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3Republic of t!Je ,113!Jilippines

~upreme QI:ourt
;J;l!lanila

THIRD DIVISION

JEFFREY M. CALMA, G.R. No. 242070

Petitioner,
Present:

LEONEN, J, Chairperson,
GESMUNDO,
-versus-
CARAJ-.JDANG,
ZALAMEDA, and
LOPEZ: JJ

MARI KRIS SANTOS-CALMA, Promulgated:

August 24, 2020
Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

When the totality of evidence demonstrates psycholog1cal incapacity,

a marriage may be declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code. 1

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari' under Rule 45 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the assailed Decision 3 and

Designated additional Member per Raffle dated June 8, 2020_

FAMJLY CODE, art. 36 provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated ro comply with the essential marital obligations ofmaiTiage, shall likewise be void even
if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Rollo, p. 25-39.
Id. at 222-237. The June 21, 2018 Decision docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 109155 was penned by
Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan
(now a member of this Court) and Marie Christine Azcatnga-.Jacob of the Eighth Division. Court of
Appeals, Manila.
Decision 2 GR. No 242070

Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 109155 be reversed

and set aside, and that petitioner Jeffrey M. Calma's (Jeffrey) marriage with
respondent Mari Kris Santos-Calma (Kris) be declared null and void in
accordance with Article 36 of the Family Code.

The assailed Court of Appeals Decision affirmed Guagua Regional

Trial Court's January 6, 2017 Decision' which dismissed the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed by Jeffrey against Kris. The
assailed Resolution denied Jeffrey's Motion for Reconsideration.

Jeffrey met Kris in February 2005 while they were both working as
Jollibee crew members. Within a month of meeting each other, they had
become sexually intimate. Soon after, Kris became pregnant. Though
admittedly incapable of raising a family, Jeffrey sought Kris' hand in
marriage. They were married in civil rites on August 15, '.2005. 6

Ten days into their marriage, Jeffrey received information that he was
given a visa for a three-year contract as an overseas Filipino worker in the
Middle East. Confronted with this, Jeffrey and Kris agreed that Kris would
live with Jeffrey's parents in Pampanga while he was away working. This
choice was also due, in part, to how Kris did not have good relations with
her parents. 7

On December 31, 2005, Kris gave birth to their son, Josh Xian. A few
months later, Kris told Jeffrey that she wanted to stay with her own family in
Bulacan. Jeffrey acceded. After a couple of months, however, Kris told
Jeffrey that she needed to leave Bulacan due to a misunderstanding with her
father. Jeffrey then made arrangements for Kris to live at his sister's house
in Quezon City. 8

Jeffrey thought things were going well, when he noticed that Kris'
demands for money kept escalating; always claiming that the money was for
Josh Xian. In 2008, Kris changed mobile numbers in rapid succession,
making Jeffrey suspicious. Moreover, some time in 2008, Kris asked for
more money, explaining that she was in "deep trouble[.]" 9 Jeffrey responded
that he was due to return to the Philippines shortly, and asked that Kris wait
for him instead. 10

Id. at 251~252. The August 22, 2018 Resolution docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 109155 was penned by
Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo and concurred in by Associate .Justices Samuel H. Gaerlan
(now a member of th!s Court) and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob of the Former Eighth Division.
Court of Appeals, Manila. ~- ~
Id. at 40-48. The [)eC'13ion docketed as Civil Case NO. G-13-4943 was penned by Presiding Judge
Meridch D. Delos Santos-Malig of the Regional Trial Comi, Branch 51. Guagua Pampanga.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
io Id.
Decision 3 G.R. No 242070

Upon his return, Kris never bothered to meet Jeffrey. He had to go to

Bulacan to see her and his son. While Josh Xian was there, Kris was not.
Kris' parents told Jeffrey that K1is was already cohabiting with another man
and was pregnant. His in-laws allowed him to have Josh Xian and advised
him to start anew. 11

When Jeffrey confronted Kris, she allegedly showed no remorse and

blamed Jeffrey for abandoning her to work abroad. Kris would never again
talk to Jeffrey or visit Josh Xian. 12

In 2013, Jeffrey considered the possibility of having his marriage to

Kris declared null. Efforts were then made to locate Kris. 13 Clinical
psychologist Dr. Leo Ruben C. Manrique's services were subsequently
engaged. After interviews with Jeffrey, Kris, and their relatives. 14 Dr.
Manrique concluded that Kris: (1) was suffering from schizoid personality
disorder; (2) manifested maladaptive behavioral patten1s; and (3) was
psychologically incapacitated to such an extent that she was "incapable of
performing essential marital obligations[.]" 15

Subsequently, Jeffrey filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of

Marriage on account of psychological incapacity.

Jeffrey presented three (3) witnesses: (I) himself; (2) his mother; and
(3) Dr. Manrique. 16

After trial, the Guagua Regional Trial Court rendered its January 6,
2017 Decision 17 dismissing Jeffrey's Petition on account of his supposed
failure to show the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Kris'
psychological capacity. The Regional Trial Court was particularly
dismissive of Dr. Manrique's findings, stating that nothing was offered by
way of evidence. 18

Still centering on the supposed inadequacies of Dr. Manrique's

findings, the Court of Appeals' assailed June 21, 2018 Decision 19 affirmed
the Regional Trial Court.

1
I
' Id.
i2 Id.
13
Id. at4I-42.
i.i. Id. at 78.
15
Id. at 224.
16
Id. at 225.
17
Id. at 40-48.
18
Id. at 44.
19
Id. at 222-237.
Decision 4 G.R. No 242070

Following the denial20 of his Motion for Reconsideration, Jeffrey filed

the present Petition.

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability of Kris' psychological capacity has
been shmvn as would justify the declaration of nullity of her marriage to
Jeffrey.

Article 36 of the Family Code identifies psychological incapacity as a

groillld for considering a mani.age void:

ARTICLE 36. Amarriagc contracted by any party v.-·ho, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

This Court had an early occasion to interpret Article 36 in Santos v.

Court of Appeals. 21 Noting that Article 36 was deliberately framed with
"less specificity ... [so as to] to allow some resiliency in its application[,]" 22
Santos dete1mined that:

"[P]sychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not

physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
''psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. 23

Santos proceeded to determine that psychological incapacity, under

Article 36, "must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence,
and (c) incurability." 24

Proceeding from this, Republic i, Court of Appeals and 1\10/ina25 set

more specific standards. Republic v. Pangasinan 26 summarized these f
20
Id. at 25 1-252.
21
31 O Phil. 21 (1995) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].
12
ld. at 36.
23
Id. at 40.
24
ld. at 39.
25
335 Phil. 664 (I 997) [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
26
792 Phil. 808 (2016) [Per J. Velasco, Jr., Third Division]
Decision 5 G.R. No 242070

standards, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the mamage

belongs to the plaintiff.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)

medically or clinica1ly identified, (b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in
the decision.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

celebration" of the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be mediCally or

clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) 'D1e essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Fa'llily Code as regards the husband
and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

In sum, a person's psychological incapacity to comply with his or

her essential obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted
on a medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and
shovm to have existed at the time of mani.age, although the manifestations
thereof may only be evident after marriage[.] 27 (Citations omitted)

However, jurisprudence subsequent to Molina observed that the

Court's decision "has unnecessarily imposed a perspective by which
psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally inconsistent with the way
the concept was formulated~ free in form and devoid of any definition." 28
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, decided in 2009, lamented that "Molina has become a strait- /

27
Id. at 820, citing Aurelio v. Aurelio, 665 Phil. 693 (2011) [Per J. Pernlta, Second Division].
28
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666,669 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
Decision 6 G.R. No 242070

jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it."29 It explained:

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to

impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in _Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by
the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was
sensitive to the [Office of the Solicitor General's] exaggeration of Article
36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended
consequences of A·folina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to
live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like tennites, consume little by little the very foundation
of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended
by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into
and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Comi, in conveniently
applying };Jolina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and
pervert the sanctity ofmarriage[.] 30 (Citations omitted)

In 2015, Kala:w v. Fernandez3' echoed Ngo Te:

The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. I3ut Article 36 of the
Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied
given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of
"less specificity'' obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application."
Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to
its ovm facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all
fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of lhe trial
court." 32 (Citation omitted)

II

The Molina guidelines have spurred emphasis on the importance of

expert testimony. For example, Hernandez v. Court Appeals, 33 citing the
second Molina guideline, explained:

I1 must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered

personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private
respondent's youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome, as the J
29
Id. at 696.
30
Id. at 695---696.
31
750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
32
Id. at 499-500.
33
377 Phil. 919 (1999) [Per J_ Mendoza. Second Division].
 Decision 7 GR. No 242070

appellate court held. As pointed out in [_Molina]:

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must

be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological-not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that the person could not have kno'Wn the
obligations he was assuming, or k.."lowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis . . nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating
nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to

establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological
incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
maniage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests
upon petrt10ner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 34
(Citations omitted)

It has, however, been subsequently clarified that expert findings on

either of the spouses' psychoiogical incapacity obtained from direct,
personal examination is not an absolute and indispensable requirement.
Drawing on the nature of marriage as a relation between two individuals,
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes 35 emphasized that infonnation obtained from
either party to the marriage may suffice to inform an expert's assessment:

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent,

or any otber person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se
invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings
automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion as
evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only

two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and maniage is generally and genuinely \.Vitnessed mainly by
the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment
of the present state of the parties' marriage from the perception of one of
the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage,
had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent's pattern of
behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists f
34
Id. at 931-932.
642 Phil. 602 (201 0) [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
Decision 8 GR. No 242070

and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists' and psychiatrist's

assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview- of
the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent's own son, siblings
and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their ovro
observations of respondent's behavior and interactions with them,
spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the
basis of the doctors' assessments. 36 (Citations omitted)

Marcos " Marcos 37 categorically stated that psychological incapacity

is ultimately determined by the totality of evidence. It is not necessarily
negated by perceived imperfections in expert findings, or even by total non-
examination of the person alleged to be psychologically incapacitated:

Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a

marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There
is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such
declaration. 38

Commenting on the Molina guidelines, Marcos further explained:

The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the

person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. ln fact, the root
cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the
presence- of evidence that can adequately establish the party's
psychological condition. For indeed, ff the totality of evidence presenfed
is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 39
(Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

Informed by these evolving standards in Article 36 cases-and, in the

process, itself evolving these standards as well-jurispn1dence has become
more receptive to varying manifestations of psychological incapacity.

Some marriages, which this Court saw as warranting a declaration of

nullity, stand out for the rather prodigious narratives involved (even as some
proportions were not quite literally immense). They involved egreg10us
examples of a spouse's being psychologically incapacitated.

For example, Chi kling Tsai v. Court of Appeals, 40 involved "the

Id. at 627.
I
"
38
397 Phil. 840 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
Id. at 842.
Id. at 850.
40
334 Phil. 294 [Per J. Torres, Jr., Second Division].
Decision 9 GR. No 242070

senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties"41 to engage in sexual

relations throughout the entire duration spanning their marriage to their de
facto separation. This Court found these circumstances to be indicative of
"the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found
themselves[,] trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated
marital obligations[. ]"42

Antonio" Reyes,43 involved a pathological iiar who: (1) concealed to

her spouse how she previously bore a son (and instead introduced him to her
spouse as her family's adopted child); (2) fabricated a tale about her brother-
in-law attempting to rape and kill her; (3) misrepresented herself to be a
psychiatrist; (4) falsely introduced herself as a singer in whose honor a
luncheon show was held ( even going to the extent of presenting a supposed
invitation); (5) invented two (2) non-existent friends and sent letters in their
names to her spouse; ( 6) altered her pay slip to inflate her income; and (7)
falsely claimed that a living room set purchased at a public market was
obtained from a famous furniture dealer. 44

Tani-De La Fuente v. De La Fuente45 involved a husband noted to be

suffering from paranoid personality disorder. He feared that his 15-year-old
cousin was his wife's lover and thus, poked a gun at his head. Further, he
made a sex slave out of his wife-having sex with her as much as five (5)
times a day, and forcing to see her during lunch break just to have sex. In a
heated argument in front of their children, he poked a gun at his wife's
head. 46

The marriages involved in some recent cases decided by this Court

have involved manifestations of psychological incapacity which were of
somewhat lesser notoriety. \Vithout meaning to discount the gravity of
circumstances in those cases, it is nevertheless a reasonable observation that
recent jurisprudence has exhibited a greater wrningness to admit
psychological incapacity in cases that evoked far less bizarre narratives.

Resolved in 2015, Kalaw saw this Court reverse itself after ruling in
47
2011 that no declaration of nullity was availing. This involved an
allegation by the husband regarding the wife's "immaturity and
irresponsibility towards [him] and their children during their co-habitation,
as shown by [the wife]'s following acts:

1. she left t.lie children Villthout proper care and attention a,;; she

41
Id. at 303.
42
Id. at 305.
43
Antonio v. Reyes, 519 Phil. 337 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
44
Id. at 344-345.
45
807 Phil. 31 (20 17) [Per J. Leanen, Second Division].
46
Id. at 34-35.
47
Kalaw v. Fernandez, 673 Phi!. 460 (201]) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
Decision 10 G.R. No 242070

played mahjong all day and all night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the
early hours of the follow-ing day; and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone

discovered in flagrante delicto." 48 (Citation omitted)

In reversing itself, this Court showed a keener understanding of how

the wife's fixation with gambling was far from innocuous:

The frequency of the respondent's mahjong playing should not

have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at
the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties
and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her
children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them
to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.

Nonetheless, tlle long-term effects of the respondent's obsessive

mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her
very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by
Valerio Teodoro Kalaw - the parties' eldest son - in his deposition,
whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had
been hooked on playing mahjong[.]

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children's

moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protec-i: her children, as expressly defined under
Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code[.] 49 (Citation omitted)

In Camacho-Reyes, 50 this Court remarked that:

[The husband's] pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a

psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as
shovm by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3)
substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money
obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family
businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa. 51

In Azcueta v. Republic, 52 the wife alleged that her husband was

"emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself

~
9
Id. at 463.
Kalaw v Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482, 515-517 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division].
I
,o 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura,Second Division].
51
Id. at 632---633.
52
606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro. First Division].
Decision 11 G.R. No 242070

to married life[.]" 53 Specifically, he was noted to have "never bothered to

look for a job and instead always asked his mother for financial
assistance." 54 Further, the place where they resided was secured by her
mother-in-law, who also paid rent. At one point, the husband claimed to
have found a job, but was only spending time at his parents' residence.
When confronted, he explained that he pretended to have a job so that his
wife "would stop nagging him[.]" 55 The spouses' sex life was also said to be
"unsatisfactory[,]" 56 with them having sex only once a month and the wife
"never enjoy[ing] it." 57 The husband was also charged with inflicting
violence on his wife when he got drunk. 58

In concluding that the husband was psychologically incapacitated, this

Court explained:

We like\vise cannot agree with the [Court of Appeals] that

Rodolfo's irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother can be
attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at
the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the
fact that the expert testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical
cause for his abnormal behavior.

Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital

obligations embodied in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by
the trial court, as a result of Rodolfo's dependent personality disorder, he
cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his responsibilities as a
husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, support under Article 68. Indeed,
one who. is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot
independently make decisions regarding even the most basic and ordinary
matters that spouses face everyday; one who cannot contribute to the
material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations
within the meaning of Article 36. 59

Republic v. Mola Cruz 60 concerned a wife who started giving her

husband the "cold treatment" 61 and was later confirmed to have been in an
extra-marital affair with a Japanese national. The wife left her husband,
although they later reconciled. Sometime after, however, the husband found
his wife's Japanese lover in their residence and, to his surprise, was

53

s4
ld.atl81.
Id.
J
55
Id. at 182.
56 Id.
s1 Id.
ss Id.
59
Id.atl97-198.
60
G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018 <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thcbookshelf/showdocs/1/64585>
[Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
61 Id.
Decision 12 G.R. No 242070

introduced by his wife to her lover as her elder brother. The wife would
again leave the husband and ultimately cohabit with her !over. The wife was
found to be suffering from histrionic personality disorder. This Court
explained:

It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for

legal separation. It may be noted, however, that the courts a quo duly
connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her
histrionic personality disorder. A person with such a disorder was
characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate
gratification. These traits were especially reflected in Liezl's highly
unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital
abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and
introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of
desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of
the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person who
reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage. 62
(Citation omitted)

III

In keeping with contemporary standards on appra1smg Article 36

cases, this Court finds that the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court
erred in failing to appreciate that respondent's condition was attended by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, thereby warranting a
declaration that her marriage to petitioner is void.

Witnesses recounted several damaging occurrences and

circumstances. None of these were ever successfully rebutted.

First, respondent was unable to settle in a single residence with her

and petitioner's son for a sufficiently prolonged duration. After getting
married, she initially opted to stay in Pampanga, and not with her parents in
Bulacan, because of strained relations with her parents. Shortly after giving
birth, however, she would opt to live with her parents. Things would not
work out with respondent's father and petitioner would have to make
arrangements for respondent to stay with his sister in Quezon City. 63
Respondent would, nevertheless, find her way back to Bulacan where
petitioner would endeavor to find her and their son upon his return. She
would, however, leave Bulacan again to cohabit with another person. 64

Second, respondent did not only squander whatever meager support

petitioner could muster. Worse, she kept entreating him for more money on
the pretense that it was for their son. At one particularly glaring instance,
I
o2 Id.
63
Rollo, p. 223.
64
Id. at 224.
 Decision 13 GR. No 242070

she offered no concrete justification and simply said that she was in "deep
trouble." 65

Third, for no apparent and justifiable reason, respondent distanced

herself from petitioner. While he was still abroad, sbe changed her mobile
number in rapid succession. 66 Upon his return, she never bothered to see or
communicate with him. After petitioner took their son with him, she never
communicated with petitioner or bothered to see their son. 67

Fourth, she engaged in an extra-marital affair, abandoning not only

petitioner, but also her son. 68

Lastly, she was utterly indifferent both to petitioner and her son. She
never objected to, questioned, or acted on her parents' allowing petitioner to
take their son. She showed no remorse when finally, she saw petitioner. To
the contrary, she would even cast the blame on him for "abandoning" 69 her
and working abroad. After their confrontation, she would never bother to
see their son. 70

Even without technical examination by a psychologist, the gravity of

respondent's quagmire and her utter inability to fulfill essential marital
obligations are plain to see. This gravity is further highlighted when
juxtaposed with similar conditions and circumstances of abandonment,
squandering, apathy, and dejection seen in such cases as Kalaw, 71 Camacho~
Reyes, 72 Azcueta,73 and Mola Cruz. 74

Respondent showed herself utterly incapable of "!iv[ing] together,

observ[ing] mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render[ing] mutual help
and support" 75 with her husband. She let petitioner carry the burden of
support all to himself, making things even worse by squandering whatever
support he rendered when he was abroad, and ultimately abandoning their
son to petitioner. She left petitioner and her son to their own devices in utter
and callous disregard of her obligations under Article 70 and 220 of the
Family Code:

f
ARTICLE 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
10 Id.
71
750 Phil. 482 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin. Special First Division_].
72
642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura,Second Division].
73
606 Phil. 177 (2009) [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].
74
GR. No. 236629, July 23. 2018 <https://elibrmyjudicimy.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/J/64585>
(Per J. Gesmundo, Third Division].
75
FAMILY CODE. art. 68.
Decision 14 G.R No 242070

family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall
be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the
income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or
absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from
their separate properties.

ARTICLE 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall
have with respect to their unemancipated children or \Vards the following
rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct

them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,

companionship and understanding;

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in

them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and
thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them
compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials.

supervise their activities, recreation and association with others,
protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring
habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;

(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;

(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the

circumstances; and

(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents
and guardians.
Decision 15 G.R. No 242070

Further t6 the undisputed facts and incidents just recalled, Dr.

Manrique's findings confirmed the extent of respondent's debility. By
identifying her as suffering from schizoid personality disorder, and
manifesting maladaptive behavioral patterns, 76 Dr. Manrique's report
medically identified the root cause of her psychological incapacity, and
explored how she has been rendered incapable of fulfilling essential marital
obligations. Thus, her lack of interest in social relationships-though not as
grave as the degree manifested in schizophrenia 77 -prevents her from
developing strong attachments and from staying in relationships. Her
maladaptive behavioral patterns affect her impulse control and makes her
susceptible to mood changes. This "invariably strain[ s]" 78 her relationships
and results in her lacking empathy and concem. 79

The same report explored and explained how respondent's condition

had its onset in early childhood. Thus, it was already attendant when she
and petitioner were married in February 2005. Moreover, it noted that her
condition is not only "chronic and long lasting." 80 Worse, that same
condition drives respondent to avoid seeking treatment, thereby aggravating
her imperviousness to recovery. Also, since her condition inheres in her, it is
a debility that she does not suffer specifically with respect to petitioner only.

For clarity, it is worth quoting Dr. Manrique's report at length:

From the interviews and tests administered to the subjects, the

relatives of the couple, as well as from the results of the community
investigation conducted by the undersigned psychologist, it is clear that
Mari Kris Santos-Calma, has manifested patterns of behavior compatible
with a person suffering from SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER.

Often described as a 'loner' or an eccentric, the schizoid

personality shows lack of interest in social relationships. Kris' emotions
of people appear shallow or bllmted but not to the degree found in
schizophrenia. People with this personality disorder see[m] rarely, if ever,
to experience strong anger, joy or sadness.

Although Kris prefer[ s] to remain distant from others, she remains

in better contact with reality than do schizophrenics. Kris' [face], as all
others who suffer from the same personality disorder, rarely shavv[s]
emotional expression and rarely exchange[s] smiles or nod with others.
Women with schizoid personality disorder are more rarely (sic) to
passively accept romantic advances. They seldom develop strong
attachments with their paiiners, but their sexual desires are very strong.
·women with this disorder are more likely to experiment sexual f
relationships that stay in a heterosexual relationship, as what happened in f
this case.

76
Rollo, p. 224.
77
Id. at 230.
78
Id. at 231.
79 Id.
so Id.
Decision 16 G.R. No 242070

The personality profile of MARI KRIS SANTOS-CALMA,

showing that she suffers from personality disorder and psychological
incapacity in the performance of her marital obligations were further
confirmed.

In comparing the data gathered from the standard patterns of

behavior, it is clear that MARJ KRIS SANTOS-CALMA manifest[ sJ
MALADAPTIVE BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS which [affect] her IMPULSE
C0]\1TROL, and MOOD CHANGE. Interpersonal relations are invariably
strained (sic) her demands and by her lack of empathy and concern for her
husband. She is keenly sensitive to criticism and may feel angry by any
hint that she is not as special as she fancies herself to be.

The PERSONALITY DISORDER ofJ\1ARI KRIS SA.lvIOS-CALAfA,

have had [sic] its onset during her early adulthood stage. In this
particular case, it was found that it started during the time that she was
turning 16 years old.

Her disorder is chronic and long lasting, being a development

defect. It stemmed from the formation of inflexible traits, which are
responsible for the lifelong maladaptive behavior a person. Moreover, the
disorder involves psychological factors of long duration so that a major
therapeutic endeavor is needed only to suppress the manifestations of the
disorder.

MARJ K.RlS SANTOS-CAL.MA, suffering from a personality

disorder also suffers from PSYCHOLOGICAL li\/CAPACJTY in the
performance of her marital obligations. She [i]s incapable of giving love
and support to her husband and has no sense of responsibility towards
family.

Likewise, MARJ KRIS SANTOS-CALMA, suffering from

psychological incapacity lacks insight of her deficit, such that she feels
comfortable with her maladaptive ways. As such, she never seeks
treatment and [isJ impervious to recovery. Since her [pJsychological
[i]ncapacity towards her marital obligations is the product of her
personality disorder, it is therefore considered to be a PERMANElVT and
IJVCURABLE defect of the personality functioning. No amount of therapy
and counseling could cure the incapacity but the same can only suppress
the manifestations of the disorder. MARI KRIS SANTOS CALMA's
psychological incapacity is _NOT-RELATIVE to her present relationship. It
vvill be hard for the subject to establish and maintain relationships with
any other partner.

MARI KRlS SANTOS-CALMA has brought great strain to the

marriage and had exposed her husband and son to severe mental and
emotional torture. There seems to be a significant impairment in her
cognition, affectivity, and interpersonal relationships. Her actions are
clear indications of her poor conscience development and inadequate
moral development, which reflect personality disorder and psychological /
incapacity. 81 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

81
Id. at 230-231.
 Decision 17 G.R. No 242070

Pressed for further details on his findings, Dr. Manrique explained

that, when she was being examined, respondent gave evasive, "shadow"
answers. 82 These answers confirmed her apathy and incapacity for
interpersonal attachment. Dr. Manrique also noted that these confinned
respondent's condition as deep-seated, anchored in paternal relations:

During the clinical interview that was conducted with the

respondent[,] there were questions t.11at were asked from her and she gave
answers that were awash with the shadow of probable irrelevant[,] for
example, when asked what do you think of marriage? Her answer was, I
don't think about marriage. What do you think about your sexual
relationship -with your husband? Her answer was, it is not important that
she has Ia] sexual relationship with her husband. So that these are shadow
answers, these are just examples of the answers that were given as to the
point in the discovery of the root cause obtaining to the lack of fatherly
love. It is very clear in the examination of the respondent as well the
interviews that she hated her father. The hate was really on [a] higher
degree than we, psychologists, would not even consider it as normal
anymore. 83

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals were myopic,
zeroing in only on Dr. Manrique's supposed inadequacies. It is unfortunate
that they were so dismissive of those findings and, ultimately, of petitioner's
cause.

Even without Dr. Manrique's report, however, other pieces of

evidence indisputably point to the extent of respondent's debility. Dr.
Ma.nrique's findings bolster these by proffering not only a medically
grounded understanding of respondent's condition that explored its causes,
historical persistence, and prospects of being alleviated. In giving little
regard to Dr. Manrique's findings, the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals appear to have disregarded how jurisprudence has settled that,
though not an absolute and indispensable requirement, expert findings
deserve great weight when they are available. In Ngo Te: 84

By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties. 85 (Citation omitted)

Consistent with how the totality of evidence should ultimately inform

any determination of whether a marriage should be declared void pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code, as well as with judicial wisdom expressed in
contemporary jurisprudence that has more keenly and openly understood the /

82
Id. at 45.
83
Id. at 45-46.
84
Ngo Te 1,: Yu-Te, 598 Phil. 666 (2009) [Per J. Nachura. Third Divisionl
85
Id. at 700.
Decision 18 G.R. No 242070

myriad manifestations of psychological incapacity, this Court finds that

petitioner successfully discharged his burden of demonstrating respondent's
psychological incapacity. It was error for the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals to insist on the validity and subsistence of the parties'
marriage.

It was clear from the onset how respondent was unsuited to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage. She was unable to settle in what should
have been a common abode with her spouse and son. She never contributed
to and even squandered resources for their family's subsistence and her
child's rearing. She scoffed at petitioner's effort to support their family;
gaslighting him with the claim that he abandoned her. Ever unsatisfied, she
would come to a point when she would not even offer a proper explanation
for imploring more money. In the face of her husband's fortitude and
beneficence, she would leave him for another partner. Worse, she only
seemed all too satisfied to abandon their son's rearing to her husband.

As cited in Ka/aw:

[T]he fulfilment of the constitutional man.date for the State to protect

marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid
marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence. 86
(Citations omitted)

It is not an affront to the institution of marriage to rule that marriages,

which are so utterly devoid of the spouses' capacity to fulfill the basic
purposes of entering into a shared, loving life 87-such as those subject of
this case-are no marriages at all. By declining recognition to them as valid,
the state is able to limit marriage only to those relations that can be true to
marriage's purposes. Quite contrary to being an affront, "[i]n declaring a
marriage null and void ab initio .. .. the Courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of maniage as an inviolable social institution. The
foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid." 88

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 21, 2018

Decision and August 22, 2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-

86 Kulaw v_ Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482, 501 (2015) [Per J. Bersamin, Special First Division], citing
CONST., art. XV, sec. 2, and Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes-Reyes, 642 Phil. 602 (2010) [Per J. Nachura.
/q
Second Division].
87
In J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Mallilin v. Jamesoiamin. 754 Phil. 158, ::?.03 (2015) [Per J_
Mendoza, Second Division]:
The notion of"permanent" is not a characteristic that inheres without a purpose. The Family Code
clearly provides for the purpose of entering into marriage, that is, "for the establishment of conjugal
and family life." Consequently, the state's interest in protecting the ma_rriage must anchor on ensuring
a sound conjugal union capable of maintaining a healthy environmenr itJ'I.&, family, resulting in a more
permanent union. The state's interest cannot extend to forcing two individuals to stay within a
destructive marriage.
88
Ka/aw v. Fernandez, 750 Phil. 482, 501 (2015) [Per J_ Bersamin, Special First Division].
Decision 19 G.R. No 242070

G.R. CV No. 109155 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of
Jeffrey M. Calma with respondent Mari Kris Santos-Calma is declared
NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

/ Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

G.GESMUNDO

D.CA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, l certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
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DIOSDADO JVI.. PERALTA
Chief Ju\,tice
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