Team Code – LLDC 087

DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

2021

IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

Approaching the Court under Section 482 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 226 of the
Indian Constitution.

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN

State of Punjab and Haryana …Petitioner
V.
Mr. Veer Singhania …Respondent

BEFORE SUBMISSION TO HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE

AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES
OF THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

(Memorandum prepared on behalf of Respondent – Mr. Veer Singhania)
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

SL. NO. SUBJECT PAGE NUMBER

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATION 2

2. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 3-4

3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 5

4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 6-7

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 8

6. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 9-11

7. ISSUE 1 12-13

8. ISSUE 2 14-16

9. ISSUE 3 17-22

10. ISSUE 4 23-25

11. ISSUE 5 26-28

12. PRAYER 29

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATION FULL FORM

AC Appeal Cases

AIR All India Reporter

Art. Article
All England Law Reports (United
All ER
Kingdom)

1
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Const. Constitution

CJ Chief Justice

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SC Supreme Court

HC High Court

SCW Supreme Court Weekly

MP Madhya Pradesh

UP Uttar Pradesh

WP Writ Petition

SCALE Supreme Court Almanac

J. Justice

Ori. Orissa

IPC Indian Penal Code

CrPC Criminal Procedure Code

ITPA Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. Sheikh Haidar v. lssa Syed, AIR 1938 Nagpur 235.
2. Mohamed Sajeed v. the State of Kerala, (1994) 1 KLT 464.
3. Remla v. S.P. of Police, 1993 Cri LJ 1098 (Ker).
4. Om Hemrajani v. State U.P, 2004 (9) SCALE 655.
5. Kalwati V. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1953 AIR 131, 1953 SCR 546.
6. Narayanlal Bansilal v M.P. Mistry, 1961 AIR 29, 1961 SCR (1) 417.

2
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

7. Leo Roy V. Superintendent District Jail, 1958 AIR 119, 1958 SCR 822.
8. Monica Bedi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 1 SCC 284.
9. State of Rajasthan V. Hat Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 152
10. Hari Singh vs The State & Ors. 2000 (53) DRJ 255
11. Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors, AIR 2018 6 SCC 664.
12. Jewan v. Tex, AIR 1949 All 587: 50 Cr Lj 884.
13. State of Assam v. Sri Nanda Mamashi, Sessions Court of Sonipat, Case No. 39 of 2017.
14. Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1997 105 STC 421 AP.
15. Samaruddin v. Asstt. Director of Enforcement, 1995 CriLJ 2825.
16. Fatma Bibi Ahmed Patel v. Territory of Gujara, (2008) 6 SCC 789.
17. S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, AIR 1954 SC 375.
18. Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateshwar Rao and Anr, (2011) 2 SCC 703

BOOKS
1. Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law
2. S.C. Sarkar, The Code of Criminal Procedure
3. M.P. Jain’s Indian Constitutional Law
4. Courts on Military Law by Col. G.K. Sharma, Col. M.S.Jaswal
5. Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law 29 (David Ormerod ed., 13thedn., 2011)
6. K.D. Gaur Textbook on Indian Penal Code
STATUTES
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
2. Criminal Procedure Code, 1974 (CrPC)
3. Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act, 1956
4. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
5. Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999
6. Constitution of India
7. Sale of Goods Act, 1930
8. General Clause Act, 1897

BILLS
1. Banning of Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019

3
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Counsel on Behalf of the Petitioner is approaching this Hon’ble High Court who has the
jurisdiction to hear this matter under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1956
which reads as follows –
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court. Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit
or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to
give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

4
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. Rohini Singh, aged 24 years and Veer Singhania aged 30 years met on a dating app
called Tinder and decided to get married within two weeks of the meeting. Rohini’s
family opposed the union, but she married Veer Singhania on 31st December without
the family’s blessings. They left for their honeymoon on the 5th of January, 2019.
Veer was a serial entrepreneur always searching for a venture capital market. During
this trip, Veer met a wealthy oil baron, Sheikh Abdul Tayyar whose business office is
in Venice, ready to diversify his holdings. 

5
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

2. The Sheikh invited Veer and Rohini to his villa for a visit, to which Rohini and Veer
agreed and took to it three days after sightseeing in Dubai. Siting a conservative
mindset, Rohini was not allowed to indulge in business talks but was sent to enjoy the
Sheikh’s villa. After Rohini left to look around with the Sheikh’s three wives, Veer
and the Sheikh negotiated the finer details of the proposal of payments gateway
business that Veer was building. In conclusion, the Sheikh transferred a sum of 7,000
Bitcoins to Veer’s account.
3. After the meeting’s conclusion, Veer decided to leave and requested for his wife.
Abdul Tayyar informed him that he had become delusional and that he didn’t have a
wife. The three wives of the Sheikh and the cab driver who bought the couple into the
villa also validated that Rohini never accompanied veer. The hotel also claimed that
Veer  was staying there alone in a business suit and not a honeymoon suite as he
claimed. The business suite had all his belongings laid out in it, but his wife’s
belongings and the camera were nowhere to be seen. The only piece of evidence he
had were a few pictures on his smartphone. 
4. Rohini’s father, Bhisham Singh, Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh flew to
Dubai fearing his daughter’s well-being as she had eloped with Veer within just two
weeks of meeting him. Mr Bisham Singh on hearing Veer’s story of his daughter’s
disappearance, immediately concluded that Veer has indulged in human trafficking
and had sold his daughter off. A case was logged in the nearest police station and the
investigation began. Simultaneously, the Chandigarh Police inquired into Veer’s
antecedents and followed up with the Immigration and Customs Bureau to verify
whether Rohini had indeed gone into the United Arab Emirates. After a lengthy
investigation, Veer was charged under Article 344 of the Penal Code and Article 2 of
the Federal Law on Combating Human Trafficking.
5. After arguments from the prosecution about Veer’s character and the pattern that he
had been married once before and his wife had disappeared was bought out with Mr
Bisham Singh testifying regarding the wrong intentions of Veer. The defence argued
that Veer and Rohini were very much in love and Veer would never do such a thing.
The court acquitted Veer and directed for an investigation on Sheikh Abdul. Veer
flew back to India on 21st December 2019 and was arrested by a special detail of the
Chandigarh police when he landed at the Indira Gandhi International Airport. The
arrest was made based on the FIR registered by Rohini’s mother, Swapna Singh on

6
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

December 16th, 2019. The charges had been registered under Sections 363, 366, 367,
368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code, and under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral
Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. 
6. Veer was then granted bail on a bond of Rupees 20,00,000 on the 29th December
2019. To pay the legal fees, Veer approached Rahamat Saeed, a currency broker who
dealt in Bitcoins. Veer transferred 5000 bitcoins to Rahamat, for which he received
Rs. 46,00,000 in cash. The Chandigarh police arrested both Veer and Rahamat with
the special team’s help in-charge of economic offences for Bitcoin transactions.
Following this incident, Rahamat Saeed’s shop was also sealed and the special the
team ceased all electronic machines including computers, external hard drives, USB
sticks, and other documents. Post the raid and arrests, FIR No. 923 of 2019, dated
January 1, 2019, were filed under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering
Act, 2002 and Sections 3, 4, 7 and 13 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act,
1999.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES
1. Whether competent Court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case?
2. Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges that he had
already faced in Dubai, as that would amount to Double Jeopardy?
3. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Sections 363,
366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8
of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956?

7
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

4. 4. Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian
currency is contrary to law in India?
5. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999?

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. Whether competent Court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case?
The council on behalf of the Respondent would like to submit that according to
section 188 of the criminal procedure code of India which provides for extra
territorial jurisdiction stating that “no offence should be enquired into or tried
in India except with the previous sanction of the Central government” in this
case there has been no previous sanction by the central government and hence

8
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

this case should not be entertained and should be dismissed at first instance. The
court held that the fundamental condition for the utilization of Section 4 is that
the wrongdoing ought to be submitted in India thus the law isn't pertinent on an
outsider who acquires the citizenship of India after the commission of the
offense. Director of Enforcement, where the court held that the courts in the
nation don't have the power to attempt an offense submitted outside the domain
of India without the earlier assent of the focal Government. The defence counsel
would like to submit that the Provisions of immoral trafficking prevention act
does not provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction and hence this court does not
have jurisdiction to try the defendant in this matter hence this case should be
dismissed.
2. Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges that he had
already faced in Dubai, as that would amount to Double Jeopardy?
Section 300: - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence
1.1. A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for
an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction
or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence,
nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the
one made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section
221, or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof. If
the arguments made by the prosecution are to be considered then such an
argument leads to the absurd position where in an Indian citizen who has been
prosecuted and punished or prosecuted and acquitted by a competent court in a
foreign country for an offence committed in that country may be tried again for
the same offence in India "as if it had been committed at any place in India"
even though the foreign country where the offence was actually committed tried
and convicted or acquitted him. Section 188 CrPC -When an offence is
committed outside India— 1.1. by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or
elsewhere; or 1.2. by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft
registered in India, he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had
been committed at any place within India at which he may be found; Provided
that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this Chapter,
no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except with the previous

9
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

sanction of the Central Government. In this case section 300 of the Indian Code
of Criminal Procedure shall be the general law of the land and hence according
to this section autrefois acquit can be rightly held for the present matter 1.3.
Recently Supreme court of India in Kolla Veera Ragha v Rao case has affirmed
that Section 300(1) CrPC is wider in its scope than Article 20(2) of the
Constitution.
3. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Sections 363,
366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8
of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956?
Counsel would argue on behalf of the Respondent that the aforementioned
sections cannot be applied in this present case on account of the absence of mens
rea or any intention to traffic. The element of consent that exists at the time of
legal marriage nullifies the argument that the Petitioner had forcefully taken
away to another country which would make the abovementioned sections from
the IPC moot and inapplicable in this present case. For matters under the ITPA,
the Respondent does not meet the requirements to invoke its applicability in the
present case.
4. Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian
currency is contrary to law in India?
The legal maxim ‘expressum facit cessare tacitum’ means that “what is
expressed makes what is implied silent”. This means that when coherence on a
matter is provided for in a document, the clear and precise meaning is to be
adopted. The implied meaning need not be adopted when a clear meaning is
provided. A high-level government panel was created to make recommendations
on the treatment of cryptocurrencies in the nation. The report of this committee,
submitted on 23rd July 2019, also included a proposal for a Draft Bill. Sale of
Goods Act, 1930 defines goods as all types of movable property, and this
definition including stocks and shares but not money or actionable claims that
are agreed to sold before a contract is entered into. Hence, for the purpose of its
legal treatment, cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin may be treated as an intangible
moving asset.

10
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

5. Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999?
As per Indian Copyright Act, the term “computer programme” refers to “a set
of instructions stated in schemes, codes, words or computer originated language
in order to achieve a particular target or accomplish a specific task.” The
definition of the term ‘currency’ under FEMA is broad and includes “any
instrument which can be used to create a financial liability”. However,
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are not named or indicated under the
enumerated categories under this definition. In light of these treatments, it is not
right to charge Veer under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act
as there has been no act of “projection of proceeds of crime as untainted money”.

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE RESPONDENT

ISSUE 1 - Whether competent Court in India has jurisdiction to try the present case?

11
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

1. Analysis of Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code

1.1. Section 188 CrPC -When an offence is committed outside India —
 by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or
 by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India,
he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at any
place within India at which he may be found.
 Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of this
Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except with the
previous sanction of the Central Government.
1.2. The council on behalf of the Respondent would like to submit that according
to section 188 of the criminal procedure code of India which provides for extra
territorial jurisdiction stating that “no offence should be enquired into or tried in
India except with the previous sanction of the Central government” in this case there
has been no previous sanction by the central government and hence this case should
not be entertained and should be dismissed at first instance.
1.3. The defence council would like to rely on the case of Mohamed Sajeed v. the
State of Kerala1, in which the Division Bench ruled that the police can investigate
into a crime committed in a foreign country. The prior sanction of the Central
Government for purposes of pre-inquiry or investigation is not necessary, however,
for the purposes of prosecution previous sanction by the central government is a
prerequisite and mandatory in nature, thereby it cannot be overruled. In the present
matter the Petitioner has not got any previous sanction by the central government for
the purpose of prosecution and hence this case should be dismissed at once.
1.4. The defense counsel would like to submit that the Provisions of immoral
trafficking prevention act does not provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction and hence
this court does not have jurisdiction to try the defendant in this matter hence this case
should be dismissed. The Counsel would like to use the case of Samaruddin v. Asstt.
Director of Enforcement2, where the court held that the courts in the nation don't have
the power to attempt an offense submitted outside the domain of India without the
earlier assent of the focal Government.
1.5. On account of Fatma Bibi Ahmed Patel v. Territory of Gujarat, the appealing
party was a resident of Mauritius and her child and daughter in-law were living in
1
(1994) 1 KLT 464.
2
1995 CriLJ 2825.

12
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Kuwait. The Appellant habitually visited India on Visas and used to remain in her
relative's home. The child of appealing party Hanif Ahmed Patel wedded the
Petitioner. After some time, the connection between the child and daughter in law of
the litigant became stressed thus the daughter in law recorded a request before the
boss legal justice, in Gujarat against the supposed physical and mental torment by her
better half. The court held that the fundamental condition for the utilization of
Section 4 is that the wrongdoing ought to be submitted in India thus the law isn't
pertinent on an outsider who acquires the citizenship of India after the commission of
the offense. In this manner, the request documented by the daughter in law of the
litigant was not viable.

ISSUE 2 - Whether trial of Veer by the Court in India, for the same charges that he had
already faced in Dubai, as that would amount to Double Jeopardy?

13
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

2. Statutory Provisions covering Double Jeopardy in Indian Law and plea of autrefois
acquit
2.1. Section 300: - Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same
offence - A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for
an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or
acquittal remains  in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor
on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one
made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of section 221, or for
which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.
2.2. It was said in the Venkatraman case3 as regards the omission of autrefois
acquit within the constitutional guarantee of article 20(2):
"It seems that our Constitution makers did not think it necessary to raise one part of
the Common Law to the level of a fundamental right and thus make it immune from
legislative interference. This has been left to be regulated by the general law of the
land specific narrow connotations, the inclusion of both autrefois convict and
autrefois acquit in section 300 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure as part of
"the general law of the land" fortunately remains”.
2.3. The defendant council would like to rely on the judgement of Venkatraman
case in which it was held that since the fundamental right does not raise the necessary
part of autrefois acquit then it has to be left to be regulated by the general law of the
land. In this case section 300 of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure shall be the
general law of the land and hence according to this section autrefois acquit can be
rightly held for the present matter
2.4. Recently Supreme court of India in Kolla Veera Raghav Rao4 case has
affirmed that Section 300(1) CrPC is wider in its scope than Article 20(2) of the
Constitution. While Article 20(2) of the Constitution only says that “no person shall
be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once”, Section 300(1)
Cr.PC states that no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a
different offence but on the same facts. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned
case while explaining this proposition of law inter alia observed that a person cannot
be convicted even for a different offence under a different statute if the facts leading
to the conviction under both the statutes are the same.
3
S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India AIR 1954 SC 375.
4
Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateshwar Rao and Anr, (2011) 2 SCC 703.

14
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

3. Application of Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code -

3.1. Section 188 CrPC -When an offence is committed outside India—
i. by a citizen of India, whether on the high seas or elsewhere; or
ii. by a person, not being such citizen, on any ship or aircraft registered in India,
he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it had been committed at
any place within India at which he may be found;
Provided that, notwithstanding anything in any of the preceding sections of
this Chapter, no such offence shall be inquired into or tried in India except
with the previous sanction of the Central Government.
3.2. The defence counsel would like to submit that according to section 188 of the
Indian code of criminal procedure, if the legal fiction transfers the venue of the
offence to India, the same legal fiction transfers the jurisdiction and juridical capacity
of the Indian court to the foreign court which actually tried and convicted or
acquitted the Respondent for the satisfaction of the Indian legal system and
administration of justice. Or else the concept of "double jeopardy" becomes
meaningless and one national legal system presumes to sit in judgment upon another.
3.3. If the arguments made by the prosecution are to be considered then such an
argument leads to the absurd position where in an Indian citizen who has been
prosecuted and punished or prosecuted and acquitted by a competent court in a
foreign country for an offence committed in that country may be tried again for the
same offence in India "as if it had been committed at any place in India" even though
the foreign country where the offence was actually committed tried and convicted or
acquitted him. Such Absurdity can never be a part of the legislative intent or judicial
interpretation.
3.4. In England the determining concept is the ancient Common Law Rule, nemo
debet bis vexari, that none may be put in peril twice for the same offence, and applies
equally in terms of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit.
"The plea of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit avers that the defendant who has
been previously convicted or acquitted on a charge for the same offence as that in
respect of which he is arraigned. The question for the jury on the issue is whether
the defendant has previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on which
he is arraigned, for the rule of law is that a person must not be put in peril twice
for the same offence. The test is whether the former offence and the offence now

15
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the facts constituting the one
is sufficient to justify a conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the
Crown are the same in two trials”
3.5. The council would like to humbly submit that based on the common law rule
of England and the universal applicability of the above-mentioned maxim, the
doctrine of double jeopardy shall apply equally in terms of autrefois convict and
autrefois acquit. Regarding the test which is to be considered, in this case the
offences which have been charged in the foreign country as well as in India are same
and constitute of the same ingredients. Thus, the doctrine of double jeopardy should
be rightfully applied in the present matter.
3.6. The jurisprudential doctrines of "finality of judgment" and res judicata
buttress the Anglo-American positions. The principle or res judicata, of things
adjudicated, relates to the finality of judgment and poses a bar to any further
proceedings and trial. If there has been a jeopardy, by means of indictment,
arraignment, and in terms of conviction or acquittal in England, there shall be no
subsequent proceedings for the same offence or there shall be a complete bar to
another trial in- as much as another proceeding or trial poses another jeopardy. In
either case, and equally in the application of the doctrine of autrefois acquit and
autrefois convict finality of judgment avails. "Where an offence has already been the
subject of judicial investigation and adjudication, and there has been an acquittal, the
acquittal is conclusive, and it would be a very dangerous principle to adopt to regard
a judgment of not guilty as not fully establishing the innocence of the Respondent”.
If an acquittal should have been erroneous, so long as it stands unreversed, it is a bar
to a further trial. On similar grounds constructive acquittal equates acquittal as
regards double jeopardy.
3.7. Thus, the principle of finality of judgement and res judicata must be upheld at
all costs in order to subdue the very dangerous principal with regard to a judgement
of not guilty which does not fully establish the innocence of the Respondent. Hence,
the doctrine of double jeopardy must be upheld.
ISSUE 3 – Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Sections
363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 5, 8
of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956?
4. Analysis and Applicability of Section 363, 366, 367, 368, 367, 371 of IPC

16
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

4.1. Section 363 – Punishment for Kidnapping

Kidnapping is codified as a criminal offence under IPC, 1860. It is the unlawful
taking away or conveying of a person and wrongfully confining the person against his
or her will. Kidnapping is defined under Section 360 of the IPC and the following
ingredients must be present –
a. Victim was kidnapped when he/she was residing in India at the time of the
offence.
b. Accused committed the offence of enticing the person kidnapped.
c. Person was taken without his/her consent or consent of someone legally
authorised to give the same.

The offence of kidnapping under this section becomes punishable under section 363
of the IPC when
a. a person takes someone else beyond the limits of India, without the consent of that
person or someone legally authorized to give consent on behalf of that person.
b. the person reaches not only the foreign territory but to his destination as well.
c. If the person conveyed has been conveyed without his consent, this consent
cannot be under fear or cases where it would amount to submission and not
consent.
4.2. Section 366 – Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her
marriage, etc.
4.2.1. It is defined in the IPC as follows –
“Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled,
or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against
her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or
knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of
criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other
method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that
she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.”

17
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

4.2.2. The Supreme Court in the case of Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani v. The State of
Maharashtra & Ors5. the division bench provided the following essential
ingredients to apply Section 366 of IPC –
a. Kidnapping or abducting any woman
b. Such kidnapping or abducting must be:
i. With the intent that the woman may be compelled or knowing it to be
likely that she will be compelled to marry any person against her will,
or
ii. in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or
knowing that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse; or
c. by criminal intimidation or abuse of authority or by compulsion inducing any
woman to go from any place, with the intent that she may be or with
knowledge that it is likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse with some person.
4.2.3. That to establish an offence under Section 366 of IPC mere finding that a
woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the Accused
abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it
to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she
may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that
she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse.
4.3. S. 367 - Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to grievous
hurt, slavery, etc. Whoever kidnaps or abducts any person in order that such person
may be subjected, or may be so disposed of as to be put in danger of being subjected
to grievous hurt, or slavery, or to the unnatural lust of any person, or knowing it to be
likely that such person will be so subjected or disposed of, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and
shall also be liable to fine. The question of Kidnapping does not arise with the facts
in hand as Rohini Singh was not Kidnapped or abducted. An essential requirement
for Kidnapping as per Section 360 of the IPC is consent of the person being
kidnapped or abducted. In this present case, as per the facts provided, Rohini Singh
agreed to marry Veer and she gave her consent for the same. (Para 2 of the Problem
Sheet)

5
AIR 2018 6 SCC 664.

18
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

4.4. Section 368 – Wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement,

kidnapped or abducted person –
4.4.1. Essential ingredients to constitute an offence is –
a. That the person in question had been kidnapped or abducted,
b. That the Accused knew that the said person had been kidnapped or abducted, and
c. That the Accused having such knowledge wrongfully conceals or confines such
person.
4.4.2. The element of concealment or confinement should be determined form the
facts and circumstances of the case. In the case of Jewan v. Tex 6it was held
that an essential element to charge under Section 368 it must be proved that
the Respondent had knowledge of kidnapping or abduction. This element
becomes inapplicable with the present facts of this case because there was no
“kidnapping” or “abductions”. All parties involved in the marriage gave their
consent except for the parents. Thus, this section is held inapplicable and Veer
cannot be held liable under section 368.
4.5. Section 369 – Kidnapping or abducting child under ten years with intent
to steal from its person. This section penalises kidnapping or abduction of a child
under ten years with the intention of stealing something from the person of the child.
It says that whoever either kidnaps or abducts any child under the age of ten years
with the intention of dishonestly taking any movable property from the person of that
child, shall be punished with simple or rigorous imprisonment for a term extending
up to 7 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
4.6. Section 370 – 1) Whoever, for the purpose of exploitation,
(a) Recruits,
(b) Transports,
(c) Harbours,
(d) Transfers, or
(e) Receives, a person or persons, by –
Using threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion, or by abduction, or by
practising fraud, or deception, or by abuse of power, or by inducement, including
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits, in order to achieve the consent of
any person having control over the person recruited, transported, harboured,

6
AIR 1949 All 587: 50 Cr Lj 884.

19
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

transferred or received, commits the offense of trafficking. (no such force was
used)
2) Whoever commits the offence of trafficking shall be punished with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years, but which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. (did not commit an offence)
3) Where the offence involves the trafficking of more than one person, it shall be
punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine. (does not amount to trafficking)
4.7. Section 371 - Whoever habitually imports, exports, removes, buys, sells
traffics or deals in slaves, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with
imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also
be liable to fine. This section is applicable to children who would be dealt as slaves.
As per the facts of this case, Veer had no intention to import, export or sell Rohini.
Also, Rohini was a consenting adult who decided to marry Veer.
4.8. The Counsel for the Respondent would like to emphasise that these sections
are inapplicable in this present case because of the element of consent and
appropriate age. Veer and Rohini consented to get married and no parties were forced
to consent. It was a legitimate and legal act. However, Rohini’s parents did not
consent to the same, this element remains moot as a “major” is capable of deciding
his or her life. Hence the aforementioned provisions under the IPC cannot be held
applicable in these cases.
5. According to Section 5 of the Immoral Trafficking (Preventions) Act reads as
follows – Procuring, inducing or taking [person] for the sake of prostitution.
(1) Any person who
(a) procures or attempts to procure a [person], whether with or without [his] consent, for
the purpose of prostitution; or
(b) induces a [person] to go from any place, with the intent that [he] may for the purpose
of prostitution become the inmate of, or frequent, a brothel; or
(c) takes or attempts to take a [person], or causes a [person] to be taken, from one place to
another with a view to [his] carrying on, or being brought up to carry on prostitution; or
(d) causes or induces a [person] to carry on prostitution;

20
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

[shall be punishable on conviction with rigorous imprisonment for a term of not less
than three years and not more than seven years and also with fine which may extend
to two thousand rupees, and if any offence under this sub-section is committed against
the will of any person, the punishment of imprisonment for a term of seven years shall
extend to imprisonment for a term of fourteen years:
5.1. Provided that if the person in respect of whom an offence committed under this
sub-section,
(i) is a child, the punishment provided under this sub-section shall extend to rigorous
imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years but may extend to life; and
(ii) is a minor, the punishment provided under this sub-section shall extend to rigorous
imprisonment for a term of not less than seven years and not more than fourteen
years;]
(3) An offence under this section shall be triable
(a) in the place from which a [person] is procured, induced to go, taken or caused to
be taken or from which an attempt to procure or take such [person] is made; or
(b) in the place to which he may have gone as a result of the inducement or to which
he is taken or caused to be taken or an attempt to take him is made.
5.2. Essential Ingredients to apply Section 5 of Immoral Trafficking Act,
a. Displacement of Person from one community to another - The relocation could be
starting with one house then onto the next, one town to another, one region to
another, one state to another or starting with one country then onto the next.
Uprooting is likewise conceivable inside a similar structure. A model will explain
the point. Presume that the brothel keeper controls several young women who are
inmates and that one of the women has a teenage daughter staying with her. On
the off chance that the brothel keeper, by pressure or pay off, figures out how to
get the mother to consent to permit the teen to be utilized for CSE, the young
person has been moved out of the ‘mother’s community’ and into the ‘brothel
community’. This relocation is sufficient to establish trafficking.
b. Exploitation of Trafficked Person - The ITPA and related laws deal with the
sexual exploitation of victims. The cycle of abuse might be shown, as in a brothel,
or inert, as in certain back rub parlours, dance bars, and so on, where it happens
under the veneer of an authentic business activity.

21
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

c. Commercialisation of the exploitation and commodification of the victim - The

victim is misused as though she is a commodity (see the definite rundown of
infringement in the accompanying section). The exploiters produce income out of
the misuse. They may impart a piece of the income to the casualty as well. The
casualty who is getting a portion of the cash created is regularly 'marked' as an
associate and captured/charge-sheeted and even indicted. The dealt casualty,
whose opportunity even to think, not to mention move out, is directed by the
exploiters, ought to never be treated as an associate. Regardless of whether she
gets a portion of the 'profit', the way that she has been dealt to CSE doesn't modify
her status as a casualty.
5.3. Counsel would submit to this Hon’ble Court that the Respondent does not
meet the requirements to be punished under Section 5 of the Immoral Traffic Act.
6. Every criminal act should have not only actus reus, but also mens rea. If mens rea
is absent, the person cannot be held guilty under ITPA. Therefore, investigation and
prosecution should see whether the person being charged under Section 8 ITPA, the
most commonly used section, did have the required intention or not. It is known that
the trafficked woman/girl is made to solicit under duress, coercion, lure, deceit or
compulsion by the trafficker or other exploiters. In such cases, the woman should be
treated only as a witness and not as an Respondent. If there was no informed
intention, the person cannot and should not be prosecuted for soliciting. Hence
establish a mens rea is necessary to invoke this provision. Thus, the counsel would
like to submit to this Hon’ble Court that in the absence of mens rea, the Respondent
cannot be held guilty and the abovementioned sections would remain inapplicable.

22
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

ISSUE 4 – Whether alleged transaction through bitcoins and its exchange into Indian
currency is contrary to law in India?
7. Jurisprudence of Cryptocurrency as per FEMA
7.1. As per the provisions of Foreign Exchange Management Act1999, currency is
defined as currency notified or recognised by the Reserve Bank, including
currency notes, bills of exchange, cheques, drafts, letters of credit, postal notes
and promissory notes7. Furthermore, Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999
also defines ‘foreign currency’ as “any currency other than Indian currency”.8 In
addition, the Act also states that Indian currency is the “currency which is
expressed or drawn in Indian Rupees”.9
7.2. The legal maxim ‘expressum facit cessare tacitum’ means that “what is
expressed makes what is implied silent”. This means that when coherence on a
matter is provided for in a document, the clear and precise meaning is to be
adopted. The implied meaning need not be adopted when a clear meaning is
provided. This doctrine has been applied by Indian courts in various cases to state
that expression precludes implication. Taking into account the provisions of
FEMA with this maxim, it can be concluded that cryptocurrencies should be
excluded from the definition of currency as stated by FEMA. While it may be
argued that it may fall under ‘such other similar instruments’ under Section 2(h),
however such ‘other instruments’ need to be specifically notified by the RBI
which is not the case here.
7.3. The FEMA also specifically defines the term ‘Currency Notes’. It states that
currency notes “means and includes cash in the form of coins and bank notes”.10
Therefore, it is clear from this definition that cryptocurrency such as Bitcoins may
not be included under the preview of the definition within the FEMA Act as these
are intangible in nature. Hence it can be reasonably concluded that under the

7
Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, Section 2(h).
8
Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, Section 2(m).
9
Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, Section 2(q).
10
Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, Section 2(i).

23
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

provisions of FEMA, Bitcoin cannot be considered to be currency. Therefore,

Veer has been wrongly charged under the foreign exchange rules.

8. Clarification on RBI Guidelines and Stance of Union Government

8.1. The circular issued by the Reserve Bank of India, dated 6 th April 2018,
explicitly prohibits financial institutions regulated by the RBI from dealing in
transactions involving cryptocurrency. Individual investors cannot be said to come
under the purview of this circular. Therefore, Veer cannot be implicated for any
wrongdoing on the basis of the same.
8.2. Following different queries that were raised in the Rajya Sabha on the legality
of cryptocurrency and whether the government has prohibited cryptocurrency
trading within the territory of the country, the Minister of State for Finance and
Corporate Affairs of India, confirmed in negative, stating that there presently
exists no different law for managing issues identifying with cryptocurrencies.
8.3. Consequently, all concerned departments and law enforcement offices, for
example, RBI, Enforcement Directorate and Income Tax authorities, and so forth
make a move according to the applicable existing laws.
8.4. Likewise, police/courts make a move on IPC offenses. Further, taking into
account the dangers and perils related with cryptocurrencies, the public authority
and RBI have been giving advisories, press statements and circulars to people in
general. These statements made by the Union Minister are reasonable grounds to
ascertain that dealing in cryptocurrency transactions is not in contravention of any
law or government order in India.
8.5. A high-level government panel was created to make recommendations on the
treatment of cryptocurrencies in the nation. The report of this committee,
submitted on 23rd July 2019, also included a proposal for a Draft Bill11.
8.6. Along with a nation-wide ban on trading of cryptocurrencies, the committee
has also proposed a hefty fine of ₹25 crore and imprisonment of up to 10 years for
individuals and companies indulging in any cryptocurrency-related activities. The
proposal is yet to be introduced in the Parliament and acted upon. Furthermore,

11
Banning of Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019.

24
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

the RBI has time and again been advising public to be cautious regarding the
trading of cryptocurrencies. In spite of this negative background against
cryptocurrencies, it can be confidently stated that there is no blanket ban on
cryptocurrencies yet.

9. Treatment of Bitcoins as Goods

9.1. As per the General Clauses Act 1987, the ambit of the term movable property
is wide enough to include all forms of movable property but not property that is
immovable in nature.12
9.2. This definition of movable property can be assumed to be wide enough to
include intangible properties within its ambit. This assumption is made on the
basis of the Supreme Court ruling made on the case of Tata Consultancy Services
v. State of Andhra Pradesh13 which stated that Indian law doesn't make any
qualification between tangible property and intangible property. A ‘product’ might
be a tangible property or an intangible one. It would become merchandise given it
has the ascribes thereof having respect to (a) its utility; (b) fit for being purchased
and sold; and (c) fit for transmitted, transferred, delivered, stored and possessed.
On the chance that whether a software tweaked or non-modified fulfils these
credits, similar would be classified as a good.
9.3. Furthermore, Sale of Goods Act, 1930 defines goods as all types of movable
property, and this definition including stocks and shares but not money or
actionable claims that are agreed to sold before a contract is entered into. 14Hence,
for the purpose of its legal treatment, cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin may be
treated as an intangible moving asset.
9.4. On the basis of this treatment, the exchange of Bitcoins for Indian Rupees
between Veer and Rahamat Saeed is not an exchange of foreign currency coming
under the purview of Foreign Exchnage Management Act, 1999, but is instead a
sale transaction coming under the purview of Sale of Goods Act, 1930, where
Bitcoins (the goods in this case) where sold by Veer to Rahamat Saeed for a
consideration in Indian Rupees as per its market value on the date of transaction.

12
General Clauses Act, 1897 Section 3(36).
13
Appeal (civil) 2582 of 1998.
14
Sale of Goods Act, 1930 Section 2(7).

25
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Therefore, Veer cannot be charged under the foreign trade and exchange laws as
stated by the Chandigarh Police.

ISSUE 5 – Whether Veer has committed the alleged offence punishable under Section 4 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Section 13 of the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999?
10. Classification of Bitcoins
10.1. In light of the Indian legislation, Bitcoins cannot be categorized under
conventional financial instruments such as currency, security or negotiable
instruments. So now it must be decided as to how they can be categorised.
10.2. As per Indian Copyright Act, the term “computer programme” refers to “a set
of instructions stated in schemes, codes, words or computer originated language
in order to achieve a particular target or accomplish a specific task.” Bitcoins are
essentially lines of computer-generated code that operate the transfer system of
bitcoin currency from an account to another. This would categorically put it into
the definition of computer programme.
10.3. As per General Clauses Act, 1897, the term “movable property” includes all
types of property except immovable property. In that context, computer
programmes will also fall in the broad purview of this definition which, therefore,
allows bitcoins to be considered as movable property.
10.4. Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 provides a broader definition of
goods15 which include all kinds of goods which can be classified as movable
property. The only exceptions here being securities, money and actionable claims.
In consideration of the above definitions, Bitcoins are generally classified as
‘Goods’ under the Indian legislative System.
11. Bitcoins under the Foreign Exchange Management Act (FEMA), 1999
11.1. The definition of the term ‘currency’ under FEMA is broad and includes “any
instrument which can be used to create a financial liability”. However,
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin are not named or indicated under the enumerated
categories under this definition. The term ‘currency notes’ refers to cash in the

15
Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, Section 2(d).

26
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

form of coins and banknotes. Furthermore, in response to an RTI query, the RBI
also stated that it does not classify cryptocurrency as currency under
FEMA. Therefore, Bitcoins do not fall under the definition of the term ‘currency’
as:
 It is not included under the definition of currency under the Sec 2(h) of the
FEMA;
 Not notified by the RBI as a currency.
11.2. Section 2(m) of FEMA defines ‘foreign currency’ as “any currency other
than Indian currency”. But the Cryptocurrencies are not considered currency
under the FEMA and therefore the cryptocurrency is neither foreign currency nor
foreign exchange under the FEMA. Furthermore, Section 2(i) of FEMA
specifically defines the term ‘Currency Notes’ as money in the form of cash as
well as coins.
11.3. Therefore, it is clear from this definition that Bitcoins may not be included
under the preview of the definition within FEMA as these are intangible in nature.
Hence it can be reasonably concluded that under the provisions of FEMA, Bitcoin
cannot be considered to be currency. Therefore, Veer has been wrongly charged
under the foreign exchange rules.
11.4. If an online exchange of Bitcoins is initiated wherein a person is allowed to
sell or buy Bitcoins using Indian currency, then such an online transaction will be
regulated by the Sale of Goods Act or any other laws which pertains to the
purchase or sale of goods on any exchange platform. On the basis of this
treatment, the exchange of Bitcoins for Indian Rupees between Veer and Rahamat
Saeed is not an exchange of foreign currency coming under the purview of
FEMA, 1999, but is instead a sale transaction coming under the purview of Sale of
Goods Act, 1930, where Bitcoins (the goods in this case) where sold by Veer to
Rahamat Saeed for a consideration in Indian Rupees as per its market value on the
date of transaction.
12. Bitcoins under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002
12.1. Veer had been acquitted of any involvement in Rohini’s disappearance by the
Honourable Court in Dubai. Furthermore, the Court had directed the local police
to perform investigations on Sheikh Abdul’s activities, whose intentions and
actions seemed dubious. Hence, it has been concluded that Veer has not

27
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

committed any crime and is innocent with regard to Rohini’s disappearance.

Therefore, the Bitcoins transferred to him by Sheikh Abdul cannot be claimed to
be proceeds of any unlawful activity.
12.2. In addition to this, the Bitcoins transferred to him cannot be considered to be
capital investment for his start-up anymore. Since Sheikh Abdul is being
investigated by the Dubai Police, any involvement of Sheikh Abdul in his start-up
will damage his own and his entity’s repute. Dishonourable ties to the start-up
may hinder not just its growth but also its inception. Hence, the Bitcoins is being
treated by Veer as compensation from Sheikh Abdul for the legal expenses and
inconvenience that the former has been facing due to the latter’s actions.
12.3. In light of these treatments, it is not right to charge Veer under Section 4 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act as there has been no act of “projection of
proceeds of crime as untainted money”.

28
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, authorities cited and arguments advanced, the
Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana be pleased to –

1. To Declare this Hon’ble Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter
as per Section 188 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
2. To Acquit Mr. Veer Singhania from offences under the Indian Penal Code
and the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.
3. To Acquit Mr. Veer from offences under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 and Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 and
declare the transaction between Mr. Veer ad Rahamat Saeed legal and
according to law.
4. To Dismiss this petition and all claims of the Petitioner.

AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

29
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED
 DR. B. R. AMBEDKAR NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
LATE LALA DIP CHAND MEMORIAL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Counsel on behalf of Respondent

Sd/-

30
ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED