Individual Development:

A Holistic, Integrated Model

David Magnusson
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

A s the title of the chapter suggests, the aim of this chapter is to pre-
sent and discuss the main elements of an integrated, holistic model
for individual functioning and development, which can serve as a general
theoretical framework for planning, implementation, and interpretation
of empirical research on specific aspects of individual development. The
motive for such a model is discussed on the background of an analysis of
the present state of affairs, which is characterized more by fragmentation
of developmental subfields than by integration, which is a prerequisite for
further success.
The old holistic view has got new clothes and an enriched content
from three sources during recent decades. The first source is the modern
models for dynamic, complex processes, which have meant a theoretical
and empirical revolution in disciplines that are concerned with such
processes in natural sciences, biology, and medicine. These models em-
phasize the holistic character of the processes and the need for integra-
tion of all operating factors in the theoretical models, which serve as the
theoretical framework for planning, implementation, and interpretation
of empirical research. The second source is the rapid development in sci-

19

http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10176-001
Examining Lives in Context: Perspectives on the Ecology of Human Development,
edited by P. Moen, G. H. Elder, Jr., and K. Lüscher
Copyright © 1995 American Psychological Association. All rights reserved.
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

entific disciplines in which research has contributed knowledge about the

role of biological aspects of individual functioning and development: de-
velopmental biology, pharmacology, endocrinology, neuropsychology, and
other disciplines. The third source is the conceptual analyses of the role
of environmental factors, at different levels of organization, for which
Bronfenbrenner (1977, 197Ya, 1979b, 1993) has been a pioneer.
The chapter is mainly devoted to the presentation of a theoretical out-
line of a holistic, integrated model for individual development. The re-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

search strategy and methodological implications of such a model are

far-reaching, and it would lead too far to deal with them more compre-
hensively in this connection (see Bergman, 1988, 1993; Magnusson, 1988,
1993; Magnusson, Anderson, & Torestad, 1993; Magnusson & Bergman,
1988; Magnusson & Torestad, 1993, for further discussions).

I N D I V I D UAL DEVELOPMENT: A D E F I N I T I 0 N
Psychological research on individual development is concerned with in-
dividual functioning in terms of thoughts, feelings, actions, and reactions
studied across the lifetime of the individual.
Development of living organisms refers to progressive or regressive
changes in size, shape, and function during the lifetime. Psychological re-
search on individual development covers this process from conception to
death. In this definition, two concepts are essential: change and time. Time
is not the same as development, but development always has a temporal
dimension. Therefore, if a person’s distinctive pattern of characteristics re-
mains unchanged across time, no development has occurred. Consequently,
processes that go on in an unchanged manner, within existing structures,
do not constitute development. Thus, developmental models should be dis-
tinguished from models that analyze and explain why individuals function
as they do in terms of their current psychological and biological disposi-
tions. Because the current functioning of an individual is a result of ear-
lier developmental processes in his or her life course and because this cur-
rent functioning, at the same time, forms the basis for later stages, models
for current functioning and developmental models are complementary.

20
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

S C I E N T I F I C PROGRESS: T H E N E E D F O R
A GENERAL M O D E L O F H O M O

In the empirical sciences, one characteristic feature of real scientific

progress is increasing specialization. When specialization in a subfield of
the natural sciences has reached a certain level, it becomes apparent that
further progress lies in integration with what has been achieved in neigh-
boring disciplines. During recent decades, the most important steps for-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

ward in natural sciences have been taken by integration within the inter-
face of what earlier had been conspicuously different disciplines. This
happened first in the interface of physics and chemistry and recently in
the interface of biology, chemistry, and physics. The earlier unambiguous
and clear boundaries between subdisciplines have disappeared.
Also in empirical research on individual functioning, specialization
takes place. In some areas, specialization has been very productive and has
offered important contributions. However, despite the recent indications
of more integration among disciplines, for example, between brain research
and cognitive psychology, research in behavioral sciences in general is still
characterized by what Toulmin (1981) once described as “sectarian rivalry”
(p. 267). During the eighties, researchers, discussing the future prospects
of psychology, described this lack of integration as one of the main obsta-
cles for further, real scientific progress in behavioral sciences (de Groot,
1990; Thomae, 1988). As a matter of fact, this was also an issue of great
concern for Stern (1911) in the beginning of this century.
Thus, fragmentation is still a characteristic of psychological research
on individual functioning at all levels, that is, diversification of research
in specialties with little or no contact across domains. Fragmentation in-
volves content, concepts, research strategies, and methodology. At a
metatheoretical level, it has its roots in the existence of three main ex-
planatory models: mentalistic, biological, and environmental. (The mod-
els are, of course, not mutually exclusive; each one is a matter of empha-
sis.) The distinction between these explanatory models is not only of
theoretical interest. Each of them has had and still has a far-reaching im-
pact on fundamental aspects of societies: social welfare, politics, culture,

21
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

education, the causes and treatment of mental illness, criminal behavior,

and alcohol and drug abuse, to mention only a few (see Magnusson, 1988).
According to a mentalistic approach, the main explanation for an in-
dividual’s way of functioning is to be found in the functioning of the mind
and can be discussed and explained in terms of intrapsychic processes of
perceptions, thoughts, values, goals, plans, and conflicts. To this approach
belong personality theories in general, as well as the mainstream of re-
search on intelligence, cognitive processes, and learning-with repercus-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

sions in research on artificial intelligence. A strong representative of this

approach is, of course, Piaget.
The biological model identifies biological factors as having primary
influence on individual functioning. Its roots can be traced back to the
very old notion of individual differences in temperament as dependent on
the predominance of one of the four basic body fluids: blood, phlegm,
black bile, or yellow bile. When modern biological models of individual
development are applied, the major determining guiding factors are ge-
netic and maturational. In its extreme version, this model implies that in-
dividual differences in the course of development have their roots in genes,
with little role played by environmental and mental factors. This view was
characterized by Cairns (1979a) in terms of the organism as a “gene ma-
chine” (p. 165). The view was discussed and criticized by Hunt (1961),
who characterized the main elements of it in terms of “predetermined de-
velopment” and “fixed intelligence.” Research in behavioral genetics, phar-
macology, endocrinology, and neuropsychology during recent decades has
strengthened the biological explanation of individual functioning.
The environmental model locates the main causal factors for individ-
ual functioning in the environment. It is reflected in theories and models at
all levels of generality, from Marxist models for the society to stimulus-
response models for very specific aspects of behavior as it is studied in the
mainstream of experimental psychology. In developmental research, there
are various environmental streams with different sources. A strong and very
influential exponent is, of course, behaviorism (cf. Skinner, 1971; Watson,
1930).Another is psychoanalytic theory, which refers to early experiences of
the environment as guiding forces for the individual’s way of functioning
later in life. An additional influential line, which strongly influenced devel-
22
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

opmental psychology during the sixties, seventies, and eighties, is rooted in

sociology, in which the basic formulations about the strong environmental
impact on individual development were formulated by Durkheim (1897).
This view is reflected in the vast amount of research in which individual dif-
ferences in various aspects of the life course have been studied as the result
of differences in upbringing environments (cf. Bronfenbrenner & Crouter,
1983, and their discussion of the “new demography”).
An old controversy in developmental research is that between a biolog-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

ical and an environmentalisticview: the nature-nurture issue. The debate can

be traced back to the early times of our civilization. Plato in his Republic dis-
cussed the central issue of justice in the perspective of human character as
determined by nature [physics]and nurture [ trophe].In the modern history
of psychology, the biological view was formulated and strengthened by the
work of Galton and the publication of his influential book Hereditary Ge-
nius (1869). With respect to intelligence, his line of reasoning was followed
in the beginning of this century by Terman, Goddard, and Yerkes, among
others, all of whom believed that the intelligence tests that had been con-
structed at that time actually measured fixed and innate intelligence.
As pointed out by Eccles and Robinson (1985), it was chiefly in the
eighteenth century that the thesis of environmentalistic determinism be-
came “official,” much influenced by the empiristic psychology of Locke. A
view emphasizing the role of environment and the possibilities to influ-
ence individual development by environmental factors was advocated by
Binet (1909). He strongly argued against the view of intelligence as an in-
herited, fixed quantity: “We must protest and react against this brutal pes-
simism. With practice, enthusiasm, and especially method, one can suc-
ceed in increasing one’s attention, memory and judgement, and in
becoming literally more intelligent than one was before” (Binet, 1909, p.
126). Binet also took the consequence of this view and worked out a pro-
gram of “mental orthopaedics” as a method of improving the intelligence
of mentally retarded children (pp. 127-128). A recent contribution to this
nature-nurture debate was presented by Bronfenbrenner and Ceci ( 1994).
A somewhat younger controversy is that between the mentalistic and
the environmentalistic perspective, which is reflected in the debate be-
tween proponents of a cognitive approach (cf. Piaget, 1948) and propo-
23
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

nents of a socialization approach (cf. Miller & Dollard, 1941) to social de-
velopment and behavior. An example drawn from theories of moral de-
velopment may illustrate the issue. For Kohlberg (1969), moral develop-
ment is closely related to cognitive development. In contrast, both Marx
and Freud, from very different perspectives, regarded conscience, as the
base for moral choice, as being instilled from the outside through a process
of socialization beyond the individual’s control.
Of course, nothing is wrong with each of the three general explana-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

tory models per se. What is wrong occurs when each of them claims to-
tal supremacy, and that has been the case to an extent that has hampered
real progress both in research and in application.
Now, a basic question to be answered is the following: When research
in natural sciences is characterized by the iterative process of specializa-
tion and integration, why is behavioral research, including developmental
research, on the whole characterized by specialization with only little in-
tegration? The reason is probably complex, but let me point to a possible
explanation.
One condition that facilitates the iterative process of specialization and
integration in natural sciences is the existence of a general theoretical
framework, a general model of nature, for theorizing and conducting em-
pirical inquiry. The fact that we lack a corresponding general theoretical
framework for the formulation of problems, for the development of a com-
mon conceptual space, and for the development and application of ade-
quate methodologies is, in my opinion, an essential obstacle for further
real progress in the behavioral sciences.We need the formulation of a gen-
eral model of homo, which synthesizes and integrates the three metathe-
oretical models briefly described earlier. A modern, integrated holistic
model meets this requirement.

BASIC PROPOSITIONS OF AN INTEGRATED,

HOLISTIC VIEW
A modern, integrated, holistic model for individual functioning and de-
velopment rests on three basic propositions:

24
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

1. The individual functions and develops as a total integrated organism.

Development does not take place in single aspects, taken out of context.
As a general statement, this view is old. It is reflected in the assump-
tion about the four basic temperaments, in the typologies, and in the dis-
cussion about an idiographic versus a nomothetical approach and about
statistical versus clinical prediction in empirical research. In developmen-
tal research, a holistic view was advocated in the beginning of this century
(see, e.g., Stern, 1911). During recent decades, it has had its proponents
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

in Block (1971), Cairns (1979a, 1983), Magnusson (1988), Sameroff

(1983), Sroufe (1979), and Wapner and Kaplan (1983), among others. In
a volume that did not receive the attention it deserved, Cairns (1979a) ex-
pressed this view in the following formulation: “Behavior, whether social
or nonsocial, is appropriately viewed in terms of an organized system, and
its explanation requires a ‘holistic analysis’ ” (p. 325). Sroufe (1979) ex-
pressed the same general view: “There is a logic and coherence to the per-
son that can only be seen in looking at total functioning” (p. 835).
In a modern holistic model, individual functioning and development
is best described as a series of dynamic, complex processes; that is, many
factors are involved and operate simultaneously in an individual, most of-
ten in a nonlinear way. For understanding such processes in general, the
mainstream models of dynamic, complex processes-chaos theory (Basar,
1990; Gleick, 1987), catastrophe theory (Zeeman, 1976), and general sys-
tems theory (Bertalanffy, 1968)-must be considered. They have been for-
mulated in the scientific disciplines concerned with dynamic processes
(e.g., meteorology, ecology, biology, brain research, and chemistry) and
have had a far-reaching, almost revolutionary influence on theorization
and empirical research in these fields (see, e.g., Bothe, Ebeling, Kurzhan-
ski, & Peschel, 1987). A consequence of the formulation of the modern
models for complex, dynamic processes has been the development of ad-
equate methodologies for the study of such processes, for example, the re-
vival of nonlinear mathematics and methods for the study of patterns.
These models for dynamic, complex processes have important impli-
cations, if adequately applied, also for theorization and empirical research
on the dynamic, complex process of individual development. When the

25
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

methodologies developed for such models are considered in psychology,

we have to avoid the mistake we made when we took over models and
methods from natural sciences, particularly physics, in the beginning of
this century. By doing this without careful analysis of the phenomena that
were the objects of our interest and without consideration of these phe-
nomena’s characteristics, we applied models and methods from physics in
an inappropriate way. Most researchers now agree that this had a ham-
pering effect on real scientific progress in psychological research.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Thus, although it is important to consider the modern models for dy-

namic, complex processes mentioned above, it is equally important to be
careful with their application in research on individual functioning. There
are some similarities between the structures and processes studied in nat-
ural sciences and the structures and processes investigated in psychologi-
cal research. But there are also essential differences, particularly when the
interest is in the functioning of the total organism. At that level, funda-
mental characteristics and guiding elements in the dynamic, complex
process of individual functioning are intentionality, linked to emotions
and values, and lessons learned from experience. This fact must be taken
into consideration when methods derived for the study of dynamic, com-
plex processes, which do not have these elements, are applied in planning
and implementing of empirical research in psychology.
One basic formulation in modern models for complex, dynamic
processes has direct and important application for empirical research on
individual functioning. It states that the total process cannot be under-
stood by studying one aspect (variable) after the other in isolation from
the other, simultaneously operating elements. The total picture has an in-
formation value that is beyond what is contained in its specific parts (the
doctrine of epigenesis). This property of dynamic, complex processes has
important consequences for the planning, implementation, and interpre-
tation of empirical developmental research.
2. The individual functions and develops in a continuously ongoing, re-
ciprocal process of interaction with his or her environment.
This proposition forms the basic feature of classical interactionism. It
has been advocated and elaborated for a long time by researchers from
very different perspectives,both in research on personality and in research
26
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

on developmental issues. Baldwin ( 1895) explicitly discussed ontogenetic

and evolutionary development in such terms in the 1890s. And as sug-
gested by Cairns and Cairns (1985), there is a direct line from Baldwin to
Piaget and Kohlberg and those who have influenced various areas of de-
velopmental research. During the last decades, the role of person-envi-
ronment interaction for individual development has become accepted by
most developmentalists.
Particularly by his theoretical contributions, including the conceptual
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

analyses of the environment and its function, at different levels of orga-

nization, in the person-environment interaction process, Bronfenbrenner
(1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1989, 1993) has played a leading role in this devel-
opment.
3. The third basic proposition integrates mental factors, biological
factors, behavioral, and environmental factors in a dynamic-process
model. As was underlined in the introduction, two models are needed one
for current functioning of the individual within given structures and one
for the individual developmental process. Thus, the third basic proposi-
tion has two complementary subpropositions: one for current individual
functioning (3a) and one for individual functioning in a developmental
perspective (3b).
3a. At each specific moment, individual functioning is determined in a
process of continuous, reciprocal interaction between mental factors, biolog-
ical factors, and behavior-on the individual side-and situational factors.
The way this process in an immediate situation evolves can be de-
scribed with reference to Figure 1. The figure gives a simplified (but on
the main points correct) picture of what happens psychologically and bi-
ologically in a certain situation with specific features. (Note that the fig-
ure is only a summarized description of a temporal sequence of events,
not a neural network or a neuropathway.)
Assume that an individual encounters a situation that he or she in-
terprets as threatening or demanding. The cognitive act of interpreting the
situation stimulates, through the hypothalamus, the excretion of adrena-
line from the adrenal glands, which in turn triggers other physiological
processes. The cognitive-physiological interplay is accompanied by emo-
tional states of fear, anxiety, or generally experienced arousal. In the next
27
 DAVID MAGNUSSON
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

A simplified picture of the interplay of environmental, cognitive-emotional, physiologi-

cal, and behavioral factors for an individual in a specific situation.

stage of the process, these emotions affect the individual's behavior and
handling of the environment. They also influence his or her interpreta-
tion of the sequence of changes in the situational conditions and thereby
his or her physiological reactions in the next stage of the process.
Thus, the perceptual-cognitive system and the biological system of an
individual are involved in a continuous loop of reciprocal interaction. The
way this process functions is contingent, among other things, on the en-

28
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

vironment, as it is perceived and given meaning by the individual. The

outcomes of such situation-individual encounters will set the stage for
subsequent reactions and actions to psychologically similar situations, as
interpreted by the individual in his or her perceptual-cognitive system. In
the developmental process, this interaction process affects both the men-
tal system-for example, in the interpretation of certain types of situa-
tions and in the response to such situations-and the physiological sys-
tem. Frequent encounters with stressful situations may affect the immune
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

system and lead to psychosomatic symptoms (Farmer, Kaufmann, Packard,

& Perelson, 1987; Ohman & Magnusson, 1987).
3b. The individual develops in a process of continuous reciprocal inter-
action among psychological, biological, and environmental factors.
Stattin and Magnusson (1990) illustrated this process by assessing the
implications of biological maturation rate for the developmental process
of girls. When the girls were 14 years and 5 months, on average, Stattin
and Magnusson found a strong relation between different aspects of norm-
breaking behavior (e.g., alcohol consumption) and the age at which each
girl had reached menarche. In a follow-up study of the girls when they
reached the age of 26, there was no systematic relation between various
aspects of social adaptation (e.g., alcohol consumption) and each girl’s age
at menarche. However, there was a systematic relation between other as-
pects of adult life (e.g., family, children, education level, and job status)
and age at menarche. Further analyses showed that the important medi-
ating factor behind the more advanced social behavior among early-
maturing girls was association with older, working boys. Early-maturing
girls without this association did not demonstrate socially advanced be-
havior. The early-maturing girls who associated with older, working boys
also differed from girls without this association with respect to mental fac-
tors, such as self-perception.
Thus, to understand and explain the role of biological factors, here
the rate of biological maturation in the developmental process, we have
to consider mental factors, biological factors, behavior, and environmen-
tal factors operating simultaneously (Pulkkinen, 1992).
Together, these propositions form the main elements of modern

29
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

interactionism. What distinguishes modern interactionism from classical

interactionism or developmental contextualism is the introduction of
biological factors in individual functioning and the ongoing recipro-
cal interactive processes of biological and mental factors in the indi-
vidual.

THE MENTAL SYSTEM IN A

HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

A basic element of an interactionistic, holistic view is that a person is not

only a passive receiver of stimulation from the environment, but also an
active, purposeful agent in the person-environment interaction process
(Endler & Magnusson, 1976). Thus, a guiding principle in the individual's
inner and outer life is in the functioning of the perceptual-cognitive sys-
tem (including worldviews and self-perceptions) with attached emotions,
motives, needs, values, and goals. It can be briefly summarized as the in-
tegrated mental system.
The dynamic conception of mental processes as activities, rather than
as the reception and processing of information, was advocated early by the
act psychologists in Europe, such as Brentano (1874/1924) and Stumpf
(1883). In the United States, James was a proponent of the same view. The
intentional character of the individual's way of functioning was stressed
by Tolman (1951), among others, and more recently the individual as an
active, purposeful agent has been emphasized in action theory (cf. Brandt-
stadter, 1993; Strelau, 1983; see also Pervin, 1990).
By selecting and interpreting information from the external world and
transforming this information into internal and external actions, the men-
tal system plays a crucial role both in the process of interaction between
mental and physiological factors within the individual and in the process
of interaction between the individual and his or her environment. Not
only does the mental system permit the organism to shape its effective en-
vironment, but also it provides a rapid and reversible strategy for organ-
isms to adapt to changing environments. The mental system serves as a
leading edge for adaptation in individual development in that it mobilizes

30
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

neurobiological and physiological modifications and environmental

changes.
Congenital factors (including genetic factors) set the stage for the de-
velopment of an individual's mediating mental system. Within the re-
strictions, and using the potentialities of these biological factors, the struc-
ture and functioning of an individual's mediating mental system are
formed. This system changes slowly in a process of maturation and expe-
rience that takes place in the continuous, bidirectional interaction between
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

the individual and the environment. Thus, the mediating system is a func-
tion of the individual's interaction with the environment in the course of
individual development, and it plays a crucial, guiding role in that inter-
action process at each stage of the developmental process.
In some psychodynamic models of individual development and the
functioning of the mental system, the concept of unconscious processes
has played a central role. This debate has been given new fuel during the
past few decades through the growing interest in and understanding of
the parallel processes of controlled (conscious, attended to, and thus sub-
ject to critical analysis) versus automatic (out of attentional focus and
awareness) processing of information (see, e.g., Bowers, 1981; Brewin,
1986; Greenwald, 1992; Norman & Shallice, 1980). This continuously on-
going processing of signals impinging on the senses subliminally renders
new importance to the perceptual-cognitive system; at the same time, it
plays down the central role earlier ascribed to its conscious functioning.

BIOLOGICAL FACTORS IN A
HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE
Two lines of research on biological factors are of interest in this connec-
tion:
1. As discussed in the introduction, an issue of debate since ancient
times has concerned nature versus nurture: the relative role of hereditary
and environmental factors in individual functioning, currently and in a
developmental perspective.
Since the beginning of the history of differential psychology, the role

31
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

of genetic factors has been a main issue (Galton, 1869). After a period,
starting during the 1960s, in which genetic factors were almost abandoned
from the agenda, the development in human genetics has led to a renewed
interest. That various aspects of individual functioning are, to some ex-
tent, determined by inherited properties of the body is supported by much
empirical research (Cairns & Nakelski, 1971; Lagerspetz & Lagerspetz,
1971; Pedersen, 1989; Plomin, Chipuer, & Loehlin, 1990).
The traditional view on the role of genetic factors has been a unidi-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

rectional, cause-effect relation. At a most basic level, the onset and course
of certain developmental sequences may be determined genetically to the
extent that they are common to all individuals. However, even such devel-
opmental sequences as the onset of the menstrual cycle in girls and the reg-
ulation of growth in height are somewhat modifiable by environmental fac-
tors. The individual phenotype develops in the framework offered by the
genotype in a reciprocal interaction process with the environment, a process
that starts at conception and goes on through the life span. On the scene
set by inherited factors, many different plays are possible (Waddington,
1962). Within the limits set by inherited factors, there are large potential-
ities for change, because of the interplay with environmental factors.
Thus, that there is a hereditary predisposition for a certain type of be-
havior does not mean that it cannot be changed by environmental influ-
ences (cf. Angoff, 1988). Cairns (1979), in his evaluation of the role of
heredity and environment in individual differences in aggression, drew the
conclusion that the differences obtained by selective breeding show strong
environmental specificity and can be modified by environmental social
conditions to such an extent that the inherited differences no longer mat-
ter. In well-planned longitudinal studies of newborns, Meyer-Probst,
Rossler, and Teichmann ( 1983) demonstrated that favorable social condi-
tions acted as protective factors for later social development among chil-
dren identified at birth as biologically rich.
In this perspective, current individual functioning is the result of a life
history of a person-environment interaction, in which environmental and
inherited factors participate in a process for which it is not possible to dis-
entangle their relative role at the individual level. The outcome of the process,

32
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

at a certain stage of development, depends on the potential resources and

limitations of the individual from the start and the properties of the envi-
ronment with which the individual interacts during the life course.
2. The interaction process in which an individual is involved with the
environment can be described in terms of an active adaptation process
(Lerner, 1991). In this adaptation process, physiological factors, in con-
stant interaction with cognitive-emotional factors, play an important role.
On the biological side of this internal process, the endocrine system, in
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

particular the sympathetic-adrenal and pituitary-adrenal systems, is of

special importance. Cannon (1914) pointed to the role of the sympa-
thetic-adrenomedullary system in emergency situations and demon-
strated that adrenaline and noradrenaline are released as an effect of sym-
pathetic innervation in response to threatening stimuli, as an adjustment
mechanism to prepare the body for fight and flight (see Figure 1 and the
discussion under 3a, pp. 27-29).
The rapid developments in neuropsychology, endocrinology, and
pharmacology during the last decades have brought new knowledge about
the role of physiological factors for the way that people think, feel, act, and
react (cf. Magnusson, af Klinteberg, & Stattin, 1993; Rutter & Casaer, 1991;
Zuckerman, 1980).Recent research on temperament has demonstrated the
biological basis for temperament at an early age (Kagan, 1989, 1994). The
relation of thoughts, emotions, and behavior to physiological processes
has been elucidated in much recent empirical research (see, e.g., Gunnar,
1986, for a review). The role of individual differences in biological matu-
ration during adolescence was elucidated in the study by Stattin and Mag-
nusson (1990), presented above. That physiological factors are involved in
the developmental process has been empirically demonstrated in a num-
ber of studies on antisocial behavior (cf. Magnusson, af Klinteberg, & Stat-
tin, 1994).

BEHAVIOR IN A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE

As shown in the interactive model presented in Figure 1, behavior in all
its manifestations, including verbal and motor behavior, plays an essential

33
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

role in the total interaction process and, thus, also in individual develop-
ment. In the interaction process, behavior is influenced by cognitive in-
terpretations of what happens in the outer world (embedded in world-
views, self-perceptions, emotions, values, and needs), by subconscious
automatic processing and by physiological processes. At the same time, it
has a functional role in the total interaction process in two interrelated re-
spects: first, by activities to reach short-term and long-term goals (Pervin,
1983), such as changing the situational conditions to satisfy personal short-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

term and long-term needs and to avoid negative cognitive, mental, or bi-
ological experiences (Magnusson, 198 1) and, second, by adaptation to
other individuals’ behavior to develop and maintain working social rela-
tions (Cairns, 1994). The way the behavioral system of a person functions
in a particular situation at a particular stage of the life cycle, and how suc-
cessfully, is a result of the process of maturation and learning across de-
velopment.

THE ENVIRONMENT IN A
HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE
In the developmental process of a person, environmental factors play a de-
cisive role (see, e.g., Maccoby & Jacklin, 1983; Radke-Yarrow, 1991). Con-
tact with others is necessary for the development of speech and language
as a tool for thought and for communication (Camaioni, 1989; Tomaselli,
1992); for the development of adequate worldviews and self-perceptions
(Epstein & Erskine, 1983); and for the development of well functioning,
integrated norm and moral systems (Wilson, Williams, & Sugarman,
1967). The importance of contact with others for physical health has been
emphasized in the increasing number of reports from research on social
networks (e.g., Wills, 1984; Wortman & Dunkel-Schetter, 1987).
The individual and his or her environment do not form separate en-
tities. The individual is an active, intentional part of the environment with
which he or she interacts. Individuals meet their environment most di-
rectly in specific situations, which, in turn, are embedded in the larger en-
vironment with physical, social, and cultural properties operating both

34
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

directly and indirectly at all levels of specificity-generality in the per-

son-environment interaction (Barker, 1965; Bronfenbrenner, l977,1979a,
1979b, 1993; Magnusson, 1981).
The actual, physical environment acts on the individual in important
respects that can be reacted to without an intermediate process of inter-
pretation. The view of the environment as a source of stimulation that
elicits and releases individual responses was bluntly expressed by Skinner:
“A person does not act upon the world, the world acts upon him” (Skin-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

ner, 1971,p. 21 1).This conception of the environment is inherent in much

developmental research in which various aspects of the upbringing envi-
ronment in the home and at schools have been regarded as causes in the
developmental process of individuals, with reference to a one-direction
cause-effect model.
In a holistic, interactionistic perspective, the main role of the envi-
ronment in the functioning and development of an individual is to serve
as a source of information. This assumption contributes to understand-
ing the way an individual interacts with the environment at various lev-
els of complexity as conceptualized and discussed by Bronfenbrenner in
various connections. This view is reflected in modern social learning the-
ory, which assumes that an individual’s way of dealing with the external
world develops in a learning process in which two types of perceived con-
tingencies are formed: (a) situation-outcome contingencies (implying that
certain situational conditions will lead to certain outcomes) and (b) be-
havior-outcome contingencies (implying that certain actions by the indi-
vidual will have certain predictable consequences; cf. Bolles, 1972). The
formation of situation-outcome and behavior-outcome contingencies
constitutes one source for the stability and continuity of individuals’ func-
tioning in relation to the environment in current situations and for the
development of well functioning mental systems in the individuals.
The environmental influence on the developmental process differs
among individuals with respect to size and type of consequences. Of par-
ticular interest in this connection is the occurrence of significant single
events that may have profound impact on the life course of a person. Some
such events occur seemingly randomly, but also as a consequence of the

35
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

person’s readiness for a certain type of action or reaction (e.g., a marriage

or a new job) and an opportunity offered by the environment (e.g., meet-
ing a special, matching person or receiving an offer of a new job). In other
cases, a significant event may be the result of deliberate action by the per-
son himself or herself or by individuals whose actions influence others.
Significant single events may occur over the whole life span, the char-
acter depending on the readiness of the individual, both mentally and
physically, to act and react in relation to the opportunities and restrictions
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

offered by the environment.

The effect of significant events is to change the direction of the life
course. For example, buying a new house in a certain area with specific
characteristics in terms of neighbors, opportunities or jobs, schooling, and
cultural and leisure activities-instead of in an area with other character-
istics-may have far-reaching effects on the direction of the future life
course of all family members. Sometimes the effect is not immediately vis-
ible, but grows slowly and ends up having decisive effects on the person’s
life in a manner that is characteristic of the so-called butterfly effect in
chaos theory. In other cases, the effect is more direct and leads to what
has been discussed in terms of turning points (Pickles & Rutter, 1991).

T H E TOTAL PERSON-ENVIRONMENT SYSTEM

The fact that the mental factors, behavior, biological factors, and envi-
ronmental factors have been discussed separately does not imply that they
function as four independent systems, operating interactively in the dual-
istic sense of a Cartesian view. They represent different aspects of a sys-
tem of personal and environmental factors, which together constitute an
integrated whole and operate as such (see also Schneirla, 1966).
The view reflected in the second proposition (p. 33) concerned with
person-environment interaction and referred to as classical interactionism
has been advocated and discussed by researchers under various headings.
For example, Pervin (1968) adopted the term transactionism, and Bandura
(1978) the term reciprocal determinism for individual functioning in a cur-
rent perspective. Baltes, Reese, and Lipsitt (1980) used the term dialectic-con-

36
 I N D I V I D U A L DEVELOPMENT

textualistic; Bronfenbrenner and Crouter ( 1983), the term process-per-

son-context model; and Lerner and KaufTman (1985), the term develop-
mental contextualism, for their view on the person-environment process.
Here and in other connections, I have consistently over the years used
the terms interaction and interactionism. My reason is simple. They are
terms well established in all other life sciences to cover the essence of the
life processes of living organisms. Recently, a Swedish cell biologist used
the title “Life Is an Interaction” for a public lecture on his discipline (Lind-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

berg, 1992). It can only be harmful and detrimental to progress in our

own discipline and to collaboration with neighboring sciences if we al-
ways try to invent and use new terms instead of adopting concepts well
established in sciences with which we want to collaborate.

CAUSALITY: T H E CENTRAL ROLE OF

DYNAMIC INTERACT1 O N
When I use the term interaction here, it refers to lawful dynamic interac-
tion as a basic principle in the process of individual functioning. This
meaning of the term has to be distinguished from statistical interaction
in experimental designs for the study of individual differences.
An essential common characteristic of the explanatory models, which
were briefly described in the introduction, is the view of unidirectional
causality for the relation among variables. For a long time, the dominat-
ing general view, reflected in the experimental designs in the distinction
between dependent and independent variables and between predictors and
criteria, has been that biological and environmental factors are causes and
that mental phenomena are results. The notion of stimulus-response (S-
R) relations has been one of the most influential views in psychology. Many
personality models also assume a unidirectional relation between cogni-
tive-emotional factors and behavior.
In contrast to this traditional view, a central element in an interac-
tionistic model is the reciprocal interaction among operating factors (Mag-
nusson, 1990,1993; Magnusson & Torestad, 1993). Interaction among op-
erating factors is a fundamental characteristic of the processes of all living

37
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

organisms. (Interaction among elements is also a central aspect of relational

holism in physics; Zohar, 1990). It is central at all levels of individual func-
tioning, from the functioning of single cells and how they organize them-
selves into systems in a lawful manner to fulfill their developmental role in
the total organism (Edelman, 1987) to the functioning of a person in re-
lation to his or her environment (Endler & Magnusson, 1976). In the in-
teraction process, psychological factors can operate as causal factors, and
biological factors can influence psychological phenomena. What starts a
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

specific process and what maintains it vary. A psychological factor can start
a biological process that is then maintained by physiological factors, and
psychological factors can start and maintain a process that has been trig-
gered by biological factors. Environmental factors influence a person’s phys-
ical and mental well-being, and at the same time, an individual affects his
or her own environment in many different ways.
The example presented in Figure 1 illustrates how the mental, behav-
ioral, and biological systems of a person are involved in a continuous loop
of reciprocal interaction in a current situation. The example illustrates
how this process is dependent on the character of the specific, proximal
situation that the individual encounters, particularly the situation as it is
perceived and interpreted by the individual. The empirical example about
maturing girls from Stattin and Magnusson (1990) shows how the devel-
opmental processes of the girls and their outcomes in the long range were
dependent on the psychological and biological dispositions of the girls;
the properties of the social, economic, and cultural environments in which
the specific situations that the girls encountered were embedded; and the
interaction among these factors.

DEVELOPMENTAL CHANGE: LAWFUL PROCESSES

I N T H E PERSON-ENVIRONMENT SYSTEM
A fundamental characteristic of the developmental process of a person is
that the total person environment system of operating factors-biologi-
cal, psychological, and social-changes across time (Gottlieb, 1991). In the
balance between the built-in resistance to change in the total system and

38
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

subsystems once established, on the one hand, and sensitivity to factors in

the individual and in the environment that work for change, on the other,
the total system is in continuous transition into new states across the life-
time. In this process, both individuals and environments change and in-
teract as totalities: individuals as a result of biological changes (e.g., growth
or myelinization of the brain), as well as cognitive and emotional experi-
ences, and environments as a consequence of societal changes and of in-
dividuals’ direct and indirect actions in and on them, among other things.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

The fact that both persons and environments change across the life span
leads to changes in the character of the interaction between them. The in-
teraction process per se will thus precipitate development. For example, the
character of the interactive process within a family changes across time.
A consequence of the perspective applied here, with methodological
implications, is that changes do not take place in single aspects isolated
from the totality. The extent to which different aspects of individual func-
tioning are influenced by environmental factors in this process varies. For
example, in sexual development, some features, such as gonadal structure
and function, are strongly regulated by biological factors. On the other
hand, other aspects of individual functioning, such as choice of peers and
type of sexual relations, may be strongly open to experiential influences
(Cairns, 1991).
Much debate has been devoted to the issues of stability versus change
and continuity versus discontinuity in individual development. Charac-
teristics of most of these studies are (a) that they deal with data for sin-
gle variables one at a time, for example, aggressiveness, intelligence, and
hyperactivity and (b) that they express temporal consistency of single vari-
ables in terms of relative stability, that is, in terms of stable rank orders of
individuals across time for the variable under consideration (Weinert &
Schneider, 1993).
As emphasized above, a fundamental characteristic of individual func-
tioning as a holistic, dynamic process implies, among other things, that
individuals do not develop in terms of single variables but as total inte-
grated systems. In this perspective, all changes during the life span of a
person are characterized by lawful continuity (Magnusson & Torestad,

39
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

1992); the functioning of a person at a certain stage of development is

lawfully related to the functioning of the individual at earlier and later
stages, but is not necessarily predictable. Each change in the process of hu-
man ontogeny is understandable and explainable in the light of the indi-
vidual’s previous life history and the functioning of the environment at
the time for the change. This is true even for changes that are so abrupt
that they seem to break a stable direction of development; for example,
changes that have been characterized as turning points sometimes appear
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

as a result of chance events or significant events. This view makes the dis-
pute about whether individual development is characterized by continu-
ity or discontinuity a pseudoissue in developmental research. The inter-
esting aspect of this issue is what determines abrupt changes in the life
course of a person and the kind of mechanisms that underlie such changes.
Individual development is not a process of accumulation of outcomes;
it is rather, at the individual level, a process of restructuring of subsystems
and the whole system within the boundaries set by biological and social
constraints. If one aspect changes, it affects also related parts of the sub-
system and sometimes the whole organism. For example, if one of the nec-
essary operating factors in the coronary system totters, the whole coro-
nary system and the whole organism may be affected. At a more general
level, the restructuring of processes and structures at the individual level
is embedded in and part of the restructuring of the total individual-
environment system.
Much developmental research on stability and change has concen-
trated on stability and change in quantitative terms, and the issue has of-
ten been whether individual development is characterized by more of the
same in a way that is reflected in statistical stability of rank orders of in-
dividuals for the specific variable under consideration. It should be rec-
ognized that the process of developmental change in an individual is char-
acterized by both quantitative and qualitative change. The psychological
significance of a certain state of a certain variable depends on the context
of other, simultaneously operating variables in the system under investi-
gation (i.e., on the pattern of operating factors to which the variable un-
der consideration belongs).

40
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

These points have the implication-stressed by modern models for dy-

namic, complex processes, which were briefly referred to above-that the
functioning of the total process cannot be understood by the study of sin-
gle aspects, taken out and studied in isolation from their context with other
operating factors. Developmental change does not take place in single vari-
ables. It is the total individual that changes in a lawful way across time.

THE PATTERNING OF OPERATING FACTORS

Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

A basic, well-documented principle in the development of biological sys-

tems is their ability for self-organization (Barton, 1994; Eigen & Schuster,
1979; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1991; Kauffman, 1993; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977).
From the beginning of the development of the fetus, self-organization is
the guiding principle (Hess & Mikhailov, 1994). Within subsystems, the
operating components organize themselves in a way that maximizes the
functioning of each subsystem with respect to its purpose in the total sys-
tem. At a higher level, subsystems organize themselves to fulfill their role
in the functioning of the totality. We find this principle in the develop-
ment and functioning of the biological systems of the brain, the coronary
system, and the immune system. It can also be applied to the development
and functioning of the cognitive systems and manifest behavior.
For the discussion here, two aspects of the self-organizing processes
are essential. First, individuals differ in the way operational factors are or-
ganized and function within subsystems, such as the perceptual-cogni-
tive-emotional system, the immune system, the coronary system, and the
behavioral system. Individuals also differ in subsystem organization and
function. These organizations can be described in terms of patterns of op-
erating factors within subsystems and in terms of patterns of functioning,
cooperating subsystems. As an example, Weiner (1989) discussed the os-
cillations produced by natural pacemakers of the heart, the stomach, and
the brain in terms of patterns.
Second, the number of ways in which operating factors in a certain
subsystem can be organized in patterns, for the subsystem to play its func-
tional role in the totality, is restricted. The goal for empirical research is

41
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

Speech Preparation

p SBP
DBP
HR
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3

(n = 18) (n = 14) (n = 28)

Magnitudeof systolic blood pressure (SBP), diastolic blood pressure (DBP), and heart rate
(HR) reactivity in cardiovascular response clusters during preparation of a speech (from
Graber & Huber, 1994).

then twofold: (a) to identify the possible operating factors in the subsys-
tem under consideration and (b) to identify the ways in which these fac-
tors are organized (i.e., the actual working patterns of operating factors).
An empirical illustration to this view is presented by Gramer and Hu-
ber (1994). In a study of cardiovascular responses in what was assumed
to be a stressful situation, they found that the subjects could be classified
in three groups on the basis of their distinct pattern of values for systolic
blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, and heart rate (see Figure 2).
These data demonstrate a basic principle in individual development

42
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

underlying individual differences: The characteristic of individual devel-

opment is that it takes place in terms of patterns of operating factors. This
is true for the operating factors in subsystems such as the coronary sys-
tem, the immune system, the brain, and the cognitive system. It is also true
for the development of the individual as a whole, where the operating sub-
systems are organized at the top level in terms of patterns.
This view leads to the conclusion that the main individual differences
are to be found in the patterning of operating factors within subsystems,such
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

as those I just described, and in the patterning of subsystems in the totality,

for example, in the way the cognitive, the behavioral, and the physiological
systems function together in the total functioning of the individual.
The view that development takes place in terms of patterns of oper-
ating factors forms the theoretical basis for the application of a person ap-
proach in developmental research. The person approach is briefly dis-
cussed later.

INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
One of the major goals for scientific work is to arrive at generalizations
about the lawfulness of structures and processes in the space of phenom-
ena that are the objects of interest. In psychology, one of the roads to this
goal has been the systematic study of individual differences (cf. Cronbach,
1957; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985).

The Variable Approach

Empirical research on individual differences in the area of developmental
psychology has three main characteristics. An understanding of these char-
acteristics is important in order to understand and evaluate the relevance
of the results.
The first characteristic is the emphasis on variables in the search for
lawfulness of structures and processes in individual functioning and de-
velopment. The focus of interest is on a single variable or a combination
of variables, their interrelations, and their relations to a specific criterion.
The problems are formulated in terms of variables, and the results are in-

43
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

terpreted in such terms. This is the case in such studies as those on the re-
lationships among variables as a basis for factor analysis, on the stability
of single variables across time, on the links between environmental fac-
tors and various aspects of individual functioning, and on the develop-
mental background of adult functioning. An example is the research fo-
cusing on the relation between various aspects of individual functioning
and environmental upbringing conditions, on the one hand, and the de-
velopment of adult alcohol abuse and criminal behavior, on the other.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

The second characteristic is that the lawfulness of structures and

processes in individual functioning is studied by the application of vari-
ous regression models, mainly linear regression models. This approach to
the search for lawfulness implies the following interrelated assumptions:

Individuals can be compared on a nomothetical, continuous dimen-

sion in meaningful ways.
Individuals differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively, along the di-
mension for a certain variable.
Relationships among variables and their way of functioning in the to-
tality of an individual is assumed to be the same for all individuals. In
a multiple regression equation, each variable has the same weight for
all individuals and reflects what is characteristic of the average person.
The interrelations among variables studied in nomothetic analyses
can be used for inferences about how the variables actually function
within individuals.

These assumptions are too seldom made explicit and considered in

the interpretation of results from variable-oriented studies. Lewin ( 193 1)
discussed the limitations of this approach
The third characteristic of developmental research is the fact that
many, if not most, of the variables studied in empirical analyses are hy-
pothetical variables. A hypothetical variable is an abstraction aimed at de-
lineating a certain aspect of the total functioning of an individual-such
as intelligence, aggressiveness, hyperactivity, attachment, shyness-or
sometimes of the environment, such as social class or poverty. What is ac-

44
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

tually assessed as a measure of such an aspect is, of course, defined by the

properties of the procedure used for data collection, independent of the
wording of the theoretical definition. Hypothetical constructs, in which
developmental psychology abounds, run the risk of reification (ix., to be
regarded as tangible and really existing).
One complication of the traditional variable approach, that is, apply-
ing regression models for the treatment of data for hypothetical variables
in nomothetic analyses, is the existence of collinearity among variables,
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

expressed in sometimes very high correlations among variables (Darling-

ton, 1968). Statistical collinearity is reflected in sometimes very high in-
tercorrelations among operating variables.
One general aim of traditional, variable-oriented studies in develop-
mental research is to estimate the extent to which a specific variable or a
set of variables, regarded as independent variables, contribute to the sta-
tistical prediction of a specific criterion, regarded and treated as the de-
pendent variable. A study presented by Magnusson, Anderson, and
Torestad ( 1993) was performed to illustrate the problems connected with
this approach, in the perspective presented above.
The study was concerned with early person variables as antecedents of
adult alcohol problems. On the basis of an analysis of existing literature,
seven variables were chosen: aggressiveness, motor restlessness, concentra-
tion difficulties, lack of school motivation, disharmony, peer rejection, and
school achievement. The data were collected when the boys were 13 years
of age. Data for alcohol abuse were obtained from official registers. Both
predictor and criteria data were available with insignificant dropout.
In Table 1, the correlation coefficients are presented for the relation-
ship between each of the independent variables and the dependent vari-
able, obtained as point-biserial coefficients. As expected, each of the inde-
pendent variables had a significant linear relationship with the dependent
variable with one exception: peer rejection. Each of the semipartial coeffi-
cients presented in the last column reflects the unique relation between the
variable under consideration and the criterion when the role of the other
independent variables is partialed out. None of them exceeded the level of
.lo, which means that data for each of the independent variables shared

45
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

Point-Biserial Correlations and Semipartial Correlations Between the

Independent Variables and the Dependent Variable:
Registered Alcohol Abuse Age 18 Through Age 24

Independent variable Correlation Semipartial correlation

Aggressiveness .221 .025

Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Motor restlessness .236 .036

Concentration difficulties .262 .048
Low school motivation .259 .030
Disharmony .248 .079
School achievement -.180 -.018
Peer rejection ,055 - ,049

less than 1% with the total variance for registered alcohol abuse at adult
age, when the variance common with all of the other variables was removed.
Thus, the specific contribution of each single variable per se to the predic-
tion of alcohol problems at adulthood was limited.
As illustrated by the entries in Table 1, the specific role of single hypo-
thetical variables in the developmental process is conspicuously overesti-
mated in studies of single variables in isolation from their context of other,
simultaneously operating variables. This is overlooked too often because, fre-
quently, the roles of only one or a few independent variables are studied at
each time. A good prediction is that it would have been possible to publish
at least five studies, independent of each other, demonstrating a significant
correlation between early individual functioning and adult alcohol problems.
For a statistician, the figures presented in Table 1 are not surprising,
considering the intercorrelations among the independent variables. Nor
are the results surprising, if they are interpreted in the perspective of a
holistic, integrated model for individual development.
The analysis just presented shows the limitations of a simplistic vari-
able approach as a basis for understanding and explaining the function-
ing and development of the individual. This does not mean that the vari-

46
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

able approach can be abandoned in developmental research. It is a useful

tool as a first step, in which the goal is to identify possible operating fac-
tors in the system that is under consideration as a basis for the applica-
tion of a person approach.

The Person Approach

As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, the main characteristics
of an individual are in the patterning of structures and functioning of sub-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

systems and cooperating subsystems. A consequence of this view is that

the variable approach has to be complemented with a person approach,
in which the individual is the basic unit of observation (Bergman, 1988,
1993; Bergman & Magnusson, 1983; Magnusson & Bergman, 1988; Mag-
nusson, Stattin, & Dun& 1983). In a variable approach, the specific prob-
lem under consideration is formulated in person terms and operational-
ized and studied empirically in terms of patterns of values for variables
that are relevant to the problem under consideration. In other scientific
disciplines that are concerned with dynamic, complex processes, such as
ecology, meteorology, biology, and chemistry, pattern analysis has become
an important methodological tool.
The following steps are included in a pattern analysis:

Identification of the system to which a pattern analysis is to be ap-

plied. This implies specification of the level of analysis, that is, if the
interest is in the patterning of variables in a subsystem at a mi-
crolevel, such as a subsystem of the brain; in the patterning of vari-
ables at a more general level, for example, in the system of manifest
behavior; or in the patterning of subsystems forming a system of
higher order.
Identification of possible operating factors at the specified level of
analysis to constitute the pattern to be studied.
Application of a statistical method for pattern analysis, for instance,
grouping the individuals in categories that are homogeneous with re-
spect to their patterns of values for the variables included in the anal-
ysis.

47
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

An empirical illustration of a person approach, concerned with the

patterning of factors in the cardiovascular system, was presented in Fig-
ure 2. Another demonstration, which also offers a comparison with a vari-
able approach, can be obtained from Magnusson and Bergman (1988),
who used a person approach to the study of early problem behaviors as
precursors of adult adjustment problems, among them, alcohol problems.
Thus, the general purpose, the study of early antecedents of adult prob-
lems, was the same as that of the study presented by Magnusson, Anders-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

son, and Torestad (1993), referred to above. The result of the pattern analy-
sis is presented in Table 2.
The patterns in Table 2 are based on data for six variables, which cover
different aspects of problem behaviors: aggressiveness, motor restlessness,
concentration difficulty,low school motivation, underachievement, and peer
rejection. Empirical studies indicate that each of them is a possible operat-
ing factor in the developmental processes underlying adult maladjustment.
Data for each of the variables have been transformed to a scale with values
ranging from 0 to 4,reflecting levels of seriousness of problem behaviors for
boys at the age of 13. The methodology and results of the pattern analysis
were discussed in detail in Magnusson and Bergman (1988). Here, only a few
comments, pertinent to the discussion in this chapter, will be made.
Table 2 demonstrates that the boys could be grouped into eight dis-
tinctly different groups with reference to their pattern of values for the
variables under study. An inspection shows that four out of six problem
behaviors did not appear as single problem clusters for the boys at age 13.
For example, aggressivenessand motor restlessness, which have been stud-
ied extensively in the variable-oriented tradition as separate indicators of
maladjustment in both a cross-sectional and in a longitudinal perspective,
appear only in combination with other indicators. This result is an illus-
tration of the first basic proposition of a holistic model for individual
functioning and individual development: A certain aspect of the total
process cannot be finally studied and understood in isolation from its con-
text of other, simultaneously operating factors. A certain factor, say ag-
gressiveness, does not have a significance of its own per se, independent
of the context of other factors simultaneously working in the individual.

48
 Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Clusters of Boys at Age 13 Based on Data for Overt Adjustment Problems

Cluster meana

Cluster Average Motor Conc. Low school Peer

no. Size coefficientb Aggressiveness restlessness diff. motivation Underachievement rejection

1 296 .12
2 23 .30 -
A 3 40 .28 - -2.6
\o
4 61 .39 1.3 1.4 -
5 41 .39 1.5 2.3 1.9 -
6 12 .56 1.7 1.8 2.3 1.9 2.6
7 37 .37 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.3 -
8 22 .48 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.4

Residue 8 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 2.3

Note. Conc. diff. = concentration difficulty.

"Indicates that the cluster mean of,a variable is less than 1 in the 4-point scale coded 0, 1, 2, 3. bAverage coefficient means average error sum of squares
within the cluster.
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

It gets its significance from its context. This became even more apparent
in the follow-up study to the age of 24, which was reported by Magnus-
son and Bergman (1988). The long-term significance of a certain factor
was not in the factor itself, it was in the total pattern in which the factor
appeared at the individual level. For example, only when in combination
with other severe problem behaviors at the age of 13 was aggressiveness a
precursor of adult problems.
A number of methods for pattern analysis have been presented and
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

applied: multivariate P-technique factor analysis (Cattell, Cattell, &

Rhymer, 1947), Q-sort technique (Asendorpf & van Aken, 1991; Block,
1971), latent profile analysis (LPA; Gibson, 1959; Magnusson, Dun&, &
Zetterblom, 1975), configural frequency analysis (CFA; Lienert & zur
Oeveste, 1985;von Eye, 1990),and cluster-analytical techniques (Bergman,
1993).Use of higher order contingency-table techniques, for example, log-
linear analysis, seems to be one fruitful way for the study of configura-
tions of individuals’ values (see, e.g., Bishop, Feinberg, & Holland, 1975).
The methods that are available are mainly applicable to description of pat-
terns and less appropriate for the study of developmental change in process
terms (Magnusson & Torestad, 1993). For further scientific progress, de-
velopment of methods for empirical study of developmental change in
process terms is one of the most urgent tasks.

FINAL C O M M E N T S
A holistic, integrated model for individual functioning and development
does not imply that the whole system of an individual must be studied at
the same time. The essential function of the model is that it enables us to
formulate problems at different levels of the functioning of the total or-
ganism, to implement empirical studies, and to interpret the results in a
common, theoretical framework. For a long time, the Newtonian view of
the physical world has served this purpose in the natural sciences. The im-
plication of the acceptance of that model of nature has never been that
the whole universe should be investigated in one and the same study. But
it has enabled researchers concerned with very different levels of the total

50
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

system, for example, nuclear physicists and astrophysicists, to communi-

cate and understand each other. In the same way, an integrated, holistic
model for individual development should make it possible for all those
concerned with aspects of individual development, from developmental
biologists to psychologists focusing on social development, to plan, im-
plement, and interpret research in the same theoretical framework, thus
enabling them to communicate with each other effectively.
The complexity of individual functioning and developmental change
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

has brought some researchers to a pessimistic view about the future of

psychology as a science (cf. Cronbach, 1975). However, the litmus test of
a scientific discipline cannot be whether its phenomena are complex and
hard to analyze. The criterion for a science is the appropriateness of the
research strategy and methods that are applied in dealing with relevant
questions. Whenever processes display order and regularity on the basis
of given structures, it is a scientific challenge to map this lawfulness of or-
der and regularity (cf. Bateson, 1978, in press). To do that successfully in
research on individual development, a prerequisite for real scientific
progress is that we start in careful analysis of the nature of the phenom-
ena that are the objects of our interest; formulate the issues with reference
to the result of such analyses; and plan, implement, and interpret the em-
pirical research with reference to a holistic, integrated model for individ-
ual functioning and development (Cairns, 1979b, 1986; Magnusson, 1988,
1992; Magnusson & Cairns, in press).

REFERENCES
Angoff, W. H. (1988). The nature-nurture debate, aptitudes, and group differences.
American Psychologist, 43, 7 13-720.
Asendorpf, J. B., & van Aken, M. A. G. (1991). Correlates of the temporal consis-
tency of personality patterns in childhood. Journal of Personality, 59,689-703.
Baldwin, J. M. (1895). Mental development in the child and the race: Method and
processes. New York: Macmillan.
Baltes, P. B., Reese, H. W., & Lipsitt, L. P. (1980). Life-span developmental psychol-
ogy. In M. R. Rosenzweig & L. W. Porter (Eds.), Annual review of psychology
(Vol. 31, pp. 65-110). Palo Alto, C A Annual Reviews.

51
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

Bandura, A. (1978). The self system in reciprocal determinism. American Psycholo-

gist, 33, 344358.
Barker, R. G. (1965). Exploration in ecological psychology. American Psychologist, 20,
1-14.
Barton, S. (1994). Chaos, self-organization, and psychology. American Psychologist,
49, 5-14.
Basar, E. (Ed.). (1990). Chaos in brain function. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
Bateson, P. P. G. (1978). How does behavior develop? In P. P. G. Bateson 8 P. H.
Klopfer (Eds.), Perspectives in ethology: Vol. 3. Social behavior. New York Plenum.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Bateson, P. (in press). Design for a life. In D. Magnusson (Ed.), The life-span devel-
opment of individuals: Behavioral, neurobiological and psychosocial perspectives.
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Bergman, L. R. (1988). Modeling reality. In M. Rutter (Ed.), Studies ofpsychosocial
risks: The power of longitudinal data (pp. 354-366). Cambridge, England Cam-
bridge University Press.
Bergman, L. R. (1993). Some methodological issues in longitudinal research Look-
ing forward. In D. Magnusson & P. Casaer (Eds.), Longitudinal research on in-
dividual development: Present status and future perspectives (pp. 217-241). Cam-
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Bergman, L. R., & Magnusson, D. (1983). The development of patterns of malad-
justment. In Report from the project Individual Development and Environment.
Stockholm: Stockholm University.
Bertalanffy, L., von. (1968). General system theory. New York: Braziller.
Binet, A. (1909). Les idea modernes sur les enfants [Modern ideas about children].
Paris: Ernest Flammarion.
Bishop, Y. M. M., Feinberg, S. E., & Holland, P. W. (1975). Discrete multivariate
analysis: Theory and practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Block, J. (1971). Lives through time. Berkeley, C A Bancroft Books.
Bolles, R. C. (1972). Reinforcement, expectancy, and learning. Psychological Review,
79, 394-409.
Bothe, H. G., Ebeling, W., Kurzhanski, A. B., & Peschel, M. (Eds.). (1987). Dynami-
cal systems and environmental models. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
Bowers, K. S. (1981). Knowing more than we can say leads to saying more than we
can know: On being implicitly informed. In D. Magnusson (Ed.), Toward a psy-
chology of situations (pp. 179-194). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

52
 I N D1 V I D UAL D EV E L 0 PM EN T

Brandtstadter, J. ( 1993). Development, aging and control: Empirical and theoretical

issues. In D. Magnusson & P. Casaer (Eds.), Longitudinal research on individual
development: Present status and future perspectives (pp. 194-216). Cambridge,
England Cambridge University Press.
Brentano, F. ( 1924). Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkte. Mit ausfirhrliche Ein-
leitung. Leipzig: F. Meiner. (Original work published 1874)
Brewin, C. R. (1986). Cognitive foundations of clinical psychology. Hillsdale, NJ: Erl-
baum.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1977). Toward an experimental ecology of human development.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

American Psychologist, 32, 5 13-53 1.

Bronfenbrenner, U. ( 1979a).Context of child rearing: Problems and prospects. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 34, 834-850.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979b). The ecology of human development: Experiments by na-
ture and design. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bronfenbrenner, U. (1989). Ecological systems theory. Annals of Child Development,
6,185-246.
Bronfenbrenner, U. ( 1993). The ecology of cognitive development: Research mod-
els and fugitive findings. In R. H. Wozniak & K. Fischer (Eds.), Development in
context: Acting and thinking in spec@ environments (pp. 3-44). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Bronfenbrenner, U., & Ceci, S. J. (1994). Nature-nurture reconceptualized in de-
velopmental perspective: A bioecological model. Psychological Review, 101,
568-586.
Bronfenbrenner, U., & Crouter, A. C. (1983). The evolution of environmental mod-
els in developmental research. In P. Mussen (Series Ed.) & W. Kassen (Vol. Ed.),
Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 1. History, theories and methods (4th ed., pp.
357-414). New York Wiley.
Cairns, R. B. (1979a). Social development: The origins and plasticity of interchanges.
San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Cairns, R. B. (1979b). Toward guidelines for interactional research. In R. B. Cairns
(Ed.), The analysis of social interactions: Methods, issues, and illustrations. Hills-
dale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Cairns, R. 8. (1983). The emergence of developmental psychology. In P. Mussen (Se-
ries Ed.) & w. Kassen (Vol. Ed.), Handbook of child psychology: Vol. 1. History,
theories and methods (4th ed., pp. 41-101). New York Wiley.

53
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

Cairns, R. B. (1986). Phenomena lost: Issues in the study of development. In J.

Valsiner (Ed.), The individual subject and scientijkpsychology (pp. 79-1 11). New
York: Plenum.
Cairns, R. B. (1991). Multiple metaphors for a singular idea. Developmental Psy-
chology, 27,23-26.
Cairns, R. B. (1994, June). Socialization and sociogenesis. In The life-span develop-
ment of individuals: A synthesis of biological and psychosocial perspectives. Sym-
posium, Stockholm.
Cairns, R. B., & Cairns, B. D. (1985). The developmental-interactional view of so-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

cial behavior: Four issues of adolescent aggression. In D. Olweus, J. Block, & M.

Radke-Yarrow (Eds.), The development of antisocial and prosocial behavior. New
York: Academic Press.
Cairns, R. B., & Nakelski, J. S. (1971). On fighting in mice: Ontogenetic and exper-
imental determinants. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 71,
354-364.
Camaioni, L. (1989). The role of social interaction in the transition from commu-
nication to language. In A. de Ribaupierre (Ed.), Transition mechanisms in child
development (pp. 109-125). New York Cambridge University Press.
Cannon, W. B. (1914). The emergency function of the adrenal medulla in pain and
the major emotions. American Journal of Physiology, 33, 356-372.
Cattell, R. B., Cattell, A. K. S., & Rhymer, R. M. (1947). P-technique demonstrated
in determining psycho-physiological source traits in a normal individual. Psy-
chometrika, 12, 267-288.
Cronbach, L. J. (1957). The two disciplines of scientific psychology. American Psy-
chologist, 12, 671-684.
Cronbach, L. J. (1975). Beyond the two disciplines of scientific psychology. Ameri-
can Psychologist, 30, 116127.
Darlington, R. B. (1968). Multiple regression. Psychological Bulletin, 69, 161-182.
de Groot, A. D. (1990). Unifylng psychology: A European view. In P. J. D. Drenth,
J. A. Sergeant, & R. J. Takens (Eds.), European perspectives in psychology: Theo-
retical, psychometrics, personalitx developmental, educational, cognitive, geronto-
logical (Vol. 1, pp. 3-16). New York: Wiley.
Durkheim, E. (1897). Le suicide: Etude de sociologie [Suicide: A sociological study].
Paris: Alcan.
Eccles, J., & Robinson, D. N. (1985). The wonder of being human. Boston: New Sci-
ence Library.

54
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

Edelman, G. (1987). Neural Darwinism: The theory ofneuronal group selection. New
York: Basic Books.
Eigen, M., & Schuster, P. (1979). The hyper cycle-A principle of natural self-organi-
zation. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
Endler, N. S., & Magnusson, D. (1976). Toward an interactional psychology of per-
sonality. Psychological Bulletin, 83,956-979.
Epstein, S., & Erskine, N. (1983). The development of personal theories of reality
from an interactional perspective. In D. Magnusson & V. L. Allen (Eds.), Hu-
man development: A n interactional perspective (pp. 133-147). New York Aca-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

demic Press.
Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, M. W. (1985). Personality and individual differences:A nat-
ural science approach. London: Plenum.
Farmer, J. D., Kaufmann, A., Packard, N. H., & Perelson, A. S. (1987). Adaptive dy-
namic networks as models for the immune system and autocatalytic sets. In
S. H. Koslow, A. J. Mandell, & M. F. Schlesinger (Eds.), Annals ofthe New York
Academy of Sciences: Vol. 504. Perspectives in biological dynamics and theoretical
medicine (pp. 118-131). New York New York Academy of Sciences.
Galton, F. (1869). Hereditary genius: An inquiry into its laws and consequences. Lon-
don: Macmillan.
Gibson, W. A. (1959). Three multivariate models: Factor analysis, latent structure
analysis and latent profile analysis. Psychometrica, 24,229-252.
Gleick, J. (1987). Chaos: Making a new science. New York Penguin Books.
Gottlieb, G. (1991). Experiential canalization of behavioral development: Theory.
Developmental Psychology, 27, 4-1 3.
Gramer, M., & Huber, H. P. (1994). Individual variability in task-specific cardiovas-
cular patterns during psychological challenge. German Journal of Psychology, 18,
1-17.
Greenwald, A. G. (1992). Unconscious cognition reclaimed. American Psychologist,
47,766-779.
Gunnar, M. R. (1986). Human developmental psychoendocrinology: A review of re-
search on neuroendocrine responses to challenge and threat in infancy and
childhood. In M. E. Lamb, A. L. Brown, & B. Rogoff (Eds.), Advances in devel-
opmental psychology (Vol. 4). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Hess, B., & Mikhailov, A. (1994). Self-organization in living cells. Science, 264,
223-224.
Hunt, J. McV., (1961). Intelligence and experience. New York Ronald Press.

55
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

Kagan, J. (1989). Unstable ideas: Temperament, cognition, and self: Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Kagan, J. (1994). Galen’s prophecy: Temperament in human nature. New York: Basic
Books.
Kaplan, M. L., & Kaplan, N. R. (1991). The self-organization of human psycholog-
ical functioning. Behavioral Science, 36, 161-179.
Kauffman, S. A. (1993). The origins of order. New York: Oxford University.
Kohlberg, L. ( 1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to
socialization. In D. A. Goolin (Ed.), Handbook of socialization theory and re-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

search. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Lagerspetz, K. M. J., & Lagerspetz, K. Y. H. (1971). Changes in the aggressiveness of
mice resulting from selective breeding, learning and social isolation. Scandina-
vian Journal of Psychology, 12,241-248.
Lerner, R. M. (1991). Changing organism-context relations as the basis of develop-
ment: A developmental contextual perspective. Developmental Psychology, 27,
27-32.
Lerner, R. M., & Kauffman, M. B. (1985). The concept of development in contextu-
alism. Developmental Review, 5, 309-333.
Lewin, K. (1931). Environmental forces in child behavior and development. In C.
Murchison (Ed.), A handbook of child psychology (pp. 94-127). Worcester, MA:
Clark University Press.
Lienert, G. A., & zur Oeveste, H. (1985). CFA as a statistical tool for developmental
research. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 45, 301-307.
Lindberg, U. (1992). Livet iir en interaktion [Lifeis an interaction]. Stockholm: Folku-
niversitetet.
Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin, C. N. (1983). The “person” characteristics of children and
the family as environment. In D. Magnusson & V. L. Allen (Eds.), Human de-
velopment: An interactional perspective (pp. 75-91). San Diego, CA: Academic
Press.
Magnusson, D. (1981). Toward a psychology of situations: An interactional perspec-
tive. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Magnusson, D. (1988). Individual development from an interactional perspective.
Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Magnusson, D. ( 1990). Personality development from an interactional perspective.
In L. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook ofpersonality (pp. 193-222). New York: Guilford
Press.

56
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

Magnusson, D. (1992). Back to the phenomena: Theory, methods and statistics in

psychological research. European Journal of Personality, 6, 1-14.
Magnusson, D. (1993). Human ontogeny: A longitudinal perspective. In D. Mag-
nusson & P. Casaer (Eds.), Longitudinal research on individual development:
Present status and fiture perspectives (pp. 1-25). Cambridge, England: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Magnusson, D., af Klinteberg, B., & Stattin, H. (1993). Autonomic activity/reactiv-
ity, behavior, and crime in a longitudinal perspective. In J. McCord (Ed.), Facts,
fiameworkr, and forecasts (pp. 287-3 18). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Magnusson, D., af Klinteberg, B., & Stattin, H. (1994). Juvenile and persistent of-
fenders: Behavioral and physiological characteristics. In R. D. Ketterlinus & M.
Lamb (Eds.), Adolescent problem behaviors. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Magnusson, D., Anderson, T., & Torestad, B. (1993). Methodological implications
of a peephole perspective on personality. In D. C. Funder, R. D. Parke, C. Tom-
linson-Keasey, & K. Widaman (Eds.), Studying lives through time: Personality
and development (pp. 207-220). Washington, DC: American Psychological As-
sociation.
Magnusson, D., & Bergman, L. R. (1988). Individual and variable-based approaches
to longitudinal research on early risk factors. In M. Rutter (Ed.), Studies ofpsy-
chosocial risk: The power of longitudinal data (pp. 45-61). Cambridge, England:
Cambridge University Press.
Magnusson, D., & Cairns, R. B. (in press). Developmental science: Principles and il-
lustrations. In R. B. Cairns, G. H. Elder, Jr., E. J. Costello, & A. McGuire (Eds.),
Developmental science. Cambridge, England Cambridge University Press.
Magnusson, D., Dun& A., & Zetterblom, G. (1975). Adjustment: A longitudinal study.
Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell.
Magnusson, D., Stattin, H., & Dun& A. (1983). Aggression and criminality in a lon-
gitudinal perspective. In K. T. van Dusen & S. A. Mednick (Eds.), Prospective
studies of crime and delinquency (pp. 273-301). Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Magnusson, D., & Torestad, B. (1992). The individual as an interactive agent in the
environment. In W. B. Walsh, K. Craig, & R. Price (Eds.), Person-environment
psychology:Models and perspectives.Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Magnusson, D., & Torestad, B. (1993). A holistic view of personality: A model re-
visited. Annual Review of Psychology, 44,427-452.
Meyer-Probst, B., Rossler, H. D., & Teichmann, H. (1983). Biological and psychoso-
cial risk factors and development during childhood. In D. Magnusson & V. L.

57
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

Allen (Eds.), Human development: An interactional perspech’ve (pp. 244-259).

San Diego, C A Academic Press.
Miller, N. E., & Dollard, J. (1941). Social learning and imitation. New Haven, C T Yale
University Press.
Nesselroade, J. R., & Ford, D. H. (1987). Methodological considerations in model-
ing living systems. In M. E. Ford & D. H. Ford (Eds.), Humans as self-constructing
living systems: Putting the framework to work (pp. 47-79). Hillsdale, NJ: Erl-
baum.
Nicolis, G., & Prigogine, I. (1977). Self-organization in non-equilibrium systems. New
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

York Wiley Interscience.

Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1980). Attention to action: Willed and automatic con-
trol of behavior (CHIP Report 99). San Diego, CA: University of California.
Ohman, A., & Magnusson, D. (1987). An interactional paradigm for research on psy-
chopathology. In D. Magnusson & A. Ohman (Eds.), Psychopathology: An in-
teractional perspective. New York Academic Press.
Pedersen, N. (1989). Some evidence regarding the importance of genes and envi-
ronments during behavioral development. ISSBD Newsletter, 1 5 3 4 .
Pervin, L. (1968). Performance and satisfaction as a function of individual environ-
ment fit. Psychological Bulletin, 69, 56-68.
Pervin, L. A. (1983). The stasis and flow of behavior: Toward a theory of goals. In
M. M. Page (Ed.), Personality: Current theory and research (pp. 1-53). Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press.
Pervin, L. A. (1990). A brief history of modern personality theory. In L. A. Pervin
(Ed.), Handbook ofpersonality: Theory and research (pp. 3-18). New York Guil-
ford Press.
Piaget, J. (1948). The moral judgment of the child. Glencoe, I L Free Press.
Pickles,A., & Rutter, M. (1991). Statistical and conceptual models of “turning points”
in developmental processes. In D. Magnusson, L. R. Bergman, G. Rudinger, &
B. Torestad (Eds.), Problems and methods in longitudinal research: Stability and
change (pp. 133-166). Cambridge, England Cambridge University Press.
Plomin, R., Chipuer, H. M., & Loehlin, J. C. (1990). Behavioral genetics and per-
sonality. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research.
New York Guilford Press.
Pulkkinen, L. (1992). Life-styles in personality development. European Journal of Per-
sonality, 6, 139-155.
Radke-Yarrow, M. (1991). The individual and the environment in human behav-

58
 INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

ioural development. In P. Bateson (Ed.), The development and integration of be-

haviour: Essays in honour of Robert Hinde (pp. 389-410). Cambridge, England
Cambridge University Press.
Rutter, M., & Casaer, P. (1991). Biological risk factors for psychosocial disorders. Cam-
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Sameroff,A. J. (1983). Developmental systems: Contexts and evolution. In P. H. Mussen
(Ed.), Handbook of child psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 237-294). New York Wiley.
Schneirla, T. C. (1966). Behavioral development and comparative psychology. Quar-
terly Review of Biology, 41,283-302.
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

Skinner, B. F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York Knopf.

Sroufe, L. A. (1979). The coherence of individual development: Early care, attach-
ment, and subsequent developmental issues. American Psychologist, 34,
834-84 1.
Stattin, H., & Magnusson, D. (1990). Paths through life: Vol. 2. Pubertal maturation
in female development. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Stern, W. (191 1). Die difierentielle Psychologie in ihren metodischen Grundhgen [Dif-
ferential psychology in its methodological basis]. Leipzig, Germany: Verlag von
Johann A. Barth.
Strelau, J. (1983). Temperament-personality-activity. New York Academic Press.
Stumpf, C. (1883). Tonpsychologie [True psychology] (Vol. 1). Leipzig, Germany: S.
Hirzel.
Thomae, H. (1988). Das Individum und seine Welt: Eine Pers onlichkeitstheorie [The
individual and his world A theory of personality]. Gottingen, Germany:
Hogrefe.
Tolman, E. C. (1951). A psychological model. In T. Parsons & E. A. Shils (Eds.), To-
ward a general theory of action (pp. 279-364). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Tomaselli, M. (1992). The social bases of language acquisition. Social Development,
1, 67-87.
Toulmin, S. (1981). Toward reintegration: An agenda for psychology’s next century.
In R. A. Kasschau & Ch. N. Cofer (Eds.), Psychology’s next century: Enduring is-
sues (pp. 264-286). New York Praeger.
von Eye, A. (1990). Introduction to configuralfrequency analysis: The search for types
and antitypes in cross-classifications. New York Cambridge University Press.
Waddington, C. (1962). New patterns in genetics and development. New York Co-
lumbia.

59
 DAVID MAGNUSSON

Wapner, S., & Kaplan, B. (1983). Toward a holistic developmental psychology. Hills-
dale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Watson, J. B. (1930). Behaviorism (2nd ed.). New York Norton.
Weiner, H. (1989). The dynamics of the organism: Implications of recent biological
thought for psychosomatic theory and research. Psychosomatic Medicine, 51,
608-635.
Weinert, F. E., & Schneider, W. (1993). Cognitive, social, and emotional develop-
ment. In D. Magnusson & P. Casaer (Eds.), Longitudinal research on individual
development: Present status and future perspectives (pp. 75-94). Cambridge, En-
Copyright American Psychological Association. Not for further distribution.

gland: Cambridge University Press.

Wills, T. A. (1984). Supportive functions of interpersonal relationships. In S. Cohen
& L. Syme (Eds.), Social support and health (pp. 61-82). New York: Academic
Press.
Wilson, J., Williams, N., & Sugarman, B. (1967). Introduction to moral education. Bal-
timore: Penguin Books.
Wortman, C. B., & Dunkel-Schetter, C. (1987). Conceptual and methodological is-
sues in the study of social support. In A. Baum & J. E. Singer (Eds.), Handbook
of psychology and health (Vol. 5, pp. 33-67). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Zeeman, E. C. (1976). Catastrophe theory. Scientific American, 234, 65-83.
Zohar, D. (1990). The quantum sew A revolutionary view of human nature and con-
sciousness rooted in the new physics.
Zuckerman, M. ( 1980). Sensation seeking and its biological correlates. Psychological
Bulletin, 88, 187-214.

60