INSURGENCY AND COUNTER INSURGENCY IN WEST AFRICA: A CRITICAL

ASSESSMENT OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE BOKO HARAM

INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA (2009-2013)

BY

OTEGWU ISAAC ODU (B.SC, M.SC. ABU, ZARIA)

PH.D/SOC-SCIE/6991/2009-2010

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES,

AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY, ZARIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PH.D)
DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

SEPTEMBER, 2015

i
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research was conducted by me in the Department of Political

Science under the supervision of Professor Paul P. Izah, Professor Kayode Omojuwa and Dr.

Yusufu Yakubu. The information derived from the literature has been duly acknowledged in the

text and a list of references provided. No part of this project was previously presented for another

degree or diploma at any university.

Student‘s Signature Date

 CERTIFICATION

This project entitled ―Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in West Africa: A

Critical Assessment of the Federal Government‘s Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency in

Nigeria (2009-2013)‖ by Otegwu Isaac Odu, meets the regulations governing the award of

Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) Degree in Political Science and is hereby approved for its

contribution to knowledge and literary presentation.

Prof. P.P Izah Signature Date

Chairman Supervisory Committee

Prof. K.A Omojuwa Signature Date

Member Supervisory Committee

Dr. Y.A Yakubu Signature Date

Member Supervisory Committee

Dr. Y.A Yakubu Signature Date

Head of Department

Prof. Kabiru Bala Signature Date

Dean of School of Post Graduate Studies
 DEDICATION

This dissertation is first dedicated to the memory of officers and men of the Nigerian

Armed Forces and Para-Military agencies who lost their lives in the course of containing the

Boko Haram insurgency.

I also dedicate this dissertation to the memory of innocent Nigerian citizens whose lives

were cut short by the insurgency of Boko Haram while going about their normal daily routines

(especially late Sheikh Mohammed Auwal Albani Zaria) and also those who lost fathers,

mothers, children, brothers, sisters, loved ones and friends in the course of the Boko Haram

crisis. It is my sincere prayer that the Almighty God will condole them and grant them the grace

to cope with the sudden departure of their loved ones.

Lastly I dedicate this work to the memories of my beloved late Mother Mrs. Ogele

Otegwu who passed on to the great beyond on 21st March, 1983 and wife Mrs. Sandra Oyiwodu

Otegwu who answered the glorious call on 2nd September, 2008. May you both continue to rest

in perfect peace.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My sincere and heartfelt gratitude first goes to the Almighty God, the God of all creation,

God of all flesh, God of all eternity, God of power and might, the One who was, the One who is

and the One who is to come, the One who opens and none can close, the One who closes and

none can open, the father of light whose ways are truth, whose words are truth and whose acts

are truth, the God who speaks and no one in heaven, on earth and beneath the earth can question

or reverse, the giver of life and everything that is good, the King of all kings, the Lord of all

lords, the God of all gods, the King of Glory, the One who makes crooked paths straight, the one

who makes everything beautiful and perfect in His own time, the Holy One of Israel, the Lord of

Hosts, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, God of the Prophets of old, the One who controls

the universe, the God who sits in the heavens and makes the earth His footstool, the Husband of

widows, the father of the fatherless, the defender of the defenceless, the I AM THAT I AM,

JEHOVAH is His name without whose abundant mercies, love, faithfulness and grace my entire

academic pursuit would have been an exercise in futility and a wild goose chase, my savior, my

deliverer, Glory be to your name Oh father.

I sincerely extend my profound gratitude to my supervisor Professor Paul Pindar Izah

who acted not only as a supervisor but as a father indeed. Despite his really tight schedule he was

always willing to listen to me and also found time to peruse through my manuscripts and

provided me with the much needed guidance. Thank you so much sir and may the Almighty

Allah reward all your efforts in abundant folds, Ameen.

To my second reader Professor Kayode Adeniran Omojuwa I also express my sincere

gratitude for all the tutorship, support, love and guidance through thick and thin. His doors were
always open to receive me. He stood by me when I needed someone to lean on, his ears were

always open to hear me out when I needed to talk to somebody, he gave me counsel when I

needed courage and strength to move on, being aware of my being unemployed he was always

willing to lend a hand of support through contacts, his role in my life certainly transcend that of a

teacher to that of a father. A man of integrity, he is hard work and scholarship personified. Sir

you will always be my role model. Thank you very much.

To my third reader, Dr. Yusufu Abdullahi Yakubu I also say thank you for his efforts in

providing me with useful advice and guidance in the course of this research. Nagode Mallam,

Allah ya saka da Alheri.

I also use this medium to express my gratitude to Professor Rauf Ayo Dunmoye for the

intellectual insights he provided in the course of my research and the role he has played in my

entire scholarship, Professor Dunmoye acted as a father indeed and is a model for all academics

to emulate. Thank you very much sir.

I must not forget to mention the efforts of Professor Ejembi Anefu Unobe whose

tutorship has gone a long way to shape my outlook in the academics, a man of principles and a

man of his words. Sir your support and counsel will not be forgotten in a hurry. Thank you sir.

To Dr. Edgar Agubamah I say a big thank you for the numerous counsels and

exhortations. Your support, brotherly love and guidance which always came timely are highly

appreciated. I also sincerely appreciate the assistance of Dr. Lawal Tafida who was consistent in

providing me with relevant materials and contacts to aid my research. Mallam na gode. This is

not to forget a friend and brother, Dr. Jacob Audu who provided me with valuable counsel,

guidance and encouragements along the way, thank you brother. To my able Coordinator and
friend, Dr. David O. Moveh I express my heartfelt gratitude for all the efforts geared towards

facilitating the successful completion of this prgramme.

To my Daddy and Mummy Professor and Dr. (Mrs.) O.J Mudiare I say a big thank you

for your support in the trying moments of my life. You were there for me when I needed parents

to lean on and for always ready to listen to me and give me a pat on the back. May God bless and

keep you, Amen.

To other non academic staff in the department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello

University like Oga Steve, Oga Sunday, Mallam Likoro, Mrs. Suleiman (now on transfer) I also

say thank you for all the support, counsel and help.

I am also highly indebted to Dr. Ntim Gyakari Esew of the Department of Political

Science Kaduna State University. He has always been interested in my academic progress and

has been supportive in various ways. He also gave me an opportunity to venture into the

international academic community by helping to pay my registration fees and also present papers

on my behalf at various international conferences. Thank you very much sir for the confidence

reposed in me.

I must not fail to mention my friends whose companionship was of tremendous help, they

include but are not limited to Jibirilla Adamu, Tommy Timothy (Figer man, my main man), Paul

Osazuwa, Steven Ekele, Abdul Ahmadu, Chukwuma Okoli, Dr. George Atelhe, Tanimu Apat

Kiden, late Dr. Sunday Suleiman, Mohammed Sambo, Johnson Akpoga, Dominic Madu, Ilukwe,

Muideen Usman, Aminu, Saminu, Mr. and Mrs. Sunday Alechenu, Julius Oladipo and others too

numerous to mention.
 I appreciate also the companionship, friendship, encouragements, fervent prayers and

support of Helen Iliya Mutum (Ashia), Laitu Iliya Mutum, Eli Mutum and mama. May God bless

you all.

Mention must also be made of my benefactors without whose support I would not have

been where I am today. To Dr. Mahmoud Bala Alfa, a friend and brother, I say thank you so

much for your tremendous financial support. He was never tired of hearing my endless financial

requests, he took so much interest in me and my career more than a friend would. Brother you

are God sent. I do not know if I can ever pay you back for all that you have done for me and my

family. May Allah continue to bless and keep you for me and may our friendship continue to

yield positive fruits for our mutual benefits and for our dear country at large. Thank you so very

much.

I must not fail to mention also the various financial support rendered by Mr. William

Maina Apikins towards the completion of my entire studies. Sir words cannot express my

gratitude for the brotherly love you have extended to me in my trying moments. God bless you

and the work of your hands. To Honorable Idris Mohammed Gobir I will not fail to extend my

profound gratitude for your benevolence and magnanimity. You have been wonderful and may

Allah reward you bountifully and make your aspirations a reality in no distant time, Ameen.

Mention must also be made of Major Sunny Kent Samuel, Lt. Col. Buhari, Lt. Colonel

ML Abubakar, Lt. Colonel WL Nzidee, Colonel Emmanuel H. Akpan, Colonel Francis N Ekoyo,

Colonel Adeyemi Alabi, Colonel Saviour Akpan, Brigadier General Julius O. Oni, Brigadier

General Bright Fiboinumama, Commodore KB Ati-John, Major General Emmanuel Jebe Atewe
and Major General Mobolaji Adeleke Koleoso for their various support financially and in

assisting by providing me with materials and insight to enrich my work.

To my elder brothers and sisters I must sincerely say a big thank you for being role

models and for the inspiration and encouragement all through my trying times and my studies.

Having you all as elder siblings has no doubt been a blessing. Particular mention must be made

of my elder sister and mother Mrs. Christy Ene Makanjuola, mummy you are more than a

blessing to me. In fact having you for a mother all this while is a blessing that I will always be

thankful for. Thank you for being there, thank you for the strength, courage, motherly counsel,

love and direction. Above all I thank you for giving my life an essence, meaning and focus. May

God keep you for us all, Amen.

I appreciate the fervent prayers, support and encouragement of my sweet Mother in Law,

Mrs. Augustina Azumi Joshua, Sisters In Law; Ndip (Police Woman), Jeniffer and Agatha. You

people have been family indeed.

Lastly but certainly not the least I acknowledge the efforts of my loving wife, partner,

friend, sister, mother, my better half, my jewel of inestimable value, my precious ornament and

love of my life, Mrs. Kubai Benedicta Otegwu. Thank you for the tremendous support, love,

patience and understanding throughout the period of this programme, thank you for taking good

care of the home in my frequent absence. I love you very much mum. May God bless, sustain

and keep you for me.

 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACF---Arewa Consultative

Forum AD---Alliance for

Democracy APC ---All People‘s

Congress

APC s---Armored Personnel

Carriers APC---Arewa People‘s

Congress

AQIM---Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb AU---African Union

BH- - - -Boko Haram

CAN- -Christian Association of Nigeria

CTU- -Counter Terrorism Unit

DDR- -Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DSS- - -Department of State Security

DTAT- - -Data Transcription and Analysis Technique

ECOWAS---Economic Community of West African States

EEZ- - -Exclusive Economic Zones

EIDs- - -Improvised Explosive Devices
FIS—Islamic Salvation Front

FNDIC ---Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities

GIA ---Groupes Islamiques Armes

GSPC ---Salafist Group for Preaching and Call

ICT---Information and Communication Technology

IDI---In- Depth Interview

IRA---Irish Republican Army

JASLIWAJ ---Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lidda‘awati Wal Jihad

JEM ---Justice and Equality Movement

JTF---Joint Task Forces

MAP ---Mass Awareness and Participation

MASSOB---Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra

MEND ---Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

MNA---National Movement for Azawad

MNLA ---National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

MPA ---Azawad People‘s Movement

MUJWA---Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

NBS---National Bureau of Statistics

NDDB ---Niger Delta Development Board

NDPSF ---Niger Delta People‘s Salvation Front

NDPVF ---Niger Delta People‘s Volunteer Force

NDVS ---Niger Delta Volunteer Service

NIS---Nigerian Immigration Service

NMRD ---National Movement for Reform and Development

NPFL ---National Patriotic Front of Liberia

OAU---Organization of African Unity

OMPADEC ---Oil Minerals Producing Area Development Commission

OPC---Oodua People‘s Congress

PANAFU ---Sierra Leonean Pan-African Union

PDP---People‘s Democratic Party

RSLMF ---Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force

SALW--- Small Arms and Light Weapons

SLA ---Sudan Liberation Army

SLPP ---Sierra Leone People‘s Party

SSS---State Security Service

UNCLOS---United Nations Organization Convention on the Law of the

Sea UN---United Nations

US—United States

WTC---World Trade Center

 ABSTRACT

Insurgency has come to assume global concern in view of its magnitude and spread. In Nigeria,
while history reveals that insurgency is not entirely new as the nation witnessed the Maitasine
and Niger Delta insurgencies among others in times past, the wave of violence unleashed by the
Boko Haram sect in northern Nigeria has proved unprecedented and has also revealed the extent
of the failure of governance in the country, the abysmally poor crisis management tradition by
the Nigerian state and its palpable inability to provide security to its citizens. It has also brought
to the fore the necessity on the part of government to make concerted and intensified efforts to
evolve lasting solutions to intractable crisis in the country. This work is therefore an effort to
assess the Federal Government of Nigeria‟s response to the Boko Haram insurgency. The
objectives of the study are to identify and discuss the major issues leading to the outbreak of the
Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria, to examine the Nigerian state‟s response to the
Boko Haram insurgency with a view to determining its efficacy and suitability, to offer likely
reasons for the inability of the Nigerian Military to contain the insurgency and to suggest
possible measures for effectively managing insurgency in Nigeria. The study was conducted in
five northern states including Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Yobe and Borno. It relied on both primary
and secondary sources of data. The study revealed that the Boko Haram crisis has a long history
stretching beyond 2009 and that there were early warning signs which the government obviously
ignored. The study also unveiled that the various steps taken so far in response to the insurgency
reveals government‟s insincerity and lack of political will to finally contain the crisis. It was
recommended that there should be enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed
and sustain the group which can lead to a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the
Nigerian state, a comprehensive approach necessarily needs to be built on a deep understanding
of the drivers and dynamics of, in particular, the north-east Nigerian context, there is a need for
the government to really monitor what is preached by any religious organization and if such is
not in tandem with accepted standards there will be need to address it, to nip it in the bud, there
is an urgent need for the defence budgeting system to be completely overhauled. Furthermore it
was recommended that there is an urgent need for the prioritization of modern state of the art
military equipments and weapons to be acquired, the attitude of Nigeria leadership to the
welfare of military personnel also needs to be reviewed. Better welfare packages need to be
introduced to boost their morale and ensure that they are better motivated, government also
needs to demonstrate a sincere commitment to alleviating poverty in Nigeria especially in the
Northern part of the country, enlightenment campaigns also need to be introduced on the
need for education in the North. Leaders in the north should endeavor to encourage the people
to embrace western education, the Nigerian state should desist from the heavy-handed military
and police methods that risk pushing yet more restless, jobless and frustrated youths into
violence and extremism, government should to be fair to all, especially in the utilisation of the
country‟s resources and government should pay attention to the issue of religion. The
government takes religion as the strict affairs of the clerics and their students.
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title page - - - - - - - - - - i

Declaration - - - - - - - - - - - ii

Certification - - - - - - - - - - iii

Dedication - - - - - - - - - - iv

Acknowledgements - - - - - - - - - v

List of Abbreviations - -- - - - - - - x

Abstract - - - - - - - - - - xiv

Table of Contents - - - - - - - - - - xv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Background- - - - - - - - - 1

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem- - - - - - - 9

1.3 Objectives of the Research - - - - - - - 10

1.4 Significance of the Research - - - - - - - 10

1.5 Research Propositions- - - - - - - - 11

1.6 Scope and Limitations- - - - - - - - 11

1.7 Organization of Chapters - - - - - - - 12

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1 Literature Review - - - - - - - 14

2.1.1 Insurgency - - - - - - - - - 14

2.1.2 Counter Insurgency - - - - - - - - 24

2.1.3 Overview of African States‘ Response to Terrorism-- - - - 29

2.1.4 The Malian Insurgency - - - - - - - 31

2.1.4.1 Domestic and Regional Response- - - - - - - 35

2.1.5 The Sierra Leonean State‘s Response to Insurgency - - - - 37

2.1.6 The Algerian State and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Insurgency - 42

2.1.7 The Darfur, Sudan Armed Conflict - - - - - 46

2.1.7.1 Remote Causes of the Insurgency - - - - - - 47

2.1.7.2 Immediate Causes - - - - - - - - 49

2.1.7.3 Factions/Parties in the Conflict - - - - - - 51

2.1.7.4 The Outlawed Groups - - - - - - - - 53

2.1.7.5 Response of the Sudanese Government - - - - - 54

2.1.8 The Nigerian State‘s Response to Domestic Insurgency - - - 55

2.2 Theoretical Framework - - - - - - - - 78

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - 82

3.2 Type of Research - - - - - - - - 82

3.3 Research Sites - - - - - - - - - 83

3.4 Population of the Study - - - - - - 84

3.5 Sample and Sampling Technique- - - - - - - 84

3.6 Method of Data Collection - - - - - - - 85

3.6.1 Questionnaire Administration- - - - - - - 86

3.7 Method of Data Analysis - - - - - - - 97

3.7.1 Data Transcription and Analysis Technique (DTAT) - - - 97

3.8 Limitation of the Methodology - - - - - - 98

3.9 Problems Encountered in the Field - - - - - - 98

CHAPTER FOUR: BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN

NIGERIA

4.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - 101

4.2 History of Insurgency in Nigeria - - - - - - 101

4.2.1 Military Task Forces and Counter-Insurgency in Nigeria - - - 114

4.2.2 Organogram of Nigerian Counter Insurgency Architecture - - - 117

4.3 Origin, Ideology and Philosophy of the Boko Haram sect - - - 118

4.3.1 Biography of Late Mohammed Yusuf - - - - - 118

4.3.2 Evolution of the Boko Haram sect - - - - - - 121

4.3.3 Philosophy and Ideology of the Boko Haram Sect - - - - 126

4.3.4 The Salafi Ideology - - - - - - - - 133

4.4 Modus Operandi of the Boko Haram Sect- - - - - - 135

4.5 Organizational Structure of the Boko Haram Sect - - - - 138

4.6 Splinter Groups - - - - - - - - 140

4.7 Remote Causes of the Boko Haram crisis - - - - - 141

4.7.1 Prebendal/Affective Relationships - - - - - - 142

4.7.2 Politicization of Ethno-Religious Sentiments- - - - - 145

4.7.3 Economic Deprivation/Poverty - - - - - - 148

4.7.4 The Almajiri Syndrome - - - - - - - 149

4.7.5 Proliferation of Terrorism on a Global Scale - - - - - 152

4.7.6 The Arab Spring and Small Arms Proliferation - - - - 152

4.7.7 Poor Border Management in Nigeria - - - - - - 157

4.7.8 Clash of Civilization - - - - - - - - 161

4.8 Immediate Causes of the Boko Haram Crisis - - - - - 161

4.8.1 The Setting up of Special Military Task Force Code Named Operation Flush 162

4.8.2 Implementation of the National Policy on Crash Helmets - - - 162

4.8.3 The extra-Judicial Killing of Mohammed Yusuf and Consequent

Radicalization of Sect Members - - - - - - 164

4.9 Boko Haram Global Dimensions - - - - - - 165

4.9.1 The Chadian/ French Connection - - - - - - 168

CHAPTER FIVE: DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - 172

5.2 Presentation of and analysis of Data - - - - - - 172

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION

6.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - 193

6.2 Discussion of Data - - - - - - - - 193

6.2.1 Ignoring early Warning Signs - - - - - - - 196

6.2.2 Recourse to Violence - - - - - - - - 202

6.2.3 Commission/ Panel of Inquiry Approach - - - - - 205

6.2.4 Attitude towards Arms Acquisition and Manpower Recruitment and Motivation 207
6.3 Other Efforts to Curb the Boko Haram Insurgency - - - - 207

6.3.1 Establishment of Counter Terrorism Units in Mando and Kontagora - - 207

6.3.2 Censoring of Sermons by Clerics in the Flash points - - - - 208

6.3.3 Establishment of a New7 Division Comprising of three Brigades in

Maiduguri and Recruitment of more Soldiers - - - - 208

6.3.4 Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Legislation - - - - - 208

6.3.5 United Nations Assistance to the Nigerian Government - - - 209

6.4 Nigerian State‘s Incapacity to arrest the Menace - - - - 209

CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction - - - - - - - - - 216

7.2 Summary - - - - - - - - - 216

7.3 Conclusion - - - - - - - - - 218

7.4 Recommendations- - - - - - - - - 220

References - - - - - - - - - 223

Appendix 1: Questionnaire- - - - - - - - 236

Appendix 2: Interview Schedule - - - - - - 239

Appendix 3: Chronicle of Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria from 2009-2013 241

 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 General Background

It is a historical fact that human society from time immemorial has been characterized by violence in

various forms. In traditional societies violence existed in form of raids, tribal wars, slavery and

insurgency among others. These were conducted as individuals and groups sought to enhance their power,

status and influence over others or to register their grievances. Insurgency has existed throughout history

but ebbed and flowed in strategic significance. Today the world has entered another period when

insurgency is common and strategically significant.

Insurgency is a strategy used by groups which cannot realize their political aims through

conventional means of seizure of power. Insurgency is characterized by continued, asymmetric violence,

ambiguity, the use of complex terrain (jungles, mountains, urban areas), psychological warfare, and

political mobilization which are designed to protect the insurgents and eventually affect the balance of

power in their favor. Insurgents may attempt to capture power and replace the existing government

(revolutionary insurgency) or they may have more limited objectives such as separation, independence or

alteration of a specific policy. They avoid battle places where they are weakest and focus on those areas

where they can operate on more equal footing. They try to postpone decisive action, avoid defeat, sustain

themselves, expand their support, and hope that, over time, the power balance changes in their favor

(Metz, 2004: 2).

Generally, insurgencies are of two types. The first is what can be referred to as

―national‖ insurgencies, the main antagonists are the insurgents and a sitting government which has some

degree of legitimacy and support among the people. The differences between the insurgents and the

government are based on economic class, ideology, identity (ethnicity, race, religion), or some other

political factor. The government may have external supporters, but the conflict is clearly between the

insurgents and a national

1
government. National insurgencies are triangular in that they involve not only the two antagonists the

insurgents and counterinsurgents but also a range of other actors who can shift the relationship between

the antagonists by supporting one or the other. The most important of these other actors are the populace

of the country but may also include external states, organizations, and groups. The insurgents and

counterinsurgents pursue strategies which, in a sense, mirror image the other as they attempt to weaken

the other party and simultaneously win over neutrals or those who are not committed to one side or the

other (Metz, 2004:2).

The second important type is ―liberation‖ insurgencies. These set the insurgents against a ruling

group that is seen as outside occupiers by virtue of race, ethnicity, or culture. The goal of the insurgents is

to ―free‖ their nation from alien occupation. Examples include the insurgency in Rhodesia, the

one against the white minority government in South Africa, the Palestinian insurgency, Vietnam after

1965, the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet occupation, Chechnya, the current Taleban/al Qaeda

insurgency in Afghanistan, and the Iraq insurgency (Metz, 2004:3).

Insurgent movements have always been part of human history. From the nomadic rebels who

brought down the Roman Empire to the internet-savvy, plane-exploding jihadists who triggered

America‘s ill-conceived ―global war on terror‖, insurgent forces are a constant factor in the history of

warfare. And fighting them has become tougher than ever. According to Max Boot, ―Invisible Armies‖ is

a narrative history of guerrilla warfare and insurgency ranging from what he describes as its origins, in

bringing down the Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia in the 22nd century BC, to the present day (Boot,

2013).

Among the many ―liberal‖ insurgencies Boot (2013) considers are the American revolution; the

struggle against Napoleon in the Iberian peninsula; Greece‘s war for independence against the Ottomans;

the wars of unification in Italy and various uprisings against colonial powers, such as the slave revolt

against the French that led to the foundation of the Republic of Haiti. In the 20th century Boot looks at the
impact of irregular forces in World War 1 and 2, the contribution to insurgent theory of Mao Tse Tung‘s

seminal work ―On Guerrilla Warfare‖, gleaned from his experiences in the Chinese civil war, the

different French and British responses to rebellions against their declining empires, the ―radical chic‖

revolutionaries of the 1960s and the rise of radical Islamism (Boot, 2013).

In view of the fact that insurgencies set the weak against the strong, history shows that most of

them end up in failure (Boot, 2013). Between 1775 and 1945 only about a quarter achieved most or all of

their aims. However since 1945 that number has risen to 40%, according to Boot (2013). Part of the

reason for the improving success rate is the rising importance of public opinion. Since 1945 the spread of

democracy, education, mass media and the concept of international law have all conspired to sap the will

of states engaged in protracted counter-insurgencies. In the battle over the narrative, insurgents have

many more weapons at their disposal than before (Boot, 2013). Therefore from the American Revolution

to World War 2, to Syria and Afghanistan in contemporary times, regular armies have to contend with

irregular fighters who hide themselves among the population and carry out hit-and-run attacks on their

targets.

With regards to many African countries, there is widespread discontent and disenchantment

among the various communities because of the inability or refusal of successive governments to resolve

grievances arising from the state‘s unresponsiveness and insensitivity to the people‘s plight over long

periods. This generates despair and frustration which certain leaders capitalize on to organize acts of

defiance or incipient lawlessness. Acts of terrorism perpetrated by insurgent groups like the Al-Qaeda in

the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabab, Islamic Salvation Front, Movement for the Emancipation of

the Niger Delta (MEND) and the current Boko Haram crisis which Nigeria now witnesses are clear

instances.

In Algeria for instance, the engagement of the post colonial regimes in authoritarian and

repressive policies resulted in growing economic imbalances and a large youth population unable to find
employment. This gave the Salafi, an Islamic group, reason to seek for an alternative community based on

the Sharia. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) subsequently came into existence as well as other Islamic

groups which later formed the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In response to consequent

insurgency using acts of terrorism in Algeria by the AQIM, the Algerian state has been supporting the US

war on terrorism and in exchange has received US military equipment and presence in the area.

Violence by such insurgent groups is certainly not a new phenomenon in Africa generally and

Nigeria especially in the northern part of the country. There have been riots and disturbances in most

states in the northern part of the country in the past leading to loss of lives and property. However none

appears close to the latest wave of terror unleashed by the Jama‘atu Ahliss-Sunnah Lidda‘awati Wal Jihad

or people committed to the prophet‘s teaching and Jihad now popularly known as the Boko Haram

(Western education is sin). (Chronicle of Boko Haram activities is at Appendix 3).

This sect has a humble beginning. Its history can be traced to December 2003 in Kanamma and

Geidam settlements in Yobe state, North Eastern Nigeria (Ibrahim, et al, 2011). The leader of the group

Mohammed Yusuf was an Islamic preacher who moved from place to place in search of more knowledge

while at the same time preaching. He was said to be an orator and an eloquent preacher who was able to

capture the minds of his audience. He was able to attract a large membership because his teachings

exploited existing socio-economic lapses especially in the provision of basic social amenities as well as

alleged government injustices on its members.

At that time the group preferred to be referred to as ―Muhajirin‖, an Arabic word which describes

the Mecca people who moved from to Medina from Mecca with the Prophet Mohammed in order to

escape persecution and to find a conducive environment to practice Islam (Ibrahim, et al, 2011). They

were believed to be committed to living in seclusion far away from the hustles of the city. The purpose of

their seclusion was to entrench a life of compassion in the hearts of Muslims and to establish a land full of

justice, devoid of rancor and materialism (Ibrahim, et al, 2011). This principle easily endeared the group
to their hosts, the locals of Kanamma and Geidam so much that no one can precisely tell why they started

attacking police stations and killing innocent people in late 2003 to early 2004.

The group however claimed that the police provoked them by arresting some of their members as

a result of a disagreement with locals over the use of land. It was also acclaimed that the group had a

clash with officials of the Operation Flush leading to the shooting of seventeen (17) of their members.

The sect members were reported to be on their way to bury four (4) of their members who died a day

earlier in an auto accident on the Biu road while returning from their preaching called ―Dawah‖, when

members of the joint security outfit accosted them for not wearing crash helmets. In the ensuing

confrontation a member of the security outfit opened fire and injured some members of the sect including

passers-by (Abubakar, 2009). About eighteen members of the sect were injured and none of the hospitals

accepted them except after further trouble which resulted in further deaths of four more of their members.

This incident had inflicted a deep wound in the heart of the sect leader Mohammed Yusuf who vowed that

the security outfit had ―murdered sleep‖ as they would avenge the shooting at the appropriate time.

According to him, ―it is unacceptable for policemen to shoot 17 unarmed people who are their way to a

funeral. No, we must act, but when and how, we shall not tell anyone‖. (Abubakar, 2009). In an open

letter to the federal government he threatened and urged them to respond within forty (40) days with a

view to a resolution between the government and his group and if not then ―jihadi operations will begin in

the country which only Allah will be able to stop‖ (Murtala, 2013). The forty day timeframe elapsed and

after that the movement did little except for its leaders planning strategies and plans for war (Murtala,

2013).

The Boko Haram violence which commenced in 2003 in Yobe state was to resurface again in

Maiduguri, Borno state on 26 July, 2009. Within a week the crisis spread to other states like Yobe, Kano,

and Bauchi. The sect‘s Headquarters was destroyed and the leader of the group was killed alongside other

members in an extra judicial manner. Even though the group called for the arrest and trial of the culprits,

the government initially took no visible steps towards this direction. This inaction on the part of
government was a recipe for several attacks from the sect who adore Mohammed Yusuf even in death due

to his profound impact on them economically and spiritually. These are what the Nigerian government

failed to do for them in first place.

The Northern region of Nigeria particularly the North East has since 2009 not known peace due

to the activities of the Boko Haram sect (among other security threats) which has unleashed series of

terrorist attacks in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Plateau, Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and the

Federal Capital Territory claiming an estimate of thirteen thousand lives between 2009 and 2013

(Olukolade, 2014), destroying properties not quantifiable in monetary terms and displacing an estimated

two (2) million peole (NTA News, 28, October, 2014). The spate of insecurity which has crippled

commercial activities in the worst affected areas is so alarming that the citizens now admonish each other

and take solace in the saying that ―the fear of Boko Haram is the beginning of wisdom‖. The bombing of

the Louis Edet house, Headquarters of the Nigerian Police, the United Nations building and similar other

bomb blasts in Saint Theresa‘s Catholic Church, Madalla, Bauchi state, Gombe state, Kano as well as

recurrent bombings and killings in various parts of Borno state and other parts of the north show that the

group can strike anywhere and at any time and that no one can claim to be safe or free from their attacks.

Their modus operandi also reveals a clear incapacity on the part of government and its security agencies

to effectively and amicably manage the situation. So far virtually every violent approach adopted by

government to manage the situation has proved a failure and has only helped in exacerbating the crisis as

the group has vowed to continue the wave of attacks until their demands are met.

These demands include the introduction of real Shari‘a law in twelve northern states, rejection of

the current democracy, constitutionalism and the sovereignty of the Nigerian state. They also insisted on

outright justice to those who killed their leaders and their accomplices (Abubakar, 2011). A cursory look

at these demands would reveal that the group does not have confidence in the Nigerian state and its

capability to adequately cater for the needs of the citizens i.e that the state has apparently failed in its
duties to the citizens since injustice, oppression and deprivation have gained prominence in the land. Its

various waves of attacks also indicate that the sect does not recognize the authority of the Nigerian state.

It is to be noted that Boko Haram was at the initial stage not against western education

particularly per se as widely acclaimed but western culture or what has been termed westoxication which

in their view corrupts true Muslims. This can be seen in their modus operandi as at 2003 when they

committed themselves to the establishment of a land full of justice, they secluded themselves and their

families from associating with anything to do with westernization or government. This was because they

perceived westernization as being the cause of materialism, corruption, injustice, immorality etc which

are the order of the day in Nigeria.

To give credence to the assertion above, the spokesperson of the group Abu Zaid stated that:

…the Yusufiyya Movement has come to mean different things to

different people in the last few months. This confusion and
misinterpretation have made it necessary for us to come out
publicly with the clear truth regarding our concept,
struggle, aim and ultimate objective as our declaration would
guide in distinguishing the Yusufiyya Movement from the various
labels ascribed to us as the Boko Haram (Balogun, 2011)

Furthermore, according to Abu Zaid:

We want to make it clear that we are fighting not just because

our mosque and centre of learning were destroyed or
because our wealth have been seized or because we were chased
out of our houses. The reason why we are at war is because our
freedom has been curtailed. It is while we were propagating
Islam that the government connived with some Imams and Ward
Heads and attacked us in many states (Ibrahim, et al, 2011).
 The spokesperson clearly stated that the group is targeting traditional rulers, clerics, politicians

and representatives of the Nigerian state like security agents due to the roles they were said to have played

before, during and after the 2009 impasse (The News Magazine 3, October, 2011, Forest, 2012). True to

the group‘s spokesperson, the casualties up to 2013 are mainly political elites, state security agencies and

others perceived to be directly or indirectly linked to one or both of them. However from the latter part of

2013 to 2014 they attacked several innocent people in mostly in the rural areas of Borno state. One can

however posit that the whole episode is a reaction against the state‘s perceived unresponsiveness and

insensitivity to the plight of the downtrodden.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Violence is endemic in human society. However the state exists to manage violence and thereby

maintain order in society. The essence of the state thus lies in its ability to facilitate human interaction.

Whether one is speaking of interpersonal relations or group dynamics, it is hardly contestable that the

state plays a critical role.

The history of uprisings against the state in Nigeria shows that there has always been a preference

for repression i.e whenever and wherever violence erupts the state is always quick to dispatch heavily

armed military personnel to the flash point to ―quell the crisis‖. No serious efforts are made to find out the

possible cause of the violence and how genuine and justifiable those causes are or what can be done to

amicably address the issues leading to the crisis. Even though the state usually adopts the

Committees/Commission of Inquiry approach to ―look into the immediate and remote causes of the

crisis‖, the reports and subsequent recommendations of such Committees never see the light of the day or

get released to the public. According to Danjibo (2010) such reports usually add up files to the state‘s

mortuary of unattended reports. Therefore unaddressed issues always lead to the recurrent and lethal

nature of crisis in Nigeria. Hence governments‘ response to crisis in Nigeria appears to be palliative.
 The wave of violence unleashed by the Boko Haram sect in northern Nigeria has revealed the

extent of the failure of governance in the country, the abysmally poor crisis management tradition by the

Nigerian state and its embarrassing inability to provide security to its citizens. It has also brought to the

fore the necessity on the part of government to make concerted and intensified efforts to evolve lasting

solutions to intractable crisis in the country. The purpose of this work therefore is to assess the Federal

Government of Nigeria‘s response to the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.

1.3 Objectives of the Research

The under listed will be the objectives of this study:

i. To identify and discuss the major issues leading to the outbreak of the Boko Haram

insurgency in Northern Nigeria.

ii. To examine the Nigerian state‘s response to the Boko Haram insurgency with a view to

determining its efficacy and suitability.

iii. To explain the possible reasons for the incapacity of the military to contain the insurgency.

iv. To suggest possible measures for effectively managing insurgency in Nigeria.

1.4 Significance of the Research

This study shall be of significance to knowledge as it will enable the Nigerian authorities and

members of the public to appreciate the causes of violence in Africa and Nigeria in particular. It will also

enhance an understanding of the stages of crisis in order to build up management capacities to effectively

arrest crisis when they erupt. Finally it will serve as a contribution to existing literature on the subject

matter which can assist other researchers in future studies.

Specifically speaking it has been observed from the examples of other African countries that in

most countries, there is a culture of and preference for repression as an approach towards responding to

insurgency which yields no long lasting benefits. Rather than sincerely and consciously getting to the root

causes of crisis (as usually identified and/or suggested by Commissions of Inquiry) and addressing them
there from proactively, the state in Africa rather adopts a violent or reactive approach which has so far not

been successful but has only worsened the situation. This work therefore becomes significant as it is

geared towards identifying the remote and immediate causes of the Boko Haram insurgency with a view

to establishing the argument or thesis that the Nigerian state‘s approach or response to managing the

insurgency is inappropriate and ineffective therefore necessitating the adoption of more effective and

amicable strategies.

1.5 Research Propositions

The underlisted are the propositions of this study:

i. The reactive approach to insurgency in Africa generally and Nigeria in particular has proved

to be ineffective.

ii. The Boko Haram insurgency is a result of the failure of the Nigerian state to perform its

statutory functions to the citizens.

iii. The violent response to insurgency in Nigeria is a stimulant for further violence.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

Violence is an intrinsic phenomenon in human society and its occurrence or recurrence indicates

the ever dynamic character of society. Violence ensues because man‘s interests and inclinations are varied

and often antagonistic. The propensity of man to pursue his selfish interests which usually give room for

the outbreaks of violence necessitated the evolution of the state as an impartial referee to check human

excesses. In Africa, conflicts leading to violence have become a major source of concern due to their

recurrent nature and consequence on the continent‘s development efforts. This study covers the Fedral

Government of Nigeria‘s response to the Boko Haram insurgency in particular from 2009 when the sect‘s

activities came to capture global and national attention, to 2013. Emphasis will be placed on the response

of the Nigerian state within this period. The study notes that the Boko Haram sect has existed long before

2009 and would also make reference to the pre-2009 in the course of the study.
 The the major limitation of this study is the inability of the researcher to gain access to members

of the Boko Haram sect for interviews in view of their invincibility. Some victims of the sect‘s activities

which were reached in Kaduna and Abuja were not willing to talk, and this forms another limitation to

this study. Furthermore members of the public particularly the target population for this study especially

security agencies like the Department of State Security (SSS), the Police Force, Defence Headquarters etc

were not willing to divulge necessary information on grounds that the required information is classified.

These no doubt negatively affected the data collection process of this study. Nevertheless, the

researcher has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through

interviews and research reports among others.

1.7 Organization of Chapters

This research is structured in a seven chapter framework. Chapter one introduces the work and

comprises of the statement of the problem, objectives, significance, research propositions, and scope and

limitations. Chapter two comprises of literature review and theoretical framework. It also presents an

insight into some states‘ approaches to containing insurgency; these include Mali, Sudan, Sierra- Leone,

Algeria and Nigeria. Chapter three presents the various steps taken to conduct the research i.e the research

methodology.

Chapter four examines the background/ evolution of insurgency in Nigeria. It discusses the

history of the Boko Haram sect and the factors which precipitated the waves of violence unleashed by the

sect. Chapter five presents and analyses data obtained from the respondents through questionnaires and in

depth interviews. Chapter six critically assesses the response of the Nigerian state to the Boko Haram

crisis. The seventh and final chapter summarizes and concludes the research and also proffers

recommendations.
 CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

The previous chapter gave an introduction to the study and stated the research problematic and

objectives. This chapter comprises of a review of literature and theoretical framework. It is presented in a

thematic manner with focus on states‘ responses to insurgency within their borders. It examines some

African countries‘ response to insurgency like Mali, Sudan, Sierra- Leone, Algeria and finally Nigerian

state‘s response to insurgency beginning with the Maitasine crisis of the 1980s, the Niger Delta

insurgency and then the Boko Haram insurgency.

2.1.1 Insurgency

An insurgency is simply an armed revolution against the established political order.

Insurgencies are internal affairs and the insurgents are self-sustaining. They usually do not require

assistance from foreign powers (Gen, 1976). Although insurgencies are civil wars, the situation

becomes less clear-cut when outside powers intervene in some manner. Often such intervention is

only in the form of supplying arms aid to one side or the other, or providing professional

revolutionaries (like the Cuban revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara in Bolivia) who can organize and

discipline what might otherwise be a haphazard affair easily crushed by the government in power.

When intervention draws the attention of an opposing power, an insurgency can quickly be cast as a

major power confrontation (Gen, 1976).

Gen (1976) opines that the fact remains that insurgencies are at base, internal affairs unless

the role of one or both sides is co-opted by an intervening power. Conditions are ripe for insurgencies

in many areas of the third world. Typically, developing Third World nations display stark contrasts
between incredible poverty for the bulk of the population and fabulous wealth for the ruling elite.

Furthermore, a middle class, which can be both a stabilizing influence and a perceived conduit for

upward mobility, is often very small or virtually nonexistent in many areas. Therefore an insurgent

warfare is a fact of life in the Third World.

Characteristics of Insurgent Warfare

Every insurgency has its unique characteristics. However, successful insurgencies have had

certain characteristics in common that constitute the basis of insurgent warfare doctrine. According to

Summers (1981) four characteristics are particularly significant to the identification of an insurgency: The

protractedness of such struggles, the central role of the insurgent political infrastructure, the subsidiary

role of insurgent military forces, and the use of guerrilla tactics in military operations. These can be

examined closely in the following paragraphs.

Protractedness

Summers (1981) noted that insurgencies are almost always protracted struggles. To him it would

be highly unusual for rebels attempting to overthrow an entrenched government to achieve a quick

victory. Time, however, becomes a two-edged sword in the hands of an insurgent, and both edges cut into

support for the government. On one hand, the rebels require time to build their political support and

military strength relative to the government they seek to overthrow. On the other hand, insurgents use

time as a weapon in itself to weaken that same government.

Every day that an insurgent movement continues to exist (not to mention its continued operations

and growth) discredits the government and its ability to govern effectively and control its own destiny.

Every day that an insurgent movement continues to exist tends to add legitimacy to the insurgent cause

and can eventually create an air of inevitability surrounding its eventual victory. Time is the condition to

be won to defeat the enemy. In military affairs time is of prime importance. Time ranks first among the
three factors necessary for victory, coming before terrain and support of the people. Only with time can

we defeat the enemy.

Mao Zedong, considered by many to be the godfather of modern insurgent warfare theory,

promoted the concept of a protracted, three-phased conflict. Mao‘s concept began with the

establishment of secure base areas and the creation of a political infrastructure; progressed through

guerrilla attacks on the government and actions to build popular support and change the correlation

of forces and culminated in a more conventional war seeking quick and decisive victory. Based on

his experiences in China, Mao knew such a struggle could continue for years if not decades. His

concept included the flexibility to move from one phase to another in either direction depending upon

the situation at hand.

Quick victory was not important because time and the continuing insurgency would, in

Mao‘s view, eventually bring victory to the rebel cause. In this light, Mao‘s famous dictum that

guerrilla forces facing a stronger enemy should withdraw when he advances; harass him when he

stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws, becomes significant far beyond

mere tactical doctrine (Summers, 1981).

Political Infrastructure

Although the military aspect of the struggle may ebb and flow, the source of insurgent strength; a

covert political infrastructure remains constant. This infrastructure, the bitter fruit resulting from the

perceived political and economic inequities sown much earlier, is the most important ingredient in the

insurgent recipe for success (Summers, 1981). The political infrastructure performs at least six major

functions vital to the survival, growth, and eventual success of the insurgency: (1) intelligence gathering

and transmission; (2) provision of supplies and financial resources; (3) recruitment; (4) political

expansion and penetration; (5) sabotage, terrorism, and intimidation; and (6) establishment of a shadow

government (Summers, 1981).

 Accurate and timely intelligence is vital to insurgent success in both political and military actions.

Well-placed agents within the government and the military can provide information that, at once, can

make government counterinsurgency actions ineffectual and increase the effectiveness of insurgent

actions. Even those agents or sympathizers who are not well placed within the government or its military

can provide significant information to the insurgent command structure simply by observing government

troop movements or reporting the unguarded conversations of minor government officials overheard in

social or business settings.

Insurgent sympathizers provide their military forces with essential supplies that are readily

available within the society under attack. They can obtain simple medical supplies (disinfectants,

bandaging materials, etc.) and clothing in small amounts without suspicion. For those supplies not readily

available, taxes voluntarily paid by sympathizers and coerced from those intimidated by the insurgents

provide the means to obtain such needs from foreign sources or corrupt government officials (Summers,

1981).

Summers (1981) argued further that if the proselytizing efforts of the insurgent underground

succeed and the infrastructure spreads through the population, the government is weakened. In

addition, as it spreads through the society, the infrastructure taps into a larger and larger manpower

pool from which to draw recruits (volunteers and .conscripts.) for the rebel armed forces. This

phenomenon explains why it is possible for the size of the rebel military forces to increase in spite of

heavy casualties inflicted by government forces. Indeed, if the government concentrates its attention

on subduing the insurgent military threat, it provides the infrastructure with the opportunity to grow

unimpeded; thus exacerbating the government‘s military problem.

Members of the underground often hold positions from which they can effectively conduct

sabotage operations against government resources and installations. Moreover, because they are

embedded deep within the general population, clandestine insurgent cells can effectively engage in or
abet acts of terrorism designed to intimidate targeted factions of the population. These activities

further weaken support for the government (especially if the perpetrators are not apprehended) and

weaken the will of the population to resist insurgent efforts.

Finally, the insurgent infrastructure can establish its own government as a rival to the authority of

the government under siege. This is an effective ploy if certain geographic areas are effectively under the

control of the insurgents. A shadow government challenges the legitimacy of the established government

by virtue of its announced political program (calling for solutions to the grievances that produced the

insurgency), its control in certain areas, and its steadfastness in spite of attempts by the government in

power to destroy the insurgency. Further, a shadow government can provide a .legitimate. conduit for

support from friendly foreign powers (Summers, 1981).

The rebel political infrastructure feeds on the perceived grievances that led to the birth of the

insurgent movement. The infrastructure is difficult for the government to attack because it is essentially

.bulletproof.. One does not attack a three-person insurgent cell in a Saigon high school with heavy

bombers or artillery. Moreover, if the infrastructure is well constructed (e.g., small cells with limited

knowledge of other cells), the government will have great difficulty in rooting out and destroying the

infrastructure by nonmilitary means (i.e., counterintelligence activities and police actions) (Summers,

1981).

Subsidiary Role of the Military

The importance of the insurgent political infrastructure is mirrored in the comparatively

diminished importance of insurgent military forces. Without question, rebel military actions play a

primary role in an insurgency. But the success of rebels on the battlefield is not crucial to the success of

the insurgent movement. Insurgent forces can lose virtually every battle and still win the war. In effect,

the insurgents have an unfair advantage. The government can lose if its forces lose on the battlefield, but
the government does not necessarily win if its forces win on the battlefield. Government forces must win

on the battlefield and destroy the insurgent political infrastructure.

Clausewitz described insurgent warfare perfectly when he said war is a political

instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means. Although theorists consider

insurgent warfare to be .anti-Clausewitzian, such warfare is the very embodiment of the Prussian

master‘s most famous dictum. Insurgency represents the total integration of political and military

factors, but with political factors always in complete domination. In the Vietnam War, it is now

clear that the Vietcong and North Vietnamese fully understood the Clausewitzian concept and

implemented it through the dau tranh (struggle) strategy, which fully integrated political and

military elements. Political dau tranh and military dau tranh were pictured to rebel recruits as

the jaws of a pincer or as a hammer and anvil. As Pike has noted, to the enemy in Vietnam, the

dualism of dau tranh is bedrock dogma. Neither can be successful alone, only when combined,

the marriage of violence to politics can victory be achieved.

Guerrilla Tactics

The fourth characteristic successful insurgencies have in common is the use of guerrilla tactics by

insurgent military forces. Guerrilla tactics are the classic ploy the weak use against the strong. Unlike

conventional or European military operations designed to win a quick victory, guerrilla tactics are

designed to avoid a decisive defeat at the hands of a stronger enemy. Although conventional forces are

constructed around the mobility of large units, guerrilla forces base their operations on the mobility of the

individual soldier. Operating in small units, guerrillas avoid presenting themselves as tempting targets for

government forces, which usually have vastly superior firepower at their disposal ( Gen, 1976). Guerrillas

fight only when it is to their advantage to fight, often quickly concentrating a superior force against an

isolated government unit, attacking and then disappearing as quickly and mysteriously as they appeared.
Rarely do forces using guerrilla tactics attempt to hold terrain, for to do so invites destruction by superior

enemy forces.

Often associated with a particular type of military organization (e.g., Brigadier Orde

Wingate‘s Chindits or the .Green Berets) or with so-called irregular forces, guerrilla tactics can

be used by almost any kind of force with the proper training. In Vietnam between 1969 and the

Easter offensive in 1972 when regular units of the North Vietnamese Army comprised the bulk

of the enemy‘s forces, roads were never crowded with men and their equipment as they moved

into position to attack. Even these regular forces would somehow secretly move from sanctuary

areas, concentrate, attack, and then fade back into their forces sanctuaries. As late as 1975 during

the all-out .conventional invasion of South Vietnam, Gen notes that in the area west of Saigon

the deployment, without detection, of a combined arms force of more than 30,000 men in terrain

largely devoid of cover or concealment should go into the book of professional military records.

The benefits of a guerrilla war are manifold. First, insurgent military actions shift government

attention away from the activities of the insurgent political infrastructure so that it can continue to grow

and spread with minimal opposition. Second, guerrilla attacks harass, demoralize, and embarrass the

government and its forces. Third, successful guerrilla actions can elicit draconian reprisals from a

frustrated government (Gen, 1976). Although reprisals can take a heavy toll on insurgents, they always

exact a fearful price in blood from uncommitted bystanders. As a result, such reprisals are often

counterproductive because they further alienate the population from the government.

If successful, rebel operations using guerrilla tactics can achieve several favorable results. People

choose to support the insurgents or to take a neutral stance because the government is unable to protect

itself or the people. Government forces experience fatigue and war weariness as the struggle becomes

more protracted and the government seems not to be making any headway against the guerrilla forces.
Troop desertions from the government ranks increase while the underground infrastructure continues to

expand, thus compounding the government‘s problem almost exponentially. Eventually, the correlation of

forces changes in favor of the insurgents. Insurgent forces mass into large units using conventional tactics

and administer the coup de grace in rapid order.

Differences Between Insurgency and Conventional Warfare

When taken together, the unique aspects of insurgent warfare indicate that such struggles are

fundamentally different from the conventional model of warfare. Rather than a large war writ small,

insurgent warfare is at least as different from conventional war as we imagine conventional war to be

different from nuclear war. At least three fundamental differences are apparent.

Perhaps the most important difference is that in an insurgency, both antagonists have the same

Clausewitzian .center of gravity, that is, the same hub of power and the same factor upon which

everything ultimately depends (Metz, 2004). The center of an insurgency‘s strength and the key to its

survival and growth is the covert political infrastructure deeply embedded in and permeating the general

population. Without some support from the people, or at least their neutrality in the struggle (neutrality is

a net benefit to the insurgent and is, in effect, passive support), the underground infrastructure would be

quickly exposed and eliminated. Without an infrastructure, the insurgency has no political arm, is devoid

of its intelligence apparatus, and bereft of its principal source of military manpower and logistical

support.

At the same time, the besieged government‘s power also ultimately depends upon the support and

loyalty of the general population. In the long run (and insurgencies certainly qualify as long-run

situations), no government can survive without the acquiescence of the people--least of all a government

actively opposed by an attractive and aggressive insurgent movement. And thus the centers of gravity for

each side in an insurgency are located within the general population. For the insurgents it is their
infrastructure and its active and tacit supporters. For the government, it is their supporters. Both groups

comingle and are virtually indistinguishable.

In conventional warfare, military professionals have long accepted the concept of centers of

gravity, and that the basic military objective in war is to conduct operations that lead to the destruction of

the enemy‘s center of gravity while at the same time protecting one‘s own vital centers. However, the

existence of comingled centers of gravity calls this basic military doctrine into serious question. Using

traditional military means fire and steel on a target--to destroy the enemy‘s center of gravity may well

also destroy one‘s own vital centers (Metz, 2004).

A second unique feature of insurgent warfare is that insurgent military forces win when they do

not lose. Although forces using guerrilla tactics often lose in small tactical engagements, their dispersed

nature and their focus on small unit actions are designed to avoid anything approaching a decisive defeat.

Their very survival in the face of often vastly superior government strength adds to their credibility.

Conversely, conventional military forces lose when they do not win. The failure to decisively defeat a

military force over which they have great advantages in firepower discredits the government‘s military

and the government as a whole.

The kind of military warfare conducted by insurgents is the antithesis of conventional warfare.

Conventional military forces have continually sought, particularly over the past two centuries, ways to

concentrate forces in time and space to achieve quick and decisive victories. Insurgent military forces take

the opposite approach by dispersing in space and protracting in time in order to avoid decisive defeat.

While conventional forces attempt to achieve victory by acting faster than the enemy can react, insurgent

guerrilla forces seek victory by acting longer than the enemy can react. While conventional forces attempt

to provide their enemy with insufficient time, guerrilla forces try their enemy‘s patience--time becomes a

weapon.
 The third fundamental difference is on a more technical level. The flow of logistical support for

the insurgent‘s military force is the reverse of the support pattern in conventional warfare. In conventional

warfare, logistical support proceeds from rear areas toward and to the front lines. In short, logistics flow

in the same direction that the fighting forces attempt to advance. Insurgent military forces, on the

contrary, are largely supported by their infrastructure within the target population. Schematically the

direction of advance and the flow of logistics are in opposite directions (Metz, 2004).

Although the unique logistical pattern of insurgent warfare may, at first blush, seem to be

a minor technical matter, in actuality it is a factor of fundamental importance to the military

portion of counterinsurgent actions. The insurgent logistical flow challenges traditional notions

and means of interdiction which, in conventional warfare, attempt to isolate the battlefield from

the enemy‘s sources of supply. To the extent that the infrastructure is the source of rebel military

logistics, traditional interdiction efforts (air attacks on rear area lines of communication, etc.)

will be ineffective (except perhaps in cases where an insurgent military force may be receiving

some degree of logistical support from external sources).

To simplify the analysis, the study at hand has considered insurgency from a purist‘s

viewpoint. An insurgency is a home-grown rebellion, a civil war; virtually free from outside

influence. But insurgencies are not pure. Like all wars, insurgencies are deadly, complex, and

messy affairs. Reflecting the interdependent world in which they occur, insurgencies often

involve more major actors than just the leading antagonists. This is even truer in the age of

superpower politics in which each side vies for influence, support, and a favorable correlation of

forces (Metz, 2004).

2.1.2 Counter Insurgency

 According to the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide (2009) counter-insurgency

or counterinsurgency (COIN) "may be defined as ‗comprehensive civilian and military efforts

taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Counter-

insurgency campaigns of duly-elected or politically recognized governments take place during

war, occupation by a foreign military or police force, and when internal conflicts that involve

subversion and armed rebellion occur. The best counterinsurgency campaigns "integrate and

synchronize political, security, economic, and informational components that reinforce

governmental legitimacy and effectiveness while reducing insurgent influence over the

population. COIN strategies should be designed to simultaneously protect the population from

insurgent violence; strengthen the legitimacy and capacity of government institutions to govern

responsibly and marginalize insurgents politically, socially, and economically." (U.S.

Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 2009)

Counterinsurgency has been defined as ―those military, paramilitary, political,

economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency‖

(Shame et al, 2010). Based on this definition, counterinsurgency is an all-encompassing

approach to countering irregular insurgent warfare – an approach which recognizes that a

military solution to a conflict is not feasible; only a combined military, political, and civilian

solution is possible. Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation has argued that, based on his analysis

of 90 insurgencies, defeating an insurgency is a long process that lasts on average 14 years. T.

E. Lawrence has been quoted as saying ―to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like

eating soup with a knife‖ (Boyle 2008)

 There are several studies that highlight the best practices of waging counterinsurgency

warfare. David Galula, is considered the intellectual God Father of counterinsurgency studies.

In his famous book Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964), Galula argued

that, in order to counter an insurgency, it was essential for the counterinsurgent to win the

support and legitimacy of the local population, promote good governance, and keep a sufficient

amount of troops in an area to provide security after the governments forces have taken it over.

He also argues that is important to ―destroy or expel the main body of armed insurgents‖ or, if

that is not possible, to ―win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants‖(Galula, 2006). These

principles provided the intellectual framework for countries like America and Britain to further

develop and implement their respective counterinsurgency doctrines at both the theoretical and

practical level. They are also the foundation of General Petraeus‘s ―clear, hold, and

build‖ strategy.

Nagl (2005), building on Galula‘s work, argues that there are two approaches to

counterinsurgency: the direct and indirect approach. The direct approach focuses primarily on

defeating the enemy with military force. The indirect approach, on the other hand, involving a

―battle for the hearts and minds,‖ focuses on a more population-centric strategy. It

involves denying the insurgency the support of the local population while at the same time

attacking the insurgency with military force.

The primary goal of both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent is promoting good

governance and winning legitimacy in the eyes of the local population. This framework for

victory has been the primary focus of American counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan. As a consequence, General Petraeus‘s declaratory strategy has revolved around

denying the insurgency its sanctuary within the population and training the local security

services to hold the territory so the insurgents do not return, while building infrastructure,

promoting good governance, and eliminating political corruption – thereby wining the

population‘s ―hearts and minds.‖

Evidence currently available does suggest some basic counterinsurgency doctrinal

concepts.

A Three-Pronged Strategy

The most clearly evident concept is that any successful counterinsurgency strategy must

incorporate a three-pronged approach. The government must excise the sources of popular unrest,

must identify and destroy the covert infrastructure, and must defeat the insurgent military forces.

Each of these tasks is critical.

Making the required reforms to excise the grievances upon which the rebellion is based can

be a lengthy undertaking. Even if the governing achieves success quickly, the effects of redressing

grievances are evident in preventing a recurrence of an insurgent movement once the problem at

hand is under control. Of course reform does have real-time effects. Reforms may demoralize

insurgent guerrilla fighters as they see the cause for which they are willing to risk their lives co-opted

by their enemy. Reforms may also have a positive effect upon those who are neutral in the struggle,

in effect strengthening the government position.

The most significant real-time benefit of genuine reform lies in weakening the rebel

infrastructure. Because genuine government reforms undercut the basis of the insurgency, they make

it much more difficult for the infrastructure to spread its influence. Destroying a well-organized

infrastructure is a time-consuming task that can be hastened significantly by timely and effective

political and economic reforms.

 Circumstances may dictate that the more immediate task is to defeat the insurgent military

threat, which, if unattended, might quickly overwhelm the host government long before reforms are

implemented and the covert infrastructure is destroyed. In other words, defeating the insurgent‘s

military forces can buy time for the remainder of the counterinsurgency efforts to take effect. The

impact of military victory is short term and, in fact, does little good if reforms are not forthcoming

and the infrastructure continues to operate and expand. If the infrastructure remains healthy, defeated

military forces can be replaced with surprising speed.

Corollary, Command and control of a counterinsurgency effort requires far more than just

military expertise and, therefore, should be vested in nonmilitary leaders. Two of the three prongs of a

counterinsurgent strategy are nonmilitary. Instituting political and economic reforms requires diplomatic

leadership and leverage, political acumen, and economic expertise. Rooting out the covert infrastructure is

a paramilitary function requiring police and criminal intelligence techniques. Only the defeat of the

insurgent military forces requires traditional military forces, skills, and firepower. However, if a crisis

stage evolves, defeating the enemy‘s military forces becomes an overwhelming priority; and temporary

military leadership of the overall effort may be appropriate until the crisis subsides -

Human Intelligence

Population control and intelligence gathering are key factors in the implementation of a

successful counterinsurgency strategy. Guerrilla fighters are exceedingly difficult to find and engage in

battle, a fact which places more emphasis on superior intelligence operations. Additionally, the

identification and destruction of the covert insurgent infrastructure requires criminal intelligence

operations (identification, correlation, tracking, and apprehension).

Population control is a key factor because both military and police intelligence functions must

focus their efforts on human intelligence techniques. Electronic intelligence, overhead imagery, and other

technologically sophisticated techniques often are not very useful in finding soldiers who make minimum
use of electronic communications, move in very small groups on foot, and are difficult to distinguish from

the general population. The same holds true for the identification of members of the covert infrastructure-

-the problem is to separate the wheat from the chaff, a task not well suited to technologically

sophisticated intelligence-gathering means.

The inte1ligence task is much more difficult if population movement is not tightly

controlled. A key ingredient when working against the infrastructure is the knowledge of who is

whom and who is supposed to be where--and identifying aberrations to the pattern. This can be

done much more effectively in a controlled environment. Further, population control

presupposes a high degree of security within the controlled area. With effective control and

security, those who are intimidated by the infrastructure may feel confident enough to aid in

identifying insurgent agents. Developing an appropriate counterinsurgency force structure

presents a multitude of problems, more so when one considers integrating its civilian

components.

2.1.3 Overview of Selected African States’ Response to Insurgency

Destructive conflicts have turned Africa into a continent unable to change its rich diversity into

opportunities for development. The number of violent and destructive conflicts in Africa appears higher

than ever and more funds are going into their management and resolution. This is at the expense of

sustainable development programmes that would have built solid foundations for African nations.

At its inception the Organization of African Unity (OAU) developed tools meant for the effective

mediation of interstate conflicts. Its charter provided for a Commission on Mediation, Reconciliation and

Arbitration. This legal mechanism was created to encourage member states to submit their disputes for

regional arbitration. Most of these disputes were expected to arise from disagreements on the definition of

colonial boundaries. The Commission‘s facility was hardly ever used. This was why the OAU evolved a
more traditional African concept of intervention through respected elders and heads of states. This use of

ad hoc apparatus to mediate and facilitate dispute settlements expanded the scope of the regional

organization to include inter states disputes.

These envoys and heads of states sought to prevent disputes from escalating by encouraging the

parties to allow third party mediation. This was the case in the territorial disputes between Algeria and

Morocco in 1971, Somalia and Ethiopia, and Somalia and Kenya. The mechanism was also used for

Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, and Ghana and Togo over the Volta Region.

Most post Cold War conflicts had not been confined to specific geographical areas but often

engulfed the entire society. The use of traditional inter-positionary peacekeeping forces for the

management of such conflicts has often been difficult. In most cases, intervention was required even

when there was no peace to keep. The United Nations, Organization of African Unity and sub regional

organizations including Economic Community of West African States and Southern African

Development Community had initiated different levels of intervention at various times. These included

political and election monitoring, military and civil police observer groups and peace enforcement

operations in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra- Leone. There were also humanitarian support missions in

Liberia, Somalia and Rwanda. The lessons so far experienced from conflicts in Africa have brought to the

fore the need for a more effective management approaches.

Having said that this review examines cases of insurgency or rebellion against the state in some

African countries i.e Mali, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Algeria, Sudan and Nigeria. The aim of this is to

enhance an analysis and appraisal of the approaches adopted in managing instances of conflicts against

the state in Africa. It is also to enhance an understanding of the Nigerian state‘s approach or attitude to

managing conflicts in Nigeria as is presented in this work.

2.1.4 The Malian Insurgency

 Members of the semi-nomadic and diverse Tuareg community, who inhabit parts of Mali, Niger,

Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya, have in times past engaged in armed rebellions against the Malian state

and in neighboring Niger. The Tuaregs are a small minority within Malian society (Jibrin, 2012). Tuareg

rebel groups have claimed the right to control what they see as their historic homeland in the north, which

they refer to as ―Azawad‖ (Jibrin, 2012). At times Azawad has been defined to include Tuareg

areas across the region.

The Tuaregs have often complained of neglect and discrimination by the Malian

government, which has been dominated by southern ethnic groups since independence

(Fonbaustier, 2012). For decades prior to the 2012 rebellion, Tuareg political leaders had

asserted that the nomadic Tuareg people were marginalized and consequently impoverished in

both Mali and Niger, and that mining projects had damaged important pastoral areas

(Fonbaustier, 2012). Issues such as climate change and a rooted background of forced

modernization into the northern Nomadic areas of Mali have caused much tension between the

Tuareg peoples and the Malian government (Fonbaustier, 2012).

Most recently, negotiated settlements in the early 1990s and 2006-2009 mediated by the

government of Algeria laid the groundwork for fragile peace by promising greater regional autonomy, the

integration of Tuareg combatants into the national military and increased government aid for the

impoverished north (Emerson, 2011). However, these agreements were never fully implemented, and

non-implementation became a grievance among the Tuaregs.

In the early 1990s Tuareg and Arab nomads formed the Mouvement Populaire de

l‘Azaouad or Azawad People‘s Movement (MPA) and started a war with the goal of gaining

independence for the region of Azawad (Emerson, 2011). Despite peace agreements with the

government of Mali in 1991 and 1995, a growing dissatisfaction among the former Tuareg
fighters, who had been integrated into the Military of Mali, led to renewed rebellion in 2007

(Fonbaustier, 2012). Despite historically having difficulty maintaining alliances between secular

and Islamist factions, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) allied itself

with the Islamist groups Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and began the 2012-

Northern Mali conflict (Fonbaustier, 2012).

The MNLA was an offshoot of a political movement known as the National Movement

for Azawad (MNA) prior to the insurgency. After the end of the Libyan civil war, an influx

of weaponry led to the arming of the Tuareg in their demand for independence for the

Azawad

(Lecoq, 2010). The strength of this uprising and the use of heavy weapons, which were not

present in the previous conflicts, were said to have "surprised" Malian officials and observers.

Though dominated by Tuaregs, the MNLA stated that they represented other ethnic groups as

well, and were reportedly joined by some Arab leaders. The MNLA's leader Bilal Ag Acherif

said that the onus was on Mali to either give the Saharan peoples their self-determination or they

would take it themselves (Lecoq, 2010).

Another Tuareg-dominated group, the Islamist Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith), initially

fought alongside the MNLA against the government. Unlike the MNLA, it did not seek

independence but rather the imposition of Islamic law (Sharia) across Mali (Lecoq, 2010). The

movement's leader Iyad Ag Ghaly was part of the early 1990s rebellion and has been reported to

be linked to an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) that is led by Hamada Ag

Hama as well as Algeria's Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS).

Furthermore Mali was going through several crises at once that favored the rise of the
conflict:
 i. State crisis: the establishment of a ―Tuareg State,‖ was a long term goal of the MNLA

when they entered into a rebellion in 1962. Therefore, Mali has been in a constant

struggle to maintain their territory.

ii. Food crisis: Mali‘s economy lives on support, with an extreme sense of dependence on the

outside, which led Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to decide on a

blockade to subdue the military junta.

iii. Political crisis: The mutiny led to the fall of the president (Jibrin, 2012).

Furthermore Mali faces multiple overlapping crises. The country‘s political Leadership has been

uncertain and disputed since a military coup on March 22, 2012, overthrew a democratically elected

government in the capital, Bamako (UNOCHA, 2012). The coup was nominally motivated by the

government‘s failure to devote adequate resources toward fighting a rebellion in the vast, sparsely

populated north by a loose alliance of predominantly ethnic Tuareg separatists and Islamist extremists

(UNOCHA, 2012). After the coup, the insurgents took advantage of the power vacuum to seize control of

the north. The insurgency has since fragmented along ideological lines, with extremist groups

increasingly outmaneuvering the separatists. The former include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

(AQIM), a regional terrorist network that is a United States designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.

The conflict places additional pressure on an already dire regional food security emergency, having

displaced over 420,000 people (Reuters, 2012).

Many of the Tuaregs fighting in the rebellion received training from Gadaffi's Islamic Legion

during his tenure in Libya. Hence many of the combatants are experienced with a variety of

warfare techniques that have posed major problems to the national governments of Mali and

Niger hence regional security. This suggests that the Malian government may not have the

wherewithal to effectively contain the insurgency of the group.

 At present, control over Mali‘s vast and sparsely populated northern territory is shared among three

Islamist extremist groups: AQIM, a splinter faction known as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West

Africa (MUJWA, or MUJAO after its French acronym) and Ansar al Deen, whose leadership also has ties

to AQIM (Reuters, 2012). The relationships and balance of power among these groups are uncertain, but

there have been few overt clashes among them since the military was routed from the north. They have

split from and outmaneuvered the MNLA, whose presence in the north is greatly reduced. The Islamist

groups are well armed and embedded among the local population, and have threatened to carry out attacks

against governments in the region that would commit troops to a military intervention (Reuters, 2012).

These developments could provide AQIM with expanded terrain in which to operate, recruit new fighters,

launch cross-border attacks, and enhance its prestige and connections to other extremist groups.

AQIM, which has been present in northern Mali, is thought to pose the most significant transnational

terrorist threat in the Sahel, although the degree to which it poses a direct threat. The group‘s origins date

to Algeria‘s civil conflict of the 1990s and AQIM retains a presence in northeastern Algeria as well as in

the Sahel. MUJWA, which declared its existence in late 2011, has also carried out kidnappings in the

region and terrorist attacks in Algeria (Jibrin, 2012). AQIM raises funds by kidnapping for ransom;

through involvement in trans-Sahel trafficking of arms, vehicles, cigarettes, persons, and, allegedly,

narcotics; and, reportedly to a more limited extent, from supporters abroad, notably in Western Europe.

The Sahel has long provided AQIM with terrain in which to move and conduct training, as well as a base

from which to advance its regional ambitions. The degree of coordination and ideological cohesion

among AQIM cells is uncertain. AQIM‘s Sahel and Algeria-based commanders may be rivals as much as

comrades, or they may operate relatively autonomously.

Among the Sahel states most affected by AQIM (Mali, Niger, and Mauritania), Mali has long been

seen as the least militarily capable of countering the group‘s presence. According to multiple open-source

accounts, AQIM leaders in the Sahel have cultivated extensive family, personal, and business ties with

northern Malian ethnic communities, including Tuareg and Arab groups (Emerson, 2011). Despite its
participation in U.S.-supported counterterrorism initiatives prior to the coup, the Malian government at

times appeared reluctant to confront AQIM head-on. Some analysts attributed this apparent reticence to

fears of provoking AQIM attacks in the south and of upsetting fragile ethno-political détente in the north,

particularly with regard to Tuareg groups. These dynamics entrenched mutual mistrust among

governments in the region and, along with limited military capacity, hindered the implementation of

sometimes disparate U.S. and Algerian efforts to foster regional security cooperation.

2.1.4.1 Domestic and Regional Response

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continues to pursue negotiations

aimed at resolving the political impasse in the south and brokering an agreement between the interim

government and Malian-led armed groups in the north. A proposal for a regional stabilization force,

submitted by ECOWAS and the African Union (AU), is also pending before the U.N. Security Council,

but international support has been inhibited by the lack of sufficient information concerning the proposed

mission‘s structure and the ability of participants to carry it out (Lewis, 2012). Moreover, Mali‘s interim

leaders have issued mixed messages with regard to their attitude toward an ECOWAS or other foreign

deployment, and members of the former junta have opposed the idea. ECOWAS‘s effectiveness has been

further undermined by a lack of consensus among its member states on the appropriate course of action in

Mali, and the fact that Mali‘s neighbors Mauritania and Algeria are not ECOWAS members.

Furthermore, many Malians appear to object to outside interference in their domestic affairs and perceive

ECOWAS as having acted unilaterally to install Interim President Traoré, who is closely associated with

the unpopular former ruling elite.

The Malian crisis suggests that there has been a neglect and marginalization of the minority

Tuaregs by the majority composed of southern ethnic groups. While the Tuaregs have been politically

excluded over time, the state did not give them a sense of belonging in a society in which they are

stakeholders. The consequent impoverishment of this minority group bred tension among the victims who
then perceived the state as the enemy. Though there were mediation efforts which resulted into peace

agreements, the Malian state never really committed itself to implementing the agreements.

Another development in the Malian instance is the existence of several splinter groups each with

its own operational ideology. In the face of this development, the Malian state did not possess the

capacity to contain their possible tendency towards insurgent activities. Even if it did, it was reluctant to

commit resources towards containing the rebellion. This reluctance could derive from the connection of

some of the insurgent groups with the AQIM which possesses enormous resources to sponsor wide scale

rebellion against the Malian state. The implication of these is that having performed poorly in terms of

governance, the Malian state did not demonstrate a willingness to respond positively to the grievances of

the Tuaregs, adopt transparency and accountability or entrench good governance. In other words good

governance could have averted the crisis if it had been entrenched by the Malian state. Suffice to note also

that the approach adopted by the Malian state was negotiations (at the instance of the ECOWAS and AU)

with the insurgent groups resulting in agreements which were never implemented. Genuine efforts to look

into the origin and justification of the grievances of the Tuaregs were hardly ever done. The Malian state

was also unwilling to cooperate with the ECOWAS as it was suspicious of the sincerity of the regional

body. These bring the sincerity of the Malian state to question and a reason for further acts of insurgency

by the various aggrieved parties.

2.1.5 The Sierra Leonean State’s Response to Insurgency

Sierra Leone became a one-party state under the authoritarian rule of President Siaka Stevens of

the All Peoples‘ Congress Party in 1978. Political opposition was either oppressed or bought off by

Stevens. Radical students in Freetown and some other major towns, interested in socialism, Gaddafi‘s

‗Green Book‘ and Pan- Africanism, organized themselves in the Mass Awareness and Participation

(MAP) movement and became increasingly proactive in their protests against the regime (Gberie, 2005).
 Forced into exile by the regime, MAP leader Alie Kabbah then approached the Sierra Leonean

Pan-African Union (PANAFU) with the request to gather candidates for revolutionary training in Libya,

but PANAFU rejected the idea of an armed struggle. Nevertheless, in the late 1980s, about fifty Sierra

Leoneans travelled to Benghazi, Libya, to receive military training. Among them was Foday Sankoh, a

former corporal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Force (RSLMF). After Sankoh returned to Sierra

Leone to further organise his rebellion, he met with Charles Taylor who was the leader of the National

Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). The NPFL with the support of Sankoh and a group of Sierra Leoneans

first launched its incursion into Liberia in December 1989. About a year later, the RUF used NPFL-

controlled territory to start its incursion into Sierra Leone (Gberie, 2005).

In March 1991, hundreds of fighters entered Kailahun district in eastern Sierra Leone from

neighbouring Liberia. This was later followed by another group of fighters entering the southeastern

border district of Pujehun. The groups were composed of Sierra Leoneans, some were trained in Libya

and some were recruited in Liberia and trained at the NPFL‘s Sogoto base and Liberian ‗special forces‘

on loan from Charles Taylor‘s NPFL. In addition, both groups had some revolutionaries from Burkina

Faso among them. Although it was well known that the RSLMF did have a more ceremonial role, Stevens

and his handpicked successor Momoh relied more on a special and well armed police force unit, the

Internal Security Unit, than on any real capacity to deal with military threats. It was clear to the insurgents

that they had to embark on a massive recruitment campaign to increase the movement‘s numbers

(Richards, 2004). The NPFL rebels had previously employed this tactic in Liberia. When, in December

1989, the NPFL entered Liberia (from Cote d‘Ivoire), it also did this with a relatively small force.

However, it quickly increased its ranks by effectively recruiting predominantly among the Mano and Gio

ethnic groups, which had been marginalised and oppressed by the authoritarian President Samuel Doe, an

ethnic Krahn. As was the case in President Doe‘s counterinsurgency in neighbouring Liberia, the response

by the Sierra Leonean army did not make things much better. In a number of cases it sealed the fate of the

voluntary and forced rebel recruits and civilians (Richards, 2004).

 Part of the explanation for these particular brutal counterinsurgency practices and the opposite

effect they had on ending the war or winning the support of the local population may be found in the

ethnic manipulation of the military forces. For instance, after coming to power in 1980, President Doe

turned the Liberian national army into an ethnic Krahn-dominated force that went on the rampage in Gio-

and Mano-dominated areas. Stevens and Momoh made the Sierra Leonean army an almost completely

ethnic Temne, Koranko and Yalunka (all ethnic groups from the northern part of the country) institution,

which had less affiliation with civilians living in Mende-dominated areas (Ellis, 1999).

To copy the NPFL‘s tactic of recruiting among oppressed ethnic groups perhaps on the

suggestion of the Liberian ‗special forces‘ the RUF tried to exploit the resentments of local people

against the All People‘s Congress (APC) regime. The APC a party mainly representing the interests of the

Temne ethnic group was widely condemned by the Sierra Leonean population. This resentment turned

into open hatred in the eastern part of the country, which formed the political homeland of the banned

Sierra Leone People‘s Party (SLPP), an organisation that mainly represented the Mende ethnic interests.

Nevertheless, the reality on the ground was more complicated. Many civil servants and police officers of

Mende ethnicity had little choice but to cooperate with the APC regime. Others, whose political or

economic positions were endorsed by the regime, often in exchange for loyalty to the APC, acted as

brokers and patrons for the peasantry. Local populations at all levels were thus navigating the pre-war

(but clearly not peaceful) terrain to the best of their abilities (Ellis, 1999).

As a result of campaigns by the combined forces of the RSLMF, Kamajors, Guinean soldiers (in

Sierra Leone as part of a mutual defence agreement) and the United Liberian Movement for Democracy

(a rebel movement created by Liberian exiles in Sierra Leone opposed to the NPFL and the RUF), the

rebels found themselves nearly defeated by the end of 1993. Driven back to the far east of the country,

they abandoned their heavy military equipment and ‗disappeared‘ in the Gola Forest, a long strip of

primary rainforest along the Sierra Leone/Liberian border (Keen, 2005).

 The RUF did not disappear for long, however. Early in 1994 it started to establish jungle camps

in inaccessible terrain all over the eastern and southern half of the country, including the so-called

‗Zogoda‘ in the Kambui South Forest Reserve, where rebel leader Foday Sankoh stayed most of the time.

From these camps the RUF launched hit-and-run campaigns or sent fighters on ambush missions. The

movement had completely changed its strategy from a more or less conventional rebel force aiming to

conquer towns and mining areas and ultimately the capital Freetown to a forest-based guerrilla movement

with very little control over any territory. The isolated bush camps were under closed canopy and

provided protection to the RUF, but at the same time created a considerable dilemma with regard to

recruitment. If it had had control of villages and towns, it could have rounded up people and forced them

to join or have used slightly more subtle coercive measures to safeguard new recruits (Peters, 2010).

However, as a forest-based guerrilla movement these possibilities no longer existed. During these

years, few volunteered and even if potential conscripts had the intention of joining the RUF, it was not

easy to find a camp and reach it unharmed; both the army and the rebels were highly suspicious of

everyone moving around in the combat zones. To increase its ranks, the RUF during this period depended

mainly on the abduction of people.

During the second half of 1996, the RUF and the newly elected SLPP government were

negotiating a peace that culminated in the signing of the 30 November 1996 Abidjan Peace Accord, but

the Kamajor trained and guided by the South African mercenary firm Executive Outcomes attacked a

number of RUF base camps, including the Zogoda. These successful attacks may have forced reluctant

rebel organizations into signing the peace accord. Although a peace accord was signed, few soldiers, CDF

fighters or rebels registered for the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme.

There were high levels of distrust between the different factions and a number of violent clashes were

reported during the first post-Abidjan months. In February 1997, Sankoh was arrested in Nigeria on

weapon charges and kept in custody at the request by the Sierra Leonean government (Peters, 2010). It

increasingly became clear that the peace accord would not hold and that the war was not over yet.
 Again, disarmament and demobilisation of fighters did not really take off. At the time of the

signing of the Lomé Accord, the RUF was in control of a large area which included the diamond mining

areas running from the eastern district of Kailahun all the way to the western district of Port Loko. It was

reluctant to hand over its territories or even allow free access to government officials or UN military

observers. For nearly two years until DDR really started in May 2001 the RUF was the de facto

government in these areas and again the relationship between the RUF and the civilians changed

significantly.

With the RUF claiming to be the (de facto) ‗government‘ in the areas under its control, local

populations could expect at least some level of service provision by the new authorities. In fact, when the

RUF launched its struggle in 1991 it propagated an ideology of free education and medical health care to

all. Some of the larger jungle camps had primary schools, and medicines were provided to the fighters

and their families free of charge. The RUF later made some attempts to institutionalize these services in

its occupied territory. Perhaps this was no more than a kind of opportunistic and last minute attempt by

the RUF to win the hearts and minds of the people, but equally it can be argued that only at this stage

when not all efforts and resources had to be directed towards fighting was the RUF in a position to

implement its ideology (Peters, 2010).

Evidently from the foregoing the Sierra Leonean RUF insurgency was a direct reaction to the

oppression meted out against the civilian population in a bad governance setting. The response from the

state was also one of violence rather than by peaceful means. There were brutal counterinsurgency

measures by the ruling elites as well as domination of the army by ethnic groups of northern decent.

Though there were peace negotiations which resulted in the DRR programme, there were still high levels

of distrust among the various parties to the crisis. The Sierra Leonean instance clearly reveals that

repression may not always be effective.

2.1.6 The Algerian State and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) Insurgency
 The Algerian experience with insurgency is an offshoot of Islamist opposition against the state.

This originated in Egypt in the 1960s, but also emanates from earlier forms of Islamism. The emergence

of these movements is simultaneously a reaction to state policies, social crisis and international factors

(George and Ylonen, 2010).

Since independence, the post-colonial regimes in Algeria have engaged in authoritarian and

repressive policies, which lay emphasis on coercion and concentration of state resources at the disposal of

the governing elite. Therefore the socio-economic landscape became a reflection of state agendas in

which political and economic power were placed in the hands of a few privileged individuals (Ylonen,

2010). The result of this is the growing economic imbalances, amplified by the late 1980s recession, and

the inability or unwillingness of the state to provide social, economic, political and psychic goods to their

expanding, increasingly youthful, urbanized and literate population. Thus, an expanding youth population

found itself marginalized due to a lack of opportunities, which contrasts with the media images of wealth

in the West. The dream of a better future remained unfulfilled, leading to disenchantment and bitterness

across wide sections of the population (Ylonen, 2010).

The picture painted above is reflective of a social crisis not addressed by state policies. It is

indicative of populations in Arab countries no longer willing to see their dignity, their worth as human

beings, their human rights and their fundamental freedoms trampled upon on a daily basis by institutions

and individuals, including ―security‖ agencies who act on behalf of, and on orders from, national political

authorities, the state.

This deepening disillusionment contributed to the conditions conducive to political extremism

manifested in an Islamic resurgence and its more violent expressions as a counterforce to the authoritarian

state. Alienation from an increasingly modern society that remained inaccessible provoked a militant

response among the growing, conservative sections of the poor and educated youth, and provided

momentum for Islamist organizations and their ideologies. Linking identity issues with social justice,
Islamist groups became particularly appealing to the marginalized sections of the population because they

provided services where the government failed to do so and offered remedies to other aspects of the social

crisis (Hermassi, 1993).

Some Islamist groups, such as the Salafi in Algeria, sought to establish an alternative community

through the provision of services and Islamic order and the creation of alternative Islamic networks.

Others engaged in providing education and social services through charitable activities, civil society,

student unions, professional labour organizations, social help associations and Islamic banks. These

groups also appeal to liberal professionals and members of the urban middle classes disgruntled by the

lack of prospects under military rule and economic crisis (Martnez et al, 1999).

In Algeria the state‘s withdrawal from impoverished neighbourhoods and slums created space for

the growth of local Islamic orders based largely on neo-fundamentalist foundations. These spaces,

consisting of parts of individual neighbourhoods, are often governed by Shariah (Islamic law) and at

times, violent coercion is used to enforce the Islamist order seen as a prerequisite for establishing an

Islamic community. This trend also reached poor Muslim neighbourhoods in the West, where some armed

Islamist groups recruited in ‗places of congregation‘ (mosques, internet cafes, cafeterias, gyms, summer

camps etc), among the vulnerable and marginalized (prisons, refugee centres, welfare agencies, possibly

universities etc), and through radical mosques and bookshops that act as ‗recruitment magnets‘ (Martinez

et al, 1999).

By the late 1980s, an Islamist movement consisting mostly of university professors and students

had emerged in reaction against state repression in Algeria. This group recruited largely by preaching in

‗popular neighbourhoods‘ where local ulama enjoyed support. The Algerian state proved incapable of

channeling religious sentiment in their favour. Algerian Islamist groups used the available political space

to create a mass movement revolving around the Ulama and an increasingly receptive poor urban youth

harbouring grievances arising from the economic crisis and the disruption of the democratic process. This
culminated in the creation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in March 1989 as an Islamist alliance of

various groups (Ylonen, 2010). The early success of the FIS stemmed from its ability to unite the poor

urban youth with the pious bourgeoisie under the same Islamist ideology in order to challenge the regime

and provide an alternative project to an exclusive and repressive state (Ylonen, 2010).

However in the course of the 1990s and especially after the government cancelled elections in

1991 to prevent the victory of the FIS, violence escalated to such levels that it fragmented the Islamist

movement and its constituency. Factions dominated by the mujahedeen leadership migrated to the ranks

of the more radical and violent Groupes Islamiques Armes (GIA), uniting the urban youth underclass and

opposing any compromise with the state. The GIA deliberately targeted civilians and its violence

alienated a more moderate pious bourgeoisie that threw its support behind the Armee Islamique du Salut

or Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the armed wing of the FIS, ultimately resulting in a reconciliation of

sorts with the regime in a process that mirrored the Egyptian experience (Ylonen, 2010).

By 1998, popular support for the GIA had eroded dramatically and the global jihadist movement

offered a desperately needed ideological and strategic alternative, particularly for the Salafi Jihadists from

Afghanistan. This resulted in Hassan Hattab breaking from the GIA to form the GSPC in September

1998, publicly condemning attacks against civilians and limiting its violence to representatives of the

state. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Call (GSPC) attracted the most attention among the remaining

armed Islamist groups in Algeria for both its alleged ties to al-Qaeda and its activities. In September

2006, the group officially announced its adherence to al-Qaeda, changing its name to Al-Qaeda in the

Land of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Ylonen, 2010). AQIM continued to orient its attacks on the state

security apparatus, as well as foreign interests, while undertaking kidnappings that also appear to have

been financially lucrative. In May and June 2009 it engaged in a campaign of suicide attacks and

ambushes, notably against a military convoy protecting Chinese workers, police recruits and paramilitary

gendarmes (Ylonen, 2010).

 The Algerian state has supported the United States‘ war on terror and, in exchange, received

military equipment previously witheld due to human rights concerns. An apparent resurgence of armed

Islamic groups in the region, evidenced in the reported 2003 kidnapping of 32 European tourists in

southern Algeria for which AQIM claimed responsibility, strengthened the regime‘s military capabilities,

and by extension, the US presence in the area (Ylonen, 2010). A certain duality may be detected in the

official Algerian response; on the one hand, its internal discourse announced violent groups to be on

verge of disappearance, while the regime simultaneously emphasized the omnipresence of danger for

external audiences. The International Crisis Group (2004) report on Algeria noted that states openly

supporting the war on terror risked finding the threat of extremism increasing rather than diminishing.

This implies that the resort to violence adopted by other countries may prove counterproductive by

fueling terrorism rather than nipping it in the bud.

2.1.7 The Darfur, Sudan Armed Conflict

The inhabitants of Darfur with their different Arab and African roots are 100% Muslim.

They are interested in the spiritual and cultural activities like learning, memorizing Qur‘an by

heart and learning the Arabic language. Darfur‘s population of approximately 6 million are of

African and Arab descents with the major tribes being the Fur, Messilat, Zhagawa, Rizaigat, Al-

Marareal and Gimir. Most of the African tribes engage in subsistence farming and animal

husbandry, while their Arab neighbors are mostly nomads (Holt and Daly, 2000). Despite a long

tradition of coexistence and of political, social and economic cooperation, local disputes do arise

over resources. Elders meet to resolve such differences. Families inter marry, farming and

herding communities see their economic activities as complementary. A vibrant, shared and long

standing Islamic identity further binds communities together. Smaller groups sometimes

assimilate into larger ones. For instance many communities become Fur under the Sultanate of
Dar Fur that the Fur dominated. Darfur is famous for different kinds of folklore like singing,

collective dancing and handicrafts (Holt and Daly, 2000).

However all the states of Sudan including Darfur are having development challenges.

The lack of essential social services and the efforts to have these necessary facilities for the

sustenance of the people of Darfur led to a prolonged crisis in the country. The peak of it was the

rise of insurgency in 2003 (Jok, 2007).

2.1.7.1 Remote Causes of the Insurgency

The scope of the human rights crisis and conflict in Darfur is deeply rooted in the history and shares

strong elements of continuity with the past conflicts. Some of the remote causes of the conflicts are as

follows:

a. Failure of successive governments since independence and perhaps even before to

provide essential services to Darfur.

b. The consistent tendency of Sudanese state institutions, starting from the Judiciary to the

National Assembly, the military, to public utility corporations and to the bureaucracy to

be operative against the interests of Darfur.

c. Failure of governments to implement policies that are beneficial to the region and the

trend of neglect and exploitation accelerated under the three most recent governments of

Jafar Nimeiri, Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the military Islamist Regime.

d. Over 35 years, Darfur was sidelined in the mainstream politics of Sudan either by under-

representation or neglect in national politics, government and the National Assembly,

within state institutions, or within the successive ruling parties.

 e. Under the guise of administrative and fiscal decentralization, governments absolved

themselves of much of their obligations to pay for health, education and other services,

while continuing to extract resources from Darfur.

f. The constant reshaping of administrative borders and local government mechanisms also

divided the communities. The government‘s decision of 1994 to carve up the old Darfur

region into the three federal states of North, South and West Darfur, as a part of the

would-be federalization of the country, created artificial divisions within Darfur and

weakened the stronger non-Arab tribes, especially the Fur. The result was the damage to

their legitimacy and ability to resolve local conflicts.

g. Failure of the state to implement simple policies to mitigate against food insecurity:

working grain-price stabilization mechanisms, effective grain storage systems both at

town and village levels.

h. Policies of exploitation and neglect, implemented over the last three decades, have

compounded the rising pressure on natural resources, such as cultivable land, grazing and

water which occurred as a result of drought and ecological destruction. The great Sahel

drought of the early 1970s and subsequently droughts in the mid 1980s, drastically

affected the region as both pastoralists and farmers from northern Darfur started to move

south in search of cultivable land and water, putting pressure on the more fertile area of

Jebel Marra and southern Darfur (Jok, 2007).

2.1.7.2 Immediate Causes

Insurgents appear to have been organizing in Darfur since late 2001. In early 2003, they evolved into

two armed rebel groups, Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). This
was the first time in modern history that Darfur witnessed a cohesive armed rebellion with a

comprehensive agenda for the province, rather than merely local demands. Some of the immediate causes

include:

a. Arab attack on a Zaghawa camp in Bir Tawill and a riot in the Fur town of Tur following

the rape by police of local women. This led to the burning of Fur villages in west Jebel

Marra. In a meeting called by the authorities in the Jebel Marra town of Nertiti in August

2002, the government allegedly made commitments to Fur traditional leaders but did not

keep them, thereby heightening anger and resentment.

b. The restiveness of the localized armed groups, whose outlook was often more local than

political, then converged with the broader ambitions of Fur and Zaghawa political and

intellectual figures in exile outside Sudan.

c. The Machakos Protocol breakthrough in mid 2002 and the subsequent negotiations

between Khartourn and SPLM/A. The Darfur rebels saw the SPLM/A‘s success in

getting southern grievances addressed in an internationally mediated peace process as

indication that armed rebellion brings economic and political gains.

d. The progress in the peace talks between the government and the SPLM/A provided the

immediate trigger to the insurgency since the Darfur groups feared they would have little

leverage after a North/South deal was concluded.

e. The rebel attack on isolated army posts, police and military checkpoints, convoys in Jebel

Mara localities such as Abu Gamra, Tur and Golo.

f. The SLA attacks of April 2003 on El-Fashir. Later the same year the SLA attacked and

briefly seized the towns of Kutum and Mellit, all in North Darfur (Jok, 2007).
 In a desperate bid to quell the rebellion in the Darfur region, the government armed the

Janjaweed/Arab militia to fight the rebel groups who are non-Arabs. The situation then degenerated into

an ethnic/tribal conflict, which is partly responsible for the crisis in Darfur, which has been tagged as the

worst humanitarian crisis ever. It was in an attempt to finding a lasting solution to the crisis that the

Chadian Mediators under the auspices of Idris Derby, President of the Republic of Chad, assisted by the

Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, and in the presence of the International Observers

and Facilitators, the government of the Republic of Sudan, SLA and JEM; thereafter known as parties

agreed to sign Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur. Consequently, an AU

Assessment Mission for the establishment of the CFC was dispatched to Darfur from 7-13 May 2005. On

completion of its assignment, the team recommended the immediate establishment of the Ceasefire

Commission.

The CFC therefore began official operation in El-Fashir Sudan on 9 June 2004, the same day the

African Union (UN) flag was hoisted. This conflict which was combined with sexual violence against

women and girls escalated in 2003, displaced a huge number of people internally and refugees in the

neighboring country of Chad. This situation presented a daunting challenge to the UN and the

international community, who responded with positive protection initiatives to the crisis by coordinating

humanitarian relief efforts and supporting African Union initiative to deploy a peace keeping force (Holt

and Daly, 2000).

The destruction of homes, community structures, wells, food production/crops, livestock,

personal assets combined with restricted access to humanitarian aid and continuing violence,

created an unstable environment for displaced Darfurians. They experienced the virtual

elimination of the attributes of civil society, their cultural identity that was tied to their villages,

and the very fabric of their social structures. The United Nations (UN) investigations for the war

crimes and crimes against humanity laid out evidence of widespread systematic rape and murder
in this conflict. The UN was concerned with the less control by the government of Sudan to take

security measures over the escalating human rights violation. The UN recognized the seriousness

of the situation and organized a massive humanitarian assistance and considered a rapid African

Union deployment of a peace keeping force to protect the victims and humanitarian

organizations (Holt and Daly, 2000).

The history of political instability in independent Sudan can therefore be attributed to the colonial

legacy that isolated Southern Sudan from northern Sudan. Furthermore, the causes of rebellions and

armed violence are rooted in the ethnic composition of Sudan, in historical grievances and in economic

disparities. Incompatible public policies and problems of marginalization of the country‘s regions in terms

of wealth and power-sharing are at the heart of centre-periphery disputes in the country. Nearly all rebel

groups in the country claimed that they were fighting because their regions were neglected by Khartoum-

based oligarchies since independence in 1956 (Wassara, 2010). Given the rise in the number of rebellions,

post-independent regimes have used several strategies to undermine rebel groups in Sudan. The cheapest

and most effective strategy to contain rebellions was to enlist civilians in militia groups.

2.1.7.3 Factions/Parties in the Insurgency

There were 3 major belligerents involved in the Darfur crisis. Although there were other outlawed

groups like the Janjaweed/Armed militia and NMRD who are not party to the Humanitarian Ceasefire

Agreement. The major actors are as follows:

a. Government of Sudan Forces. The Sudanese People Armed Forces (SPAF) comprised

of the Navy, Air Force and the Popular Defence Forces. Of all the 3 armed services, the

dominant force in the Darfur region was the Popular Defence Forces, also known as the

Government of Sudan Forces (GoS). The force was deployed in all the sectors in Darfur.

Since the 1980s, the GoS was accused of promoting violence by arming, training and
 financing tribal militias in Darfur. In the armed conflict, the GoS was alleged to be

providing direct military support to the pre-government militias; the Janjaweed, to fight

the rebel groups.

b. The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M). The SLA was organized in small

highly mobile units. They relied on hit and run tactics to demoralize GoS forces and

acquire critical supplies of fuel, weapons, ammunitions and even cash. Typically of

rebels they did not hold ground, but rather denied GoS access to large areas by attacking

officials, blocking roads and controlling trade flows. They got their material support from

many tribes especially the Zaghawa and Fur tribes in the north, south and west Darfur.

The movement demanded that GoS end its social, economic and political marginalization

of Darfur. The geographic and ethnic configuration of its rebellion was predominantly

with the Fur and Massaleit, concentrated in the Jelbel Marra area in Southern and

Western Darfur states. The bulk of the force, were predominantly Zaghawa and Meidoub

fighters, in Northern Darfur. They controlled areas around Nyala, Kabkabiya, El-Genaina

and Zalinge.

c. The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). JEM was associated with the Zaghawa

tribe of the northern half of Darfur and dominated by the Fur. The movement seemed to

share similar objectives with the SLM/A. It was a smaller movement than the SLA. The

movement claimed it was not a secessionist movement but that they only wanted a role in

power and a share of the resources. Its mode of operation was similar to that of SLA

(Holt and Daly, 2000).

2.1.7.4 The Outlawed Groups

 Several outlawed groups existed in Darfur. These groups were mainly involved in armed robbery,

banditry activities, highway robbery, attack on villages, looting of livestock. Notable among these groups

are:

b. The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD). The NMRD was a splinter

group from JEM. Its founders were members of Toundebai, a sub clan of the Zaghawa. The movement

originated from a personal dispute between Dr. Khalil Ibrahim of JEM and Gibril Barey. The NMRD

accused the JEM of exploiting religion for political ends, exacerbating the Darfur conflict. It also accused

the JEM of being a radical Islamic fundamentalist movement that continued to have ties with Turabi.

They were mainly found in the Chadian border town of Tina and in the Jabel Moun area of West Darfur

state. The group emerged n September 2004 and signed a ceasefire agreement with GoS on the 17

December 2004. In the right circumstances, peacekeeping operations could offer a flexible and unique

means to confront conflicts in Africa.

As noted above, the primary actors in the armed violence are the government, rebels and militia

groups. Their commitment to the use of violence in addressing problems could be examined from the

perspective of the economic and social structures of the country, ideologies, the quest for power at

different levels, and the struggle for control of resources. Human security was therefore threatened by the

resort to violence by governments, rebels and the militias that are directly involved in the different violent

conflicts in Sudan.

2.1.7.5 Response of the Sudanese Government

The Sudanese government is known to have often resorted to violence by employing the services

of militia groups as auxiliaries of the national army to fight rebel groups. The militia groups in Sudan

were part and parcel of the government‘s counterinsurgency strategy. As such, they were hired to fight for

the government defence force. Some militia groups had an ethnic objective while others were created by
influential individuals with the goal of enriching themselves (Wassara, 2010). They made money from

internal social disorder with the support of the government by waging violence against rebels and

plundering properties of communities supporting rebel groups. The heavy reliance of the government on

militia groups was therefore both an economic and a tactical strategy.

The various militia groups in Sudan are described in this study as ethnic and tribal. Other civilian

paramilitary groups were recruited, trained and armed by the government for the purpose of waging proxy

wars against rebels and communities supporting rebel movements. The formation of tribal militia groups

started under Nimeiri in 1983 as a counterinsurgency strategy. The military regime of Omar el-Bashir

institutionalized all militia groups supported by the government after promulgation of the Popular

Defence Act in October 1989 (Jok, 2007). This Act legitimized militia and allied paramilitary groups as

auxiliaries of the national army (Wassara, 2010). The most popular of the militia groups was the

Janjaweed. The Janjaweed militia group became prominent after the Darfur rebellion in 2003. The

estimated strength of the Janjaweed was about 5 000 men (Wassara, 2010). It was described as an ‗Arab‘

paramilitary militia group on camels and horses and is known for perpetrating violence against civilians

in Darfur.

Therefore one can deduce from the foregoing analysis that in managing the crisis in

Darfur, the Sudanese government relied on brute force as a strategy. Its reliance on force can be

said to have perpetuated the crisis thereby necessitating the intervention of the African Union

(AU) and the United Nations Organization (UNO) peacekeeping operations. Even though the

Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement was signed, its implementation proved an uphill task as the

state was more committed to crushing insurgency than on peaceful means of resolving the

differences. The intractable nature of the conflict led to the secession of South Sudan from Sudan

on July 9, 2011.

2.1.8 The Nigerian State’s Response to Domestic Insurgency: The Boko Haram
Insurgency
 The Boko Haram episode has attracted attention from virtually every quarter in Nigeria. Opinions

on how the scourge is being handled or should be handled are multiple. While some opine that the state

should go after the sect‘s adherents with the sledge hammer not minding the rights or wrongs of their

actions, others maintain that caution is the best approach to dealing with the situation. For those who

preach a violent approach to managing the crisis, any attempt to discuss the roots of their terrorism is only

an attempt to justify it. Those who insist on caution maintain that violence only begets more violence.

According to Ajah (2011) certain issues in human existence cannot just be overcome by force or

the application of both force and inducements. In his view when the cause of the problem is known and it

is justifiable, it becomes very deadly to apply force. Ajah illustrated his argument with the Niger Delta

insurgency during which many Niger Delta people especially the youths lost their lives in a course they

strongly believed in i.e the emancipation of the Niger Delta as encapsulated in the meaning of MEND.

The people became like the Gog and the Magog who came out in folds when a section is annihilated.

In Ajah‘s position, the Boko Haram is a product of the ―Haram‖ in the ―Boko‖. Haram in

his position is illegality, unlawfulness and obscenities. These abstractions in his opinion are definitely the

order of the day in Nigeria most especially among the high level of the citizenry. He deplored the current

situation in Nigeria in which uprightness and mercy have drifted off the hearts of many citizens and

cruelty, injustice, discrimination, inhumanity, corruption and lawlessness have taken over the society.

Ajah posited that the spread of the Boko Haram menace is to be attributed to the mishandling of

the situation by the authorities concerned. To him the restraint exercised by the former president Obasanjo

in not taking a violent measure against Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta militants, was not for

nothing. This to Ajah was because the government then knew that if Dokubo was killed, several other

Asari Dokubos would emerge and strike even harder than the original Dokubo. His opinion is therefore

that the Nigerian government made a grave error by killing the leader of the Boko Haram Mohammed
Yusuf. This in his view cannot be distanced from being a primary cause of the rampage by the group.

Ajah called for dialogue and not violence.

Furthermore Ajah (2011) posited that the Boko Haram has assumed another dimension going

beyond terrorism to open assault on the Nigerian state. To him the sect has the intention of Jihad like the

Maitasine in the 1980s and that the insurgency exists as a result of maladministration and long neglect of

the youths by the Northern leaders. Ajah in agreement with former National Chairman of Alliance for

Democracy (AD) Adamu Song (who granted an interview to Newsstar Newspaper) noted that:

I can foresee that they are children of frustration,

exploitation by the leadership of the society. If you
look at their modus operandi, you will know that
they are educated. In fact the propelling force of
Boko Haram is a product of failure of leadership
which people are revolting against the way things
are being done in our society by our leaders”

Ajah further maintained that the operations of the Boko Haram group reveals that they are

aggrieved and this grievance stems from the general frustration of going through school and not being

able to secure jobs while the privileged ones secure jobs without difficulties. This situation in his opinion

is the propelling factors that can engineer revolution which the Boko Haram is involved in now.

One can further infer from the above that Ajah‘s position is for government to make sincere

efforts to address the frustrating unemployment situation in the country and not resort to violence as it is

now, as a way of curbing the menace of the Boko Haram crisis. In his opinion most youths will certainly

withdraw from these violent activities when they see legitimate means of livelihood.

In an interview granted to Weekly Trust Newspaper (June 25, 2011), Sheikh Abdullahi Bala

maintained that the activities of the Boko Haram sect is only a pointer to or a reflection of the socio

economic situation in the country which he opines, government must address. He further suggested that

government should evolve ways of dialoguing with the leaders of the group and that no extra judicial

killing should be tolerated. He opined again that the government should work hard to address the needs of
the Nigerian populace generally. If this approach is adopted, he maintained, some of these insurgents will

disappear. Sheikh Abdullahi asserted that good governance is key in the management of crisis of this

nature.

The Sheikh further noted that government has committed grave mistakes that need to be reviewed

for the Boko Haram problem to be addressed. First among these is that government destroyed the houses

of Boko Haram members and their leader was arrested and killed without proper investigation. Secondly,

the killers were not arrested not to talk of being punished accordingly and lastly government embarked on

indiscriminate arrest of people most of whom were considered innocent.

In as much as Sheikh Abdullahi did not try to justify the activities of the Boko Haram, he also did

not support the government. His position again reveals the short comings of the Nigerian state in terms of

its failure to entrench good governance and address the poor living condition in the country, two factors

that if lacking can generate uprisings which will definitely negatively impact on the security of lives and

property.

The Editorial section of The Guardian Newspaper (August, 2009) lamented that the Boko Haram

experience is a failure on the on the part of the state. In its opinion, Nigeria has gone through this road of

infamy before. It lamented that since 1983 when the Maitasine crisis wrecked havoc in Maiduguri, there

have been several sectarian uprisings in different parts of the country which have claimed over 10, 000

lives and the untold number of properties destroyed.

The Editorial further lamented that in spite of the recurrent incidents, no single perpetrator of

heinous crimes has been put on trial and punished. In its opinion, this negligence on the part of the

Nigerian state has emboldened all sorts of insurgent groups who rise at will to visit mayhem on innocent

people. The Boko Haram episode underscores the growing state of anarchy in Nigeria. The Editorial

noted that many people are dissatisfied with the woeful state of affairs in the country, particularly the

inefficiency of the state and its security agencies.

 With an army of unemployed, uneducated, frustrated and poverty stricken youths all over Nigeria,

who are easily manipulated by the powers that be in religious and political circles, it is easy to recruit

thousands of mindless individuals into any clandestine activity. Sadly enough, government is doing

nothing to redress a potential malady that could rock the very roots of social cohesion in Nigeria, the

Editorial lamented.

Abugu (2009) argued that the Boko Haram incident was more about a disenchanted, disinherited

people deciding to vent their anger and frustration (in a very violent way) against the rest of society. In his

opinion, Boko Haram is a metaphor for poverty and not Islamism. This to him becomes true when one

takes a causal look at the states where the sect is said to be active and one will find that some of them are

among the states with the worst poverty rates in the country. Abugu argued that people with little or

nothing to for, who have no hope for, or faith in a better tomorrow, who feel shortchanged by life are

almost always likely to offer themselves for use for nefarious purposes by persons who often masquerade

as religious men but who only hide under religion to exploit others‘ weaknesses for personal

aggrandizement.

Abugu argued further that it is in the nature of man that what he cannot have, he often discredits

or even tries to destroy. With regards to the Boko Haram crisis he maintained that the Boko Haram sect is

not actually rebelling against western influence in their lives as much as they are rebelling against the

system that made it difficult for them to have access to the opportunities for a better life inherent in

western education, a system that drove them to the periphery of life while a few of their compatriots

sometimes even from the same neighborhood, lived in unimaginable privilege.

Abugu therefore opined that northern leadership must be held accountable for every Boko Haram

that happens. That the northern elite must sit down and ponder on these questions: Does the cultural

dictatorship in practice in the northern region serve the region and all its people well? What is the beauty

in a cultural practice that makes life almost impossible for the masses of the people (e.g the almajiris)
while only a few people enjoy all the appurtenances of life? Why is it so difficult for northern leaders to

invest so massively in the education of the region‘s youths? Why can‘t the Emirs and other categories of

religious leaders, who have moral authority over these people, join hands with governments in the region

to get all the potential Boko Haram kids out to school compulsorily?

According to Reverend Father (now Bishop) Matthew Hassan Kukah (2012) Nigerians now live

in an environment of a severely weak architecture of state which allows evil to triumph. In his view it is

this poverty that produces jealousy and hatred which leads to violence. He added that Nigerians live in a

state of ineffective law enforcement and tragic social conditions. Corruption in his opinion has destroyed

the fabric of society and that its corrosive effect is visible in the ruination of citizen‘s lives and the decay

in the society.

Kukah lamented that the inability of the state to punish criminals as criminals has created the

illusion that there is a conflict between Christians and Muslims. To him it would appear that many

elements today are going to great extremes to pitch Christians against Muslims and vice versa so that

Nigerian‘s attention is taken away from the true source of their woes: corruption and bad governance

(emphasis added). This opinion implies that Kukah views the Boko Haram menace as a fall out of the

prevailing worsening socio-political situation in the country.

In his view, Ali (2012) argued that the state of insecurity which thrives in Nigeria would not

cease until the government addresses injustice and corruption in the country. He maintained that the Boko

haram insurgencies are clearly a fall out of corruption, bad governance and individuals who did not care

about the welfare of the Boko Haram. According to him:

Until government addresses injustice and corruption, peace

would be difficult to achieve. This is so because the simple thing
is that once one is hungry, then anger comes and anybody who is
hungry can just anything (sic). You see, there is starvation in this
country. There are people who had gone to school, they finished
their school and have been at home for many years and no hope
of getting a job. (Ali, 2012)
 Ali argued further that the 932 billion naira 2012 budget on security by the federal government is

just going to be a waste as some people would steal it and nothing would happen. To Ali physical security

does not guarantee peace; injustice and peace cannot cohabit, they cannot coexist in the same atmosphere.

Therefore Ali maintained that unless government deals with corruption, it cannot deal with such an

insurgency as the Boko Haram. Ali further posited that:

The Boko Haram insurgency is a social issue. You cannot fight

this type of insurgency with the type of approach the government
is taking. What we see now is deployment of troops and
harassment of members of the public. You cannot fight this
insurgency by using force but dialogue.

The position of Ali implies that the worsening security condition in Nigeria especially in the

North is as a result of poor governance and inability to address lingering issues of unemployment,

illiteracy and numerous unmet needs. It is therefore logical that managing such crises requires peaceful

means and not coercive approaches.

According to the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in North East Nigeria, the Boko

Haram crisis is to be blamed on poverty, unemployment, existence of private militias funded and used by

politicians and individuals and then dumped after having been trained to handle arms and the presence of

almajiris who together with those mentioned above could easily be used as cannon fodders to ignite and

sustain crisis. It noted further that the extra judicial killing of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf and

some members of the sect by security agencies also account for the crisis. Other issues identified by the

Committee are weak governance and failure to deliver services even as huge resources accrue to

governments at all levels and influx of illegal aliens resulting from porous and unmanned borders.

In Mamu‘s (2012) opinion, the issue of corruption, greed and consequent inefficiency which

permeates all cadres in the Nigerian security outfit militates against the Nigerian state‘s ability to contain
the Boko Haram crisis. It is therefore deplorable that the Boko Haram crisis has brought to the fore the

various loopholes and shortcomings in Nigeria‘s security framework. Even though the state invests

colossal amounts of Naira on ―security‖, the actual act of providing security for all Nigerians is not given

priority.

Salihi (2012) viewed the Boko Haram crisis as a manifestation of failure of governance in

Nigeria. In his opinion, violence of this nature is not new in Nigeria but has been a recurrent development

from the colonial era. In his view, the attainment of political independence and the opening up of the

democratic space and consequent decay in the polity have resulted in widespread use of violence to press

for demands on the state as well as in the relations among groups in the country. Salihi went on to posit

that the emergence of militants like the Niger Delta miltants, Oodua people‘s congress (OPC), Movement

for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Boko Haram, are clearly

manifestation of the failure of governance in Nigeria.

Salihi further argued that the manifestation of protests in the form of militancy, militarism or

violence has largely to do with the character of the state in Africa especially with respect to governance.

To him movements, groups, militias, gangs or other such tendencies arise in contestation with the state

because of the way it is being ruled or something it denies those represented by the group or even its

inappropriateness in terms of its raison d‘etre for the whole or a section of the citizenry. Salihi maintained

that the Boko Haram insurgency is a manifestation of state failure whose symptoms can be summarized as

ineffectiveness of the state in security, provision of essential services, functioning of its institutions,

corruption, economic decline, control of violence and the existence of other centers of power. Therefore

in Salihi‘s position state failure fuel political violence as the weakness of the state to meet the

expectations of the people coupled with its inability to control violence allow it to get out of proportion.

Political violence therefore becomes the norm for groups to express themselves in the pursuit of their own

goals.
 According to Danjibo (2010) the most viable explanation for the recurrent violence including

religious and sectarian violence, is the failure of governance in Nigeria. He stressed the fact that Nigerians

in general have been denied good governance for long. He argued further that the youths that are mostly

engaged in acts of violence or serve as an army of this sectarian violence are the first victims of this bad

governance and acute corruption. Therefore the involvement of youths in the Boko Haram violence can

be ascribed to the prevailing bad governance which consequently breeds frustration and aggression

against the Nigerian state and all that are seen as representatives of the exploitative order.

In forest‘s (2012) opinion a government failure to adhere to the conventional social contract

between government and the governed breeds disenchantment among citizens who then seek the power to

force change. According to him this in turn has resulted in a variety of revolutionary movements

throughout history. He noted further that corrupt governments seek to maintain and increase their power

over others and over resources by any means necessary, while the powerless see the corruption and look

for ways to combat it even through violent acts of terrorism, as that may be perceived as their only form

of recourse. Forest maintained further that in the African context, corruption has indeed been a common

underlying factor in various forms of political violence, and is cited often by Boko Haram as one of the

motivating causes for their campaign of terror.

Forest argued further that no terrorist group has ever emerged in a vacuum but were motivated by

dynamic contextual factors i.e political, social, economic, temporal, spatial, even spiritual. These to him

must be taken into cognizance. He argued that there is an array of environmental conditions and

grievances among members of the local population that facilitate opportunities for Boko Haram to muster

support and orchestrate acts of political violence. In response Forest noted that the Nigerian state has

struggled to deal effectively with these grievances and sources of tension throughout the country, and that

there is a pervasive belief particularly among northern Nigerians that the government continually fails to

address critical needs of those who aspire for a better future. Forest noted that while resources are surely

constrained, it is the inequitable distribution of those resources, and the widely acknowledged levels of
corruption among elites, that detract from the government‘s effectiveness. He asserted further that in turn,

patronage and corruption fuels a general perception that government officials (to include law

enforcement) cannot be trusted, and this further undermines the government‘s ability to influence the

behavior of local community members in positive directions, away from the lure of radical extremist

ideologies like that of Boko Haram. The argument of Forest like those of other analysts places the

Nigerian state at the center of the Boko Haram insurgency. There is a strong connection between the

failure of governance, corruption and the state‘s insensitivity to the plight of the entire citizenry and the

outbreaks of violence in the country. It also means that the state has not adopted the right approach to

handling the situation.

Idris (2011) argued that the Boko Haram incident was aggravated by the near absence of a

channel of communication between the sect members and the federal and Borno state governments on the

one hand and the security agencies charged with the responsibility of restoring normalcy on the other

hand. Idris posited further that activities of the security agencies are a wild goose chase because members

of the sect are hardly tied to a specific area. To him, the deployment of troops to the area led to a different

dimension in the crisis.

Idris argued further that the Boko Haram crisis is an issue of good governance. To him if there

were good governance in Nigeria, each and every fabric and complex aspect of governance would be

taken seriously and systematically and strategically treated for the good of the nation. He also lamented

that when we operate at the micro level, we do not go deep into the fabrics, there is a tendency that

problems of the nature of the Boko Haram, will crop up. He maintained that the insurgency by the Boko

Haram is just a symptom of a big development failure because the state has failed to unite Nigeria into

one indivisible entity, the economic strata between the haves and have nots has widened, Nigeria now has

a huge population burden and a micro population who have taken over the whole fabric of the economy.
 Idris further posited that in the east, the youths felt left out and were indoctrinated to believe that

they do not belong in Nigeria, they are there as MASSOB. Even though they are lying low, on the

frontline everybody feels the issue has been solved, in the west there is the Oodua People‘s Congress

(OPC), we also had the Area Boys syndrome which seems to have gone under. Idris argued that nothing

systematic was done to solve these problems but the same actors, the issues and the same conditions are

still prevailing. Now that there is the Boko Haram , Nigeria is in need of a serious and purposeful

government intervention in order to resolve the problem because nobody knows for sure who the

members of the Boko Haram are, why they are doing what they are doing and how they are doing what

they are doing. To him the issue is beyond sending soldiers to go and kill people.

Jideofor (2012) maintained that the Boko Haram is a symptom of the crisis in Nigeria‘s nation

building project which feeds into the crisis of underdevelopment to create an existentialist crisis for

majority of Nigerians. To him, for many people a way of resolving the consequent sense of alienation is

to retreat from the Nigerian project and construct meaning in chosen primordial entities often with the

Nigerian state as the enemy. Therefore the Nigerian state is regarded as the enemy not just by Boko

Haram but by several Nigerians and groups each attacking it with as much ferocity as Boko Haram‘s

bombs, using whatever means they have at their disposal.

It would appear that there is a lot of politics surrounding the Boko Haram crisis especially by the

Nigerian state which is trying to absolve itself of any blame in creating an enabling environment for the

Boko Haram crisis to thrive. Furthermore, the crisis clearly reveals the extent of the complexities and

complications in the Nigerian socio-economic spheres thereby emphasizing the urgent need for a

fundamental restructuring and reordering of the Nigerian state.

Abubakar (2011) accused the former Borno state governor Ali Modu Sherriff of creating the

Boko Haram insurgency. By ―creating‖ Abubakar argued that the former leader gave room for its

nurturing and growth. In Abubakar‘s opinion for the two terms that sheriff served as governor, he did
nothing to develop the state. He pointed out that worse still, even the little Sherriff found on ground in the

state on assumption of office, he allowed to collapse. He further lamented that as at the time Sherriff left

office there was no functioning government general hospital, no tertiary institution was functioning and

Borno state became the least linked state in terms of roads.

Abubakar noted that Sherriff constructed an ultra modern hospital which he locked up and

allowed to lay waste. He bought one thousand motorcycles (including two thousand with attachment for

carrying goods), to help with job creation which again he locked up four about four years. The seven

hundred tractors he bought for farming complete with all their implements were also not distributed for

over four years. Tens of thousands of tones of grains were also kept for four years undistributed. With

these and many more, Abubakar argued that ―why won‘t poverty and unemployment help create

frustrated groups fed up with what they perceive as unjust and uncaring government‖.

In Abubakar‘s opinion the current deployment of troops to the troubled areas especially Borno

state is uncalled for. This is so because the soldiers are already being accused of going to Borno with a

pre conceived notion that whole neighbourhoods shall be dealt with if they allow the Boko Haram to

operate in their locality. Abubakar warned that the government and army must avoid the appearance of an

Israeli like collective punishment otherwise it risks loosing popular support and the struggle will become

what has been described as ―Zalunci Haram‖ (oppression is forbidden). Abubakar further deplored the

situation noting that just where all this uprising and strategic response is going is not clear but there is

need for caution on the part of government.

Mohammed (2011) faulted the Nigerian state‘s approach in the management of the Boko Haram

threat. He opined that the Nigerian state should have acted much earlier to nip the spread of the sect in the

bud. He lamented that the authorities were aware of the existence of the group from the onset but did

nothing to curtail their excesses. He attributed their violence and extremity to the failure of the

government to put in place a major push to check their proliferation. To him, the sect has become more
and more extreme because of a broken down structural condition in Nigeria which gives people the

effrontery to take the law into their hands without being reprimanded.

Mohammed‘s opinion can be given credence in the light of the lackadaisical attitude with which

security threats in Nigeria are handled. It can also be viewed against the abysmally poor security network

in Nigeria and the ―medicine after death‖ approach to handling internal security threats. It goes without

saying that having the necessary information at their disposal the Nigerian authorities did not take the

necessary steps to contain the Boko Haram crisis. This to him largely accounts for the sect‘s spread across

many northern states in the country.

Haruna (2011) blamed the Nigerian state for its failure to crush the sect earlier in 2009. In his

opinion, if the sect had been eliminated then, the story would have been a more pleasant one today. He

noted that what the military counter insurgency merely succeeded in doing was to send the sect

underground temporarily only to resurface in a more monstrous form. Haruna asserted that available

information indicate that the Nigerian authorities still have not learned the right lesson of their failure.

This lesson to him is that you can only solve a crime (which is what the activities of Boko Haram are) by

being as hard on its sources as you are on the crime itself.

Haruna further asserted that the Boko Haram‘s outright condemnation of modernity and western

ideals is unreasonable and untenable. He further described their methods of bombing and killings as being

worse. To him Boko Haram‘s attacks on the police Headquarters is no more worse than the previous

attacks on security forces by ethnic militias like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

(MEND) and Afenifere. Haruna noted that at any rate, there is no problem on earth that genuine dialogue

cannot solve and that repression as the opposite of dialogue has never solved any of societies‘ problems.

At this juncture one cannot say where Haruna‘s position stands since he commenced by

advocating for a violent approach and then condemned violence as the way out. He went further to state

that there is a chance (no matter how slim) that if the outcome of the panel that looked into the killing of
the sect‘s leadership are published, the new leadership could come out in the open, change its attitude of

disdain for the authorities and accept offer for dialogue.

Former President Obasanjo (2011) opines that the Nigerian nation needs adequate information on

the activities of the Boko Haram sect, the motives behind their actions and their sponsors. This to him is

necessary before the problem can be effectively handled. Nigeria, he asserted needs information to be

well positioned to address the Boko Haram issue. He further stated that there is so much to know and so

much to find about them. Obasanjo further opined that if there is need to deal with the sect using the

carrot and stick approach, we must be able to know what should be the ―stick‖ and what should be the

―carrot‖.

Interestingly Obasanjo stated his belief that a group of people acting in a strange manner when

they are not actually insane must have their reasons. To him the members of the Boko Haram sect are not

insane and so there must be reasons for their actions and even though we may not necessarily agree with

their actions, we must endeavour to find out why they are doing what they are doing and those behind

them internally and externally.

Obasanjo further reacted on whether or not the sect should be granted amnesty by the federal

government as in the Niger Delta case. In his opinion, the amnesty could be subjected to abuse and that if

amnesty must be granted the people concerned must be identified, the offence committed brought out and

the necessity of granting the amnesty must be ascertained as well.

It is evident from Obasanjo‘s position that he does not favour an all out repressive approach in the

management of the Boko Haram conflicts with the government but a carrot and stick approach. It can also

be deduced from his viewpoint that adopting a violent approach all through could further complicate

matters hence the need to be circumspect in managing the crisis.

According to Shinkafi (2011) the recent Boko Haram uprising among others demands a frank and

dispassionate introspection especially regarding roles and responsibilities of institutions of government

that deal with good governance in general and maintenance of law and order in particular. In his opinion,

a lot of the problems experienced in Nigeria arise from one or the other not abiding by the tenets of the

law. Shinkafi argued that a proper understanding of law and order requires reference to the fundamental

essence of the subject which is that both the citizens and the state must live within the precincts of the

law. He asserted among other things that the state itself must be fair, must be just and also must be law

abiding, and that the moment the citizenry sees the state as being unjust and unfair, the whole basis of the

social contract and security will be wrecked.

Shinkafi maintained further that the arrest of those alleged to be responsible for the killings of the

Boko Haram leaders is a right step towards resolving the problem. He noted however that this might be

the beginning of a new phase. He thus suggested that the Nigerian authorities should follow up with the

carrot and a little bit of stick. This means that Shinkafi called for less violence and more dialogue. To him

it is no longer realistic to regard the movement as a gang of unworthy bandits unworthy of dialogue. He

argued that we have reached a point where the current posturing of the security agencies will not do

because it instigates deadlier reactions from the militants and discredits the conciliatory overtures of those

in the main arena of conflict in and around Borno state.

According to Musa et al (2009) Nigeria is steadily moving towards and manifesting symptoms of

a failed state. According to them with the federal governments seeing non commitment to eradicating

illiteracy among Nigerians especially the youths, it was exposing the country to danger as group like

Boko Haram would always find recruits into their fold.

Musa et al agreed with the Congress of Nigerian Political Parties (CNPP) and the Action

Congress (AC) which accused the federal government of mismanaging the mayhem. And for executing

the Boko Haram‘s leader, Nigerians have been robbed of the opportunity of knowing the real

masterminds of the recurring violence in the North. They described the uprising as a signpost to the

dangerous slide of Nigeria to a failed state.

 According to Amnesty International (2012) the federal government is not doing enough to deal

with the worsening Boko Haram terrorist activities in northern Nigeria. The body reacted to the

continuing terrorist attacks in Kano and Bauchi states where innocent people were caught between Boko

Haram‗s terrorism and Nigeria‘s counter terrorism measures which have apparently failed to prevent,

investigate, prosecute or punish the acts.

The Amnesty International opined that the federal government should rather invest in reforming

the criminal justice system in Nigeria to prevent more losses in northern Nigeria and also to investment

the crimes and bring perpetrators to justice. The body condemned the extrajudicial approach response to

the Boko Haram crisis as security agents make sweeping arrests and disappearance of suspected members

of Boko Haram and the detention and ill treatment of women and children related to suspected members

of Boko Haram in order to elicit information from them.

Unuigbe (2011) observed that prior to the incidence of 26, July, 2009, the activities of the sect

were to a large extent known to the public including the state government and nothing was done to

forestall the ensuing violence. He argued further that the failure of the Nigerian leadership at all levels to

address the failings of the society is responsible for the mass followership to the sect. He added that the

consequent outbreak of violence is due to the high rate of corruption and the inexplicable ostentatious

living of the leadership class.

Unuigbe further posited that series of intelligence reports were sent to appropriate authorities but

there was an apparent lack of action on these reports. He noted that:

There was adequate intelligence on the sect (Boko Haram) and

that information sent to higher headquarters through 21
Armoured Brigade before the conflict began but were not acted
upon in good time (emphasis added)
 The position of Unuigbe above clearly reveals negligence on the part of government and the

security agencies in taking timely action to nip the resulting violence in the bud. The reactive approach

adopted by the government is therefore belated and totally unsuitable in managing the crisis.

In the position of Eseku (2011), the act of vengeful tact by the state security apparatus marks the

beginning of an unprecedented spate of violent and catastrophic occurrences on the Nigerian state. He

opined that the idea of acquiring Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), AK 47, jeeps and other high tech

equipments that have little effect in combating what he described as ―civilian warfare‖ on civilian

territory is tantamount to using a hammer to kill a mosquito.

He asserted that it is obvious that the criminal neglect by the government of some northern states

over the years in enforcing quality education, albeit western in the region should be reversed by

compulsory education of the coming generation of youngsters in the states so as to eradicate the negative

notion that western education is harmful, injurious and detrimental to the growth and development of

Islam and their tribal beliefs.

Eseku‘s position implies that the resort to violence may be too harsh and that a process of

managing the situation peacefully be embraced. He suggested rather that an olive branch be extended to

all militants or terrorist factions in the nation as a ―carrot‖ strategy attached with a firm deadline and after

wards, a massive cleanup of dissidents should be employed and sustained as a ―stick‖ approach to justify

the ―carrot and stick‖ strategy.

For the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in North East Nigeria also known as the

Boko Haram Committee headed by Ambassador Usman Galtimari, the Intelligence Community has

failed. The Committee observed that there are no effective and coordinated intelligence gathering and

deployment to forestall crime in Nigeria. The Committee listed operational lapses, service rivalry, under

funding and lack of collaboration as accounting for the issues of the security agencies.
 Mamu (2012) maintained that despite the billions of Naira being expended in the name of

security votes by both the federal government and some state governments in the north east, the

government may not be able to effectively defeat the Boko Haram armed insurgency. This to him is in

view of the fact that the morale, zeal, patriotism and desire to sacrifice their lives by the security agents

have gone with the fear of official corruption in the system. These to Mamu prevent training and

retraining, motivational allowances commensurate with the hazards of the job they do. He noted further

that inadequate and lack of modern arms and equipment and the delay or failure to pay families of several

officers that lost their lives or sustained serious injuries as a result of their commitment and sacrifice to

the fight against the Boko Haram sect seriously militates against success by the Nigerian state. With all

these systemic shortcomings, Mamu wondered how far the Nigerian state can go in confronting the Boko

Haram sect.

In an excerpt from a letter dated July 11, 2011 to President Jonathan and published in Sunday

Trust of July 17, (2011), Barrister Sadau Garba (Lawyer to late Mohammed Yusuf, leader of the Boko

Haram sect), outlined ten steps to peace with Boko Haram:

i. Engage the group in meaningful and sincere dialogue in order to address the perceived

injustice done to the group as Nigerians.

ii. Do not involve the traditional rulers (Emirs and Chiefs) and the major Islamic

groups/organizations in reaching the group or resolving the problem because the members of

the group do not have any respect for them but rather consider them as part of the problem.

iii. Constitute a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate the extrajudicial killing of the

members of the group in Bauchi and Borno states.

iv. Investigate the public apologies tendered by Governor Isa Yuguda of Bauchi state, Senator

Ali Modu Sherriff and Senator Danjuma Goje for the mass killings of the group‘s members.

There is more to the public apologies they tendered, if justice is to be done.

 v. The federal government should ascertain the number of those killed by the police during the

crisis and pay their surviving family members adequate compensation.

vi. The landed properties of the group seized in Borno and Bauchi states be returned to them

with compensation for reconstruction.

vii. The federal government should embark on immediate rehabilitation programme of the

displaced members of the group who are scattered, angry, hungry and jobless through the

establishment of vocational centres to absorb them. Some of them should be sent abroad to

acquire both western and Islamic education.

viii. The integration of the Almajiri schools into the modern system of education for easy

monitoring by government at all levels.

ix. The federal government should encourage and ensure proper utilization of scarce resources

by the states and local government councils in the north in order to guide against treasury

looting, the resources can create jobs for the teeming unemployed youths who have become a

nuisance to the society.

x. The federal government should task the northern elites who largely depend on government

patronage for their survival to establish in their localities community schools, give

scholarship and grants to the poor and establish industries just like their southern and western

counterparts. This should henceforth be part of the conditions for federal appointments of any

person of northern extraction.

This excerpt explicitly shows that the group is frustrated by the prevailing economic situation in the

country and is determined to end the perceived injustices in the country.

The Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in North East Nigeria recommended the use

of dialogue and negotiation which should be contingent upon the renunciation of all forms of violence and

surrender of all arms. It further recommended that government at all levels should as a matter of priority

initiate and design appropriate programmes to address unemployment in the zone. It noted that the
ongoing trial of police officers linked to the murder of Mohammed Yusuf and some of his followers,

should be expedited and publicized to convince the public of government‘s sincerity on the matter and

victims compensated.

In a press statement released by the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) (2011), it was observed

that the challenges presented to the nation by the incessant attacks if uncontrolled can threaten national

security thereby leading to collapse of peace, security and public order. In view of this, the Forum

maintained that the federal government should visibly commit itself to ensuring the safety of the leaders

of Boko Haram when they eventually present themselves for dialogue. Government was called upon to

continue to persevere, uncover the true identity of the sect to be able to determine their demands or

grievances and address those that may be genuine and in accordance with the laws of the land. While

noting that the actions of the Boko Haram are condemnable, the Forum called on the government and all

political leaders as well as those in positions of authority to call to mind the United Nations resolution

1963 of 2010 which urges all governments around the world to address underlying causes of civil unrest

and social conflicts rather than resort to hard military power which rarely solve them.

It also called on governments at all levels to demonstrate fairness and justice in dealing with all

issues of insecurity and infringement of the laws of the nation. The ACF‘s position indicates its

concurrence with the position that the government of the Nigerian state is incapable of managing the

situation with the use of force. In other words the position of the ACF is one that calls for caution, tact

and strategy in the management of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Walker (2012) maintained that it is difficult for there to be any meaningful dialogue between the

Nigerian state and the Boko Haram sect. this in his opinion is due to government‘s misconception and

wrong perception of the group. He posited further that contrary to widely held view of the sect as being in

the same league with Algeria‘s Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or Somalia‘s Al Shabab, the Boko

Haram cannot be said to be in the same global jihadist bracket as these terrorist organizations. He
maintained that rather, the Boko Haram believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group

of corrupt, false Muslims and is poised to wage a war against them and the Nigerian state generally to

create a ―pure‖ Islamic state ruled by Sharia law.

In view of the forgoing, Walker asserted that the group cell like structure is open to factions and

splits, and there would be no guarantee that someone speaking for the group is speaking for all of the

members. Walker noted that the tactics or approach of the federal government through the security

agencies against the sect have been consistently brutal and counterproductive. He noted further that the

state‘s reliance on extra judicial execution as a strategy in ―dealing‖ with any problem in Nigeria not only

created the Boko Haram as it is today but also sustains it and gives it fuel to expand.

It can be inferred from Walker‘s position that he faults the Nigerian state of portraying the Boko

Haram sect in bad light, a fact which would invariably make it difficult for any meaningful dialogue to

take place between the state and the sect.

Jideofor (2012) argued that the Nigerian state has a vested interest in portraying Boko Haram as

having a link with international terrorist groups. This in his view is based on three (3) factors. One, it will

make it easier to attract international sympathy and technical assistance from European countries and the

United States which are normally paranoid about any group linked to the Al-Qaeda. Two, linking Boko

Haram to Al-Qaeda will blunt criticisms against the government‘s inability to contain the group after all if

the United States and the European countries with all their resources and capabilities have not been able

to effectively contain Al-Qaeda, why will anyone consider it a sign of weakness that the government has

not been able to defeat an organization it sponsors? Three, by linking Boko Haram to Al-Qaeda the

government may hope to use innuendos of United States‘ involvement to frighten the sect and help to

pressure it to the negotiating table. It would appear that Jideofor made an allusion to the involvement of

the Nigerian state in sponsoring the Boko Haram sect‘s activities. This singular fact therefore makes

negotiations unrealistic.
 The crisis situations reviewed so far reveals that there is a recurrent preference for

violence/repression by the state in Africa and Nigeria. Where there is no whole scale violent response by

the state, the Commission of Inquiry approach is adopted. This study however becomes significant to

academic pursuit as it emphasizes the fact that insurgent groups like the Boko Haram are driven by an

ideology which never dies even if the major actors are eliminated while striving to propagate their

ideology. This study therefore brings to limelight the necessity for governments in Africa and Nigeria in

particular to sincerely set aside their selfish and parochial interests and reach out to insurgent groups, their

leaders, adherents and would be followers who nurture grievances against the state with a view to

subjecting them to reorientation and subsequent reintegration into the larger society rather than always

relying on the force of arms to crush insurgency. The study also emphasizes the need for continuous

reorientation of the entire citizenry and those in the crisis prone areas in particular as a long term strategy

for nipping insurgency in the bud.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The postulations in this dissertation shall be founded upon the weak state theory. This approach is

presented by Holsti (1993), Ake (1967), Buzan (undated) and Collins (2007). Deducing from Barry

Buzan (undated), states comprise of three things: The institutional expression of the state (the

bureaucracy), the idea of the state (the nation), and the physical base of the state (territory). He asserted

that weak states are those states where the idea and the bureaucracy are lacking leaving us with an

ungoverned space whose territorial integrity is nonetheless enforced by international norms enshrined in

the United Nations Charter.

The theory operates from the perspective of the rulers of the weak states. By analyzing actions in

the context of the weak state, we see the context under which decisions are made and provide policy

implications that affect the context and mitigate the costs of these contexts. In weaker states, the nature of
government and its relationship to other actors means that the survival of the regime becomes practically

indistinguishable from the survival of the state.

Furthermore the weak state theory looks at post colonial states especially in Africa as products of

arbitrary decisions taken by the colonial powers without due consideration for and consultation with the

people whom the decisions affected. According to Holsti (1993) the colonial powers drew boundaries to

suit their own purposes and these purposes had little or nothing to do with ethnic, language and religious

population distributions.

These new states were created and their existence as sovereign states was upheld by the United

Nations before the people developed a strong sense of nationalism. These states comprise of multiplicities

of ethnic, language and religious groups. Holsti (1993) identifies Central African Republic, Cameroon,

Nigeria, Kenya etc as belonging to this group of states. The basic postulations of the theory include:

i. In the new states individuals‘ loyalties extend majorly to their tribe, clan, region or other

significant reference group and often only secondarily if at all to the state which had been

created in their names.

ii. The leaders speak in the name of the people but their political referent is usually the

geographic and usually artificial colonial creation and not a unified and distinct society.

iii. The leaders‘ right to rule is hardly validated by elections but by coercion (Holsti, 1993).

The consequence of this is that most of these states are weak not militarily but in the sense that

significant sections of the population do not identify strongly with the ruling groups or the post colonial

state and its symbols. Sentiments of nationalism in these states are consequently not firmly or deeply

rooted, if they exist at all and the social fabric of the country is weakened by frequent conflicts between

the various groups that compose the population. These states therefore experience secessionist attempts

and aggrieved groups foment trouble at the slightest provocation.

 In addition to the above, in Buzan‘s (undated) postulation the weakness of the state creates an

environment where centers of power outside the government pose a threat to authority of the state. These

groups may include religious groups, local self-defense, militias, tribal systems, drug lords, smugglers,

parastatals, and businesses. Many of these groups enjoy power, wealth, and identification that compete

with the state itself. As such, the state is only one actor among groups and power structures residing

within the territory. What differentiates the state from these other actors is the international recognition it

receives.

This creates a state-society conflict; the more the regime tries to establish state control of the

country/economy/society, the more resistance they face from powerful actors/groups in society (Buzan,

undated). The case of Liberia during the war readily comes to mind. These dynamics are clearly

illustrated. Mining, rubber, and forestry industries were held and operated by rebel groups. These groups

actively resisted any expansion of the Monrovia-based state to protect their businesses. The same goes for

the Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria; Tribal justice in Burundi, or innumerable other examples; any

expansion of state control seems to come at their expense. ―The more elites try to establish effective state

rule, the more they provoke challenges to their authority from powerful groups in society.‖(Collins 2007)

Therefore like all dilemmas, that of insecurity is central. The inability of the state to provide

security causes groups to provide their own which in turn compromises the ability of the state. The

dynamic holds irrespective of the leadership in the capital; the nature of the society conditions the

response of the leadership rather than the other way around.

In view of the above, when the state is unable to meet its basic responsibilities to the citizens, the

consequence is frustration and aggression which also breeds rebellion against the authority of the state.

The state is not able to exert control over the people because it lacks the legitimacy to do so.

The weak state theory shall be applied in the explanation of the Boko Haram insurgency in view

of the realities on the ground in Nigeria. These include increasing poverty, unemployment, rising
insecurity, corruption in high places, government‘s apparent insensitivity to the plight of the ordinary

Nigerian and consequent citizens‘ lack of identification with the state. These are factors which have the

tendency to ignite conflicts among Nigerians and between the people and government.
 CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Data is central to research as it forms the building block of every research. The process of data

gathering is consequently the most vital aspect in the research process. Data is central to answering the

research question or solving the research problematique. Therefore this chapter presents and discusses the

various procedures adopted in conducting this research including the various steps adopted during the

field work. It presents the type of research, research design, population of the study, sampling and

sampling technique, method of data collection, method of data analysis, the problems encountered in the

field and limitations of the methodology.

3.2 Type of Research

Research can be classified into three. These include experimental research, control analysis and

survey research (Mbachu, 2005). Experimental design deals with studies in which the researcher has

control over the independent variable. It mostly covers laboratory experiment. The control analysis is an

objective and systematic analysis of the content of recorded information. The survey research could be

descriptive or analytical, longitudinal or cross sectional. Its methods of gathering include questionnaires

and interviews. The descriptive or analytical research comprises of describing a particular phenomenon

within the confines of a people‘s cosmologies (Adogbo, 2009). This approach is essentially aimed at

presenting the true picture of a phenomenon. It is designed towards collecting and analyzing data for

descriptive, evaluative or comparative purposes (Olayiwola, 2007). Descriptive research is categorized

under survey research, case study, developmental studies, correlational studies and causal comparative or

ex-post facto studies.

The study employs the survey design and is descriptive in nature. It is that which describes a

particular state of affairs at a particular period. It adopts the use of questionnaires and/or interviews for
collecting data from a population based on appropriate sampling techniques. It presents information

which can generate further research. It further comprises of a definite statement of research problem,

collection of relevant and adequate data, concise analysis and interpreting of data in a scientific manner

(Olayiwola, 2007). The Boko Haram crisis has been reported both by the print and electronic media,

political analysts as well as other researchers. Based on the controversial and sensitive nature of the

situation it is needful for further analytical research hence the adoption of the survey research method to

obtain relevant data. Furthermore by adopting the survey research, the researcher is able to sample views

from relevant actors and analysts. These stakeholders and analysts include personnel of security agencies,

academia, civil servants, private sector workers, media practitioners, students and religious clerics in the

affected states.

3.3 Research Sites

This study was carried out in five (5) northern states. These as well as the towns visited are

itemized in table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1: Research Sites

State Towns Visited

1 Kaduna Kaduna, Jaji , Zaria

2 Kano Kano Municipal Area

3 Bauchi Bauchi Metropolitan Area

4 Yobe Damaruru and Potiskum

5 Borno Maiduguri Metropolitan Area

Source: Author‘s Compilation

These states as well as the towns visited were chosen mainly because the spate of terrorist attacks by

the Boko Haram sect took place in these areas.

3.4 Population of the Study

The population of a study is the group of interest to the researcher. It is the group or individuals to

which the results or outcomes of the study become generalizable (Olayiwola, 2007). The population of

this study comprises of personnel of the security agencies, members of the academia, civil servants,

journalists, Nigerians in private sector employment, religious clerics and others like students in post

graduate studies in Borno, Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Kaduna states. They also include some members of

the government‘s Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the Northeast also called the

Amnesty Committee on the Boko Haram crisis. The security personnel were chosen because they are at

the forefront of the fight against the insurgency and their views can be regarded as credible as they were

either players in the debacle before and after the outbreak of the crisis while the others were chosen

because they are positioned to give an objective and unbiased assessment of the situation or are well

informed on the insurgency hence the relevance of their views in this study.

3.5 Sample and Sampling Technique

A sample can be defined as a sub set of a population which is selected to meet specific objectives

(Essan and Okafor in Olayiwola, 2007). Gay (1980) describes sampling as the process of selecting a

number of individuals for a study in such a way that the individuals represent the larger group from which

they were selected. In other words a sample is the representative group from the population and sampling

is the procedure for selecting the sample from the population (Mbachu, 2005). Sampling is also the

mechanism of choosing designated quantities or proportions as representations of the whole population.

This study adopts the Multi stage sampling technique. It is a sampling strategy (gathering

participants for a study) used when conducting studies involving a very large population. The entire

population is divided into naturally occurring clusters and sub clusters from which the researcher

randomly selects the sample. It is usually carried out in phases and involves more than one sampling

method. In very large and diverse populations sampling may be done in one or two stages (Lavrakas,
2001). As stated earlier the study divided the respondents into clusters i.e security agents, academics, civil

servants, journalists, private sector workers, religious clerics and students.

In view of the fact that the total number of respondents especially in the North East region of

Nigeria could not be determined at the time of this research in view of the expected low return rate, a

sample of two thousand (2000) respondents were drawn from the population of the study. Four hundred

(400) were drawn from each state i.e Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Yobe and Borno states.

3.6 Method of Data Collection

The collection of data was from secondary and primary sources. The major means of gathering

data through the secondary sources is document analysis. It includes historical analysis, films, recording

of narrative accounts of events, perception or personal values, or by examining collections of printed

documents. The methods for primary data include the field methods like interview, administration of

questionnaires or by observation (Arikpo, 1986). The secondary sources of data include textbooks,

journals, newspapers, magazines. These were obtained from the libraries at the Ahmadu Bello University,

Zaria, Armed forces Command and Staff College, Jaji, National Defence College, Abuja, the Institute of

Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja and personally acquired materials. The primary sources were

obtained through the administration of a total of two thousand (2000) questionnaires i.e four hundred

(400) in each of the selected states (Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Yobe and Borno) and the conduct of

interviews. This study therefore employed the document analysis to obtain data from the secondary

sources and interviews and questionnaires to obtain data from the primary sources.

3.6.1 Questionnaire Administration

The questionnaire was structured into a single section comprising thirteen (13) questions (a copy

is attached as Appendix 1). They were administered to adult Nigerians. Two (2) research assistants were

employed in each of the states to administer the questionnaires i.e they were each given two hundred

copies of the questionnaires to administer in the states capital. The choice of the state capitals is in view
of the fact that most members of the target population are resident in the state capitals. In Kaduna and

Kano states the researcher administered the eight hundred questionnaires with assistance from a nephew

and a Service call up letters. In Kano state, the questionnaires were administered in Kano metropolis,

while in Kaduna, a hundred were administered in Zaria and three hundred in Kaduna metropolis.

Kaduna State

Attributes

Kaduna state is the successor to the old Northern Region of Nigeria, which had its capital in

Kaduna. In 1967 the state was split up into six states, one of which was the North-Central State, whose

name was changed to Kaduna State in 1976. This was further divided in 1987, losing the area now part of

Katsina State. Under the governance of Kaduna is the ancient city of Zaria, which this research also

covered. The capital of Kaduna State is Kaduna; it has an area of 7,626.20sq kilometres and a population

of about 4,652,989 people (CLEEN Foundation, 2014).

Kaduna is known to be a volatile state particularly the southern and northern parts of the state.

Kaduna metropolis is also susceptible to ethno-religious violence. The attempt to examine the socio-

economic circumstances of religious crises in Northern Nigeria, from the Maitatsine Revolts of the 1980s

to the current insurgency by members of the Jama‘atuAhlilSunnatiLidda‘awatiWal Jihad, popularly

known as Boko Haram, will be better appreciated if situated within an appropriate historical framework.

However, this research does not provide room for historical framework of that nature.

Unlike most cities of Northern Nigeria, Kaduna is quite complex. The ethnic, religious and

cultural diversity with Islam and Christian values sometimes inter-mixing with traditional values provides

a veritable ground for differences that, if not properly mediated, could easily lead to violence. Against the

exclusive nature of most old cities of Northern Nigeria, Zaria another city in Kaduna State which this

research covers, has its peculiarity where ―indigenous‖ communities are separated from ―settlers‖; lasting
inter-penetration across ethnic and religious lines is evident in that part of the state (CLEEN Foundation,

2014).

The researcher and the Field Assistants took an inventory of various Government Agencies,

Parastatals and private sector firms within Kaduna metropolis, Jaji and Zaria. These are places which

experienced attacks by the Boko Haram sect in Kaduna state. A total of one hundred and two (102) of

these agencies, parastatals and private sector firms were recorded. These were given numbers written

down in pieces of papers, squeezed and poured in a polythene bag. The dip and pick method was then

used to select a total of forty agencies, parastatals and firms. Ten (10) questionnaires were consequently

allocated to each for administration using the simple random sampling technique.

Challenges

The researcher was denied entrance at the Nigeria Air Force Base, Mando Road, Nigeria Police

Force, Kawo Division, Nigerian Army Depot, Zaria. These three were therefore replaced with the

Nigerian Defence Academy, Mando, Nigerian Army School of Military Police, Basawa and Nigerian

Security and Civil Defence Corps, Kaduna State Secretariat, Independence Way, Kaduna where the

researcher has friends and acquaintances.

An aggregate number of three hundred and twenty eight (328) questionnaires were filled and

returned. While some filled the questionnaires and returned, others collected and asked the researcher to

check back on a later date and time. Forty six (46) were returned unfilled while twenty six (26) were not

accounted for.
Kano State

Attributes

Kano State was created under this name on 27 May 1967, when Nigeria assumed the 12- state

structure. It survived sub-division in 1976 and 1987 until 27 August 1991, when Jigawa State was excised

from it. The birth was due in part to its being the most populous state. It is now composed of Kano

Emirate. The three other emirates: Hadejia, Gumel and Kazaure, having been out together to form Jigawa

State.

Kano State lies between latitude 130 North in the North and 110 North in the South and

longitude 80 W in the West and 100 in the East. The total land area of Kano State is 20,760sq kilometres

with a population of 9.4 million people based on the official 2006 National Population and Housing

Census. Kano is largely Muslim, a majority of whom are Sunni. Christians and followers of other non-

Muslim religions form a small part of the population, and traditionally lived in the Sabon Gari, or Foreign

Quarter. Kano City has been the capital of Kano State since the earliest recorded time. The state is

dividedinto 44 local government areas (LGAs) (CLEEN Foundation, 2014).

The researcher observed that Kano is more of a Commercial than a Civil Service town. The

researcher took an inventory of government agencies, parastatals and private sector firms within Kano

metropolis. A total of eighty four government agencies, parastatals and private sector firms were noted

down. Similarly these were given numbers written down in pieces of papers, squeezed and poured in a

polythene bag. Like the Kaduna instance the dip and pick method was then used to select a total of forty

agencies, parastatals and firms. Ten (10) questionnaires were consequently allocated to each for

administration using the simple random sampling technique.

Challenges

At the Nigerian Police Force, Divisional Headquarters, Zone A, Unguwan Uku, and the Nigerian

Police Force, Divisional Headquarters, Sabon Gari the researcher was out rightly refused access to the

premises unless the State Commissioner of Police issues an express permission. Similarly at the Bayero

University the researcher was restricted from conducting any form of research unless the Chief Security

officer of ABU, Zaria confirms the researcher‘s status as a bona fide student of ABU, Zaria. At other

places especially at the Audu Bako Secretariat, the reception of the respondents was very cold as he was

viewed with suspicion.

A total of two hundred and thirty nine (239) questionnaires were filled and returned to the

researcher. This was with a lot of persistent calls to the various offices. One hundred and twenty two

(122) were returned unfilled while thirty nine (39) were not accounted for.

Bauchi State

Attributes

Bauchi State is a state in northern Nigeria. Its capital is the city of Bauchi. The state was

formed in 1976 when the former North-Eastern State was broken up. It originally included the

area now in Gombe State, which became a distinct state in 1996. What is now known as Bauchi

was until 1976 a province in the then North-Eastern State of Nigeria. According to the 2006

census, the state has a population of 4,653,066.

Bauchi State has gone through tremendous transformation over the years. The Ajawa

language was spoken in Bauchi State, but became extinct between 1920 and 1940 as speakers
switched to Hausa. Bauchi State occupies a total land area of 49,119 km² representing about

5.3% of Nigeria‘s total land mass and is located between latitudes 9° 3' and 12° 3' north and

longitudes 8° 50' and 11° east. The state is bordered by seven states, Kano and Jigawa to the

north, Taraba and Plateau to the south, Gombe and Yobe to the east and Kaduna to the west.

Bauchi state is one of the states in the northern part of Nigeria that span two distinctive

vegetation zones, namely, the Sudan savannah and the Sahel savannah. The Sudan savannah type

of vegetation covers the southern part of the state. Here, the vegetation gets richer and richer

towards the south, especially along water sources or rivers, but generally the vegetation is less

uniform and grasses are shorter than what grows even farther south, that is, in the forest zone of

the middle belt.

Bauchi State has a total of 55 tribal groups in which Hausa, Fulani, Gerawa, Sayawa,

Jarawa, Kirfawa, Turawa Bolewa, Karekare, Kanuri, Fa'awa, Butawa, Warjawa, Zulawa, and

Badawa are the main tribes. This means that they have backgrounds, occupational patterns,

beliefs and many other things that form part of the existence of the people of the state. There are

cultural similarities in the people's language, occupational practices, festivals, dress and there is a

high degree of ethnic interaction especially in marriage and economic existence. Some of the

ethnic groups have joking relationships that exist between them, e.g. Fulani and Kanuri, Jarawa

and Sayawa, etc.

Furthermore in Bauchi state the researcher got the help of one Sabiu Gumba of the Bauchi state

Ministry of Justice who was once a student of Master of Law and Criminal Justice (MLCJ) of Ahmadu

Bello University, Zaria. The researcher travelled to Bauchi with copies of the questionnaires on April 16,

2013. Sabiu Gumba was of immense assistance as he took the task of getting two people to help in the
administration of the questionnaires using the multi stage sampling method as adopted in the other states.

Three hundred and three (303) questionnaires were filled and collected back while seventy eight (78)

were returned unfilled. The remaining nineteen (19) were not accounted for.

Yobe State

Attributes

Yobe State came into being on the 27 August 1991. It was carved out of the old Borno State by

the past military head of State, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida. The circumstances that led to the splitting of

former Borno State into Yobe and Borno are mainly twofold: viz. the former Borno State being one of the

largest in terms of land area, was simply too large for easy administration and meaningful development;

and, ethnic rivalry. There are 17 local government councils in the State. However, this study focused on

the State capital, Damaturu, and Potiskum town. The climate condition of Yobe State varied over the

years. Rainfall is notably seasonal, concentrated in the three months of July, August and September. Since

the early 1970s the climate tended to be drier. The current annual rainfall is (250mm), fell to 15 and

20mm over the last 40 years, with the 2012 as an exception due to the heavy rainfall compared to the

previous years (CLEEN Foundation, 2014).

The main ethnics groups in the areas under study are Kanuri, Fulani, Balewa, Karekare,

Gizimawa, Hausa, and Gamu. However, majority of the populace are predominantly farmers and engaged

in it as means of subsistence. Besides, herders had long co-existed with farmers in the area. While crops

produced on the area are millet, Melon (guna) guinea corn, beans (cow pea) usually as cash crops and a

sizeable quantity of beniseed (ridi).

In Yobe state the researcher got the assistance of Mallam Tukur Mamu, publisher and Editor in

Chief, Desert Herald Newspaper who is himself an indigene of Yobe state. Mallam Mamu was kind

enough to arrange for accommodation for the researcher in his home town of Fika, Fika Local

Government area of the state and also getting a family member to serve as a guide. The researcher made
the trip to Fika from Bauchi on 18 of April, 2013 with copies of the questionnaires. Efforts to get people

to serve as field assistants as anticipated proved difficult due to the nature of the topic and the security

risks involved. Therefore the host (who pleaded anonymity) volunteered to enlist another relative of his to

assist in administering the questionnaires on condition that their names will not be made public and that a

particular amount would be paid to them. The questionnaires were to be administered in Potiskum and

Damaturu using the multi stage sampling techniques adopted in Kaduna and Kano. In view of their

residency in Fika transportation fares were calculated and provided for by the researcher. The researcher

was to go back for the administered questionnaires after one month.

Challenges

However as time passed by and the waves of attacks by the sect increased with the attendant risk

to life, the field assistants had a hard time administering the questionnaires, this is coupled with the

declaration of a state of emergency in three states i.e Borno, Yobe and Adamawa and consequent shut

down of telecommunication. In view of this the researcher could not go back. The questionnaires were

therefore sent back through the transport service of Yobe Line with terminus in Kaduna on September 2,

2013. A total of one hundred and thirty two (132) were filled, fifty seven (57) were not accounted for

while the remaining two hundred and eleven (211) were returned unfilled.

Borno State

Attributes

Borno State lies in the extreme North-Eastern corner of Nigeria on latitudes 10˚ 30‘ and 13˚ 50‘

north and longitudes 11.00˚ and 13˚ 45‘ east. It is bordered by Niger Republic in the north, Chad and

Cameroun Republics to the east, Adamawa and Gombe States to the south, and Yobe State in the west.
This makes Borno the only state bordered by three countries in Nigeria with enormous implications on

the socioeconomic and cultural aspects of the state‘s development and governance.

Colonial partitioning of the erstwhile Kanem- Borno Empire and subsequent state creations in

post-colonial Nigeria have reduced it to the present Borno State‘s size of 75,481 square kilometres,

though there still exists strong cultural linkages between its people irrespective of the boundaries. Borno

State‘s population is predominantly Muslim though a sizeable proportion of Christians are found in the

south near the border with Adamawa State. Ethnically, the northern and central part of the state is Kanuri

while the population in the south is mixed with Babur/Bura being the dominant group. Other ethnic

groups include Marghi, Glavda, Kibaku, Fulani, Shuwa Arab, Mandara, etc. Despite this rich history as

well as religious and cultural diversity in the state, the people have coexisted peacefully without anymajor

conflict until 2009 (CLEEN Foundation, 2014).

Borno State, until 2009, was rated among the most peaceful states in Nigeria hence its epithet

‗Home of Peace‘ which has been generally acclaimed by the indigenes and migrant settlers alike. So

peaceful and prosperous has been the state that many dry season migrants from Hausaland find it difficult

to go back home for their rainy season farming chores for which reason the term Bornokәji (a Kanuri term

meaning ‗Borno is sweet‘) is used to describe these migrants.

To some extent the same may be true for settlers from other parts of Nigeria who have regarded

Borno as a second home through ownership of landed properties. This is nowhere better exemplified than

the heavy presence of Igbo people (from South-East Nigeria) as landlords in Pompomari quarters of

Maiduguri, the state capital (CLEEN Foundation, 2014).

Regarding Borno state, the volatile security situation in the area was of serious concern.

arrangements to personally visit were always frustrated by news of mass killings and the outbreaks of

violence between the Boko Haram sect and members of the military Joint Task Force (JTF). The

researcher therefore did not visit Borno state personally. However copies of the questionnaires were sent
to Borno with the help of Colonel Emmanuel Akpan of the Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna (now

serving in the Nigerian Army School of Artillery, Kachia), an acquaintance of the researcher who once

served in Maiduguri. The questionnaires were administered by some of his boys in Maiduguri. The

researcher wrote down the method for administering the questionnaires using the same method as the one

adopted in Kaduna, Kano and Bauchi states. Sadly only thirty six (36) questionnaires were filled out of

the four hundred (400) sent. The remaining three hundred and sixty four (364) were returned unfilled. On

going to Kachia to collect the questionnaires on 17th of August, 2013, the Colonel told the researcher that

his boys complained that majority of those approached to fill the questionnaires bluntly refused to oblige.

Challenges

This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general

difficulty which research in the field of (counter-) insurgency encounters while trying to gather primary

data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security

risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zone which is the centre of the crisis. Members

of the public especially in Borno state also declined filling questionnaires given to them for fear of being

attacked.

Therefore a total of one thousand and thirty eight (1038) were filled and returned for analysis.

3.6.2 Interviews

This study employed the use of qualitative data based on the quality

of information and not necessarily mass data. As such, a structured In-Depth Interview (IDI) guide was

designed in order to obtain qualitative information from the respondents (a copy is attached at Appendix

2). As such, principal officers of the organizations and association sampled were assessed. The researcher

obtained letters of introduction from the department to the interviewees. The rationale for the choice of

these categories of specialized agencies and officials is predicated on the fact that the nature of the study

requires that data should be generated from relatively informed individuals who are not only conversant
with the activities of the Boko Haram sect but who can provide useful information on the subject under

study.

Therefore the following people were interviewed:

TABLE 3.2 LIST OF INTERVIEWEES, DESIGNATIONS, VENUES AND INTERVIEW

DATES

Interviewee Designation Venue and Date of Interview

Barr. Shehu Sani President Civil Rights Unguwan Sarki, Kaduna,
Congress December 17, 2012
Mallam Tukur Mamu Publisher, CEO Desert Herald Unguwar Sarki Kaduna
Newspaper January 22, 2013
Prof. M.T. Ladan Professor of Law. Kongo Campus, ABU, Zaria
December 18, 2012
Prof. Kyari Mohammed Director Centre for Peace Arewa House, Kaduna July, 5,
and Security Studies, 2013.
Modibbo Adama University
of
Technology, Yola
Colonel F.N. Ekoyo Former Commander, National Defence College
Ordinance Services, Abuja, August, 6, 2013.
Department, Nigerian Army
Headquarters, Abuja
Colonel S.P. Akpan Former Chief of Staff, Private Residence, Mpape
Headquarters, Operation District FCT, August, 16,
Restore Order I, land 2013.
Component, Maiduguri.
Colonel Adeyemi Alabi Former Commander National Defence College
Ordinance Service I Quarters Abuja, July 20, 2013.
Division Headquarters,
Nigeria Army
Kaduna
Mohammed Abdulkadir NTA News Defence NTA Newsroom, NTA
Correspondent Headquarters Area 11, Abuja,
July 16 2013.
Prof. Abdulahi El-Okene Academic and Social Critic I.A.R. ABU, Zaria April, 10,
2013.
Dr. Hakeem Baba Ahmed Former Permanent Secretary Off Rabah Road Kaduna,
in the Ministry of Foreign April, 27, 2013.
Affairs, Member, Presidential
Committee on Security
challenges in the North
East
 For Sheik Albani during an initial meeting with him he gave the researcher certain video CDs

titled ―In An Ki Ji‖ ―Karen Bana‖ and ―Karshen Alewa‖ all of which were texts of lectures he himself

gave on the Boko Haram insurgency. He told the researcher to go and listen to the lectures and thereafter

come for further discussion. The meeting never held as he was subsequently assassinated on February 1,

2014. Furthermore Dr. Hakeem Baba Ahmed (Former Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Member, Presidential Committee on Security challenges in the North East) also gave the

researcher permission to use his paper tiltled ―Security, Politics and Economy of the North‖.

3.7 Method of Data Analysis

Data analysis refers to the strategies and effort to categorize, summarize and seek patterns and

relationships within the relevant information gathered (Mbachu, 2005). Data analysis could either be

descriptive or inferential. Descriptive statistics deals with methods and techniques of summarizing and

description data (Mbachu, 2005). It applies mostly in qualitative data analysis. On the other hand,

inferential statistics is concerned with gaining knowledge of population (Mbachu, 2005). It is mostly

adopted in quantitative data analysis. The descriptive method was used in analyzing data in the study for

easy comprehension.

3.7.1 Data Transcription and Analysis Technique (DTAT)

The essence of the DTAT is to transcribe the raw data generated into an instrument for analysis.

For the IDI, it is instructive to note that before interviews were conducted, the interviewees were

contacted and informed about the research with the detailed overview. Meetings were scheduled by prior

notice of the interviewees and each interview lasted between thirty minutes to forty five minutes

depending on the individuals and response to the issue under investigation. Responses from the

interviewees were tape-recorded on the permission of the respondents, which were later transcribed into

notes. Some others could not be recorded hence the researcher only took down notes.
 The transcription process began with a careful reading of the transcribed notes in order to gain

overall familiarity with the data from the interviews. The second reading was conducted in order to

identify the salient themes in the data in line with research problem under investigation and research

objectives. The last reading was to establish emerging themes and to place relevant quotes within the

different identified themes.

A triangulation method was adopted for the analysis of the data generated. This is informed by

the nature of the phenomenon under investigation in which documentary surveys, questionnaire and

interviews were used. These methods were adopted so that one would complement the other and

ultimately strengthen the research findings. Inferences were later drawn from the documentary records

and interviews to explain these issues under investigation for the purpose of validity and reliability.

3.8 Limitation of the Methodology

The major limitation of the study is the fact that since the researcher maintains his humanity

throughout the research process, it is difficult to avoid biases. The qualitative method requires a lot of

careful thought and planning to ensure that results obtained are as objective as possible. The method is

more open to personal opinion and judgment which could affect the research negatively. This challenge

constitutes the major limitation to the study. The unavoidable impact of personal biases and the difficulty

in conducting proper statistical analysis of the data could negatively impact on the finding of this

research. To surmount these challenges, records, were double checked during the research to ensure

validity.

3.9 Problems Encountered in the Field

The major challenge encountered in the field was one of suspicion from members of the public

who were scared of giving out any information through questionnaires or the security agencies who were

obviously not willing to divulge any information to the researcher in spite of the researcher‘s possession

of valid identification documents. The researcher was all along suspected of either being a Boko Haram
member or an agent of the state. Both at the Nigerian Police Force Headquarters and State Security

Services (SSS) headquarters, the researcher was not allowed access to relevant personalities. The attitude

of officers at the Defence and Army Headquarters was also not encouraging.

At the Nigerian Police Zone A Divisional Headquarters in Naibawa area where the Boko Haram

attacked and killed some officers early 2012 in Kano, the researcher was simply accosted at the gate and

sent back. It took the intervention of an elderly officer who requested to know the researcher‘s mission.

After proper explanation and identification, the researcher was asked to wait and see the Divisional Police

officer (DPO) who was not on seat at the time. After being allowed to see the DPO on his arrival he

insisted that he would not entertain any issue on the Boko Haram unless with express permission from the

State Commissioner of Police. The researcher did not go further in view of his experience at the Police

Force Headquarters in Abuja.

Similarly on reaching the old site of Bayero University, Kano (BUK) around the Kabuga area

which also witnessed terrorist attacks at the Dansati Abubakar Twin lecture theatres and Sports Complex

by the Boko Haram sect, the researcher was advised by a staff of the institution to first proceed to the

Security Department for permission to either interview people or take snap shots. Having complied and

proceeded to the New Site where the security department is situated, the Personal Assistant of the

Director of Security after being pleaded with took the researcher‘s identification card and letter of

introduction to the Director. The Director insisted that the researcher‘s identification documents could be

fake and would not suffice and hence could not be allowed to administer questionnaires or do anything

regarding research on the Boko Haram issue in that institution unless the Chief Security Officer of

Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria confirms the researcher‘s status by phone. This was in view of the

volatile and sensitive nature of the subject. The researcher was warned against going against that directive

unless he was prepared to risk being arrested.

 Furthermore, at the Luxury Motor Park, New Road, Sabon Gari where there were attacks in

March this year (2013), there strict security checks. An attempt by the researcher to talk to one person

was rebuffed as the man said ―I no be police abeg, make you go police place I no want any wahala.‖

Administering the questionnaires to the target population within Kano metropolis proved an arduous task

as the researcher had to do a lot of talking, pleading and convincing before they agreed to fill the

questionnaires. Reception from many civil servants was indeed cold once they learnt of the researcher‘s

topic. Many questionnaires were therefore returned unfilled. The researcher was politely walked out of

some offices on grounds that he was an agent of the state. This was particularly so in some state ministries

at the Audu Bako Secretariat.

A sizeable number of respondents (especially in Borno and Yobe states) were either not willing to

fill the questionnaires given to them or be interviewed for fear of the researcher being either a security

agent or a member of the sect in disguise. Therefore the researcher had to rely on those who were

available and willing to state their opinion on the subject. Furthermore the researcher did not interview

ordinary Nigerians on the streets in view of the difficulty of identifying members of the sect whom were

described by President Jonathan as faceless. The researcher therefore stood the risk of running into

members of the sect if he attempted interviewing or reaching out to members of the public.
 CHAPTER FOUR

BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

4.1 Introduction

The chapter begins with a background examination of the evolution of insurgency in Nigeria. It

further discusses the history, ideology and philosophy of the Boko Haram sect. The chapter also gives an

insight into the Salafi ideology upon which members of the Boko Haram sect base their activities and

creed and an expose on the Sharia legal system as advocated by the Boko Haram sect. lastly the chapter

also brings to light the remote and immediate causes of the Boko Haram crisis. An understanding of these

will bring the modus operandi of the sect to clearer perspective.

4.2 History of Insurgency in Nigeria

There have been insurgent movements that characterized Nigeria‘s socio-political history. While

there were several uprisings in times past the Niger Delta insurgency of the 1960s is a case in point. The

neglect, marginalisation and underdevelopment that generated activism and fomented unrest in the Niger

Delta began during the colonial administration. Indeed, the recent events defined by oil politics constitute

merely the tipping point in a conflict dating back to the colonial era. Thus, conflicts in the Delta can be

categorised as pre- and post-oil conflicts, with different strands of engagement characterising the post-oil

conflicts.

Indeed the first manifestation of the militia phenomenon in the Niger Delta was between February

and March 1966, when Adaka Boro‘s Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS), comprising armed militant

Ijaw youths, seized some communities and oil facilities, declared a Niger Delta People‘s Republic, and

engaged the Nigerian military until it was defeated and its members tried for treason. There was a

cessation of militant activities until 1997 when the current manifestation began (Ikelegbe, 2008). The

present militia groups, comprising mostly Ijaw militants, first emerged in the Warri region to fight their
Itsekiri neighbours, the oil companies and the Nigerian military deployed to protect the oil infrastructure

and to contain the conflict arising from political and resource marginalisation. The most prominent

militant group, the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), supported mainly Ijaw causes and

militant activities elsewhere.

Therefore the Niger Delta in Nigeria was not left out of protracted crisis and instability caused by

protesting groups and communities agitating for development, environmental protection, resource control

and self determination (Ibaba,2008). Therefore from Ogoni to Eket, Peremabiri to Okerenkolo,

Olugbobiri to Kula etc, violent conflicts, militancy and hostage taking of oil company personnel became

frequent. It is imperative to assert at this juncture that the Niger Delta crisis has colonial origins as

evidence abound in history where the people in the region took up arms and agitated for resource control

and self determination. The attainment of political independence by the Nigerian state did not help to

douse the agitations.

Although the Niger Delta produces the bulk of Nigeria‘s oil and gas wealth, it remains one of the

least-developed parts of the country. This paradox triggered a conflict that lingered on for five decades.

This conflict consequently manifested through huge militarisation of the region, militia insurgency,

hostilities between youth militias and the Nigerian military, militia attacks on the oil industry and

consequent huge disruptions, the theft of oil by syndicates, and militias and intra- and inter-ethnic,

community and militia conflicts. Since the late 1990s, militia groups such as the Niger Delta People‘s

Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), and Niger Delta

People‘s Salvation Front (NDPSF) have been conducting hostilities against the military and transnational

oil companies (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010).

The first manifestation of the militia phenomenon in the Niger Delta was between February and

March 1966, when Adaka Boro‘s Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS), comprising armed militant

Ijaw youths, seized some communities and oil facilities, declared a Niger Delta People‘s Republic, and
engaged the Nigerian military until it was defeated and its members tried for treason. There was a

cessation of militant activities until 1997 when the current manifestation began. The present militia

groups, comprising mostly Ijaw militants, first emerged in the Warri region to fight their Itsekiri

neighbours, the oil companies and the Nigerian military deployed to protect the oil infrastructure and to

contain the conflict arising from political and resource marginalisation. The most prominent militant

group, the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), supported mainly Ijaw causes and militant

activities elsewhere (apart from violent clashes during the Warri crisis between 1997 and 2004) (Ikelegbe

and Ibaba, 2010).

The militias were organized on the basis of military hierarchy and formations. MEND, for

example, which is the most prominent group, has a command and platoon structure in all states of the

Niger Delta, each headed by a commander, with a central command in the Ijaw territory of Delta State.

The intelligence unit undertakes strategic studies and provides tactics that underlie its operations. The

leadership has false names and identities, and to a large extent is unknown, particularly to the Nigerian

security forces and operatives. Other groups that are based in particular locations are organized into area

commands, too. It is noteworthy that these commands all have a semblance of military formations,

command structure and discipline. The militias have predominantly youth members. The militia groups

along the eastern axis of the Delta interface with cult groups that usually serve as fertile grounds for

recruitment (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010).

The militias use essentially speedboats and guerrilla tactics when attacking oil and military

installations. Although they have operated in the oil cities of Port Harcourt and Warri as well as other

towns, their main targets are along the creeks, swamps, estuaries and waterways of the Delta. Their main

strategy has been to disrupt oil production and compel government to negotiate with them on their

demands (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010). They have achieved this through issuing press releases, delivering

threats and ultimatums to oil companies, attacking personnel and facilities of oil companies, disrupting

and even shutting down oil production, kidnapping oil workers or taking them hostage, and carrying out
armed attacks and counterattacks against security forces guarding oil installations and patrolling

waterways (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010). The objectives of the militias include ending injustice and neglect,

achieving ethnic emancipation and survival, true federalism, obtaining a greater share of the oil revenue,

redressing marginalization and underdevelopment caused by the Nigerian state and oil companies,

acquiring ownership in the oil industry, promoting employment and economic empowerment, achieving

self determination and increasing their political representation (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010).

The militias can be categorized on the basis of objectives or ethnic composition. There are private

militias (NDPVF, Adaka Marines, Martyrs‘ Brigade, Niger Delta Vigilante, NDMFS and Niger Delta

Coastal Guerrillas), ethnic militias (the Meinbutus, Arugbo Freedom Fighters, Iduwini Volunteer Force

and Egbesu Boys) and pan-ethnic militias (MEND, COMA and the NDPSF) (Ibaba, 2008). Attacks and

counterattacks have taken place in the oil installations, local communities, militia camps, military posts

and along the waterways. The militias have attacked numerous oil facilities such as pipelines, gas

facilities, flow stations, oil platforms and terminals, offshore oil facilities, vessels and even towns such as

the main oil cities of Warri and Port Harcourt. They have seized vessels, cargo ships, boats, barges,

helicopters, equipment and oil facilities, and kidnapped and abducted hundreds of foreign oil workers. It

is noteworthy that it took the combined effort of the Nigerian navy, army and air force, and the use of

military hardware such as helicopter gunships, to subdue one militant camp in Delta State in May 2009,

during a counterinsurgency operation (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010).

Militia activities and attacks have been quite intense since 2006. Between 2003 and 2005 there

were several incidents, including eight attacks on the security forces/police in which 36 people were

killed and two injured; five attacks on oil companies that led to the killing of eight people (five

expatriates), while 18 expatriates were taken hostage. There were a further 39 militia attacks between

January and August 2006, which led to the deaths of 36 people (including 21 soldiers and six naval

personnel) (Ibaba, 2010). Perhaps more significant was the bomb attack on Bori Camp, the headquarters

of the amphibious brigade of the Nigerian army in Port Harcourt in Rivers State on 19 April 2006 and the
29 April 2006 attack on the Joint Military Task Force headquarters in Warri in Delta State. About 130 oil

workers were taken hostage in 33 attacks with nine deaths between January and July 2007 (Ibaba, 2010).

The February 2008 attack on Equatorial Guinea drew attention to the threat that Niger Delta militias could

pose to regional stability and security in the Gulf of Guinea.

Available literature on the Niger Delta crisis blame this on various factors like ethnic politics,

politics of revenue allocation and marginalization by the federal government, accountability and

transparency failures, the unethical activities of the oil multinationals and oil induced environmental

degradation, greed and the resultant commercialization of violence have led to what Ikelegbe (2002 )calls

deviant insurgent militias. Although grievances resulting from the socioeconomic and political

marginalization of the minority ethnic groups in the Niger Delta by the major ethnic groups in Nigeria

were seen to be the fundamental causes of the conflict, looting of oil wealth for selfish purposes was also

seen to be driving and sustaining the conflict.

Militia attacks have led to the seizure, occupation, destruction, vandalization and disruption of

numerous oil flow stations, pipelines and terminals, as well as equipment, helicopters and ships since

1998. The activities of the militias have caused considerable disruption to oil production, destruction of

oil production facilities and insecurity to oil company operations, equipment and staff. These activities

have at various times led to a severe decline in oil production, with oil production along the eastern and

western axis of the region being cut by 17 to 50 per cent. In the first quarter of 2009, the country‘s daily

oil production dropped to 1,6 million barrels from an earlier 2,029 million barrels per day, mainly because

of disruptions in oil production caused by militia activities (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010). Oil theft, which is

aided by and fuels the conflict, has caused heavy losses to the oil industry, particularly in terms of oil

revenues. Between January and September 2008 alone, the country lost about US$20,7 billion to oil theft

(Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010).

 In response to the agitations various initiatives were put in place by successive governments.

These include the Willinks Commission which recommended the establishment of a special body to deal

with the development problems of the area. This led to the establishment of the Niger Delta Development

Board (NDDB) in 1961 (Ibaba, 2008). Other policy initiatives include the 1.5 per cent committee (1981),

the Oil Minerals Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) (1992), the Niger Delta

Development Commission (1999), the Consolidated Council on Social and Economic Development of

Coastal States of the Niger Delta (2006), and the Niger Delta Peace and Conflict Resolution Committee

(2007). The oil companies also spent billions of naira on various community development projects with a

view to promoting peace in the region (Ibaba, 2008). It is clear that the crisis in the Niger Delta continued

in spite of these initiatives and programmes.

The central strategy of the Nigerian state has been to protect oil installations, pacify the region in

terms of militarization, repress conflict groups and create an enabling environment for continued oil

production. This was evident in the suppression of the peaceful protests by the Ogoni and the entire

region since the early 1990s. However, state repression turned the peaceful protests into violent

confrontations as youth activists adopted armed confrontation as the mechanism for the pursuit of their

goals.

Apart from the military and repressive response, the government tried to build peace through

development engineering. However, these extra-ministerial agencies failed to achieve much development

of the region due to overt violence in 2009, owing to a balance of power and terror between the military

and militias, particularly after the failure of a major military operation in the western delta region, which

was met by extensive militia counterattacks on oil facilities that saw daily productive decline to its lowest

level ever, the federal government reached out to militia leaders and proclaimed an amnesty programme

(Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010). The programme took effect in October 2009 and entailed a disarmament,

demobilisation, rehabilitation and reintegration for militia members. The programme was embraced by

the main militia groups and an estimated 17,000 members surrendered arms and entered rehabilitation
camps (Ikelegbe and Ibaba, 2010). The main militia groups declared a unilateral ceasefire. The amnesty

programme can thus be said to be have recorded ground breaking achievement in dousing the Niger Delta

crisis. However, there have been huge challenges of inadequate camp spaces, poor planning and

implementation, inadequate funding, poor management of the camps and poor political will and

commitment. As a result, there has been mounting disenchantment, which has manifested in the

suspension of unilateral ceasefire by MEND and a low-scale resumption of hostilities. Furthermore,

President Jonathan in his visit to Borno in response to agitations for an amnesty for members of the Boko

Haram sect, recently faulted the amnesty programme stating that it was not handled perfectly thereby

leading to its seeming endless nature (Obalonye and Olanrewaju, 2013).

Therefore it can be gleened from the foregoing that conflict not properly controlled or managed

tends to become chaotic and may transform into violence. This explains the African conflicts profile as

analyzed above. Most of the conflicts witnessed in Africa have been violent and multifaceted, prolonged

and their resolution and management difficult due to the wrong diagnosis and consequent response by the

state. This reveals the poor perception of conflict management by most African states. This also helps an

understanding of why the African state‘s approach to conflict management has been described in the

previous chapter as being palliative.

By way of deduction from the foregoing, states are expected to maintain general harmony and

satisfaction among the people, or shared peace, as well as to keep the peace, meaning law and order. Most

states (in Africa especially) however tend to concentrate on keeping the peace at the expense of

maintaining shared peace and the result has often been confrontations (Ikpe, 2007). This is particularly

the case with states in Africa which, Ikpe argues lack the capacity and resilience to protect themselves

from various challenges. This means that they cannot protect citizens, absorb shocks and manage conflict

without resorting to the use of violence which in turn begets further violence.
 Fragility as described above creates an environment for violence because of the perceived

inability of security forces in a state to command trust from the citizens. Such states become breeding

grounds for illicit activities like armed insurgencies that compound their problems (Ikpe, 2007). If

properly handled, the agitations can lead to reforms or seeming reform as a way of keeping the peace, for

it is the unheeded calls for reforms (as shown in the countries examined in this chapter), that lead to

rebellions. When the point of rebellion has been reached it means that the ruling elite have lost legitimacy

in the eyes of the ruled who transfer their loyalty to new groups or leaders (Ikpe, 2007). In the process,

different types of militia and rebels emerge.

State responses in Africa generally include suppression, creating counterinsurgency forces,

constitutional restructuring, Commissions of inquiry approach and in some cases inviting foreign

intervention. In the case of suppression (which is preferred by African states), the state tries to destroy

militias and rebel movements by mobilizing all types of security apparatus in a show of force. The use of

force is justified as the proper response of the state to ―internal enemies‖. Suppression becomes a law

and order operation and a lesson to other would-be troublemakers that the state has the capacity to act. No

focus or resources are devoted to identifying and addressing the root or remote causes or entrenching

good governance, accountability, respect for the rule of law or regard for the yearnings of the generality

of the people and this mistaken perception perpetuates the circle of violence which reigns in Africa.

Furthermore evidence from history indicates that there has been a rise of Islamic reform groups in

the north that share broadly common proclaimed aimss of promoting a purist vision of Islam based on

Sharia; eradicating heretical innovations and for many,the establishment of an Islamic state in northern

Nigeria. These groups greatly influenced the debate over religion and politics in the northern part of

Nigeria generally in favour of legal interpretations of religious texts (the Hadiths). Although the

traditional Sufi orders remain predominant, the Jama‘at Izalat al-Bida wa Iqamat al-Sunnah (Society for

the Eradication of Evil Innovations and the Reestablishment of the Sunna), better known as the Izala

Movement, in particular has contributed to a general religious revival and a much greater public and
political role for Islam (Falola and Heaton, 2008). It was joined by several other reform movements,

including the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSS), widely regarded as a platform for young radical

preachers, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a more radical offshoot of the MSS better known as the

Muslim Brotherhood, or Zakzaky, after its leader (Falola and Heaton, 2008).

A smaller, far more radical movement emerged around the same time as Izala.Mohammed

Marwa, nicknamed ―Maitatsine‖ (meaning ―the one who curses‖ in Hausa), a young preacher from

northern Cameroon, took an aggressive stance against Western influence, refusing to accept the

legitimacy of secular authorities. As his following swelled during the 1970s with unemployed urban

youth, relations with the police deteriorated. In December 1980 a confrontation at an open-air rally in

Kano sparked massive, weeks-long rioting, leaving many hundreds dead and spreading to other states.

Marwa died in the initial riots, but pockets of violence continued for several years (Falola and Heaton,

2008).

The Maitastine radical militant Islamist movement assumed a popular dimension in the early

1980s in the city of Kano and other areas of northern Nigeria. It came to national limelight as a result of

its prolonged armed and violent confrontation with the security and military agencies, hence the Nigerian

state (Isa, 2010). The Maitastine was an anti-status quo movement driven by Islamic fundamentalism. Its

members were anti establishment radicals who challenged both the dominant religious and political

authorities, and indeed the larger Muslim ummah (community). The movement was founded by Alhaji

Marwa Maitastine. He was an Islamic scholar who migrated from the town of Marwa in Northern

Cameroon to the city of Kano in 1945 (Danjibo, 2010). While in Kano he became an Islamic zealot

concerned with the purification of Islam. He believed that Islam had been corrupted by modernization

(Westernization) and the formation of the modern state. His constant preaching became very abusive and

provocative especially against established institutions like the emirate and the political class to the extent

that the then Emir of Kano, Alhaji Sanusi Lamido, expelled him from Kano. Marwa found his way back

to Kano and settled in Yan Awaki area in 1966 after the Emir‘s death. He subsequently earned the name
Maitasine meaning ―one who curses‖ (Danjibo, 2010). Between 1972 and 1979 Marwa was detained in

prison several times for his provocative preaching and acts of lawlessness against the state (Danjibo,

2010).

The members rejected other Muslims for having gone astray while maintaining that their beliefs

are the most realistic because they revolve around ‗Qu‘ran only‘, a tendency towards an obsession with

the Qu‘ran and a rejection of the Hadith and Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad and other related

sanctioned sources of Islamic law. Members of the movement lived in secluded quarters isolated from

other members of society while rejecting everything that was European or Western, especially education,

schools and material things like radios and wristwatches. They were opposed to affluence and as such

condemned material wealth and the rich. The members exhibited intense hatred for agents of the state

such as the police and armed forces. These feelings partly contributed to the recurrence of violent

confrontations with the security and military agencies in Kano and other parts of northern Nigeria in the

1980s (Isa, 2010).

The movement has been classified as radical and militant with a millenarian belief largely

because of its expressed perceptions that the dominant Muslim population had derailed from the tenets of

the Qu‘ran and getting richer and more Westernized to the detriment of the lowly, poor and non-

Westernized segment of society (Isa, 2010). The Maitastine movement represents a radical shift from

other forms of Islamist movements because it operated at variance with established or accepted beliefs or

theories, especially with regard to Islamic beliefs and injunctions (heterodox movement). The Maitastine

movement believed that it should be constituted only of genuine Muslims and righteous servants of God.

Going by the manner of the sect‘s activities, it was obvious that Marwa exploited the dwindling

economic situation and the Almajiri system and was able to attract large followers amongst the

commoners who unable to afford the basic necessities of life became zealous patriots of the sect and of

Marwa himself (Danjibo, 2010). The activities of Maitasine and his followers became a threat and a
source of worry to the people of Kano to the extent that Governor Abubakar Rimi issued a letter on

November 18, 1980 giving the sect two weeks to quit Kano state. On December 18, 1980 the sect

launched attacks on police formations, government establishments, Churches, Christians and moderate

Muslims (Danjibo, 2010).

On December 18, 1980, the Maitasine group went to ―Shahuci‖ (a popular open field) to preach

when the police arrived the place to prevent the sect from preaching because they did not obtain a permit

(Danjibo, 2010). Conflict ensued between the police and the sect. Obviously the police underrated the

strength of the sect and the two police units that went for the operation were soon over powered by the

members of the sect who appeared with bows and arrows, knives and dane guns. The sect burnt down all

the thirteen police vehicles, killed four policemen and injured the rest whom they stripped off their

weapons (Falola, 1998).

Therefore encouraged by the ‗defeat‘ of the police, the sect marched in Kano city chanting ―yau

zamu sha jini‖ (today we shall drink blood). By 19, December, 1980 the sect took over strategic places in

Kano city including the Fagge Mosque, some schools, a cinema house and the Sabon Gari market. For

eleven days the police was unable to bring to control the sectarian riots. When the situation was getting

out of control, the then president Shehu Shagari had to invite the Army to intervene (Danjibo,2010). It

took the army two days to dislodge the sect while their leader was killed in the operation. More than 1000

members of the sect were arrested and detained in prison where they received agonizing treatment from

the police. The crisis lasted for eleven days, claimed the lives of more than 4,179 people and hundreds of

houses and shops were either burnt or destroyed (Danjibo, 2010).

The Nigerian state‘s response to the Maitasine insurgency was one of a violent reaction. While it

is clear that the crisis was a result of the poor socio-economic situation in the country, little efforts were

devoted to an entrenchment of good governance which was lacking or fundamental reforms. Even though

a commission of inquiry i.e the Kano Disturbances Tribunal of Inquiry headed by Justice Anthony
Aniagolu was set up to identify the causes of the violence and proffer recommendations, the report of this

panel as argued by Bala Usman (1987) contained more ambiguities than answers thereby bringing the

state‘s sincerity and commitment to peaceful means of conflict resolution to question. The poor

management of the Maitasine crisis by the Nigerian state can be said to partly explain its recurrence in

other parts of the North later in 1985.

The latest manifestation of insurgency in Nigeria is the Boko Haram insurgency. Commonly

known as ‗Boko Haram‘, the movement was unknown to most people outside Maiduguri before 2009,

when federal forces launched a military offensive against its headquarters. Extremely violent, the

crackdown eventually resulted – in addition to several hundred victims hastily buried in mass graves – in

the transformation of a limited in scale but well-structured Islamic sectarian movement into an

underground, clandestine armed organisation with possible connections to the ever-changing jihadist

scene in Africa and beyond (Marc-Antoine, 2014).

4.2.1 Military Task Forces and Counter- Insurgency in Nigeria

The police which are the primary institution responsible for internal security in Nigeria

have been overwhelmed by the rising wave of insurgency largely because they lack requisite

training and expertise in counter-insurgency operations (Francis et al. 2011). Consequently,

government have relied on the military which are widely perceived to be better trained and

equipped to take a leading role in law enforcement and counter-insurgency operations. Over the

years various task forces including Special Task Forces (STFs), Military Special Operations

Forces (MISOFs), Joint Security Task Forces (JSTFs) and Joint Military Task Forces (JMTFs)

have been established and mandated to carry out counter-insurgency operations in different parts

of the country. Although a typical Joint Task Force (JTF) in Nigeria comprises the Army, Navy,
Air Force, Police, State Security Services (SSS) and sometimes immigration and custom officials

(Francis et al. 2011), they are mostly dominated by the Army.

The first military task force established for internal security operation in contemporary

Nigeria dates back to 1993 when an Internal Security Task Force (ISTF) was deployed in Ogoni

land in the Niger Delta to suppress protests by oil producing communities against Shell

Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) over environmental injustice (Boele et al, 2001). The

operations of the ISTF were characterised by extra-judicial executions and widespread human

rights abuses, including the widely condemned arrest and eventual execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa

and eight other members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) in 1995

(Forest 2012). The execution of Saro-Wiwa and other eight members of MOSOP (Ogoni Nine)

by the then military junta of General Sani Abacha, was widely condemned by members of the

international community and human rights organisations, including Amnesty International

(Boele et al, 2001).

In addition to the ISTF, two JTFs code named ‗Operation Salvage‘ and ‗Operation Flush

I, II and III‘ in Bayelsa and Rivers states respectively, were established in 1997 (Francis et al.

2011). However, the first major JMTF in the Niger Delta was established in 1999 and code

named ‗Operation HAKURI II‘. Basically, ‗Operation HAKURI II‘ was a punitive military

operation that resulted in massive destruction of lives and property after two days of continuous

bombardment of Odi community in the Niger Delta (see Human Rights Watch 1999). At the

height of the now-abated Niger Delta insurgency, the JTF code named ‗Operation Pulo Shield‘

(formerly ‗Operation Restore Hope‘) was established in around 2004 under the command of a

Major General, with the mandate of countering insurgency, illegal oil bunkering, piracy,

kidnapping and hostage taking in the creeks and coastal areas of the Niger Delta and other
adjoining states (Azuatalam, 2012). The activities of ‗Operation Pulo Shield‘ are usually fraught

with allegations of arbitrary killings and human rights abuses against the host communities.

Apart from the Niger Delta region, a number of JTFs have been established in parts of

northern Nigeria as a result of the increasing incidents of ethnic and sectarian violence in the

region. Since 1999 when Nigeria returned to democratic governance, the North-Central part of

the country has witnessed ethnic and sectarian violence, mainly involving Christians and Muslim

adherents, particularly on the Jos Plateau and in Kaduna state. In response to the breakdown of

law and order that resulted from Muslim-Christian strife on the Jos Plateau, a Security Task

Force (STF) code named ‗Operation Safe Haven‘ was established sometime in 2010. The STF

was commanded by a Major General and its operatives includes personnel from the Army, Navy,

Air Force, Mobile Police (MOPOL), Anti-terrorism Squad (ATS) from the Nigerian Police Force

(NPF), and other personnel drawn from the SSS and the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence

Corps (NSCDC).

The STF was mandated to curtail the spate of killings by ethnic militiamen on the Jos

Plateau and its environs. In addition, with the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency, a JTF code

named ‗Operation Restore Order‘ was established in June 2011, and deployed in Borno and

Yobe states. Specifically, the mandate of ‗Operation Restore Order‘ is to ―restore order to the

north-eastern part of the country with emphasis on Maiduguri‖ (Mohammed 2012). The JTF

whose counter-insurgency operations were initially limited to Borno and Yobe states had its

mandate extended in September 2011 to include a range of states where Boko Haram insurgents

are known to be active, excluding Plateau state which falls within the operational domain of the

STF. The figure below presents an organogram of Nigeria‘s counter insurgency architecture.
 ORGANOGRAM OF NIGERIAN COUNTER INSURGENCY ARCHITECTURE

The President/Commandant-In-Chief

National Assembly

Senate Committee on Defence House Committee on Defence

Ministry of Defence

Defence Headquarters

Army Headquarters
Air force Headquarters Police NSCDC Customs Immigration

Field Commanders

Source: Research
Troopscompilation, 2015

107
4.3 Origin, Ideology and Philosophy of the Boko Haram Sect

Various accounts abound on the origin of the Boko Haram sect and the causes of the insurgency

against the Nigerian state. However these can conveniently be grouped under the origin of the sect and the

remote and immediate causes of the ensuing crisis. The remote causes can be situated within the context

of the biography of the sect‘s leader, late Mohammed Yusuf, the evolution of the sect, the sect‘s

identification with Salafism, its consequent ideology and philosophy, the strained prebendal relationship

that existed between politicians in northern Nigeria and members of Boko-Haram sect and failure of

leadership. The immediate causes can be gleaned from the events preceding and succeeding the extra-

judicial killing in July 2009 of Mohammed Yusuf the leader of the sect and other of its members (African

Security Review, 2012).

Therefore to understand the origin and philosophy of the Boko Haram sect, one must first

understand the life and religious beliefs of the late Mohammed Yusuf.

4.3.1 Biography of Late Mohammed Yusuf

Little is known about his early life. What is however known is that he was born in Girgir village

in Yobe state on 29 January, 1970 (Abimbola and Adesote, 2012). His father was said to have hailed from

Jakusko while his mother hailed from Gashua both communities in Yobe state (Mohammed, 2010,

Adeniyi, 2011). However according to Albani (2010) Mohammed Yusuf‘s father was originally a citizen

of Niger Republic who settled in Gashua and studied the Quran during the reign of the Emir of Gashua,

Umar Suleiman who was an advocate of western education. Mohammed Yusuf‘s father was however

against children being enrolled in schools on the grounds that western education is tantamount to kafirci

or paganism and he openly campaigned against the Emir‘s advocacy for western education. This angered

the Emir who then expelled him from Gashua. He therefore moved to Girgir village where he had

Mohammed. Mohammed Yusuf‘s father was one of the staunch and active members of the Maitasine

movement who was killed during the crisis in 1980 (Albani, 2010). His mother‘s relative Yusuf

118
eventually took Mohammed and raised him as his son hence the name Mohammed Yusuf. Albani

therefore posits that Mohammed Yusuf‘s aversion to western education was inherited from his father.

Albani‘s (2010) position as presented below affirms this finding;

Let me pause and say what I have never mentioned at any

fora before. Do you know that Mohammed Yusuf‟s father
was one of the followers of the insurgent movement that took
place about thirty years ago? Go and seek audience with the
king of Gashua, His highness Abubakar Umar Suleiman.
May be you hear of a hostel in ABU called Suleiman Hall,
that Suleiman is the King of Gashua the father of the current
king. What happened? That king was an advocate of western
education. His full name is Umar Suleiman, a staunch
advocate of western education who was fond of campaigning
for children to be enrolled in schools. Mohammed Yusuf‟s
father at that time was a student in a local Islamic school
who went about proclaiming that children should not be
enrolled in schools because education is paganism, all these
happened in Gashua.

However he was originally a Nigerien by nationality. The

king of Gashua subsequently expelled him from Gashua. He
therefore moved and settled down where Mohammed Yusuf
was born. Where was he killed? He was killed at rijiyar Zaki
in 1980, that was Mohammed Yusuf‟s father. He brought in
war armaments for Maitasine in 1980. Therefore the Yusuf
which Mohammed Yusuf bore was not his biological father
but his mother‟s relative who took him from where his
father was killed to where they finally settled down in
Maiduguri. This is a history which confirms the fact that
Mohammed Yusuf inherited that violent disposition and
ideology from his father. His father was the first critic of
western education and he therefore continued by treading
on his father‟s path. This is a long story which you can
confirm in details from the king of Gashua Umar Suleiman.

Contrary to popular views, Mohammed Yusuf was never enrolled in an institution of formal

learning though he was interested in acquiring western education (Albani, 2009). He only learnt some few

English words from some of his educated friends. As a matter of fact Albani (2009) asserted ―……With
regards to western education he confessed to me that he never enrolled in any formal school of learning

not primary, secondary or any Islamic school belonging to any seasoned Islamic scholar like Abubakar

Mahmud Gumi‖.Due to his desire to acquire western education, he was said to have attempted to

fraudulently obtain a Senior School Certificate (SSC) from a Higher Islamic College in Borno state

without ever being a bonafide student of the programme (he attempted this in order to proceed to the

university). When his attempt failed he became the more publicly averse to western education (Albani,

2009). There is therefore an irony in this. He was himself discreetly interested in schooling, but

influenced his followers against western education. Mohammed Yusuf though went through some

informal Islamic training from one Imam or the other like the late Sheikh Mahmud Jaafar Adam. He was

married to four wives and had twelve children.

Yusuf‘s rise from relative obscurity to prominence in the Salafi Islamic circle derived from the

fact that he was a close disciple of the late Sheikh Jaafar Adam. He was so prominent within the circle

that he was soon recognized as the heir to the pulpit at Muhammadu Ndimi mosque in Maiduguri

(Adeniyi, 2011). This was made so by his depth of knowledge, brilliance, oratorical prowess and an

apparent willingness to emulate the Holy Prophet Mohammed (Salkida, undated). Due to his eloquence

and ability to capture his audience‘s attention, he was once appointed a member of the state‘s Board of

Islamic Affairs where he was placed on the state‘s payroll (Albaniy, 2010). He however openly

denounced ever being an employee of the state because he preached against working in the civil service.

According to Albaniy (2010) when some of his followers found out that he was on the state‘s payroll as

they were shown previous payment vouchers with signature on them, Mohammed Yusuf was infuriated

and henceforth stopped going to personally collect his pay but would send a follower to do so on his

behalf. This is another irony to Yusuf‘s aversion to the state.

Being once an Imam at the Mohammed Ndimi Mosque of Maiduguri, Mohammed Yusuf‘s

adopted radical views which pitched him against his superiors especially Sheikh Jaafar Adam. He was

appointed the leader of the sect by a Committee of Sheiks in 2002. He subsequently ousted the Sheiks
who appointed him on allegations of corruption and failure to preach ―pure Islam‖ (Onuoha, 2012). He

therefore broke away and became an avowed critic of his former colleagues at the mosque and Imam

Malik Islamic Centre. He also became excessively critical of western education, modernity and the

government. Mohammed Yusuf claimed not to believe in most of the tenets of western science. He

rejected the scientific fact that the world is spherical and that rain is caused by evaporated water (Onuoha,

2012). He was said to have personally admitted that he had two problems i.e stubbornness and a desire to

impress people (Albaniy, 2011). Little wonder therefore that all efforts to get him to desist from the

radical path he chose proved abortive.

4.3.2 Evolution of the Boko Haram Sect

The precise date of the evolution of the Boko Haram sect is still shrouded in controversy. This is

so because scholars, political analysts and the media (both local and international) are divided on the

actual origin of the sect. While some foreign and local media outfits trace the origin of the sect to 2002

when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as the sect‘s leader in Maiduguri, Murtala (2013) traced the origin of

the sect to the 1980s when the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Hausa as Yan Brothers) emerged under the

leadership of Ibraheem el- Zakzaky. Many youths then joined the movement. Mohammed Yusuf was one

of them. The movement was then known for its emotional rhetoric and enthusiasm against the Nigerian

state in the name of Islam (Murtala, 2013). Before 1994 Shi‘ism emerged along with an inclination to

serving Iranian interests among the Muslim Brotherhood and its leader Ibraheem el- Zakzaky and some of

his close supporters. The group then disintegrated into other groups some of which went with the leader

Zakzaky while some others inclined towards Salafiyyah and some who formed a group called Jama‘at ut

Tajdeed ul-Islami which remained on a similar course as that of the Muslim Brotherhood and viewed that

this should be the way to traverse (Murtala, 2013).

Murtala has it that in 1999 after the general elections in Nigeria, Ahmad Sani, Governor of

Zamfara state thought it imperative for him to implement the Sharia in his domain and in 2001 became
the first to introduce the system in Nigeria. Having urged other northern state Governors to do same,

twelve (12) states followed suit in spite of the public outcry against the move in some states and resultant

crises which claimed lives and properties.

Mohammed Yusuf was undoubtedly influenced by the split in the Ikhwan/Akhwan movement

(Arabic term for Brotherhood) in Nigeria and he became one of the leaders in the aftermath of that split

and continued teaching and guiding them. He then became close to the group Izalat ul- Bida‘ wa Iqamat

us-Sunnah (the Removal of Innovation and Establishment of the Sunnah Group) and stayed in the states

of Yobe and Borno for some time and his ideas began to develop. He also introduced amendments which

he viewed as progressive in the realm of da‘wah and which also reduced scrutiny. This in Yusuf‘s opinion

was after he became a member of Jama‘at ul-Izalat ul-Bida, a split occurring among the three Masajid

(Arabic term for place of worship) which used to serve as the administrative centers of the movement.

This split led to Mohammed Yusuf and his students being linked to one of the Masjids in particular while

the other two remained with Jama‘at ul-Izalat ul-Bida. This therefore was the first stage for Mohammed

Yusuf continued with his group and students until they formed an independent group which they called

Jama‘atu Ahlis sunah Lidda‘awati wal Jihad (Murtala, 2013).

Another account established that the Boko Haram was originally founded by one Abubakar

Lawan from Kano in l995 as a religious group named Ahlulsunna wal‘ jama‘ah hijra sect at the

University of Maiduguri, Borno state (Onuoha, 2012). The sect preached opposition to Western education

and values in Northern Nigeria (Mohammed, 2009). The group also called for a jihad to oust the secular

status quo within the Salafi circle (Adeniyi, 2011).

When he left for further studies to Saudi Arabia, he left the mantle of leadership to the senior

clerics of the sect. However, two years later, Mohammed Yusuf staged what may be referred to as a coup

to assume leadership of the sect. The sect became transformed into an insurgent group in 2002 when

Mohammed Yusuf started imbibing a more radical version of Islam similar to that of the Taliban in
Afghanistan (Global News Reel, 2012). Thereafter, he began to shape and mould the movement in line

with his ideology in nursing the idea of waging a jihad (Religious war). Yusuf‘s revolutionary

transformation which result from his long-term dream of reforming society, may explain the

radicalization of the group under his leadership, the group having assumed a hard-line position after its

erstwhile leader, Abubakar Lawal, left to study at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia (Oyegbile and

Lawal, 2009).

While various attempts by the Islamic Preaching Board and the Council of Ulaama in Borno state

were made to get him to back down, the attempts were unsuccessful (Mohammed, 2010, Albani, 2010).

While he would renounce the radical ideology in some forums of religious leaders, he secretly kept

inciting his followers against constituted authorities and those who were not on his side. In the meantime

Mohammed Yusuf attracted a huge membership from illiterates, indolent and the unemployed who soon

considered him as a champion of the down trodden (Adeniyi, 2011). As his followership grew so did his

power and influence. Others who embraced his doctrine include some educated people who tore off their

certificates as a form of attesting to their joining the group and those who dropped out of school on the

ground that western education (―boko‖) was a sin (―haram‖) hence the name Boko Haram. Their

mission was to fight ―Taghut‖ system and implant true Sharia in Nigeria (Mohammed, 2010).

They began to preach openly for jihad that aims to ―change the socio-political order‖.

It was obvious that that the sect under his leadership took advantage of the poor quality of

Nigeria‘s educational system, the incessant strikes, cult activities, widespread malpractices and

prostitutions that is made worse with no offer of jobs after graduation. He also took advantage of the

irresponsible leadership at all levels of government, unemployment, poverty, corruption and insecurity

which became the order of the day. While pointing out such failures citing verses of the Quran and the

sayings of the Holy Prophet, the youths saw him as the leader that will indeed deliver them from

malevolence to the promised land (Salkida, undated).

 Mohammed Yusuf identified with the Shiites under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky

originally, and when the Kano-based Jama‘atul Tajdidi Islam (JTI) of Abubakar Mujahid denounced the

Shiites in the 1990s, Yusuf also became a member of the JTI and was even the amir (leader) of JTI for

Borno State (Sulaiman, 2009 cited in Abimbola, 2009). The Shiites, also known as the Islamic Society of

Nigeria, emerged in Nigeria in the late 1970s under the leadership of Ibrahim El-Zakzakky. Its objective

is the establishment of an Islamic state governed by the Sharia through preaching and subtle influence on

society. It also sympathizes with the state of Palestine and abhors Israel and the United States of America.

The Shiites did not hide their disdain for the state police and the judiciary, both of which it considers

instruments of Satan (Olugboji 1995 cited in Abimbola, 2010).

In 2004 Yusuf relocated his group to an enclave in Kanamma, Yobe state and has since emerged

under various names like Muhajirin, Yusufiyya sect, Nigerian Taliban and now Jama‘atu Ahlissunah

Lidda‘awati wal Jihad (Onuoha, 2012). He attracted mostly disaffected young people and unemployed

university students and graduates, many of them animated by deep-seated socioeconomic and political

grievances like poor governance and corruption (Forest, 2012). Its membership also extended to drug

addicts, vagabonds, and generally lawless people (Abimbola, 2010).

Having settled at a camp in Kannama Yobe state around 2002 and early 2003. They emphasized

Islamic purity, disregarded local traditions especially on property rights by farming and fishing on the

bank of River Yobe which belonged to families claiming that: everything belongs to Allah (African

Security Review, 2012). In 2002, the Nigerian Taliban who had once referred to themselves as Muhajirun

(Migrants) emerged and demanded for the full implementation of Sharia in the 12 northern states of

Nigeria.

There are other claims that Yusuf dissociated himself from the Taliban because of its extremist

propensities but vowed that the group under his leadership would not relent until an independent and a

just state devoid of anything haram (ungodly or sinful) had been established (Omipidan 2009). However
the spate of violence carried out by his own sect makes it difficult to distinguish between the Yusifiyya

sect and the Taliban. However one can say that Yusuf prepared himself for the leadership role that he

played in the Boko Haram sect with his membership in other fundamentalist groups.

4.3.3 Philosophy and Ideology of the Boko Haram Sect

The philosophy of the group is founded on the practice of orthodox Islam. Orthodox Islam in its

view abhors Western education and working in the civil service. Meanwhile Mohammed Yusuf who

openly opposed working in the civil service was himself on Borno state‘s payroll as a member of the

state‘s board for Islamic affairs. As a matter of fact as stated above there were evidences of his signature

on the state‘s payment voucher. However, when some members of the state‘s executive council made this

known to the public, Mohammed Yusuf was outraged and consequently denied having anything to do

with the Borno state government and civil service (Albaniy, 2010). The abhorrence of western education

and working in the civil service could explain why the sect is popularly referred to as the Boko Haram.

However in a statement released on August 2009 by the acting leader of the sect Mallam Sanni Umaru,

the group rejected being designated as Boko Haram;

Boko Haram does not in any way mean western education is

sin as the infidel media continue to portray us. Boko Haram
actually means „Western Civilization‟ is forbidden. The
difference is that while the first gives the impression that we
are opposed to formal education coming from the west….
Which is not true, the second affirms our belief in the
supremacy of Islamic culture (not education), for culture is
broader, it includes education but not determined by western
education. (Onuoha, 2012)

The issue of schooling is therefore particularly salient to understanding the ideology of Boko

Haram. Boko can be said to mean the ability to read and write, especially in the Western-styled
educational system, as distinct from the Islamic educational system that existed in northern Nigeria before

being dislodged by colonialism (Forest, 2012). As Isa (2010) observes, the term implies a sense of

rejection and resistance to imposition of Western education and its system of colonial social organization,

which replaced and degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state. According to Isa:

Islamic scholars and clerics who once held sway in the

caliphate state and courts assigned the name boko to
northern elites who spoke, acted, ruled and operated the
state like their Western colonial masters. It is not
uncommon to hear in discussions among Islamist scholars
and average northerners that poverty and collapsed
governance—the bane of the region—can be blamed on the
failures and corrupt attitudes of yan boko (modern elites
trained at secular schools) who have acquired a Western
education and are currently in positions of power. As such,
the system represented by the yan boko is unjust, secular
and has no divine origin. It is therefore un-Islamic,
which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness.

Furthermore Isa noted:

The idea of boko is not just about rejecting Western

education per se; it is a judgment of its failure to provide
opportunities for better lives and thus became a symbol for
the Boko Haram movement to capitalise on the shortcomings
of yan boko. Subsequently it was coupled with haram
(forbidden). The movement used the term to mobilise
unemployed, unskilled and poverty-stricken youths to join its
cause, dislodge the secular, boko-controlled state in Nigeria,
and introduce the strict application of Sharia law and the
creation of an Islamic state. This partly explains why Boko
Haram‟s primary targets of attack were symbols of the state
such as security agencies, which had become widely
despised.

Therefore Boko Haram, as the group came to be called by the generality of Nigerians and

eventually by the government, because of its anti-Western focus sought to create a ‗better‘ Nigeria
through strict adherence to Islam because in they had been indoctrinated by the Quranic phrase that says

―anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors‖ (Ekanem et al,

2012). Over time, the group‘s members saw themselves increasingly at odds with the secular authorities,

whom they came to view as representatives of a corrupt, illegitimate, infidels dominated federal

government. Therefore they embraced the ideology that any member who fought and died for the cause of

an Islamic/Sharia state by destroying modern state formations and government establishments would

automatically gain Aljanna (paradise) (Danjibo, 2010).

In order to understand the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency, one must therefore come to

terms with these reasons why its ideology found resonance among a small but increasingly capable group

of young men in northern Nigeria. Furthermore in the case of Boko Haram ideological components which

can be identified include: the desire for policy change and social control; a religiously-based sense of

superiority; distrust of authorities; perceptions of injustice; and shared feelings of vulnerability,

particularly with regard to socioeconomic conditions and the status of Islam vis-a-vis other influences in

the region. As Alex Thurston has observed,

Boko Haram has an entrenched sense of victimhood and

now sees the state as both the main persecutor of “true”
Muslims and the major obstacle to “true” Islamic
reform.

It is therefore from this perspective that it becomes clear that the Boko Haram movement is a

reaction against the state‘s ineptitude and insensitivity to the plight of the underprivileged majority

especially the young, able bodied but unemployed people. The emphasis on western education is due to

the socio economic and political ills inflicted on the people by the products of western type of education,

the political elites. Therefore it can be posited that political elites in Nigeria have labeled the sect as being

anti western education in the bid to divert attention from the major issue at stake i.e the failure of

governance/leadership at all levels.

 The group is opposed to media‘s description of it as Boko Haram. Abimbola (2010) posited that

the group might not have explicitly given the name ―Boko Haram‖ to itself; rather the name could come

from the external view of its basic beliefs. It rather prefers to be called Jama‘atu Ahlis sunah Lidda‘awati

wal Jihad which means a people committed to the propagation of the prophet‘s teaching and Jihad. The

philosophy and ideological mission of the sect is clear i.e to overthrow the Nigerian state and to replace

modern state formation with the traditional Islamic state because Western values run contrary to Islamic

values.

Furthermore, it embraced and advocated the propagation of and strict adherence to Islam by all

and sundry regardless of anyone‘s personal wishes (Abimbola, 2010). Umma Mahammadiya (Muslim

faithful) and Dar-ul-Islam (Islamic community) cannot be compromised by western influence. Evil in the

society is as a result of the embrace of western civilization and in order to curb such evil, an Islamic

society must be entrenched by destroying modern state institutions (Danjibo, 2010). Members of the sect

are therefore motivated by the conviction that the Nigerian state is filled with social vices and corruption

and so the best thing for devout Muslim to do was to migrate from the morally bankrupt society to a

secluded place and establish an ideal Islamic society devoid of political corruption and moral deprivation.

In this wise, non members were therefore considered as Kuffar (disbelievers or those who deny the truth)

or Fasiqun (wrong doers) (Onuoha, 2012).

Furthermore according to Sani (2012) the philosophy, ideas and views of the sect are founded in

the beliefs of Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah who lived in Turkey between 1263 and 1328 (Olomojobi,

2013). Taymiyah was a Sunni Muslim and an Islamic Puritan who attempted recapturing the traditional

ethics of Islam. He declared a Jihad against the Mongols who ruled over Turkey at the time because he

perceived them not to be true Muslims even though they had converted to Sunni Islam. They were also

accused of ruling with manmade laws (their traditional Yassa code) rather than Islamic laws or Sharia.

Taymiyyah (undated) reasoned that they were living in a state of jahiliyyah or pre Islamic pagan ignorance
and that when Muslims live in this state there is need to wage a Jihad to establish Islamic law (Sharia) in

the region (Olomojobi, 2013).

Taymiyyah also opined that the reason Muslim communities are made to suffer is because their

leaders have not been true to the faith. He preached that it was necessary to engage in active jihad in order

to defend the Ummah (global community of Muslims) and spread the faith, and that a leader who does not

enforce Sharia law completely, and wage active jihad against infidels, is unfit to rule (Forest, 2012).

Many Islamic militants are noted to have towed the path of Taymiyyah. Olomojobi noted for

instance that the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Al Sadat by the Al-Jhad group was justified

on the teachings of Taymiyyah. Furthermore Osama Bin Laden‘s Al-Qaeda (to which Boko Haram is

affiliated) is also founded on a similar ideology. Mohammed Yusuf‘s militant orientation is can therefore

be traced to Ibn Taymiyyah after whom he named his Mosque in Maiduguri (Olomojobi, 2013, Sani

2012).

The call for Sharia can be said to be hinged on the conservatives‘ insistence on a unitary view of

society that recognizes no difference between state and religion, and they advocate making Nigeria an

Islamic state administered according to the principles of Sharia law. For them, all Muslims belong to the

ummah, and the idea of a secular state is founded on a disbelief in the existence of God or atheistic. Apart

from challenging the Muslim affirmation of religious principles especially the Sharia, the imposition of

secularity, according to them, amounts to a cultural affront to a significant portion of the population and

reduces them to the status of second-class citizens (Abimbola, 2010). This idea which is being inculcated

into the people has been the driving force which propels the insurgents and would be followers to carry

out the indiscriminate attacks on innocent victims.

It is necessary to state at this juncture that since Shariah is meant for those who believe in the Islamic

religion, it is therefore condemnable to subject those who are not followers of the faith to its application.
All state governors in Nigeria who have introduced the Muslim legal system have said consistently that it

applies only to Muslims.

Olomojobi (2013) posited that clearly the clamour for the implementation of Sharia in Nigeria can be

gleaned from the fact that first the Nigerian state is considered by the fundamentalists as a ―fraud‖ in that

it is a colonial creation, an English/Western/Christian creation. Secondly Nigeria at independence adopted

the West Minster Model or Parliamentary system and subsequently replaced it with the Presidential

system of government both of which are considered as Western or Christian oriented systems. Therefore

for them to live under and be loyal to what they consider as un-Islamic system is an affront to their

religious beliefs hence the outright rejection of the Nigerian state as currently constituted.

Furthermore the call for the adoption of Sharia can be considered as an effort to nullify English law

which is considered as non Muslim law hence Christian and a Muslim should not subject himself to any

law other than the Islamic law (Olomojobi, 2013). Therefore the realization of Sharia can be viewed as a

reassertion of the primordial Islamic identity of northerners in the face of a perceived threat of a non

Muslim, un-Islamic state system.

That there are political undertones to the introduction of the Sharia in Nigeria cannot be disputed.

Muslim governors who operate the Sharia legal system in their states have presented Islam, a universal

religion as limited only to the penal code (Bego, undated). Islam is far more comprehensive and its

worldview far greater than merely concerned about cutting off the hand of the man who allegedly stole a

cow. As a religion revealed for mankind, Islam aims to guide humanity to all imaginable levels of

progress and perfection and to make man a true vicegerent of God on earth (Bego, undated). But without

providing the objective conditions for the application of Sharia laws, the Muslim ‗north‘ Sharia

enterprise, has stripped Islam of its humanism, aesthetics, intellectual quests and spiritual devotion (Bego,

undated).
 Nor do those who so fanatically insisted on reducing Islam to a tool for gaining new or lost political

grounds shown any benchmark for probity and commitment to the provisions of Sharia laws themselves.

If the millions that they receive or the billions that they received so far from the State were used

according to Sharia preaching, the economic lot of people in Sharia implementing states and their social

well being would have been a lot better than what they are now. Perhaps those stole cows would not have

resorted to doing so to survive. Perhaps the common people would have been strengthened educationally

to ask questions regarding their rights and the rights of their leaders over them.

But by not making themselves available to Sharia penalties for offences similar to those said to have

been committed by the ―thieves‖ and ―adultresses‖, by not using resources meant for the betterment of the

conditions of their people properly and accountably, custodians of Sharia in the north have given up Islam

to ridicule and failed in their attempt to show the Sharia process as purely a ‗response to the demands of

the majority of the people who are Muslims‘ in their states.

Therefore though Islamic Sharia law was adopted in Maiduguri during the late 1990s, as it was across

Nigeria‘s northern states, it was not enforced strictly enough for the conservative Yusuf who was a devout

Salafist. Yusuf originally intended his Salafist prayer and self-isolation movement to promote the religion

of Islam and encourage the enforcement of Sharia law in the country‘s northern states. A discourse on the

creed and beliefs of the Salafis would suffice at this juncture.

4.3.4 The Salafi Ideology

Scholarly interest for Salafism, a strict and puritanical branch of Islam greatly increased after the

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since then there has been debates about the ideology of the

Salafis. Wiktorowicz (2005) has divided Salafis into three groups i.e the purists, who are politically silent

and concentrate on peaceful means to spread their beliefs, the politicos who focus their beliefs and faith

on political questions and take a more activist violent approach and the jihadis, whose ideology includes

the permissibility of fighting nominally Islamic rulers they consider non-Muslims or kuffars
(Wagemakers, 2009). In his view Wiktorowicz (2005) noted that these groups share a common creed but

that each has a different method of applying it in the contemporary world.

The Salafi creed revolves around strict interpretations of themes such as the unity of God which

does not just refer to monotheism but also to an adamant rejection of alleged religious innovations like

visiting graves of so-called saints. For Salafis, these practices amount to unbelief and polytheism because

they ascribe partners to God. In contrast to these ‗deviant‘ forms of Islam, Salafis see themselves as part

of the group that will be saved on Judgement Day. To achieve this, they model themselves after ‗the

pious predecessors‘ (al-salaf al- salih), hence the name ‗Salafism‘, the Muslims who learned about Islam

from Prophet Muhammad himself or from his followers and who can thus be seen as embodying true

Islam (Wiktorowicz, 2005 cited in Wagemakers, 2009).

In view of their desire to purify Islam, the Salafis attach great importance to the creed and are

keen to distinguish themselves from less strict adherents to the correct creed or groups that are considered

deviant altogether. This explains the large number of documents that simply explain what a Muslim

should believe. Some militant groups even write down their creed as a manifesto to show others what they

stand for. These writings clearly show that there is indeed a shared set of beliefs among Salafis in general,

as Wiktorowicz has stated, but that they certainly do not agree on everything. Contentious questions, such

as what constitutes unbelief, are answered quite differently by various religious ideologues and show that

there is sometimes significant friction between the creeds of the separate Salafi branches.

The main differences between purists, politicos and jihadis, however, can be found in the

methods of application of their creed. Salih b. Fawzan al-Fawzan (undated) distinguishes three broad

types of methods of application: the practical application of the creed, by which he seems to mean the

methodology towards the sources of Islam (Quran and Sunna); the application of the correct form of

worship (ibada); and the propagation of Islam (dawa) and current affairs. Although al-Fawzan‘s

distinction is slightly slanted towards the purist point of view, it is a useful starting point. Concerning the
treatment and application of the Quran and Sunna, Salafis take an exclusive approach in the sense that

they, for example, do not apply analogous reasoning to derive new rules from existing ones. They also

apply a literal reading to the sources, refusing rationalism and metaphorical reasoning as correct ways of

using the Quran and the Sunna. On the other hand, if there is textual evidence for a particular issue,

Salafis often go to great lengths to apply it in their lives.

All Salafis agree on the methods of application of their creed towards the sources of Islam, which

cannot be said of their methodology for worship. However the most contentious part of the Salafi

methods of application is the third part: the way to deal with current affairs. Purist Salafis mostly engage

in studying, teaching and particularly propagation of Islam (or dawa) to change society and make it more

Islamic. Politicos, on the other hand, actively engage in political debate, especially because they consider

it an obligation to shun man-made laws and adhere to the divine regulations of the Sharia instead

(Wagemakers, 2009). Jihadists reject the sole reliance on either dawa or political involvement and believe

that criticism of un-Islamic conduct by others could and should ultimately lead to waging jihad against the

unbelievers (kuffar). They express their contention by fighting to make Islam supreme and establish

regimes based on the Sharia. All three groups challenge each other, accusing their opponents of deviating

from the correct method of application of their creed (Wagemakers, 2009).

It is therefore obvious judging from the foregoing that the adherence to the Salafi ideology and

creed by the Boko Haram leadership largely informs the modus operandi of the Boko Haram group.

4.4 Modus Operandi of the Boko Haram Sect

The activities of the Boko Haram sect in northern Nigeria have been different when compared with

other groups. The sect operates in similar way like the Somali Al- Shabaab in the Maghreb region of the

Sahel and Al-Qaeda (Opukri and Etekpe, 2013). Attacks of this nature are usually swift, tempestuous and

enhanced by guerilla firepower. They usually target those they view as infidels or opponents of Sharia
code that they supposedly seek to achieve. The Boko Haram has applied tactics and the common noes

include the following:

i. Bombing: This relies on the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (EIDs). This is the

most prevalent strategy adopted by the sect. Typically the EIDs are easy to manufacture,

they are smaller and hard to detect but contain very destructive capabilities. It has been

pointed out by Opukri and Etekpe (2013) that in 2011 alone the sect carried out forty (40)

bombings in northern Nigeria.

ii. Kidnapping and Hostage Taking: The sect has engaged in this act especially in cases involving

expatriates working in Nigeria. While some were set free others were killed in the process.

iii. Arson and Fire Bombing: The Boko Haram sect largely invests and relies on this tactic and has

applied it against public buildings, recreation centers and gardens, churches etc to portray an image

that the federal government is incapable of maintaining law and order (Opukri and Etekpe, 2013).

The pattern of terrorist attacks embarked upon by the Boko Haram sect has assumed a dangerous

dimension especially as the sect has no defined enemies, targets or grievances. It commenced with

attacking police stations to the on going form of coordinated bombings. Thus the regime of fear is all over

the nation especially in the north. Above all, the Boko Haram sect has developed the capability to engage

in attacks all over the country and has confirmed the assertion by Opukri and Etekpe (2013) that the 21 st

century terrorist organizations can attack anything, anywhere and at anytime. The figure below shows the

locations of Boko Haram‘s attacks and suicide bombings in Nigeria.

Figure 3.1: Locations of Boko Haram’s attacks and suicide bombings in Nigeria

Source: Onuoha, 2014 p.172

Since the mid-2010 the sect‘s modus operandi has changed and they have become unpredictable. Old

methods such as the targeted killing of traditional ward and village heads, security officials, prominent

politicians, and opposing ulama has continued unabated. They now target media houses and journalists,

schools (including teachers and pupils), telecommunication base stations, and, recently, kidnapping of

locals and foreigners. The burning of schools is a new strategy used by the sect. A number of schools

have been burnt since the July 2009 violence in Maiduguri as symbols of government and Western

education, which they abhor, along with police stations and other government buildings.
 However, the attack on schools, school teachers, and pupils has forced many schools to close down in

Maiduguri since February 2013. It seems Boko Haram is losing its initial focus as old members are lost

and security forces close in on them. As the situation changed on the ground, Boko Haram changed its

methods and style. Kidnapping, a style they had rejected and vehemently denied using, now became

acceptable.

There has been an upsurge in the killing and kidnapping of foreigners by Boko Haram since 2012,

indicating a change of tactics arising from desperation. There are numerous such incidents in the north-

east of Nigeria. These include the killing of road construction workers and Korean doctors in Borno and

Yobe states, the kidnapping and subsequent killing of employees of a construction firm, Setraco, in

Jama‘are town of Bauchi State, and the kidnap of the French family of Tanguy Moulin-Fournier, his wife,

brother and four children at Waza National Park in Northern Cameroon (Mohammed, 2014). All these

indicate both a change of tactics and further splintering of the movement into smaller groups, arising from

internal and external developments.

4.5 Organizational Structure of the Boko Haram Sect

In the years leading to the outbreak of the Boko Haram crisis, the sect was under the leadership of

Mohammed Yusuf as the Amir ul-Aam or Commander in Chief or the leader of the entire group. He had

two deputies (Na‘ib Amir ul Aam 1 and 11). It was in his Ibn Taimiyya centre in the company of his

lieutenant Abubakar Shekau that he began to build an imaginary state within a state. Together they set up

Laginas (departments), they had a cabinet, the Shura, the Hisbah, the Brigade of guards, a military wing, a

large farm, an effective microfinance scheme and the late Mohammed Yusuf played the role of a judge in

settling disputes (Salkida, undated). The sect also had a Shura (consultative council). Each of the states

where they had membership also had their own Amir (Commander/ Leader) while each local government

area also had its own Amir. Closely following the Local Government Amir are the sect‘s membership or

followers (Onuoha, 2012). They were structured to perform the multiple functions of the sect‘s soldiers,
police and so on (Mohammed, 2010). The sect also had amirs in Chad and Niger that gave accounts of

their stewardship to Yusuf directly (Salkida, undated).

The diagram below represents the organizational structure of the sect under Sheikh Abubakar

Shekau.

Source: Onuoha, 2013

In terms of membership the sect has been noted to draw followership from the unemployed and

socially excluded in the society. When Mohammed Yusuf was arrested in November 13, 2008 by the

SSS, he admitted having a membership of 1.5 million people mostly within the ages 18 and 38 (Lawal,
2009) and that he was then making N500,000 (five hundred thousand Naira) daily from contribution from

the followers who had committed themselves to contribute N1 (One Naira) Daily (Oloja, 2009)

4.6 Splinter Groups

Another fact which came to the fore in the course of this research is that the Boko Haram has

been factionalized and that other splinter groups now hide under the guise of Boko Haram to commit

heinous crimes (Mamu, 2013). In fact Forest (2012) notes that the sect is not a unified, monolithic sect

and that there are separate factions within the group who are not in agreement about tactics and strategic

direction and oftentimes they compete against each other for attention and followers.

It was found out that a United States House of Representatives report suggested that one faction

of the sect is oriented towards domestic issues and another on violent international extremism (Meehan

and Speier, 2011). Another report by the same body published in November 2011 indicated that the group

may have even split into three factions i.e one that remains moderate and welcomes an end to the

violence, another that wants a peace agreement, and a third that refuses to negotiate and wants to

implement strict Shariah law across Nigeria.

It is also instructive to note that there is least evidence of disagreements among some Boko

Haram members. In July 2011, a group calling itself the Yusufiyya Islamic Movement distributed leaflets

widely in Maiduguri denouncing other Boko Haram factions as ―evil.‖ The authors of the leaflet,

asserting the legacy of founder Mohammed Yusuf, distanced themselves from attacks on civilians and on

houses of worship (Meehan and Speier, 2011). Some local observers now discriminate between a Kogi

Boko Haram, Kanuri Boko Haram, and Hausa Fulani Boko Haram. And there are also individuals or

groups of armed thugs whose attacks on banks or other targets are blamed on Boko Haram in some cases,

the perpetrators will even claim they are members of Boko Haram, when in truth they are motivated more

by criminal objectives than by Boko Haram‘s core ideological or religious objectives (Gambrel, 2011).
4.7 Remote Causes of the Boko Haram Crisis

This study asserts that the Boko Haram insurgency has both remote and immediate causes. The

remote causes are here presented and discussed under the following sub headings.

4.7.1 Prebendal/Affective Relationships

Another dimension to the Boko Haram insurgency which can also account for the origin of the

crisis is the strained prebendal relationship that existed between the northern politicians and the sect‘s

leadership as discovered in the course of this research. Among the characteristics that informed the

description of Nigeria as a weak state, political godfatherism or prebendalism is identified as one of the

causes of Islamist terrorism in general and the Boko Haram insurgency in particular in northern Nigeria.

This is because the political elites consider winning elections as a matter of life and death. In such

situations, rather than relying on manifestoes and sound logic to win elections, politicians take to sharp

practices like affective behaviours.

It is necessary to add that the most important common factor in crises of this nature is the

phenomenon of political corruption. The concentration of resources in the state makes the possession of

political power very lucrative and the competition for political positions very intense (Institute for Peace

and conflict Studies, 2008). As Richard Joseph (1991 cited in IPCR, 2008) has contended that Nigeria‘s

present and future depend upon a prior understanding of the nature, extent and persistence of a certain

mode of political behavior and of its social and economic ramifications. In his position this mode of

political behavior is the prebendal culture which sees politics as the clearing house for jobs, contracts and

official plunder. In Joseph‘s expression:

Democratic politics and prebendal politics are two sides of the

same coin in Nigeria; each can be turned over to reveal the
other….. the system of prebendal politics enables divergent
groups and constituencies to seek to accommodate their interest
… the system is often wasteful, unproductive and contributes to
the increasing affluence of the relative few, paltry gains for a
 larger number and misery for the great majority of people. Since
it is a self justifying system which grants legitimacy to a pattern
of persistent conflict and since its modus operandi is to politicize
ethnic, religious and linguistic differences, it serves to make the
Nigerian polity a simmering cauldron of irresolvable tension
over which a lid must regularly be closed and just as regularly
removed (cited in IPCR op Cit)

This partly explains the current wave of violent Islamism led by the Boko-Haram as a fall-out of

the failed economy of affection relationship between the two of them (African Security Review, 2012).

Hyden (2006) defines the economy of affection as personal investments in reciprocal relations with other

individuals for the purpose of achieving goals which would not have been possible without going into

such relationships. The desired goals that motivate such behaviours have scarce value, they may be

physically and constitutionally available, but accessing them might warrant going into an affective

relationship with others. This leads to an informal institution such as the economy of affection when a

group of people voluntarily agree to do something together guided by an unwritten code to guide their

relationships with (un)specified punishment for breaching such codes.

Within this context people go into such behaviours and create informal associations/institutions

for the purpose of gaining status, seeking favour, sharing a benefit and providing a common good (Hyden,

2006). Furthermore as a reciprocal relationship, parties to such contracts do not usually go into legal

negotiations or agreements but there is contingent use of rewards or punishments in a transaction likely to

be driven by any of the following: mutual rewards, mutual punishment and coercion (Hyden, 2006). With

regard to mutual benefits, the results are often positive not minding the fact that the power relation is

symmetric or asymmetric (Hyden, 2006).

Mutually punishing agreements usually result in conflicts just like the coercive transaction which

is explicitly asymmetrical characterized by potential flow of punishment from one party. In the

relationship between many northern politicians just like their other counterparts around the country, their
relationship between the Islamists started as mutually rewarding when the members of the Boko-Haram

aided their electoral successes. However, it has now become mutually hurting because of the coercive

behaviour demonstrated by the politicians in the way the implementation of the Sharia penal code was

handled, failure to fulfill promises made during elections and the extra-judicial killing of the sect‘s leader

allegedly ordered by the former Governor of Borno State, now a Senator of the Federal Republic Senator

Ali Modu Sherif (Albert, 2010, Mamu, 2013).

It has been argued by Mefor (2013) and Mamu (2013) that some northern Governors supported

and even sponsored the sect from the outset. Though the symbiosis that attended their association is long

established, the sect is now well entrenched and established beyond the original intention of those who

may have armed and deployed them for political gains especially during campaigns. The fallout between

the sect and the then governor of Borno state came when the latter failed to introduce full Sharia in Borno

state as he had promised them (Mefor, 2013, Mamu, 2013, Abimbola, 2010). The leader of the group

came to believe either that the northern political elites were either not serious Muslims or that their

Western education orientation had hindered and militated against their commitment (Abimbola, 2010).

In illustrating the affective behaviour and reciprocal relationship between politicians and the

Boko-Haram like other radical groups, Alao quoting Muhammed Umar, stated that:

The leaders of these groups are normally loyal to one or two

powerful political figures that are rich. They are used as pawns
in political power games. This group was well known to
government officials since its formation in 2004. They are not
secret societies and they preach openly in their mosques.

Again the International Crisis Group (2014:i) added that:

……around 2002, Yusuf was co-opted by the then Borno state

gubernatorial candidate, Ali Modu Sheriff, for the support of his
large youth movement, in exchange for full implementation of
Sharia and promises of senior state government positions for
his
 followers in the event of an electoral victory. Sheriff denies any
such arrangement or involvement with the sect. As the group
rose to greater prominence, the state religious commissioner
was accused of providing resources to Yusuf, while the
government never implemented full Sharia. Yusuf subsequently
became increasingly critical of the government and official
corruption, his popularity soared, and the group expanded into
other states, including Bauchi, Yobe and Kano. “After the
politicians created the monster”, a senior security officer
commented, “they lost control of it”. The State Security Services
(SSS) arrested and interrogated Yusuf a number of times, but he
was never prosecuted, reportedly because of the intervention of
influential officials.

It is also a well known fact that this affective behaviour informed the appointment of member of

the sect as Commissioner by the Borno state government in the administration of former Governor Sherif

before the relationship between the sect and the governor went sour when the governor decided to reduce

patronage to the sect (African Security Review, 2012). In the making of the Boko-Haram akin to those

described as ―children of tribulation‖ by Honwana and De Boeck (2005), the option of bribery has been

used with Islamism as the main consequence. Since the inception of Nigeria‘s fourth-republic the political

elites have continually organized, funded and patronised violent youth groups through retail and bulk

votes purchase for two reasons. These are to get them to register and vote as a group for a political party

and the second is to use them as thugs to perpetuate electoral fraud and violence as circumstance might

require.

4.7.2 Politicization of Ethno-Religious Sentiments

Out of all these amoral and sharp practices, the bribery option which is lying to the electorate can

be seen to have been at the heart of the pretensions for the full implementation of the Sharia as a means of

seeking legitimacy and maintaining control (African Security Review, 2012). This is common among the

political elites in Nigeria that feeds on manipulation of either ethnic or religious sentiments in bid to

capture state power by good or crook without considering the far-reaching consequences of their actions
on the state and polity (Obianyo, 2010, Odeh, 2010). According to Aiyede (2001) and Odeh, (2010), in

1999, October to be precise, when Sani Ahmed the then Executive Governor of Zamfara State decided to

implement the Sharia code of law in his state, he was ―unwittingly setting the stage for another cycle of

violence in the country‖.

While the declaration of the full implementation of Sharia law in Zamfara state attracted

condemnation though without incidence of violence, planned imposition of the same by government of

Kaduna state ignited destructive conflict that claimed over two thousand lives, property worth billions of

naira including mosques and churches in a wav of violent conflict that started on February, 21, 2000

(Aiyede, 2001, Odeh, 2010). Despite widespread condemnations of total disregard for the rights of the

minorities in these states, there was no formal acceptance by any of these states to revert to the status quo

ante. In fact in an emergency meeting of the National Council of States and a caucus meeting with the

nineteen Northern states Governors convened by the then President Obasanjo in the bid to resolve the

crisis, all efforts to get the Governors of the Sharia states to revert to the status quo ante proved abortive

as the governors of Zamfara and Kano especially Ahmed Yerima and Rabiu Kwankwaso insisted on

having their way i.e going ahead with the Sharia legal system (Odeh, 2010). It took the Senate‘s

pronouncement that it would not hesitate to give assent to an imposition of emergency laws by the

president in any state where violence threatened the corporate existence that doused the Sharia crisis

(Odeh, 2010). This made then President Olusegun Obasanjo to declare that Political Sharia will die a

natural death. However, he failed to mention that there will be consequences of the death of the political

Sharia which was rightly predicted by Osuntokun (2002) that:

those who introduced the Sharia seem to have created a

Frankeinstein monster, which they may yet regret.
This is because over time the Mallams may challenge
elected governors in the North for political supremacy.
This is because Sharia is Allah‟s way and should
therefore be superior to man-made government. Since
the governors are not religious leaders, they are in for a
rough time in the nearest future.
 Albert (2010) argues that these so called ‗fundamentalists‘ were created by the abandoned Sharia

project embarked upon by the northern governors. According to Albert, “thinking that the ‗Sharia

governors‘ were truly interested in the practice of Sharia, the Islamists became frustrated when the Sharia

project was abandoned after its political dividends had been reaped by the Governors‖.

In reaction the Islamists began to fracture, reinvent and even bypass the public space. In pursuit

of the goal of Islamism, members of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria have fractured and reinvented the

religious public space in particular going by the spate of bombings of churches on Sundays when majority

of Christians worship, which has forced fear into many adherents of Christianity especially in northern

Nigeria. This is an indication of the pursuit of the creation of an Islamic State based on the thinking of

modern Islamists aimed at actualizing their vision of the Islamic polity (Albert, 2010).

The adoption of Islamism indicates the social imagination of the northern youths as they strive to

shape the society in their own way. Islamism provides a tool for this going by the history of the region

and the contents of political Islam. Ayoob (2005) explains that adherents of political Islam are convinced

that Islam as a body of faith has something important to say about how politics and society should be

fashioned in the contemporary Muslim world.

Defining Islamism as a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and

organizations that pursue political objectives, Ayoob posits that it provides political responses to today‘s

societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations of which rest on re-appropriated and reinvented

concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition (Ayoob, 2005).

The Islamists consciously de-historize and de-contextualize Islam. In de-historizing Islam, they

separate it from the various contexts in terms of time and space in which Islam flourished for over 14

centuries through different types of religious inventions. Islamists de-contextualize Islam by ignoring the

social, economic and political milieu within which Muslim societies operate. Through a combination of
both, Islamists come up with a strong ideological tool to ―purge‖ Muslim societies of ―impurities” and

―accretions‖ which they consider to be the reasons for Muslims‘ declining power. By de-historizing and

de-contextualizing Islam, Islamists enter into diametrically opposing positions with the scholars of

Islamic theology and jurisprudence (Ayoob, 2005).

4.7.3 Economic Deprivation/Poverty

One further significant factor that has stimulated the drive towards violent extremism, recruitment

and support for Boko Haram is economic deprivation. Abject poverty and economic dislocation of

livelihoods have drastically reduced the options of many young Nigerians in the northern region.

Deducing from the structural violence paradigm, individual and group grievances, such as poverty,

unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising

instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence (Briscoe and van Ginkel,

2013, Mohammed, 2013, Sani,2012). Indeed the International Crisis Group (2014:i) asserted that:

Most Nigerians are poorer today than they were at

independence in 1960, victims of the resource curse and
rampant, entrenched corruption. Agriculture, once the
economy‟s mainstay is struggling. In many parts of the
country, the government is unable to provide security,
good roads, water, health, reliable power and
education. The situation is particularly dire in the far
north. Frustration and alienation drive many to join
“self- help” ethnic, religious, community or civic
groups, some of which are hostile to the state.

It is the combination of these factors that Boko Haram has exploited in a bid to gain support for

its activities in northern Nigeria. In May 2013, the Nigerian government released dozens of women and

teenagers previously detained as relatives of suspected Boko Haram members. Among the youths were
individuals who confessed to previously accepting payments of 5,000 Nigerian Naira from Boko Haram

militants, who in turn provided them with kegs of fuel to set schools ablaze in Maiduguri, Borno State

(Ibrahim and Matazu, 2013). Similarly Danjibo (2010) notes that some Almajirai were paid as low as

N200 (two hundred naira) by unknown people to perpetrate violence during the outbreaks of crisis. This

is indicative of the economic desperation expressed by thousands of youths who have been rendered

vulnerable by the shortcomings of Nigeria‘s leadership over several decades. According to Nigeria‘s

National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the measure of relative poverty is most apparent in the northern

region. In comparison with the southeast and southwest zones, which have relative poverty rates of 67.0%

and 59.1% respectively, the north-east and north-west zones have higher figures of 76.3% and 77.7% of

relative poverty (NBS, 2012). The North East, Boko Haram‘s main operational field, has the worst

poverty rate of the six official zones.

The foregoing background analysis therefore forms the remote causes of the violence

which has threatened the socio-economic and political stability of the Nigerian society. At this

juncture, the immediate causes of the crisis will be identified and examined.

4.7.4 The Almajiri Syndrome

The enrolment of many boys and young men in traditional Quranic schools rather than in formal

education has become an issue of growing concern in northern Nigeria especially in the Boko Haram

issue and this serves as a remote cause of the Boko Haram insurgency. The students of such schools,

many of whom while young beg for a living. The almajirai, as they are known, have also been associated

with Islamic radicalisation, militancy, and the periodic riots that have characterized many northern

Nigerian cities. The current spate of Boko Haram violence in northern Nigeria has carried such modes of

thinking to the extreme. Many have jumped to the conclusion that the Islamist sect finds easy recruits in

traditional Quranic schools. Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka (2012), for example, declared in an article in

Newsweek magazine about Boko Haram that the ―butchers of Nigeria‖:

 [have] been deliberately bred, nurtured, sheltered,
rendered pliant, obedient to only one line of command,
ready to be unleashed at the rest of society. They were
bred in madrassas and are generally known as the
almajiris. From knives and machetes, bows and
poisoned arrows they have graduated to AK-47s,
homemade bombs, and explosive-packed vehicles.

Other authors have declared the almajirai‘s deprived living conditions as being responsible for

violence. Former Minister of Education Aishatu Jibrin Dukku, for instance, found that ―most of these

children, because of the harsh realities they found themselves in, end up becoming juvenile delinquents

and, subsequently, adult criminals‖ (Alkali 2009). Some almajirai may well be, and probably are,

amongst the followers of Boko Haram. But there is no systematic evidence to support such assertions.

However it is believed that the socio-economic conditions in which the almajirai find themselves are

sufficient to drive them into violent actsivities.

According to Aluaigba (2009) street begging exposes almajirai ―to all sorts of vile and deviant

behaviors and immoral acts because they interact freely with people of low virtue like prostitutes, drug

addicts and gamblers‖ (2009: 22). Defying the norms of ‗modern‘ childhood, the almajirai are described

as a threat to the project of the ‗modern‘ Nigerian nation in its entirety. President Goodluck Jonathan

calls them ―dangerous to national development‖ (Kumolu, 2012) and adds that ―the time has come for

the nation to build on the moral foundations of the traditional school system by providing the Almajiri

with conventional knowledge and skills‖.

It is widely acknowledged that many almajirai grow up in difficult conditions. The circumstances

of their upbringing are often presented as sufficient conditions to make them inherently dangerous.

Saudatu Sani, a federal legislator from Kano State, claimed about the almajirai that ―the pathetic life

they live ... breeds heartless criminals‖ (Abubakar, 2009). It has been asserted that, ―hungry and angry‖,

the almajirai can easily be mobilized to engage in looting and killings during ethno-religious clashes so

as to
pay society back (Abubakar, 2009). Awofeso et al. (2003:320) write of the ―immense‖ ―terrorist potential

of having about one million hungry and gullible children roaming aimlessly in Nigeria‘s northern cities,

from whom any fanatic, religious or otherwise, could readily recruit disciples for antisocial purposes‖.

The foregoing views were therefore coroborated by the Kano state Governor, Rabiu Musa

Kwankwaso when the Presidential Committee on security challenges in the north east visited him on

May, 20, 2013. According to the governor:

We have a situation in this part of country where parents

give birth to 20 to 30 children, choose only two out of
them and send the rest away to God knows where.
Children are sent to places that they don‟t know. They
are left to fend for themselves. We have a situation
where you go round the city and find garrison of
children, able bodied youths begging. Having been
abandoned by their parents, those children grow up to
hate themselves, hate their parents, hate the leaders,
hate the government, and the society. They feel they
were deprived, they feel injustice and they become
enemies of the state and constituted authorities; and
thereby becoming vulnerable to crime and violence
(SaharaReporters, May 21, 2013).

The prevalence of the almajiri symdrome in the northern parts of Nigeria can therefore be cited as

a remote cause of the Boko Haram in view of the desperate situation of the almajiris who are open to any

option in order to survive in Nigeria‘s harsh socio-economic environment. Indeed, Olomojobi (2013)

notes that the high turn overs of Almajiris constitute a significant source of insecurity in the North Eastern

region of Nigeria. Similarly Onuoha (2012) and Salihi (2012) observed that the Boko Haram draws

mrmbers from dissatisfied Almajiris mostly in Northern Nigeria. The ICG (2014) has it that in a context

of urbanisation and increasing poverty, this practice is open to abuse and may foster criminality. It notes

that in cities like Kano and Kaduna, many Almajiri have graduated into Yandaba (adolescent groups that
once socialized teenagers into adulthood but have in many cases become gangs), it also estimated there

were seven million (7,000,000) Almajiri children in northern Nigeria.

4.7.5 Proliferation of Terrorism on a Global Scale

Terrorism is a global phenomenon and no part of the globe can claim to be completely insulated

from its scourge. It thrives in situations where socio-economic exclusion, mal-administration,

marginalization of the majority by a privileged few, oppression etc. Terrorism was once prevalent in the

Middle East as a reaction against Israeli domination and perceived injustice as well as the over bearing

presence of the United States in the region. The consequent success of the September, 11, 2001 attacks on

the US and others across the world have increased the tempo of terrorism across the world moving from

the Middle East to North Africa, the Maghreb/Sahel area called the ―Arc of Instability‖ and now

northern Nigeria (Sani, 2012).

4.7.6 The Arab Spring and Small Arms Proliferation

Furthermore it worth noting that the Arab Spring which started in 2011 in Tunisia and spread to

Egypt and then Libya among other Middle Eastern countries, further set the pace for the intensification of

the Boko Haram insurgency. The same socio-economic conditions which precipitated the Arab Spring i.e

bad or oppressive governance, socio-economic exclusion, corruption etc, were also present in the

Nigerian case and can be consired as contributing factors to the insurgency of the Boko Haram sect.

Corroborating this assertion, Baba-Ahmed (2012) noted that:

Even more tragic was the failure to recognize that the

period 2007 to 2009 was also a period of intense activity
in the Sahel and the Maghreb, as well as intensification
of conflicts in the Horn of Africa. A suitable terrain,
surfeit of grievances and deluge of material support and
other opportunities for linkages may have encouraged
the rebuilding of Yusuf‟s group into a more organized
 and better motivated outfit. An obviously ill-prepared
Nigerian state and a community which had borne the
brunt of the group was targeted by a disciplined, trained
and highly motivated insurgency, whose most potent
weapon, the suicide bomber, raised the stakes in a new
conflict. Operating with the tactics, if not the
sophistication of terror groups which seek to achieve
maximum impact by inducing fear among citizenry, the
Jamaatu Ahlil Sunnah Lidda‟awati Wal Jihad
(JASLIWAJ) embarked upon spectacular campaigns
against the Nigerian state, and a systematic campaign of
intimidation around the local population.

Furthermore the disintegration of Muamar Ghadafi‘s weapons stockpiles and disengagement of

his soldiers from active service gave room for the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across

West Africa‘s already porous borders. Small arms therefore easily find their way into Nigeria where there

are demand factors. Similarly, the Libyan rebels are desperate to exchange arms for money to Boko

Haram Terrorists, their financiers and collaborators as the Sect has since been affiliated to Al-Qaida in the

Maghreb. This has added to the overwhelming challenge of the influx of illegal aliens, arms, ammunitions

and sophisticated IED materials into the country

The Nigerian government has also entered into bilateral cooperation with its neighbours, Benin

Republic, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. They have taken a number of measures to boost cross-border

cooperation and enhance security at the borders. These measures include the establishment of joint

commissions like Chad-Nigeria Joint Commission, Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission, Benin-Nigeria Joint

Commission, Cameroon-Nigeria Joint Commission, Lake Chad Basin Commission and joint border

patrols between Nigeria and Republic of Benin (Adejo, 2005).Nigeria has been an active participant in

multilateral arrangements both in terms of regional and global discussions on SALW proliferation.

Nigeria is a signatory to a number of international measures to curb SALW proliferation. It supported the

adoption in 2005 of the international instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace Illicit Small Arms

and Light Weapons, and has argued that political document needs to be transformed into a legally binding
instrument in order to control effectively and criminalize the illicit movement of SALW. Nigeria has as

well recommended consideration of sanctions for those found diverting arms into illegal networks, the

establishment of common international standard for regulating the activities of arms brokers, integrating

SALW measures into comprehensive national development strategies, and establishment of a common

standard for end-user certification and stockpile management. At the regional level, Nigeria has supported

ECOWAS measures aimed at reducing the proliferation of SALW. At the global level, Nigeria is a

signatory to the United Nations (UN) Firearms Protocol on November 13, 2001; which it ratified on July

15, 2004 (Hazen and Horner, 2007). Nigeria supported the extension of ECOWAS Moratorium in

October 2004 for the second time and the agreement to strengthen it by transforming it into a legally

binding convention.

A working draft, titled the ―Protocol Regarding the Fight against the Proliferation of Small

Arms and Light Weapons, Their Munitions and Other Related Materials‖ (Vines, 2005). At the national

level, Nigeria continues to rely on the National Firearms Act of 1959 as the legal instrument governing

small arms possession, manufacture and the use in the country as amended even though the Robbery and

Firearms (Special Provisions) Decree No.5 was promulgated in 1984 and later the Robbery and Firearms

(Special Provisions) Act. Proposals were made that the laws be revised and up dated following the UN

Programme of Action in 2001, but to date there have been no efforts to overhaul the national legislation

on small arms.

Former President Obasanjo initiated a number of committees aimed at addressing the issues of

proliferation, disarmament and related matters, but to date these committees have made little progress in

tackling these issues (Hazen and Horner , 2007). In July 2000, the Nigerian government established a

National Committee on the Proliferation and Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons the

purpose of which was to determine the sourcing illegal small arms and collect information on small arms

proliferation in Nigeria. In May 2001, the government established a second committee aimed at

implementing the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium. These two committees were later merged into a single
committee. The committee has accomplished very little in the past five years in large part due to lack of

political will, financial support, technical expertise, and institutional capacity.

In other words, NATCOM was incapacitated by underfunding, corruption on the part of law

enforcement agencies, etc. Rather than being established as an independent commission the committee

has been placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Staffing of the Committee is not permanent rather

individuals with full-time appointments are asked to serve in the Committee. The Committee produced an

ambitions works plan in 2003, but unable to implement these activities. Originally conceived of as a

primary documentation centre on small arms and light weapons, the Committee has not yet demonstrated

capacity to perform this role (Chuma-Okoro, 2011).

There were renewed efforts in 2007 to revive the activities of the Committee and legislation is

being written to convert the Committee into a national commission. The Committee is currently preparing

to conduct a national survey of small arms by the end of 2007. It is seeking support from the ECOWAS

Small Arms Programme to conduct the survey and to undertake other activities in support of the

implementation of the 2006 ECOWAS Convention (Hazen and Horner, 2007). Inaugurated in 2001, the

NATCOM is responsible for the registration and control of SALW, and granting of permits for

exemptions under the ECOWAS Moratorium (Chuma-Okoro, 2011).

Despite these national-efforts, the rate of accumulation of SALW is increasing and becoming

endemic as various forms of violence and casualties are in the recent times recorded in the Northern part

of Nigeria. Thus, the proliferation of SALW in Nigeria has a destabilizing effect. There is lack of capacity

and strong legal or effective institutional frameworks to regulate SALW and combat the phenomenon of

SALW proliferation in Nigeria, particularly Northern part of Nigeria (Chuma-Okoro, 2011). More

fundamentally, the Nigerian state is yet to deal with the demand factors of SALW proliferation preferring

to dwell on the symptoms rather than the root causes.

 The demand factors are the root causes of SALW proliferation, because if there is no demand

there will be no supply. Nigeria is the source, transit and destination of SALW, and therefore the demand

factors include mass unemployment, poverty, corruption, excessive militarization, failure of political

leadership, misgovernance, bad leadership, poor governance, state violence, among others. There is

indeed excess politicization, state-sponsored violence and state proliferation of SALW leading to political

violence, electoral violence and other forms of violence. For example, virtually all the law enforcement or

security agencies are allowed to carry arms with exemption of few that are even lobbying to be allowed to

carry weapons, thus militarizing the society more. In fact, the Nigerian state was not been able to deal

with these demand factors, because dealing with it means dealing with itself or starting by reforming

itself.

The political class in their struggle or contest for political power has sacrificed everything in the

name of politics including suppressing class consciousness and promoting ethno-religious consciousness.

The promotion of ethnic and religious consciousness at the expense of class consciousness has resulted to

the increasing demand of SALW for executing ethno-religious violence, election and political violence,

communal wars, sectarian violence, etc. The unemployed and ignorant youths have been a willing tool in

this intense struggle for state power. No doubt colonialism and many years of military rule contributed to

the excessive militarization of the Nigerian society and intensive political contest for the soul of the

Nigerian state resulting to the rising demand factors for SALW.

So it is actually a product and a combination of many years of political leadership failure tilting

the Nigerian state towards the status of a failed state. A state that is not able to deal with matters or issues

of political corruption, poverty, mass unemployment and economic hardship leading to increasing

demand for SALW (Okafor, Okeke and Aniche, 2012). Thus, the inability of the Nigerian state to deal

with the demand factors of SALW heightens proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in

Nigeria, particularly the northern part of the country. As an indication of this militarization of the
Nigerian society, the oil companies are allowed to operate private security outfits. Private security outfits,

bodyguards, vigilante and thugs have proliferated over the years (Nte, 2011).

4.7.7 Poor Border Management in Nigeria

Nigeria shares international boundaries with four countries namely: Benin, Niger, Chad and

Cameroon (Asiwaju,1993). The total length of these boundaries is about 4500km and is spread over

different terrain and vegetation (Prescott, 1987). The Atlantic seaboard fails within the South East of the

border. It constitutes a coast line of 415 nautical miles with a territorial limit of 12 nautical miles and

Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles. The limits fall within Article 3 of the United

Nations Organization Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the breadth of territorial seas of

every state. The problem of smuggling, human trafficking and coastal piracy has brought new security

dimensions. The coastal area is characterized by swamps, mangrove forests and non navigable waterways.

The Nigeria-Benin boundary stretches over thick forest and wooded savannah; while Nigeria-Niger

boundary covers vast open land and desert in the north. The Nigeria-Chad boundary is mainly in the Lake

basin; while Nigeria-Cameroon boundary also covers forest, rugged and mountainous areas in the north

and swampy region in the south (Asiwaju, 1993). Arising from the foregoing is that Nigeria has about

1,475 official border points and 975 unofficial border points which are largely unmanned due to

inadequate staff strength of the relevant agencies (Alabi, 2013). Indeed Alabi asserts that

…..if you look ay the issue of porous borders too, the

borders are very wide even though they are demarcated,
they are not properly manned, most of the countries in
sub-Saharan Africa they don‟t have enough manpower
or security personnel to man these borders, they don‟t
have enough infrastructure like security apparatus,
security infrastructure like satellite unarmed aerial
vehicles, drones and the rest of them to really patrol and
check the movement of people who carry illegal arms….
 Furthermore the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS) states that between Damaturu and

Maiduguri, there are about 250 foot paths leading in and out of the country (Nigerian Immigration

Service, in NTA News International, March, 2014). These entry points are not adequately controlled

(Eyam-Ozung, 2012). This makes it easy for foreigners and prohibited goods to move easily across the

borders.

The northern borders are relatively porous and easy to cross while the coastal border has very

difficult terrain with swampy and mangrove conditions and numerous crisis-crossing creeks. The porosity

of the northern borders makes it difficult for security agents to effectively check movements across these

borders (Akpan, 2013). The creeks in the south provide easy hideouts and escape routes for smugglers,

pirates and other undesirable elements (Adejuyigbe,1989).

Another feature of the borders relates to the ethno-cultural linkages between the inhabitants on

both sides of the borders. A number of Nigeria‘s major cultural groups, including the Hausa/Fulani, the

Yoruba, the Kanuri, the Ejagham, are among the list of bi-nationally partitioned culture areas (NBC,

2003). Thus, virtually every ethnic group found on one side of the border is duplicated on the other side.

The result is that there is frequent movement across Nigeria‘s international boundaries irrespective of

official attitudes on both sides.

There is therefore a basic contradiction between the official perception of the international

boundaries and the perception of the local inhabitants. While the sovereign authorities are keen on

implementing the exclusive functions of these international boundaries, a number of factors, including the

necessities of daily life, the dynamics of other ethno-cultural relations and their mutual economic

dependence, tend to compel the local inhabitants to ignore the existence of the international boundaries.

This feature has helped to promote integrative activities between inhabitants on both sides of the borders.

The presence of a number of identical festivals and other cultural activities, some of which are jointly
celebrated by the affected inhabitants on both sides of the borders, have their salutary effect on border

relations by helping to cement harmonious relationships between border communities (Asiwaju, 1993).

The inhabitants of both Nigeria and the neighbouring countries engage themselves in the same

economic activities such as agriculture, fishing and a host of others. This makes the economy of these

border communities more competitive than complementary (National Concord, May, 5, 1983). The

settlement pattern of border communities is relatively smaller and less sophisticated in nature than what

obtains in the hinterlands of the respective states. In terms of amenities, the border regions are mainly

neglected areas of their respective countries by virtue of their location at the peripheries of the countries.

However, when this issue of relative neglect is examined in comparative terms between Nigeria and its

neighbours, the problem seems more acute on the Nigerian side.

Perhaps the most important feature of Nigeria‘s borders is the non demarcation of some sections

of the international boundary. Even where the borders have been demarcated, some of the boundary

markers are missing and difficult to replace because of the lack of proper survey (Asiwaju, 1993). The

border areas that are particularly affected include part of the western border with the Republic of Benin,

the marine border with Chad and the southern part of the eastern border with Cameroon. These are also

the border areas where there have been incursions, skirmishes and clashes between border inhabitants

and/or security personnel operating on both sides of the borders (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989).

This nature of Nigeria‘s borders facilitates the influx of illegal items like live weapons and illegal

aliens. In fact Akpan (2013) notes that AK 47 riffles which cost over N700, 000 and are not readily

accessible are so common in the north eastern part of Nigeria especially Maiduguri where they are sold

for as low as N18,000. Similarly it was confirmed that the Boko Haram sect draws members from other

coutries like Chad and Niger, they easily find their way into Nigeria and wreck havoc unchallenged. This

in Akpan‘s view is as a result of the poor management of Nigeria‘s border with the republic of Chad

through which weapons and illegal aliens are transported into Nigeria. Similarly Olomojobi (2012)
posited that since most Boko Haram‘s strategic posts are located close to border towns and villages, it is

easy for foreign nationals of Chad, Smalia and Sudan to come in and go out of Nigeria at will.

4.7.8 Clash of Civilization

The Boko Haram ideological mission is primarily to overthrow the Nigerian state with its western

values and then impose strict Islamic law in the entire country (Olomojobi, 2013). This is a violent

reaction against the Nigerian state with its western attributes. Olomojobi maintains that the scenario

presents an obvious clash of civilizations i.e a clash between Islamic values and Western values.

Deducing from Huntington (2006), it is assrted that the efforts of the West to promote its values of

democracy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military predominance and to advance its

economic interest will generate counter responses. This study opines that the rise of the Boko Haram

insurgency with its attendant violent disposition to Western values, is a counter response to Western

civilization that is fast eclipsing if not eclipsed other civilizations such as Islamic civilization.

Therefore the emergence and philosophy of the Boko Haram sect can better be appreciated within

the context of the Clash of Civilization thesis as posited by Samuel P. Huntington. He stated that people‘s

cultural and religious identities will be a major source of conflicts in the Post Cold War era (Huntington,

2006). Therefore Boko Haram‘s rejection of the current political arrangement in Nigeria as currently

constituted and its insistence on the implementation of full Sharia in Nigeria is therefore a remote factor

in the outbreak and sustenance of the Boko Haram insurgency.

4.8 Immediate Causes of the Boko Haram Crisis

Having examined the remote causes of the insurgency, more analysis will now be made on the

immediate factors which sparked off the Boko Haram insurgency. The immediate causes of the crisis are

as identified and discussed as follows.

4.8.1 The Setting up of Special Military JTF Code Named Operation Flush

These can be illustrated with developments in Borno state which resulted in the open

confrontation between the state and the Boko Haram sect. Though presented as religious, the basic

message of the sect was more political (Mohammed, 2012). Their principle was the rejection of

secularism, liberal democracy, partisan politics, corruption and bad governance all of which are

associated with westernization and western education. In their position, the government of Ali Modu

Sheriff with the flawed elections that brought it to power, corruption, rot in governance and the palpable

wealth of the elite in the mist of abject poverty and penury resonated with Mohammed Yusuf‘s followers

and this angered the state governor (Mohammed, 2012). The Governor took these attacks as personal and

deployed the state security named ―Operation Flush II‖ and resources to counter the challenge. This was

the beginning of the militarization of the Boko Haram sect.

Mohammed Yusuf was reported to have perceived the Special Military–Police Task Force code

named ―Operation Flush II‖ as specifically aimed at harassing and intimidating him and his followers.

This according to Mohammed (2012) was confirmed by the state Governor Ali Modu Sheriff in August

2009 when he said ―For this Mohammed Yusuf and his crowd, I set up ‗Operation Flush‘ to make sure

that there is law and order‖ (Leadership, 8, August, 2009 cited in Mohammed, 2012). Therefore

confrontation between an arrogant Governor armed with power and a fiery Cleric intoxicated with his

new found fame and influence with a large following was inevitable. This combination did not provide

much room for dialogue and peaceful resolution.

4.8.2 Implementation of the National Policy on Crash Helmets

At the beginning of 2009, the federal government introduced a new policy regarding the use of

crash helmets and the governor of Borno state instructed the police to enforce the policy as part of

―Operation Flushout‖, yet this was coordinated with brutality and led to a lot of people being harmed

(Murtala, 2013). During this period, the Boko Haram sect was involved in a clash with officials of the
Operation Flush 2 leading to the shooting of seventeen (17) of their members. The sect members were

reported to be on their way to bury four (4) of their members who died a day earlier in an auto accident on

the Biu road while returning from their preaching or Dawah, when members of the joint security outfit

accosted them for not wearing crash helmets. In the ensuing confrontation a member of the security outfit

opened fire and injured some members of the sect including passers-by (Abubakar, 2009). As a matter of

fact Mohammed (2012) asserted that the restriction of movement of motor cycles at night and the attempt

at enforcing the use of crash helmets were all aimed at drawing the sect out for a fight. This mandatory

use of crash helmets by motor cycle riders though a national policy, was not enforced in other places with

the same zeal. In fact it was said to have been stopped once the Boko Haram sect was ―defeated‖ in 2009

(Mohammed, 2012).

This incident had inflicted a deep wound in the heart of the sect leader Mohammed Yusuf who

vowed that the security outfit had ―murdered sleep‖ as they would avenge the shooting at the appropriate

time. According to him, ―it is unacceptable for policemen to shoot 17 unarmed people who are their way

to a funeral. No, we must act, but when and how, we shall not tell anyone‖. (Abubakar, 2009). He

consequently wrote ―An Open Letter to the FederalGovernment‖ in which he threatened the government

and urged them to respond within 40 days with the view to a resolution between the government and his

group and if not then ―jihadi operations will begin in the country which only Allah will be able to stop‖

(Murtala, 2013). The 40 days ultimatum ran out and after that the group did little except for its leaders

preparing strategies for war. In the meantime members of the group awaited the fatwa from their leaders

which would permit them to wage war. Their movements, sermons and lectutres were all focused on

getting ready for a confrontation.

4.8.3 The Extra Judicial Killing of Mohammed Yusuf and Consequent Radicalization of Sect

Members

Similarly triggering the current rage from the Boko-Haram is the extra-judicial killing of the

sect‘s leader Mohammed Yusuf and Buji Fwoi in July 2009 by the Nigerian Police in Borno state thereby

radicalizing the sect‘s members. Those who fled either went for further military training or went into

hiding without denouncing their beliefs. This extra judicial killings and the widespread dissemination of

the videos locally and its broadcast by the Aljazeera cable satellite network, youtube and other social

media networks on the internet further enraged members (Mohammed, 2012). These tapes incensed the

sensibility of the general public and attracted the attention of human rights groups in Nigeria. The

Aljazeera publication of the incident so embarrassed the Nigerian state that they had to send a delegation

to apologize to the United Nationss (UN)for the extrajudicial killings (Mohammed, 2012). No one

thought it expedient to do same to Nigerians especially those affected.

This is because prior to his public execution, the activities of the sect were limited to Borno and

Yobe states in Northeastern Nigeria. The extra-judicial murder of Yusuf reflects the character of the

Nigerian state and its interpretation of conflict and dissent which have always informed its responses to

such. Historically and characteristically, the patterns of responses to Islamism in Nigeria have always

relied on the use of force through the agency of the police and army in most instances which is also

similar to the way critical segments of the press which bears no physical arms have also been treated

under military and democratic dispensations.

As an observed trend of response to dissents and cognizant of the fact that radical Islamism is a

form of terrorism, this observed trend typifies the responses of the Nigerian state to dissent and radical

Islamism as legitimist. The legitmist perspective of the use of violence posits that only the state has the

right or monopoly of violence while its use by any other agency is illegal and illegitimate (African

Security Review, 2012). Therefore, the use of violence by any other group is considered a threat to the
legitimacy and sovereignty of the state. Paradoxically, the use of military and legal means to deal with

terrorism strengthens the power of the state but can simultaneously precipitate terrorism, which makes

state terrorism vital for its existence based on the generally held view of terrorism (African Security

Review, 2012). This view enables states to pursue hidden agenda such as demonization of political

opponents and criminalization of dissents. A drawback in the orthodox interpretation of terrorism is that it

avoids a ―root-cause‖ approach in resolving the question of terrorism opting to manage it in

order to sustain tight political control and justify huge spending in the name of ―terrorism management‖

(African Security Review, 2012).

4.9 Boko Haram Global Dimensions

The Boko Haram insurgency has proven to be gradually assuming global dimensions in view of

recent developments. The following discussions are instances to indicate that the Boko Haram crisis has

assumed international dimensions.

The Boko Haram is the prominent terrorist organization and it has been confirmed to have

affiliation with AQIM (Dorell, 2012, Forest, 2012). This can be made clear by the fact that in 2003,

Osama bin Laden indicated that Nigeria was one of several countries ―ready for liberation.‖ In fact

the International Crisis Group (2014: 23) reported that:

between 2000 and 2002 Osama bin Laden issued two

audio messages calling on Nigerian Muslims to wage
jihad and establish an Islamic state. His interest dated
from his 1992-1996 stay in Sudan, where he reportedly
met Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian from Maiduguri
studying at the Islamic University in Khartoum who
became his disciple and trained in Afghanistan……, Bin
Laden asked him to organise a cell in Nigeria with a 300
million naira budget (approximately $3 million in 2000).
Ali returned home in 2002 and began funding religious
activities of Salafi groups that were unaware of the
plan.
 Mohammed Yusuf and his group allegedly were the
major beneficiaries.

Forest (2012) suggested that al-Qaeda would certainly welcome the establishment of an affiliate

group in Nigeria. The group re-emerged in 2012 with ties to AQ through AQIM and has carried out series

of terrorist attacks which has impacted negatively on Nigeria‘s security. The group has over the past 2

years improved their ties with AQ especially for funding, training and logistics. This growing ties with

AQ has increased the intensity of Boko Haram operations with devastating effects on national security in

Nigeria.

While other terrorist organizations like the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Somali Al-

Qaeda affiliate al shabaab have been linked to Boko Haram, AQIM in 2010 made an overture to the Boko

Haram; “We are ready to train your children to use weapons and will supply them with all we can,

including support and men, weapons, ammunitions and equipment, in order to defend our people in

Nigeria and respond against the aggression of the Christian minority” (Gourley, 2012). This was

subsequently reciprocated on October 2, 2010 when Muhammed Abu Bakr bin Muhammed al-Shakwa

pledged ―bayaat‖ to Droukdel creating an indirect oath of loyalty to Al-Qaeda Central (Gourley, 2012). A

synergy between the Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram does not augur well for Nigeria‘s national security, it is

what Gourley (2012) described as a deadly synergy. In addition to the above On 24 November, 2012 a

purported spokesman for Boko Haram, Abul Qaqa, stated: ―It is true that we have links with al-Qaeda.

They assist us and we assist them.‖ (Forest, 2012).

Furthermore as early as 2003, the first mujahideen fighters of Boko Haram called themselves

―Taliban‖ even though it was not confirmed if they had any operational link with Afghanistan. Since then

however, some of them have made references to other jihadist battlefronts like Somalia. The main change

came in 2011 when they started resorting to suicide attacks after the model of Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon and

Palestine (Marc-Antoine, 2014). This is indeed a real novelty in Nigeria, a country where non-Muslim
groups also used terrorist techniques and bombs against the military regime in the 1990s, but no suicide

bombings.

Since the Boko Haram sect staged a come back in 2010, Boko Haram expanded its terrorist

attacks in Nigeria to include international targets, such as the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja in

August 2011. The group also made significant leaps in its operational capability, and there are indications

that members of the group have received weapons and training in bomb-making and other terrorist tactics

from al-Qaeda affiliates in the north and/or east of the continent.

In November 2011, the U.S. Department of State issued an alert for all U.S. and Western citizens

in Abuja to avoid major hotels and landmarks, based on information about a potential Boko Haram attack.

Another report by the U.S. House of Representatives expressed concerns about Boko Haram attacks

against the aviation and energy sectors as well (Forest, 2012).

To further confirm the international dimension of the Boko Haram insurgency the U.S.

Department of Defense in 2012 provided more than $8 million to Nigeria for the development of a

counterterrorism infantry unit. According to Lieutenant General Azubuike Ihejirika, the former Army

Chief of Staff, the United States, France, Pakistan, and Britain have also offered to assist with

counterterrorism training (Forest, 2012). Similarly on June 21, 2012, the United States government

labeled Boko Haram leaders; Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kambar and Khalid al- Badawi global

terrorists. They were specifically designated global terrorists under section 1 (b) of Executive Order

13224. The statement also stated the designation under 13224 blocks all of Shekau‘s, Kambar‘s and al-

Badawi‘s property interests subject to US jurisdiction and prohibits US persons from engaging in

transactions with or for the benefits of these individuals.

Furthermore the international dimension of Boko Haram is not a new phenomenon if one

considers the history of Islamic protest in northern Nigeria. All the main Sufi brotherhoods had a foreign

origin, while the Izala followed the model of Saudi Arabia, the yan schi‟a of Ibrahim el-Zakzaky looked
at Iran, and the leader of the Maitatsine, Muhammad Marwa, hailed from Cameroon and the Boko Haram

sect members received training from Al-Qaeda affiliates in Somalia, Niger, Chad etc. The real novelty of

the sect in Nigeria therefore is to resort to suicide attacks and terrorist techniques that follow a global

jihadist model. Evidence also shows that the Late Mohammed Yusuf is originally a citizen of Niger

republic (Albani, 2010) and Abubakar Shekau is also a native of Niger republic (Alabi, 2013).

4.9.1 The Chadian/ French Connection

Among the factors connected to the international dimension of the crisis is the

Chadian/French suspected involvement. Oil reserves exist in the Chad basin, which is located in

Lake Chad and is surrounded by Niger, Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. Chad is an exporter of oil

which runs in 1070 km pipelines through Cameroon. Nigeria‘s exploration of oil from the Basin

which extends through Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states have been hindered by Boko Haram

insurgency which deliberately hampers commercial exploration. Oil has been discovered in Lake

Chad but domestic insurgency continues to push forward the mission of Nigeria to start drilling

for commercial quantities.

The various technical personnel who provided support services for exploration activities

have left the region from fear of being killed, while geologists in the Nigerian National

Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), also shunned the volatile Basin in Borno State for fear of losing

their lives. According The Vanguard Newspaper (11, September, 2014) ―Hopes of stepping up

oil exploration in Nigeria‘s Lake Chad Basin have been dashed by the brutal attacks of Islamic

Boko Haram and the Ansaru sect terrorists in the country‘s northeastern region‖.

Between 2011 and 2013 the Nigerian government provided $240 million to facilitate oil

and gas exploration activities in the Lake Chad Basin and other northern hydrocarbon basins,
including the Benue Trough, Bida Basin and the Sokoto-Rima Basin in northern Nigeria (The

Vanguard Newspaper 11, September, 2014). According to Vice President Sambo prospecting in

the Lake Chad Basin was ―yielding promising results and may lead to commercial exploration

of oil and gas this year,‖ (The Weekly Trust, July 13, 2013). Three blocks were identified for

potential oil and gas exploration, and hopes were to begin exploration work by fourth quarter of

2013 or first quarter of 2014.

The Boko Haram insurgency is noted to have conveniently provided Chad, under the

government of Idriss Derby, unfettered access to oil under Nigeria‘s soils through 3D oil drilling

from within its territorial borders, which the country exports. The neighboring Francophone

colonies of France, Chad, Cameroon and Niger without compensating Nigeria are now drilling

off and selling significant quantities of Nigeria‘s oil under partnerships with

multinationals. Furthermore with the Hague Ruling in favour of Cameroon and the handing over

of the Bakassi peninsula, the same way, Cameroon is drilling oil flowing out of Nigeria‘s Gulf of

Guinea, safely from its territory. The Hague ruling favored these foreign investors and French -

Cameroon partners.

Big players have abandoned Nigeria and invested heavily in its neighbors. Billions of

dollars have been invested by multinationals in the Lake Chad exploration in Chad and this oil is

tapped through Chad. The over 2 billion oil reserves are flowing through the Chad-Cameroon

pipeline (soon to extend to Niger), leaving terror bedeviled Nigeria out of the loop. Currently, oil

from Lake Chad being drilled by the Republic of Chad is transferred to a stationary Floating,

Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel which can store over 2 million barrels of
oil and processed oil shipped through tankers to the international refineries at the Port of Le

Havre in France (Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

It goes without saying therefore that France benefits largely from the Boko Haram terror

crises in Nigeria‘s northeastern states that hamper Nigeria‘s exploration of the linked reserves

from within its territory.

Suspected terror sponsor, Ali Modu Sheriff is thoroughly invested in Chad‘s oil and gas

industry. He is a benefactor of the tapping of reserves from Nigeria through Chad drilling. The

recent urgent trip by him and Nigeria‘s President after he was named a Boko Haram sponsor by

President Jonathan‘s terror negotiator, Australian Doctor Stephen Davis is believed to have

been necessitated to restore investor confidence in Chad and assure the Chadian partners in

tapping of oil from the common basins that all is well, Nigeria‘s President will stand by Sheriff

and protect their common investments in that industry and country. Former President Olusegun

Obasanjo and the current President are both said to have been introduced to the lucrative

investments in Chad by Senator Modu Sheriff (Brimah, 2013).

 CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of data obtained in the field on the response of the Nigerian

state to the Boko Haram insurgency. Data sources are questionnaires and in depth interviews. These

sources are combined as highlights of interviews with prominent persons used to complement the

opinions of respondents in the questionnaires. Therefore this analysis is focused on the objectives of the

study. Two thousand (2000) questionnaires were administered in the study areas comprising Kaduna,

Kano, Bauchi, Yobe and Borno states. For the purpose of this chapter, the analysis was based on one

thousand and thirty eight (1,038) questionnaires which were duly filled and returned out of the two

thousand (2000) sent out andwhich constitute 51.9 % of the total number.

5.2 Presentation and Analysis of Data

This section presents the opinions of the generality of Nigerians as sampled from questionnaires

and structured interviews.

Fig. 5.1 Sex of Respondents

Male
Female
 The information presented above shows a wide gap between the male and female respondents.

This may be explained by the nature of the topic which is sensitive and capable of instilling fear and

suspicion, hence the females may not be bold enough to speak out. It may further be explained by the fact

that the places visited have more males in the public sphere than females.

Fig. 5.2 Educational Qualification of Respondents

WASSC/SSC
OND/NCE
Defree/HND
Masters and Above
Others

While it can be said that respondents have attained some level of education, those with degrees

and higher degrees dominate. This may be as a result of the locations where the researcher went to

administer questionnaires i.e civil service and private sector organizations where some level of education

is a prerequisite for employment. There were no respondents with other qualification other than those

provided.
Fig. 5.3: Occupation of Respondents

Student
Security Agent
Civil Servant
Teacher/Lecturer

The figure above indicates that Civil Servants had the highest representation while the students

came out with the least. It can also be said that the respondents are drawn from the adult population of the

study area. The respondents are furthermore drawn from segments of the population which are informed

and can give relevant information.

Fig. 5.4: Respondents’ Awareness of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Yes
No
No response
 Figure 5.4 above reveals an overwhelming respondents‘ awareness of the Boko Haram

insurgency in Northern Nigeria. Though a tiny percentage claim to be ignorant of it, while another minute

percentage did not respond, the fact remains that the magnitude and dimension of the insurgency makes it

inevitable for all and sundry in Nigeria to be aware of the crisis. Being aware of the crisis also means they

are better informed to give objective views.

Figure 5.5: Respondents’ Opinion on the Causes of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Failure of intelligence
Religious intolerance
Rise of fundamentalism
Poverty and unemployment
Failure of governance
All of the above

Analysts and commentators as well as media practitioners in Nigeria have advanced various

factors as causes of the Boko Haram insurgency. However the information in the table above indicates

that poverty and unemployment has the highest rating. This is not to argue that other factors like failure of

intelligence, religious intolerance, rise of fundamentalism and failure of governance, have no part to play

in the insurgency. It is asserted therefore that the Nigerian socio-economic and political environment is

characterized by factors which are capable of breeding violence of this nature.

Albaniy (2010) posits that the Boko Haram crisis is a manifestation of the poverty,

unemployment, and frustration among youths in the North east. They are therefore quick to identify with

anyone who holds any ideology that is pitched against the state which they perceive as the cause of their
misery. He also revealed that the late Mohammed Yusuf had the financial backing of some elites in Niger

state who were determined to present Islam as a violent religion and to set Muslims against themselves.

Similarly Ladan (2012) maintains that unemployment is a crucial factor to consider in the Boko

Haram insurgency. According to him:

In 2011, we had 12.4 million youths, educated. You call

Boko Haram and all these militia, call them illiterates,
fine. But go back to National Bureau of Statistics, this is
a government agency in collaboration with CBN and
National Planning Commission, these are all 3 most
authoritative government agencies. They said 12.4
million youths were unemployed as at 2011 December
reported in the first quarter of 2012. A year later, that
figure had actually risen from 12.4 million to 14.7
million youths, educated youths, graduates of secondary,
polytechnics up to university. They condemn Boko
Haram they said they are illiterates that is why they
resort to violence, what of this group, 14.7 million. In
any country where you allow 14.7 million educated
youths, secondary schools to university graduates
roaming about the streets useless, hopeless, frustrated,
they are easy recruits for any acts of terrorism for any
terrorist organization or group of individuals that want
to pursue their selfish objectives, easy made recruits
very available.

Sani (2012) also opined that poverty in the north accounts for the Boko Haram crisis. In addition

to that Mohammed (2013) opined that abject poverty, employment, ignorance and a fast declining living

condition are drvvers of violence of this nature. According to him in Nigeria and specifically north

eastern-Nigeria where according to the Human Development Index released by the UN, the North East is

about the poorest. Therefore the conditions for insurgency, the conditions for violence, have always

existed in Nigeria. For Mohammed Abdulkadir (2013) the crisis stems from the unfortunate fact that some

people especially in the Northeastern part of the nation feel dissatisfied with the system i.e. they feel the

system has not been fair to them in view of the plethora of acts of corruption and injustice prevalent in the
society today and so they decided to take up arms and fight the system. Abdulkadir further noted that the

crisis can be said to be state induced. To him a factor which lends credence to the fact that the crisis is

state induced is what hedescribed as the ―use and dump syndrome‖ of the Nigerian political elites

especially those of the northeastern region. Most of the members of the Boko Haram sect were once in the

employment of some of these elites who dumped them after achieving their political goals of winning

elections. The youths consequently feeling used and dumped have therefore come out to demand for

compensation hence the current insurgency. Furthermore Mohammed (2013) maintains that the Boko

Haram crisis is a state induced crisis. In his view this becomes really evident if one considers the

negligence of various security reports submitted by appropriate security agencies prior to the outbreak of

the violence.

However in a unique position Okene (2013) blamed the crisis on the contemporary Nigerian

society. According to him

….About 50 years ago a Muslim knows he is a Muslim,

the Christians know they are Christians, the Muslims
are not told the Christian is bad, no, the Christian is not
told the Muslim is a bad person, no but in our own age
group today, the Muslim is growing up and he is told
even another Muslim is bad, the way he is worshiping is
bad, he is told the Christian is bad, don‟t eat his food,
he is told that. Then how does he grow up? At our time
what borders is that you grow up to know that telling
lies is bad, stealing is bad, fornication is bad, its not
issues of dress, its issues of the mind but today its not
like that. And where does the government come in, the
government saw the proliferation of people preaching
hate instead of love and as a government that is
supposed to maintain in peace, they kept quiet. A stitch
in time saves nine. So these boys that are Boko Haram
today, really we owe them apologies for wasting
resources that are supposed to useful and turning them
into weapons of destruction instead of instruments of
development. Because these boys were told as they were
growing up, don‟t pray like these other Muslims are
praying, pray like this because these other Muslims
are
 wrong so you see they are told face that way, or these
Christians are not a good group of people. Where does
Boko Haram come into being in Hausaland today? Its in
this place you have young boys who are faced with
uncertainties, you have gambling, you have corrupt
officers all over the country, you have people who
divorce any how, you have young girls who are harlots,
who are prostitutes, you have big people in government
who take the millions to give to their girl friends, the
religious scholars both Muslims and Christians who are
seeing these wrongs in the society but nobody is paying
attention, what is taking their attention is what would
make them popular….

Therefore the issues of poverty and unemployment, religious intolerance, rise of fundamentalism,

bad governace etc are all encapsulated in the contemporary character of the Nigerian state and are said to

be stimulants for rebellion. It is also posited that the enabling environment for the insurgency has long

been existing and the Nigerian state did not deem it necessary to address the socio-economic and political

factors which created the enabling environmrnt.

The respondents were therefore asked to indicate reason(s) for their response above. It was

pointed out that religious fundamentalism is already on the increase in the Northern part of the country

due to the dwindling socio-economic conditions of the people, hence the identification of fundamentalism

as a cause of the insurgency.

Those who indicated poverty and unemployment noted that there is palpable poverty, lack and

squalor in Nigeria and these are capable of pushing individuals into criminal or anti-social activities

especially when one considers the flaunting of wealth by the elites in the society. The resulting frustration

is therefore an issue here. Furthermore poverty is capable of making an individual susceptible to being

brainwashed into doing what he or she would not do under normal circumstances.
 Those who view the crisis from the perspective of failure of governance opined that successive

governments in Nigeria have not been able to live up to their campaign promises or their constitutional

obligations to their citizens hence the anger and frustration that occurs in the people as a result of this.

Furthermore government is noted to have failed to nip the crisis in the bud right from its infancy to avert

what the country is going through now.

Another factor which was identified under failure of leadership is the incapacity of the

government to appropriately secure the nations borders. The porous nature of the borders therefore

facilitates the entry of illegal goods and individuals which further aggravates the already tensed

atmosphere in Nigeria. Still under failure of governance it was pointed out that the increasing gap

between the government and the governed and the consequent breakdown of law and order accounts for

the failure of leadership and why insurgency crops up.

Failure of governance was also viewed in the light of corruption and poor leadership. The

insurgency therefore is a reaction of the poor, hungry and frustrated and socio-economically excluded

members of society and a feed back to the society, a feedback of what the society has produced.

Among those who identified religious intolerance it was pointed out that intolerance accounts for

violence among adherents of the two major faiths. This is because in tolerance breeds hatred and

suspicion and at the slightest provocation, people can take up arms against each other. This intolerance

therefore accounts for adherents of one religion viewing others as inferior and deserves nothing but to be

rejected.

Under religious intolerance there were views that the crisis emanates from intolerance because of

the misinterpretation of the tenets of Islam by the adherents and failure of the religious leadership to be

able to get them to retrace their steps.

Having said so, it may be added that there are respondents who maintained that all the above

factors combine to account for the crisis. This assertion has been explained by the fact that Nigerian
socio-economic and political environment is characterized by all of these factors and they are palpable

even to the illiterate members of the population.

Figure 5.6: Respondents’ Description of the Boko Haram Insurgency

Justifiable
Not justifiable
Indifferent

The Boko Haram insurgency has attracted various opinions from members of the Nigeria public.

While there are those who agree with the insurgents, others do not. As for the respondents, majority view

the insurgency as not being justifiable, while the minority condone the insurgency. However an equally

significant proportion of the respondents i.e 29.6 % were in different. Those who were in different may

have been scared to state their views being a controversial and sensitive issue. Those who indicated their

views may have been convinced that this is purely an academic endeavour which guarantees respondents

security and confidentiality. In his view concerning the justification or otherwise for the Boko Haram

insurgency, Mohammed (2013) asserted that:

 …..definitely Boko Haram has a grievance and definitely
it is the Nigerian state that gourded them into a fight
and it was the Nigerian state that definitely was the
number one culprit in the smashing of Boko Haram, the
extra judicial killing especially of their leadership which
was shown on Aljazeera, which was on the social media
where they just pack people up and line them and shoot
them on the street, which is really barbaric. So to that
extent, yes they (Boko Haram) have a case but they also
have killed people extra judicially. So, two wrongs will
definitely not make a right. The Nigerian State was bad,
it is just like the Boko Haram is also responding to the
barbarism of the Nigerian State with more barbarism.
They have killed innocent Nigerians, Muslims and
Christians, they have killed people in their places of
worship who are not party to the crisis. So yes, there is a
case, they have a case against the Nigerian state but
they also killed innocent people.

Tukur Mamu (2013) is of the opinion that the sect‘s grievances are justifiable to a very large

extent mainly due to the way the Nigerian state has responded to the sect‘s demands. To him if the most

powerful country in the world i.e the US is now realizing the futility of combating terrorism with more

violence how much less Nigeria?

Having been asked to state reasons for their responses in table 5.2.6 above, it was opined that the

insurgency is justifiable to the extent that it is simply a reaction to the state‘s un responsiveness and

insensitivity to the plight of the down trodden and excluded segments of the nation‘s population. The

Boko Haram insurgency has been described as a monster which was created and sustained by the state in

Nigeria and so it‘s on going campaign against the state is a necessary outcome of the state‘s refusal to

address the crisis from its embryonic state.

Furthermore respondents justified the Boko Haram insurgency on the ground that the open

display of opulence and wealth obviously acquired through corrupt and illegitimate means is enough to

push people into acts of rebellion against the state. Therefore the display of ill gotten wealth in the mist of
prevalent poverty especially in the North is said to be reason enough to spur insurgent groups to acts of

incipient lawlessness.

Respondents also noted that the way the state has responded to similar uprisings in the past makes

the state culpable. The Nigerian state was accused of not properly managing conflicts and crisis in Nigeria

in the past hence the monstrous nature of the on going insurgency. The foregoing implies that those who

justified the Boko Haram insurgency did so not on ethno-religious grounds but on the ground that the

state has not put in place or initiated mechanisms to nip rebellions in the bud.

On the other side of the divide are the majority of respondents who described the Boko Haram

insurgency as not justifiable. Reasons advanced for this include the fact that no matter the level of

provocation, taking innocent lives or attacking innocent people and their properties, is not justifiable

anywhere or under any circumstances. Respondents similarly noted that no religion encourages, permits

or condones the killing of innocent people for religious reasons or on grounds that they are infidels or

unbelievers.

Furthermore, respondents condemned the Boko Haram insurgency on the grounds that the attacks

on innocent people should have been directed at those in positions of leadership i.e those who actually

created the problem. As far as respondents are concerned the indiscriminate attacks on the poor and

defenseless people reveals a faulty perception of the Nigerian situation by the insurgents. On the issue

which borders on why the Boko Haram sect has been engaging in wanton destruction of lives through

coordinated attacks on the innocent, Sani (2012) has asserted that the aim is to cause chaos in the country

thereby giving them a basis to carry out their major objective which is the islamization of Nigeria.

Furthermore Forest (2012) in agreement with this position noted that the attacks against churches from

December 2011 through February 2012 by the sect implies a calculated attempt or strategy of

provocation, through which the sect seeks to ―spark off a large scale sectarian conflict‖ that will

destabilize the country. In a similar vein in the wake of the bomb attacks by the sect in Kano on 18
March, 2013 the Emir of Kano Alhaji Ado Bayero corroborated Sani‘s and Forest‘s positions by stating

that the perpetrators have an intention of sparking off a civil war in the country (People‘s Daily, March,

22, 2013).

Therefore respondents condemned the insurgency on the grounds that it is capable of polarizing

the society into hostile camps thereby negatively affecting the process of nation building in Nigeria.

Specifically it was pointed out that the consequent suspicion and hostility now emerging between

Christians and Muslims, Northerners and Southerners as a result of the insurgency is not a healthy

development for Nigeria‘s drive towards unity. Respondents therefore condemned the insurgency on the

grounds of the foregoing.

Another factor which respondents identified to condemn the insurgency is the fact that Nigeria is

a secular state and as such any attempt to impose a single religion (Sharia) on a multi religious or multi

ethnic state should not be condoned but outrightly condemned. The insistency by the Boko Haram sect for

an introduction of the Sharia in Nigeria was also described by respondents as unconstitutional and anti

people hence its condemnation. Mohammed (2013) insisted that the clamour for the implementation of

the Sharia is only a bargaining position as the sect members themselves do not have a blueprint for the

implementation of Sharia in Nigeria. According to him:

…….there is no way you can have a secular state, a

secular multi religious state like Nigeria and still insist
that it is going to the governed by the Sharia. One of two
things will happen, they will have to conquer Nigeria by
force, by military force then implement Sharia. Sharia
can only exist in a state dominated by Muslims
specifically by Islamists. So that is not possible in a
multi religious country like Nigeria. So for me the
Sharia is just a bargaining position. I am not sure they
really want Sharia, they want to present their case in
religious terms and if you have to present the Boko
Haram case in religious terms, you have to insist that
there has to be Sharia because that is the only difference
between Boko Haram and the rest of us…….So that is
the insistence on
 the Sharia. I am not sure they really want Sharia, they
are just looking for a bargaining position. Sharia means
they will now be the educated elites in a Sharia state so
they are going to replace all these western educated
elites with their own type of people. They are just
looking essentially for a revolution, a system of a
complete change of the federal structure to replace the
western with their type, with the Almajiri education
that‟s all……

Though the insurgency has been presented in religious terms i.e an attempt to rid the Nigerian

society of the evils of westernization, the modus operandi reveals a political undertone. Similarly while

establishing a relationship between the clamour for the implementation of Sharia and politics Baba-

Ahmed (2012) asserted that:

…..Pockets of frustrations survived the failure to

improve the manner Muslims lived under Islamic law in
Nigeria. In a region which had a long history of
turbulence around periodic efforts to expand the
scope of Islam into public and private lives, it was
logical that some of these frustrations will acquire
political outlets. In parts of Yobe and Borno States, and
in limited circles in Kano, and Kaduna and Sokoto,
resentment at the failure of the political process to
engineer the expansion of Islamic laws and processes in
the north became intensified. Politicians who had
cultivated intimate relationships with groups seeking
expansion of Sharia, or improvements in the quality of
governance through observance of transparent justice,
elimination of impunity and curtailing moral and
economic corruption became targets of hostility of
religious groups.

Therefore the insistence by the Boko Haram sect for an implementation of the Sharia is is only a

means of getting back at the politicians who encouraged and funded the sect from the beginning for the

purpose of actualizing their selfish political goals and dumping the sect thereafter having been voted into

public offices.
Figure 5.7: Respondents’ Awareness of the Federal Government’s Response to the Insurgency

Yes
No

Very few of the respondents i.e 12.7 % confessed not knowing the federal governments approach

to managing the Boko Haram insurgency. The fact that majority of the respondents i.e 87.2% are aware

indicates the gravity of the crisis and also the extent of awareness of the situation among the Nigerian

citizenry. Those who claimed ignorance may be unwilling to admit for security reasons.

Figure 5.8: Respondents’ Opinion on Federal Government’s Response to the Crisis

Force
Cannot and stick
Dialogue
Lobbying

Figure 5.8 above reveals that more respondents opine that the federal government has responded

more with violennce/force to the Boko Haram insurgency. The fact that more respondents view the
government‘s response in terms of violence means that more Nigerians view the response by the state in

the same light. This is however not to say that there are no dissenting views. There are still those who

believed that the government is adopting other strategies like the carrot and stick approach, dialogue and

lobbying. For Baba-Ahmed (2012) the approach adopted by the state has been one of violence, violence

because of the state‘s perception of the insurgency as primarily aimed at the Jonathan administration. He

noted that:

The Nigerian state has been consistent in its pursuit of a

singular strategy of fighting the insurgency by the
deployment of force and leaning hard on the community
to flush it out. Against a foe which has a variety of
tactics and targets, this strategy of the state has been
basically a failure. Attempts to engage the insurgency in
dialogue and negotiations failed because of insufficient
political will behind them, and the powerful influence of
security interests in determining state responses. A
political environment which has primarily defined the
insurgency as a resistance against the Jonathan
administration has also been a strong disincentive in
terms of engaging politicians in discussing options and
strategies.

Figure 5.9: Respondents’ Description of the Federal Government’s Response the Crisis

Satisfactory/Effective
Not satisfactory/Ineffective

There is a majority view that governments response to the insurgency has not been satisfactory

are effective. The respondents‘ views as presented in the table above can be corroborated with the popular
position in Nigeria today on the ineffectiveness of governments‘ response to the Boko Haram insurgency.

Furthermore despite governments‘ repeated promises of protecting lives and properties of Nigerians

against the Boko Haram sect‘s recurrent attacks, the sect has proven to be gaining the upper hand over the

security agencies. Moreover despite the huge budgetary allocation to the security sector, it appears that all

is money down the drain as the sect has become more daring and invincible. The foregoing is therefore

reason for the respondents assessment of government‘s response.

To lend credence to the above Sani (2012) asserts that:

……So but as a result of the use of force several cases of

human rights violations have been recorded which
involves arbitrary and disproportionate use of force,
massive arrests of people suspected of being members of
Boko Haram group, persecution of people who are
suspected to be members of Boko Haram group,
unauthorized, unlicensed and unapproved raiding of
homes, siege on communities and indiscriminate
application of force against innocent persons. So the use
of force or the use of military might or violence against
the Boko Haram group is the choice of the state to which
they felt such application of brutal force would reduce
the activities of the Boko Haram group to the barest
minimum or will be exterminated but that has not
worked……

However Abdulkadir (2013) is of the opinion that the strategy has been worth while. He argued

that:

Well in my opinion, that is an act of prevention and not

repression. By using the security agencies like the JTF,
the government is able to maintain the territorial
integrity of this country. You need to see what I saw in
my visit to Maiduguri, if not for that option the story of
Nigeria would have been a different one today. As far as
I am concerned that option has really worked in
favour of Nigeria so I would not say it is an act of
repression but an act of prevention. Prevention of what I
see as the disintegration of this country. If not for the
military option do you think Nigeria will be a
country today?
 Moreover terrorism is not an issue you can just wish
away or assume will end on its own. You need to fight it
and that is what the government is doing by setting
up the JTF in that part of the country and contrary to
some media reports, things are picking up in Maiduguri
and Yobe, life is returning to normal thanks to the
government of the day…..

To buttress the foregoing, Abdulkadir (2013) who accompanied the JTF to the Boko Haram

stronghold in Sambisa forest around the border between Nigeria and Chad stated that they found out that

the sect had attempted to set up a society of their own. They found that the sect had a bank of their own

where they conducted all their financial transactions, they had a hospital with qualified doctors and nurses

to treat their soldiers who got wounded in battle and to take deliveries for their women. They had

mechanics, vulcanizers and other artisans who helped to repair their vehicles and re configure stolen

vehicles to serve their operations. They had experts who made their Improvised Explosive Devices

(IEDs). According to Abdulkadir these professionals were conscripted from the civil populace and forced

to take oaths of allegiance to the Boko Haram cause. Abdulkadir also revealed that in the local

governments where they held sway i.e Baga, Bama etc, they sacked the executives, brought down the

Nigerian Flag and hoisted their own flag meaning that the Nigerian authority was not recognized by them

or that they were setting up a state within the state which is an act of treasonable felony calling for an act

of violence from the Nigerian state.

However President Goodluck Jonathan while receiving the report of the Presidential Committee

on Security Challenges in the Nortnh East Chaied by Minister of Special Duties Barrister Saminu Turaki

himself admitted the futility and irrelevance of the use of force to combat terrorism. His opinion is that

terrorism can only be quelled by peaceful means (NTA News at 9, November, 5, 2013). Having admitted

this the president would therefore be expected to initiate mechanisms to ensure the peaceful means.
 Therefore while some view the government‘s approach to the crisis with satisfaction many others

are not impressed with government‘s response to the insurgency. The intractable nature of the insurgency

and governmet‘s apparent incapability to end the insurgency attracts criticisms from the Nigerian

populace.

A reason advanced by respondents for the poor assessment of government response is the

speculation that the Boko Haram has infiltrated the government. Such dements are said to be the ones

frustrating governments plans and actions towards ending the insurgency. Indeed Akpan (2013) in an

active session demented that Boko Haram has loyalists even in the military. These loyalists usually give

members of the sect information about operations against them before hand hence the usual high causality

being suffered by the JTF during operation against the insurgents.

Furthermore, respondents gave governments response a poor rating because of the inadequate

number of military personnel in the flash point. The Boko Haram sect apparently always out number the

JTF hence the JTF‘s inability to amicably end the crisis. There are not enough personnel to man the

nation‘s border point hence the hence the recruitment of these and the flagrant entry and exist by foreign

nationals into the country for the purpose of wreaking havoc on the country.

The foregoing not withstanding, some respondents still maintained that governments‘ effort have

been effective in view of the fact that the insurgents activities have been greatly minimized in some areas.

Others maintained that the mere demonstration of the will to end the crisis is a plus on the part of

government.
Figure 5.10: Respondents’ Views on the Way Forward

Beefing up security agency

Proper border

management

Transparent, accountable
government
Dialogue

All of the

above Others

The foregoing options have been indicated as the way of ending the Boko Haram insurgency.

While majority of the respondents i.e have maintained that all of the listed strategies should be

adopted, opined that transparent and accountable governance is the best way out. It can be deduced that

respondents are convinced that either one or all of the provided options are what Nigeria state needs to do

to contain the Boko Haram insurgency. Similarly Ladan (2012), Mamu (2013) Okene (2013), Akpan

(2013) etc also opined that the best option which government can adopt to end the insurgency is good

governance.

Similarly Albani (2012) maintains the futility of repression but peaceful means. To him;

…….when the authorities decided to be aggressive

on the movement of Boko Haram, we tried to advise
them to be cautious in using force against the
movement. The idea of the government that any
youthful scholar, who wants to foment trouble
should be allowed to do so as government has
security agents to crush him, is a wrong
thinking
 that is contrary to the modern civilisation. Now,
where are the government‟s security agents?
Where are the weapons? Are all the forces able to
tackle the present problems? Have all the
checkpoints solved the problems? How many
people were caught with explosives at those
checkpoints? The innocent people being intimidated
at those checkpoints would now begin to hate the
government and its security agents. What about the
huge resources which are supposed to be used in
developing the country but wasted on security?
These were all the things that we wanted
government at that time to realize, but
unfortunately, they did not listen. Everywhere
now is scattered simply because the government, at
that time, had refused to embrace dialogue.

This position by Albani when examined in the light of the current situation especially in the

North east underscores the unsuitability of violence as a means to ending the Boko Haram insurgency.

Nigeria has experienced several uprisings in times past most of which may be described as ethno

religious conflicts and to assert that these ethno religious conflicts have attracted some state response

cannot be disputed. However to what extent has the state‘s response to these conflicts been effective?

This chapter assesses the Nigerian government‘s formal response to the Boko Haram crisis with a view to

proffering other appropriate options for resolution. The analysis of the state‘s response to the crisis by the

Nigerian state is conducted under government‘s response before, during and after the crisis.
 CHAPTER SIX

DISCUSSION

6.1 Introduction

While the previous chapter was devoted to presentation and analysis of data obtained through the

questionnaires and interviews, this chapter therefore discusses the findings from the field with the aid of

relevant secondary data.

6.2 Discussion of Data

Though Uwazie et al (1999) described the Maitasine riots as the most militant and widespread

religious protest against the secular and religious establishment in Nigeria since independence, this

description now befits the Boko Haram insurgency far more than the Maitasine uprisings of the 1980s.

Government approach to religious uprisings in times past can be viewed in the context of long or

short term responses. The long term response is largely preventive (Uwazie et al, 1999). This is in so far

as the responses comes by way of specific and deliberate government policies aimed at establishing an

enduring atmosphere of harmony and accord within the polity. State policies can be steam lined into four

perspectives i.e the ecumenical, the political/diplomatic, the constitutional and the security engineering

perspectives (Uwazie et al, 1999).

The ecumenical engineering perspective can be illustrated with the government‘s role in the

formation of such ecumenical organs as the Advisory Council on Religious Affairs, Pilgrims‘ Welfare

Board etc. The constitutional engineering perspective can be illustrated with a number of constitutional

reviews which were initiated at the instance of government. The aim stated or not was to address the

Muslim community‘s perceived sense of religious deprivation in the Nigerian legal system. With regard

to the political/diplomatic engineering perspective, one may consider the government‘s establishment of

fact finding and grassroots education organs like the Political Bureau and Mass Mobilization for Self
Reliance (MAMSER) whose major aim was to instill the ideal of religious tolerance and peaceful

coexistence of ethnic groups in Nigeria. On the security engineering aspect one may consider

government‘s formation of such security operatives as the State Security Service (SSS). Ideally these

operatives are meant among other things to infiltrate various religious groups in order to gather vital

information about their plans and activities in advance for the government to neutralize those that are

detrimental to security and harmony in the country (Uwazie et al, 1999).

The foregoing are government‘s long term response to religious crisis. As for the short term or

immediate response to religious crisis, the approach has come to sound very familiar and monotonous:

i. A contingent of the state‘s security agents especially the police and/or the army

personnel is sent to quell or at least contain the riot.

ii. Arrests and trial of suspects for the riot are conducted.

iii. Some form of Commission of inquiry is set up to examine the remote and immediate

cause of the riot and to proffer solutions.

It is this short term approach that has come to be traditional in conflict management in Nigeria by the

state. For each of the religious uprisings experienced in Nigeria there were Commissions of Inquiry. For

example, a judicial Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice Anthony Aniagolu was set up for the 1980

Maitasine riots. Another Judicial Commission under the Civil Disturbances Special Degree of 1987, this

time a Judicial Tribunal was set up at the state level under the headship of Justice HN Donli for the 1987

Kafanchan/Kaduna/Zaria/Funtua religious riots.

At the federal level, the Karibi-Whyte Panel was set up to punish those who were found guilty in this

same riot. While the Justice Babalakin headed the Commission of Inquiry for the 1990 Bauchi religious

riot, its 1991 counterpart in Katsina had a five man Judicial Tribunal something similar to the Donli led

Commission of 1987. As for the 1992 Zangon Kataf riot, two Commissions were set up by the Kaduna

state and federal governments respectively. While Justice Rahila Cudjoe headed the Commission set up
by the state government, its federal counterpart was headed by Justice Benedict Okadigbo. The panel set

up by the state government to investigate the 1994-1995 religious riots in Kano was headed by

Ambassador Bashir Wali (Uwazie et al, 1999).

Similarly with the recurrence of coordinated attacks by the Boko Haram sect from 2009, the federal

government set up the Presidential Committee on Security challenges in the north east also called the

Boko Haram Committee on the 2 nd of August, 2011. The Committee was headed by Ambassador Usman

Galtimari. Furthermore in response to the clamour by prominent Nigerians especially from elites of

northern extraction for an amnesty to be extended to the Boko Haram sect as a way of dousing the crisis,

the Jonathan administration on 17 April, 2013 set up a 26 member of Boko Haram Amnesty Committee

under the Chairmanship of Alhaji Kabiru Tanimu Turaki.

The analysis of data obtained in the field on the state‘s approach to handling the Boko Haram crisis is

done under various headings i.e ignoring early warning signs, the recourse to violence, the

Commission/panel of enquiry approach and attitude towards arms acquisition and manpower recruitment

and motivation.

6.2.1 Ignoring Early Warning Signs

It is a historical fact that religion plays a central and domineering role in the Nigerian society

(Usman, 1987). This has manifested as a potent variable in the socio-political development of Nigeria

since the pre independence era. In fact a discussion of socio-political events in Nigeria would be

incomplete without a discussion of religion. This should therefore be reason enough for the state to take

matters of religion with the seriousness that it demands. However the reverse has always been the case.

Danjibo (2010) has posited that the Nigerian state has historically treated issues of religion lightly not

minding the dangers which they pose to the nation‘s national security. The various religious crises so far

witnessed in Nigeria e.g the jihad, the civil war propaganda, the Maitasine uprising, the Sharia

controversy, the tensions provoked by Nigeria‘s accession to the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)
and recurrent religious upheavals in the Northern part, could have been nipped in the bud based on the

security reports which have always reached governments at all levels on the dangers of religious

extremism. These crises could not have evolved from nothing; security agents have always presented

reports of their threatening activities before their outbreaks (Danjibo, 2010). The state has always

demonstrated a lack of commitment to preventing their outbreaks.

The clamor for the implementation of the Sharia legal system in some Northern states from 2000

and the state‘s ineffective response is a case in point. Beginning from Zamfara state to Kano, Katsina,

Sokoto, Niger, Kaduna etc, there were intense agitations for the implementation of Sharia legal code and

these agitations sparked off religious crises which claimed many lives and properties. Though part 11,

Section 10 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria clearly states that ―the government of

the federation or of any state shall not adopt any religion as state religion‖, the leadership at the central

level responded to this development with levity. In fact the then President Obasanjo remarked that Sharia

will die a natural death. Much as this turned out to be true in the states concerned, the failure to amicably

deal with the issue then can be said to partly account for its recurrence in the current lethal and

devastating dimension.

Similarly it has been pointed out by Abimbola (2010) that the introduction of Sharia in some

Northern states beginning in 1999 encouraged closeness between Mohammed Yusuf and some of the

ruling and/or aspiring politicians as their decision was favourable to his plan to promote strict adherence

to the Sharia Islamic law. His expectation was however dashed by the type of Sharia that was introduced

across some Northern states which fell short of his expectation. He therefore believed either that the

office-holders were not serious Muslims or that the influence of western education was hindering or

limiting their commitment. In addition, his close association with the political class informed his

willingness to use his group to assist the political elite to secure political power that would, in turn, be

used to protect and possibly advance his career (Mamu, 2013). The disappointment he felt following his

abandonment by the political elite hastened his desire to effect a change through the resort to violence
(Omipidan 2009 cited in Abimbola, 2010). Therefore the Sharia episode should have served enough

notice to the state on its negative implications on the nation but as it would appear, nothing was done

about it.

This could be explained by the fact that the adoption of Sharia appeared to be an effort to pacify a

section of Muslims who had consistently agitated against the secular nature of the country and who

perhaps were seen either as a threat to the tenure of the political office-holders or as a support base that

could not be neglected on the basis of political calculation (Abimbola, 2010). It was therefore more of an

effort to realize personal ends than enhance the religious/spiritual devotion of the people. The generality

of the people were however made to believe that the adoption of the Sharia legal code was in their best

interest and that it is a cause which they must fight for with all devotion.

Another instance is the finding that in the case of Boko Haram ―Operation Sawdust‖ which was

carried out in 2005 by the military and police covering Borno, Bauchi and Yobe states led to the arrest of

certain fundamentalists whose activities posed a threat to the security of the Nigerian state. Those arrested

included Mohammed Yusuf who became the leader of the Boko Haram sect, Bello Maiduga and one

Ashafa (Danjibo, 2010). These arrests established the first facts about the links between the

fundamentalists and the Al-Qaeda terrorist group. They admitted having been trained in the act of

terrorism in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq. Some of the items recovered during the operation

were maps and diagrams of government establishments and of some specific buildings in Abuja (Tell

Magazine, August 17, 2009 cited in Danjibo, 2010). They were held until the late President Yar‘Adua

ascended the presidency. Some Muslim scholars and elites thereafter lobbied for their release on the

grounds that they were ―simply Islamic evangelists‖. Their request was granted. It would appear that the

leadership of the country at the time did not consider the national security implications of having such

elements walking the streets as free men. Again on November 13, 2008 the sect leader Mohammed Yusuf

and some of his followers were arrested and subsequently charged to an Abuja High Court for their

extremist activities which bordered on inciting people mainly youths against constituted authorities. They
were however granted bail and released through the influence of unnamed northern political elites

(Unuigbe, 2011)

Furthermore before the outbreak of the Boko Haram crisis, the State Security Service (SSS)

submitted fourteen (14) reports to the Government of Borno state, the Presidency and the Police

Headquarters under Mike Okiro. Two weeks after the retirement of Mike Okiro, his successor

Ogbonnnaya Onovo admitted that he has detected and read the 14 comprehensive security reports filed by

the SSS Headquarters (Oloja, 2002). President Yar‘Adua, the governor of Borno state and the then

Inspector General of Police failed to take action against Mohammed Yusuf and his activities (Kyari,

2013, Danjibo, 2010). There is no way the Inspector General of Police could have taken action without an

express permission from the President. The President‘s reluctance to take any action against the sect cost

the Nigerian state in terms of lives. However the Governor of Borno state Modu Sherrif having received

the report revealing that the sect was making bombs, ordered the security agencies to take action. It was

during the operation that bombs exploded killing some members of the sect thereby triggering the crisis

that was to ravage other states.

Unuigbe (2011) also found out and reported that prior to the incidence of July, 26 2009, the

activities of the sect were to a large extent known to the public including the state government. This is

further buttressed by Murtada (2013) who revealed that Mohammed Yusuf prior to the crisis travelled

over all northern Nigerian cities and from Borno to Sokoto giving lectures and calling the youth to

preparation for a jihad. He was able to mobilize groups of enthusiastic youth who pledge allegiance to

him from states where his da‘wah spread. There were security reports on this but they never acted upon in

good time. Enahoro (1998) writing on African states‘ response to crises posited that ―if African states

are often caught unawares by crisis, it is not because there was intelligence outfits to monitor and report

on developments but because the reports are either tailored, ignored or are deliberately misleading‖.

Therefore with regards to the Boko Haram crisis there was an apparent lack of action on series of

intelligence reports on the activities of the sect by the Nigerian state. This statement is buttressed by
Ahanotu (2010) that ―there was adequate intelligence on the sect and that information sent to higher

headquarters through the 21 Armoured Brigade in Maiduguri before the conflict began were not acted

upon in good time‖. The result of this apparent non-challance on the part of the state is the intractable,

lethal and seeming insurmountable nature of the current crisis.

It was also found out that as far back as 2004, concerned parents and security outfits raised alarm

on the dangerous activities of the Boko Haram sect and the involvements of youths. In spite of the

plethora of complaints by these parents and security agencies, the state did not deem it necessary to take

steps to check the activities of the sect (Danjibo, 2010, Tell Magazine, August 10, 2009).

Another early warning sign which could have been given attention to is the decadent socio-

economic situation in the country particularly in the north. The same factors which sparked off the

Maitasine uprising in the early 1980s i. e mass poverty; inequality in educational, political and

employment opportunities; ignorance due to limited educational opportunities; growing unemployment;

and governmental corruption, including the misuse of resources, by which the people were repulsed, are

present today and in many cases have gotten worse. History reveals that most of the crises experienced in

Nigeria are consequent upon the prevalence of these socio-economic and political situations. The state has

unfortunately not done enough to address them.

Therefore the inability of the Nigerian state to effectively manage the problem and dealing with

the key figures over the years gives it a wider scope and dimension. Implicitly any culprit or sect member

who escapes being killed during one insurrection, naturally takes part in another and so the culture of

impunity and the circle of violence continues hence the recurrent nature of religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Furthermore in spite of the violent suppression of previous occurrences, the determination and boldness

of the Boko Haram soldiers, the proliferation and swiftness of its military organization, and the belief of

its leadership and membership that it can indict the state and tactfully engage it in a military warfare all

call for concern. The recurrent and lethal nature of insurgencies and intra and inter-ethnic religious crises
is a timely early warning which demands urgent attention if the corporate existence of Nigeria is of any

importance to the nation‘s leadership.

It is also pertinent to add that the growing problem of Islamic extremism is much more deep

rooted than the approaches so far adopted by the Nigerian state to address it. In view of the negative

implications to the nation‘s and global security, and the more serious response by nations around the

world to terrorism related issues, comprehensive and drastic measures that are geared towards addressing

the root causes should be sought and adopted. This would provide a spring board or basis to amicably

address the scourge of insurgency in Nigeria. Underestimating the sect‘s potency, over confidence in the

nation‘s security outfits, or insisting that the problem is not as serious as it is, is tantamount to sitting on a

bomb waiting to go off. In fact a member of the Joint Task Force (JTF) in Maiduguri in an interview with

Sahara Reporters noted that anyone underestimating the Boko Haram sect should have a rethink because

they are ―resilient warriors‖ who are guided by ideological beliefs and are fearless in confronting

the security agencies. The soldier further stated that ―I have been to Darfur and Liberia, but have never

experienced these kinds of fighters. Rebels want power but these ones want death, they are just resilient

warriors. You will see a small boy fearless and exchanging gun fire with us and even killing and injuring

our colleagues‖ (SaharaReporters, undated).

Albani (2009) also warned the federal government by bringing to government‘s notice the

imminent crisis which Nigeria faced but his warnings fell on deaf ears. Indeed he stated that:

He (Mohammed Yusuf) also got support from his

followers who were tasked to make daily contributions
for him. At a point these contributions amounted to
about 74-77 million naira to be used for acquisition of
drugs, equipment and ammunitions which would be used
to carry out the Jihad. In view of the porous and lengthy
borders and government‟s inability to properly man
them, several weapons were brought and transported
through Niger into Nigeria on camels under the guise of
trade in Date palms and the Nigerian Custom and
Immigration merely gave them way ignorantly.
 Mohammed Yusuf also got support from outside Nigeria
from where his accounts were credited for the purchase
of weapons. They were also specialized in making
weapons locally including bombs. The SSS knew all
these all along….… There were several reports on these
presented by the SSS boss on the floor of the National
Assembly and the Presidency but no action was taken.

6.2.2 Recourse to Violence

Mohammed (2013) has asserted that across the world, governments are committed to protecting

lives and properties though security agencies. Therefore security agencies are equipped with the necessary

arms and ammunitions to make this task realistic. However when these agencies turn round to use their

ammunitions against the citizens they are supposed to protect then the stage is set for crisis. Mohammed

made this assertion in relation to the acts of human rights violations perpetrated by members of the

military Joint Task Force (JTF) in Maiduguri against the civilian populace.

To buttress this fact, the National Human Rights Commission recently released a report to the

effect that members of the Joint Task Force are engaged in various acts of human rights violation.

However the Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Ola Sa‘ad Ibrahim in his duty tour of Maiduguri maintained

that members of the force have always kept to the rules of engagement and in line with global standards

(Abdulkadir, 2013). The Spokesperson of the Defence Headquarters Brigadier General Chris Olukolade

also denied allegations incriminating the members of the JTF.

Abdulkadir (2013) explaining this trend noted that the host communities had before now been

hiding the insurgents thereby making it difficult for the members of the JTF to arrest them since they do

not know them. This to him made the task of the JTF difficult thereby necessitating punitive measures

against the people. He gave an example of a scenario when the JTF were chasing an insurgent member

who ran into a compound and was quickly accommodated by a woman in purdar (seclusion). She was

asked of the whereabouts of the man who ran into the house and her response was ―ba kowa‖ (there is no

one). After searching the entire house and not finding the insurgent whom they were sure ran into that
house, the JTF asked the woman who was sitting down on a long chair to stand up. She hesitated for a

while and on insistence by the soldiers she got up thereby revealing the man who was hiding under her

hijab. Abdulkadir therefore asked ―what do you do to such a person?‖ He maintained further that a battle

of this nature cannot be fought without injuring some innocent people or without violating the rules of

engagement from time to time, or punishing those who are caught collaborating or being sympathetic to

the insurgents. He therefore maintained that those leveling allegations of human rights violations against

the members of the JTF are journalists ―who report from afar‖ without going there to see things for

themselves. Similarly Akpan (2013) noted that residents of Maiduguri had been warned by the military

authorities that anyone who allows his/her facility to be used by terrorists would be punished without

consideration for human rights.

In the case of the Boko-Haram, it can as well be posited that the group became more violent after

the extra-judicial killing of its leader and many of its members. In one of its official statements, the group

insisted that ―ours is a clear fight for the blood of our founder Mohammed Yusuf and other leaders who

were slain in cold blood by Ali Modu Sherif former governor of Borno state, the former Borno State

Commissioner of Police and the late President‖(African Security Review, 2012). Albert (2010) describes

the extra-judicial killing of Yusuf as state terrorism and argues that it must have been allowed by the

Commissioner of Police for two plausible reasons; an assumption that killing such a ‖state enemy‖

like Yusuf will earn him commendation which is customary in Nigeria and the need to prevent

Yusuf from revealing his relationship with members of the ruling class in the northern states and the

roles he and members of his sect played in the electoral successes of these politicians. This position is

strenghtened by Mamu‘s (2013) assertion that his Newspaper outfit found out from the Police officers

where Yusuf was murdered that the Governor of Borno state called the police and gave specific

instructions as to whom to be killed and whom not to be.

Albani (2009) while emphasizing the futility of killing the sect leader stated:
 The Nigerian government should get set because the
assassination of Mohammed Yusuf is certainly not the
end of this battle, it is not the end of the crisis. Back to
my explanation they killed Muhammed Yusuf because
they had serious grudges against him and they know that
had he not been killed and was taken to court, he would
expose those who were behind him. Secondly they killed
Mohammed Yusuf because they felt that would finally
end the ideology. Mohammed Yusuf really proved
daring and members of the military task Force called
operation flush had a hard time with him. He and his
followers violated the law especially regarding the crash
helmet policy of the government.

Lastly I must say that killing him is not the end of the
movement, the ideology behind the sect has come to
stay, the government made a mistake. Though several
hundreds of them were killed yet not even one quarter of
the sect members were killed, they have plans and very
soon they will come out to announce the new leader of
the group. They have several sophisticated weapons
which they have kept in several places and are ready for
action. It is now left for the Nigerian government to
sit up and reexamine its position and do the right thing.

These instances speak to the popular-styled interpretation of dissent by the Nigerian state and its

conflict handling style.

6.2.3 Commission/ Panel of Inquiry Approach

The Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful Resolution and Peaceful Resolution of

Security Challenges in the crisis in the North East or the Amnesty Committee throughout its lifespan had

fundamental flaws which indicate an imminent failure of the initiative. First of all the Chairman of the

Committee Barrister Kabiru Tanimu Turaki had once claimed that the Committee met with the man

behind the Madalla bombings, Kabiru Sokoto at the Kuje prison and that they were making substantial

progress in negotiations with the group. He claimed that the meeting was a confidence building measure

between the committee members and members of the sect. However in reaction to that Kabiru Sokoto
denied ever having met with the Chairman or any other member of the group for that matter. Sokoto said

he was undergoing trial before Justice Adeniyi Ademola of the Federal High Court on the said date.

Even the trial Judge remarked ―The accused person is supposed to be under the custody of the State

Security Services (SSS); in fact, he was in court from morning to evening but the next day, the press

reported that the Amnesty Committee members said they visited and held a meeting with Kabiru Sokoto

in Kuje prison, this is funny.‖ (Guardian news online, 3, August, 2013). Turaki apparently embarrassed

thereafter admitted that he did not actually say he had met with Kabiru Sokoto and that he was misquoted.

Secondly, the same Chairman further went to publicly announce that the members of the

Committee were in negotiations with Shekau, leader of the Boko Haram sect and that they were working

out modalities for a ceasefire with the sect. Abubakar Shekau however also denied such a claim stating

that he had not met Turaki before and that no negotiations were going on between Boko Haram and the

federal government. When journalists sought audience with him on the matter i.e his claim of meeting

with Shekau, the Special Duties Minister/Chairman of the Amnesty Committee obviously lost his temper

claiming that the reporter was not polite in his approach.

Furthermore the researcher was privileged to witness the Amnesty Committee meeting with

Traditional leaders, political leaders, religious clerics, security chieftains, representatives of Civil Society

Organizations and other members of the public at the Usman Katsina House/Office of the Kaduna state

Governor on 23 May, 2013 during which the Chairman openly announced that government knows the

sect‘s leader, Bukar Shekau but needed people‘s help to find him. In response to that, a human rights

activist there present was of the view that if government knows the sect‘s leader why then is it in need of

people‘s help to find him. The Government in his view should therefore deploy the security apparatuses at

its disposal to track him down. At this point the Committee Chairman denied having said that government

knows Shekau. To him ―we all know Shekau, don‘t we? I mean we see him on internet, on You Tube

and other social media network.‖ The manner in which the Chairman of the Committee twisted his

earlier
claim thus raised serious concerns in the audience on the sincerity and success of the Committee‘s

mission.

Thirdly, on August 1, 2013 during a meeting with foreign diplomats in Nigeria, Turaki publicly

confessed that engaging in constructive dialogue with key members of the Boko Haram sect had remained

a ―major challenge‖ for the Presidential Amnesty Committee (Daily Trust, 2, August, 2013). This

implies that all his claims of the Committee having met with some members of the sect are actually

fallacies. Furthermore it is deplorable that having exhausted the two months timeframe given to the

Committee by the President, nothing substantial was achieved. It therefore remains likely that even the

two months extension given to the Committee by President Jonathan may yet be exhausted without any

visible results.

These instances as discussed in the foregoing indicate a lack of sincerity of purpose on the

Committee‘s part and ultimately on the part of the government.

6.2.4 Attitude Towards Arms Acquisition and Manpower Recruitment and Motivation

The attitude of the Nigerian state regarding arms acquisition and recruitment as well as

motivation of personnel leaves much to be desired. Alabi (2013) notes that Nigeria is big, there are

expanse of land to cover but Nigeria does not have enough capacity. The strength of the armed forces is

one hundred and twenty nine thousand (129,000) which a far cry from the recommended strength of the

military by the UN (Ekoyo, 2013). The UN recommended 10% of the population so if you are to follow

the 10% UN requirement, Nigeria is estimated to have a population of about one seventy million, so we

should be talking of 17 million military personnel, minimum. The numerical strength of the military

therefore is far below expectation.

6.3 Other Efforts to Curb the Boko Haram Insurgency

6.3.1 Establishment of Counter Terrorism Units in Mando and Kontagora

It was revealed by Alabi (2013) that Counter Terrorism Units have been established in Mando

and Kontagora to train Nigerian military personnel in the area of containing terrorism. The Nigeria Navy

also has their Special Boat Service, it‘s a force too has counter terrorism department which can combine

to flush out terrorism from Nigeria. The Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna has also been mandated to

introduce Counter Terrorism courses so that future military personnel will be adequate trained.

6.3.2 Censoring of sermons by clerics in the flash points

Akpan (2013) noted that in Maiduguri especially it is now mandatory that religious clerics who

intend to air their sermons must first submit same to relevant agencies of government for proper vetting

before it can be aired. The aim of thie move is to ensure that innocent minds are not influenced negatively

into anti social acts and to prevent the spread of perverted ideologies.

6.3.3 Establishment of a new 7 Division comprising of three Brigades in Maiduguri and

Recruitment of more Soldiers

The Nigerian army has set up a new Division, the 7 Division with Headquarters in Maiduguri.

The new Division will cover Nigeria and Chad, Cameroon and Chad borders which formerly enhanced

easy entry of arms due to lack of confidence in Immigration, Customs and Police. These Brigades will be

equipped with ICT devices for surveillance. With this development there is hope for more sanity as the

new Division will largely check illicit movement of illegal personnel and commodities since soldiers are

more feared and respected than the Police, Immigration or Customs Officers (Akpan, 2013).
6.3.4 Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Legislation

President Jonathan signed the Terrorism (Prevention) Act in 2011. It was amended in 2012 to

designate the Office of the National Security Adviser (NSA) as the national coordinator for anti-terrorism,

in order to prevent in-fighting among security agencies. On 4 June 2013, the government proscribed Boko

Haram and Ansaru, describing their activities as terrorism, and warned that any persons associated with

the two groups was liable to prosecution. It is prosecuting hundreds of suspected Boko Haram and Ansaru

members and collaborators. Mohammed Bello Adoke, the Attorney- General and justice minister,

reported that eleven convictions of Boko Haram members were obtained in 2013. On 4 December 2013,

the defence headquarters recommended the immediate trial of over 500 suspects arrested in the north-

eastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa. They were among almost 1,400 detainees in Maiduguri,

Yola and Damaturu screened by a joint investigation team. Among those recommended for trial were

paramilitary personnel and a medical doctor who allegedly offered the militants direct logistical support;

others who trained them in weapons handling; and those who confessed that they were trained in Mali and

other countries.

6.3.5 United Nations Assistance to the Nigerian Government

In view of its concern about the situation in Nigeria, the United Nations also disclosed its

intention to help the Nigerian government to end the Boko Haram insurgency. The strategy named

―Integrated Support Package‖ is geared towards complementing current efforts of the Nigerian

government which would only achieve results through a multi dimensional approach (The Guardian

News, 11 July, 2014).

6.4 Nigerian State’s Incapacity to Arrest the Menace

The persistence of the Boko Haram insurgency and the state‘s inability to deal with the menace

once and for all has become glaring. In fact according to Olojo (2013:1) ―These multi-

dimensional
challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the

problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it.‖

Similarly Abimbola (2010: 96) laments that ―Yet, the Boko Haram uprising attracted attention

not only because the legitimacy of a state was challenged in the course of promoting Islamic revivalism,

but also because its outbreak was an indictment of the state, whose seeming ineptitude was becoming

apparent with regular outbreaks of violence of many kinds despite the state‘s continuous promises to

check them.‖ Given these approaches of the Nigerian state to religious conflict, this violence may remain

a recurring problem.

The seeming inability of the Nigerian military to permanently end the Boko Haram insurgency

has attracted intense criticism from the Nigerian citizenry. The more members of the JTF apply force, the

more the escalation of the insurgency. This has been explained by military personnel like Akpan (2013).

To him, the insurgency is not a conventional warfare where an Army comes out against a known enemy

in a known location. The JTF is engaging a faceless enemy with unknown location in what Akpan

described as ―fourth generation warfare‖, a type of warfare in which the Nigerian military personnel

have no adequate training or background. Therefore the JTF is made up of some of the nation‘s good

hands in military warfare, their professional competence is never in doubt but the kind of warfare they are

now confronted with is of a different kind.

To affirm this position Alabi (2013) asserts that:

The military in particular they are trained for

conventional kind of warfare where you have defined
enemies, defined boundaries, so you can plan, you can
locate your enemy, locate human plan to assault the
enemies position. The issue of terrorism is not like that,
they are people like you and I that you know. Terrorism
is not written in any body‟s face, you don‟t know your
next person, the person in your office, the people you
are in the same vehicle with or on the road together, you
don‟t know his intention, his plan or what he is
carrying.
 So then the capacity of the security agencies too like the
police, they are trained for conventional police duties,
pursuit of armed robbers, lay ambush or some people
and armed robbers based on information, arrest etc but
the issues of terrorism is not like that, so terrorism is a
new phenomenon in Nigeria and therefore the training
is just being provided, its just in the recent years that the
military and the police are stepping up their training on
terrorism.

Another factor which obviously negatively impacts on the operation of the military can be

deduced from the statement made by the Governor of Borno state Kashim Shettima that the Boko Haram

are better armed and better motivated than the Nigerian soldiers (The Politico Magazine, March, 10,

2014, Daily Trust, February 18, 2014). Even though this statement obviously angered the Presidency, yet

a closer examination reveals the veracity of the Governor‘s position. First to consider in this context is the

short changing of soldiers deployed to curb the insurgency. In a personal interaction with Colonel,

Emmanuel Akpan of Nigerian Army School of Artillery (NASA), Kachia, the researcher found out that

soldiers are now aware that the Nigerian State does not appreciate them and so for them dying for Nigeria

must be for a reason, but as it is the Nigerian state has not given them a reasons why they should die for

Nigeria. Soldiers according to him are human being with wives, children, fathers, mother e.t.c to cater for.

They have seen how government has abandoned bereaved families with no compensation meaning that

for them to lay down their lives for Nigeria will translate to more suffering for their families and that is

not acceptable. Furthermore, most of them do not even get the daily stipend which was appropriated for

them. This is what is meant by them being poorly motivated and a poorly motivated soldier cannot make

any impact on his enemy on the battle ground.

Another factor which makes the Nigerian military appear weaker than the insurgents is the fact

that they are inadequately equipped. For example in 2012 the sum of N396.5 billion was the proposed

spending for the Armed Forces. Of this about N122.4 billion was set aside for the Army which leads the
ground war against the Boko Haram insurgency and also participates in other Task Forces and Peace

Mission aboard. But out of this N122.4 billion only N5.77 billion was allocated for acquisition of

equipment and weaponry and about N17 billion was for deploying soldiers while N116.7 billion was for

the recurrent needs of the army (The Politico Magazine, March 10, 2014 p. 13). In the face of the gravity

of the situation at hand one can only say that the N5.77 billion is grossly inadequate and shows the

attitude of the leadership of the country sector towards the insurgency.

Furthermore, there are speculations of corruption in the defence industry because despite the huge

budgetary allocation to the sector, not much is seen. The opposition partly All Progressive Congress

(APC) has also repeatedly called for a probe of the military budgets in view of these speculations. The

state budgeted 100 billion naira in 2010 and then 927 billion naira in 2011 to defence and security

(International Crisis Group, 2014). In 2012, N920 billion, a quarter of Nigeria‘s budget for that year was

allocated to the security and defence sector. In the 2013 budget the allocation was N968 billion or a

quarter of the federal budget (The News Magazine, June 9, 2014, p.13). Despite these huge allocations, it

is yet to reflect on men fighting in the field in terms of better welfare, equipment and kitting. As a result,

confrontation with better armed and better motivated Boko Haram insurgents always leaves the troops

worse off.

It is therefore contended that the lack of investment in training, failure to maintain equipment and

corrupt procurement practices constitute the major bane of the Nigerian military. As a matter of fact

Oluokun (2014) posited that the surveillance drones which Nigeria bought from an Israeli firm in 2006

that might have been used to locate the over 2000 Chibok girls held by the insurgents, have been left

grounded due to poor maintenance. The manufacturers said the drones were never put to use as there has

not been demand for spare parts or routine maintenance since purchase. The machines cost between $15

million and $17 million Dollars. Furthermore the Nigerian Air Force last year also unveiled its own

locally made drone it called ―Gulma‖ or ―Operation Amebo‖ at the Air Force Base, Kaduna. But it has

not flown since due to lack of operators for the Unmanned Air craft (Oluokun, 2004).
 Olukun further noted that Nigerian soldiers have lost their lives because their equipment failed to

live up to expectation during confrontations with the insurgents. For example 70 soldiers on a mop up

operation were killed last year when they entered the Sambisa forest for an operation because the bomb

dropped by an Air Force jet did not explode because it was expired (Oluokun, 2014). Most Nigerian

troops confront the insurgents with AK47 riffles with no ballistic helmet or fragmental jacket. Soldiers

have died because they ran out of ammunition to fight back during confrontation with the insurgents as a

result of rationing of bullets. Most military units battling the insurgent are also contending with obsolete

equipment as the soldiers have no communications equipment other than mobile phones, some of the

Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), Fighter Jets and Helicopter Gunships that are being used in the on

going fight against the insurgents were acquired between 1979 and 1982 (Oluokun, 2014).

This was confirmed by Air Marshal Adesola Amosu the Chief of Air Staff in a press briefing he

held to mark the 50th Anniversary Celebration of the Air Force early in 2014. He revealed to journalists

that some of the equipment in the arsenal of the Air Force are as old as Service. According to him:

“The challenge the Nigerian Air Force is facing today as we clock 50 is

obvious. We have been on for 50 years; some of the platforms that we
have are as old as the Nigerian Air fore. Even when funds are made
available, dodgy procurement processes have ensured that high end
equipment that may have little value but are veritable avenue by
contractors to skim off government money, are purchased (cited
Oluokun, 2014:14).

The President Goodluck Jonathan also implicitly confirmed this on 5 June, 2014 during a meeting

of the National Executive Committee of the ruling People‘s Democratic Party that the National Security

Adviser briefed party Trustees on current security Challenges in Nigeria and that as a result of that

briefing some challenges encountered surmounting insurgency like lack of equipment for the military

would be encountered. He said ―… all what I can assure you is that those issues of equipment and other

things, we are handling them…‖ (Daily Trust, June 6, 2016)

 On paper, Nigeria maintains the broadest spectrum of capabilities in Africa but in reality much of

her equipment is unfit to be deployed for prolonged periods of time. This in addition to operational

blunders from the top hierarchy of leadership has led to frustration and low morale among the troops as

demonstrated by the recent attack on the General Officer Commanding 7 Division Maiduguri, Major

General Ahmed Mohammed by his soldiers protesting the killing of their colleagues in an ambush by

insurgents while returning from an operation.

Soldiers need ballistic helmets, fragmented jackets personal and special weapons

mounted with special equipment like binoculars for accuracy, bayonet, night vision googles and

hand grenades. The Nigerian soldiers lack these equipment. On the other hand, the Boko Haram

sect possess weapons like rocket propelled grenades, RPGs which can bring down an aircraft and

other sophisticated equipment. A close look at the foregoing issues will shed more light on

Governor Kashim Shettima‘s statement to the effect that Nigerian troops are poorly motivated

and armed.

It may be added that in the absence of legitimate state presence on the ground, Boko

Haram is also a difficult organisation to fight. It is quite self-sufficient, financed by bank

robberies and cross-border trade. Such cash transfers leave little if any electronic trace, so the

international security operatives who are supposed to assist the Nigerian government cannot

achieve much. Improved intelligence is clearly needed but this is not an insurgency that can be

tracked from afar. What is needed is ground-level information but local people are often just as

afraid of the Nigerian army and police as they are of Boko Haram. With an increasingly strong

insurgency and a weak state, they are caught between a rock and a hard place—with few

alternatives apart from seeking refugee elsewhere or attempting to negotiate their security with

the agents of violence who appear most powerful.

 CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 Introduction

This final chapter brings this research to an end. It comprises of the summary of findings of the

study, conclusion and the recommendations on the best way to address the Boko Haram insurgency.

7.2 Summary

Insurgency occurs in all parts of the world though in varying degrees and impacts. Groups with

little or no direct political power have demonstrated repeatedly in recent years that by employing acts of

insurgency, they can achieve effects on a direct target. These effects are out of all proportion to their

numerical or political power and could attract worldwide publicity, create widespread panic and

apprehension. It could equally cause national governments to concede to the demands of small sub-groups

within a society, or endanger international peace and security. Throughout the world, insurgency has been

on the increase since the late 1960s, despite numerous pressures against state-sponsors and supporters of

insurgency.

Insurgency is not a new phenomenon in the African continent. The first African experience of

terrorism occurred in 1904 when some Moroccans kidnapped an American with the hope that the victims‘

home government could pressurize the French government to mount pressure on the Moroccan King to

release their detained colleagues (Nwolise, 2005). Nigeria also witnessed some acts of terrorism in forms

of bomb explosions and aircraft hijacking. For example, in October 1993, a group known as Movement

for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) claimed responsibility for the hijack of a Nigerian Airways

Airbus 310 to Niger Republic. In January 1996 also, bombs claimed to have been planted by the group

exploded and damaged Mallam Aminu Kano International Airport and Durbar Hotel in Kano and Kaduna

respectively.
 Nigeria has witnessed various other uprisings and armed rebellions in the past with devastating

effects on peace and security in the country. However none appears to have been as protracted and lethal

as the Boko Haram insurgency which the Nigerian state has been confronted with since 2009.

Furthermore none other insurgency has been able to expose the serious security lapses and failure of

governance at all levels in the country as the Boko Haram insurgency. The intractability of the crisis and

apparent inability of the Nigerian state to deal with the crisis once and for all despite series of promises to

bring the insurgency and consequent suffering to end it, further confirms the inability of the government

to end the crises which it could have niiped in the bud right from its embryonic state.

This study set out to critically appraise the Nigerian state‘s response to the Boko Haram

insurgency. Since the study requires first hand information, i.e being survey based, the researcher adopted

the multi stage sampling technique to obtain data from the target population which comprised of officials

of the security agencies, Civil Servants, religious clerics, students and ordinary Nigerians etc. in the study

areas; Kaduna, Kano, Bauchi, Yobe and Borno states. The study also employed the aid of secondary

sources like Newspapers and Magazines, journal articles, conference papers, published and unpublished

texts as well as the internet websites to complement data obtained from the primary sources.

The study found out that the Boko Haram insurgency is a result of remote and immediate factors.

The remote causes of the crisis include prebendal/affective relationships in Nigeria, politicization of ethno

religious sentiments, economic deprivation/poverty, the almajiri syndrome, proliferation of terrorism on a

global scale, the Arab Spring and small arms proliferation, poor border management in Nigeria and the

clash of civilizations. The immediate causes comprise of the setting up of the Special Military Joint Task

Force coded named Operation Flush, the implementation of the national policy on crash helmets, extra

judicial killing of the sect‘s leaders Mohammed Yusuf, Buji Foi etc, and consequent radicalization of sect

members.
 The Nigerian state has adopted several strategies to address the situation. These include the resort

to violence, the Commission of enquiry approach, the Amnesty option etc all of which have failed to

bring about the deired results. The study has posited that government has not demonstrated the moral and

political will to end the insurgency. Reasons adduced for this is government‘s poor attitude to security

and defence matters in Nigeria especially with regards to arms/weapons acquisition and welfare of troops

among others.

7.3 Conclusion

The resurgence and escalation of the Boko Haram insurgency since early 2010 caught the

Nigerian state unawares. It initially believed the violence would fizzle out. However, sustained attacks

ushered in more sober responses. Since 2012, it has tried to address the challenge on multiple tracks but

especially by increasing the defence budget from 100 billion naira in 2010 to 927 billion naira in 2011

and 968 billion naira in 2012, 2013 and over I trillion 2014. Much of these increases were to combat

Boko Haram. Other measures include strengthening anti-terrorism legislation, boosting the capacities of

the military and other security agencies, exploring dialogue with the insurgents, declaring a state of

emergency in the North East and launching military offensives against the insurgents. Sadly, the results

have been limited.

Therefore the inability of the Nigerian state to effectively manage the problem and deal with the

key figures over the years gives it a wider scope and dimension. Implicitly any culprit or sect member

who escapes being killed during one insurrection, naturally takes part in another and so the culture of

impunity and the circle of violence continues hence the recurrent nature of religious conflicts in Nigeria.

Furthermore in spite of the violent suppression of previous occurrences, the determination and boldness

of the Boko Haram soldiers, the proliferation and swiftness of its military organization, and the belief of

its leadership and membership that it can indict the state and tactfully engage it in a military warfare all

call for concern. The recurrent and lethal nature of insurgencies and intra and inter-ethnic religious crises
is a timely early warning which demands urgent attention if the corporate existence of Nigeria is of any

importance to the nation‘s leadership.

This study conludes that unless the Nigerian state develops and implements comprehensive plans

to tackle not only insecurity but also the injustices that drive much of the insurgency, Boko Haram, or

groups like it, will continue to destabilise large parts of the country. The Boko Haram insurgency is noted

to be driven by the philosophy, ideas and views of Sheikh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyah who lived in Turkey

between 1263 and 1328. Taymiyah was a Sunni Muslim and an Islamic Puritan who attempted

recapturing the traditional ethics of Islam. He declared a Jihad against the Mongols who ruled over

Turkey at the time because he perceived them not to be true Muslims even though they had converted to

Sunni Islam. They were also accused of ruling with manmade laws (their traditional Yassa code) rather

than Islamic laws or Sharia. Taymiyyah reasoned that they were living in a state of jahiliyyah or pre

Islamic pagan ignorance and that when Muslims live in this state there is need to wage a Jihad to establish

Islamic law (Sharia) in the region.

Taymiyyah also opined that the reason Muslim communities are made to suffer is because their

leaders have not been true to the faith. He preached that it was necessary to engage in active jihad in order

to defend the Ummah (global community of Muslims) and spread the faith, and that a leader who does not

enforce Sharia law completely, and wage active jihad against infidels, is unfit to rule. This ideology has

been a driving force for many other terrorist organizations in the world including the Al-Qaeda to which

the Boko Haram sect in linked to. Mohammed Yusuf‘s militant orientation is can therefore be traced to

Ibn Taymiyyah after whom he named his Mosque in Maiduguri. Therefore if the Nigerian state succeeds

incrushing the sect today and does not address the socio-economic and political factors which make the

Taymiyah ideology attractive to the socio economically excuded, the Nigerian state may as well be

postponing the evil day.

7.4 Recommendations

The following recommendations are therefore put forward as strategies to effectively deal with

the Boko Haram insurgency.

a. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group can lead to a

more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state.

b. A comprehensive approach necessarily needs to be built on a deep understanding of the drivers

and dynamics of, in particular, the north-east Nigerian context. In addition to hard, military

measures and security cooperation with neighbouring states, such a counter-terrorism approach

needs to encompass inter-religious dialogues and mediation processes. It ought to address issues

of socio-economic development and governance, as well as the problem of prosecuting, detaining

and rehabilitating Boko Haram militants who have broken the law.

c. There is a need for the government to really monitor what is preached by any religious

organization and if such is not in tandem with accepted standards there will be need to

address it, to nip it in the bud.

d. There is an urgent need for the defence budgeting system to be completely overhauled.

To this end a new mechanism to monitor the disbursement of funds to the defence sector

should be introduced with the aim of ensuring rapid disbursement to the concerned

institutions and units. Furthermore thereis an urgent need for the prioritization of modern

state of the art military equipments and weapons to be acquired.

e. The attitude of Nigeria leadership to the welfare of military personnel also needs to be

reviewed. Better welfare packages need to be introduced to boost their morale and ensure

that they are better motivated.

f. Government also needs to demonstrate a sincere commitment to alleviating poverty in

Nigeria especially in the Northern part of the country. Government and leaders in the
 region should be tasked to stop paying lip service to the people but initiate strategies to

manage the poverty situation in the region.

g. Enlightenment campaigns also need to be introduced on the need for education in the

North. Leaders in the north should endeavor to encourage the people to embrace western

education.

h. The Nigerian state should desist from the heavy-handed military and police methods that

risk pushing yet more restless, jobless and frustrated youths into violence and extremism.

i. Government should to be fair to all, especially in the utilisation of the country‘s

resources. Nigerians are not the Nigerians of yesterday. Now, even teenagers know their

rights as they follow the developments in the world, largely on the internet.

j. Government should pay attention to the issue of religion. The government takes religion

as the strict affairs of the clerics and their students. This is very wrong. A situation where

government consults the clerics only when they need prayers should be stopped.

Government should be sincere in its dealings with clergies. Clerics are the ones who are

with the people at the grassroots. These people talk to the clergies freely about their

problems. Buying cars or houses for clergies is not the issue. Government should be

consulting the clerics to know the needs and the problems of the people at the grassroots.

But buying big jeeps for scholars and big houses is not the solution to what is happening

now because when government does that, the people would even become enemies of the

clerics. Government should be involved in the running of religion in this country. Lastly,

government needs to come closer to the clerics now being regarded as extremists. When

we say close, its notn to use SSS to be harassing them. They need to come to them to
 understand them and know what informed their perceived extremism. The government

that is in constant war with its people or part of its people can never bring development.

k. There is need for Nigeria to liase with her immediate neighbors like Niger, Cameroon

and Chad in terms of intelligence gathering and sharing, training etc in order to nip the

insurgency in the bud.

 REFERENCES

Abdulkadir M (2013): Interview on the Nigerian State‘s Handling of the Boko Haram Crisis, held on 16,
July, at the News Room of the Headquarters of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), Area
11, Garki, Abuja.

Abdulkadir, M (2013): ―Duty Tour Of Chief of Defence Staff to Maiduguri‖ NTA News at 9, 12 July.

Abimbola J.O and Adesote SA (2012): ―Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria,‖
Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society; Vol.4 Cenresin Publications September.

Abimbola J.O and Adesote SA (2012): ―Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria,‖
Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society; Vol.4 Cenresin Publications September.

Abimbola, A (2010): ―The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria‖ in Africa Spectrum,
German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Institute of African Affairs in co-operation
with the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation Uppsala and Hamburg University Press

Abubakar, A. (2009), ―Nigeria struggles to curb rise in child beggars‖, The Telegraph, 18

Abubakar, M (2009): ―Why the Fundamentalists Struck‖ The Guardian, August, 2.

Abubakar, S (2011): ―Borno Imbroglio: The Truth Behind the Lies‖, Daily Trust, July 26.

Abugu, F.O (2009): ―Boko Haram: Poverty, Not Islamists on the March‖, The Guardian, August
8.

Adejo, P.Y. (2005) ―Crime and Cross-Border Movement of Weapons: The Case of Nigeria‖ in A. Ayissi
and I, Sall (eds), Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa:
Handbook for the Training of Armed and Security Forces, Geneva: United Nations Institute of
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).
Adejuyigbe, O (1989) ―Identification and characteristics of Borderlands in Africa, In Asiwaju, AI and
Adeniyi, PO (eds) (1989) Borderlands in Africa A multidisciplinary and Comparative Focus on
Nigeria and West Africa, Lagos, University of Lagos Press.

Adeniyi, O (2011): Power, Politics and Death: A Front Row Account of Nigeria under Late President
Yar‟Adua; Kachifo Press Limited, Lagos.

Adibe, J (2012): ―Boko Haram: Symptom of Crisis in our Nation Building Project‖ 1, 11 and 111
Published in Daily Trust Newspaper, February 9, 16 and 23.

Adogbo, M.P (2009): Research Methods in the Humanities; Lagos, Malthouse Press Limited.

Ahanotu B (2010): ―Military role in the Management of Internal Conflict in Nigeria: A Case study of the
BokoHaram conflict‖ A paper presented at the Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji.

―Amnesty Committee Chairman Admits Failure‖ Daily Trust, 2, August, 2013

Aiyede, R (2001): ―The Travails of Leadership and Democracy in Nigeria: A Review of the Unfolding
Fourth Republic‖; Development Policy Center, Working Paper 33.

Ajah, M (2011): ―How to end Boko Haram Fire- Back‖ Desert Herald Weekly, 12-18 July.

Ajah,C (2011): ―Boko Haram Transforming into a Jihadist Force‖ Newsstar Newspaper, July 27.

Alabi A (2013). ―Structured Interview on the Nigerian State‘s Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency‖
20, July, 2013

Alao, A (2009): ―Islamic Radicalisation and Violence in Nigeria‖, Country Report (accessed online from
www.securityanddevelopment.org on March, 23, 2013.
Albani M.A.A (2009): ―Karshen Alewa‖ Lecture delivered on 5 August.

Albani, M.A.A (2010): ―In an Ki Ji…….‖ A Sermon Delivered on 11 April.

Albani, M.A.A (2012). Interview on the Boko Haram Insurgency in Sunday Trust January 1.

Albert, I.O (2010): ―An Alternative Explanation of Religious Fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria‖
Accessed from www.henrich-boell.org. on March 23 (2013).

Ali, H (2012): ―Interview with Leadership Newspaper‖ Published on 25, January.

Alkali, A. (2009), ―10 Million Kids Beg in the North – Minister‖, Leadership, Abuja, Nigeria,

Almajiri syndrome in Northern Nigeria‖, Childhood in Africa 1(1): 1-37.

Aluaigba, M.T. (2009), ―Circumventing or superimposing poverty on the African child? The

Amnesty International (2012): ―Nigeria Not Doing Enough on Boko Haram‖ Published in Leadership, 25
January.

Arikpo M (1986): Foundation of Social Science Research: A Methodological Guide for Student, Enugu,
Abic Publishers.

Asiwaju, AI (1993) Development of Border Regions. Ikeja Lagos Nigeria, Joe Tolalu and Associates
Nigeria Ltd.

Asiwaju, AI and Adeniyi, PO (1989). Borderlands in Africa: A multidisciplinary and comparative focus
on Nigeria and West Africa, Lagos, University of Lagos Press.

Awofeso, N, et al (2003), ―The Almajirih and the threat of non-state terrorism in Northern Nigeria –
Lessons from Central Asia and Pakistan‖, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 26 No. 4.

Ayoob, M. (2005), ―The Future of Political Islam: The Importance of External Variables‖ International
Affairs, Vol. 81,No. 5.
Azuatalam, C., (2012), ‗JTF Rebrands to Operation Pulo Shield‘, The Nation (Nigeria), viewed
20 May 2014, from http://www,thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/33515-jtf-
rebrands-to-operation-pulo-shield.html accessed on August 19, 2015

Baba-Ahmed, H (2012). ―Security, Politics and Economy of the North‖ Being a paper presented at the
Conference on ―The North and Strategies for Sustainable Development‖ Held at the
Arewa House, Kaduna 6th December, 2012

Balogun, F (2011): ―Methods of a killing Machine‖ The News Magazine, August 1.

Bego, A: ―The Shariah Debate: Between Ignorance and Fanaticism‖ available

at http://www.gamji.com/article1000/NEWS1662.htm accessed on 3rd July, 2013

Boele, R., Fabig, H. and Wheeler, D. (2001), ‗Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. 1. A Study in
Unsustainable Development: The Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People –
Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict and Prospects for Resolution‘,
Sustainable Development, (9), 74-86, available at
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~lemenestrel/IMG/pdf/boele_al._2001_sd_shell_nigeria_.pdf
accessed on August 20, 2015.

Boot, M (2013). Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient
Times to the Present; London, W.W. Norton Inc.

Bovard, J (2003): Terrorism and Tyranny: Trampling Freedom, Justice and Peace to Rid the world of
Evil, New York, Palgrave Macmillan

―Boko Haram Sect are Resilient Warriors, Says JTF Personnel‖ available at
http;//saharareporters.com/news-page/book-haram-sect-are-resilient-warriors-says-jtf-personnel
accessed on 19, March, 2013

Briscoe, I and van Ginkel, B (2013) ―The Nexus between Development and Security‖ cited
in Olojo, A (2013). ―Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public
Support for Boko Haram‖ The Hague, Netherlands, International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism (ICCT) Research Paper.

Brimah, P (2014)―Boko Haram, Big Oil and the Chadian Connection‖ The Guardian 30,
September.

Brucam, S (1998): The Diabetic of World Politics; the Free Press, New York.
Buzan, B: ―Weak State Theory & Democracy Assistance” available
at http://oliveandarrow.com/intelect/?p=187v accessed on 11, January, 2013

―Causal Analysis of Radical Islamism in Northern Nigeria‘s in the Fourth Republic‖ African Security
Review; (2012)

Chuma-Okoro, H. (2011) ―Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria: Legal
Implications‖ in Law and Security in Nigeria.

CLEEN Foundation (2014).‖Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern
Nigeria‖ Monograph Series No. 20.

―Civil War Goal of Kano Bombing-Emir‖ People‟s Daily, March, 22, 2013

Collins, M: ―Background on Weak State Theory: The Insecurity Dilemma‖ in Buzan B: Weak State
Theory & Democracy Assistance available at http://oliveandarrow.com/intelect/?p=187v accessed
on 11, January, 2013

―Controversy Trails Military Spending‖ in Leadership Newspaper, May 29, 2014

Danjibo, D. N (2010): ―Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The Maitatsine‖ and ―Boko
Haram‖ Crises in Northern Nigeria. Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African
Studies, University of Ibadan, Online at: http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/spip.php?article156

Deflem, M (2010): The Policing of Terrorism: Organizational and Global Perspective; New York,
Routledge.

Dorell, O (2012): Al-Qaeda expands its reach to „like-minded‟ groups; Push in Africa could mean
danger to West, Gannett Company, New York.

Ekanem, SA et al (2012): ―Boko Haram and Amnesty: A Philo-Legal Appraisal‖ International Journal of
Humanities and Social Sciences; Vol. 2 No. 4 Special Issue, February.

Ellis, S (1999): The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an
African Civil War, London: Hurst.
Emerson, S.A (2012): "Desert insurgency: lessons from the third Tuareg rebellion". Small Wars
and Insurgencies Vol 22 No 4.

Enahoro,DO (1998): ―Management of Intra-state Crises in Africa‖ in Garuba C.A (ed):Capacity

Building for Crisis Management in Africa; National War College, Abuja.

Esan, E.O and Okafor, R.O (1995): Basic Statistics Methods; Lagos, cited in Olayiwola A. O Procedures
in Educational Research; Hanijam Publications, Kaduna (2007).

Eseku, F (2011): ―Boko Haram and Threat to Nigeria‖ Daily Sun, 15, July.

Eyam-Ozung, P (2012): ―A strategic analysis of Boko Haram‖, May,

http://www.businessdayonline.com/NG/index.php/analysis/columnists/381-a-stategic-analysis-of-
boko-haram-3, accessed on 3 June 2013.

Falola, T (1998): Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies;
New York University of Rochester

Falola, T and Heaton, MM (2008). A History of Nigeria, CambridgeUniversity Press.

Fasheun, F.I (2003): ―The Failure of the Nigerian State and the Necessity for Identity Politics‖
in Babawale, T: Urban Violence, Ethnic Militias and the Challenge of democratic Consolidation
in Nigeria; Malthouse Press Limited, Lagos.

Fonbaustier, M (2012): ―Mali: A Case Study of a Complex Afri can

Crisis‖, Marcfonbaustier.tumblr.com, (June)

Forest J.J.F (2012): Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria; JSOU Report 12-5 The JSOU
Press MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (2012)

Francis, P., LaPin, D. & Rossiasco, P., (2011), Securing Development and Peace in the Niger
Delta: A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change, Woodrow Wilson International Centre
for Scholars, Washington DC.
Galula, D (2006) Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. United States: Praeger
Security International pp. 55-56.

Gambrell, J (2011): ―Nigeria: Radical Muslim Sect Grows More Dangerous,‖ Associated Press,
November 4. Online at: http://www.breitbart.com/article. php?id=D9QQ3V200&show_article=1

Gay, L.R (1980): Educational Evaluation and Management: Company Competences for Analysis and
Application; Columbus, cited in Olayiwola A.O:Procedures in Educational Research; Hanijam
Publications, Kaduna (2007)

Gberie, L (2005): A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone, London:
Hurst.

Gen WCW (1976), A Soldier Reports, New York: Doubleday and Company Inc.

Gourley, S.M (2012): ―Linkages Between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda: A potential deadly Synergy‖
Global Security Studies Vol. 3 No. 3.

Haruna, M (2011): ―Boko Haram: Two Years On‖, in Daily Trust, June 22.

Hazen, J. M. and Horner, J. (2007) ―Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger
Delta in Perspective‖ The Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper 20.

Hermassi, A (1993): ―State and Democratisation in the Maghreb‖, in Goldberg, E, et al (eds): Rules and
Rights in the Middle East, Washington University Press, Seattle.

Holt, P M and Daly, M W (2000): A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day,
5th ed, Harlow: Pearson Education.

Honwana, A, and De Boeck F (2005): Makers and Breakers Children & Youth in Post-Colonial Africa;
Trenton and Dakar: CODESRIA.

http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/07/200972913529620235.html
http://www.afrchild.ohio.edu/CAJ/articles/AluaigbaCAJ2009.pdf Accessed on 7

http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/01/15/wole-soyinka-on-nigeria-s-antichristian-

Hyden, G (2006): African Politics in Contemporary Perspectives; Cambridge University Press.

Ibaba, I S (2008): ―Promoting Peace in the Niger Delta: Some Critical Issues‖ in Proceedings of
International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta; Organized by
the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Harey Publications Company, Port
Harcourt.

Ibaba, I S and Ikelegbe, A (2010): ―Militias, pirates and oil in the Niger Delta‖ in Okumu W
and Ikelegbe, A (Eds): Militias, Rebels and Islamic Movements in Africa; Institute for Security
Studies, South Africa.

Ibaba,SI (2008); ―Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: Hostage Taking and the Dilemma of the
Nigerian State‖, African Journal on Conflict Resolution; Vol. 8 No. 2.

Ibrahim, Y and Matazu, H (2013) ―Boko Haram Pardon: 23 Women, 35 Kids Freed‖, Weekly Trust 1
June http://weeklytrust.com.ng/index.php/top-stories/12796-boko-haram-pardon-23-women-35-
kids- freed.

Idris H (2011): ―Tough Path to Peace With Boko Haram‖ Sunday Trust, July 17.

Ifedi,C (1998): ―Uses and abuses of the Nigerian Constitution‖ in National Concord, May.

Ikpe, E (2007): ―Challenging the Discourse on Fragile States‖, Conflict, Security and Development Vol.
7(1) in-child-beggars.html Accessed on 5 May, 2014.
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR) (2008): Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria:
Consolidated and Zonal Reports; Abuja

International Crisis Group (2004), Islamism, Violence and reform in Algeria.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2014). ―Curbing Violence in Nigeria11: The Boko Haram Insurgency‖,
Brussels, 3, April

Isa, M.K (2010): ―Militant Islamist groups in northern Nigeria‖ In Okumu W and Ikelegbe, A (Eds):
Militias, Rebels and Islamic Movements in Africa; Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

Jibrin, I: "West Africa: Mali and the Azawad Question". allAfrica.com.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201203260286.html. 26 March 2012. Accessed on 16,
January, 2013

Johnson, T and Vriens, L (2013): ―Islam: Governing Under Sharia‖ Council on Foreign
Relations available at http://www.cfr.org/religion-and-politics/islam-governing-under-
sharia/p8034 accessed on 3rd July 2013

Jok, M (2007): Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence, Oxford: Oneworld Publications

Keen, D (2005): Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone, Oxford: James Currey.

Kumolu, C. (2012), ―Almajiri education: Modern gang up against ancient tradition?

‖,

Kyari, M (2013): Interview on the role of the Nigerian State in the Boko Haram Crisis on 22 June.

Lavrakas, PJ (2001): Encyclopedia of Survey Research Methods; Sage Research Methods.

Lawal, A (2009). ―Rage of the Puritans‖ in Tell Magazine, 10 August

Lecocq JS (2010):―Disputed Desert: Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in

Northern Mali‖. Afrika-studiecentrum series. Vol 19.
Lewis, D (2012): ―Al Qaeda‘s Richest Faction Dominant in North Mali-US,‖ Reuters, July 26.

Mamu T (2013): ―Structured Interview on the Nigerian State‘s Response to the Boko Haram
Insurgency‖ January, 17

Mamu,T (2012): ―Why the FG Under Jonathan cannot defeat Boko Haram‖ in Desert Herald Magazine,
January- February.

Marc-Antoine P M (2014). ―Boko Haram and Politics: From Insurgency to Terrorism‖in Marc-Antoine P
M (ed) (2014). Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria, Ibadan African
Studies Centre and IFRA

Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos (2014). ―Nigeria‘s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko
Haram Crisis‖ Research Paper Submitted to The Royal Institute for International Affairs,
Chatham House, September.

Martinez, G et al (1999): ―Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups‖, Middle East
Review of International Affairs Vol 3(3) available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/
1999/issue3/jv3n3a1.html (accessed 19 February 2013).

Mbachu, O (2005): Social Science Research Methods for Policy and Strategic Studies; Owerri, Medusa
Academic Publishers.

Meehan, V and Speier, J (2011): Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the U.S. Homeland, U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence November 30.

Mefor L: ―Amnesty for Boko Haram: A Devil‘s Alternative‖ available at

http://www.punchng.com/opinion/amnesty-for-boko-haram-a-devils-alternative/ accessed on 18,
April, 2013
Metz, s (2004). Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 21st century: Reconceptualizing Threat and
Response, Strategic Studies Institute Home Available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub586.pdf accessed on 29, Nov. 2014

―Military Ware Issues Being Handled, Jonathan Says‖ Daily Trust Newspaper, June 6, 2014

Mohammed A.S (2013): Interview on BBC Hausa on President Jonathan‘s Visit to Maiduguri

Mohammed K (2012): ―Politics and Security in the North‖ Being a Paper Presented at the Conference on
the North and Strategies for Sustainable Development, Arewa House, Kaduna. 6th December.

Mohammed, K (2014). ―The Message and Methods of Boko Haram‖ in Marc-Antoine Pérouse de
Montclos (Ed). Boko Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the state in Nigeria, Leiden, African
Studies Center

Mohammed,S (2009): ―Boko Haram‖

Mohammed, H.I., 2012, ‗X-raying the Activities of Operation Restore Order in Borno State‘ 1
Nigerian Defence Magazine, p. 28.

Murtala, A (2013): Boko Haram in Nigeria: Its Beginning, Principles and Activities in Nigeria;
www.Salafimanhaj.com.

Musa, N et al (2009): ―Sectarian Crisis: Symptom of Failed State‖ in The Guardian, August 3.

Nagl, J (2005). Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

National Bureau of Statistics (2012), ―Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 Report”Abuja National Concord,
Thursday May 5, 1988.

NBC unpublished Document dated 2003.

Nigeria‖. Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies. Vol 1 No. 1 p 21

November. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/expat/expatnews/6596232/Nigeria-struggles-to-curbrise-

Nte, N.D. (2011) ―The Changing Patterns of Small and Light Weapons (SALW) Proliferation and
the Challenges of National Security in Nigeria‖, Global Journal of Africa Studies Vol. 1 No.1.

Obalonye J.T and Olanrewaju, T (2013): ―No Amnesty for Boko Haram- Jonathan‖ Daily Sun, March 8.

Obasanjo, O (2011): ―How to Deal with Boko Haram‖, The Sun news Online,
http://www.sunnewsonline.com/webpages/news/national/2011/July/08

Obianyo, N (2010): ―Behind the Curtains of State Power: Religious Groups and the Struggle for
Ascendancy in Nigeria‘s Public Institutions: A Critical Appraisal‖ Africa Development Vol. 4
accessed from www.codesria.org. on 8 April,2013

Olayiwola, A.O (2007): Procedures in Educational Research; Kaduna, Hanijam Publications.

Oloja, M (2009). ―Boko Haram: The Warnings Presidency, Police, Armed Forces Ignored‖ in The
Guardian Newspaper, August 2

Olojo, A (2013). ―Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support
for Boko Haram‖ The Hague, Netherlands, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism
(ICCT) Research Paper.

Olomojobi, Y (2013). Islam and Conflict in Northern Nigeria, Lagos, Malthouse Press Limited.

Olugboji, B (1995): ―Religious Uprising: Deadly, Divisive, Destructive‖, in Constitutional Rights

Journal, 5, 15, 6. cited in Abimbola, A (2010): ―The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic
Revivalism in Nigeria‖ in Africa Spectrum, German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA),
Institute of African Affairs in co-operation with the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation Uppsala and
Hamburg University Press.

Oluokun, A (2014). ―Nigerian Army in the Eye of the Storm‖ in The News Magazine, June, 9.
Omipidan, I (2009): Why North is on Fire, in: Sunday Sun, 2 August, cited in Abimbola, A (2010): ―The
Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria‖ in Africa Spectrum, German Institute
of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Institute of African Affairs in co-operation with the Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation Uppsala and Hamburg University Press.

Omipidan, I (2009): Why North is on Fire, in: Sunday Sun, 2 August, cited in Abimbola, A (2010): ―The
Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria‖ in Africa Spectrum, German Institute
of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Institute of African Affairs in co-operation with the Dag
Hammarskjold Foundation Uppsala and Hamburg University Press (2010)

Onuoha FC (2012). ―The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, Analysis and Emerging Trend‖ in
Security Journal Vol. 25, No 2

Onuoha, F (2012): ―Boko Haram: Nigeria‘s Extremist Islamic Sect‖ Al Jazeera Centre for Studies
available at http://studies.aljazeera.net 29, February, accessed on 6 December, 2012

Opukri CO and Etekpe A (2013). ―Domestic Response to Terrorism in a Global World: The Nigerian
Experience‖ in Mbachu O and Bature UM (Eds.) (2013). Internal Security Management in
Nigeria: A Study in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism, Kaduna, Medusa Academic Publishers
Limited.

Osuntokun, A (2002): ―Democracy and the Nigeria Populace, What Dividends?‖ An Annual Guest
Lecture of the House Ibadan.

Oyegbile, O and Lawal, A (2009): ―Shielding Patrons of Boko Haram‖, in: Tell Magazine Lagos, 17
August.

―Press Statement by the Arewa Consultative on the State of the Nation‖ Published in Daily Sun,
February 3, 2012 p.39
Prescott, JRV (1897) Political Frontiers and Boundaries, London, Unwin Hyman Ltd.

―Report of the Presidential Committee on Security Challenges in the North East‖ published in The Nation
Newspaper, September, 27 2011. pp 1-2

Reuters (2012: ―West Africa to Seek U.N. Mandate for Action on Mali,‖ June 11,

Richards, P (2004): Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone, Oxford.

Romer, D (2011). "Unemployment". Advanced Macroeconomics (Fourth ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill

SaharaReprters (2013); ―Kano Governor Blames Government and Society for Nigeria‘s Insecurity‖
available at http://saharareprters.com/news-page/kano-governor/kwankwaso-blames-government-
and-society/for/nigerias/insecurity accessed on May 21, 2013

Sageman, M (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania

Press.

Salih b. Fawzan al-Fawzan,: ‗Why Manhaj?‘, (n.d.), (www.allaahuakbar.in)

Salihi, H.M (2012): ―Governance Failure and Political Violence in Nigeria: The Jama‘atu Ahliss Sunnah
Lidda‘a Wati Wal-jihad in Perspective‖ in Mohammed H (Ed): Nigeria‟s Convulsive
Federalism: Perspectives on Flashpoints of Conflict in Northern Nigeria; Foludex Press Limited,
Ibadan.

Salkida, A: ―Genesis and Consequences of Boko Haram Crisis‖ available at

http://www.nairaland.com/1265520/genesis-consequnces-boko-haram-crisis accessed on June,
25, 2013

Sani S (2012): ―Nigeria‘s Boko Haram: Will Dialogue End the Insurgency?‖ Interview Granted BBC
News Africa, 27 January.

Sani, S (2012): ―Structured Interview on the Nigerian State‘s Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency‖
17, December.
Sani, S. (2008). Poverty in Northern Nigeria. Kaduna: Baraka Publishers.

―Shekau Denies Ceasefire Deal with FG‖ The Will, July 13, 2013 available at
http://thewillnigeria.com/politics/21939.html accessed 2, August 2013

―Sokoto Denies Meeting With Amnesty Committee‖ available at http://www.guardiannews.com/index

.php accessed on 3, August, 2013

Shinkafi, U.A (2011): ―State of the Nation‖, Daily Trust, July 19.

Soyinka, W. (2012), ―The butchers Of Nigeria‖, Newsweek, 16 January, pp. 1-5.

Summers, HG (1981), On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, Carlisle Barracks, Strategic
Studies Institute.

―Tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency‖ AIT News at 8.00 pm, 19 February, 2014

―Ten steps to Peace with Boko Haram‖, by Barrister Sadau Garba, The late Mohammed Yusuf‘s Lawyer,
Excerpt from a letter dated July 11, 2011 to president Goodluck Jonathan, Published in Sunday
Trust, July 17 2011, p. 5.

Tell Magazine, August 17, 2009

terror-sect-boko-haram.html Accessed on April, 12, 2014.

The Constitution of the federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999

The News Magazine, 3, October, 2011

The Vanguard Newspaper (11, September, 2014)

The Weekly Trust, July 13, 2013

―The Boko Haram Crisis‖ Editorial Publication of The Guardian Newspaper, August 5, 2009

22 November. http://allafrica.com/stories/200911231395.html Accessed on 22 April, 2014.

U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) (2012): ―OCHA Calls for
a Paradigm Shift to Avert a Humanitarian Disaster in Mali,‖ July 26.

―UN adopts New Strategy to Tackle Boko Haram‖ The Guardian News, 11 July, 2014

Unuigbe J.I (2011): ―Conflict Management and Internal Security Operations in Nigeria: An Appraisal of
the Nigerian Army‖ Submitted in Partial fulfillment of the requirement of the requirements for
the Award of Fellow of the National Defence College, Abuja, July .

Usman, YB (1987): The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria (1977-1987); Vanguard Printers and
Publishers Ltd, Kaduna

Uwazie E.E (ed) (1999): Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria; Lexington Books
USA.

Vanderstoep, S.W and Johnson, D.D (2009): Research Methods for Everyday Life: Blending Qualitative
and Quantitative Approaches; USA, John Wiley and Sons.

Vanguard, 26 April. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/04/almajiri-education-moderngang-

Vines, A. (2005) ―Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa‖.

Wagemakers,J (2009): ―A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi‖ British
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies; Routledge, UK

Walker, A (2012): ―What is Boko Haram‖ United States Institute of Peace, published in Desert Herald
Weekly, 4-10 September.
Wassara, S.S (2010): ―Rebels, militias and governance in Sudan‖ In Okumu W and Ikelegbe, A (Eds):
Militias, Rebels and Islamic Movements in Africa; Institute for Security Studies, South Africa.

Wiktorowicz, (2005) ―Jordan‘s 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Islamism‖, Middle East Report No. 47
Amman/Brussels, 23 November, in Wagemakers,J (2009): ―A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology
of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi‖ British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies; Routledge, UK

―What Will Stop Boko Haram Spread‖, Weekly Trust Newspaper, June 25, 2011

Wilkinson, P (1993): ―Editor‘s Introduction, in P Wilkinson, Technology and Terrorism, London: Frank
Cass.
 APPENDIX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Respondent,

I am a Ph.D. student of the Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria

currently undertaking a research titled ―The State and Conflict Management in Africa: A case study of the

Handling of the Boko Haram crisis by the Nigerian state (2009-2014)‖, as part of the requirements for the

award of Ph.D in Political Science. Your opinions on the following questions are hereby sought. You are

assured that this is strictly an academic exercise and your response will be treated with utmost

confidentiality.

Thank you

Otegwu Isaac Odu

1. Sex: Male ( ) Female ( )

2. Educational Qualification: WASSC/SSC ( ) OND/NCE ( )Degree/HND ( )

Masters and above ( )

3. Occupation: Student ( ) Security agent ( ) Civil Servant ( )

Teacher/lecturer ( )

4. Are you aware of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria?: Yes ( ) No ( )

5. What in your opinion is the cause of the Boko Haram insurgency?

Failure of Intelligence ( ) Religious intolerance ( )

Rise of fundamentalism ( ) Poverty and unemployment ( )

Failure of governance ( ) All of the Above ()

6. kindly indicate reason (s) for your response in (5)

above

7. How would you describe the Boko Haram insurgency against the Nigerian state? Justifiable ( )
Not Justifiable ( ) Indifferent ( )

8. Kindly state reason(s) for your response to 6 above

9. Are you aware of the Federal Government‘s approach to managing the crisis? Yes ( ) No ( )

10. From the provided options, kindly indicate the approach adopted by the Federal Government. Force (

) Carrot and stick approach ( ) Dialogue ( ) Lobbying ( )

11. How would you describe the Federal Government‘s approach towards managing the conflict?

Satisfactory/Effective ( )
 Not satisfactory/ineffective ( )

12. State reason(s) for your answer to (8) above

13. In your opinion, how should the government respond to or manage the Boko Haram crisis?

Beefing up security Agencies ( )

Proper border management ( )

Transparent and accountable governance ( )

Dialogue ( )

All of the above( )

Others
 APPENDIX 2

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Dear Respondent,

I am a Ph.D. student of the Department of Political Science, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria

currently undertaking a research titled ―The State and Conflict Management in Africa: A case study of the

Handling of the Boko Haram crisis by the Nigerian state (2009-2013)‖, as part of the requirements for the

award of Ph.D in Political Science. Your opinions on the following questions are hereby sought. You are

assured that this is strictly an academic exercise and your response will be treated with utmost

confidentiality.

Thank you

Otegwu Isaac Odu

1. What in your opinion are the causes of the Boko Haram crisis?

2. In view of the sect‘s grievances against the Nigerian state, can the sect be said to be

justified in its actions so far?

3. What can be said to be the sect‘s driving ideology?

4. One of the sect‘s demands is the implementation of the Sharia legal code in a

constitutionally recognized multi religious state. Why the emphasis on Sharia and how

realistic is this?

5. How would you describe the Nigerian state‘s response to the crisis hitherto and how

suitable or effective has the state‘s response been?

6. The conflict management tradition in Nigeria reveals the state‘s preference for

repression, how effective has this been in the light of the Boko Haram episode?

7. Before the Amnesty offer, all attempts at negotiations between the sect and the federal

government failed or were inconclusive. What in your opinion is the cause of the failure?

8. There are speculations of complicity of certain top government officials in the sect‘s

activities. In view of this can the federal government effectively and amicably resolve the

crisis without bringing such elements to book?

9. Do you think the amnesty offer is a right step towards amicably resolving the crisis?

10. What are the prospects of the amnesty in view of the sect‘s rejection of the offer?

11. The recent declaration of a state of emergency it is feared, is capable of sending the

insurgents to other hitherto safe neighboring states thereby endangering lives and

properties therein. What in your opinion informed the decision to adopt this drastic step

and is it not a contradiction on the part of government which has expressed a willingness

to negotiate?
 APPENDIX 3

CHRONICLE OF BOKO HARAM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN NIGERIA FROM 2009 – 2014

1. July 26, 2009, Boko Haram had an all night attack on Dutsen, Tanshi Police Station in

Bauchi State, 39 members of the sect, 2 policemen and a soldier were killed.

2. July 27, 2009, Boko Haram invaded Potiskum Divisional Police Headquarters, Yobe

State. During the attack, 3 policemen and a fire service officer were killed.

3. July 29, 2009. An all night battle between the group and combined security operatives at

Railway Terminus, Maiduguri, Bomo State. The sect operational base was destroyed

after killing over 20 of them.

4. July 29, 2009. The sect confronted security men at Mamudo village, along Potiskum,

Yobe State, leading to the killing of about 33 members of the sect.

5. September 7, 2010, Boko Haram freed over 700 inmates from a prison in Bauchi State.

6. October 1, 2010 Abuja, Bomb blast occurred twice during Nigeria‘s 50th Anniversary of

independence at about 11.20 am, and 12 noon respectively. A kilometer to Eagle Square,

Human causality - 14 people died at the scene of the incident; 70 vehicles were damaged

including properties.

7. December 24, 2010 Bomb blast occurred in Jos on Christmas Eve, above 5 bombs went

off in the City of Jos, 4 occurred almost simultaneously; one near Sacred Heart Catholic

Church, Kabong where many Christian worshippers died and several others injured.

8. December 29 2010. Bomb explosion in Barkin Ladi in Jos. The device exploded and

killed the bearer while he was trying to plant it.

9. December 31 2010, Bomb blast in Mammy Market, Mogadishu Barracks, Abuja at about

7 pm, 4 people were killed and 13 others injured.

10. January 21, 2011, The sect killed Borno State Governorship candidate of All Nigerian

Peoples Party for the 201 1 election, Alhaji Modu Fannami Gubio, a brother to former

Governor Modu Sheriff of Borno State and six other people at Lawan Bukar Ward,

Maiduguri.

11. March 2, 201 1, At Rigasa area of Kaduna State, the group killed 2 policemen, attached

to the residence of the Divisional Police Officer, Mustapha Sandamu.

12. March 4, 201 1 Bomb exploded during the PDP rally in Suleja, killing 10 and injuring 28.

13. March 13 2011, Bomb blast in Jos metropolis, however no recorded death and injury.

14. March 20, 201 1. Bomb exploded in Jos, 1 killed and 2 injured.

15. March 30, 2011, In Damaturu, Yobe State, the group planted a bomb that seriously

injured a police officer.

16. April 2, 201 1, The sect bombed Dutsen-Tanshi Police Stattion in Bauchi State and killed

2 policemen, others were seriously injured.

17. April 6, 2011. Kaduna Explosion rocked Kaduna suburb. No death was recorded, while 2

people were injured in Mahuta near National Eye Centre.

18. April 8, 2011. Bomb blast at INEC office in Suleja, 6 people were killed and many others

were injured.

19. April 9, 201 1. Bomb blast rocked Unguwar Doki in Maiduguri, Borno Borno State. A

police-woman was killed and 9 others injured. The second blast occurred when INEC

officers were moving from the polling booths to the collation centres; 1 person was killed

while 5 others were injured.

20. April 1 5, 201 1 The Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission

(INEC) was bombed and several were shot in a separate incident on the same day.
 Another bomb blast occurred at night in Maiduguri. 10 people were injured, no death was

recorded.

21. April 17, 2011. Bomb blast occurred within 20 hours on Sunday at Magaji Gari Area of

Kaduna Metropolis at about 11.30 p.m. No record of any injury but there w as destruction

of private building close to the headquarters of Kaduna North Local Government Area.

Another explosion occurred in Happy Night Hotel in Kabala West at about 8 p.m., killing

2 people while 8 others were injured.

22. April 20, 2011, Boko Haram killed a Muslim Cleric and ambushed several police officers

in Maiduguri.

23. April 22, 2011. Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa

State.

24. April 24, 201 1. 3 killed including a police Corporal, while 14 were injured in Maiduguri

metropolis at Todu Maduganami at about 8.30 p.m.. The second blast occurred at Tarsa,

Kano gate, no record of death and injury.

25. 25. April 25, 2011. Bomb blast killed 2 persons and 8 people were injured in Maiduguri.

26. April 26, 201 1. Three separate blasts occurred in Jere L.G.A of Borno State.

27. May 9, 2011. The group rejected an offer for amnesty made by the Governor-Elect of

Borno State, Kashim Shettima.

28. May 19, 2011. Several bomb blasts in Maiduguri by suspected Boko Haram members

along police station. 5 officers died.

29. May 29, 2011. Bomb blast at Mammy Market in Bauchi Army Barracks, Gadawanta

Barracks. 13 killed while 4 sustained injury.

30. May 29, 2011, This was on a Sunday evening. Bomb blast was recorded at Zuba

Relaxation Centre, 1 person died while 8 others were injured.

31. May 30, 201 1, 2 bomb blasts occurred in Zaria, Kaduna State injuring 2 teenagers at the

Iyan Juma area of Zaria city.

32. June 1, 2011. The group shot dead Shehu of Borno‘s brother, Alhaji Abba Annas Garbai

EI-Kanemi.

33. June 2, 201 1, Bomb blast with explosive and gun shots in a police station in Bulkachuwa

town in Katagum L.G.A of Bauchi State. A police constable was killed and part of the

station destroyed.

34. 33. June 2, 2011. The sect planted an explosive within the premises of St. Patrick

Catholic Church along Kano Road, Maiduguri. No one was injured.

35. 34. June 2, 2011, The group bombed Borno State Epidemiological Centre.

36. June 7, 2011, Triple blasts occurred in Maidugi.iri Borno state, killing more than 10

people.

37. June 8, 2011. Two people were killed during at attacks on police stations in Maiduguri.

38. June 12, 201 1. The sect raided Bulunkutu, Maiduguri and killed 4 persons at a drinking

joint.

39. June 16, 2011. Bomb blast in Police Force Headquarters, Abuja, at about 11.00 a.m.,

carried out by the Boko-Haram sect. Several lives were lost, many cars were destroyed

and scores were injured.

40. June 16, 201 1, Four teenagers were killed in a blast at Damboa town of Dam boa L.G.A,

Borno State.
41. June 1 9, 2011, The sect fired on some men playing cards at a popular local joint in Buntu

Suga Area. Another separate attack at a wrestling arena at Bama Road left a security

personnel dead.

42. June 20, 2011, Seven policemen, including a Divisional Crime Office were killed when

the group stormed Kankara Police Station and detonated some explosives before firing on

policemen at the station. Two policemen guarding a bank opposite the police station were

also killed.

43. June 26, 201 1, Bomb blast killed 25 people, while many others were gravely injured at

about 5.30 p.m., at Dula Kabombi area in the, Maiduguri Borno State Capital.

44. July 11, 2011 The group bombed All Christian Fellowship Mission Church (ACFMC)

claiming 4 lives and injuring others at ECWA church in Suleja, Niger State.

45. 44. July, 12, 201 1 Bomb exploded at NYSC camp in Maiduguri, Borno State by the

Islamic Radical Sect, Boko Haram. They attacked Joint Task Force (JTF) vehicle during

patrol injuring 2 soldiers while 3 of their members were killed along Baga road,

Maiduguri Metropolitan Council, Borno State. Another bomb attack on NEMA vehicle in

Maiduguri by the group.

46. July 15, 2011. Another bomb blast struck Northeastern city of Maiduguri by the Sect

group.

47. July 1 7, 2011 The group targeted a bomb attack on the Police patrol van injuring 5

Police men and leaving some vehicles damaged in Maiduguri.

48. July 2 1, 2011 Boko Haram planted another explosion which exploded at London Chiki

Ward in Maiduguri Borno State.

49. July 24, 201l, Another bomb blast at Maiduguri, leaving 8 people dead and several others

injured.

50. August 25, 2011, Sect members killed four policemen, a soldier and seven civilians and

carted away undisclosed sum of money in a bank robbery.

51. August 26, 201l, A massive explosion at the United Nations Building in Abuja, killing 23

people and injuring 60 others.

52. September 12, 2011, Seven people including four policemen, killed during a bomb attack

on a police station in Misau, Bauchi State.

53. September 13, 2011, Sect members shot and injured 4 soldiers in an attack in Maiduguri,

shortly after the arrest of 1 5 sect members during military raids on Boko Haram hideouts

in Bauchi State.

54. September 17, 2011, Brother-in-Law of Mohammed Yusuf, the slain Boko Haram leader,

Babakura Fugu, shot dead in front of his house in Maiduguri by 2 members of the sect,

two days after he was visited by former President Olusegun Obasanjo.

55. October 3, 2011, Boko Haram attacked Baga market in Maiduguri killing 3 people.

56. November 4, 2011 Series of bomb blasts and gun attacks took place in Damaturu, Yobe

State capital. The first bomb went off at about 5.30 p.m., while other bombs went off

non-stop till about 11.00 p.m. The blasts were traced to the Boko Haram sect and the

explosions killed about sixty (60) people. As a result, most of the residents are relocating

to other states of the federation.

57. December 18, 2011, three members of Boko Haram were killed when their bomb

detonated in Shuwari, Maiduguri, Borno State.

58. December 22, 201 1, Explosive and gunshots killed four people and left several others

injured.

59. December 24, 2011, About 80 people killed in bombing in Plateau State.

60. December 25, 2011, About 50 people died in Christmas Day bombing at Saint Theresa‘s

Catholic Church in Madalla, Niger State.

61. December 30, 2011, Seven people killed in Maiduguri, Borno State.

62. January 5, 2012, About 6 people died in a church attack in Gombe State.

63. January 6, 2012, Seventeen people died in a Christ Apostolic Church, Yola Adamawa

State, 20 Igbo people were also killed in Mubi in the same State.

64. January 20, 2012, About 250 people killed in multiple attacks in Kano.

65. January 22, 2012. Two churches destroyed in Bauchi State. Two military personnel, a

DPO and eight civilians also killed by gunmen at the Headquarters of Tafawa Balewa

Local Government Area in the State.

66. January 26, 2012. The Sabon-Gari area of Kano State witnessed another explosion, which

caused another pandemonium in the state.

67. February 8, 2012 Suicide bombing at 1 Div Headquarters of the Nigerian Army, Kaduna.

No Casualty

68. March 8, 2012. British and Italian hostages taken and subsequently murdered.

69. June 33, 2012. 15 Christians going to church were killed

70. June 17, 2012. Suicide bomb attacks on three churches in Kaduna state. Two in Zaria and

one in Kaduna 50 people were killed

71. October 3, 2012. Night raid on towns of Mubi, 25-46 people killed
72. November 25, 2012. Twin bomb blasts at military protestant church inside the Armed

Forces Command and Staff College, Jaji killing 11 people and injuring 30

73. March 18, 2013.Bomb Blast at a motor park in Sabon Gari, Kano killing 60 people.

74. Boko Haram members hiding and mingling in among the villages of the town of Baga

near the north eastern border with Chad. Killed an army officer resulting in the army

burning village homes. 185 killed.

75. June 5, 2013. Unknown gunmen attack a Secondary School in Mamudo, Potiskum, Yobe

state killing 29 Students and a teacher.

76. July 29, 2013. Bomb explosions in three locations along New Road and Enugu Road,

Sabon Gari, Kano killing about 45 people.

77. August 10, 2013. Unknown gunmen suspected to members of the Boko Haram sect

attacked villages in Mafa and Konduga Local Government areas in Borno state killing 52

people and injuring several others. Leader of the sect Abubakar Shekau subsequently

released videos claiming responsibility for the attacks and boasted of the sect being

capable of facing the United States.

78. August 20, 2013. About 50 gunmen invaded Dumba village on the outskirts of Baga

town in Kukawa Local government area of Borno state and slaughtered 44 people and

injured many others.

79. August 21, 2013. Suspected Boko Haram sect members numbering about fifty invaded

Gamboru Ngala Local Government Area of Borno state killing four people and injuring

eight people.

80. August 24, 2013. The Chairman of the Presidential Committee on Dialogue and Peaceful

Resolution of the Security Challenge in the North East announced the decision by some
 detained Shura members of the Boko Haram sect to accept a ceasefire as proposed by the

Federal Government. The video recording of the event took place two weeks before the

date of its publication. The detained Shura members in the video called on various Field

Commanders taking into account the clear and unambiguous provisions of the Holy

Quran and taking into account the teachings and fundamentally the practices of the Holy

Prophet Muhammad on the issue of dialogue and peaceful reconciliation; strengthening

submissions again with the works of other Islamic scholars globally who have had cause

in their lifetime to also make research and came out with a lot of literature supporting the

cause on dialogue stating the parameters and conditions under which dialogue can take

place (Vanguard online August 24, 2013 available at www.vanguardngr.com/2013/08/44-

people-slaughtered-inborno-village/ accessed on 24th August, 2013).

81. August 25, 2013. Unknown gunmen attacked Bama community in Bama Local

Government area killing 14 people and injuring 9 others.

82. August 30, 2013. Boko Haram members attacked Moguno Local Government area of

Borno state killing 26 members of the youth vigilante group.

83. 5 September 2013: Boko Haram gunmen dressed as traders open fire on a market in the

town of Gajiran, 85km from Maiduguri, killing 15 people.

84. 7 September 2013: Boko Haram gunmen kill five residents on their way to mosque in

Bulabulin Ngaura Village, 35km from Maiduguri.

85. 8 September 2013: Seventeen vigilantes, dubbed ―Civilian JTF‖, are killed and 18

injured in a fight with Boko Haram gunmen attacking Benisheik town, 72km from

Maiduguri. Five Boko Haram gunmen are also killed in the fight.
86. 11 September 2013: Gunmen with explosives and rocket-propelled grenades attack a

police station in Ga‘anda Village in northeast Adamawa State, killing two officers and

injuring another. The police station is burned in the attack.

87. 15 September 2013: Suspected Boko Haram gunmen attack a meeting of a local vigilante

group in the town of Gamboru Ngala, in Borno State, on the border with Cameroon. They

kill 17 people, including the vigilante leader and a local chief supporting them.

88. 17 September 2013: Boko Haram gunmen kill 142 people and burn dozens of homes in

coordinated attacks on the town of Benisheikh in Borno State. BH gunmen dressed in

military uniform use assault rifles, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft weapons in the

attacks.

89. 19 September 2013: Gunmen kill eight people, including three police escorts, and rob a

bullion van filled with cash near the town of Damboa.

90. 20 September 2013: Boko Haram gunmen attack Bulabulin Ngaura Village, outside

Maiduguri, killing 14 residents.

91. September 23, 2013. Boko Haram sect attack schools and hospitals in Gaijiram

headquarters of Nganzai Local Government of Borno state killing 20 people.

92. 25 September 2013: Gunmen kill a priest and two children in an attack on a church in

Dorawa Village, in northeastern Yobe State, burning the church and two nearby houses.

BH's leader, Abubakar Shekau, appears in new video claiming responsibility for several

attacks and mocking the 19 August 2013 military claim that he may have been killed. The

Nigerian army says it is trying to verify the authenticity of the video.

93. 27 September 2013: BH splinter group Ansaru releases an online video of a French

national kidnapped on 19 December 2012 in northern Nigeria‘s Katsina State. The video

shows 63-year-old engineer Francis Collomp calling for negotiations for his safe release.

94. 28 September 2013: BH gunmen open fire in a dormitory at the College of Agriculture, in

the town of Gujba in Yobe State, while students are asleep. Forty students are killed.

95. 3 October 2013: Military sources in Niger say "armed bandits" killed a Niger soldier and

seriously wounded three others in northeast Nigeria on 2 October. The soldiers were part

of a three-nation West African force combating trans-border crime, including Boko

Haram violence.

96. 24 October 2013: Boko Haram gunmen in military uniform launch coordinated attacks on

a military barracks and four police facilities in Yobe State capital Damaturu. Scores are

killed, including 35 men in army uniform. It was not clear if the 35 were Boko Haram

gunmen or Nigerian soldiers.

97. 31 October 2013: Boko Haram gunmen kill 13 passengers in an ambush on a commercial

bus in Bama District.

98. 3 November 2013: A Boko Haram attack on a wedding convoy kills more than 30

people, including the groom, along Bama-Banki highway, while the convoy is returning

from Michika in neighbouring Adamawa State. In a video, Boko Haram leader Abubakar

Shekau claims responsibility for the 24 October attack on a military base and police

facilities in Damaturu.

99. 4 November 2013: Dozens of BH gunmen on motorcycles and in pickups kill 27 people

and burn down 300 homes in a raid on Bama, a town in northeast Borno State. Twelve

people are injured in the raid, according to a local official.

100. 21 November 2013: Suspected BH gunmen kill three vigilantes in the Kasuwar Gwari

area of Yola for their collaboration with troops. Gunmen kill four policemen in an

ambush on a police patrol vehicle in the Bauchi State capital, Bauchi.

101. 23 November 2013: Boko Haram gunmen kill 12 residents, burn several homes and steal

vehicles in an attack on Sandiya Village, 85km outside Maiduguri. It is a response to the

villagers‘ alleged collaboration with troops.

102. 28 November 2013: Boko Haram insurgents kill 17 residents of Sabon Gari Village, in

Damboa District, 90km from Maiduguri, during a raid in which over 100 shops and

several vehicles are burned.

103. 2 December 2013: Around 200 Boko Haram gunmen dressed as soldiers launch

coordinated attacks on an Air Force Base, a Military barracks and a nearby checkpoint in

Maiduguri. They burn buildings and five aircraft, and kill dozens of soldiers and

civilians. The attacks prompt a round-the-clock curfew in the city and the suspension of

flights.