportunity to ask questions of understanding on the activities.
 12- Both teams record the results
 13- Team 2 describes what they can know and what they can’t about opponent
activities, relying on their scheduled capabilities for reconnaissance.
 14- Team 2 describe the reaction to the team 1 activities.
 15- Team 1 gest the opportunity to ask questions of understanding on the activities.
 16- Both teams record the results
 17- If Team 1 is Red team (enemy side), the wargame may stop at this point. Go to item
XX of the checklist
There is no interest to play out an enemy counteraction, as it too much subject to
interpretation about the enemy possibilities.
 18- Team 1 describes what they can know and what they can’t about opponent
activities, relying on their scheduled capabilities for reconnaissance.
 19- Team 1 describes the activities as a counteraction against enemy activities
 20- Team 2 gets the opportunity to ask questions of understanding on the activities.
 21- Both teams record the results

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 22- the referee lead the cognition phase

An appreciation of probable results and outcomes typically follows each game turn and is
used to set conditions for the succeeding game turns.
Recording Results. Observations and conclusions drawn from the wargame should be
recorded in line with the purpose. Typically, these include:
 Advantages and disadvantages.
 Refinements to the COA and correction of deficiencies.
 Additional force/capability requirements.
 Synchronisation requirements.
 Significant risks/opportunities encountered against opposing COAs.
 Branches and sequels required.
 Decision points and supporting CCIRs.
 Amendments to the provisional component missions.
 Other observations/conclusions.
The results from the wargaming should provide material for CoA comparisons. COA
comparisons include:
 Advantages and Disadvantages
 Compare Friendly and Opposing COAs
 Compare COAs against COMJFAC’s selection criteria
 Analyse and Test COAs for Viability
 COA Risk Evaluation
See check list FOR COA COMPARISON for more details

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1. Own COAs developed and enemy COAs;

2. Wargaming results;
3. COMJFAC criteria and their weight.
4. CoA risk analysis

 1- Compare own COAs.

 1.1- List the obvious advantages and disadvantages of each COA;
 1.2- Integrate pros and cons identified during the wargaming and/or during COA
Risk analysis development;
 1.3- Build a matrix to be able to compare those COAs together.
 2- Compare Friendly and Opposing COAs.
 2.1- Based on the results of wargaming, the AOPG should rate how well each own
COA coped with opposing COAs.
 2.2- Indicate the expected effectiveness, likely costs and potential risks for each
combination.
 3- Compare COAs against COMJFAC’s selection criteria
 3.1- The AOPG should compare these differences using whatever method the
Commander prefers (e.g. narrative, one word descriptors, numerical rating, rank
ordering or +/0/-).
 4- Analyse and Test COAs for Viability
The AOPG tests each COA to determine if it is or can be adjusted to be viable. This
test has six criteria:
 Suitability Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with the CPG?
 Acceptability. Are the likely achievements from the COA worth the expected costs
in terms of forces deployed, resources expended, potential casualties, collateral
effects, media and public reaction, and levels of risk?
 Feasibility. Is the COA possible given the time, space and resources likely to be
available and the operational environment? This should include consideration of the
likelihood of other actors fulfilling the complementary nonmilitary actions and the
results of any force sensing or any understanding developed by SHAPE for the
provision of forces/resources.
 Exclusivity. Is the COA sufficiently varied from other COAs to clearly differentiate its
comparative advantages and disadvantages?
 Completeness. Is the COA complete? Does the COA answer the when, who, what,
where, why and how questions?
 Compliance with NATO Doctrine. Does the COA implement Allied Joint Doctrine
to the extent possible?
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 4-- COA Risk Evaluation.

As they develop COAs, the AOPG should be constantly looking for risks and, if
necessary, finding ways to mitigate them. The COA risk evaluation provides the
Commander with an appreciation of the risks for each COA against specific aspects of
the COA (e.g. mission (including operational objectives), DCs, desired operational
effects, etc.), as well as how those risks could be mitigated, including requirements for
branches and sequels. Building on the mission analysis risk analysis, the JOPG will
evaluate additional risks that have been identified. The operational level risk evaluation
matrix, provides a possible way of capturing and evaluating risks.

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 1- Higher Direction;
 2- MAB Summary
 Mission
 Initial Intent
 Operational COGs
 Initial Operational Design.

 1- General Description;
 2- Potential Operational Timeline;
 3- Analysis (Advantages and Disadvantages);
 4- Assessment of Opposing COAs.

 1- Common Points Applicable to all COAs;

 2- Specifics for each COA;
 Aim;
 General CONOPS (Sequencing/Phasing Description, map sketches);
 CONOPS by Phase;
 Start and end conditions, and purpose of the phase;
 Sub-sequencing as necessary;
 Operational effect;
 Operational actions;
 Essential capabilities required for the phase, if appropriate;
 Possible decision points, and related required CCIR;
 Task Organisation;
 Ops timeline;
 Log. Support Concept (if not common to all COAs);
 Mil. Engineering Concept;
 C2 Arrangements incl. Areas of Operations (if not a common to all COAs);
 Major differences to other COAs.

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 1- War Game Results ;

 2- Comparison of COAs;
 (1) Advantages and Disadvantages;
 (2) Friendly COAs to Opposing COAs.;
 (3) Against Commander’s Selection Criteria;
 (4) COA Risk Assessment.
 3- Recommended COA;
 4- Branch Plan Requirements for Recommended COA.

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After the component estimate, some members of the AOPG could be requested to stay for
the Phase 4 - Plan development which is divided in two steps:
Phase 4a, the CONOPS development and phase 4b, the OPLAN development.

Prerequisites
CONOPS development begins following the revision of the Commander’s selected COA,
operational design and component mission with air objectives. The staffs also need the
Commander’s guidance, including on required branches and sequels, milestones for the
development of the CONOPS and Commander’s guidance on coordination with relevant
national and international actors.
Process
The revised COA and its operational design, is the basis for the development to the AIR
CONOPS. This is especially important for JFAC-HQ personnel not involved so far in the
conduct of the air estimate.
Staff work is to focus on describing:
 operational direction,
 execution,
 service support,
 command and signal.
Phase 4a concludes with the submission of the draft Air CONOPS to the COMJTF, CONOPS
back brief, and its supporting illustrative statements of requirements
 Operational statements of requirements, including CJSOR,
 Theatre Capabilities Statements of Requirements (TCSOR),
 Manpower SOR (in the form of a request for PE reinforcement or a CE),
 Rules of Engagement request (ROEREQ).
They are essential for the finalization of the operational and the strategic CONOPS. The draft
CONOPS also provides the basis for the commencement of the development of the Air
OPLAN.

The purpose of Phase 4b is to:

1- develop the arrangements and further specify the required activities to implement the
operational CONOPS
2- to specify the conduct of operations, including the deployment, employment and
sustainment of forces.
The plan uses the CONOPS as a basis (the CONOPS provided a description of how the
operation will be conducted). Details are included in annexes to enable the conduct of

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operations, including the potential COMJFAC responsibilities as Air Defence Commander

(ADP) and Airspace Control Authority (ACP). The confirms the Task Force organization,
synchronises Forces and Functions for each phase of the ops, plans for the build-up and
use of Reserve forces. It also contributes to StratCom and Information Strategy and includes
cooperation with relevant national and international actors.

Drafted Component CONOPS & Plans are submitted for final consideration in Joint
CONOPS & Plan focusing on 4 domains of interest we have to look after when planning:
 Coordinating instructions
(CCIRs, CRMs, ROEs, targeting, Force Protection, Military Police, Public Affairs and
StratCOM requirements, CIMIC, Inter-agency Coordination, Partner Involvement,
Operations assessment (MOEs, MOPs), Lessons Learned, Critical timings).
 Service Support concept
(Staging and entry into the JOA, Theatre and forward logistic bases, Petroleum, oils,
lubricants (POL) supply and distribution, Strategic & theatre infrastructure support and
prioritie, Logistic command, control and co-ordination relationships, Reporting
procedures).
 C2 and CIS Support concept
(C2 arrangements, relationships and liaisons, Task Organisation and Command
Relationships, Chain of command, delegation and transfer of command authorities,
the JOA and Areas Of Operations (AOOs), Liaison and Coordination, Location/co-
location of primary HQs based on CIS limitations, phasing of C2 (if COMJFAC
deploys).
 Any Operational requirements

A limited number of annexes are specifically mandated for inclusion with the Operational
level CONOPS to the Strategic level. Most aspects of the campaign or operation will be
developed during Phase 4b and detailed in annexes as follow:
A Concept of Operations
B Task Organisation and Command Relationships
C Forces and Effects
D Intelligence
E Rules of Engagement
J Force Protection
P Electronic Warfare
R Logistics
S Movements
T Environmental Support

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AA Legal
GG Non-NATO Force Procedures
II Targeting
JJ NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS)
OO Operations Assessment
QQ Medical
TT Public Affairs

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We are no longer in the planning phase but in phase 5 – Execution.

Before the operation starts, the JFCHQ will issue a Joint Coordination order, followed by the
AOD signed and promulgated by the COM JFAC. The AOD is the expression of the
COMJFAC’s intent and provides direction and guidance to the planning and execution
branches of the JFAC HQ. The AOD is the translation of higher-level guidance (JCO) into
directives at the air component level for the JFAC HQ and units. That means that any time
there is a new JCO, a new AOD will most likely be issued.
The COMJFAC conducts the air plan through periodic AODs, then through the ATO (AOD
being the mother document for ATO development).
The AOD outlines the COMJFAC’s guidance for the execution of the air plan during a specific
phase (means at least one AOD per phase of the operation) such as mission priorities,
objectives, apportionment, allocation of forces, RAP production areas, Air defence areas…

The AOD covers the current situation (enemy forces, friendly forces) and describes COMJTF
guidance (JTF mission, intent, main effort, supporting/supported relationship, JFAC
mission).
The chapters developed by the Strategy Division of the JFAC HQ, detail the following:
COMJFAC intent, Scheme of manoeuvre (from the COA DB), air objectives, apportionment
by mission types, specific priorities and goals, acceptable level of risk, guidance for TST,
CCIRs, C2 organisation.
The Combat Service Support Division (CSSD) of the JFAC HQ is in charge to describe the
logistics’ support of the air ops.
Finally, in addition to annexes provided in the JCO (JTL, Air PTL, JPDAL, TST matrix), some
are developed to describe JFAC resources allocation, daily sorties capability, prioritized
objectives by mission type, tasks prioritization.

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Those materials are required: CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued,
OPG.

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 3.4 - Impact of other domains

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 5- Draw conclusions and categorise them in the Excel matrix.

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Factors analysis conclusions, CPOE (actors or system of actors to analyse), CoGs

developed by the JOPG.

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 To protect a CR, reinforce it and to defend it, provide it with assistance.

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The filled formatted matrix to be presented to the COMJFAC during Mission Analysis Brief with a highlight on
the conclusions for the Air component.
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Factors analysis, CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued, OPG.
Any political material in relation with the operation (UNSCR, NAC initiating directive).

 1- Identify the syndicate in charge of the limitations.

One slide with identified restraints and constraints for the JFAC.
Highlight the one developed by the AOPG from the one coming from other entities.

 Factors analysis, CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued, OPG.
 Any political material in relation with the operation (UNSCR, NAC material).

 1- Identify the syndicate in charge of the assumptions development.

For the MAB, create a slide with identified restraints and constraints for the JFAC.
Highlight the one developed by the AOPG from the one coming from other entities.

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 Factors analysis, CPOE, SSA, SPD, COMJFAC guidance and, when issued, the OPG.
If an OLRT is deployed on the theatre: initial OLRT report.

 1- Identify the syndicates in charge of the CORs and split them to focus on one on
several aspects depending on the number of planners in the AOPG;
 2- CCIRs:
 2.1- Develop the CCIRs at the same time of assumptions and risk assessment
 2.2- Sort CCIRs from the conclusion of the factors analysis
 2.3- Take a look at the Joint mission. Since the air Component contributes to the
overall end-state, everything that concerns the achievement of the overall mission,
will likely concern as well the air component mission.
 2.4- Identify the elements COMJFAC should estimate necessary to bring to his
attention as soon as they occur (during execution phase) in order to give him the
possibility to adapt quickly to the new situation and to take the timely appropriate
decisions.
 What are the elements for which you must wake up immediately the COMJFAC?
 2.5- coordinate with “Assumption” and “Risk analysis” syndicates as you may
highlight new CCIRs from their analysis.
 3- Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements:
 3.1- The syndicate in charge of those focus area should include logistics, CIS,
medical, finance and human resources experts;
 3.2- From the factors analysis matrix, sort the “SPT” conclusions
 3.3- Identify the service support requirement concerning:
 Logistic Support; Movement; Host Nation Support; Supply and Maintenance;
Contractor Support; Military Engineering; Medical Support; Finance and
Manpower.
 4- Pre-conditions for Success.
 4.1- Get the preconditions for success from the JOPG;
 4.2- Review them and modify them if needed to address the JFAC
 4.3- Identify preconditions exclusive for the conduct of air operations, including:
 transit authorities’ establishment,
 Host Nation Support for air operations
 Legal agreements, such as on the status of forces, HNS, and/or any additional
agreement -including with third nations - aimed at specific mission support).
 4.4- Bring to the COMJTF the modification on the joint preconditions and the JFAC
exclusive preconditions developed by AOPG
 5- Rules of Engagement/Use of Force.
 5.1- The syndicate in charge of that focus should integrate an AD and an offensive
fighter pilot and be in touch with the LEGAD;
 5.2- Get the declared ROEs to review them and the delegation authority;
 5.3- Identify the need for other ROEs;
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Factors analysis conclusions, COMJFAC risk level acceptability (NB: this is not the risk to
the force but to the JFAC mission accomplishment).

 1- Identify and list potential risks to assess:

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Risk Prob Severity Consequences Mitigation Measures Conclusion

 Loss of Actor X
1-SCUD  Provide TBMD in
Support Conditionally
launch Med High pro. of Actor X
 Loss of NATO acceptable
against X  SCUD  TST matrix
credibility

The matrix above is a way to deal with risk, mitigations and acceptability.

In the above example, risk evaluation is a multiplier of probability and severity.

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NATO End State, Joint Military End State, Joint Operational Design (draft), JFAC Mission,
Air Objectives, CoGs.

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Critical timing from JOPG; phasing for the operation, JLSG information, Planning timings
(COA DB, CONOPS back brief, SUPPLAN delivery for approval

 1- Get Planning milestones, including:

A slide to be inserted in the MAB with all the relevant timings issue/deadline (planning
activities and operations) to be presented to the COMJFAC.
Example of timeline

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List of Air assets (Force generation process?), effects, operations phases.

Example of capabilities estimate outcome

This matrix is to be compared with the initial force.

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JTF and other CCs C2 arrangements, COMJFAC intent on the JFAC HQ location and on its
personal location.

A proposed location and organisation for JFAC HQ with required CIS support and
requirements (to NCIA).

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 1- Current Strategic Situation;

 2- Adversaries, Friends, Neutrals;
 3- Political Direction and Guidance. NATO end state; Strategic non-military
objectives; Political limitations; additional direction and guidance.

 1- Strategic military mission; Intent; Military strategic objectives; Military strategic

effects; Preconditions for success; Assumptions; Limitations; Provisional
operational mission (including objectives); Additional direction and guidance.

 1- Key Factors and Conclusions;

 2- Operational Limitations (Constraints, Restraints);
 3- Assumptions;
 4- Operational Risks.

 1- JFAC Mission (including Operational Objectives) and Operational COGs;

 1- Forces Available for Planning Purpose (If given); Estimate of Forces / Capability
Required.

 1- Preliminary C2 Arrangements; Theatre of Operations and Joint Area of

Operations.

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 1- Critical operational support and resources requirements;

 1- Operational timing and planning milestones.

 1- Planning Guidance to Staff including on the following sorts of issues:

 Opposing COAs to develop;
 Criteria for COA comparison;
 Broad terms on COAs to develop.
 2- Direction to AOPG;

 1- Commander’s Initial Intent:

 Commander’s Planning Guidance and Guidance to Planning Staff;
 2- Direction to Subordinate Commanders and Additional COM Guidance.

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1. Commander’s approved mission analysis and JFAC Operational Design;

2. OPD and COMJFAC planning guidance including Commander’s initial intent and
orientation for COA development and selection (COMJFAC criteria);
3. Feedback from the OLRT (Site survey).

Before starting with the development of different COAs:

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 8- During the overall development process, the AOPG director and/or COA leaders
must consider these criteria to assess the viability of the COAs:
 Suitability. Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with the JOPG?
 Acceptability. Are the likely achievements from the COA worth the expected costs
in terms of forces deployed, resources expended, potential casualties, collateral
effects, media and public reaction, and levels of risk?
 Feasibility. Is the COA possible given the time, space and resources likely to be
available and the operational environment?
 Exclusivity. Is the COA sufficiently varied from other COAs to clearly differentiate
its comparative advantages and disadvantages?
 Completeness. Do you address all the ops design DCs in your COA (phase by
phase)? At the end of the development, is the COA complete?
 Compliance with NATO Doctrine: Does the COA implement Allied Joint Doctrine
to the maximum extent possible?
At any stage of the COA development, you must identify:
 ISR needs;
 how your COA can be supported and sustained (Log issues);
 how your assets are protected;
 other component support requirements.
 9- Start with the deployment of your assets that could be challenged from the beginning.
 10- From the friendly Forces COG conclusions develop the initial tasks to protect the
vulnerabilities of your COG;
 11- From the enemy COG conclusions develop the tasks/effects to influence/target the
enemy COG vulnerabilities.
 12- Consider developing actions for each campaign phase issued by JOPG (that will
constitute the CONOPS). As a guideline for the COA DB, consider preparing one slide
for each phase as a minimum and one slide presenting the appropriate timeline.
 13- To consider the plan complete, try to challenge it using the questions below:
 What is the sequence and purpose of the main actions required to create the
required Decisive Conditions? (WHEN? / WHY?)
 What effects are intended by the main actions? (WHAT? / HOW?)
 What system/system-elements are actions directed at? (WHERE? / HOW?)
 What are the main forces/capabilities required to carry out the main air actions and
create the desired effects? (WHO?)
 What complementary non-military actions are required? (WHAT?)
 What message must be communicated to the main actors? (WHY?)
 14- Review the enemy COAs (most dangerous and most likely) to assess the own COA
effectiveness.
 15- After this review, you should be ready to wargame your course of action against
the enemy COAs, according to AOPG director orientations.

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Own CoAs, enemy CoAs (Most likely and Most dangerous) and period of time, area or
Decisive condition to be wargamed.

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 22- the referee lead the cognition phase

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5. Own COAs developed and enemy COAs;

6. Wargaming results;
7. COMJFAC criteria and their weight.
8. CoA risk analysis

 1- Compare own COAs.

 1.1- List the obvious advantages and disadvantages of each COA;
 1.2- Integrate pros and cons identified during the wargaming and/or during COA
Risk analysis development;
 1.3- Build a matrix to be able to compare those COAs together.
 2- Compare Friendly and Opposing COAs.
 2.1- Based on the results of wargaming, the AOPG should rate how well each own
COA coped with opposing COAs.
 2.2- Indicate the expected effectiveness, likely costs and potential risks for each
combination.
 3- Compare COAs against COMJFAC’s selection criteria
 3.1- The AOPG should compare these differences using whatever method the
Commander prefers (e.g. narrative, one word descriptors, numerical rating, rank
ordering or +/0/-).
 4- Analyse and Test COAs for Viability
The AOPG tests each COA to determine if it is or can be adjusted to be viable. This
test has six criteria:
 Suitability Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with the CPG?
 Acceptability. Are the likely achievements from the COA worth the expected costs
in terms of forces deployed, resources expended, potential casualties, collateral
effects, media and public reaction, and levels of risk?
 Feasibility. Is the COA possible given the time, space and resources likely to be
available and the operational environment? This should include consideration of the
likelihood of other actors fulfilling the complementary nonmilitary actions and the
results of any force sensing or any understanding developed by SHAPE for the
provision of forces/resources.
 Exclusivity. Is the COA sufficiently varied from other COAs to clearly differentiate its
comparative advantages and disadvantages?
 Completeness. Is the COA complete? Does the COA answer the when, who, what,
where, why and how questions?
 Compliance with NATO Doctrine. Does the COA implement Allied Joint Doctrine
to the extent possible?
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 4-- COA Risk Evaluation.

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 1- Higher Direction;
 2- MAB Summary
 Mission
 Initial Intent
 Operational COGs
 Initial Operational Design.

 1- General Description;
 2- Potential Operational Timeline;
 3- Analysis (Advantages and Disadvantages);
 4- Assessment of Opposing COAs.

 1- Common Points Applicable to all COAs;

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 1- War Game Results ;

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UNCLASSIFIED

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This Glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms used in planning activities. It is not
exhaustive; more comprehensive lists of abbreviations with explanation are contained in
COPD, AAP-15 & AAP-6.

Abbreviation Definition Abbreviation Definition

ACC Air Component Command. CPOE Comprehensive Preparation of
Former acronym for JFAC HQ the Operational Environment
ACTORD Activation Order CR Critical Requirement
AJP Allied Joint Publication CRM Crisis Response Measures
AO Air Objective CRO Crisis Response Operation
AOI Area of Interest CV Critical Vulnerabilities
AOO Area of Operation D&G Direction and Guidance
AOPG Air Operations Planning Group DB (COA) Decision Briefing
ASAP As soon as possible DC Decisive Condition
BP Branch Plan DP Decision Point
BPT Be prepared to EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly
Information
CCs Component Commands
EEI Essential Elements of
CC Critical Capability
Information
CCIR Commander’s Critical
FFIR Friendly Forces Information
Information Requirements
Requirement (part of CCIR)
CD Cyber Defence
FOF Follow-on Forces
CE Crisis Establishment
FOM Freedom of Movement
CG Command Group
GO Governmental Organisation
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
GOV Government
CIS Communication & Information
HA Humanitarian Assistance
Systems
HN Host Nation
CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of
Requirement I&W Indicators and Warnings
CMI Civil-Military Interaction IAMD Integrated Air & Missile
Defence
COA Course of Action
IAW In accordance with
COG Centre of Gravity
IED Improvised Explosive Device
COM Commander
IMS International Military Staff
CONPLAN Contingency Plan
INTEL Intelligence
CONOPS Concept of Operation
IER Information Exchange
COPD Comprehensive Operations
Requirements
Planning Directive
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Abbreviation Definition Abbreviation Definition

IO International Organisation NCMP NATO Crisis Management
Process (Political and mil.
IOC Initial Operational Capability
Strategic level)
IOT In Order To
NCRS NATO Crisis Response System
IS International Staff (NATO
NCS NATO Command Structure
structure)
NEO Non-Combatant Evacuation
JAOP Joint Air Operations Plan
Operation
JCO Joint Coordination Order
NFS NATO Force Structure
JFAC Joint Force Air Component (Nations)
JFAC HQ JFAC Head Quarter NGO Non-Governmental
JFC Joint Force Command Organisation

JHQ Joint Headquarters NID NAC Initiating Directive

JOA Joint Operations Area NRF NATO Response Force

JOPG Joint Operations Planning NTM Notice to Move

Group OLRT Operations Liaison and
JPTL Joint Prioritised Target List Reconnaissance Team

JPCAL Joint Prioritised Critical Assets OMLT Operations Mentoring and

List Liaison Team

JPDAL Joint Prioritised Defended OPCON Operational Control

Assets List OPD Operational Planning Directive
JTF Joint Task Force OPFOR Opposing Forces
LCC Land Component Command OPG Operational Planning Guidance
LLOC Land Lines of Communication OPLAN Operation Plan
LO Liaison Officer OPP (Military) Operations Planning
LOA Level of Ambition Process

LOAC Law of Armed Conflicts PE Peacetime Establishment

LOC Lines of Communication PIR Priority Intelligence

Requirement
LOO / LoO Line(s) of Operation (Part of CCIR)
MAB Mission Analysis Briefing PME Political Military Estimate
MC Military Committee PMESII Political, Military, Environment,
MCC Maritime Component Command Social, Infrastructure, Inform.
MOE Measures of Effectiveness PMR Periodic Mission Review
MOO Military Operational Objective POD Port(s) of Debarkation
MRO Military Response Option PoP Points of Presence (CIS)
MSO Military Strategic Objective POL Petrol, Oils and Lubricants
NAC North Atlantic Council PTL Prioritised Target List

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Abbreviation Definition Abbreviation Definition

PVO Private Volunteer Organisation SOFA Statement of Forces Agreement
RDG Response Direction Group SPD SACEUR’s Strategic Planning
Directive
RFI Request for Information
SPMP Strategic Political Military Plan
RM Risk Management
SPOD Sea Port of Debarkation
RMP Recognised Maritime Picture
SQN Squadron
ROE Rules of Engagement
SSA SACEUR’s Strategic
ROEREQ ROE REQuest
Assessment
SA Situational Awareness
STRATCOM Strategic Communication
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander
SUPPLAN Supporting Plan
Europe
SWOT Strengths, Weaknesses,
SASE Safe and Secure Environment
Opportunities, Threats
SDP Standing Defence Plan (process)
SF Security Forces TCN Troop Contributing Nations
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied TNL Target Nomination List
Powers Europe
TOA Transfer of Authority
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
TOO Theatre of Operations
SLOC Sea Lines of Operation
UNSCR United Nations Security Council
SME Special Matter Expert Resolution
SOCC Special Operations Component WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
Command

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This Glossary contains abbreviations and acronyms used in Air operations. It is not
exhaustive; more comprehensive lists of abbreviations with explanation are contained in
AAP-15 & AAP-6.

Abbreviation Definition Abbreviation Definition

AAR Air to Air Refuelling CAP Combat Air Patrol
ABN Airborne CAS Close Air Support
ACO Airspace Control Order CBRN Chemical, Biological,
Radiological and Nuclear
ACM Airspace Control Measures
CIVCAS Civilian Casualties
ACA Airspace Control Authority
COMJFAC Commander of the JFAC
ACP Airspace Control Plan
COMJTF Commander of the Joint Task
AD Air Defence
Force
ADC Air Defence Commander
COMAO Composite Air Operations
ADP Air Defence Plan
COP Common Operational Picture
AEW Airborne Early Warning
CRC Control and Reporting Centre
AFB Air Force Base
CSAR Combat, Search and Rescue
AI Air Interdiction
C4I Command, Control,
AIR C2 Air Command & Control Communication, Computer and
AIR SUP Air Superiority Intelligence

AM Aerial Mining DCA Defensive Counter Air

AMC Air Maritime Coordination DOB Deployed Operating Base

AMCP Air Maritime Coordination EASA European Aviation Safety

Procedures Agency

AOD Air Operations Directive EW Early Warning

AOI Area of Interest FIR Flight Information Region

APCLO Air Power Contribution to FOB Forward Operating Base

Counter Land Operation FOC Full Operational Capability
APOD Airport of Debarkation FRAGO Fragmented Order
ASC Airspace Control FTR Fighter
ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare GAT Guidance, Apportionment and
ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare Targeting

ATO Air Tasking Order GBAD Ground Based Air Defence

AWX All Weather fighter GCA Ground Controlled Approach

BTN Battalion GCI Ground Controlled Interception

BVR Beyond Visual Range HVAA High Value Air Asset

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Abbreviation Definition Abbreviation Definition

IADS Integrated Air Defence System SAM Surface to Air Missile
IFR Instrument Flight rules SAR Search and Rescue
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, SBAD Surface Based Air Defence
Reconnaissance
SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air
MOA Missile Operating Area Defence
MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft TAT Tactical Air Transport
OCA Offensive Counter Air TBMD Tactical Ballistic Missile
Defence
QRA Quick Reaction Alert
TST Time Sensitive Target
RECCE Reconnaissance
VFR Visual Flight Rules
RS Readiness Status

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JFAC e FPG
V.5 – May 2020

NATO Air Operations COE

Lyon, France

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