The International Atomic Energy Agency

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) serves as the world’s foremost
intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation in the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. Established in 1957 as an autonomous international organization within
the United Nations system, the IAEA carries out programmes to maximize the contribution
of nuclear technology to society while verifying its peaceful use. The IAEA Secretariat has
been led by Director General Yukiya Amano since December 2009.

The IAEA works with its 164 Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe,
secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Through technical cooperation programmes
the IAEA assists its Member States and promotes the exchange of scientific and technical
information between them. The IAEA’s work also includes setting the framework for
cooperative efforts to build and strengthen an international nuclear safety and security
regime and verifying States’ fulfilment of their non-proliferation undertakings under the
NPT.

The IAEA headquarters is at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria. Operational
liaison and regional offices are located in Geneva, Switzerland; New York, USA; Toronto,
Canada; and Tokyo, Japan. The IAEA runs scientific laboratories in Vienna and Seibersdorf,
Austria and in Monaco. It also supports research centres, such as the one in Trieste, Italy.

The IAEA Secretariat is a team of some 2500 multi-disciplinary professional and support
staff from more than 100 countries.

The IAEA and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

The IAEA is not a party to the NPT but is entrusted with a key verification role under it. Under
the NPT, the IAEA has a specific role as the international safeguards inspectorate. The
IAEA serves also as a multilateral channel for transferring peaceful applications of nuclear
technology:

NPT Article III: The IAEA administers international safeguards to verify that non-nuclear
weapon States party to the NPT fulfil the non-proliferation commitment they have
made, “with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive devices.”

NPT Article IV: The IAEA facilitates and provides a channel for endeavours aimed
at “the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.”
IAEA Safeguards

Under Article III of the NPT, each non-nuclear-weapon State party undertakes the
obligation to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Under such
agreement, the IAEA has the right and obligation to ensure that safeguards are applied
on all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State,
under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of
verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.

As of the end of 2014, safeguards were applied for 180 States1,2 with safeguards agreements
in force with the IAEA. These States3 include the five nuclear-weapon-States party to the
NPT with voluntary offer agreements in force for which safeguards are applied to declared
nuclear material in selected facilities or parts thereof. Twelve non-nuclear-weapon States
party to the NPT had not yet brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force
as required by Article III of the NPT.4

Although the IAEA has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify
the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness
of the State’s declarations), the tools available to the IAEA under such an agreement
are limited. Indeed, one of the greatest challenges for the IAEA is to detect undeclared
nuclear material and activities. Additional protocols concluded based on the 1997 Model
Additional Protocol equip the IAEA with important supplementary tools which provide the
IAEA with broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under
an additional protocol thus significantly increase the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful
use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement. By the
end of 2014, 124 States had brought additional protocols into force.

At the end of 2014, the IAEA was implementing safeguards in some 1300 facilities and
safeguarding nuclear material equivalent to some 190 000 significant quantities5. The
implementation of safeguards involves activities carried out both in the field and at
the IAEA’s headquarters in Vienna. The latter activities include the evaluation of States’
nuclear material accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive
safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of other safeguards
1 These States do not include the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the IAEA did not
implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.
2 And Taiwan, China.
3 These States also include those States that are not party to the NPT for which the IAEA applies safeguards
pursuant to item-specific safeguards agreements to nuclear material, nonnuclear material, facilities and other
items subject to such safeguards agreements.
4 A summary of the status of States´ safeguards agreements is available at: https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/
documents/sir_table.pdf.
5 A significant quantity of nuclear material is the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility
of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.
relevant information. In implementing in-field activities, the Secretariat annually carries
out approximately 2000 inspections and spends some 12 000 calendar-days in the field for
verification.

Since the 2010 Review Conference, the IAEA has continued its effort to resolve outstanding
safeguards implementation issues in three States.6

Peaceful Applications of Nuclear Technology

Consistent with its statutory mandate “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world”, the IAEA’s activities
include: developing and transferring nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes to its
Member States; contributing to the strengthening of the global nuclear safety framework
and strengthening the security of nuclear material and facilities.

The IAEA, through its technical cooperation (TC) programme, aims to support tangible
socio-economic development by promoting the use of appropriate nuclear science
and technology in addressing major sustainable development priorities of Member
States at the national, regional and interregional levels. The programme concentrates
on six thematic areas — human health, agricultural productivity and food security, water
resources management, environmental protection, physical and chemical applications,
and sustainable energy development, together with a cross cutting thematic area — safety
and security — and supports the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. The
IAEA’s TC programme is unique in the UN system, in that it combines significant technical
and developmental competencies. It seeks to forge human and institutional capacities
in Member States, so that they can safely and securely maximize the utilization of nuclear
technologies to address challenges to sustainable socioeconomic development.7

Ensuring safety and security is primarily the responsibility of each State. However, the
recognition of far reaching and transboundary consequences of any severe nuclear
or radiological emergency has led to the recognition of the central role of the IAEA
in promoting international cooperation and in coordinating international efforts to
strengthen global nuclear safety, in providing expertise and advice in this field and in
promoting nuclear safety culture worldwide. The IAEA continues to help develop and
strengthen the global nuclear safety and security framework based on strong national
infrastructures, international instruments, safety standards and security guidelines. The IAEA
6 For further details on the safeguards implementation issues see Section 3 of the background document to the
2015 NPT Review Conference prepared by the IAEA Secretariat on Activities of the International Atomic Energy
Agency relevant to article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/13).
7 For further details on the IAEA TC programme, promotion of peaceful nuclear cooperation and the IAEA
Peaceful Uses Initiative see, inter alia, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the background paper to the 2015 NPT Review
Conference prepared by the IAEA Secretariat on Activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency relevant to
article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/14).
assists Member States in these areas, upon their request, through peer reviews, advisory
services, knowledge networks and capacity building activities.8

8 For further details on nuclear safety and nuclear security see Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the background paper to
the 2015 NPT Review Conference prepared by the IAEA Secretariat on Activities of the International Atomic Energy
Agency relevant to article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT/CONF.2015/14).