Report

Report no. 12/20

Performance of European
"

cross-country oil
pipelines
Statistical summary of reported spillages in 2018
and since 1971
 report no. 12/20

Performance of
European cross-country
oil pipelines
Statistical summary of
reported spillages in 2018
and since 1971
This report was prepared by:
M. Cech
P. Davis
F. Gambardella
A. Haskamp
I. Huidobro Barrio

Under the supervision of:

B. Scholtissek (Concawe Science Executive)

At the request of:

Concawe Special Task Force on-Oil Pipelines performance report (OP/STF-1)

Thanks for their contribution to:

 J-F. Larivé (Consultant)

 Members of OP/STF-1

Reproduction permitted with due acknowledgement

 Concawe
Brussels
July 2020

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 report no. 12/20

ABSTRACT

Concawe has collected 48 years of spillage data on European cross-country oil

pipelines. At nearly 36,000 km the current inventory includes the majority of such
pipelines in Europe, transporting some 680 million m3 per year of crude oil and oil
products. This report covers the performance of these pipelines in 2018 and a full
historical perspective since 1971. The performance over the whole 48 years is
analysed in various ways, including gross and net spillage volumes, and spillage
causes grouped into five main categories: mechanical failure, operational,
corrosion, natural hazard and third party. The rate of inspections by in-line tools
(inspection pigs) is also reported. Product theft attempts continued to be the
main cause of spills in 2018 although the total number (10) confirmed the sharp
decline observed in 2017 (11) from previous years (87 in 2015). Another 2
spillage incidents were reported in 2018, corresponding to 0.06 spillages per 1000
km of line, about 40% of the 5-year average and an order of magnitude below the
long-term running average of 0.45, which has been steadily decreasing over the
years from a value of 1.1 in the mid-70s. There were no fires, fatalities or injuries
connected with these spills. One incident was related to a construction defect and
the other caused by accidental third-party interference. Although in recent years
there have been relatively few incidents due to third party activities (excluding
theft), this category remains the main source of spillage incidents.

KEYWORDS

Concawe, inspection pig, oil spill, performance, pipeline, safety, soil pollution,
spillage, statistics, trends, water pollution

INTERNET

This report is available as an Adobe pdf file on the Concawe website

(www.concawe.org).

NOTE
Considerable efforts have been made to assure the accuracy and reliability of the information
contained in this publication. However, neither Concawe nor any company participating in
Concawe can accept liability for any loss, damage or injury whatsoever resulting from the use
of this information.

This report does not necessarily represent the views of any company participating in Concawe.

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 report no. 12/20

CONTENTS Page

SUMMARY IV
1. INTRODUCTION 1

2. PIPELINE INVENTORY, THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC 3

2.1. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY 3
2.2. REPORTING COMPANIES 3
2.3. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2018 4
2.3.1. Pipeline service, length and diameter 4
2.3.2. Age distribution 6
2.4. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC 8
3. PIPELINE SAFETY 9
3.1. FATALITIES AND INJURIES 9
3.2. FIRES 9
4. SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS (2014-18) 11
4.1. 2018 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS 11
4.1.1. Mechanical Failure 11
4.1.2. Operational activities 11
4.1.3. Corrosion 12
4.1.4. Natural causes 12
4.1.5. Third party activity 12
4.2. 2014-2018 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW 12

5. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2018 14

5.1. NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY 14
5.2. SPILLAGE VOLUME 19
5.2.1. Aggregated annual spilled volume 19
5.2.2. Spillage volume per event 21
5.3. HOLE SIZE 23
5.4. PART OF FACILITY WHERE SPILLAGE OCCURRED 24
5.5. SPILLAGES PER DIAMETER CLASS 25
5.6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 26
5.6.1. Land use where spillage occurred 26
5.6.2. Ground area affected 26
5.6.3. Impact on water bodies 27
5.7. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY 28
6. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES 30
6.1. MECHANICAL 32
6.2. OPERATIONAL 33
6.3. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING 33
6.4. NATURAL HAZARDS 35
6.5. THIRD PARTY 35
6.5.1. Accidental damage 35
6.5.2. Incidental damage 38
6.5.3. Intentional damage 38

7. IN-LINE INSPECTIONS 40
8. PRODUCT THEFT FROM PIPELINES 43
APPENDIX 1 DEFINITIONS AND CODES 46
APPENDIX 2 SPILLAGE SUMMARY 48

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 report no. 12/20

SUMMARY

Data Collection and inventory statistics

Concawe has collected 48 years of spillage data on European cross-country oil

pipelines with particular regard to spillage volume, clean-up and recovery,
environmental consequences and causes of the incidents. The results have been
published in annual reports since 1971. This report covers the performance of these
pipelines in 2018 and provides a full historical perspective since 1971. The
performance over the whole 48-year period is analysed in various ways, including
gross and net spillage volumes, and spillage causes grouped into five main
categories: mechanical failure, operational, corrosion, natural hazard and third
party. The rate of inspections by in-line tools (inspection pigs) is also reported.

73 companies and agencies operating a total of 35,956 km of oil pipelines in Europe

are currently listed for the Concawe annual survey. For 2018, 64 operators provided
a full set of information representing over 131 pipeline systems and a combined
active length of 32,886 km. The reported volume transported in 2018 was 703 Mm3
of crude oil and refined products, somewhat lower than the 2017 figure. Total
traffic volume in 2018 was about 117x109.m3.km.

In addition, Concawe could confirm from reliable industry sources that 3 other
operators (representing 1213 km) did not suffer any spillages in 2018. Although not
accounted for in the throughput, traffic and in-line inspections data, the additional
inventory has been taken into account in the spills statistics. The 6 companies from
which no data was obtained represent 444 km.

2018 spillage incidents

10 spillages related to theft attempts (third party intentional) were reported, close
to the 2017 number (11) and in sharp decline from the record figures reported in
2015 (87) and 2016 (60). This is a good result although it is still relatively high
compared to historical levels: 28 theft-related spillage incidents were reported
between 1971 and 2012, and as many as 240 since then.

2 non theft-related spillage incidents were reported, corresponding to 0.06 spillages

per 1000 km of line. This is about 40% of the 5-year average and nearly an order of
magnitude below the long-term running average of 0.45, which has been steadily
decreasing over the years from a value of 1.1 in the mid ‘70s. There were no
reported fires, fatalities or injuries connected with these spills.

The 2 non-theft related spillages were in the Mechanical-Construction and Third

party-accidental categories. Although in recent years there have been relatively
few incidents due to third party activities (excluding theft), this category remains
the main source of spillage incidents, after theft and mechanical failure. After great
progress during the first 20 years, the frequency of mechanical failures appeared to
be on a slightly upward trend over the last decade, but this trend has been reversed
in the last 8 years.

When excluding theft events (for which the volume lost is unknown in most cases),
the gross spillage volume was 49 m3 or 1.4 m3 per 1000 km of pipeline, which is
lower than the 48-years average of 63 m3 per 1000 km of pipeline. 97% of that
volume was recovered.

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 report no. 12/20

In-line inspections

In 2018 a total of 65 sections covering a total of 11,730 km were inspected by one

or more type of in-line inspection pig. Most inspection programmes involved the
running of more than one type of pig in the same section, so that the total actual
length inspected was less at 5,182 km (16% of the inventory).

Overview of the main issues affecting pipeline integrity

Corrosion in hot pipelines: an historical problem now resolved

External corrosion in insulated pipelines transporting hot products has been a major
issue in the past, particularly in the 70s and 80s with several failures reported in
any one year. The problem was inherent to the design of these lines. Over time
most such lines have been taken out of service (only 52 km remains today from a
peak of over 1100 in the late 70s) and the issue disappeared with them, with only 4
cases recorded in the last 20 years.

30 1200

Number of corrosion-related spills

25 1000
Average inventory
20 800
Number of spills

15 600

km
10 400

5 200

0 0
1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 - 2006 - 2011 - 2016 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018

Mechanical integrity and ageing: a relatively recent issue that requires

continued attention

Most European pipeline systems were built in the ‘60s and ‘70s. Whereas, in 1971,
70% of the pipelines in the inventory were 10 years old or less, by 2018 less than 3%
were 10 years old or less and 66% were over 40 years old. Over the last two decades,
operators and regulators became concerned that ageing lines may be increasingly
prone to mechanical (e.g. metal fatigue) or corrosion-related failures.

The Concawe database provides some reassurance in this respect, showing that the
long-term decreasing trend of the failure frequency for both mechanical and
corrosion causes has continued in recent years. A spike in mechanical failures
observed towards the end of the last decade caused some concern. A detailed
analysis showed, however, that there was no correlation between fatigue related
failures and actual pipeline age. Over the last ten years the downward trend has
resumed. There is therefore no evidence that the ageing of the pipeline inventory
implies a greater risk of loss of integrity.

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 report no. 12/20

0.35
5-year moving average
0.30 Mechanical
Spillages per year per '000 km

Corrosion
0.25

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00

The development of sophisticated integrity management and maintenance systems

including the use of new techniques, such as internal inspection with inspection
pigs, has doubtlessly played a role and hold out the prospect that pipelines can
continue reliable operations for the foreseeable future. Concawe pipeline statistics,
in particular those covering the mechanical and corrosion incidents, will continue
to be used to monitor performance.

Accidental third-party interference: an on-going problem not fully resolved

Pipelines run, mostly below ground, over long distances through diverse areas and
are as such vulnerable to accidental damage caused by parties involved in digging,
excavating and other earth moving activities.

This has been an issue ever since underground pipelines were first laid. Several
measures have been put in place and actions taken over the years, including
marking, enhanced surveillance, regular contacts with landowners, utility
organisations and civil contractors and, in some countries, the development of so-
called “one-call systems” designed to encourage potential “excavators” to declare
their intentions in advance. These measures have had only limited success and,
although the frequency of related incidents has decreased following the general
trend, accidental third-party interference remains one of the major causes of
failure in the European network.

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 report no. 12/20

0.8

0.7
Spillage per year per '000 km
0.6 Third party (ex theft)

0.5 All causes (ex theft)

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0
1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 - 2006 - 2011 - 2016 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018

Product theft: a new threat being vigorously and successfully addressed

By the nature of their location and the fact that they transport valuable
commodities, oil pipelines have always been a potential target for criminals,
vandals or even terrorists. Up to the beginning on this decade, incidents involving
any of the above were few and far between in Europe (less than one incident per
year on average), mostly related to theft attempts and geographically concentrated
in South-Eastern Europe.

From 2011, there was a sharp increase in the number of theft attempts culminating
at 147 in 2015, 87 of which causing a spill. These occurred in several different
countries across the continent, often with evidence of sophisticated criminal
operations.

Beyond the potential loss of product and/or disturbance to operations, such

interference with pipelines, which involve drilling through the pipeline to install a
small-bore connection, can cause serious environmental damage and potentially
injuries or even fatalities.

Faced with this serious new threat, operators reacted promptly, enhancing
surveillance, improving leak detection system capabilities and increasing awareness
of the problem with own staff, contractors and law enforcement authorities.
Relevant information was shared within Concawe and good practices established
and disseminated. These efforts have paid off and the trend was reversed with 112
events recorded in 2016, 46 in 2017 and 36 in 2018. Indications are that the
downward trend continued in 2019 with a provisional total of 19 incidents.
Nonetheless, the annual rate is still far above the 48-years average, requiring
continued focus and vigilance.

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 report no. 12/20

160

All theft-related events

140
Theft or theft attempt having
120 caused a spill
Number of incidents

100

80
Preliminary
60

40

20

0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

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 report no. 12/20

1. INTRODUCTION

The Concawe Oil Pipelines Management Group (OPMG) has collected data on the
safety and environmental performance of oil pipelines in Europe since 1971.
Information on annual throughput and traffic, spillage incidents and in-line
inspection activities are gathered yearly by Concawe via on-line questionnaires.

The results are analysed and published annually. Summary reports were compiled
after 20 and 30 years. From the 2005 reporting year, the format and content of the
report was changed to include not only the yearly performance, but also a full
historical analysis since 1971, effectively creating an evergreen document updated
every year. This report uses this same format and therefore supersedes the 2017
data report 3/19. All previous reports have also been superseded and are now
obsolete.

In this single annual integrated report, it was, however, not considered practical to
include the full narrative description of the circumstances and consequences of
each past spillage. We have therefore created a series of separate appendices to
this report where this information can be accessed via the following links:

1971-1983/ 1984-1993 / 1994-2004 / 2005+

CONCAWE also maintains a map of the oil pipeline inventory covered by the annual
survey. The recently updated map is available in digital and interactive form at
www.concawe.eu

Aggregation and statistical analysis of the performance data provide objective

evidence of the trends, focusing attention on existing or potential problem areas,
which helps operators set priorities for future efforts. In addition to this activity
Concawe also holds a seminar, known as “COPEX” (Concawe Oil Pipeline Operators
Experience Exchange), every four years to disseminate information throughout the
oil pipeline industry on developments in techniques available to pipeline companies
to help improve the safety, reliability and integrity of their operations. These
seminars have included reviews of spillage and clean-up performance to cross-
communicate experiences so that all can learn from each other’s incidents. The last
COPEX was held in 2018.

Section 2 provides details of the pipeline inventory covered by the survey (length,
diameter, type of product transported) and how this has developed over the years.
Throughput and traffic data is also included.

Section 3 focuses on safety performance i.e. the number of fatalities and injuries
associated with pipeline spillage incidents.

Section 4 gives a detailed analysis of the spillage incidents in 2018 and of all
incidents over the last 5 reporting years.

Section 5 analyses spillage incidents for the whole reporting period since 1971 while
Section 6 provides a more detailed analysis of the causes of spillage.

Section 7 gives an account of in-line inspections.

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 report no. 12/20

In 2015, to address the increasing number of theft-related spill incidents, the

Concawe survey was updated to include an additional section on product theft. This
new section captures data on all theft events, including those that did not result in
a reportable spill. The findings from this new section of the survey are discussed in
Section 8.

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 report no. 12/20

2. PIPELINE INVENTORY, THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC

2.1. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE SURVEY

The definition of pipelines to be included in the Concawe inventory has remained

unchanged since 1971. These are pipelines:

 Used for transporting crude oil or petroleum products,

 With a length of 2 km or more in the public domain,
 Running cross-country, including short estuary or river crossings but excluding
under-sea pipeline systems. In particular, lines serving offshore crude oil
production facilities and offshore tanker loading/discharge facilities are
excluded.
 Pump stations, intermediate above-ground installations and intermediate
storage facilities are included, but origin and destination terminal facilities and
tank farms are excluded.

The minimum reportable spillage size has been set at 1 m3 (unless exceptional
safety or environmental consequences are reported for a <1 m3 spill).

All the above criteria are critical parameters to consider when comparing different
spillage data sets, as different criteria can significantly affect the results.

The geographical region covered was originally consistent with Concawe’s original
terms of reference i.e. OECD Western Europe, which then included 19 member
countries, although Turkey was never covered. From 1971 to 1987, only pipelines
owned by oil industry companies were included, but from 1988, non-commercially
owned pipeline systems (essentially NATO) were brought into the inventory.
Following the reunification of Germany, the pipelines in former East Germany (DDR)
were added to the database from 1991. This was followed by Czech and Hungarian
crude and product lines in 2001, Slovakian crude and product lines in 2003 and some
of the Croatian crude lines in 2007. From 2013 additional Croatian crude lines were
included.

Although Concawe cannot guarantee that every single pipeline that meets the above
criteria is actually covered, it is believed that most such lines operated in the
reporting countries are included. Notable exceptions are NATO lines in Italy,
Greece, Norway and Portugal as well as all crude and product pipelines in Poland.

It should be noted that all data recorded in this report and used for comparisons or
statistical analysis relate to the inventory reported in each particular year, and not
to the actual total inventory in operation at the time. Thus, year-on-year
performance comparisons must be approached with caution and frequencies (i.e.
figures normalised per 1000 km of line) are more meaningful than absolute figures.

2.2. REPORTING COMPANIES

73 companies and agencies operating a total of 35,956 km of oil pipelines in Europe

are currently listed for the Concawe annual survey. This total includes affiliates and
joint ventures of large oil companies. This number has remained essentially
constant over the years, as the impact of new operators joining in was compensated
by various mergers.

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 report no. 12/20

For the 2018 reporting year, 64 companies completed the survey. In addition,
Concawe received information from reliable industry sources confirming that 3
additional companies suffered no spills in 2018. Although not accounted for in the
throughput, traffic and in-line inspections data, the additional inventory operated
by this company has been taken into account in the spills statistics. Although there
were no public reports of spillage incidents for the remaining 6 companies, they
have not been included in the statistics. The proportion of responding companies,
as well as the fraction of the inventory included in the statistics, have been
reasonably stable over the years.

2.3. INVENTORY DEVELOPMENTS 1971-2018

2.3.1. Pipeline service, length and diameter

The 64 companies that reported in 2018 operate 131 pipeline systems split into 623
active sections running along a total of 32,886 km plus 25 sections covering 1413 km
which are currently (but not permanently) out of service. These latter sections are
included in the reported inventory which therefore stands at 34,264 km. The 9
companies from which we received no or partial information represent 1657 km
split into 48 sections in 18 systems.

For the purpose of the spill statistics we considered the “active” inventory i.e. the
32,886 km mentioned above, to which we added that of the 3 companies that did
not provide data but were confirmed to have suffered no spills in 2018 (1213 km),
bringing the total active inventory to 34,099 km.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of this "Concawe inventory” over the years since 1971.
The two historical step increases occurred when systems previously not accounted
for in the survey were added. In the late 80s the majority of the NATO pipelines
were included and, at the beginning of the last decade, a number of former Eastern
bloc systems joined the survey. The increase was mostly in the "products" category,
the main addition in the crude oil category being the Friendship or "Druzba" system
that feeds Russian crude oil into Eastern European refineries.

Over the years a total of 273 sections have been permanently taken out of service,
reducing the inventory by 11,608 km.

Figure 1 represents the pipeline length reported to Concawe in each year and does
not give an account of when these pipelines were put into service. Most of the major
pipelines were built in the ‘60s and ‘70s and a large number of them had already
been in service for some time when they were first reported on in the Concawe
survey. This aspect is covered in the discussion of pipeline age distribution in the
next section.

The sections are further classified according to their service, i.e. the type of
product transported, for which we distinguish crude oil, white products, heated
black products (hot oil) and other products. A few pipelines transport both crude
oil and products. Although these are categorised separately in the database they
are considered to be in the crude oil category for aggregation purposes. A small
number of lines may be reported as out of service in a certain year without being
permanently retired in which case they are still considered to be part of the
inventory. The three main populations are referred to as crude, product and "hot"
in this report. The last one refers to insulated lines transporting hot products such
as heavy fuel oil or lubricant components.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 1 shows that the first two categories represent the bulk of the total
inventory. Out of the 273 sections that have been retired since 1971, 25 (1160 km)
were in the “hot” category. The remaining “hot” inventory consists of 52 km
distributed between 20 km in 4 sections transporting heavy fuel oil and 32 km in 4
sections transporting lubricant components. This reflects the decline in the heavy
fuel oil business since the mid-1970s, but also specific action taken by operating
companies because of the corrosion problems and generally poor reliability
experienced with several of these pipelines (see Section 5.1).

Figure 1 Concawe oil pipeline inventory and main service categories

40 Total 1600
Crude
35 White products 1400
Cold and total pipelines inventory ('000 km)

HOT

30 1200

Hot pipelines inventory (km)

25 1000

20 800

15 600

10 400

5 200

0 0

Figure 2 shows the diameter distribution in 2018 for each service category. In
general, the crude pipelines are significantly larger than the other two categories.
86% of the crude pipelines are 16” (400 mm) or larger, up to a maximum of 44”
(1100 mm), whereas 85% of the product lines are smaller than 16”. The largest hot
pipeline is 20”. The smallest diameter product pipelines are typically 6” (150 mm)
although a very small number are as small as 3” (75 mm).

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 2 European oil pipeline diameter (inches) distribution and service in 2018

100%

>=30
80%
24 - <30

16 - <24
60%

12 - <16

40% 8 - <12

<8

20%

0%
Crude Products HOT

2.3.2. Age distribution

When the Concawe survey was first performed in 1971, the pipeline system was
comparatively new, with some 70% being 10 years old or less. Although the age
distribution was quite wide, the oldest pipelines were in the 26-30 year age bracket
and represented only a tiny fraction of the inventory.

Over the years, a number of new pipelines have been commissioned, while older
ones have been taken out of service. As mentioned above, existing lines were also
added to the inventory at various stages, contributing their specific age profile.
Although some short sections may have been renewed, there has been no large-
scale replacement of existing lines. The development of the overall age profile is
shown in Figure 3a.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 3a European oil pipeline historical age distribution (years)

100% 40

90% 1-10
35
11-20
80% 21-30
Total 30
31-40
70% length
41-50 surveyed
25
60% 51-60

'000 km
60+
50% 20

40%
15
30%
10
20%
5
10%

0% 0

The system has been progressively ageing. The 2018 age distribution is shown on
Figure 3b both for discreet age brackets and cumulatively: only 929 km, i.e. 2.8%
of the total, was 10 years old or less while 21,660 km (65.9%) was over 40 years old.
The relevance of age on spillage performance is discussed in Section 6.3.

Figure 3b European Oil pipeline age distribution in 2018

20% 100%
% of total inventory up to and including age bracket

16% 80%
% of total inventory in age bracket

12% 60%

8% 40%

4% 20%

0% 0%
0-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71+

Pipeline age bracket (years)

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2.4. THROUGHPUT AND TRAFFIC

Some 703 Mm3 (324 Mm3 of crude oil and 378 Mm3 of refined products) were
transported in the surveyed pipelines in 2018. The crude oil transported represents
about 60% of the combined throughput of European refineries. It should be realised
however, that this figure is only indicative. Large volumes of both crude and
products pass through more than one pipeline, and whilst every effort is made to
count the flow only once, the complexity of some pipeline systems is such that it is
often difficult to estimate what went where. Indeed, there are a few pipelines
where the flow can be in either direction.

A more meaningful figure is the traffic volume which is, for a given pipeline section,
the total volume transported annually (m3) times the length of the section (km).
This is not affected by how many different pipelines each parcel of oil is pumped
through. In 2018, the total reported traffic volume was about 117x109 m3.km,
slightly higher than the 2017 figure and split between 73x109 m3.km for crude and
43x109 m3.km for products (with an insignificant number for hot lines).

Throughput and traffic are reported here to give a sense of the size of the oil
pipeline industry in Europe. These are not, however, considered to be significant
factors for pipeline spillage incidents. Although higher flow rates may lead to higher
pressure, line deterioration through metal fatigue is known to be related to pressure
cycles rather than to the absolute pressure level (as long as this remains within
design limits). These figures are, however, useful as a divider to express spillage
volumes in relative terms (e.g. as a fraction of throughput, see Section 4), providing
figures that can be compared with the performance of other modes of oil
transportation.

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3. PIPELINE SAFETY

The Concawe pipeline database includes records of fatalities, injuries and fires
related to spillages.

3.1. FATALITIES AND INJURIES

No spillage-related fatalities or injuries were reported in 2018.

Over the 48 reporting years there have been a total of 14 fatalities in five separate
incidents in 1975, 79, 89, 96 and 99. All but one of these fatalities occurred when
people were caught in a fire following a spillage.

In three of the four fire-related incidents the ignition was a delayed event that
occurred hours or days after the spillage detection and demarcation of the spillage
area had taken place. In one incident involving a spillage of chemical feedstock;
naphtha, 3 people were engulfed in fire, having themselves possibly been the cause
of ignition. In another incident, ignition of spilled crude oil occurred during
attempts to repair the damaged pipeline. The repairers escaped but the spread of
the fire caught 4 people who had entered inside the marked spillage boundary some
distance away. The third incident also involved a maintenance crew (5 people)
carrying out repair activities following a crude oil spill, none of whom escaped.
These fatalities all occurred after the spillage flows had been stemmed, i.e. during
the subsequent incident management and reinstatement period. In all three cases
the fatalities were not directly caused by the spillages but by fires occurring during
the remediation process. Stronger management of spillage area security and
working procedures might well have prevented these fires and subsequent
fatalities.

In just one case, fire ensued almost immediately when a bulldozer doing
construction work hit and ruptured a gasoline pipeline. A truck driver engaged in
the works received fatal injuries.

The single non-fire fatality was a person engaged in a theft attempt who was unable
to escape from a pit which he had dug to expose and drill into the pipeline. This
caused a leak that filled the pit with product in which the person drowned.

A total of 3 injuries have been reported over the years. Single non-fatal injuries
were recorded in both 1988 and 1989, both resulting from inhalation / ingestion of
oil spray/aerosol. There was one injury to a third party in 2006.

3.2. FIRES

There was no spillage-related fire reported in 2018.

Apart from those mentioned above, five other fires are on record:

 A large crude oil spill near a motorway probably ignited by the traffic.

 A gasoline theft attempt in a section of pipeline located on a pipe bridge. The

perpetrators may have deliberately ignited it.

 A slow leak in a crude production line in a remote country area found to be

burning when discovered. It could have been ignited purposely to limit the
pollution.

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 A tractor and plough that had caused a gasoline spill caught fire, and the fire
also damaged a house and a railway line.

 A mechanical digger damaged a gasoline pipeline and also an electricity cable,

which ignited the spill.

There were no casualties reported in any of these incidents.

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4. SPILLAGE PERFORMANCE IN THE LAST 5 YEARS (2014-18)

4.1. 2018 SPILLAGE INCIDENTS

12 spillage incidents were recorded in 2018, 10 of which were related to theft

attempts (Third Party Intentional). Table 1 gives a summary of the main causes and
spilled volumes and environmental impact. For definition of categories of causes
and gross/net spilled volume, see Appendix 1.

Theft attempt from pipelines has been a concern in recent years, causing a small
number of spillages in 2011 and 2012. The number jumped to 18 in 2013, 54 in 2014,
and 87 in 2015. The first sign of decline came in 2016 with 60 spillages followed by
11 in 2017. The 2018 figure strongly confirms that efforts by operators to reduce
theft attempts have borne fruit. The problem still remains though, albeit at a low
level, and continues to be a challenge for operators. While theft tended in the past
to be an issue in Southern and Eastern Europe it is now more widespread, affecting
also central and North/ West Europe.

The circumstances of each spill, including information on consequences and

remediation actions are described in the next section according to cause. Further
details are available in Appendix 2 which covers all spillage events recorded since
1971.

Table 1 Summary of causes and spilled volumes for 2018 incidents

Event Facility Line size Product Injury Fire Spilled volume Contamination
(") spilled Fatality Gross Net loss Ground area Water

(1) (2)
(m3) (m2) (3)

Mechanical
Construction
768 Underground pipe 12 White product - - 9.1 1.4 240 S, G
Third party activity
Accidental
767 Underground pipe 6 White product - - 40.0 0.0 0
Theft or theft attempt
757-765 No details available
766 Underground pipe 12 White product - - 12.0 0.0 80
(1)
Spillage events are numbered from the beginning of the survey in 1971
(2)
I = Injury, F = Fatality
(3)
S = Surface water, G = Groundwater, P = Potable water

4.1.1. Mechanical Failure

There was one spillage in this category in 2018, in the “Construction” sub-category.

Event 768:
A temporary repair clamp, which had been installed on an attempted theft point,
developed a leak. The leak was identified, and permanently repaired, in March
2018. The clamp had been installed in December 2016.

4.1.2. Operational activities

There were no spillages in this category in 2018.

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 report no. 12/20

4.1.3. Corrosion

There were no spillages in this category in 2018.

4.1.4. Natural causes

There were no spillages in this category in 2018.

4.1.5. Third party activity

There were 11 spillage incidents in this category in 2018 all but one theft-related.
One incident was in the “Third Party Accidental” category.

Accidental

Event 767:
An excavator hit and punctures the pipeline in an agricultural area. It appeared that
the pipeline operator was not made aware of this activity being undertaken while
the machinery operator was also unaware of the presence of the pipeline. Some
40 m3 of gasoline were spilled, the bulk of which was recovered through the
emergency response actions and subsequent soil cleaning.

Theft-related

Events 757-766:
No details available.

Event 767:
The pipeline control centre was alerted of a leak by a member of the public (who
is believed to be the perpetrator of the theft attempt). This was confirmed by
pressure monitoring. Pumping was stopped immediately and the relevant section
shutoff while staff were sent to the presumed location where the leak was quickly
located and dealt with.

4.2. 2014-2018 SPILLAGE OVERVIEW

Table 2 shows 5-year trends in spill incident causes and also spill volumes, from
2014-2018. Spillage volume due to theft has been excluded from the spill volume
statistics so that the baseline performance of the European pipeline network,
excluding intentional damage (i.e. product theft) is apparent.

Only 2 non-theft related spillages were reported in 2018, well below the
5.2 spillages per year average for the last 5 years and well below the long- term
average of 10.6.

Excluding product theft, the total reported gross spilled volume was low at 49 m3
in 2018, compared to the averages of 283 m3 for the last 5 years and 1665 m3 since
records began in 1971. 97% of the spilled oil was recovered.

Some temporary environmental contamination was reported for 2 of the

12 incidents, although no detailed information was provided for 10 out of the 11
theft-related incidents.

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 report no. 12/20

Table 2 5-year comparison by cause, volume and impact: 2014– 2018

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2014-2018
Average

3
Combined Length km x 10 34.0 36.0 34.1 33.4 34.1 34.3
3 6
Combined Throughput m x 10 681 760 755 720 703 724
3 9
Combined traffic volume m x km x 10 120 121 119 128 117 121
Spillage incidents Total
All incidents 58 93 66 13 12 242
Excluding theft 4 6 6 2 2 20
MECHANICAL FAILURE
Construction 1 1 2
Design and Materials 1 2 1 4
OPERATIONAL
System
Human 2 2
CORROSION
External 2 3 5
Internal 1 1
Stress corrosion cracking
NATURAL HAZARD
Ground movement
Other
THIRD PARTY ACTIVITY
Accidental 2 2 1 5
Incidental 1 1
Intentional (theft) 54 87 60 11 10 222
3
Volume spilled (ex theft) m Average
Gross spillage 518 61 756 33 49 283
Net loss 4 19 235 0 1 52
Average gross loss / incident 130 10 126 17 25 71
Average net loss / incident 1 3 39 0 1 13
Average gross loss/1000 km 15 2 22 1 1 13
Average net loss/1000 km 0 1 7 0 0 4
Gross spillage/ throughput ppm 0.8 0.1 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.4
Gross spillage per cause
Mechanical failure 5 32 11 0 9 11
Operational 0 0 0 33 0 7
Corrosion 0 29 217 0 0 49
Natural hazard 0 0 0 0 0 0
Third party activity (ex theft) 513 0 528 0 40 216
Net loss distribution
(No of incidents)
≤ 10 4 5 3 2 4 18
11 -100 1 2 3
101- 1000 1 1
> 1000 m3 0
Environmental impact
NONE or not reported 48 83 66 13 10 220
SOIL (affected surface area)
< 1000 m2 6 10 7 2 25
2 4 1 5
> 1000 m
WATER BODIES
Surface Water 1 2 1 4
Groundwater 1 1 2
POTABLE WATER

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 report no. 12/20

5. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGES 1971-2018

As mentioned in section 4, the unprecedented growth in theft-related spillage

incidents over the last few years has the potential to distort long term statistics.
Where appropriate, we have presented the statistics with and without these
incidents.

5.1. NUMBERS AND FREQUENCY

Over the 48 years survey period there have been a total of 766 spillage incidents,
498 when excluding theft. 68 of these spillages occurred in "hot" pipelines, a
disproportionately large proportion in relation to the share of such pipelines in the
total inventory (note that such hot pipelines have now virtually disappeared from
the active inventory with only 52 km left in operation, from a peak of around
1100 km).

Figure 4a/b show the number of spillages per year, moving average and 5-year
average trends over the 48 years since 1971 for all pipelines including and excluding
theft-related incidents. Figure 4a shows a long-term downward trend in total
spillages per year until the beginning of this decade followed by a major spike due
to the sudden rise in product theft.

Figure 4b shows that the overall 5-year moving average, excluding theft, has
decreased from about 18 spillages per year in the early 1970s to 4.0 in 2018 (48.4
when including theft-related spills), which bears witness to the industry’s improved
control of pipeline integrity. The moving average increases in the late ‘80s to early
‘90s and again in the early 2000s are partly linked to the additions to the pipeline
inventory monitored by Concawe.

Figure 4a 48-year trend of the total annual number of spillages (all pipelines)
Including theft

100
Yearly
90
Running average
80
5-year moving average
70
Spillages per year

60
50
40
30
20
10
0

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 4b 48-year trend of the total annual number of spillages (all pipelines)
Excluding theft

25
Yearly
Running average
20
5-year moving average
Spillages per year

15

10

Several step changes in the inventory surveyed by Concawe over the years make the
absolute numbers difficult to interpret. The spillage frequency i.e. number of spills
per unit length of pipeline is therefore a more meaningful metric. Figure 5a/b
shows the same data as Figure 4a/b, now expressed in spillages per 1000 km of
pipeline (as per the reporting inventory in each year). Figure 5b shows that the 5-
year moving average spillage frequency has reduced from around 1.1 in the mid ‘70s
to 0.12 spills per year and per 1000 km of pipeline in 2018. When theft is included
(Figure 5a) the 2018 value increases to 1.39.

Figure 5a 48-year trend of the spillage frequency (all pipelines)

Including theft

3.0
Yearly
Spillages per year per '000 km

2.5 Running average

5-year moving average

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 5b 48-year trend of the spillage frequency (all pipelines)

Excluding theft

1.6
Yearly
1.4
Spillages per year per '000 km

Running average
1.2 5-year moving average

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0.0

These overall figures mask the poorer performance of hot pipelines (related to
corrosion issues, see Section 5.1), particularly in the early part of the period. This
is illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the spillage frequency for hot oil pipelines to
be almost an order of magnitude higher than for cold pipelines. Hot oil pipelines
have now been almost completely phased out, hence the low frequency in recent
years, although one such pipeline developed a leak in 2018.

Figure 6 5-year moving average of spillage frequency (hot and cold pipelines)

1.6 16.0
Spillages per year per '000 km (Cold lines)

Spillages per year per '000 km (Hot lines)

1.4 Cold 14.0

Cold ex theft
1.2 12.0
HOT
1.0 10.0

0.8 8.0

0.6 6.0

0.4 4.0

0.2 2.0

0.0 0.0

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 report no. 12/20

Figures 7&8 show the evolution over 5-year periods of the spillage frequency for
hot and cold pipelines respectively, now broken down according to their main cause.
For cold pipelines we have presented the figures with (Figure 8a) and without theft-
related events (Figure 8b).

The hot pipeline spillage frequency starts from a much higher base than is the case
for the cold pipelines, with a very large proportion of spillage incidents being due
to corrosion. In the 1970s and early ‘80s several hot pipelines suffered repeated
external corrosion failures due to design and construction deficiencies. They were
gradually shutdown or switched to clean (cold) product service, greatly contributing
to the remarkable performance improvement. There were 3 spillages between 1996
and 2000, one in 2002 and one in 2016. Recent frequency figures are strongly skewed
by the 2016 event and not statistically meaningful.

When the hot pipeline data are excluded, the cold pipelines show a somewhat
slower improvement trend than for the total data set. Nevertheless, the frequency
of spillages has been reduced by nearly three quarters over the last 48 years (when
excluding theft). This statistic best represents the performance improvement
achieved by the operators of the bulk of the pipeline system.

For cold pipelines we have shown theft-related events separately. There is a gradual
decrease in the frequency of all causes except theft. Corrosion is a much less
prevalent cause of failure for cold than hot pipelines. Although third party activities
(excluding theft) have historically by and large been the most prevalent cause of
spillage, there have been relatively few cases in recent years so that the cause
structure has become more balanced. Mechanical causes increased during the last
decade to be on a par with non-theft third party causes but this trend appears to
have reversed since the beginning of this decade. A more complete analysis of
causes is given in Section 6.

Figure 7 Hot pipelines spillage frequencies by cause

100% 10.0

80% 8.0
Spills per year per '000 km

3rd party

60% 6.0 Natural

Corrosion

Operational
40% 4.0
Mechanical

All causes
frequency
20% 2.0

0% 0.0
1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 - 2006 - 2011 - 2016 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 8a Cold pipelines spillage frequencies by cause

Including theft

100% 2.0

Theft
80% 1.6 3rd party ex theft

Spills per year per '000 km

Natural

60% 1.2 Corrosion

Operational

Mechanical
40% 0.8
All causes frequency

All causes fequency

ex theft
20% 0.4

0% 0.0
1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 - 2006 - 2011 - 2016 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018

Figure 8b Cold pipelines spillage frequencies by cause

Excluding theft

100% 1.0

3rd party ex theft

80% 0.8
Spills per year per '000 km

Natural

60% 0.6 Corrosion

Operational

40% 0.4 Mechanical

All causes frequency

20% 0.2

0% 0.0
1971 - 1976 - 1981 - 1986 - 1991 - 1996 - 2001 - 2006 - 2011 - 2016 -
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2018

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 report no. 12/20

5.2. SPILLAGE VOLUME

Spilled volume is generally difficult or impossible to determine in the case of theft-

related events as spillage may have occurred over a period of time and one cannot
determine how much was spilled or indeed how much was stolen. This section
therefore excludes theft-related incidents.

5.2.1. Aggregated annual spilled volume

Figure 9 shows the total gross spillage volume over the complete period, year by
year and in terms of running and 5-year moving average. The same data is shown
per 1000 km of pipeline in Figure 10 and as a proportion of throughput in Figure 11.
Although there are fairly large year-to-year variations mostly due to a few very large
spills that have occurred randomly over the years, the long-term trend is clearly
downwards, probably a consequence of the lower number of spills per year. Over
the last 5 years, the gross pipeline spillage has averaged 0.5 parts per million (ppm)
of the oil transported.

It might be expected that the trend in the differences between the annual gross
volume spillage and the net volume spillage, i.e. the recovered spillage, would
indicate the degree of success in improving clean-up performance. In practice this
is not necessarily the case. Maximum removal by excavation of contaminated soil is
not necessarily the correct response to minimise environmental damage and this is
now better understood than it once was. Another compounding factor is that the
growth in the pipeline inventory has been predominantly for refined product
pipelines and it can be assumed that less invasive recovery techniques are justified
for white oil products than for fuel oil or crude oil to achieve a given visual and
environmental standard of clean-up. The 5-year running average of the annual
recovery percentages ((gross-net) / gross) is shown in Figure 12, fluctuating around
the 60% mark. Over the whole period, the average recovery of spilled oil is 60%
(100% in 2018) leaving an average net loss of oil to the environment of 65 m3 per
spill.

Figure 9 Gross spillage volume (excluding theft)

Yearly
7000
Running average

6000 5-year moving average

5000

4000
m3

3000

2000

1000

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 10 Gross spillage volume per 1000 km (excluding theft)

350
Yearly
300 Running average

5-year moving average

250

200
m3/'000 km

150

100

50

Figure 11 Gross yearly spillage volume as a proportion of throughput (excluding theft)

13
Yearly

5-year moving average

10

8
ppm

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 12 Spilled oil recovery (5-year moving average) (excluding theft)

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

5.2.2. Spillage volume per event

The gross volume released is a measure of the severity of a spillage incident. While
a large proportion of spills involve low volumes, one or a few events involving large
volumes can have a very large impact on the annual as well as long term averages
so that trends can be difficult to discern.

At around 120 m3 per spill, the gross spill volume 5-year moving average over the
9 years to 2008 had consistently been lower than the long-term average of 170 m3
per spill. A single very large spill recorded in 2009 pushed up this figure to 191 m3
per spill for that year and even higher for the 4 subsequent years. With no such
large incidents in the last 5 years the 2018 figure is again low at 77 m3 per spill. It
can be expected that improved monitoring of pipelines and the generalised use of
automated leak detection systems will lead to a reduction in spill sizes. There is
insufficient data on record to establish any trend in the speed of detection or the
response time to stem leakages.

Figure 13 shows a small reduction in the gross spill volume 5-year moving average
since 1975, with superimposed large year-by-year variation. This indicates that the
long-term reduction in total spilled volume (c.f. Figure 9) is mainly due to a
reduction in the number of incidents, rather than the spill volume per incident.
Changes in the mix of spillage causes may also account for this: for example, the
proportion of corrosion spillages, which on average are smaller ones, has decreased
relative to third party spillages (excluding theft) which tend to be larger (see
Figure 14).

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 13 Yearly gross spillage volume per event (5-year moving average)
(excluding theft)

600 5-year moving average

Annual average
500

400
m3 per spill

300

200

100

Figure 14 shows the average spill size for each cause category. The largest spillages
on average have resulted from mechanical failure, third party activities and natural
hazards, whereas operational problems and corrosion have caused smaller spills. As
a rule of thumb, on average the three “largest spills” categories result in spillages
that are twice the size of the two “smallest spills” categories.

Figure 14 48-year average gross spillage volume per event by cause (excluding theft)

250
Average gross volume spilled (m3)

200

150

100

50

0
Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party
(ex theft)

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 15 shows the distribution of spillage sizes, demonstrating that less than 20%
of all spillages account for 80% of the cumulative gross volume spilled and over 90%
of the net spillages, with little change over the years. Clearly a majority of the
spillages recorded in the Concawe database were so small that they have only had
a very limited and localised impact. This also highlights the importance of
considering the cut-off spillage size before comparing data sets taken from different
sources.

Figure 15 Distribution of gross and net spillage sizes (over 48 years and since 1995)
(excluding theft)

100%
% of cumulative volume spilled/lost

80%
Gross spillage volume

Net loss
60%
Gross spillage volume 1995+

40%

20%

0%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

% of spillage events

5.3. HOLE SIZE

The following definitions have been adopted within this report for classifying hole
size:

 No hole = failure of a gasket or seal, or a mechanical breakage in a piece of

equipment other than the pipeline itself,
 Pinhole = less than 2 mm x 2 mm,
 Fissure = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% max wide,
 Hole = 2 to 75 mm long x 10% min wide,
 Split = 75 to 1000 mm long x 10% max wide,
 Rupture = >75 mm long x 10% min wide.

Note that the “no hole” category was only introduced in the mid 00s. Before that
time the hole size for such events was reported as “unknown” or left blank.

Hole size data are only available for 352 (46%) out of the 766 spillages recorded (286
out of 498 or 57% ex theft). The corresponding statistics are shown in Table 3 for
all spillages (excluding theft).

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 report no. 12/20

Table 3 Distribution of spillages by hole size (excluding theft)

Hole type No hole Pinhole Fissure Hole Split Rupture Overall
Number of events 13 37 48 75 52 61 286
% 5% 13% 17% 26% 18% 21% 100%
Hole caused by
Mechanical 10 5 14 14 17 7 67
Operational 2 0 1 2 3 5 13
Corrosion 0 27 11 25 17 5 85
Natural hazard 0 1 2 0 2 2 7
Third party (ex theft) 1 4 20 34 13 42 114
Gross average m3 41 29 230 83 238 355 0
spillage per event

Spillages not involving a hole in the lines normally relate to failures of fittings and
other ancillary equipment (gaskets, pump seals, etc), hence the strong link to
mechanical failures. Pinholes are mostly caused by corrosion. Larger holes are often
the result of third party activities, although corrosion and mechanical failures also
take their share. The majority of third party incidents result in larger holes.

A relationship may be expected between hole size and spill volume for an
operational pipeline on the basis that higher leakage rates arise from larger holes,
and because hole sizes are to an extent related to the pipeline diameter, which in
turn sets the potential flow rate available for leakage. However, there are many
other factors involved, including the pressure in the pipeline, the volume of pipe
available to leak after shut in and the length of time between the start of leakage,
the leak being detected and pipeline shut- in. Table 3 suggests that there is indeed
a weak relationship between the average gross spillage size and the hole size.

Table 4 shows the evolution of the number of events per 1000 km of pipeline
inventory (frequency) by hole type and 5-year period. Note that early figures (say
before 1985) are not very representative as hole type was not commonly reported
at the time. There is no discernible trend.

Table 4 Spill frequency by hole size

Event/1000 km 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-05 2006-10 2011-15 2016-18
No hole 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.11 0.00
Pinhole 0.27 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.20 0.17 0.26 0.09
Fissure 0.32 0.21 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.09 0.40 0.00
Hole 0.16 0.41 0.54 0.37 0.54 0.63 0.28 0.94 0.33
Split 0.64 0.41 0.46 0.23 0.10 0.20 0.03 0.09 0.03
Rupture 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.43 0.17 0.26 0.28 0.11 0.06
All reported events 1.67 1.45 1.70 1.37 1.11 1.47 1.17 1.90 0.50
Not reported 1.99 1.45 0.79 0.87 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.23 0.06

Note: total figures exclude multiple theft events for which no details are available

5.4. PART OF FACILITY WHERE SPILLAGE OCCURRED

Table 5 shows this data expressed in both percentage of all spills within each
category and percentage of all reported events (non-theft related). 67% of all non-
theft related leaks and 86% of theft-related incidents occur in underground pipeline
sections, which form the major part of the overall pipeline system.

However, particularly for Mechanical and Operational causes, a sizeable proportion

of incidents are related to valves, flanges, joints and small bore connection failures
indicating that these and other fittings are vulnerable items. Adding seemingly

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 report no. 12/20

useful features such as more section block valves, instrument connections or

sampling systems can therefore potentially have a negative impact on spillage
frequency. Small bore lines are also associated with a higher spillage frequency
because they are mechanically vulnerable and often subject to corrosion. Wherever
possible, these more vulnerable features should be designed out of the pipeline
system.

Table 5 Part of facility where spillage occurred, by main cause

Total Bend Joint Pipe run Valve Pump Pig trap Small bore Not reported
Mechanical 136 7.4% 32.4% 25.0% 15.4% 2.2% 1.5% 11.0% 5.1%
2.0% 8.9% 6.8% 4.2% 0.6% 0.4% 3.0% 1.4%
Operational 37 0.0% 5.4% 16.2% 32.4% 2.7% 10.8% 16.2% 16.2%
0.0% 0.4% 1.2% 2.4% 0.2% 0.8% 1.2% 1.2%
Corrosion 141 0.7% 6.4% 87.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 2.1% 2.8%
0.2% 1.8% 24.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.6% 0.8%
Natural 15 0.0% 6.7% 80.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.3% 0.0%
0.0% 0.2% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0%
3rd party (ex theft) 168 0.6% 1.2% 93.5% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8% 2.4%
0.2% 0.4% 31.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.8%
All (ex theft) 497 2.4% 11.7% 66.8% 6.8% 0.8% 1.4% 5.8% 4.2%
3rd party (theft) 265 0.0% 0.4% 86.4% 12.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 0.8%
Percentages in italic are related to the total of all non-theft -related events

5.5. SPILLAGES PER DIAMETER CLASS

In Figure 16 the frequencies of spillages have been calculated for the average
length of each diameter class for the periods 1971 to 1987, 1988 to 2000 and 2001
to 2018. These periods have been chosen because of the major change in the
reported pipeline inventory between 1987 and 1988 following the inclusion of the
non-commercially owned pipelines and from the beginning of the current decade
when a number of Eastern European pipelines operators joined the survey.

Figure 16 Spillage frequencies per diameter class

1971-1987
2.0
1988-2000
2001-2017
Spillages per year per '000 km

1.6

1.2

0.8

0.4

0.0
< 8" 8 to 12" 12 to 16" 16 to 24" 24 to 30" > 30"

25
 report no. 12/20

Clearly smaller pipelines are more liable to develop leaks than larger ones. A
number of possible reasons for this could be postulated, but there is no way of
determining from the available data what each risk-increasing factor might
contribute. Neither is there sufficient data on depth below surface to indicate how
much the risk is reduced by deeper coverage. It is not recorded if large diameter
pipelines have greater coverage than smaller ones.

5.6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

5.6.1. Land use where spillage occurred

We differentiate between spillages occurring either in the pipeline itself or in

pumping stations and also record the type of land use in the area. Not surprisingly,
most incidents (80%) occurred in the cross-country pipelines themselves. The type
of location has been reported for a total of 496 spillages (out of 766). The results
of this analysis are provided in Table 6.

While we do not have statistics for the length of pipeline installed for each land use
type, it is clear that the number of spillages in commercial and industrial areas is
higher than would be expected from consideration of installed length alone.
Evidently, the vulnerability of the pipelines is significantly increased in such areas
by a factor of possibly as much as ten compared to other areas. The majority of the
spillages from pump stations occur in industrial/commercial areas simply because
this is where most of them are located.

Table 6 Location of spillage incidents

Underground pipe Above ground pipe Pump Station
Number Crude/ % Number % Number %
Product
Residential high density 17 3/14 4% 2 5% 0 0%
Residential low density 200 55/145 51% 11 30% 9 14%
Agricultural 73 5/68 18% 3 8% 3 5%
Industrial or commercial 83 22/61 21% 19 51% 51 81%
Forest Hills 17 2/15 4% 0 0% 0 0%
Barren 4 2/2 1% 0 0% 0 0%
Water body 2 0/2 1% 2 5% 0 0%
Total 396 37 63
Unspecified 270

5.6.2. Ground area affected

The current Concawe pipeline performance questionnaire, in use with minor

changes since 1983, requests reporting of the area of ground (m2) affected by the
spillage. Before that date, area data were reported infrequently. Area data is
available for 322 events (42% of all recorded spillages). For these events, the
percentages that fall within the area ranges are shown in Figure 17 together with
the average spill size for each category.

In the history of the survey only one spillage affected more than 100,000 m2,
although the gross volume spilt was relatively modest. For all other spillages, there
appears to be a direct relationship between spill size and area affected, with the
area affected increasing slowly at first and then more rapidly where the average
spill volume exceeds 100 m3. This suggests that very large spills behave differently

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 report no. 12/20

to smaller releases, which could happen, for example, if product escaping at a high
flow rate was to migrate across the surface, rather than in the subsurface.

It should be noted that small spillage volumes can affect larger areas at the surface
if fine sprays are directed upwards and spread around by winds, or if material is
spread over larger areas by flowing water. Conversely, comparatively large spills,
particularly those that occur over extended periods of time and in the lower
quadrants of the pipeline circumference, can have their main effect underground
with relatively little impact on the surface. Porous ground and hot, arid conditions
can also lead to the surface consequences being limited.

Figure 17 Ground area (m2) affected by spillages (% of number reporting)

50% 1000

Aevrage gross spilled volume per event (m3)

% of events where reported

40% 800

30% 600

20% 400

10% 200

0% 0
<10 10-99 100-999 1000-9999 10,000-99,999 >=100,000
Area affected (m2)

5.6.3. Impact on water bodies

The Concawe survey records whether spillages had consequences for the abstraction
of potable water. 14 spillages, representing 1.9% of the total, have had some effect.
It is understood that all of these effects have been temporary.

Since 2001 impacts on other types of water have been included. Of the 375 reported
spillages since then, 19 have affected surface water, 18 have affected ground water
but only 2 have impacted potable water supplies.

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 report no. 12/20

5.7. SPILLAGE DISCOVERY

The way in which the occurrence of a spillage was detected is reported in

6 categories (Figure 18) and for three types of facility. The pattern for spillages
from pump stations differs from that from pipelines.

Figure 18 Discovery of spillages

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
Underground pipe Above ground pipe Pump Station

RoW surveillance by pipeline operator Routine monitoring by pipeline operator

Automatic detection system Pressure testing
Third party Internal Inspection
% of all reported events

Underground pipeline spillages are most commonly first detected by a third party
(51%), often by those who caused the incident in the first place. Automatic
detection systems were involved in detecting only 15% of those spillages. Although
this may seem a rather small proportion, one has to realise that third parties are
often on the scene when the leak occurs. As the technology improved and more
such systems were installed, their effectiveness and contribution increased. Indeed,
over the last 5 years 30% of underground spills were discovered via leak detection
systems. This is further illustrated in Figure 19. Although the annual percentage
shows considerable variation, the 10-year moving average clearly demonstrate the
upward trend in the proportion of all spills discovered via LDSs.

Failures in above ground lines are more readily detected by pipeline company
resources presumably because they tend to be located in areas where personnel are
more routinely present. This is especially the case for pumping stations.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 19 Proportion of all annual spillage discovered via leak detection systems

60%
Fraction of leak detection by automatic

Annual
50%
10-year moving average

40%
systems

30%

20%

10%

0%

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 report no. 12/20

6. DETAILED ANALYSIS OF SPILLAGE CAUSES

Concawe traditionally classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical
failure, operational, corrosion, natural hazard and third party. These are then
further divided into sub-categories (see definitions in Appendix 1). As discussed in
the previous chapter we now show theft-related incidents separately, as a sixth
main category. The survey returns provide more detailed information on the actual
cause and circumstances of spillage incidents and these are analysed in this section.

As already discussed in Section 5, the causes of spillage incidents are different for
hot and cold pipelines. For hot oil pipelines spillages are mainly corrosion related
(81%), whereas for cold pipelines mechanical problems and third-party activities
dominate, with corrosion accounting for only 12% of the total (20% when excluding
theft). This is illustrated in Figure 20.

Figure 20 Distribution of major spillage causes for cold pipelines

Cold pipelines Cold pipelines

698 incidents Exc. theft
430 incidents

19% Mechanical Mechanical

Operational 31%
Operational
38% 38%
5% Corrosion
Corrosion
Natural

Natural
12% 3rd party ex theft

Theft 8% 3rd party ex theft

2%
3%
24% 20%

Figures 21 and 22 further show the distribution of primary and secondary causes,
for all pipelines and for cold pipelines respectively, illustrating again the prominent
impact of corrosion for hot pipelines. Secondary causes are unremarkably
distributed except perhaps for the large proportion of accidental causes within third
party-related incidents (largely related to excavations).

There is a wider debate regarding the increasing age of the EU pipeline inventory
and potential integrity issues related to ageing infrastructure. Of the 5 main causes
of spillage mentioned above, age- related defects are anticipated to play a role in
the Mechanical and Corrosion categories and so these are further analysed in
section 6.1 and 6.3 below.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 21 Distribution of major and secondary spillage causes – All pipelines

a:construction a: system a: external a: ground a: accidental

280 b: design & b: human b: internal movement c: incidental
260 materials c: stress b: other
corrosion
240
220
200
Number of spills

180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party Theft
(ex theft)
a b c

Figure 22 Distribution of major and secondary spillage causes – Cold pipelines

a: construction a: system a: external a: ground a: accidental

280 b: design & b: human b: internal movement c: incidental
materials c: stress b: other
260
corrosion
240
220
200
Number of spills

180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Mechanical Operational Corrosion Natural 3rd party Theft
(ex theft)
a b c

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 report no. 12/20

6.1. MECHANICAL

There have been 136 cases of mechanical failure (18% of all spillage events, or 27%
excluding theft). This is an average of 2.8 spillages per year. 50 failures were due
to construction faults and 86 to design or materials faults.

Note: It is not always straightforward to classify the cause of a spillage. For instance, a
number of leaks can be attributed to pipeline damage (e.g. a dent). If it is clear that
such damage was caused after the pipeline was installed it is classified as “third party
/ incidental” (this was the case for one of the 2011 spillages). If no such evidence is
available it is classified as “mechanical / construction”.

The 5-year moving average frequency of mechanical failures is shown in Figure 23.

Figure 23 Frequency of mechanical failures for cold pipelines

0.25

5-year moving average

Spillages per year per '000 km

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00

The downward historical trend which appeared to have reversed from the beginning
of the last decade seems to have resumed in the last 8 years.

Within each of the sub-categories, the most common reasons for mechanical failures
are illustrated in Table 7.

Table 7 Reasons for mechanical failures

Number of spills due to
Construction Faulty weld Construction Incorrect Not
damage installation reported
12 6 14 18
Design & Materials Incorrect design Faulty material Incorrect material Age or fatigue Not
specification reported
9 34 3 10 30

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 report no. 12/20

The total number of reported age- or fatigue-related failures remains low. 2 of the
10 registered events occurred in the last 10 years.

The increasing occurrence of mechanical failures observed between 2000 and 2010,
combined with the appearance of an increase in fatigue-related failures caused
some concern as it may have been an indication of the ageing process, defined as
the deterioration of the metal structure of pipelines resulting from fatigue caused
by normal operation (pressure cycles etc). In order to gain more insight into this
point all 34 mechanical failures reported between 2001 and 2010 were further
investigated in cooperation with the relevant operators. It was found that only
4 events could be linked with certainty to ageing according to the above definition,
a further 7 being undecided because of lack of appropriate information.

The trend has been reversed since the beginning of this decade which reinforces
the view that the frequency of mechanical failures is not directly linked to ageing
of the metal structure. This remains, however, an area of focus for the pipeline
operators and for Concawe.

6.2. OPERATIONAL

There have been 37 spillage incidents related to operation (5% of all spillage events,
or 7% excluding theft). This is an average of 0.8 spillages per year. 27 incidents were
due to human errors and 10 to system faults. The most common reasons for
operational incidents are illustrated in Table 8.

Table 8 Reasons for operational incidents

Number of spills due to
System Equipment Instrument & Not
control systems reported
2 3 5
Human Not depressurised Incorrect operation Incorrect Incorrect procedure Not
or drained maintenance or reported
3 13 5 5 1

6.3. CORROSION AND IMPACT OF AGEING

There have been 141 failures related to corrosion (18% of all spillage events, or 29%
excluding theft). This is an average of 2.9 spillages per year. As noted earlier
though, a large proportion of these events (56) occurred in the more vulnerable hot
pipelines and in the early years (with the exception of 1 event in 2016). For cold
pipelines the number of failures is 86 (11% of the total, 20% excluding theft) and
the average is 1.8 spillages per year.

The events have been subdivided into external and internal corrosion and stress
corrosion cracking (SCC) that was introduced as an extra category in the late 80s.
The number of spillages in each sub-category is shown in Table 9.

Table 9 Corrosion-related spillages

Number of spills due to
Hot Cold All
External corrosion 54 55 109
Internal corrosion 1 27 28
Stress corrosion 0 4 4

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 report no. 12/20

Internal corrosion is much less prevalent than external corrosion. 21 out of the
27 cold pipeline internal corrosion incidents occurred in crude oil service, although
crude pipelines only account for less than a third of the cold pipeline inventory.
Thus crude pipelines appear to be more vulnerable to internal corrosion than
product pipelines. This is to be expected, as crude oil is potentially more corrosive
than refined products. Only one of the pipelines suffering a spill reported that
inhibitor was used, one did not report and the others did not use inhibitors.

Although there have only been four Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC) related spillages
to date (including one re-categorised from external corrosion), these have been
relatively large spillages, possibly as a result of the more severe failure mechanisms.

As already mentioned in Section 5.1, the number of corrosion- related spillage

incidents on hot pipelines has fallen significantly over the years as these have been
taken out of service. On cold pipelines there is no sign of an increase in the
frequency of corrosion- related spillage and if anything, the frequency has
decreased, as shown on Figure 24. Out of the 86 corrosion-related failures in cold
pipelines, 27 were related to special features such as road crossings, anchor points,
sleeves, etc. which therefore appear particularly vulnerable.

While there is no evidence to suggest that corrosion is becoming a problem, pipeline

operators undertake regular monitoring to identify and rectify any weaknesses
before they develop to the point of failure. Inspection methods involving in-line pigs
are used to monitor pipeline condition and to enable early identification of the
onset of corrosion. These techniques, together with the general adoption of
integrity management systems by all EU pipeline companies, should prevent any
increase in the frequency of age-related spillages.

Figure 24 Corrosion-related spillage frequency (all types) for cold pipelines

0.25

5-year moving average

Spillages per year per '000 km

0.20

0.15

0.10

0.05

0.00

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 report no. 12/20

6.4. NATURAL HAZARDS

There have been 15 spillage incidents related to natural hazards (2% all spillage
events, or 3% excluding theft). This is an average of 0.3 spillages per year. 13
spillages were due to some form of ground movement and 2 to other hazards.

No less than 10 of the natural hazards spills have occurred in the same country. This
appears to be a direct consequence of the difficult terrain and hydrological
conditions that apply to a significant part of that country’s pipeline network.

Table 10 Details of natural causes due to ground movement

Number of spills due to
Ground movement Landslide Subsidence Earthquake Flooding Others or
not reported

5 3 1 3 3

6.5. THIRD PARTY

Third parties have caused the largest number of spillages with 437 events, an
average of 9.1 per year and 57% of all spillage events. 137 events were accidental,
32 were incidental i.e. resulting from damage inflicted to the pipeline by a third
party at some point in the past, and 268 were intentional (almost exclusively theft
attempts). When excluding theft, accidental and incidental third party events
caused 34% of all spills. As discussed in Section 5, third party activities also result
in relatively large spills and account for the largest total volume spilled of all
causes.

6.5.1. Accidental damage

The most common causes of accidental third party spills are shown in Figure 25.

The vast majority of events were caused by direct damage from some form of
digging or earth moving machinery. Damage by machinery may occur due to a
combination of lack of communication and awareness and lack of care or skill.
Pipeline operators are not always made aware of impending ground work and so
cannot supply appropriate advice on exact pipeline location and working procedures
or exercise adequate supervision of the work. Even when good communication has
been established between the pipeline operator and the third party company, the
actual machinery operator may be left partially or completely unaware of a
pipeline's existence or fail to apply the requisite care or skill.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 25 Causes of accidental third party spills

60
Other
Drilling/Blasting
50 Bulldozing
Digging/trenching

40
Number of spills

30

20

10

0
Construction Agricultural Underground infrastructure

Figure 26 shows the percentage of third party-related spillages where pipeline

companies were aware of the impending activity, or third parties were aware of the
pipeline location (this data was reported for about 68% of the third party-related
accidental spillages).

In 48% of cases, third parties undertook some form of excavation activity in the
knowledge that a pipeline was present in the vicinity, but without notifying the
pipeline operating company. In contrast, only 1 case was reported where the
pipeline company was aware of the impending work but the third party was not
informed of the presence of the pipeline. In about 12% of the cases neither party
was aware of the other. In 36% of the cases the pipeline was hit in spite of the fact
that the pipeline operator knew about the work and the third party was aware of
the presence of the pipeline. These cases often denote a lack of communication at
the working level or a lack of proper care or skill by the third party.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 26 Awareness of impending works and of pipeline location

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
Drilling/Blasting Bulldozing Digging/trenching Other All

Pipeline co only Third party only Both Neither

The strong relationship between spillage frequency and diameter noted in

Section 5.5 is also apparent for accidental damage (Figure 27), possibly suggesting
a lower level of awareness around the location of smaller pipelines.

While third party accidental damage is a leading cause of spillage, the risk can be
effectively mitigated through improved communication and mutual awareness, and
the sharing of good practice between pipeline operators from different companies
and countries.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 27 Third party accidental spillage frequencies per diameter class

1971-1987
0.6
1988-2000

2001-2017
Spillages per year per '000 km

0.4

0.2

0.0
< 8" 8 to 12" 12 to 16" 16 to 24" 24 to 30" > 30"

6.5.2. Incidental damage

This category captures those incidents where damage was done at some unknown
point in a pipeline’s lifetime, which subsequently suffers deterioration over time
resulting eventually in a spill. In general they result from unreported damage done
after the original construction when a pipeline has been knowingly or unknowingly
hit during third party groundwork activities.

There have been 32 incidental damage spillage incidents which all originated from
dents, scrapes or other physical damage to the pipeline. Thus they share the
characteristic that they might be detectable by in-line inspections.

6.5.3. Intentional damage

268 spillages were caused by intentional damage by third parties. 2 resulted from
terrorist activities and 6 from vandalism. 260 were caused by attempted or
successful product theft, 222 of which occurred in the last 5 reporting years.

Only one of the terrorist or vandalism incidents was on an underground pipeline;

one was from an above-ground section of pipeline, all the rest were at valves or
other fittings at pump stations or road / river crossings, etc.

From the middle of the last decade, a few theft attempts by drilling into pipelines
were recorded (2 such incidents in each of 2006 and 2007, 3 in 2011 and 1 in 2012).
The sudden increase to 18 recorded in 2013, 54 in 2014 and 87 in 2015 was extremely
concerning. The 2016 figure was somewhat lower although still very high in the
historical context but the downward trend was amplified in 2017 with only 11
events. The 2018 figure of 10 confirms the trend and strongly suggests that measures
taken by operators and law enforcement authorities are bearing fruit. Nevertheless,
theft activities still occur at a significantly higher level that used to be the case
before the recent spike. They also account for a very large proportion of all spillage
incidents (Figure 28).

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 28 Percentage of all spills due to theft activities

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

It is important to note that product theft is more widespread than is apparent from
the spills data alone, since a large number of tampering events do not result in a
spill (even when they are successful in terms of extracting product). An analysis of
additional data on product theft events, which has been collected by the Concawe
survey since 2015, is presented in Section 8.

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 report no. 12/20

7. IN-LINE INSPECTIONS

Concawe has been collecting data on in-line inspection activities (inspection pig)
for 40 years, including a one-off exercise to collate data from paper records
generated when inspection pigs were first used around 1977. Separate records are
kept for metal loss, crack detection and for geometry (calliper) inspections. Each
inspection may entail one or more passes of a pig along a “piggable” pipe section.
Leak detection pigs are also sometimes used but their function is quite different.
They can reduce the consequences of a leak that has already started, by detecting
it earlier. They cannot, however, help prevent the leak occurring in the first place.

In 2018 the 64 companies that reported inspected a total of 65 sections with at least
one type of inspection pig, covering a total combined length of 11,730 km, split as
follows amongst the individual types of pig:

 Metal loss pig 5,003 km, 63 sections

 Crack detection pig 2,994 km, 26 sections
 Geometry pig 3,734 km, 43 sections

Most inspection programmes involved the running of more than one type of pig in
the same section so that the total actual length inspected was less at 5,182 km (16%
of the inventory).

As shown in Figures 29 and 30, the use of inspection pigs for internal inspection of
pipelines grew steadily up to the mid 90s, stabilising around 12% of the inventory
every year. This further increased to around 15% in the first decade of the new
millennium and reached 20% in the early years of the current decade. After a
relatively low point in 2014 and a record high figure in 2015, the 2018 figure is
relatively low, slightly lower than the 10-year average.

Over the last ten years, a period considered as a reasonable cycle for this type of
intensive activity, 421 (68%) of the total of 621 active sections included in the 2018
survey were inspected at least once by at least one type of pig, representing 87% of
the total length of the surveyed network. This suggests that the inspected sections
are longer than average. There are certainly some pipeline sections (mainly older
ones) which were not designed to be pigged and which, because of small size or
tight bends or lack of suitable pig launchers or receivers, cannot be inspected with
a pig. Also, a number of pipeline companies in Eastern Europe have joined the
survey in recent years, but have provided few previous pigging records. The length
of un-inspected pipelines is therefore certainly less than the above figure and should
continue to decrease in future years.

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 report no. 12/20

Figure 29 Annual length inspected by each type of pig

18000
Geometry
16000 Cracks
Metal loss
14000
Total length inspected (km)

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

Note: the total length shown above may be higher than shown in Figure 29 as some sections may have
been inspected by more than on pig type

Figure 30 Total annual portion of the inventory inspected by inspection pigs

10000 30%

9000 Total length inspected 27%

8000 % of total 24%

Total length inspected (km)

7000 21%
% of total inventory

6000 18%

5000 15%

4000 12%

3000 9%

2000 6%

1000 3%

0 0%

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 report no. 12/20

As shown in Figure 31, a number of sections have been inspected more than once
during the last 10 years. Indeed, for some pipelines, regular inspection pig
inspections are required by the authorities.

Figure 31 Repeat inspections in the last 10 years

140

120 Metal loss

Crack
100 Geometry
Number of sections

80

60

40

20

0
2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of repeat inspections

In-line inspection technology can detect flaws, corrosion and other sorts of damage
in or on the pipe inner or outer walls. Over the past 48 years, 22 spills were caused
by faulty welds or construction defects and 32 were caused by some kind of damage
inflicted by third parties at some undetermined time. All these could, in principle,
have been detected by inspection pigs. There were 6 such spills in the last 10 years.
There are also 109 spillages related to external corrosion and 28 to internal
corrosion, at least some of which could in principle have been detected. Note that
nearly two thirds of the spillages related to external corrosion occurred in hot
pipelines, most of which have now been retired. For the last 10 years these numbers
are reduced to 8 and 3 events related to external and internal corrosion
respectively.

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 report no. 12/20

8. PRODUCT THEFT FROM PIPELINES

The recent emergence of theft or attempted theft as a new threat to pipelines in

Europe has been discussed in section 6, which addresses theft events that resulted
in a reportable spill. However, there are many theft-related events that do not
cause a spill either because thieves do not succeed in drilling through the pipe wall
or because they install a product withdrawal system with sufficient integrity to
ensure containment. Also, operators are increasingly able to detect tampering early
enough to avoid causing a spill.

From the 2015 reporting year a new section was added to the annual survey
requesting respondents to report the characteristics of all theft attempts, whether
or not they were successful or resulted in a spill. The results for 2018 are
summarised in Table 11 while Figure 32 shows the evolution of the number of
incidents since 2010.

In 2018, a total of 36 theft-related incidents were reported in 6 different countries

(10 of which resulted in a reportable spill). All were on refined products pipelines.

A variety of connection techniques were used by the thieves, displaying a range of

technical knowledge and skills. Hole size was only reported in about a quarter of all
cases. The most typical hole size was in the >3 mm bracket.

The automatic leak detection systems only played a very modest part in the
discovery of illegal connections. One reason for this could be that operators are now
very much aware of the possibility of illegal connections and actively search for
them even if they are not active. Another factor may be that criminals are
“learning” and adapting their operations (e.g. flow rate) to avoid detection.

Most connections were located in open countryside. The distance to the abstraction
point varied a great deal. In a small number of cases, sophisticated storage facilities
were found, mostly inside industrial or farm building. This was not the rule though
and in most cases there was no fixed storage on site.

Faced with this serious new threat, operators reacted promptly, enhancing
surveillance, improving leak detection system capabilities and increasing awareness
of the problem with own staff and contractors. Relevant information was shared
within Concawe and best practices established and disseminated. Figure 32 shows
the development of the product theft issue since 2010, in terms of the annual
number of theft-related events and theft-related spills, and also the cumulative
number of theft events. These efforts have clearly paid off and the trend was
reversed with 112 events recorded in 2016 to 46 in 2017 and 36 in 2018. Indications
are that the downward trend continued in 2019 with a provisional total of 19
incidents. Nonetheless, the annual rate is still far above the long-term average,
requiring continued focus and vigilance. The figures also indicate a gradual
reduction of the proportion of theft events causing a spill since 2015. Although it
may not be statistically significant at this point, this may be the result of increased
“professionalism” of thieves and/or early detection by operators.

It should be noted that the total number of theft events is higher than that reported
in this Concawe survey. In their 2019 annual report, Unione Petrolifera show a
higher number of theft events for Italy (see annual report at
https://www.unionepetrolifera.it/pubblicazioni/), which suggests that some
Italian operators that did not report in the Concawe survey also experienced theft
events. The number of events reported by Unione Petrolifera for 2018 is almost

43
 report no. 12/20

identical to the 2017 figure, which is consistent with the trend suggested by the
Concawe figures.

In addition not all pipelines are included in the Concawe inventory (for example
NATO lines in Italy, Greece, Norway and Portugal as well as all crude and product
pipelines in Poland).

Figure 32 Evolution of the number of theft-related events since 2010

(with provisional figures for 2019)

180 600

160
All theft-related events 500

Cumulative number of incidents

140 Theft-related spills
Annual number of incidents

Cumulative
120 400

100
300
80

60 200

40
100
20

0 0
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

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 report no. 12/20

Table 11 Summary of 2018 attempted theft events attributes

(note that not all attributes were reported for all events)

Number of events 36
Successful thefts 18 Number
reported
Spills caused 10
Code 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Service 0% 60% 3% 14% 23% 0% 31
(type of product transported)
Facility part 56% 3% 39% 3% 21

Connection type 2% 16% 40% 42% 29

Hole size 0% 73% 27% 0% 0% 15

Detection 6% 14% 3% 6% 6% 28% 39% 31

(how was tampering detected)
Flow rate 64% 36% 0% 4
(estimated abstraction rate)
Location 58% 17% 17% 8% 7
(type of environment)
Distance 38% 38% 19% 6% 20
(between pipeline and abstraction point)
Storage 76% 0% 24% 30
(facility installed by thieves)

Key
Service (type of product transported) Detection (how was tampering detected)
1 Crude oil 1 Automatic detection system
2 Multi product 2 Operational monitoring
3 Gasoline 3 Routine surveillance
4 Diesel 4 Ultrasonic LD pig
5 Jet 5 Line internal inspection
6 Other 6 Third party
Facility part 7 Other
1 Underground pipe Flow rate (estimated abstraction rate)
2 Overground pipe 1 3
< 1 m /h
3 Valve station 2 3
1-5 m /h
4 Other 3 3
> 5 m /h
Connection type Location (type of environment)
1 Clamped 1 Open land
2 Welded 2 Car park / Lay-by
3 Screwed 3 Shrub / wooded area
4 Other 4 Building
Hole size Distance (between pipeline and abstraction point)
1 No hole 1 < 10 m
2 < 3 mm 2 10-100 m
3 3-6 mm 3 100-1000 m
4 6-10 mm 4 > 1000 m
5 > 10 mm Storage (facility installed by thieves)
1 None
2 3
<1 m
3 3
>1 m

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 report no. 12/20

APPENDIX 1 DEFINITIONS AND CODES

Spillage volume

Gross spilled volume: the estimated total quantity, expressed in m3, of hydrocarbons released
from the pipeline system as a result of the incident.

Recovered oil: the estimated quantity, expressed in m3, recovered during the clean-up
operation, either as oil or as part of the contaminated soil removed.

Net loss: the difference between gross spilled volume and recovered oil.

Categories of spillage causes

Concawe classifies spill causes into five major categories: mechanical failure, operational,
corrosion, natural hazard and third party.

Mechanical: a failure resulting from either a design or material fault (e.g. metallurgical defect,
inappropriate material specification) or a construction fault (e.g. defective weld, inadequate
support, etc.). This also includes failure of sealing devices (gasket, pump seal, etc.).

Operational: a failure resulting from operational upsets, malfunction or inadequacy of

safeguarding systems (e.g. instrumentation, mechanical pressure relief system) or from operator
errors.

Corrosion: a failure resulting from corrosion either internal or external of either a pipeline or a
fitting. A separate category is foreseen for stress corrosion cracking.

Natural hazard: a failure resulting from a natural occurrence such as land movement, flooding,
lightning strike, etc.

Third party: a failure resulting from an action by a third party, either accidental or intentional.
This also includes "incidental" third party damage, undetected when it originally occurred but
which resulted in a failure at some later point in time.

These main categories are subdivided into secondary causes and “Reasons” as shown in
Table 1.1.

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 report no. 12/20

Table 1.1 Cause categorisation tree

Primary Secondary Reason

A Mechanical Ab Design and Materials 1 Incorrect design
2 Faulty material
3 Incorrect material specification
4 Age or fatigue
Aa Construction 5 Faulty weld
6 Construction damage
7 Incorrect installation
B Operational Ba System 8 Equipment
9 Instrument & control systems
Bb Human 10 Not depressurised or drained
11 Incorrect operation
12 Incorrect maintenance or construction
13 Incorrect procedure
C Corrosion Ca External 14 Coating failure
15 Cathodic protection failure
Cb Internal 16 Inhibitor failure
Cc Stress corrosion
cracking
D Natural Da Ground movement 20 Landslide
21 Subsidence
22 Earthquake
23 Flooding
Db Other
E 3rd Party Ea Accidental 17 Construction
18 Agricultural
19 Underground infrastructure
Ec Incidental
Eb Intentional 24 Terrorist activity
25 Vandalism
26 Theft (incl. attempted)

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 report no. 12/20

APPENDIX 2 SPILLAGE SUMMARY

Key to table

Cause categories: see Appendix 1

Service Facility
1 Crude oil 1 Underground pipe
2 White product 2 Above ground pipe
3 Fuel oil (hot) 3 Pump station
4 Crude oil or product
5 Lubes (hot) Facility part
1 Bend
Leak first detected by 2 Joint
1 R/W surveillance by pipeline staff 3 Pipe run
2 Routine monitoring P/L operator 4 Valve
3 Automatic detection system 5 Pump
4 Pressure testing 6 Pig trap
5 Outside party 7 Small bore
6 Internal Inspection 8 unknown

Land use
1 Residential high density
2 Residential low density
3 Agricultural
4 Industrial or commercial
5 Forest Hills
6 Barren
7 Water body

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 report no. 12/20

Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
(") 3) detected by part
(m
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies 2
area (m )
1 1971 11 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 2 Aa 7
2 1 4 2 3 2 Aa
3 11 2 0 5 1 3 6 Aa 5
4 20 1 40 5 3 3 2 5 Ab 60,000
5 1 350 2 3 8 9 4 Ba 9
6 1 25 2 3 7 Bb 11
7 5 3 3 5 1 3 8 Ca
8 8 2 6 6 2 1 3 20 Ca
9 20 1 300 50 5 1 3 5 Ea 19 1,000
10 34 1 2000 5 1 3 9 Ea 19
11 8 2 2 2 5 1 3 20 Eb 25
12 1972 16 2 5 2 1 4 4 Ab 12
13 28 1 800 150 2 3 1 12 4 Ab 5
14 12 2 70 39 5 1 2 5 2 Ab
15 9 1 10 5 5 1 3 29 Ca
16 9 1 40 35 5 1 3 29 Ca
17 10 1 1 1 2 2 3 39 4 Ca
18 10 1 1 1 2 2 3 39 4 Ca
19 12 3 500 5 1 3 12 4 Ca
20 12 3 5 1 5 1 3 12 4 Ca
21 10 2 150 50 2 1 3 7 Ca
22 4 3 0 5 1 3 15 4 Ca
23 6 3 1 0 5 1 3 15 Ca
24 20 1 200 60 2 1 3 8 4 Ea 17
25 20 1 250 100 2 1 3 8 Ea 17
26 28 1 60 12 5 1 3 16 Ea 17
27 10 1 90 5 1 3 6 Ea
28 8 1 7 5 1 3 8 2 Ea 17
29 10 2 30 5 1 3 9 Ea 17
30 8 2 400 350 2 1 3 2 2 Ea 18
31 10 2 99 96 5 1 3 6 2 Ea
32 12 3 0 5 1 3 5 Ec
33 1973 5 3 4 1 1 3 8 Aa 4
34 20 1 25 3 5 3 2 1 4 Aa
35 16 1 0 2 3 4 3 4 Ab
36 1 4 2 3 7 11 4 Ab 4
37 24 2 25 2 3 2 2 4 Ab
38 18 1 11 1 2 3 5 13 4 Ab 4
39 6 2 12 6 5 1 2 1 4 Ab
40 9 1 12 12 1 1 3 32 Ca
41 5 3 15 1 1 3 8 Ca
42 5 3 15 1 1 3 8 Ca
43 12 3 200 2 5 1 3 13 Ca
44 12 3 12 2 2 2 3 13 Ca
45 12 3 250 5 5 2 3 13 Ca
46 12 3 150 2 1 2 3 13 Ca 14
47 12 3 310 10 5 1 3 13 4 Ca 30,000
48 28 1 100 40 5 1 3 16 Da
49 10 3 8 5 1 3 9 2 Ea 18
50 12 3 0 5 1 3 6 Ec
51 12 3 1 5 1 3 6 Ec
52 12 3 0 1 1 3 6 Ec
53 1974 1 1 0 2 3 7 4 4 Aa 7
54 1 3 2 2 3 7 5 4 Aa 4 1,000
55 6 1 20 5 1 1 15 Aa 4
56 9 1 10 1 1 3 33 Ca
57 2 2 2 2 2 7 6 Ca
58 10 3 1 2 1 3 9 4 Ca 14
59 12 3 5 5 1 3 8 Ca 14
60 13 3 5 5 1 3 8 Ca 14
61 4 3 1 5 1 3 17 4 Ca 14
62 6 3 0 5 1 3 16 Ca 14
63 16 3 1 5 1 3 9 2 Cb P
64 7 1 1 5 1 3 8 2 Cb
65 16 1 500 5 1 3 10 Ea 17
66 5 2 1 0 5 1 3 21 Ea 19
67 8 2 30 4 2 1 3 22 Ea 19
68 8 2 200 2 5 1 3 22 Ea 17
69 10 2 668 668 2 1 3 18 Ea 18
70 10 2 489 405 2 1 3 18 2 Ea 17

49
 report no. 12/20

Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
(") 3) detected by part
(m
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies 2
area (m )
71 1975 20 2 30 10 4 2 7 11 2 Ab 5
72 34 1 4 30 2 5 1 2 12 Ab 5
73 10 3 3 2 2 2 5 1 Ab
74 1 10 2 2 3 8 4 Ba 11
75 2 4 3 3 7 4 Ba 9
76 8 2 20 10 2 3 7 4 4 Bb 11
77 1 5 2 3 7 4 Bb 11
78 10 3 50 2 1 3 11 Ca 15
79 12 3 3 5 1 3 9 Ca 14
80 6 3 25 1 1 3 9 Ca 14
81 10 3 1 0 2 3 6 6 4 Ca
82 4 3 1 5 1 3 18 Ca
83 8 3 0 6 1 3 6 Ca
84 8 3 0 1 1 3 6 2 Ca
85 12 3 0 2 3 3 6 4 Ca
86 6 1 15 0 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18
87 18 1 5 0 2 1 3 12 Ea 19
88 8 1 120 3 2 1 3 9 Ea 17
89 8 2 60 60 2 1 3 23 Ea 19
90 6 1 15 6 5 1 3 2 Ea 18
91 1976 8 2 5 1 7 9 Aa 5
92 8 3 5 1 4 13 2 Aa 2
93 1 9 2 1 4 13 4 Ab 2
94 24 2 17 1 5 2 2 17 4 Ab 1
95 16 1 1322 433 2 1 2 13 Ab 1
96 10 3 80 2 1 3 11 Ca 14
97 4 2 90 90 5 1 3 16 Ca 15
98 24 1 200 2 1 3 10 Da 21
99 10 3 50 25 2 1 3 Da 21
100 10 1 40 2 5 1 3 13 2 Ea 18
101 8 2 44 14 2 1 3 24 2 Ea 18
102 18 1 802 606 5 1 3 7 2 Ea 18
103 8 2 153 153 2 1 3 2 Ea 18
104 14 2 358 358 5 1 3 23 2 Ec
105 1977 2 32 2 3 4 9 4 Ab 150
106 2 28 2 3 2 9 4 Ab 140
107 20 2 2 5 1 2 8 2 Ab 2
108 36 1 2 1 4 3 4 Ab 1
109 1 50 2 3 4 19 4 Bb 11
110 1 1 2 3 4 7 4 Bb 11
111 12 2 350 220 4 1 3 10 2 Ca 15
112 10 3 315 90 2 1 3 8 1 Ca
113 1 6 2 3 7 9 4 Cb
114 12 2 103 5 1 3 19 Da 20
115 20 1 550 500 1 1 3 13 2 Da 23
116 24 1 600 25 3 1 3 11 2 Db
117 10 1 160 2 1 3 12 2 Ea 17 1,500
118 18 1 80 2 1 3 5 2 Ea 18 400
119 8 2 3 3 2 1 3 25 2 Ea 18
120 8 2 3 1 2 1 3 13 2 Ea 17
121 12 2 191 2 1 3 19 2 Ea 17
122 8 2 269 5 1 3 19 2 Ea 17
123 20 2 2530 2500 2 1 2 9 2 Ec
124 1978 34 1 2000 300 5 1 2 16 2 Ab 2
125 8 2 235 205 2 1 4 16 2 Ab 2
126 22 1 19 5 1 3 7 2 Ab 2 1,800
127 6 2 12 6 5 1 3 18 4 Ca 15
128 10 2 100 10 2 1 3 14 2 Ca 15
129 12 3 2 5 1 3 14 2 Ca 15
130 8 3 120 60 4 1 2 7 2 Ca 15
131 8 3 80 40 4 1 3 7 2 Ca 15
132 12 3 2 1 1 3 12 4 Ca
133 18 3 4 1 5 1 3 6 4 Ca 15
134 16 4 400 250 2 1 3 14 2 Da 23
135 11 2 3 0 5 1 3 10 2 Ea 17
136 12 2 58 40 4 1 8 10 2 Ea 19
137 24 1 1 5 1 7 4 Ea 19
138 16 1 255 245 2 1 3 15 2 Ea 18 5,865
139 1979 22 1 100 40 4 1 3 8 2 Aa 6 16,000
140 24 1 100 1 5 1 3 5 Aa 6 2,700
141 9 2 50 5 1 3 17 2 Ca 14 350
142 12 2 300 200 1 1 3 23 2 Ca 15
143 18 3 20 1 1 3 12 4 Ca 15 500
144 18 3 5 1 1 3 12 4 Ca 15 100
145 18 1 5 50 1 5 1 3 16 2 Ea 17 2,500
146 12 2 90 50 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18
147 8 1 245 150 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18
148 11 2 950 380 2 2 3 15 4 Eb 26 P 6,400

50
 report no. 12/20

Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
(") 3) detected by part
(m
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies 2
area (m )
149 1980 13 2 8 1 2 3 2 12 4 Ab 7
150 40 1 4800 400 5 1 3 9 2 Ab 2 10,000
151 10 3 80 5 1 3 10 2 Ca 14
152 10 3 10 1 1 3 10 2 Ca 14
153 7 3 1 1 1 3 15 2 Ca 15 10
154 12 3 111 12 5 1 3 15 2 Da 21 P 10,000
155 10 4 762 135 2 1 3 15 2 Ea 18 10,000
156 12 2 270 5 1 3 Ea 19
157 8 2 313 2 1 3 Ea 17
158 1 30 5 3 4 4 Eb 25
159 1981 34 4 10 2 5 1 4 6 Ab
160 40 1 10 5 2 2 5 4 Ab 80
161 10 2 600 150 2 1 3 Ab 2
162 20 1 19 1 5 1 3 17 2 Ca 14
163 8 3 5 4 3 2 12 2 Ca 14
164 8 3 19 4 3 2 12 2 Ca 14
165 12 3 5 2 5 1 3 15 4 Ca 14 50
166 10 2 92 58 2 1 3 25 2 Ca 15
167 20 1 5 3 5 1 7 15 4 Ca 14
168 10 2 10 5 1 3 Ca 14
169 26 2 125 45 5 1 2 18 2 Da 20
170 24 3 30 10 4 3 7 14 4 Db
171 7 1 132 132 2 1 3 15 2 Ea 18
172 8 2 322 317 2 1 3 24 2 Ea 17
173 5 1 96 5 1 3 Ea 19
174 28 1 5 0 1 1 3 16 4 Ec
175 1982 8 2 12 12 5 2 3 20 2 Aa 6 P
176 24 1 9 5 1 3 18 2 Ab 2 1,000
177 8 1 2 1 1 3 20 2 Ca
178 12 3 8 5 1 3 16 4 Ca 15 30
179 10 3 400 16 5 1 3 19 2 Ca 15
180 5 1 20 5 3 3 10 4 Cb
181 7 1 140 140 5 1 3 16 2 Cb 3,000
182 22 1 15 5 5 1 3 18 1 Cb
183 6 1 31 5 1 3 20 2 Ea 18
184 8 2 7 1 2 1 3 30 4 Ec
185 1983 4 5 10 2 1 2 22 2 Aa 1 100
186 4 5 1 3 1 2 22 2 Aa 1 9
187 4 5 4 5 1 2 22 2 Ab 1 80
188 16 4 442 111 4 1 3 18 2 Bb 11
189 6 2 12 4 1 3 15 4 Ca 15 3,600
190 7 1 182 120 2 1 3 17 2 Cb 20,000
191 7 1 148 110 5 1 3 17 2 Ea 17 18,000
192 10 2 213 171 5 1 3 29 2 Ea 17
193 14 2 675 470 5 1 4 3 2 Eb 24
194 12 1 1 0 5 1 3 20 4 Ec 15
195 1984 28 1 4363 3928 1 1 3 10 2 Aa 6 6,500
196 24 1 141 5 1 1 18 2 Aa 6 4,500
197 28 1 3 3 2 4 11 2 Ab 2 120
198 8 2 16 3 5 2 2 17 2 Ab 2 720
199 34 1 5 2 2 3 4 13 4 Ba 8 1,000
200 16 1 10 2 3 6 18 2 Ba 8 50
201 1 10 10 2 1 3 21 2 Bb 10 50
202 12 3 2 1 1 3 17 4 Ca
203 6 1 20 16 5 1 3 24 4 Ca 15 250
204 16 2 5 1 5 3 3 11 4 Ca 14 10
205 9 2 236 236 5 1 3 11 2 Cb 200
206 10 1 150 1 5 1 3 23 5 Ea 17 100
207 11 2 244 240 3 1 4 21 Eb 24
208 1985 24 1 1 1 1 1 8 14 2 Aa 7 18
209 20 1 25 4 5 3 5 9 4 Ba
210 10 2 16 3 3 4 17 4 Ba
211 10 2 7 3 3 2 17 4 Ba
212 6 2 4 3 3 4 17 4 Ba
213 16 1 1100 756 2 1 3 9 2 Cc 13,000
214 8 2 211 195 2 1 3 33 2 Ec 18 1,000
215 1986 16 2 160 6 3 3 2 17 2 Ab 200
216 20 1 53 6 2 1 3 12 2 Ab 2 3,000
217 24 2 292 4 2 1 2 26 2 Ab 7 3,000
218 16 3 20 5 5 1 3 38 1 Ca 14
219 20 2 2 2 5 1 3 22 1 Ca 15
220 8 3 10 4 1 3 25 2 Ca 20
221 9 1 10 10 5 1 3 45 2 Cb 180
222 34 1 7 7 1 1 2 14 4 Cb 84
223 8 2 192 95 5 1 3 15 2 Ea 19 1,500
224 14 2 280 56 3 1 3 18 2 Ea 17 100
225 6 2 52 41 3 1 3 13 2 Ea 17 10
226 8 2 11 6 3 1 2 19 2 Eb 25 3

51
 report no. 12/20

Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
(") 3) detected by part
(m
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies 2
area (m )
227 1987 20 2 1000 120 4 1 2 20 4 Aa 5
228 26 4 2 1 5 1 3 25 2 Aa 7 1,000
229 9 1 25 2 5 1 1 46 2 Ab 2 200
230 16 3 550 150 2 1 3 39 2 Ca 15 200
231 9 1 8 1 5 1 3 46 1 Cb 280
232 12 2 12 10 5 1 3 21 2 Da 20 P 2,000
233 22 2 3 1 5 1 7 20 4 Ea 19 10
234 16 2 300 115 5 1 8 18 4 Ec P
235 1988 34 1 10 1 5 1 2 26 4 Ab 200
236 12 2 90 42 5 1 1 30 1 Ab 2 P 1,500
237 8 2 97 21 2 3 2 28 2 Ab 4 500
238 34 1 81 1 5 1 3 17 4 Ca 15 5,000
239 11 2 80 80 2 1 3 35 1 Ca 15
240 28 1 5 1 5 2 2 31 1 Ca 15 400
241 10 2 305 5 2 1 3 23 2 Da 20 5,000
242 20 2 40 10 5 1 3 24 4 Ea 17 30
243 3 1 2 1 5 1 3 28 2 Ea 17 100
244 10 1 14 1 5 1 3 23 2 Ea 18 100
245 8 2 3 1 5 1 3 35 1 Ea 17 20
246 16 2 3 1 5 1 3 16 2 Ea 19 150
247 16 1 1 650 650 3 1 3 23 1 Ea 17 550
248 4 2 2 1 5 1 3 26 2 Ea 19 9
249 6 2 63 56 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 17 1,200
250 6 2 18 1 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 18 1,800
251 1989 26 1 3 2 5 1 2 26 2 Aa 5 100
252 12 3 1 5 1 2 4 Aa 5 6
253 1 2 25 7 5 2 7 1 2 Aa 7 10,000
254 26 1 155 5 5 1 3 26 2 Ab 5 P 2,000
255 10 2 1 66 16 2 1 2 27 2 Bb 11
256 9 1 25 5 4 1 3 48 2 Ca 14 50
257 12 3 240 150 2 1 3 17 4 Ca 15
258 10 2 400 90 3 1 3 24 2 Cb 2,000
259 16 2 3 253 253 5 1 3 22 2 Ea 19 500
260 16 2 660 472 3 1 3 20 2 Ea 18 P
261 10 2 82 4 3 2 3 24 2 Ea 17 200
262 12 2 298 298 2 1 3 32 2 Ea 18 6,000
263 6 2 52 27 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 18 2,000
264 8 2 3 5 1 3 32 2 Ea 19 66
265 8 2 186 126 5 1 3 29 2 Ea 18
266 40 1 40 5 5 1 3 17 2 Ec 4,000
267 11 1 2 5 1 3 26 2 Ec 18
268 1990 13 2 105 105 5 1 4 2 Bb 12 30
269 10 2 252 221 5 3 6 33 2 Bb 11 1,500
270 8 2 9 2 2 4 48 2 Bb 12 10
271 11 3 325 11 2 1 3 22 4 Ca 15
272 11 2 225 194 5 1 3 11 2 Ea 17 3
273 6 2 3 1 5 1 3 34 2 Ea 18 324
274 10 2 189 34 5 1 3 24 2 Ea 18
275 1991 20 2 275 118 3 1 3 24 2 Aa 1 14,000
276 2 50 38 5 1 7 10 2 Aa 1 1,200
277 20 1 20 13 5 1 3 24 2 Aa 7 4,500
278 12 2 25 7 2 3 7 20 4 Aa 6 150
279 12 2 5 2 5 1 7 21 2 Aa 7 320
280 12 2 29 29 5 1 3 38 2 Ab 2 600
281 2 4 1 3 3 7 31 4 Ab 4 250
282 2 172 68 3 3 4 11 4 Ab 2 100,000
283 2 2 5 2 2 2 Ab
284 10 2 80 4 5 1 3 26 2 Ca 15 1,500
285 7 1 20 5 1 2 30 2 Cb 300
286 8 2 100 60 4 1 3 17 2 Cb 10,000
287 8 2 15 10 4 1 3 17 4 Cb 25
288 8 2 4 5 1 3 49 2 Ea 19 6
289 6 2 21 13 5 1 3 34 2 Ea 18 500
290 6 2 1 5 1 3 37 2 Ea 19 2
291 2 84 75 3 3 4 1 2 Eb 25
292 13 2 485 485 2 3 3 24 2 Eb 25 7,000
293 8 2 10 1 5 1 3 24 2 Ec 30
294 1992 8 2 1000 400 2 1 3 34 4 Aa 2
295 2 128 98 2 1 2 2 Ab 5,400
296 2 113 8 2 3 4 12 4 Ab 2
297 8 2 30 15 2 2 2 33 4 Ab 5
298 8 2 5 5 6 1 3 13 5 Ab 2 10
299 2 275 248 2 3 4 4 Bb 11 1,100
300 2 5 1 2 2 8 22 4 Bb 10 1,350
301 10 2 2 2 1 4 30 Bb
302 8 3 200 5 1 3 25 2 Ca 300
303 24 2 13 1 5 1 2 27 4 Ca 250
304 6 2 3 3 4 1 3 49 2 Ca 15 2
305 12 2 75 75 5 1 3 28 2 Da 23
306 8 2 50 50 4 1 3 25 2 Ec 20
307 8 2 25 25 4 1 3 25 2 Ec 60

52
 report no. 12/20

Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
(") 3) detected by part
(m
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies 2
area (m )
308 1993 34 1 248 18 4 1 3 31 2 Aa 2 45,000
309 2 3 5 3 2 2 4 Ab 80
310 12 2 2 1 1 1 4 23 4 Ab 400
311 18 2 14 13 6 1 3 27 4 Ca 400
312 13 2 580 500 2 1 8 26 2 Cb 800
313 20 1 2000 500 2 1 3 19 2 Cb 25,000
314 26 2 10 7 5 1 3 31 5 Da 20 P
315 9 2 8 6 5 1 3 30 2 Ea 50
316 24 2 49 39 5 1 3 33 2 Ea 18 40,000
317 8 2 3 1 5 1 3 37 2 Ea 19 100
318 12 2 101 19 5 1 3 31 2 Ea 19
319 20 2 3050 1450 2 1 3 29 4 Ec
320 7 2 3 3 5 1 3 13 1 Ec 6
321 1994 16 1 200 160 3 1 3 31 2 Ab 2 6,000
322 16 1 1350 1295 2 1 3 31 2 Ab 2 25,000
323 6 2 250 14 2 3 2 16 4 Ab 50
324 6 2 1 1 1 1 3 16 4 Ab 2 25
325 11 2 5 5 5 2 2 9 2 Ab 100
326 1 2 2 5 3 8 4 Ba 9 100
327 12 3 90 60 5 1 3 24 2 Ca 14
328 32 1 10 5 2 2 3 21 4 Cb 500
329 10 2 285 285 5 1 3 26 2 Ea 17
330 9 2 195 170 3 1 3 37 2 Ea 18 P 8,000
331 8 2 46 5 1 3 36 2 Ea 17 1,150
332 1995 2 280 80 2 2 6 22 4 Aa 7 10,000
333 10 2 30 30 5 1 2 35 2 Aa 5 750
334 2 53 41 5 1 7 5 2 Ab 2
335 6 2 115 1 1 3 36 2 Ab 2 500
336 16 1 132 82 3 1 3 30 2 Bb 11 6,500
337 10 2 1000 270 1 1 3 31 4 Ca 15 55,000
338 9 2 48 18 3 1 3 28 2 Ea 17 1,500
339 9 2 20 20 3 1 3 39 4 Ea 17 100
340 13 2 139 113 5 1 3 5 2 Ea 17 300
341 6 2 12 3 1 3 37 2 Ea 17 30
342 1996 9 2 165 99 2 3 2 5 4 Ab 40
343 14 2 292 209 5 1 3 40 1 Bb 10 300
344 12 3 1 5 1 3 30 4 Ca 16
345 9 2 1 437 343 2 1 3 40 4 Ea 19 20
346 7 2 19 19 5 1 3 40 2 Ea 17 350
347 10 2 500 62 5 1 3 64 4 Ec 23,000
348 1997 12 2 19 3 1 1 3 27 2 Ca 14 2,800
349 10 1 2 0 1 1 2 7 4 Cb 20
350 12 2 422 341 2 1 3 30 2 Cc
351 12 2 435 267 2 1 3 30 1 Cc P
352 8 2 13 2 2 1 4 33 2 Ea 19 150
353 12 2 40 1 5 1 3 24 4 Ec 17
354 1998 1 30 4 2 3 5 30 4 Ab 1 400
355 6 3 0 0 5 1 3 34 2 Bb 11
356 13 2 486 247 2 1 3 42 2 Bb 11 100
357 16 2 250 20 5 1 3 30 4 Ca 14
358 10 2 340 313 3 1 3 6 1 Ea 17 500
359 10 2 15 14 1 1 3 4 2 Ea 19 600
360 9 2 176 67 3 1 3 42 2 Ea 18 160
361 2 30 2 3 1 7 2 Ea 19 650
362 8 2 0 5 1 3 25 2 Ea 19 4
363 1999 1 7 2 3 6 4 Bb 11 200
364 1 3 30 2 1 3 32 4 Ca 14 300
365 11 2 167 64 2 1 3 32 2 Ca 14 60
366 6 2 1 1 3 1 3 25 2 Ca 14 5
367 4 1 1 1 5 3 8 35 4 Ca 14
368 8 2 80 20 5 1 3 48 2 Ea 17 500
369 13 2 84 13 3 1 3 10 4 Ea 17
370 6 2 29 14 5 1 3 40 2 Ea 18
371 8 2 1 80 30 5 1 3 35 2 Eb 26 1,000
372 11 2 36 28 3 1 7 5 2 Eb 26 100
373 12 2 1 2 1 3 36 4 Ec
374 2000 2 175 3 5 2 4 24 4 Ab 60
375 12 1 10 7 5 1 3 30 4 Cb 150
376 12 2 8 8 5 1 3 31 2 Ea 17
377 11 2 159 64 3 1 3 8 2 Ea 17 5,000
378 12 2 7 1 5 1 3 26 1 Ea 19
379 24 2 1 1 5 1 3 41 2 Ec 19 150

53
 report no. 12/20

Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
(") 3) detected by part
(m
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies 2
area (m )
380 2001 20 1 800 8 5 2 8 35 2 Aa 5 10,000
381 10 2 1 1 5 1 2 39 2 Aa 5 10
382 10 2 5 5 5 1 3 38 2 Ab 2 500
383 6 2 37 7 4 1 1 27 2 Ab 2 900
384 12 2 10 2 5 1 1 15 4 Ab 2 120
385 34 1 6 1 3 1 3 29 4 Ca 14 500
386 12 2 4 4 5 1 3 26 2 Ca 14 1,000
387 13 1 103 50 2 3 8 23 4 Cb 225
388 11 2 55 51 5 1 3 9 2 Ea 17
389 10 2 10 1 5 1 3 11 2 Ea 17
390 6 2 5 5 5 1 3 47 1 Ea 18 400
391 12 1 10 7 5 1 3 30 2 Eb 26 250
392 12 1 17 12 5 1 3 30 2 Eb 26 400
393 16 2 2 2 5 1 3 18 2 Eb 26 350
394 8 2 85 24 2 1 3 47 2 Eb 26 P 404
395 2002 8 2 10 10 5 1 3 47 2 Ab 325
396 20 1 100 2 1 3 36 4 Ca 15 500
397 10 2 80 20 5 1 3 38 4 Ca 14 10,000
398 10 3 1 5 1 3 28 2 Ca 15 14,000
399 6 2 17 2 2 3 33 4 Ca 400
400 8 2 70 2 1 2 ? 4 Ca
401 13 2 225 58 3 1 3 46 2 Cc 400
402 24 2 250 20 5 1 7 39 4 Da 22 5,000
403 30 1 2 5 2 2 40 4 Ea 19 40
404 8 2 170 120 4 1 3 57 2 Ea 18
405 16 1 750 45 1 1 3 39 2 Ea 17 20,000
406 20 1 280 30 5 1 3 40 2 Ea 17 12,000
407 12 1 40 15 5 1 3 33 2 Eb 26 6,000
408 8 2 190 3 1 3 4 Ec 19
409 2003 14 2 30 30 3 1 8 Aa
410 20 4 2 2 1 3 52 4 Ca S 2
411 12 2 2 5 1 3 32 4 Ea S 5
412 11 2 83 74 3 1 3 46 3 Ea 18 1,800
413 11 2 45 31 5 1 3 46 4 Ea 17 600
414 6 2 2 3 1 8 Ea
415 11 2 74 49 3 1 8 46 3 Eb 26 500
416 16 1 5 5 1 1 3 41 5 Eb 26 120
417 16 2 28 10 5 1 3 29 2 Eb 26 400
418 16 2 52 3 4 1 3 29 2 Eb 26 400
419 12 2 11 7 4 1 3 45 4 Ec 800
420 20 2 2500 1100 5 1 3 31 6 Ec 19 P 80,000
421 2004 16 2 2 0 1 1 3 32 3 Aa 4,000
422 10 2 26 18 2 2 7 40 2 Aa 6,000
423 22 1 20 6 2 3 8 5 4 Ab 200
424 8 2 90 50 5 1 1 5 3 Ea 18 1,500
425 10 2 3 1 8 29 1 Ea 2,000
426 2005 12 2 19 19 2 3 4 3 Aa 7
427 12 2 5 1 2 4 Aa 5 G
428 20 1 350 10 3 1 8 45 2 Ab 1 G 15,000
429 6 2 20 2 1 1 28 3 Ab 4 S 58
430 6 2 38 5 1 1 28 3 Ab 4 S 42
431 9 1 30 4 3 1 8 14 2 Bb 12 G 1,000
432 10 1 15 5 2 4 22 3 Bb 12 1,000
433 10 2 3 1 5 1 3 25 4 Ca 14 S 50
434 24 1 64 1 2 1 8 40 4 Cb G 150
435 8 2 15 8 5 1 3 41 2 Ea 17 G 1,000
436 24 2 0 5 1 3 46 Ec 19 SG 3,000
437 2006 12 2 75 5 1 4 58 4 Ab 50
438 8 2 6 6 2 1 4 19 4 Ab 2 60
439 9 2 5 1 2 2 1 3 Aa 7
440 14 2 5 2 2 4 4 Ab 2
441 11 2 245 2 1 3 13 3 Ea 18
442 11 2 1 37 5 2 3 3 Aa 5
443 11 2 223 5 1 3 5 Ea 17
444 13 2 4 1 2 7 4 Ab 1
445 20 2 2 3 1 3 4 Cb SG
446 12 1 10 3 5 1 1 8 4 Cb 50
447 6 2 23 3 1 3 41 5 Eb 26 G 100
448 6 2 16 3 1 3 41 5 Eb 26 G 80
449 2007 8 2 150 70 3 1 3 4 Ec 4 400
450 8 2 30 1 5 1 3 2 Ea 17 2,000
451 11 2 12 10 2 1 4 28 3 Eb 26 1,600
452 13 2 301 38 5 1 3 17 3 Ea 19 452
453 9 2 117 54 2 1 3 50 3 Ea 19 120
454 9 2 2 2 5 1 3 16 3 Eb 26 100
455 11 2 182 133 5 1 3 50 3 Ea 19 S 500
456 13 2 185 159 2 1 3 50 3 Ca 14 1,200
457 16 1 7 5 3 3 40 3 Cb SG 700

54
 report no. 12/20

Spillage Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
ID (") 3) detected by part
(m
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies 2
area (m )
458 2008 16 2 4 4 6 1 3 40 4 Aa 5 25
459 40 1 6 0 5 2 7 36 7 Ab 2 0
460 11 2 30 0 3 3 5 29 4 Ab 2 40
461 11 2 52 37 3 1 4 29 3 Ab 4 50
462 11 2 12 0 1 2 4 20 4 Aa 7 0
463 11 2 129 108 3 1 3 29 3 Ab 2 90,000
464 9 2 44 17 3 1 3 16 3 Ea 17 3,600
465 6 2 40 0 2 1 3 52 4 Ea 0 5,000
466 4 2 28 0 5 1 3 0 3 Ea 18 250
467 16 1 294 0 3 1 3 46 4 Ea 17 11,000
468 16 1 328 0 3 1 3 46 4 Ab 4 3,600
469 18 1 1 1 5 1 3 36 2 Ca 14 S 0
470 2009 20 1 30 0 2 2 4 25 4 Ab 1
471 34 1 10 10 5 1 3 45 4 Ec S
472 40 1 5401 811 2 1 3 37 6 Ab 4 G 50,000
473 24 1 10 0 3 3 6 48 4 Ab 3 G 50
474 10 2 25 12 3 2 2 0 4 Aa 7
475 2010 2 1 125 0 5 3 2 0 3 Ab 3 200
476 13 2 1 1 5 1 3 34 3 Ca 14 S 0
477 9 2 10 0 1 3 2 18 4 Ab 3 0
478 24 1 200 0 3 1 3 38 3 Ea 18 SG 21,000
479 2011 20 1 1 0 2 3 4 44 4 Bb 13 0
480 8 2 0.3 0.3 1 1 3 47 3 Ab 2 S 1,000
481 16 2 30 30 4 1 3 37 3 Eb 26 600
482 16 2 166 166 4 1 3 37 4 Eb 26 250
483 13 2 35 1 1 1 7 35 6 Bb 13 150
484 28 2 99 99 5 1 3 6 1 Ea 19 G 1,500
485 8 2 12 12 3 1 3 27 3 Eb 26 5
486 2012 10 2 7 7 5 1 3 45 7 Eb 26 S 300
487 6 2 15 15 5 1 3 51 3 Ec 0 G 10
488 9 2 1 1 5 1 3 55 3 Ea 18 200
489 24 1 5 0 5 1 3 43 4 Ea 17 20
490 10 2 240 175 3 1 3 59 3 Ec 0 15,000
491 20 1 37 12 5 1 3 12 3 Eb 25 G 10,000
492 10 1 3 0 0 1 3 26 3 Cb 0 150
493 10 2 1 0 1 1 3 52 5 Ca 14 0
494 10 2 1 0 1 1 3 52 5 Ca 0 0
495 16 2 1 0 2 1 2 57 0 Ab 1 0
496 10 2 40 0 3 1 3 50 2 Ea 19
497 10 2 20 0 3 1 3 50 3 Ea 18
498 20 1 1 0 2 3 4 0 4 Bb 13 0
499 2013 28 1 2 0 2 1 3 47 4 Aa 7 100
500 28 1 19 0 1 1 7 34 6 Bb 12 0
501 8 2 88 88 3 1 3 0 3 Ea 17 50
502 8 2 12 12 3 1 3 0 0 Ea 17
503 10 2 10 9 1 1 3 39 3 Eb 26 40
504 12 2 6 6 3 1 3 37 3 Eb 26 30
505 12 1 5 5 1 1 3 33 4 Cb 0 50
506 40 1 2 0 1 2 7 46 0 Aa 0 1,000
507 12 2 7 4 5 1 3 13 3 Eb 26 150
508 10 2 50 38 2 1 3 25 3 Eb 26 200
509 8 2 10 2 5 1 3 56 3 Eb 26
510 16 2 0 0 5 1 3 39 3 Eb 26
511 16 2 0 0 3 1 3 39 3 Eb 26
512 16 2 0 0 3 1 3 39 3 Eb 26
513 16 2 0 0 3 1 3 39 3 Eb 26
514 12 2 0 0 3 1 3 40 3 Eb 26
515 12 2 0 0 5 1 3 40 0 Eb 26
516 12 2 0 0 5 1 3 40 3 Eb 26
517 22 2 0 0 5 1 3 42 3 Eb 26
518 22 2 0 0 5 1 3 42 3 Eb 26
519 22 2 0 0 3 1 3 42 3 Eb 26
520 8 2 0 0 5 1 3 43 3 Eb 26
521 8 2 0 0 5 1 3 43 3 Eb 26
522 12 2 2 2 2 1 4 0 5 Ab 4 3
523 10 2 30 30 2 1 3 0 3 Eb 26 3,000
524 10 2 0 0 5 1 3 0 3 Ec 18 50

55
 report no. 12/20

Spillage ID Year Pipe dia Service Fatalities Injuries Spillage volume Leak first Facility Facility Age Land use Cause Impact
(") (m3) detected by part
Gross Net loss Years Category Reason Water Contaminated land
bodies area (m2)
525 2014 24 1 3 3 1 3 3 57 4 Ea 19 200
526 6 2 10 0 3 1 3 50 3 Ea 18 100
527 14 2 5 1 3 47 3 Eb 26 S 1,400
528 24 1 5 5 6 1 3 43 3 Eb 26 1,500
529 20 2 1 0 1 3 48 5 Eb 26
530 8 2 5 1 3 24 5 Eb 26 414
531 12 2 1 1 3 58 3 Eb 26 1,500
532 11 2 5 1 1 3 8 58 4 Ab 2 0
533 10 2 5 1 3 27 3 Eb 26 184
534 16 2 15 9 5 1 3 41 2 Eb 26 250
535 10 2 2 0 4 1 3 50 5 Eb 26 100
536 10 2 2 0 3 1 3 50 3 Eb 26
537 20 1 500 0 3 1 3 50 3 Ec 64,000
538 14 2 150 150 5 1 3 29 3 Eb 26
539 to 555 2 1 3 Eb 26
556 to 582 2 2 4 Eb 26
583 2015 12 2 59 38 5 1 8 47 7 Eb 26 500
584 10 2 3 2 3 1 3 41 3 Eb 26 50
585 20 1 0 6 2 8 48 7 Aa
586 12 2 2 0 5 1 3 42 2 Eb 26 50
587 to 664 2 3 Eb 26
665 8 2 39 34 3 1 3 24 5 Eb 26 275
666 14 2 25 25 5 1 3 5 3 Eb 26
667 10 2 9 9 3 1 3 33 3 Eb 26 10
668 10 2 22 20 5 1 3 33 3 Eb 26 100
669 10 2 15 14 5 1 3 34 3 Eb 26
670 10 2 3 3 3 1 3 34 3 Eb 26
671 6 1 0 0 2 2 3 26 4 Cb 20
672 8 2 15 15 5 1 3 38 3 Ca 14 200
673 8 2 13 3 2 1 3 39 4 Ca 15 200
674 12 2 30 0 3 2 2 49 Ab 2
675 1 2 2 0 5 2 2 61 Ab 2 5
676 2016 24 2 11 1 5 1 1 58 3 Aa 5 SG 200
677 16 2 128 13 3 1 3 Ea
678 10 2 0 1 3 3 Eb 26
682 12 2 7 0 2 1 3 2 Eb 26 75
683 12 2 5 1 3 26 3 Eb 26 100
684 14 2 3 0 3 1 3 7 3 Eb 26 20
685 6 2 13 10 3 1 3 51 3 Eb 26 50
686 12 2 16 16 5 1 3 3 Eb 26 S
687 12 2 9 9 3 1 3 50 3 Eb 26
688 12 2 400 20 5 1 3 52 2 Ea 17
689 18 3 1 1 5 1 3 44 Ca
690 16 2 16 0 5 1 3 48 4 Ca 15 100
691 11 2 200 200 6 1 3 64 2 Ca 14
692 16 2 97 70 5 1 3 20 5 Eb 26 850
693 to 742 2 3 Eb 26
743 2017 10 2 8 5 5 1 3 26 3 Eb 26 300
744 to 753 2 1 3 Eb 26
754 13 2 1 0 5 3 8 2 Bb 13
755 16 2 32 0 2 6 49 4 Bb 13 2,000
756 8 2 3 0 6 1 3 65 3 Eb 26
757 to 765 2018 Eb 26
766 12 2 12 5 1 60 3 Eb 26 80
767 6 2 40 3 1 35 5 Ea 18
768 12 2 9 1 2 1 3 5 Aa 7 SG 240

56
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Concawe
Boulevard du Souverain 165
B-1160 Brussels
Belgium

Tel: +32-2-566 91 60
Fax: +32-2-566 91 81
e-mail: [email protected]
http://www.concawe.eu