http://www.scborromeo.org/ccc/p3s1c1a7.

htm#1812

CCC 1803 Virtues

[Kreeft] [ABSTRACT: These four cardinal virtues [prudence, fortitude, temperance, justice] are not
the only virtues, but they are the cardes (Latin cardes means “hinges”), on which all the other virtues turn.
They are the necessary foundation and precondition for all others. If a person is not courageous, for
instance, he will not overcome the difficulties inherent in the practice of any virtue. If he is not wise, he
will not understand what he is doing, and his virtue will sink to the level of blind animal instinct.]

Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics

Moral Virtues and the Mean

by Gordon Ziniewicz

Each moral virtue

is a mean =or lies

between extremes

[mean] of pleasure or

[mean] of action, doing or feeling

[excess] too much or

[excess] too little.

The absolute mean is different

from the mean [relative mean]

as [because]

it [relative mean] is relative to the individual.

For example, the intermediate between

two pounds and ten pounds of food is

(absolutely) six pounds,

but

the mean

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 relative to the individual will be different for the athlete than
it [mean] is for the non athlete.

Morality, like art work, requires that one neither under do nor
overdo.

One must hit upon the right course (steering between too much and too
little).

This requires practice.

[c.f., virtuoso]

Virtues= are good habits =or dispositions to do the right thing

developed by means of particular virtuous acts.

Means themselves do not admit of excess and deficiency (one cannot

have too much courage, etc.).

Good judgment requires that one find the mean between extremes.

In order to do that, one must have both

general knowledge and

particular experience [in time].

Practical wisdom= is the intellectual virtue which governs

deliberation and action (intellectual virtues are higher than moral
virtues).

Here are some examples of the golden mean taken from

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Book II):

VICE (Defect) VIRTUE VICE (Excess)

[too little] (Mean) [too much]

1. Cowardice (too little Courage Rashness (too

confidence) [fortitude] much
confidence)

2. Courage Cowardice (too

Foolhardiness=rashness [same as-mirror of much fear)
(too little fear) above-uses antonyms
of fear and
confidence]

3. Insensibility (too Temperance Self indulgence

little pleasure) [Moderation] (too much

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 pleasure)

4. Meanness =or Liberality Prodigality=

Stinginess (too little [approx. Charity] Wastefulness
generosity) (too much
generosity)

5. Niggardliness (in Magnificence Tactlessness

giving out large sums of [same as Liberality-- and Vulgarity
money) both giving, but (giving out
larger] large sums)

6. Undue Humility (too Proper Pride Empty Vanity

little honor) (too much
honor)

7. Inirascibility (too Good Temper Irascible (too

little anger) [Temperance- much anger)
Fortutude]

8. Shamelessness (too Modesty Bashfulness

little shame) (too much
shame)

9. Surliness Friendliness Flattery

For both Plato and Aristotle, moral virtue has to do with reasonable
exercise=control of feeling [passions] and action.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtue
In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes every virtue as a
balance point between a deficiency and an excess of a trait. The point
of greatest virtue lies not in the exact middle, but at a "golden
mean" closer to one of the extremes than the other. E.g.:

courage is the balance between cowardice (deficit of courage) and

foolhardiness (excess of courage), lying closer to foolhardiness;

proper pride is the balance between undue humility (deficit of pride)

and empty vanity (excess of pride), lying closer to vanity;

generosity is the balance between miserliness (deficit of generosity)

and prodigality (excess of generosity), lying closer to prodigality.

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 The Book of Wisdom
Chapter 8

7. Or if one loves justice, the fruits of her [Wisdom] works are

virtues; For she [Wisdom] teaches moderation [temperance] and
prudence, justice and fortitude, and nothing in life is more
useful for men than these.

[Vulgate]

7 And if a man love justice: her [Wisdom] labours have great

virtues; for she teacheth temperance [sobrietatem], and prudence,
and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have
nothing more profitable in life.

http://www.drbo.org/drl/chapter/25008.htm

Et si justitiam quis diligit, labores hujus magnas habent

virtutes: sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet, et justitiam, et
virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus.

[From 040723 Lagrange-Aquinas]

The Nicomachean Ethics

Following Aristotle, the saint [Thomas Aquinas] here shows that

ethics= is the science of the activity of the human person,

a person who is free, master of his own act, but who, since he is a
rational being, must act for a rational purpose, a purpose that is in
itself good, whether delectable or useful, but higher than sense good.

In this higher order of good man will find happiness, that is, the
joy= which follows normal and well ordered activity, as youth is
followed by its flowering. Man's conduct, therefore, must be in
harmony with right reason. He must pursue good that is by nature good,
rational good, and thus attain human perfection, wherein, as in the
goal to which nature is proportioned, he will find happiness. [63].

By what road, by what means do we reach this goal, this human

perfection? By the road of virtue. Virtue= is the habit of acting
freely in accord with right reason. This habit is acquired by repeated
voluntary and well-ordered acts. It grows thus into a second nature
which these acts make easy and connatural.[virtuoso] [64].

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Certain virtues have as goal the control of passions. Virtue does not
eradicate these passions, but reduces them to a happy medium, between
excess and defect. But this medium is at the same time the summit.
Thus

fortitude, for example, rises above both cowardice and rashness.

Temperance, above intemperance and insensibility. [65].

Similarly,

generosity holds the highway, between prodigality and avarice.

Magnificence, between niggardliness and ostentation.

Magnanimity, between pusillanimity and ambition.

Meekness defends itself, without excessive violence, but also without

feebleness. [66].

But disciplining the passions does not suffice. We must likewise

regulate our relations with other persons by giving each his due. Here
lies the object of justice. And

justice has three [four below] fields of operation.

[1] Commutative justice acts in the world of material exchanges, where

the norm is equality or equivalence. Above it lies

[2] distributive justice, which assigns offices, honors, rewards, not

by equality, but by proportion, according to each man's fitness and
merit.

[3] Highest of all is legal justice, which upholds the laws

established for the well-being of society.

[4 vs. 3.2??] Finally we have equity, which softens the rigor of the
law, when, under the circumstances, that rigor would be excessive.
[67].

These moral virtues must be guided by wisdom and prudence.

Wisdom= is concerned with the final [ end] purpose of life, that is, the
attainment of human perfection.

Prudence= deals with the means to that end. It is prudence which finds
the golden middle way for the moral virtues. [68].

Under given circumstances, when, for instance, our fatherland is in

danger, virtue must be heroic. [69].

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Justice, indispensable for social life, needs the complement which we
call friendship. Now there are

three kinds of friendship=. There is, first,

pleasant friendship=, to be found in youthful associations

devoted to sport and pleasure.

There is, secondly,

advantageous friendship=, as among businessmen with common

interests.

Finally there is

virtuous friendship=, uniting those, for example, who are

concerned with public order and the needs of their neighbor.

This last kind of friendship, rising above pleasure and interest,

presupposes virtue, perseveres like virtue, makes its devotees
more virtuous. It means an ever active good will and good deed,
which maintains peace and harmony amid division and partisanship.
[70].

By the practice of these virtues man can reach a perfection still

higher, namely, that [perfection] of the

contemplative life, which gives genuine happiness.

Joy, in truth, is the normal flowering of well ordered activity. Hence

the deepest joy arises from the activity of man's highest power,
namely, his mind, when that power is occupied in contemplating its
highest object, which is God, the Supreme Truth, the Supreme
Intelligible. [71].

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